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Must state-building happen before democratization can go forward? Do many developing countries therefore need to wait for the state to become stronger and more functional, and only then broach the question of how to become democratic? Or are state-building and democratization mutually reinforcing and hence suited to advance in tandem? Could it even be the case that tackling democratization first will make state-building easier later on?

These questions have been hotly contested as part of the so-called sequencing debate. A number of scholars have argued that state-building and liberal constitutionalism must precede electoral democratization if democracy is to achieve stability and deepening. On this basis, some experts have warned against the pitfalls of “premature democratization,” “out-of-sequence” transitions, and doing “democratization backwards.” Critics have retorted that, since communism fell, all countries have faced potent and widespread democratic expectations that cannot be put off with rhetoric alleging the prudence of delay. Moreover, scholars have argued that there exists no inherent tension between state-building and democratization, while the same cannot be said of autocracy with its fear that strong impersonal rules and bureaucratic institutions will hamper the exercise of authoritarian power.

Sebastián Mazzuca and Gerardo Munck have captured the contrast between these arguments by distinguishing between a “state-first” and a “democracy-first” perspective. As the terms signify, these perspectives are contradictory. Nonetheless, we do find one point of consensus that cuts across the two perspectives. This concerns the original Western itinerary to democracy that makes up the historical frame of reference for the entire debate. No critic of the “state-first” perspective disputes
that in the West state-building and liberal constitutionalism preceded by centuries the development of political accountability, which eventually—after much struggle and many setbacks—took the form of election-based democratization. What is more, several of the authors who criticize the “state-first” perspective grant that in early-modern Europe state-building did in fact contribute to the emergence of mechanisms of political accountability. For instance, in the course of defending their own “democracy-first” view, Mazzuca and Munck concede that in Europe “the emergence of political rights was clearly a byproduct of state formation and, in particular, a ramification of taxation.”6 The objections against placing priority on state-building today are therefore normally premised on the argument that the Western sequence was a historical one-off that cannot be repeated.

But what exactly was the Western sequence? The notion, so often taken for granted, that it went “state-first, democracy later,” rests on an oversimplification of European history. What that history shows is that instances of either “state-first” or “democracy-first” sequencing were rare. What was much more common was for budding state institutions, the rule of law, and political accountability to grow alongside one another while interacting in messy ways. If there is any sequential pattern, it is for state-building to appear very late in the game. In Europe, aspects of the rule of law as well as strong political-accountability mechanisms—centered on, but not limited to, executive-constraining institutions such as parliaments and diets—preceded by centuries the establishment both of bureaucratic institutions and universal citizenship rights.

Parliaments and diets formed part of a legacy from the Middle Ages that put important constraints on West and Central European rulers when they commenced large-scale state-building following what historian Geoffrey Parker has termed the “military revolution” of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.7

These constraints barred state-builders from doing some things while enabling them to do others. For instance, the constraints encouraged state-builders to channel power through existing institutions such as those concerned with urban self-government, which in turn eased the establishment of bureaucratic and local-governance institutions. Processes of democratization were also affected. As Robert A. Dahl pointed out, it was no coincidence that modern democracy made its first appearance in countries that had preserved medieval institutions of representative government. The presence of such institutions, said Dahl, meant that as pressure to democratize reached critical levels in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “the design for a ‘representative’ legislature did not have to be spun from gossamer fibers of abstract democratic ideas; concrete legislatures and representatives, undemocratic though they were, already existed.”8

We can gain a better view of such phenomena by contrasting devel-
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opments in Europe with those in its most relevant “other,” Muscovite and Imperial Russia. When Czar Peter the Great (r. 1682–1721) embarked on his ambitious, large-scale state-building project in response to mounting geopolitical pressure, he faced far fewer legal and political constraints than a Western ruler would have encountered. Peter could build his state from the top down, but he had to do so without the benefit of impersonal institutions to act as “transmission belts” for the extension and application of governmental authority. As a result, Russian governmental structures both local and central were pervaded by patron-client relationships. On top of this, the lack of constraints would prove a continuing hindrance to both the rule of law and democratization in Russia long after the czars were gone.

But if Western rulers faced higher constraints, does this not suggest that constitutionalism or at least state modernity (the rule of law, civil society, and political accountability) preceded democratization? In other words, is the “state-first” narrative the correct one after all? It might be tempting to jump to this conclusion, but there are at least three reasons to avoid doing so. First, we should take to heart Francis Fukuyama’s insistence that in examining Europe’s development, we must distinguish among the state, the rule of law, and mechanisms of accountability rather than run these things together as has been done so often in the sequencing debate. These factors may have constantly interacted, but they are not the same. Only by analytically separating them can we capture the European itinerary to the modern state and liberal democracy.

Then too, we must remain mindful that political accountability and the rule of law are older than early-modern state-building. “State-first” authors such as Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin place the development of the rule of law, civil society, and political accountability in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—that is, after the heyday of early-modern state building in Western Europe—but that is a mistake. Finally, we should consider that the true lesson of European history, contra the “state-first” scholars, is that the rule of law and mechanisms of accountability (in the form of executive-constraining institutions) paved the way for state-building—not vice-versa.

Seen from this vantage point, the crucial difference between the European experience and the situation of most nondemocracies today is that the European state-builders were systematically met by countervailing power, including politically constraining institutions and strong
social groups. In developing countries today, a cognate sequence would not be based on top-down state-building in the absence of democratization; at a minimum, the two would need to coincide.

According to Fukuyama, what is so curious about Europe’s development is that the rule of law came before both the modern state and mechanisms of political accountability. While his insight regarding the rule of law’s medieval foundations is sound, this description slights the existence of medieval institutions of political accountability. One of the most conspicuous characteristics of medieval Western and Central Europe was the presence of institutions that could and did constrain executive power. These institutions took the form of assemblies—parliaments and diets—that governed along with monarchs. These representative institutions first emerged on the Iberian Peninsula and in the British Isles in the late-twelfth and early-thirteenth centuries, appearing elsewhere in Western Europe about a hundred years after that and then in Central and Northern Europe (Hungary, Poland, and Scandinavia) after 1450.

By about 1500, representative institutions were an integral part of the political regime all over Western and Central Europe. Furthermore, the national parliaments and diets represented only the apex of the medieval mechanisms of accountability. By the late Middle Ages, institutions of self-government, including regional representative institutions, municipal assemblies, and numerous other autonomous units, had come to saturate West European society.

Some scholars have even argued that these institutions were proto-democratic. This is a stretch: The people who were represented (in medieval parliaments, for example) were from elites (such as the class of large landowners or mercantile and craft guilds) that made up only a small part of the populace. Moreover, the constitutionalist thoughts and practices that pervaded medieval Europe were vastly different from the modern idea and practice of the rule of law. There was no concept of universal citizenship rights. Instead, medieval law took the form of privileges (a Latin term that literally means “private laws”) for various corporate groups. Clerics and nobles often enjoyed tax exemptions, while “free” cities received charters that stipulated their judicial and commercial autonomy. This brought about what Filippo Sabetti has called the “multiconstitutional” world of the Middle Ages. Corporate rights, often belonging to localities such as monasteries, parishes, and towns, were common. Even peasants enjoyed some customary and legal protections from their lords.

Medieval Europe was therefore characterized by institutions pertaining to two-thirds of Fukuyama’s tripod, namely the rule of law and accountability. The most celebrated monument of these features of medieval Europe is probably the Magna Carta of 1215. In this “Great Charter of Liberties,” King John (r. 1199–1216) granted English magnates, cler-
There is broad consensus in the scholarly literature that large-scale state-building only began as a consequence of the military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Parliament to accept financial levies for warfare.  

Crucially, all this occurred in a context where there was precious little state power. England had probably seen the most precocious strengthening of state capacity anywhere in Europe by 1300, a key reason for its early successes in the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453). Nonetheless, the English kings who did dynastic battle in France during the fourteenth century had no local royal administration, no police force, and no standing army. England and its Magna Carta were not a special case: Similar charters of liberties were granted all over Western and Central Europe in the late Middle Ages, and representative institutions of a sort (corporate-elitist rather than democratic) were ubiquitous by around 1500. All this unfolded in a context where royal administrations were extremely feeble by later standards.

There is broad consensus in the scholarly literature that large-scale state-building only began as a consequence of the military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Between 1560 and 1660, European warfare exploded in scale and intensity. The rudimentary administrative organs left over from the Middle Ages—and normally run by clerics—gave way to bureaucracies staffed by lay university graduates. The state took over many of the functions (such as tax collection) that representative institutions had once carried out, local government grew stronger, and the military arm of government rose dramatically in prominence.

In order to understand this state-building process, one must resort to an additional set of conceptual distinctions. States exert power through institutions. To the extent that these are not impersonal and bureaucratic, they tend to be personal and patrimonial. Bureaucratic (“Weberian”) structures rest on the practice of meritocratic appointment and provide public goods based on general criteria. Patrimonial structures, by con-
trast, rely on clientelism and corruption and provide goods based on personal connections and the discretion of those who hold power.²¹

Scholars often observe that the representative institutions described above had little independent effect on subsequent political developments and state-building. Indeed, across much of Continental Europe the military revolution saw many such institutions being swept away. Monarchs and their ministers in Prussia, France, Denmark, and Spain left parliaments and diets aside while extracting taxes without consent and raising standing armies. Early-modern absolutism replaced the medieval form of constitutionalism.

Of course, representative institutions survived in some states, most importantly in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Hungary, and Poland. Yet instances of both patrimonialism and bureaucracy existed under absolutist and constitutional regimes alike, so the variation between the two sets of countries does not help us to discern patterns of state-building. To elaborate, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden came to be characterized by “Weberian” institutions of bureaucracy, while Poland and Hungary exhibited patrimonial administrations. Likewise, France and Spain had patrimonial administrations, while Denmark and Prussia conformed to the Weberian model.

Most comparative frameworks, however, tend to miss the bigger picture in the sense that they only compare cases within Latin or Western Christendom. When we delimit the focus in this way, we fail to notice the unique features of the European experience. A comparison with cases outside the region reveals that European state-builders—even the ones who operated under the aegis of absolutism—were checked, to a larger extent than we find elsewhere, by the rule of law, quasi-independent social groups, and constraining political institutions.²²

The recent work of Daron Acemoglu and his colleagues on the colonial roots of countries’ varying development trajectories integrates this observation, at least implicitly. These scholars argue that Europe’s transplantation of constraining institutions to its colonies explains patterns of modern economic growth and modern democratization alike.²³ Acemoglu’s group makes no distinction between those colonial powers whose representative institutions survived and those powers that became absolutist. The absolutist French and Spanish, it seems, were as able as the more representation-friendly British and Dutch to plant propitious institutions overseas. The premise here is that all West European colonizers, even after the military revolution, were characterized by political institutions that constrained the exercise of arbitrary power and thus laid a basis for institutions such as a right to private property.

While Europe’s early-modern state-builders often had to struggle against corporatist opposition, they also could and did use corporatist groups and institutions to channel power. Structures of urban self-government became models for local government and eased decentraliza-
tion, for instance. Because corporatist structures were so strong, state-builders had to negotiate with them. The results might be patrimonial at first—for example, a turn to tax-farming or the sale of offices. Yet by the time modern democratization began in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Western and Central Europe had become for the most part a region of relatively bureaucratic states with local governments that were more robust than those found in other parts of the world (apart from Europe’s settler colonies). Strong social groups left over from the Middle Ages helped to foster European civil society and, with it, democracy. The survival of corporatist structures—especially parliaments—meant that these institutions were available to be democratized when pressures to extend suffrage grew in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The lesson for the sequencing debate is clear: Strong, impersonal institutions that can channel authority, along with vibrant social groups that can “watch the watchdogs,” are the keys to creating both modern bureaucratic state institutions on the one hand, and democracy and the rule of law on the other. In Western and Central Europe, the medieval legacy offered a basis for all this. In order to see how important that basis has been, one need only look at the one major European country that was never characterized by medieval institutions of constraint: Russia.

The Russian Mirror

Russian state-builders felt the same geopolitical pressures as their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, and were correspondingly keen to borrow administrative and military technologies from the West. One example of this wholesale appropriation is Peter the Great’s program for reforming his central government and his army: His source was the Sweden of his contemporary and foe King Charles XII (r. 1697–1718), which at that time was still a considerable if declining military power.24 If Russia had possessed preconditions for state-building and later for democratization similar to those found in Western and Central Europe, we would expect to have seen a convergence between Russia and the European model described above.

As the czarist regime launched its large-scale state-building project, however, Russia had neither established representative institutions nor powerful independent social groups. Nor did the rule of law limit the exercise of executive (that is, monarchical) power. The only social force with any distinct political weight was the landowning nobility, the boyars. Traditionally, they were the main source of constraints on the power of the Muscovite grand princes, who had long relied on the boyars for military help. Acting as members of the so-called Boyar Duma, they may even have enjoyed a de facto share of ruling power, with the grand prince of Muscovy “sharply circumscribed.”25

Yet in formal terms, the Muscovite grand princes—they became of-
officially called “czars” when Ivan IV (better known as Ivan the Terrible) assumed that title in 1547—claimed absolute power. Although as a practical matter the Boyar Duma partook in rule, formally it was merely an advisory body. We can say something similar about the status of the boyar nobles more generally. They may sometimes have counterbalanced the grand princes in practice, but there was no infrastructure of laws or institutions undergirding this activity. Instead, the boyars “lacked any formal, corporate, or legal means of checking [the monarch], unlike their Western counterparts.”

The only other social group of note, the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church, lacked institutional autonomy, as the Byzantine doctrine of *symphonia* between temporal and spiritual power cut strongly against this. No other groups were able to rise to the task of opposing rulers. Even under Peter the Great, the merchant class was virtually nonexistent. As Samuel Finer sums up the difference between Russia and Western Europe: “The boyars and the Church hierarchy posed no such restraints on Ivan IV as the landed nobility and the Catholic Church did in the West, and there were no towns, guilds, and corporations to cope with either.”

It is therefore unsurprising that the one attempt to copy Western representative institutions, the establishment of the Zemsky Sobor (“assembly of the land”), produced something very different from the Western model. Ivan the Terrible convened the first Zemsky Sobor in 1549. It was composed of nobles and clergy, and later would occasionally include freemen as well. At some times—during the early period after the Romanov dynasty came to the throne in 1613, for instance—the Zemsky Sobor advised the czar on foreign-policy matters, levied taxes, and approved laws. Unlike the representative bodies of medieval Western and Central Europe, however, the Zemsky Sobor had neither an institutionalized place in the Russian regime nor a principle of membership that had anything to do with the idea of representation. Indeed, Ivan the Terrible’s Zemsky Sobor consisted of “servitors of the tsar rather than delegates of constituencies.”

When Russia came under geopolitical pressure following the military revolution of 1560–1660, the main sources of threat were Sweden to the north, Poland to the west, and various Tatar khanates (followed by the Ottoman Empire) to the southeast and south. This pressure from outside had important consequences within. The stronger army and bureaucracy that the czars needed to counter neighbors with sophisticated militaries made the monarchy less dependent on the boyars and thus weakened them politically. These dynamics began under Ivan the Terrible, but the most important developments with respect to them took place about a century and a half later under Peter the Great.

Most scholars point to the Battle of Narva (November 1700), in which Charles XII cut to pieces and overwhelmed a Russian army almost four times the size of his own force, as the traumatic event that sent
Peter the Great crashing ahead on his course of state-building and military reforms. Like Ivan the Terrible 150 years earlier, Peter achieved his military build-up by freely applying ample helpings of top-down coercion. Whatever traditional constraints on the power of Muscovite rulers remained, Peter relentlessly stripped away. He stopped convening the Zemsky Sobor and the Boyar Duma, fundamentally weakened the power of the nobility, and subordinated the Orthodox Church to the state. In 1721, he abolished the Orthodox Patriarchate and replaced it with a “Most Holy Governing Synod” staffed by clerics but overseen by a secular official whom he appointed. This gave him full control of Church possessions.

**Reforming the Military, Reforming the State**

In other words, Peter intensified autocracy and created a form of absolutism far less restrained than anything we know from Western or Central Europe. Peter used his absolute power to create a “fiscal-military state” run by a much more elaborate and differentiated bureaucracy than anything seen before in the land of the czars. The most important reforms were the introduction of a direct poll tax on peasants and townspeople, universal conscription, population censuses, the meritocratic Table of Ranks, and the issuance of internal passports. More generally, Peter completely reorganized central government.

In military terms, these reforms were an obvious success. They allowed Peter to stave off the formidable challenge posed by Charles XII’s Sweden, and they gave Russia an army that could rank with any in Europe. Peter’s coercive, top-down approach reorganized the central government significantly, though Peter fell short of transforming the Russian state along European lines. In the shorter term, Peter’s greatest headache was finding a framework for provincial government.

Peter’s inclination was to reform local government by using blueprints borrowed from Northern Europe, as he had done successfully with his military. Yet he failed repeatedly, owing mainly to a lack of both skilled officials and local initiative. The problem with empowering local government was weak social stratification. State-builders faced a dearth of strong institutions on which to base new structures of governance, and lacked groups to staff them. Institutions of urban self-government proved ineffective because the social groups on which they were meant to be based simply did not exist in Russia.

In such a situation, state-building from above came to depend on patron-client relations. More specifically, Peter and his successors had to rely on noble landowners rather than the professional strata that dominated urban and local government in Western Europe. Although Peter had chained the nobility, he and his successors compensated it in several important ways. Younger sons of nobles were allowed and indeed en-
couraged to make careers as military or civil officers of the state, and landowners were given a stronger hold over their peasants. British historian Perry Anderson calls these developments the growth of a “service nobility” and the advent of a “second serfdom.” And with patron-client relations the rule in a society without much of an urban middle class, landed nobles of course dominated local government.

Not all of this was what Peter had intended, and its long-term consequences were considerable. Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, czars relied on landowners to act as the regime’s rural agents. When Catherine the Great (r. 1762–96) introduced a new system of local government in 1775, she premised it on cooperation with the landlords. This left them even stronger than before. Not until the reforms of Czar Alexander II (r. 1855–81)—which included the abolition of serfdom in 1861—was a different local-government strategy seriously tried. In 1864, Alexander II instituted the zemstvo system in order to modernize and partly democratize local governance in rural areas. In 1870, a version was extended to the cities. After Alexander II’s assassination in 1881, however, first his son Alexander III (r. 1881–94) and then his grandson Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) cut back on these reforms. Alexander III preferred the old practice of using the landed gentry as czarism’s local agents. In 1889, he established the post of zemski nachalnik (land captain) as an office to be filled in each locale by a landowner who could use it in order to manage and supervise the peasantry. The result was what Max Weber referred to as “local patrimonialism,” where landed nobles “acting through local government offices which they collectively monopolize, extend the authority which they already exercise over their own dependents to all inhabitants of a given region.”

Attempts to reform Russia’s central government ran into similar difficulties. Here, too, new structures had a tendency to rest on existing patron-client networks rather than on the creation of impersonal institutions. The competences of different administrative bodies often overlapped, with disputes among them resolved by personal relations with the czar or by rival groups at court rather than by resort to formal rules. These arrangements allowed czars regularly to ignore formal state channels and work instead through secret committees appointed personally by the monarch. The immediate difficulties raised by the use of such shadow arrangements to conduct public business pointed to a deeper contradiction: Effective bureaucratic institutions are inherently incompatible with a monarch who wields absolute personal power. Secret ad hoc committees were merely one of the weapons that czars used to fight their own institutions lest these put limits on monarchical power. With a foe as mighty as the “Czar of All the Russias,” impersonal bureaucratic institutions had scant chance of ever becoming effective.

Though the quality of rule amid such an institutional void was by definition dependent on the character of the reigning czar, it was not only...
under reactionary monarchs such as the intensely authoritarian Nicholas I (r. 1825–55) that personalism prevailed. Catherine the Great gets credit for introducing the Enlightenment to Russia, but even under her rule, the Russian polity remained “as unrestrained by laws and institutions as ever.” Likewise, the reformist Alexander I (r. 1801–25) often yielded to an urge to rely not on formal institutions of government but on personal connections and influential personalities. Even into the twentieth century, the sinews of the Russian state remained heavily composed of patron-client relationships and personal dependence.

**There Are No Blank Slates**

Most experts who write on comparative development now agree that the patterns of democratization visible in the annals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries owe much to the previously existing institutions that constrained the executive. Both sides of the sequencing debate—the “state-first” camp and the “democracy-first” camp—have oversimplified the actual sequence of state-building and regime change as these unfolded in Europe. The part of the European experience that has entered the sequencing debate is the one that was triggered by the early-modern military revolution. This revolution touched off a large-scale process of state-building, followed centuries later by the democratization processes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Yet the European states of the sixteenth century were not blank slates. The military revolution occurred against the particular backdrop of a “multiconstitutional” world pervaded by constitutionalist thoughts and practices, inhabited by potent corporate groups, and packed with local institutions of self-government and even national-level institutions based on representation. It is therefore wrong to say that in Europe state-building came before political accountability—though it is of course correct that early modern state-building preceded modern democratization in the form of the introduction of equal and universal suffrage.

More generally, European history has been an arena in which the state, the rule of law, and mechanisms of political accountability have interacted in ways far more complex than either side of the sequencing debate has so far acknowledged. Yet certain large findings emerge, among them the insight that Western and Central Europe’s corporate groups and institutions of self-government—both legacies of the Middle Ages—made it possible to channel governmental authority through impersonal institutions and laws rather than patron-client relations. To be sure, Western and Central Europe have not always and everywhere been free of patrimonialism, but its influence was not strong enough to keep this region from developing relatively modern state institutions in the centuries following the military revolution.

The contrasting case of Russia throws this into high relief. There,
geopolitical pressures like those felt elsewhere in Europe removed traditional restraints on autocracy, boosted military might, and strengthened the center’s capacity to gather power into its own hands. In Russia, however, none of this led to the creation of genuinely impersonal institutions. Instead, Russian landowners became the state’s rural agents, while patronage relations and the personal discretion of rulers regularly undermined the state’s administrative organs at its center. From all this, the rule of law and democratization reaped no benefit and received no boost. On the contrary, right up until czarism’s bitter end during the First World War, absolute monarchy remained the pillar of rule, arbitrariness pervaded the legal system, and patrimonialism fueled the state.

What lessons for today emerge from this comparison between West European and Russian history? Historical analogies are notoriously tricky, but if there is a lesson here it is that the prior presence of accountability-promoting mechanisms (institutions that can constrain the executive, and social groups that are strong enough to “push back” against power) gives a country the best starting point for both democratization and the building of a modern state.

As Russia’s experience shows, the “autocratic path to democracy”—featuring enlightened absolute rulers who build strong institutions that ultimately pave the way for their own demise—is a route more imaginary than real. Some constraints on power are surely necessary both for a felicitous pattern of state-building and for an improvement in the odds that democracy and the rule of law will develop. The implication for development today is that it is wiser to strengthen a society’s ability to generate countervailing power than it is to bet on top-down state-building. It is hard to see how, in today’s world, this strengthening can be achieved unless some form of democratization precedes or at least coincides with efforts to build the state.

NOTES


5. Mazzuca and Munck, “State or Democracy First?”

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