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The History of the Dichotomy of Civic Western and Ethnic Eastern Nationalism

The dichotomy of civic vs. ethnic nationalism has long been applied spatially to explain differences between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ manifestations of nationalism. Though frequently criticised on empirical, methodological, and normative grounds, this dualism continues to find widespread use in nationalism studies. Through a genealogical study of the dichotomy’s emergence and evolution from Hans Kohn to John Plamenatz and Ernest Gellner, the article traces its strong ties to discourses and policies of ‘Western’ superiority, and to demi-orientalising constructions of ‘Eastern Europe’ as the inferior other of the ‘civilized West’.

Keywords: Western and Eastern nationalism; the civic-ethnic dichotomy; Hans Kohn; John Plamenatz; Ernest Gellner

Introduction

In a 2009 essay, Brian Porter-Szűcs, a prominent scholar of Polish history, lamented that Hans Kohn’s dichotomy of a good nationalism in ‘the West’ and a bad nationalism in ‘the East’ remained influential. ‘Though repeatedly debunked, the spatial embodiment of nationalism’s Janus face continues to resurface’, Porter-Szűcs argued, using John Plamenatz (1973), Rogers Brubaker (1992) and Liah Greenfeld (1992) as his main examples (2009, p. 5). Critique of the civic/Western – ethnic/Eastern dichotomy has not abated since 2009, but nor has its continued application. The dichotomy frequently appears in contemporary scholarship, for example in works by political scientists using it in multiple country quantitative data analysis (Coakley, 2018; Larsen, 2017; Schulman, 2002).

Like other research fields in the humanities and social sciences, nationalism studies have frequently turned to dualistic oppositions as analytical tools. In 1998, Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman compiled a ‘cursory list’ of no less than twenty dualistic distinctions common in the literature of nationalism. Although not all have been normatively charged or applied spatially, the authors observed that ‘[t]he contrasts specifically between West and East, between the political and the cultural, between the civic and ethnic, between the liberal and illiberal are all … hewn from the same rock’ (Spencer and Wollman, 1998, p. 257). This observation forms the starting point of the following argument. Some scholars have used a civic-ethnic nationalism dichotomy for analytical purposes without linking it to a macro-
spatial West-East opposition, but historically and in its most prominent articulations, the civic vs. ethnic nationalism dichotomy has remained inherently linked to an opposition of West and East. This linking is the topic of this paper.

By tracing its genealogy, I will seek to show that this dichotomy of civic/Western – ethnic/Eastern nationalism has been firmly embedded in broader, orientalising discourses that define ‘Eastern Europe’/‘the East’ as the inferior Other of ‘Western Europe’/‘the West.’ In constructing the Eastern Other in this way, these discourses have simultaneously constructed Western Europe/the West as a normative authority, epistemologically equipped with a sanitised self-image of civic, liberal virtue. Epistemological ordering, I argue, prepares the ground for political ordering; it legitimates the perpetuation of the political subject position of Western Europe/the West. This may help to explain why this dichotomy – despite decades of critique and deconstruction – remains influential in scholarship and beyond. But before we embark on the genealogical study, we must examine some recent critiques of the dichotomy in order to clarify the main issues at stake.

**Contemporary critiques of the Kohn dichotomy**


“civic nationalism” denotes the claims of legitimacy for, and the sense of commitment to, the exercise of territorial sovereignty by (or in the name of) a people with a shared political identity. The common rights, duties, and values of citizenship, irrespective of any ethnic or cultural differences among the citizenry, are considered to constitute the foundation of peoplehood in this framework; in theory, statehood is the forge of nationhood.

‘Ethnic nationalism,’ by contrast, ‘derives its force from a sense of kinship and a myth of shared ancestry that is thought to predate statehood’ (*ibid*). Civic nationalism, the author continues, has often been associated with states in Western Europe and the USA and the latter with other regions of the world, adding that ‘the contrasting typologies have been linked to starkly drawn normative and geocultural differences’ (*ibid.*). After outlining the history of the typology and presenting some critiques of the civic-ethnic dichotomy (Brubaker, 2004; Kymlicka, 1995; Kuzio, 2002, etc.), Roshwald concludes (2016, p. 405):

Yet the very preoccupation with problematizing these terms reflects their continued heuristic utility, provided they are understood to represent ideal types rather than
concrete realities. Instead of using these concepts to draw reductionist dichotomies, one can more productively think of them as endpoints on a continuous typological spectrum ranging from purely civic nationalism to exclusively ethnic nationalism. Roshwald’s claim that the civic-ethnic dichotomy can work if understood as an ideal type in the Weberian sense (see Kennedy and van Ginderachter’s introduction to this issue) shows that though referenced by Roshwald, Brubaker has not influenced his reasoning. As will be discussed below, Brubaker rejects the idea that ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism can function as ideal type endpoints on a typological spectrum. Even more remarkable is Roshwald’s argument that the consistent problematizing of a given terminology testifies to its heuristic utility. If one replaces ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism with ‘race,’ the flaws of this reasoning become evident.

Stephen Schulman has made a valuable distinction between normative, conceptual, and empirical critiques of the dichotomy (2002, p. 557). Useful is also Meghan Tinsley’s sorting of the substantial focus of recent critiques of ‘Kohnian’ models into three broad categories: critiques of the West - non-West binary itself; critiques that stress the co-presence of civic and ethnic nationalism in every society; and critiques of the static determinism of Kohn’s original model (2019, p. 354-358). These taxonomies must, I believe, be supplemented with a distinction between partial critique, i.e. attempts to save the essence of the dichotomy by revising some aspects of it (Kamusella, 2017, Schulman, 2002, Tabachnik, 2019, Tamir, 2019), and comprehensive critique, dismissing it as a whole.

At first glance, Spenser and Wollman seem to belong to the comprehensive camp, as they hold the civic-ethnic/West-East dualism to have an inherently normative bias. They trace its history from Kohn over Plamenatz to Gellner, pointing to the value-laden assumptions underpinning the arguments of each. ‘The profoundly ethnocentric sense of Western superiority which informs this particular dualism,’ they conclude, ‘can then all too easily blind readers to the deficiencies of Western nationalism as they rush to denounce that of the East’ (1998, p. 259). Rather than problematizing the western-centric ideological premises of the dualism, however, the authors proceed to show empirically that the nationalisms found in ‘Western’ countries like France, the UK, and the USA were not particularly civic, arguing that this makes the notion of a benign liberal nationalism untenable. In approaching ‘Western nationalism’ as a separate object studied through a civic vs. ethnic prism, the authors thus inadvertently end up reproducing the West-East dichotomy they set out to dismantle.

In 2002, Taras Kuzio argued that Kohn’s division of nationalisms into civic/Western and ethnic/Eastern types collapsed against historical and theoretical scrutiny. Kuzio’s three
main arguments neatly follow Tinsley’s three categories. He holds first that all states stem from ethno-cultural cores; second, that their nationalisms inevitably include organic as well as voluntary, ethnic as well as civic elements; and third, that the Western states typically presented as perennially civic only became so in the 1960s. Kuzio passionately criticises myths about the ‘civility’ of the USA, the UK and France, but he resorts to a key feature of the West-East dichotomy, the idea of Eastern backwardness (2002, p. 35):

The evolution of states from ethnic to civic statehood occurred throughout the West … This evolution was the norm, not the exception. Only from the 1960s can we define Western states as civic, while the majority of the East became civic only three decades later in the 1990s.

Like Spencer and Wollman, Kuzio thus ends up reinforcing what he set out to criticise. He treats the distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ as analytically meaningful and applies it to a geohistorical imagining that reifies ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ as separate, ontologically stable entities.

Kuzio lists Rogers Brubaker among those subscribing to a ‘Kohnian’ West-East dichotomy. As argued by Kennedy and van Ginderachter in the introduction to this issue, this may apply to his early work. Later, however, Brubaker revised his position and offered a penetrative critique of the analytical validity of the civic-ethnic distinction with implications for West vs. East.

Brubaker addresses the conceptual weakness of the distinction by examining definitions of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ in relation to nationhood and nationalism. If one defines ethnicity narrowly, he argues, as descent or biology, the class of ethnic nationalisms becomes very small; if ‘ethnic’ is defined broadly as ethno-cultural, virtually all nationalisms must conversely count as ethnic. Similarly, strict definitions of civic nationalism as ‘involving an acultural, ahistorical, universalist, voluntarist, rational understanding of nationhood’ (cf. Roshwald’s definition cited above) essentially define the phenomenon out of existence (2004, p. 137), while broader definitions of civic nationalism typically include phenomena that bring it conspicuously close to the cultural definition of ethnicity. It does not help, Brubaker stresses, to present ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ as ideal types. If one cannot properly define the endpoints of a continuum, it makes no sense to classify individual cases as mixtures of one or the other.

Brubaker uses state promotion of a particular language as an example: since individuals can learn new languages, language promotion is not ‘ethnic’ in the narrow sense of the word. Therefore, the assimilationist language policies of France or England in the
nineteenth century and beyond have often been presented as a *precondition* for republican or liberal citizenship. If, however, one defines ‘ethnic’ broadly as ethno-cultural, any policy that makes knowledge of one particular language a requirement for social and political participation must be classified as ethno-nationalism (2004, p. 138-140).¹

In 2010, Krzysztof Jaskulowski critically examined Kohn’s conceptualization of the two types of nationalism to argue that the model suffers irreparably from a normative, western-centric bias. Jaskulowski found the sources of Kohn’s model making not just in his personal biography, or in intellectual predecessors such as Friedrich Meinecke, but in a broader cultural climate that took Western superiority for granted. Inspired by Larry Wolff’s seminal *Inventing Eastern Europe* (1994), which located the origins of the West-East dichotomy in eighteenth century Enlightenment thinking, Jaskulowski noticed a specific pattern of reasoning in Kohn’s approach to negative elements in American nationalism (2010, p. 297; emphasis added):

[Kohn] explained American ethnic nationalism assigning causality to outside, accidental or situational factors. Eastern nationalism, on the other hand, was caused by internal factors, that is by factors inherent in Eastern European societies, and it was a reflection of their deeply-rooted and persistent traditions. To put it differently, Kohn made dispositional attribution for Eastern European societies’ behavior and situational attribution for his own society, namely USA.

This dualism of situational vs. dispositional attribution continues to appear in much scholarship on Western vs. Eastern European nationalism even today.

While Jaskulowski focussed on the constitutive othering of ‘Eastern Europe’ in Kohn’s dichotomy, Tinsley applies postcolonial theory in her critique of the civic-ethnic binary. The relationship between coloniser and colonised, the global North and the global South, she argues, is foundational to the relationship between civic and ethnic nationalism, since the propagating of ‘the West’ as the realm of the former rests on the silent exclusion of the colonial Others of the ‘civic’ nations. Their colonial subjects are left out of sight theoretically, and out of rights politically. Tinsley continues (2019, p. 355):

While there is no objective truth to the claim that nations in Western Europe and North America are inherently predisposed to civic nationalism, the idea that they are has shaped their collective identity. This self-conception, in turn, provided the logic for the construction of Eastern European nations as predisposed to ethnic nationalism, and the violent colonization of Asian, African, and Latin American countries in the name of civic nationalism.
With reference to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Tinsley refers to the ‘abyssal line’ that separates colonies and colonial subjects – the ‘zone of non-being’ – from the colonial centres – the ‘zone of being’ – with their privileged citizens (2019, p. 352).

Tinsley makes a sharp distinction between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Southern’ Others, arguing that the former, unlike the latter, fall within the ‘zone of being,’ since they are regarded as behind the Western nations, but potentially ‘capable of attaining civic status by emulating the West … Further, contemporary Eastern Europeans are marked as white, and thus are afforded the opportunity to pass. Non-whites in the zone of non-being are not afforded the same opportunity.’ (2019, pp. 357, 355). Tinsley is obviously correct that colonial exploitation and dehumanising have been far more devastating than most of what Eastern Europe has had to endure, but it seems counterproductive to approach this difference as a binary opposition.

First, as Tinsley notices, Kohn’s early studies of nationalism foregrounded the experience of colonialism for the rise of ‘Eastern’ nationalisms everywhere (2019, p. 349). Kohn’s ‘East’ included both the European East and non-European regions that later became known as ‘the South.’ This locating of all ‘non-Westerners’ on a gradient of non-civilisation was, as we will see, typical also of British, French, and American decision-makers in the years when Kohn began to formulate his ideas. Consequently and secondly, the ‘whiteness’ of Eastern Europeans has historically often been disputed (Jacobson, 1998), as recently seen again in widespread anti-Polish sentiments in Brexit Britain (Dzenovska, 2017).²

The making of Eastern Europe as the home of ethnic nationalism
There is no room for a detailed account of the evolution of the idea of Eastern Europe and the West-East opposition since their Enlightenment beginnings. Suffice it so say that West-East discourses have typically operated with a number of interconnected oppositions: civilisation versus backwardness; development versus stagnation; liberal versus autocratic; individualistic versus collectivist; rational versus irrational; Romance and Germanic peoples versus Slavs. At its core is, in Wolff’s perceptive formulation, the distinction between ‘Europe as subject’ and ‘Europe as object’ (1995, p. 935). This discursive appropriation – the self-assumed right of one part of Europe to speak in Europe’s name, while classifying and evaluating the other part as an object without European subjectivity – has close affinities to Orientalism. Like this, it legitimizes a sense of political entitlement: It gives the Western European powers a natural right to intervene in Eastern Europe. This perception came to full fruition at the peace settlements after the First World War, a moment I hold to have been constitutive for the emergence of the Kohn dichotomy in three important ways.
First, it was only after 1918 that the label ‘Eastern Europe’ became attached to the lands that are still today commonly called so, also in nationalism studies, i.e. the states between Russia and Germany with an extension to the Balkans. Before the Great War, nobody had used a common term for these economically, religiously, ethnically, and politically very diverse lands. Until 1914, the term Eastern Europe (‘Osteuropa,’ ‘l’Europe orientale’) was predominantly associated with the lands of the Russian Empire or occasionally also with the ‘Near East’ of the Balkans (Bugge, 2002, p. 51-54).

Second, although the pervasive state-making interventions in the region after 1918 reflected British and French geopolitical concerns and ambitions to punish Germany and its allies as much as any sincere commitment to the principles of Woodrow Wilson, they were carried out in the name of national self-determination. Dace Dzenovska has summed up the proceedings as follows (2017, p. 300):

Culturally- and historically-defined peoples were assigned to territories, rendering some “state people” and others “national minorities,” while constructing the east European states themselves as “national states with minority problems” that required supervision from the League of Nations. Simultaneously with creating the minority problem with which east European states would have to grapple for most of their existence, post-World War I statecraft also “condemned” east European states to a continuous struggle to ensure that they had nations to legitimate the states.

If all the new states of the region were what Brubaker has called ‘nationalizing states’ (1996, p. 79), they were so, Dzenovska shows, not only by their own design. There was a certain perverse dialectic at work: the new ‘state-owning’ national elites had to cultivate the image of their perennial, ethno-national craving for independence because it formed the foundation myth of their newly acquired states. In reality, this perennial craving was largely a fiction. To the frustration of pre-war national movements, national indifference was widespread (Van Ginderachter and Fox, 2019; Zahra, 2010), and mostly, these national movements sought cultural or political autonomy only, and were perfectly capable of simultaneously practicing ethno-cultural and civic-political loyalties.

Third, the virulent, often racial ethno-nationalism that flourished in the region around 1918 (stimulated in part by the Wilsonian promise of future nation states) was interpreted by the Western powers not as a contingent phenomenon in a war-ravaged region, but as an essential feature of the East. In Jaskulowski’s terms, it appeared as a dispositional, not as a situational attribute of the peoples of Eastern Europe, another Eastern negative on the list of West-East oppositions.
Glenda Sluga (2002) has shown how before the Great War, there were vivid discussions in France and England of how to understand the relationship between race, ethnicity, and nationality. The ‘happy marriage of identity and territory’ that later propagators of a geographically aligned civic-ethnic opposition of nationalisms have identified in these two countries (and by extension in ‘Western Europe’), was by no means a given fact in the eyes of pre-war observers. Unsurprisingly, both French and English intellectuals argued that the ability to forge national unity out of a historically given racial and ethnic diversity was a unique quality of their respective core nations, the outcome of some core racial or ethnic quality that could make heterogeneity work. Their ‘civic’ qualities were thus racially, or at least culturally, predetermined.

As the political significance of the issue grew during the Great War, British and French discussions of the idea of nationality intensified, with arguments adapting to contemporary political needs. Evaluations of Austria-Hungary turned negative, and this ‘Eastern Sultanate’ was now found lacking in comparison with the advanced, benign commonwealth of the British Empire. Sluga argues that to some extent, ‘the ambiguity and ambivalence of racial, cultural, and political identities in liberal ‘Western’ European conceptions of nation were smoothed out and masked over with the displacement of racialist and ethnographic thinking onto the other side of Europe.’ (2002, p. 196) Ironically, after 1918, Western Europe thus came to represent the model of achieved nationhood, while the principle of nationality was held to be pertinent to Eastern Europe.

The representatives of the emerging states may in 1919 have believed that the moment had come for their recognition and acceptance in a ‘new Europe’ of equal nations, but the approach to peace-making from British politicians, diplomats, and experts was marked by an orientalist, colonial-imperial gaze that strongly framed perceptions of the peoples of ‘Eastern Europe.’ There was no fundamental classificatory difference in how these British actors approached the objects of their peace making in Eastern Europe or in the Near or Middle East. The ‘Curzon line’ proposed by the Supreme War Council as a border between Poland and Soviet Russia was named after Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary who as Vice Roy of India had gained a solid experience in dividing up native territories. Lord Robert Cecil, a leading architect of the League of Nations, referred to the Poles as ‘orientalised Irish’ and Lloyd George frequently compared the Poles to the Irish. Jan Smuts, the South African member of the Imperial War Cabinet from 1917 to 1919, called the Poles ‘kaffir’, a term used by Cape colonialists for South African Bantus (Mark & Slobodian, 2018, p. 3).
These British politicians drew heavily on racially informed classifications of individual nationalities according to a perceived degree of political and civilizational maturity. Smuts wrote in a pamphlet of December 1918: ‘The peoples left behind by the decomposition of Russia, Austria, and Turkey are mostly untrained politically; many of them are incapable of or deficient in power of self-government…’ In this respect, he added, these ‘European and Asiatic communities’ differed both from the ‘barbarians’ of the German colonies in Africa, and from fully developed regions like Alsace-Lorraine (Smuts, 1918, pp. 11, 15). Consequently, Smuts called for the introduction of a Mandates System in Eastern Europe. His proposal was not accepted, but the common view that the politically immature and ‘emotionally difficult’ Poles (Clark, 2020), and East Europeans generally, could not be trusted to handle nationality policies on their own led the Western powers to introduce a minority protection system specifically for the region. National self-determination was not something to which these peoples were simply entitled, and as James Mark and Quinn Slobodian observe, this ‘demi-orientalist gaze’ did not disappear when the situation in the region calmed down in the early 1920s (2018, p. 3):

…the idea of close equivalence between a brittle post-colonial Eastern Europe and a colonial world that needed shepherding towards self-sufficiency remained in the everyday assumptions of international politics in the interwar period. Even without the full supervision of the Mandates system, the League of Nations was granted the right to interfere in the minority affairs throughout Eastern Europe; and the League’s financial experts were given the capacity to intervene in the region’s reconstruction and financial stabilization in a manner that for contemporaries resembled the international administration of China or the debt-ridden Ottoman Empire.

Surely, the 1919 Minority Treaties were products of sincere and well-founded concerns for the protection of Polish Jews and other ethno-cultural communities about to become minorities in the new states (Wolff, 2020, pp. 176 ff.). They were also ‘inspired in equal measure by a fear of the coercive impulses of nation-builders and a fear of the disloyal impulses of minorities’ (Riga & Kennedy, 2009, p. 477). Eastern Europe, however, did not hold the monopoly on virulent ethno-nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, or state-sponsored discrimination of minorities. To give just one example, the desire to ‘cleanse’ reincorporated Alsace-Lorraine of Germans made France institutionalise ‘a more exclusive and racist policy of national classification’ than Czechoslovakia after 1918 (Zahra, 2008, p. 144).

With regard to Woodrow Wilson, the main sponsor of the idea of national self-determination, Larry Wolff has demonstrated how his interest in Eastern Europe arose only
during the Great War. Wilson’s commitment to correlating nationality and sovereignty in the region was inspired by his much older ‘liberal hatred’ of the Ottoman Empire, which was to be driven out of Europe and dissolved. Towards the end of the war, Wilson came to see the Habsburg Monarchy in the same light, as an ‘artificial Empire’ equally full of ‘enslaved’ peoples awaiting liberation. Wilson’s mental map of a zone of artificial empires and suffering nations from the Baltic Sea to the Near and Middle East was not radically different from the one of Smuts in December 1918.

In Wilson’s view too, agency rested firmly with the great, civilized powers of the West, whose mission it was to liberate the weak nations that had ‘called out to the world’ for help while protecting them from their own weaknesses (Wolff, 2020, p. 104). In February 1919, Wilson called Poland ‘immature, inexperienced, as yet unorganized’ and hence in need of a military guarantee of the peace settlement ‘by the united forces of the civilized world.’ Reports of anti-Semitic violence and complaints from the American Jewish Congress about the legal discrimination of Jews in these ‘supposedly civilized lands’ made Wilson support the sending of an investigative commission to Poland – ‘as if to the Hottentots’, Eugeniusz Romer, the Polish geographer, complained bitterly (Wolff, 2020, pp. 176, 179, 202). In 1919, Wilson’s trust in the good intentions of the newly liberated peoples of Eastern Europe increasingly gave way to a policy of what would later (with regard to the same region) be called conditionality, since Wilson made the recognition of state borders contingent on the ‘new’ states (a Peace Conference concept including long independent Serbia and Romania) passing minority protection clauses (Wolff, 2020, pp. 197-207).

Alan Sharp has argued that Wilson ‘as a Southerner’ was long reluctant to consider secession from Austria-Hungary, but that eventually he felt that only national self-determination could stabilise the region. Yet what was to determine nationality? Sharp writes (2008, p.141):

Wilson had no clear answers, although he brought the subjective assumptions of a western liberal to these problems. He tended to confuse the concepts of personal and political nationality, to assume that language was the key element, and naturally for an American, to stress the concept of choice. These criteria were not accepted in eastern Europe where race, nationality and religion were seen as constants determining nationality.

Sharp’s assumptions about ‘Eastern Europe’ are empirically flawed, but the key point here is to clarify what was ‘natural’ for a ‘western liberal,’ an American ‘Southerner,’ with regard to nationality and choice. Sharp ought to have known that Wilson was neither civic, nor ‘pro-
choice’ as regards the rights of the African-American population, whose racial inferiority he saw as a constant. Wilson’s administration set back the cause of civil rights for decades by instituting segregation in the federal government.3

In 1921 and 1924, the USA passed Immigration Acts “founded upon a racial logic borrowed from biology and eugenics” (Jacobson, 1999, 9). Japanese immigration was banned (like Chinese immigration earlier) as the racial otherness and un-assimilability of the Japanese was taken for granted, but the racial classification of Southern and Eastern Europeans was a matter of considerable debate (Lehtinen, 2002, pp. 46-58). The USA’s first naturalization law of 1790 had limited naturalized citizenship to “free white persons,” but the decades leading up to 1921 “witnessed a fracturing of whiteness into a hierarchy of plural and scientifically determined white races” (Jacobson, 1999, 7). The highly restrictive quotas for immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe introduced in 1921 and 1924 made clear that the US Congress did not consider Poles, Slovaks, Italians, Jews, etc. white enough to be worth letting in. If interwar USA was a paragon for nationalists, it was not for those of the ‘civic’ kind. James Q. Whitman (2017) has shown how Nazi legal scholars eagerly studied US racial legislation in the early 1930s to find inspiration for the Nuremberg laws.4

Their own colonial or domestic issues notwithstanding, the victors of Versailles designed interwar minority protection only for countries they deemed backward and immature. Mark Mazower has suggested that ‘the lack of a universal regime was an embarrassment for the Great Powers’ (1997, p. 52), though without presenting evidence that they actually felt embarrassed. Only few Western interwar scholars were critical of these double standards (Mair, 1928, pp. vii, 35), or willing to discuss the issue (Macartney, 1968 [1934], pp. 487-494). In the League of Nations, France and the UK repeatedly obstructed proposals from the new states of Eastern Europe to universalize the system (Preece, 1998, pp. 89-93).

A 1922 Lithuanian proposal that all League members be required to respect the same standards of minority rights received the following reply by the French representative, Henry de Jouvenel: ‘France has not signed any Minorities Treaty because she has no minorities. To find minorities in France, they would have to be created in the imagination.’ It would be a similar absurdity, de Jouvenel added, if one were to imagine ‘some ill-humoured Welshman posing before the League of Nations as the champion of Wales.’ To which Lord Cecil (the one who had called the Poles ‘orientalised Irish’) remarked that ‘he was not afraid of the obstreperous Welshman, because he did not exist.’ When a Romanian delegate referred to an ethnographic map of Europe that showed the presence of different languages and races in
Western Europe also, a French expert dryly responded: ‘Yes, but minorities only exist where there is a treaty’ (all quotations from Macartney, 1934/1968, p. 482; see also Zahra, 2008, pp. 137-142). The expert response reveals a deep insight into performative speech acts.

**Hans Kohn’s world of nationalisms**

These examples support the argument that the USA, the UK, and France have historically been far less ‘civic’ than claimed by Kohn and his successors, but for our purposes, they are primarily to show how understandings of national identity became a potent political issue during the First World War, and how the Great Powers in 1919 created modern ‘Eastern Europe’ with reference to its civilizational backwardness, political immaturity, virulent nationalism, and innately illiberal understandings of national identity and minority rights. The opposition of Western/civic and Eastern/ethnic nationalism was mobilized politically before Kohn turned it into academic theory, an alignment insufficiently explored in scholarship until now.5

The argument of Kohn’s seminal 1944 study, *The Idea of Nationalism*, is well-known, so I will highlight only a few issues. Though often presented in these terms, Kohn did not use the terminology of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalisms. He distinguished between ‘the Western world,’ defined as England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the USA and the British dominions, and a residual ‘outside the Western world,’ which he divided into Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. Kohn did not define the difference between Central and Eastern Europe, but Germany represented the former and Russia the latter, with India representing Asia.

While severely punished at Versailles, Germany had not been forced to sign a National Minority Treaty, and the country’s reintegration into ‘Europe as subject’ proceeded steadily in the interwar years, culminating in the Munich Agreement of September 1938 that carved up democratic Czechoslovakia with reference to its ‘inadequate’ national minority policies. With a new World War raging at the time of writing, however, Kohn saw Germany as the first non-West, a land of illiberal backwardness. With a well-worn phrase, Kohn’s argument on Germany can be summed up as a ‘from Herder to Hitler’ tale of a profoundly unsound nationalism, marked by an inferiority complex, irrationalism, and a cult of the mystic *Volk* (1944, pp. 329-334, 348-352).

Kohn describes relations between ‘the West’ and the ‘outside’ as one of cultural dissemination and reaction. In a rare passage addressing negative features of nationalism in
the West, Kohn makes full use of a territorially distributed distinction between situational and dispositional attribution (1944, p. 354):

Many fundamental thoughts of Italian Fascism were received from French sources, and some of the most important concepts of National Socialism are to be found in the writings of Maurice Barrès. But what has been a minor cult in English, French, or American thought, without any popular influence and often of purely ephemeral significance, became a most powerful and even decisive aspect of nationalism among the Germans, the Russians, and the Indians.

Kohn also places Italy – a wartime enemy, but an integral interwar part of ‘Europe as subject’ – outside the ‘Western world,’ but he has no ‘from Mazzini to Mussolini’ narrative analogous to his German one. Kohn does not even mention the two and makes only a passing reference to ‘fascist nationalism,’ which he traces back to Nietzsche (1944, p. 238). Kohn generously argues that in Italy, the impact of the French Revolution did not lead to resentment and irrationalism as in Germany, but down ‘the road from a rational cosmopolitanism to a liberal nationalism’ (1944, p. 509).

Kohn was capable of applying his model flexibly. Although Lutheranism figures prominently as a factor contributing to the negative evolution of German nationalism, it did not prevent the Lutheran kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden from entering ‘fully into the spirit of the Western world,’ or Norwegian nationalism from carrying ‘from its beginning, in spite of romantic influences, a strong Western and democratic character’ (1944, pp. 510, 515). Even the Czechs had managed to pull themselves by the hair out of the ‘eastern’ morass to which they socially and racially ought to belong. Their philosophy of history, Kohn held, ‘made the Czechs the eastern outpost of the liberal West instead of the western outpost of the Slav East’ (1944, p. 560). Whether this belief in the power of ideas to overcome a ‘natural’ belonging in the non-West reflected the wartime context or personal sympathies overruling the logic of the author’s own model, we may see it as a welcome sensitivity to the complexity of the subject matter. The Cold War was to do away with such ambiguities.

Cold War divisions at work: John Plamenatz and Ernest Gellner
After 1945, ‘Western’ historians were quick to equip the new military-political-ideological borderline running from North to South through Europe with deep historical roots. It became conventional wisdom that since the age of Charlemagne, Europe had, approximately along the current Iron Curtain, been divided in a Western and an Eastern part, substantially different from the other. Curiously, nobody questioned why such a profound and ancient cleavage had
until then gone unnoticed (Bugge, 2002, pp. 59-61; Davies, 1996, pp. 7-31; Wolff, 1994, pp. 370-371). The cleavage affected nationalism theory. If Kohn’s analysis of civic/Western and ethnic/Eastern nationalism reflected interwar and wartime ambiguities, the Cold War eradication of ambiguity found its finest spokesperson in the realm of nationalism theory in John Plamenatz.

In his 1973 essay, *Two Types of Nationalism*, Plamenatz presents the civic/West–ethnic/East opposition in its purest form. This has won him prominent intellectual endorsement. The essay served as a major inspiration for Ernest Gellner, who in his influential monograph *Nations and Nationalism* called it ‘fascinating and rather moving’ (1983, pp. 99), while in a 1993 article, John Hall called Plamenatz’ essay ‘brilliant’ (p. 14). There is therefore good reason to take a close look at what the text argues, and how it makes its argument.

Plamenatz does not refer to Kohn, but the affinity of their arguments is striking. Like Kohn, Plamenatz holds that nationalism has taken two markedly different forms, one he calls western and one he calls eastern. ‘Eastern,’ he writes, ‘because it first appeared to the east of Western Europe’ and because it ‘has flourished among the Slavs as well as in Africa and Asia, and is to be found also in Latin America’ (1973, p. 23). Unlike Kohn, Plamenatz sees nationalism everywhere as primarily a cultural phenomenon, its political expression depending on the culture of the nation within which it evolved. In ‘the West,’ he holds, nationalism had mostly been liberal, its illiberal manifestations products only of contingent factors. Plamenatz operates with *pars pro toto* arguments to create a chain of equivalence between England and France (‘the pace makers, culturally, economically, and politically’), Western Europe, and the West: ‘I say French ideas, although they were not so much French as West European … their origins, social and intellectual, were West European generally.’ This was the case, Plamenatz continues, because ‘the West’ is ‘a comity of nations that formed a consciously progressive civilisation’ (1973, p. 26). For Plamenatz, ‘the West’ is a homogenous entity marked by modernity, liberalism, and progress.

Kohn and Plamenatz both code their dualism of nationalisms normatively, but their definitions of ‘the West’ differ significantly. For Kohn in 1944, Germany was the first and the worst ‘East.’ Twenty-nine years later, Plamenatz ‘East’ begins with ‘the Slavs.’ His argument for reclaiming Germany and Italy for the West is fascinating. When they ‘first became strongly nationalist,’ the Germans and the Italians were, we hear, ‘already … well equipped culturally … relatively well provided with the qualities of skills valued and admired by the Western peoples generally’ (1973, p. 29; emphasis added). With a telling use of the
passive, Plamenatz declares that ‘it was only to be expected that such peoples as the Germans and the Italians should aspire to union within the frontiers of a national state so as to put themselves on a level with the English and the French’ (1973, p. 28). Writing in the third decade of the Cold War, Plamenatz had no room for Sonderweg arguments separating Germany or Italy from the rest of Western Europe. So he reduced Italian Fascism and German Nazism to ephemeral phenomena, lamentable, but understandable consequences of an (unjust) humiliation: ‘in the West this illiberal nationalism has been the nationalism of peoples defeated in war and disappointed in victory’ (1973, p. 29).

Let us turn to how Plamenatz presented the ‘non-Westerners’ (1973, p. 30; emphasis added):

The case with the Slavs, and later with the Africans and the Asians, has been quite different. Drawn gradually, as a result of the diffusion among them of western ideas and practices, into a civilisation alien to them, they have had to re-equip themselves culturally, to transform themselves … This has made their nationalisms in some ways profoundly different from that of the Germans, the Italians and other western peoples. I shall speak now mostly of the Slavs because I happen to know more about them than about the peoples of Africa. But I believe that much of what I say about the Slavs applies to these other peoples.

The last sentence shows that for Plamenatz, as for the imperial British peacemakers of 1919, ignorance was no obstacle to sweeping generalizations about non-Western natives. Notice the emphatic language: these natives are not merely different, but ‘quite’ or ‘profoundly’ so. And when meeting Germans, Plamenatz holds, ‘the Slavs’ encountered no less than ‘a civilisation alien to them.’

If the author were to be trusted, we would have to hold that culturally and mentally, the Czechs of Bohemia, for example, had more in common with the peoples of Burma or Bolivia than with those of neighbouring Bavaria. We must also accept that a Bohemian German and a Bohemian Czech represented two different civilisations. ‘I suggest,’ writes Plamenatz (1973, p. 32; emphasis added)

that the key to understanding nationalism in the Slav regions of the Habsburg Empire (and perhaps also in other parts of the non-Western world) is this: [The modernisation of these traditional communities] was happening under the leadership of peoples and cultures relatively well suited to new forms of activity at the expense of peoples who lacked them. There thus arose, within the Habsburg Empire, something analogous to the imperialism resulting from European penetration into Asia and Africa.
Here, as in the quote above on the cultural equipment of Germans and Italians, we notice Plamenatz’ use of the modifier ‘relatively.’ The German or Italian superiority vis-à-vis their Eastern, Slavic neighbours was immense; inside the Western camp, however, the Oxford professor upheld a clear hierarchy.

One central flaw in the argument stands out. Plamenatz’ construction of ‘the Slavs’ as a collective historical subject reflects racial thinking. In 1973, the notion that all Slavic speakers – despite their profound differences in terms of religion, culture, economic conditions or political arrangements – formed a single whole had long been abandoned. Only racial logic enables Plamenatz to claim that Czech and German Bohemians, who shared the same religion, the same everyday culture, received the same education, ate the same food, intermarried, and were often bilingual, belonged to different civilizations. Plamenatz repeatedly uses the words ‘ancestral,’ ‘ancestry,’ or ‘ancestors’ when referring to ‘the Slavs’ and their confrontations with the challenges of an ‘alien’ modernity (1973, pp. 31-34), while these words never appear in references to Western Europe. Here, we must surmise, even the poorest, illiterate villager was innately predisposed to embrace the social transformations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

While such racial thinking was the norm in 1919, its presence in 1973 in an academic argument stands out, as does the fact that neither Gellner in 1983, nor Hall in 1993, found it worthy of comment. Though relying heavily on Plamenatz, Gellner, one must stress, did not reproduce his racial logic. Gellner dealt with ‘classical liberal Western nationalism’ only briefly, since his model dictated that due to the presumed uniformity of culture between rulers and ruled in most of Western Europe ‘nothing very radical’ in terms of nationalism could happen here (1983, pp. 94-95). Gellner largely followed Plamenatz’ interpretation of German and Italian nationalism as straightforward processes of providing well-developed high cultures with the missing ‘political roof.’ ‘The Risorgimento and the unification of Germany corrected these imbalances,’ Gellner concluded, bringing his analysis of German and Italian nationalism to an end (1983, p.99).

Gellner shows awareness of the situational-dispositional opposition and its ties to the West-East dichotomy when commenting on Plamenatz’ coding of Western nationalism as ‘relatively benign and nice’ and Eastern nationalism as ‘doomed to nastiness.’ It would have been interesting to ask Plamenatz, he writes, ‘whether he would have considered the markedly un-benign forms taken by these once-benign or relatively liberal and moderate Western nationalisms in the twentieth century, as accidental and avoidable aberrations or not’ (1983, pp. 99-100). Readers might have found it even more interesting to hear Gellner’s own
thoughts on the subject, but he sidesteps the issue by declaring that his argument cannot explain ‘why some nationalisms, notably those of the Hitler and Mussolini period, should have become so specially virulent’ (1983, p. 139). Why risk destabilising a pure and simple model that neatly divides European nationalisms in two along Cold War lines simply because it cannot explain the most destructive manifestations of illiberal nationalism in the twentieth century?

Plamenatz was of more use with regard to Eastern Europe, and Gellner explicitly subscribed to the former’s idea that Eastern nationalism (1983, p. 100):

…was active on behalf of a high culture not as yet properly crystallized, a merely aspirant or in-the-making high culture. It presided, or strove to preside, over a chaotic ethnographic map of many dialects, with ambiguous historical or linguo-genetic allegiances … they lacked the clearly defined cultural basis enjoyed by their German and Italian counterparts.

These populations of eastern Europe were still locked into the complex multiple loyalties of kinship, territory and religion. To make them conform to the nationalist imperative was bound to take more than a few battles and some diplomacy. Again, the implicit assumption is that none of the described phenomena – ‘a chaotic ethnographic map of many dialects,’ ‘complex multiple loyalties of kinship, territory and religion,’ etc. – played any role in Western Europe. At the time of writing, however, Gellner should have known that this assumption was empirically untenable; Eugen Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen, for example, had come out in 1977.

**Post-Cold War Panic: the Barbarians at the Gate**

History does not repeat itself, be it as tragedy or farce, but one can find similarities in the Western response to the power vacuums appearing in the Eastern half of Europe after the Great War and after the Cold War. While the East Europeans of 1989 – now eagerly rebranding themselves as ‘Central Europeans’ – spoke of a ‘return to Europe,’ Western European elites were soon gripped by anxiety as they realised that the Iron Curtain would no longer keep the Eastern Europeans in, or rather out. The wars that broke out in former Yugoslavia in 1990 were widely seen as emblematic of a virulent nationalism inherent to Eastern Europe as a whole.

The dominant Cold War focus had been on explaining the economic, social, and cultural backwardness of Eastern Europe, or by extension the non-West, i.e. to historicise and theorise the profound difference between the ‘First World’ and the ‘Second’ and ‘Third’
Worlds. In the 1990s, scholars increasingly stressed the illiberal, irrational, violent, and threatening *nature* of East European nationalisms, the ‘ancient hatreds’ readily seen as the root cause of all regional conflicts (Auer, 2004, pp. 11-15). When in the mid-1990s, the EU finally accepted enlargement as the best strategy for how to tame the European East, they resorted to the well-tried methods of liberal paternalism and double standards. As in 1919, the Member States introduced policies of internationally supervised minority protection for the applicant countries that they had no intention to accept or live up to at home (Jutila, 2009; de Witte, 2002).

Nor were politicising professors seeking to influence European developments in a period of flux a 1919 phenomenon only. In the 1990s again, a minority tried to challenge what they saw as Western (European) parochialism. ‘Sooner or later,’ Norman Davies, the renowned historian of Poland, wrote in his ambitious attempt to reconceptualise European history without western-centric bias, ‘a convincing new picture of Europe’s past will have to be composed to accompany the new aspirations for Europe’s future’ (1996, p. 45). Others sought, often through idealised invocations of a quintessentially European ‘Central Europe’ kidnapped by the Russian East, not to discard the idea of a deep civilizational caesura in Europe, but to relocate it further to the East (examples in Bugge, 1999). Samuel Huntington’s 1996 bestseller, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, was a welcome endorsement of this view.

More often though, post-Cold War scholarship mobilised older tropes in its attempts to put, or keep, Eastern Europe in place. In 1992, Philip Longworth applied racial arguments akin to those of Plamenatz in a sweeping account of two millennia of Eastern European difference and inferiority. Longworth argued that the Eastern Europeans had a historically stable popular psychology, often expressing itself in a virulent nationalism, and he even listed ‘genetic inheritance’ as a factor shaping the East European mentality. Notably, Longworth quoted ‘a German scholar’ at length to support this point, the footnote revealing him to be a *Baedeker* travel guide writer of 1914 (1992, pp. 289, 291)!

In their 1998 *History of Eastern Europe*, Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries made it one of their ‘primary tasks … to offer hard-headed analyses of some of the historical differences between western Europe on the one hand and East Central Europe and the Balkans on the other’ (1998, p. 11). They saw ‘more justification for treating East Central Europe as the most Westernized part of the East than for regarding it the most easterly part of the West’ (1998, p. 15), and made full use of the dichotomy of Western/civic and Eastern/ethnic nationalism. We
also encounter arguments echoing Plamenatz on the determining force of Germano-Roman vs. Slavic ethnicity (1998, pp. 18-19).

The 2004 enlargement of the EU and the shift in the focus of othering after 9/11 put the issue of East European ethnic nationalism on the backburner for a time. Notions of a particular, illiberal Eastern European ethnic nationalism were, however, quickly mobilised again in Western European public and political discourse in 2015 and beyond as an explanatory key to the behaviour of those ‘Eastern’ countries that refused to accept the European Union decision on a quota system for refugee redistribution. Widely shared similar views among ‘old’ EU members states were largely ignored or explained away as temporary aberrations (Dzenovska, 2017; Krastev, 2017).

Conclusion
As Maria Todorova has argued with a quote from Jürgen Kocka, ‘the attractiveness of a concept rarely correlates with its precision’ (2010, p. 1). This holds true for the dichotomy of civic vs. ethnic nationalism, as its scholarly popularity seems unaffected by any critique of its definitional weaknesses. When paired with the opposition of Western and Eastern nationalism, however, the problems do not merely concern definitional imprecision or empirical inaccuracy.

Karl Marx wrote poetically in 1852 that men
…make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.

The first part of the quote is true for scholarly concepts too. They come with a historical baggage, and as this account has tried to show, the notion of a civic, Western and an ethnic Eastern nationalism has been flawed from the outset. There is little to indicate, however, that this century long tradition of othering, often matched with ambitions of ordering ‘Europe as object’ from outside, weighs like a nightmare on the brains of contemporary nationalism studies. Throughout its career, the Kohn-Plamenatz dichotomy of a Western civic and Eastern ethnic nationalism has smoothly aligned itself with political conjunctures, equipping Western Europe/’the West’ with a moral superiority matching its political, economic, and discursive dominance. But however convenient this may be for the model’s ‘Western’ subscribers, the dichotomy comes with a baggage of double standards, prejudice, and stigmatisation so heavy that any attempt to keep it alive today must count as an act of agnopolitics.
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Brubaker does not make the point, but there is a clear pattern in how later scholarship has labelled specific cases of linguistic assimilation policies. As shown by Eugen Weber (1977, p. 67-70), French was around 1870 still a foreign language to approximately half of the country’s population, a proportion roughly similar to that of non-Hungarian speakers within the Kingdom of Hungary at that time. Both countries defined their nations territorially, in ‘civic’ terms. The Hungarian Law on Nationalities of 1868 declared that politically, all citizens constituted ‘a single nation, the indivisible, unitary Hungarian nation’ (Kontler 1999: 282). Both countries pursued rigorous policies of linguistic assimilation using similar arguments for why to assimilate, and yet historians have commonly seen the French efforts as testimony to the country’s civic nationalism, and the equivalent Hungarian measures as testimony to an intransigent ethno-nationalism. The reason for this is not, I believe, primarily empirical. It stems from the a priori framing of France and Hungary as belonging to ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ nationalism respectively.

Pamela Ballinger has pointed out that while discussions of ‘Euro-Orientalism’ (Adamovsky, 2005) or ‘Balkanism’ (Todorova, 1997) have often been Euro-centric, postcolonial studies have all too rarely taken account of the intense debates about ‘Easternism’ within Europe (2017, p. 55). This has begun to change (see for example Valerio, 2019), but like Ballinger, I find it regrettable that this dialogue is still largely missing.

Wolff mentions Wilson’s policies of segregation, commenting that his strong commitment to emancipation from slavery only found expression outside the USA (2020, pp. 8, 82-83). Still, Wolff does not discuss how Wilson’s ‘domestic’ racial thinking influenced his approach to international politics, or to the dismantling of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires.

Whitman calls Nazi Germany and the American South of the 1930s ‘mirror images’: ‘two unapologetically racist regimes, unmatched in their pitilessness’ (2017, p. 3). He also makes clear that the Nazi interest was not confined to Jim Crow (2017, p. 5): ‘In the early 1930s the Nazis drew on a range of American examples, both federal and state. Their America was not just the South; it was a racist America writ large. Moreover … for Nazis of the early 1930s … American race laws sometimes looked too racist.’

Scholars have, however, shown how Kohn’s life story affected the design of his dichotomy (Liebich, 2006), and how it made him grateful to the USA, the country that welcomed him, and blind to its racism (Jaskułowski, 2010, pp. 296-297; Kuzio, 2002, pp. 26-27).