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**Anti-Ballistic Missiles and the Liberal-Conservative Internationalist
Divide in Cold War Canada, 1966-70**

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Abstract

Shortly following Canada's controversial adoption of nuclear weapon roles in NORAD and NATO in 1963 the focus of nuclear debates shifted to the potential impact on Canadian and international security of the construction of US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. This article expands the focus of scholarship on the ABM issue from the political and policymaking settings to include members of the attentive elite and the news media, and finds these groups deeply divided between liberal and conservative internationalists. On the one hand, supporters of liberal internationalism believed that AMB systems would destabilize the international security environment and ultimately increase the likelihood of nuclear war. Conservative internationalists took the opposite position, arguing that the systems represented a necessary addition to the Western nuclear deterrent and would make nuclear war less likely. In other words, the ABM debate exposed deep divisions in Canadian society between those who preferred diplomatic and multilateral versus military means of achieving middle power goals in the international system.

Keywords

Canada-US relations; anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems; liberal internationalism; conservative internationalism

Anti-Ballistic Missiles and the Liberal-Conservative Internationalist Divide in Cold War Canada, 1966-70

In March 1969, early in his first term as Canadian prime minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau uttered one of his most memorable quotes during a speech to the Washington Press Club, in Washington, D.C.: 'Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping next to an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.'¹ Many twitches and grunts emanated from south of the 49th parallel in the 1960s, often causing tremors that exposed significant fault-lines in Canadian society on a range of issues, among them the Vietnam War and American 'draft-dodgers', Washington's insistence that Canada's military adopt nuclear weapon roles in NORAD and NATO, and the issue of focus in this article, US plans to develop anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. In the mid-1960s, support for the construction of a defensive shield to guard against Chinese and/or Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) increased dramatically. Once it became clear that President Lyndon Johnson and a small majority of US senators supported such plans, an intense political and societal debate ensued.

As was often the case during the cold war, particularly when it came to nuclear weapon-related issues, the debate that unfolded in the US spilled over into Canada. The ABM debate touched on many issues of strategic concern to Canada, including the impact that such a system would have on the nuclear balance, ongoing arms control and disarmament negotiations, and efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new states. These issues mirrored the debate occurring in American political and public circles; however, the Canadian debate was distinctive in that it touched on issues such as

the extent to which a US ABM system would require the use of Canadian territory and airspace, and thus the extent to which it might have impinged upon territorial sovereignty, the possible physiological impact it could have on Canadian citizens if the system were ever put into use, inevitable environmental concerns, and various potential economic consequences.

The participants in the Canadian ABM debate were naturally motivated by concerns about security and stability, in both the domestic and international contexts. How, many wondered, would the development of ABM systems affect the international security environment? Would the development of an American system, perceived as effective by the Chinese or the Soviets, make the prospect of nuclear war more likely, or would it enhance stability by reinforcing the nuclear balance? Would the development of an effective shield strengthen isolationist forces in Washington and diminish its willingness to include particular regions (Southeast Asia, for example) under its nuclear umbrella, increasing the threat that countries in these regions might be tempted to develop their own nuclear weapon arsenals? Domestically, what would the impact of a US system have on the physical security of Canadians and on the Canadian environment? These questions preoccupied Canadians from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s.

Existing work on the ABM issue in the Canadian context focusses primarily on debates and deliberations at the highest political and policymaking levels.² This article, on the other hand, fills a gap in the scholarship by expanding the field of focus to include members of the attentive elite ((including military strategists, defence analysts and other academics) and the perspectives published in the print media. These sources have until now escaped extensive scholarly attention.

While the ABM issue has importance in relation to Canada's cold war policies broadly-conceived, by examining the arguments advanced for and against ABM systems it is possible to learn much about how the country's attentive elite and major newspapers viewed the state of the world and what they believed to be appropriate foreign and security policies for a responsible and effective middle power. The ideas and beliefs examined below reflect the anxieties and insecurities of individuals and groups subscribing to fundamentally conflicting beliefs about how best to deal with the threat posed by nuclear weapons, but which at the same time were also united in their shared search for stability, security and order. The middle power concept – the dominant conceptual framework influencing how most Canadians understood their country's position and roles in the international system – deeply influenced how the actors examined in this study formulated and articulated their beliefs about ABM systems. Canada, they understood, was situated in the geo-strategic middle 'between adversarial great powers and strategically seeking to maintain a balance of power between them.'³ This understanding influenced both policymakers and 'average' Canadians alike. Individuals and groups in both the political and civil society realms supported ABM policies they believed best exemplified the aims of a foreign policy John W. Holmes first described as 'middlepowermanship', predicated 'on the primacy of systemic peace as Canada's dominant foreign policy objective.'⁴

That Canadians expressed fundamentally different views on ABM systems does not detract from the persuasiveness of the middle power concept. Rather, it is strengthened as the debate's participants all regarded themselves as its representatives, even guardians. What can be observed in the course of the ABM debate is a wide schism separating

liberal and conservative internationalists. While subscribers to these perspectives could agree on the ends of Canada's foreign and security policies, when it came to the means to achieving them, they could not have been further apart.

The approach adopted in this article is inspired by the work of Don Munton and Tom Keating, who have described internationalism as a flexible perspective which 'divides Canadians as well as binds them.'⁵ While during the cold war Canadians agreed that their country should be active on the international stage, Munton and Keating found 'marked disagreement' and 'even some polarization of views' on the form Canada's internationalism should take. Based on their analysis of public opinion survey data they isolated different types or strains of internationalism, which in turn produced very different perspectives on a range of foreign and security policy issues. One of the clearest divisions they found was between so-called liberal internationalists and conservative internationalists.⁶

This typology is applied here to an analysis of the Canadian debate triggered by US ABM programs in the mid-to-late 1960s and early 1970s. For the purposes of this study, liberal internationalists are defined as individuals and groups who believed that multilateralism and diplomacy provided the best means to security and that nuclear weapons, and systems developed to defend specific nations against them, represented a source of insecurity which fuelled expensive and destabilizing arms races, making nuclear war a more likely prospect. From this perspective, Canadian support of US ABM systems would not align with the policies expected of a responsible middle power, and in fact contradicted the country's main foreign and security policy objective – contributing to conditions of international stability and peace. Conservative internationalists, on the

other hand, represented the 'security through strength' school of thought, adopting an approach to Western security that emphasized 'the legitimate role of the national armed forces in conflict resolution and the importance of military strength to domestic and international security.'⁷ These Canadians believed that rather than making nuclear war more likely, ABM systems served to buttress the West's nuclear deterrent, making nuclear war less likely. And in the unlikely event that a nuclear exchange did take place, the countries that had or fell under the protection of an ABM system would be ready. Put another way, the ABM debate exposed deep and irreconcilable differences between Canadians who favoured foreign and security policies that emphasised military versus diplomatic and multilateral approaches.

Background

Compared with the previous decade, East-West relations had stabilized by the mid-1960s. Tensions diminished in part because the two sides had agreed to engage in arms control talks, which represented both a cause and a manifestation of early détente, and which also produced concrete results such as the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). Some also attributed the relative stability of the period to the concept of mutual assured destruction, or MAD, and the deterrent effect it had on both sides. Before the widespread acceptance of MAD, Western defence was based upon the threat of massive retaliation against the Soviet Union. Under this doctrine, the US and the West held Moscow in check with the threat that any major military action undertaken would trigger a massive nuclear response. However, the growth of the Soviet Union's own nuclear arsenal forced American strategists and policy-makers to re-formulate Western strategic doctrine.

According to the MAD theory, each side would be deterred from using its nuclear weapons the belief that both possessed them in sufficient numbers to absorb a nuclear first-strike and still inflict unacceptable damage on the other. Although in the early and mid-1960s the US possessed a massive advantage in the number of deliverable thermonuclear warheads, it was generally accepted that both the US and the Soviet Union possessed a second-strike capability.⁸

Despite the relative stability afforded by the easing of East-West tension, both Moscow and Washington initiated defensive ABM programs.⁹ The fear of nuclear attack in the US increased support for the development of an ABM system.¹⁰ The Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik (1957) and China's first nuclear test (1964), gave urgency to the issue in the minds of some Americans.¹¹ The Soviet Union had also started to construct its own limited ABM system around Moscow, known as the "Galosh" system, lending power to the argument that the US needed a system of its own.¹²

The major focus of the ABM debate in the US was the effect it would have on the nuclear balance that had emerged between the Eastern and Western blocs. The logic behind MAD – the belief that both sides would suffer unacceptable destruction in a nuclear war – meant that both were deterred from launching a surprise nuclear attack. The American nuclear deterrent depended on three means of responding to a Soviet first-strike, including its Minuteman ICBM missile force stored in hardened silos located on US territory, intercontinental nuclear bombers, and Polaris submarines armed with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The decision to proceed with the development of the ABM system in the US stemmed from the concern that the survival of two of these systems had been compromised. The bomber force had always been considered a 'soft'

target for Soviet ICBMs, while the belief that the Soviet ICBM force was also being expanded and modernised meant that the Minutemen could conceivably be threatened.¹³

The opponents of the construction of ABM shields argued that they would undermine arms control negotiations. As the American strategic thinker Adam Wildavsky wrote at the time, the development of missile shields would add another item to an already long list “thus increasing the complexity of an already tortuous series of negotiations.” On the other hand, supporters of the program thought that it would actually facilitate the negotiations. The development of ABM systems would conceivably increase security against lesser nuclear powers, such as China, and if the US and the Soviet Union both possessed them, this would increase their security relative to each other and “enable them to relax a little ...”¹⁴ In addition, as the American ABM critic and former Vice-President and 1968 Democratic presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey explained in 1969, ABM advocates believed that an effective system would force the Soviets to “shift their emphasis to defense, thus permitting a mutual de-escalation of the offensive missile race.”¹⁵ Therefore, rather than leading to an escalation of the arms race, the development of ABM systems, according to some, could contribute to an environment in which both sides would become more flexible and productive in arms control talks.

Opponents of the ABM also focussed on the inability of any system to stay ahead of offensive advancements. Humphrey argued that penetration devices could be easily developed that would overcome an American ABM system, and besides, “the offensive improvement that its deployment is bound to stimulate certainly will render the system obsolete before it can be made operational.”¹⁶ The system envisaged, which the staunch ABM opponent Senator Edward Kennedy described as “the single most complex

undertaking man has yet set for himself in his time on earth,” required radars that could find objects beyond the horizon, identify and track incoming weapons, distinguish actual weapons from decoys and other atmospheric junk, and relay the information gathered to computer systems at various command and control operations, which then “must guide the outgoing missiles rapidly to the target so that the incoming missiles are destroyed high enough in the atmosphere to prevent serious damage.” Due to these complexities, much of the ABM debate in the US revolved around the issue of whether it was even realistic that such systems could be developed, particularly since testing them was “difficult if not impossible.”¹⁷ As Humphrey argued, there would be “no way to test it except under actual enemy attack.”¹⁸

Many complementary and competing interests recognised the value of developing an ABM program. According to Edward Reiss, the supporters of the ABM system in American officialdom represented “a potent mixture of strategic concerns and economic and bureaucratic self-interest.” The various service chiefs in the US armed forces “had long argued” in favour of the ABM. The US Army, in particular, did not have a role in the strategic nuclear missile system and fought to have the ABM program as its own. Many leading politicians also supported the idea, because of the “inherently attractive” idea of protecting Americans against Soviet missiles and the electoral value of supporting such a project. At the same time, for many the ABM symbolised “America’s commitment to keep a technological edge over the Soviets and a military role in space.” For its part, American industry had a clear interest in any new military program that depended heavily on research and development.¹⁹

Despite the growing pressure to develop an ABM system, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed that “the best defense was a good offense” and that the best way to protect the American people from nuclear attack was by enhancing the quality of the US strategic nuclear arsenal.²⁰ He considered anti-ballistic missile technologies immature and unreliable, arguing that they could be easily defeated with the use of decoys or multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs). The main outcome of developing an ABM system would be that the Soviet Union would simply increase the size and quality of its own strategic missile forces, a far less expensive undertaking than the development of a missile defence system.²¹ On the other hand, increasing the size of the American offensive nuclear forces would offset the Soviet Galosh system at a much lower cost than the Soviets had expended on its development. If the US insisted on countering the Soviet Union’s ABM system with its own, McNamara and other critics argued that the superpowers would “wind up with a new set of defensive weapons, more sophisticated offensive weapons, and no improvement in security on either side.”²²

China's entry into the nuclear club and the missile defence policies of the Soviet Union led influential groups within the US Senate, the military (the army particularly), and the defence industry to exert more pressure the President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara on the ABM issue. There was also a fear that Maoist China was becoming more threatening, due mainly to comments made by the Chinese leader himself. Shortly after acquiring his nuclear capability, and as his internal policies were resulting in the death of millions of his own citizens, Mao made it known that he did not fear nuclear war with the United States. “If the worse came to the worst and half of mankind died,” he had been quoted as stating, “the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to

the ground and the whole world would become socialist.”²³ However, several factors continued to work against the pro-ABM camp, including anti-ABM members of Congress led by Senator Edward Kennedy, Robert McNamara’s continued opposition to ABMs, growing opposition within the scientific community, the enormous costs of the Vietnam War, and finally, the emerging détente with the Soviet Union.²⁴

However, despite this opposition the Johnson Administration bowed to mounting pressure, and in September 1967 McNamara announced the establishment of the Sentinel program which would provide a “light” anti-ballistic missile defence of population centres, specifically against missiles launched by China.²⁵ The Sentinal ABM system was designed to provide for both long- and short-range interception of nuclear-armed ICBMs, by Spartan and Sprint anti-ballistic missiles respectively, both of which would also be armed with nuclear warheads. The Spartan and Sprint missiles would, according to plans, destroy or inactivate incoming nuclear-armed ICBMs in their terminal phase, meaning after they had re-entered the atmosphere in their descent toward their targets.²⁶

In Canada, the immediate official reaction to the US ABM program was mixed. As Ronald Purver explained in the midst of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) debate in the mid-1980s, Canadian governments had always “maintained a rather ambiguous, if not ambivalent, policy towards ballistic missile defence.”²⁷ James G. Fergusson goes further, arguing in his recent study of Canadian political responses to US ABM programs from 1950s to 2009, that Ottawa has historically intentionally avoided making firm decisions in this area “in order to avoid two perceived undesirable outcomes: an alienated ally or a divided nation and government.”²⁸ On 22 September 1967, following the announcement of the Sentinel program, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson told a press conference that

Canada had “no intention at this time of taking part in any such ABM system.”²⁹ He told the House of Commons on 25 September that Canada was “not involved in any way” and he thought that Canada should not become involved.³⁰ He also said, however, that he understood why the Americans felt that it was necessary to develop such a system.³¹ Pearson’s mixed message characterised the official Canadian stance on ABM for the next several years. The government regretted that the US had decided to develop its ABM system – the prime minister feared that the anti-ballistic missiles would destabilise the nuclear balance – and therefore would avoid directly participating in its construction and operation.³² But Canada’s close political, economic, and military relationship with the US, particularly in the defence of North American air space, complicated, even undercut, clear and unambiguous opposition.

More specifically, the ABM announcement made it difficult for the Pearson government to justify renewing the NORAD agreement, which was due to expire in 1968.³³ In 1966, US officials approached Canadian officials about starting talks on the renewal of NORAD, and hinted that they hoped that Canada would agree to alter the treaty to include “suitable provisions for incorporating an ABM system if the two countries decided to deploy one.” The Pearson government moved cautiously to avoid opposition among a Canadian public increasingly uneasy with the American alliance.³⁴ The earliest bilateral discussions took place during a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) meeting in October 1966.³⁵ Meanwhile, Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin and Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer advised Pearson that Canada should renew the agreement, arguing that it still performed necessary functions. On the other hand, the evolving international strategic environment, including the diminishing manned

bomber threat and the emergence of intercontinental ballistic missiles as the nuclear delivery method of choice, as well as American ABM plans and the likelihood that Washington would prefer to have the system operated within NORAD, led Pearson and some others in cabinet to question the long-term relevance of the treaty, particularly for Canada.³⁶

Pearson's uncertainty led him to summon Martin and other officials and inform them that "he would not approve the renewal of NORAD until Ottawa was given more information on American plans to deploy an ABM system."³⁷ The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, found himself attempting to convince sceptical members of cabinet, including Walter Gordon, Jean Marchand, Gérard Pelletier and Pierre Trudeau, that Canada's continued co-operation with the Americans in continental defence was still necessary. He stressed that NORAD remained relevant because the "Soviet Union would not put all its eggs in the missile basket" and neglect its bomber capability.³⁸ Pearson urged that the decision concerning Canada's future in NORAD needed to be considered in light of past and on-going changes in the international strategic environment. As well, he requested "full information on the implications for Canada of the possible deployment of an antiballistic missile system by the United States."³⁹

Thus, the renewal of NORAD became intertwined with the American ABM program, and the ongoing uncertainty about its operational specifics produced uncertainty among policymakers about Canada's future role in continental air defence.⁴⁰ Some clarification came from Robert McNamara in April 1967 when he told Minister of Defence Hellyer that Canadian territory would not be needed for the ABM system envisioned by the Americans.⁴¹ McNamara also told Hellyer that the renewal of NORAD and ABM should

be negotiated separately.⁴² In June, Hellyer told the House of Commons that re-signing the NORAD agreement “would not automatically commit Canada to participate in the A.B.M. program.”⁴³ By July the Canadian ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney, could report to Ottawa that the US would agree to an ‘ABM exclusion clause’ as a condition of NORAD’s renewal, meaning that “a Canadian decision to renew NORAD would not entail a commitment to participate in ABM.”⁴⁴ Ultimately, the Pearson government decided to go ahead with the renewal of NORAD, treating the ABM as a separate matter. In February 1968, the US government indicated its readiness to exchange notes renewing NORAD which would include an ABM exclusion clause. Even though Pearson’s retirement was imminent, the out-going cabinet agreed to extend NORAD on 14 March.⁴⁸ One year later to the day, on 14 March 1969, President Richard Nixon announced that the original Sentinel program would be replaced by Safeguard, a new system that would focus on Soviet, rather than Chinese, attacks on Minuteman ICBM sites. The Nixon Administration couched the Safeguard system in stabilising terms – that it would appear less threatening than Sentinel as its purpose was to defend twelve Minuteman missile sites rather than population centres – while at the same time justifying it as a response to the Soviet SS-9 ICBM and the development of Multiple-Missile Re-entry Vehicles (MRVs), which the Americans viewed as a threat to their own deterrent force.⁴⁹ The change of focus – from cities to ICBM missile sites – was made, according to President Nixon, because he had become convinced that “there is no way that we can adequately defend our cities without an unacceptable loss of life.” Thus, the primary purpose of the new system, and its main distinguishing feature compared to the Sentinal program, was the emphasis on protecting the US-based nuclear deterrent force. As Nixon

stated at the press conference announcing the establishment of the Safeguard program:

“When you are talking about protecting your deterrent, it need not be perfect. It is necessary only to protect enough of the deterrent that the retaliatory second strike will be of such magnitude that the enemy would think twice before launching a first strike.” The best way to protect American lives, he concluded, was by “protecting our deterrent, which is the best preventive for war.”⁵⁰

In the days following the Safeguard announcement, Canadian politicians debated the impact the system would have on international and Canadian security. Some expressed concern that ABM installations would be constructed close to the Canadian border, and large population centres, possibly exposing Canadians to fallout from exploding ABM missiles and incoming ICBMs. Many opposition MPs hoped that the new Trudeau government would take a firm position against the Safeguard program before visiting Washington later in the month, and that he would take up these concerns personally with the US president and defence officials. However, the new prime minister refused, arguing that he wished to remain free to criticise the program’s impact on global, not just Canadian security. To do so, he said that he would require more information, which he intended to obtain in meetings with political and military leaders. When speaking with the president, Trudeau would not ask “for a little more protection for Canadians” but would determine whether the Safeguard program constituted “an escalation and an increase of the danger of nuclear warfare or whether it is merely an operation which adds to the stability of the deterrent system.” If, after obtaining the necessary information he concluded that the American ABM system would lead to an escalation in the arms race and destabilise East-West relations, then he would condemn it: “We shall tell the United

States that we disapprove. If, on the other hand, we are convinced that the A.B.M. system is necessary though regrettable as a move by the United States, then we will have to decide whether or not we shall participate in the operation of that system.”⁵¹ Although he had not reached a final conclusion on the matter, he admitted on 23 May 1969, two months after his Washington visit, that his government was “not enthusiastic about the system” and that “if the Canadian government had the power to make a decision in this area I think we would suggest that the ABM system should not be proceeded with.”⁵²

In the end, numerous factors resulted in the abandonment of Safeguard during the administration of President Gerald Ford. The vast amounts of money needed to develop and deploy the system were gradually depleted by the Vietnam War, and according to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, the introduction of multiple warheads in the Soviet Union’s nuclear missile forces had essentially “nullified” the system’s usefulness, leading the committee to vote to deactivate it.⁵³ In addition, warmer relations between the superpowers had effectively undermined the arguments of the pro-ABM camp in the US Senate and elsewhere in American society. Both Washington and Moscow gradually came to realise that neither side could ever hope to win an ABM race and so they sought a means of “mutual restraint” on the development and deployment of the systems. These factors eventually led the two superpowers to agree to restrict their ballistic missile defence activities through the conclusion of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, which limited both countries to two ABM sites, one each for the defence of a city and an ICBM silo.⁵⁴ This number was limited to one ABM site, for either a city or a missile silo, in the 1974 ABM Protocol.⁵⁵

The Conservative Internationalist Defence of ABMs

As this political processes unfolded, the ABM issue attracted the attention of Canadians who were clearly divided when it come to the use of military versus diplomatic and multilateral tools. Canadians subscribing to a set of beliefs reflecting conservative internationalist thinking argued that an American ABM system would enhance the conditions for Western and even global security. Dr. Kenneth Hilborn, a professor of history at The University of Western Ontario and periodic foreign affairs correspondent for the conservative magazine *Canada Month*, explained in numerous articles and in testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, that the US needed to erect an ABM system and that Canada should support it. Numerous Soviet policies had come to threaten the second-strike capability of the US, including the quantitative and qualitative improvement of its nuclear arsenal, the development of its “Galosh” ABM system, and the implementation of other civil defence projects. According to Hilborn, the Soviet Union had “been doing enough of these things on a sufficient scale to worry the Nixon Administration.”⁵⁶ Among various options, an ABM system offered the best means of maintaining a convincing second-strike capability while not being “misinterpreted as part of a drive for first-strike capability.”⁵⁷

The Canadian defence analyst John Gellner also believed that an ABM system could help preserve the American second-strike capability, and by extension enhance international security. By the late 1960s, the US strategic force included approximately 1000 Minutemen ICBMs located in silos in Montana and North Dakota, the states where the first ABM installations of the Safeguard program would be located (in the end only

the North Dakota site was built). As Gellner told the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in May 1969, the Safeguard system would have fulfilled its purpose if it assured the survival of only 200 of these missiles, “because 200 Minutemen would make mincemeat out of the Soviet Union.” Gellner believed the ABM system envisioned by Washington would ensure the survival of a sufficient second strike force, and therefore was a justifiable investment.⁵⁸

Upon the announcement of the Sentinel program in 1967, the *Calgary Herald* argued that the Soviet Union’s own ABM program upset the strategic balance in its favour, forcing the US to respond with its own system to re-establish the strategic balance. Canadians critical of the ABM were “poorly placed to take a disdainful or critical attitude”, since the system was necessary to prevent a nuclear war from occurring. No one wanted a nuclear war, the newspapers editors argued, but hoping would not prevent one; “preventative action” would.⁵⁹ Nearly two years later the newspaper had not changed its view. Nixon’s ABM program was a legitimate response to Soviet actions and “displayed a sense of courageous realism.” Because the US was “committed not to launch a missile attack first”, it needed to ensure that a significant portion of its strategic missile forces survived a Soviet first-strike. “If the missile sites were unprotected and were destroyed in a surprise attack,” the newspaper argued, “the US would probably not survive.” By “defaulting (on) its defensive responsibilities” and not developing an ABM system, the US would “expose itself to blackmail or destruction.”⁶⁰

The Windsor Star’s editorial board also argued that ABM systems contributed to international security and in the long run would prevent nuclear war. The issue seemed “somewhat academic”, however, since if a nuclear war broke out “we all are likely to be

gone.” The only real defence against nuclear weapons was preventing their use, and the newspaper concluded that in the end “the US anti-ballistic missile system may be added deterrent” against their use by Moscow. Thus, the addition of anti-ballistic defences would not only protect American (and maybe even Canadian) citizens if a nuclear war broke out; such a system would ultimately decrease the likelihood that it would ever need to be put to use.⁶¹

An ABM system considered credible by Moscow would also help prevent Soviet aggression around the world. As Kenneth Hilborn explained, the ABM’s critics failed “to grasp one fundamental fact” about the US’s active military role in the world. Without “an American resolve to defend the far-flung US sphere of interest against Red encroachment,” he wrote in 1970, “there would be little to prevent the Soviet Union from doing to other peoples what it did to the Czechs.”⁶² Furthermore, the US commitment to its allies would be strengthened with the development of a missile shield and therefore have a positive impact in the area of nuclear proliferation. When a country such as India or Japan faced the threat of nuclear or conventional aggression from China, for example, Hilborn argued that “its willingness to do without a nuclear deterrent of its own” would depend “in large measure on the degree of confidence it has in being protected by the deterrent force of a friend or ally.” However, for America’s allies to remain confident in the ability of the US to defend them, the US needed to ensure that it continued to possess “a continuing ‘first-strike capability’ – that is, the capability of initiating a nuclear war ... without suffering unacceptable damage from [one's opponent].” An ABM system, he therefore argued, would prolong the period that the United States could “retain its present

undisputed first-strike capability" and by extension reinforce the credibility of its nuclear deterrent, in the process reassuring its allies of its commitment to their defence.⁶³

Just as scientists, strategists, politicians, and others debate the feasibility of constructing functional ballistic missile defence systems in the 21st century, the ABM debate of the 1960s also dealt with technical aspects. Canadian anti-missile defence supporters argued that no strategic weapon could be adequately tested in a non-conflict environment. Yet some nevertheless believed that the technology existed to create a working defence shield against Chinese and/or Soviet missiles.⁶⁴ John Gellner, who doubted that arms control negotiations would bear fruit in the near future, not only believed that workable anti-missile defence systems could be constructed, but that their development was necessary and even inevitable. Only a total global disarmament agreement or at the very least an agreement to "freeze weapons development at a certain point," he thought, could prevent the technological arms race from continuing. The dynamics of the arms race meant that the US and its allies could not allow the Soviets to move ahead in the area of weapons technology. "Neither offense nor defense can stand pat," he wrote, for "If the offense did, defense would become potentially so effective, albeit still never absolute, that the strike forces would lose their deterrent effect." If one side's ABM defences reached a certain level of proficiency, he argued, there would then be a greater temptation to launch a surprise attack. Thus, it was in the interest of both sides to develop effective missile defences.⁶⁵

Gellner characterised as "nonsense" the argument that such systems could only exist in the realm of science fiction. Of course there could be no absolute defence against nuclear weapons, but he pointed out that there was "no absolute defence against any

major weapon.” Partial defence systems against nuclear missiles could be constructed, he wrote, “just as partial defences can be set up against anything else,” and such partial systems could defend against a limited nuclear strike, protect a city from destruction, or maybe “even significantly lower the ‘megadeath’ rate in a nuclear war.”⁶⁶ Hilborn also believed that American scientists could develop a working system and that only those with inside (and classified) knowledge could know if such a system was possible. “The probable effectiveness of an ABM screen,” he wrote, “is something that can be estimated only by scientists with access to secret data derived from the most recent tests – in short, scientists associated with the US defence establishment” and attempts by those “without such information to question the system’s value are inherently unconvincing.”⁶⁷ Dr. G.R. Lindsay, chief of the Defence Research Analysis Establishment in the Department of National Defence, similarly informed members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in May 1969 that American scientists had made progress in the ABM area to the point where such systems could conceivably be made to work. The conception and development of anti-missile systems was made easier, they thought, after discovering that an incoming missile could be neutralised without making a direct hit.⁶⁸

The ABM debate also touched on several distinctively Canadian issues, including national sovereignty concerns related to the relationship of an ABM system to NORAD as well as the potential desire on the part of the US to base elements of the system on Canadian soil. For John Gellner, the question of whether or not the US ABM system would fall under NORAD was “of more than academic interest.” It amounted to a “serious political problem” for Canada because of its participation in NORAD and its lack of a clear ABM policy. It was only logical that Ottawa should agree to have the US

ABM system controlled and operated through NORAD, he thought, because to do otherwise “would deny the whole rationale of integrated air defense of North America, which is indivisible.”⁶⁹ Gellner believed that from a logistical standpoint the limited time available to respond to a nuclear attack required that decisions be “carried out by one, fully integrated organization.” On a practical level, while the ABM would have its own complex of radar, Gellner pointed out that the three ballistic missile early warning radars (BMEWS) and the space detection and tracking system (SPADATS), which tracked man-made earth-orbiting objects, were controlled by the US Air Force (USAF) and the information gathered from them would be transferred to NORAD and therefore used in any future ABM system. Gellner therefore believed that it would have been impractical not to operate the ABM under NORAD, and that if Canada decided not to participate it “would make for a rather awkward setup, with Canadian personnel in the integrated staffs excluded from what no doubt would be a substantial portion of the job.”⁷⁰

Some argued that rather than contributing financially to the development of an ABM system, Canada could contribute in other, more meaningful ways, such as by allowing components of the system to be stationed on Canadian territory. The Progressive Conservative MP Jack McIntosh (1958-1972) argued in the House of Commons that this was exactly the role Canada should have played. “If it were up to me,” he declared,

I would be in Washington today pressing the United States government to install more of these anti-ballistic missile sites much farther north, in our northern and Arctic territory. If there must be nuclear explosions of the type suggested by some people perhaps it would be better if these explosions took place over our Arctic or even farther away over Soviet Siberia. I think that would please us in western Canada much

more.”⁷¹

After all, argued the editorial board of the *Calgary Herald*, Canada possessed “lots of *unused* [italics added] space in the Arctic barrens which could be made available for selection of sites for ABM installations.” “Surely,” if the Soviets did launch a nuclear attack against North America, “it would be better ... that US ABM nuclear warheads would touch off Soviet nuclear explosions over the Arctic barrens instead of doing so just north of the US border – over Calgary, for example.”⁷² The editorial board of the *Winnipeg Free Press* agreed: the most logical alternative “would seem to be to place all or part of the defensive system in Canada, so that interception could take place far north of populated areas.”⁷³ Concerns about the impact that an ABM system might have on Canada's aboriginal peoples in the North did not appear prominently in the debate. It should also be noted these Arctic visions are somewhat naïve since the ABM systems being developed would not have the capability of intercepting incoming missiles in their mid-course phase (see above).

The ABM advocates ultimately dismissed concerns that an US ABM system would impinge upon Canadian sovereignty. Some even characterised these concerns as irrelevant since the launching of ABM missiles, and their transit through Canadian airspace, would be in response to a Soviet missile launch, which would enter Canada's airspace first. In his testimony before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, G.R. Lindsay stated that the location of ABM sites in the northern US made it “very evident” that any interceptions would likely take place over Canada. “Whether their altitude puts the missiles above the legal limit of national airspace, and into international outer space” was academic, he thought, because they would “only be

fired as a defence against overflight by ICBMs launched across Canada with destructive intent.”⁷⁴ Others picked up on this theme. The *Windsor Star* reminded its readers that it was “well to remember it would be enemy missiles (Russian or Chinese) which invaded Canadian air space first. The US anti-missiles would just be a response, and a response which came too late wouldn’t do Canada or the US any good.”⁷⁵

Finally, ABM advocates tried to assuage fears about possible environmental and physiological consequences of a missile interception over Canadian territory. “Contrary to popular belief,” the Minister of Defence Léo Cadieux argued, “the fallout resulting from high altitude nuclear blasts” would not “constitute a more serious hazard than that to which we have already been subjected during nuclear tests in the atmosphere.” Nevertheless, he admitted, under “unfavourable conditions” when an ABM missile might have engaged an enemy ICBM at a comparatively low altitude, several things might happen, including the starting of fires, breaking of windows, minor burns to exposed skin, and some temporary flash blindness. “These results are very minor,” he observed ominously, “compared with the casualties [which] would result in the vicinity of the target, or indeed over a wide area in the event that the attacking missile burst on the ground and produced widespread fallout.”⁷⁶

G.R. Lindsay similarly downplayed the threat of ABM fallout, the effects of which would “be pretty minor” compared with the fallout from explosions that would occur in the US and spread to Canada if they were not intercepted and allowed to explode on target. On the other hand, ABM defences would produce “virtually no fallout” and might “save a great deal of fallout in Canada, even if the bursts on the ground are in the United States.” Besides, Lindsay said, ABM explosions would occur at such high altitudes that

the radioactive material would remain in the atmosphere for so long and would “be so widely distributed that what finally comes to earth will not be a serious hazard to human life.” From the perspective of fallout, therefore, Lindsay argued that “ABM defence is a good thing and not a bad thing.”⁷⁷

Liberal Internationalists and the ABM Threat

Although both conservative and liberal internationalists believed that their views, translated into policy, would help stabilize the international security environment, they could not have been further apart on the ABM issue. Every argument advanced by the ABM supporters was challenged by Canadians subscribing to liberal internationalist perspectives and who viewed ABMs as contrary to Canadian national interests. These individuals and groups painted a dire picture of insecurity and instability, domestically and internationally, if Washington moved ahead with the development of an ABM system. In particular, they expressed deep concern about the potential impact of ABM systems on the so-called ‘balance of terror’. In April 1967, the Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer stated that Moscow would respond to the building of an ABM shield by increasing their offensive capabilities to the point where they would maintain a first-strike capability:

if we on the western side depend for our security on the nuclear stalemate, on having sufficient offensive power to penetrate Soviet defences and to be able to inflict unacceptable damage on them at any time even after the first strike, then they will have the same philosophy that they on their side will want to maintain sufficient offensive capability to enable them to inflict unacceptable

damage on the west, in spite of our defences in order to deter attack, and to be able to perform this even after a first strike, which of course we would never undertake.⁷⁸

The staunchly anti-nuclear NDP MP Andrew Brewin did not believe that an ABM system would increase the strength or security of the American nuclear deterrent. “The fact of the matter is,” he said, “for many years past there has been no defence, and in the foreseeable future there will be no defence, against an all-out air attack except the deterrence of the invulnerable American strategic forces.” As a result, he argued, Canada “should not spend a nickel on such a system” nor participate in any form.⁷⁹ The academic James Eayrs considered the March 1969 Safeguard decision a “mistake” arguing that the supposed benefits of the system were fictional.⁸⁰

ABM opponents also decried the idea (advanced by ABM supporters) that the US nuclear deterrent was insecure and thus needed the protection of an anti-ballistic missile shield. NDP leader Tommy Douglas declared that an ABM system “would not provide real security” to the US because its security actually rested on its “offensive capability and its four to one ratio in respect of international ballistic missiles vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its possession of the nuclear armed submarine armed with Polaris missiles.”⁸¹ University of Toronto chemistry professor and future Nobel laureate John Polanyi also criticised ABM supporters, especially defence analyst John Gellner, for claiming the US nuclear deterrent required protection in order to remain credible. In addition to the land-based Minuteman ICBM force, Polanyi pointed out that the US strategic nuclear force included approximately 650 nuclear missiles located in dozens of Polaris submarines, hundreds of manned nuclear bombers, and substantial nuclear-armed tactical air force

contingents based in Europe and on aircraft carriers. The destructive force remaining after a surprise Soviet attack would amount to “the equivalent of several hundred ICBMs,” and if a mere 100 of these reached their targets in the Soviet Union, according to US government estimates, “40 million Russians would be killed and well over half the nation’s industry would be destroyed.”⁸²

Others questioned the wisdom of developing an ABM system when tension in the East-West relationship seemed to be diminishing. The emerging stability rested to a large degree on the perceived invulnerability of each side’s retaliatory forces through their hardening and dispersal, and Thomas Hockin, a Canadian scholar at Harvard University, wrote that even if the US or the Soviet Union fired every missile they possessed neither could “possibly be sure that the other side would not be able to reply with devastating effect from its hidden submarines and almost invulnerable hardened missile sites.” This “mutual invulnerability made the deterrent relatively stable”, and in Hockin’s opinion, ABM systems would threaten that stability.⁸³ Dr. Arthur Porter, described as one of Canada’s most eminent defence research scholars, also believed that a US ABM system would upset “the fine balance” between the superpowers.⁸⁴

The news media also weighed in on the debate over the stabilising or destabilising qualities of ABM systems. The *Toronto Star* observed that “mutual nuclear deterrence” depended on the belief that both sides could destroy one another, even after absorbing a first strike, and therefore, Canada’s primary concern was to ensure that both sides continued to believe that they possessed this ability. This should involve “reasonable co-operation” with the Americans for the defence of its nuclear forces; however, these contributions should remain “within limits” that excluded the stationing of American

nuclear delivery systems on Canadian territory or other participation in an ABM system. The development of such a system, the newspaper's editorial board argued, would be "an error" likely to "stimulate the arms race and unsettle the balance between the nuclear giants".⁸⁵

The *Globe and Mail* also observed that in their efforts to develop ABM defences, Washington and Moscow appeared "poised for a drastic escalation of the arms race that could undermine all their previous efforts." The strategic balance had become threatened "by moves on both sides to develop defensive networks of so-called anti-missile missiles." The newspaper's editorial board warned that "such a costly and perilous escalation of the arms race" needed to be avoided and demanded a "more imaginative and drastic response" involving both sides, including a possible agreement to ban the development of such systems. The most important factor to consider was whether ABMs "would tend to be a stabilizing factor in our so-called 'balance of terror'".⁸⁶ For better or worse, the "balance of terror" provided an element of security, and the editors of the *Winnipeg Free Press* argued that "There must surely be, in this fact, something that brings to all men and all nations a restraint, a care and a common concern out of which some measure of international security can be restored to this small planet."⁸⁷

Others feared that the development of ABM systems would increase the likelihood of one side determining that launching a nuclear first strike was in their interest. University of Toronto lecturer H. Paul Simon believed that "damage limiting" systems, such as ABMs, "would assuredly lead to the destruction of one power's assured capability to destroy the other's society, and would thus subvert the very essence of the mutuality and therefore the stability of strategic deterrence." The Soviet Union might decide to launch a

pre-emptive first strike rather than attempt to match an American system, which would be too financially costly. On the other hand, if both sides believed that they possessed the “assured capability” to destroy each other in response to a first strike, the international strategic environment would remain “mutually stable.” For Simon, enacting policies that threatened this mutual stability amounted to “an act of madness.”⁸⁸ The nationalist academic John Warnock argued that the development of an ABM system in North America made a nuclear first strike by the US more likely. By the 1970s, the US would have “a considerable lead in strategic weapons” and modernisation programs would have made its strategic arsenal more effective, meaning that Washington “could conceivably be in a position to launch a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union.” If it worked, Warnock predicted, most Soviet ICBMs that escaped a US first-strike would be intercepted, increasing the temptation to strike first “while the advantage is with the United States.”⁸⁹ The editors of the *Globe and Mail* also feared that one side, the Americans or the Soviets, might “be tempted to adopt more reckless foreign policies, or even to launch a surprise ‘first strike’” if the balance of terror appeared to tip against them.⁹⁰

Another common liberal internationalist argument was that ABM systems would escalate the arms race. The delegates at the 1967 NDP Federal Convention considered the possible development of “two massive and extremely expensive antiballistic missile systems” a backward step because of their extreme cost and because they “would speed up the arms race and make arms control almost impossible.”⁹¹ One of the party’s most vocal nuclear critics, Andrew Brewin, declared that an American ABM system would add “absolutely nothing to the security of North America or the world” and that it marked a

further step in what Robert McNamara had described as ““the mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry.””⁹² In May 1971, he repeated these views while also welcoming the apparent movement toward the conclusion of a US-Soviet anti-ballistic missile accord: “We (the NDP) have stated many times in this House that multiplication of the antiballistic missile systems is another step in the mad momentum of the nuclear arms race ...”⁹³

In his book *Megamurder*, the Canadian arms control and disarmament negotiator General E.L.M. Burns argued that by the 1960s the greatest threat to Western democracy (and survival) was not Soviet or Chinese-style communism but rather the threat of nuclear war itself. However, security could not be founded “on a race for military superiority.” The constant development of new weapons systems, including defences against ICBMs and systems to defeat ABMs, represented the most significant threat to global security. The arms race threatened the stability upon which nuclear deterrence rested, and Burns implored his former colleagues in the military establishment to think about the consequences of their actions:

It is to be hoped that all military men ..., not only in the United States but in allied countries and also in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, will ask themselves whether there can ever be peace and safety, whether the freedoms and rights of men can be secure in a world under the threat of nuclear war. Is it not their true duty to their countrymen to find ways to remove that threat? A way must be found to protect liberty and the values of civilization which does not depend on the ultimate possibility of Megamurder.⁹⁴

For Burns, peace required an end to the arms race, and therefore, the successful conclusion of arms control and disarmament agreements. However, this could not happen while new destabilising weapons, such as ABMs, continued to be developed.

Several Canadian scholars and defence analysts warned that the consequences of ABM systems for arms control negotiations would be grave. Thomas Hockin, for instance, wrote that their construction would remove “the healthy unilateral restraints” that prevented both the United States and the Soviet Union from intensifying the arms race.⁹⁵ John Warnock believed that the American ABM program could “hinder or prevent the Soviet Union and the United States from reaching any meaningful agreement at the promised strategic arms limitations talks.”⁹⁶ Several Trent University professors expressed similar apprehensions in a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau. “We have sufficient evidence ... to conclude that the ‘Safeguard’ ABM system will be a peril to mankind” that would intensify the arms race and result in “an increase in the world nuclear arsenal, a retrograde rather than a progressive step.” Thus, rather than participating in or otherwise supporting the US ABM system, a responsible Canadian policy would be to “oppose any measures, undertaken by any power, which reduce the possibility of disarmament.”⁹⁷

In addition to fuelling the arms race between the superpowers and damage arms control efforts, some Canadians feared that the development of an American ABM system would convince other countries to seek independent nuclear capabilities, or contribute to horizontal nuclear proliferation. For example, an ABM arms race between the US and the Soviet Union could have raised European concerns about the imminence of war and lead to renewed efforts on the part of several European countries “to buttress

deterrence through the development of their own ballistic missile defenses or through control over nuclear strike forces.”⁹⁸ Thomas Hockin wondered how Japan and India would respond to the impression that Washington feared the Chinese bomb to such an extent that it was willing to spend billions of dollars to get “questionable (and short-term) immunity.” How could the US oppose these countries producing their own nuclear weapons when they arguably faced a greater threat from China than the US?⁹⁹

The *Globe and Mail* likewise viewed the development of ABM systems as potentially disastrous for the future of the recently-negotiated nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Contrary to the pro-ABM argument that an American ABM system would increase the confidence of Asian countries in the US nuclear deterrent, what the non-nuclear powers really wanted “as the price for their own foreswearing of nuclear weapons” was that “Russia and the United States make some corresponding move to reverse the arms race.” If the two powers moved ahead with their ABM plans, the newspaper’s editors believed that the non-nuclear powers would be less likely to unilaterally disavow the development of their own independent nuclear arsenals.¹⁰⁰

Aside from strategic concerns which dominated the liberal internationalist narrative throughout the ABM debate, many also argued that missile defence systems were simply technologically unfeasible and the stuff of fantasy.¹⁰¹ NDP MP Andrew Brewin declared in June 1967 that “There is no reason to believe that this particular form of defence will provide security.” He pointed to sceptics in the US, including Robert McNamara, who argued that “once you move ahead to provide a defence against a threat that exists today then a new development of offensive power takes place almost immediately.”¹⁰² Several critics also stressed the technical and practical problems that made large-scale ABM

systems unrealistic. Thomas Hockin, for example, argued that each target would require several ABM batteries to ensure their protection, a prohibitively expensive proposition. At a cost of tens of billions of dollars to produce a system that might protect 35% of the population, the Soviets could simply build more missiles, far more cheaply than developing their own ABM system, and swamp American ABM defences. The US would spend around \$100 billion on questionable defences which the Soviets could easily defeat by spending one-tenth that amount: “Looks foolish, doesn’t it?”¹⁰³

John Warnock described several simple counter-measures that could render an ABM shield relatively useless. Incoming missiles could be hardened to withstand the blast of interceptor missiles, and they could also be given “a last minute kick” that would “confuse the tracking system.” The enemy could also employ several other measures to confuse radar and tracking systems. Along its flight-path an ICBM could be “made to disintegrate into fragments ... creating space junk which the radar system finds difficult to distinguish from the actual warhead.” In addition, decoys, such as “metal foil balloons in the shape of warheads”, could be used, and each ICBM could “carry aloft a huge amount of Chaff – fine metal wires”, which when released “would create large-scale radar reflection and background noise, making it difficult to detect or track an incoming missile.”¹⁰⁴

Others feared that technical errors in the complex operating system of an ABM system could create a crisis out of nothing. An “extremely important aspect” of the ABM problem, Arther Porter explained, involved the role of computers. In particular, he worried that the computers operating the system might detect ‘phantom’ missiles: “There may not be a threat at all. You can visualize certain situations which are going to cause

confusion – wild ducks or geese, all kinds of meteorites and certain kinds of radar echoes.”¹⁰⁵ The fear also existed that there would be a lack of human control over the proposed system. As one parliamentarian explained: “The A.B.M. system probably may be so automated that human decision will not enter into the question of whether a defensive missile is to be fired or not fired” making it entirely possible that the system could fire an anti-ballistic missile “without human decision, at a piece of space hardware returning to earth.”¹⁰⁶ In the worst case scenario, a false reading, alert or launch could precipitate a nuclear exchange.

The critics also stressed the negative effects an ABM system could have on Canadian sovereignty, as well as the security of Canada’s environment and its people. One major concern was that the US would request the use of Canadian territory for its ABM system and that the Canadian government would relent. A *Globe and Mail* editorial entitled “A madness involving Canada” dismissed American assurances that its ABM system would not be operated within NORAD and that Canadian territory would not be required. The newspaper’s editors expected the Pentagon would pressure Canada into accepting at least a radar site somewhere in the Great Lakes region.¹⁰⁷ Others claimed that the American ABM program would violate bilateral Canada-US agreements that affected Canada’s sovereignty. MP J.M. Forrestall (PC) asked Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp whether there was any truth to the rumour that the US Congress was contemplating placing “water-based anti-ballistic missiles on the Great Lakes” (and off the coast of Alaska and around Baffin Bay), and therefore whether the US regarded the Rush-Bagot Treaty null and void.¹⁰⁸

Rather than provide the US access to Canadian territory for its ABM system, Paris J. Arnopoulos, a professor of political science at Concordia University, told the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence that Canada could make a unique contribution to global security by hosting an international radar detection system. To do so, Canada would have to refuse to participate in an American ABM system and pass legislation to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Canadian-based international monitoring system would “offer reciprocal information to both the U.S. and S.U., and convert all detection facilities on Canadian soil to warn both sides” of an impending attack.¹⁰⁹ The *Toronto Daily Star* similarly proposed that a more appropriate Canadian policy would have been “to withdraw from NORAD and instead work for the development of an independent international warning system on Canadian soil which would give both the United States and the Soviet Union early warning of any hostile move by the other.” “Might this not,” the newspaper asked, “do more to reduce the danger of war than Canadian participation in US defence plans?”¹¹⁰

Others concluded, however, that whether or not Canada contributed physical territory to the ABM system, the country would nevertheless be participating in its operation through NORAD. According to John Warnock, this was the case regardless of the “ABM Clause” in the 1968 renewal agreement, which stated that Canada’s participation in NORAD would “not involve in any way a ... commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence.” In fact, he argued, an ABM system would inevitably “be coordinated under the NORAD system” since incoming missiles would be detected using information from BMEWS and later OTH-R systems operated by NORAD. The real reason the Canadian government had refused to participate *officially* in the proposed

system, he thought, was related to domestic political considerations. “The fact that the Canadian government has taken this illogical position,” he declared, “is undoubtedly due to political pressures in Canada against the introduction of the ABM and the desire of both the Trudeau and Pearson Governments to avoid another nuclear weapons crisis.”¹¹¹

Even if Canada denied the Americans access to territory, some argued that the country’s sovereignty would be challenged in other ways. According to the *Toronto Daily Star*, “Canada’s sovereignty [was] very much at stake” based on two legal claims: first, American missiles would transit Canadian airspace before (and possibly as) they intercepted incoming ICBMs; and second, the fallout resulting from any explosions would contaminate Canadian air, land and waterways. Professor Edward McWhinney, the director of the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University, argued that an American ABM passing through Canadian airspace “would be an ‘unnatural user’ and something we (Canada) would be entitled to control unless we made a specific agreement to give this control up.” If the trajectory of ABMs launched from Great Falls, Montana, and Grand Forks, North Dakota, did not “reach international airspace before crossing over Canada”, Ottawa would have “every right to insist that they be situated elsewhere.” The newspaper then suggested that Canada could apply existing bilateral arrangements to control cross-border industrial pollutants to the ABM issue:

It might be stretching a point to liken smelter smoke to nuclear fallout, but the principle is the same, in law, and the precedent was set by Canada and the United States. Operations on one side of the border must not result in pollution on the other side of the border.

Canada would therefore “have every legal right ... to insist that our airspace not be polluted.”¹¹² A group of Trent University professors agreed in their view that a functioning system could present “a profound intervention into Canadian affairs” because ABM missiles would likely transit Canadian airspace, produce fallout in case of explosion, and all with little to no consultation from Washington.¹¹³

Much of the opposition to the US ABM program derived from the fears about potential environmental and physiological effects of nuclear explosions occurring over or near Canadian territory. Although they appeared peripheral to the strategic implications of ABM systems, many inside and outside government circles raised concerns about the possible location of ABM installations. The stakes were indeed significant for Canada, according to the *Globe and Mail*, since Canada’s defences were so “linked with those of the United States, and since our most populous areas would be vulnerable to the fallout from enemy missiles exploded far out in space.”¹¹⁴ Even Canada’s chief arms control negotiator in Geneva, George Ignatieff, felt compelled to issue a statement warning about the possible fallout effects of such a system. Tommy Douglas quoted Ignatieff in the House of Commons: “Canada is placed in the most dangerous position of any country by the galloping arm’s race between the United States and the Soviet Union. If this race gets out of hand, it could be catastrophic for Canada which lies between the nuclear giants.”¹¹⁵

Those who argued that an ABM system would pose fallout risks naturally focussed much of their attention on the potential environmental and physiological impact on Canada and Canadian citizens. The Manhattan Project scientist Dr. Ralph Lapp warned that Canadians would experience eye damage from exposure to high-altitude blasts and face the effects of radioactive fallout being blown into Canada from the United States

following ABM explosions or possibly from ICBMs exploding over Canadian territory.¹¹⁶ James Eayrs used emotional language to describe the impact an American ABM program would have on Canadians. The March 1969 Safeguard announcement marked a “black Friday” for Canada, one which revealed that in order protect the American people, Washington was willing to sacrifice Canadian lives in what amounted to “a new twist to the old ‘good neighbour policy’.”¹¹⁷ Clearly, while many Canadians expressed concerns about the effects that an American ABM system would have on international security, the strength and credibility of the Western nuclear deterrent, and the East-West nuclear balance, and the arms race, they were also concerned about how it would impinge upon Canadian sovereignty, as well as diminish the physical security of Canadian territory and the Canadian people.

Conclusion

The 1960s ABM debate – which involved politicians, government officials, defence strategists and analysts, academics, the media, and the general public – reveals a great deal about how Canadians thought the uneasy East-West relationship could be most effectively managed. They approached the ABM issue from very different perspectives; however, their views were rooted in the common search for Canadian as well as international security. Much like the nuclear acquisition debate earlier in the decade, the ABM debate exposed clear divisions within Canadian society. On the one hand, many Canadians favoured a 'hard power' approach, arguing that national and international security would be enhanced through an emphasis on military strength and the buttressing of the Western nuclear deterrent with ABM systems. The opponents, however, viewed

these systems as inherently destabilizing and favoured instead an emphasis on multilateralism and arms control as the best means to achieving Canada's foreign and security policy aims.

As James G. Fergusson has recently shown in his history of ABM policymaking in Canada, the possibility of constructing defensive shields against inter-continental ballistic missiles has been a complicating irritant in Canada-US relations since the 1950s. But the political (and public) propensity to see the development of an ABM system and NORAD's renewal as mutually-dependent reflects a certain naivety on the part of Canadians regarding the nature of the Canada-US continental security relationship as well as the requirements of missile defence. After all, as Jockel and Sokolsky have argued, from the US perspective NORAD has always had limited air defence and aerospace surveillance functions, and while the Americans may have at times preferred to incorporate ABM (and later ballistic missile defence [BMD]) systems into NORAD, this was never the only option. The fact that Washington agreed to the 'ABM exclusion clause' in 1967 and subsequently continued to agree renew NORAD despite Canadian reservations about ABM/BMD reveals that Canadians, whether of the conservative or liberal internationalist ilk, have consistently (and naively) exaggerated the connection between the two. Indeed, after Canada again openly rejected participation in a BMD system in 2005, the two countries renewed NORAD, for the first time indefinitely in 2006.¹¹⁸

But with the election of Donald J. Trump as US president, the issue may once again present challenges to the bilateral relationship. Although it is still too early to know exactly the future nature of the Trump administration's continental defence strategies,

candidate Trump did indicate on the campaign trail that he believed the US required a missile shield against heightened threats from states like Iran and North Korea, and that the country's BMD capabilities had been degraded during the Obama years to the detriment of US security.¹¹⁹ Trump's campaign slogan, 'America First', also gives the impression that when it comes to defence and security policies, the new president "might favor homeland missile defense equipment — designed to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles — over overseas-based, regional-focused assets."¹²⁰ Interestingly, for the first time in well over a decade it seems the governments of Canada and the US may be moving closer together in their views on BMD. A consultation document issued by Canada's defence minister Harjit Sajjan in April 2016 indicates that Canada may be more open to participating in the US BMD as it recognizes "the increase in the number of countries with access to ballistic missile technology and their potential to reach North America" and that "this threat is expected to endure and grow more sophisticated in the coming decades."¹²¹ And as the most recent defence policy review (2017) states that "Canada will work closely with the United States to ensure that NORAD is fully prepared to confront rapidly evolving threats...", the question remains whether in future bi-lateral discussions surrounding BMD the US will be as willing to separate continental air defence and aerospace surveillance from missile defence as it has been in the past.¹²²

As it stands now, however, Canada does not participate officially in the US ballistic missile defence system. Bilateral Canada-US negotiations and the political and public debate leading to the February 2005 decision of the government of Liberal Party Prime Minister Paul Martin to pass on participating in US BMD programs paralleled the 1960's ABM debate in many ways.¹²³ Supporters of the earlier programs argued that they would

provide a necessary and effective defence and deterrent against Chinese and/or Soviet attack; current Canadian BMD proponents stress that the system is required as a defence and deterrent against the emerging nuclear weapon threat posed by China, as well as by so-called 'rogue states', such as Iran and North Korea.¹²⁴ They also claim that the system is economically and technically feasible. Canadian opponents of BMD, on the other hand, believe that it is economically wasteful, technically unfeasible, and that it contradicts arms control tradition most clearly in the form of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, from which the George W. Bush administration formally withdrew in June 2002. In addition, the BMD opponents, in a manner reminiscent of their anti-ABM counterparts in the late 1960s, argue that the construction of an anti-ballistic missile shield will encourage nuclear weapon states such as Russia and China to expand and modernise their nuclear arsenals and/or develop anti-ballistic missile systems of their own, thus sparking a new cold war-style arms race.¹²⁵ The similarities between the 21st century BMD debate and the ABM debate of the 1960s highlight the existence of long-term divisions in Canadian society over how to respond to the real threat posed by nuclear weapons in ways that will best enhance the security of Canadians and the international system. These tensions will undoubtedly persist as the debate surrounding ABM / BMD systems continue into the Trudeau-Trump era of Canada-US relations.

¹ Trudeau's Washington Press Club Speech, March 25, 1969, CBC Digital Archives. URL <http://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1797537698>.

² A very needed and welcome recent contribution is *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009* (Toronto and Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) by James G. Fergusson.

³ Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd edition (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1997), p. 57.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Don Munton and Tom Keating, 'Internationalism and the Canadian Public,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 34, 3 (September 2001): p. 547.

⁶ Ibid, p. 545.

⁷ Don Munton, 'Whither Internationalism?', *International Journal*, 58, 1 (Winter 2002-03): p. 162.

⁸ See Richard L. Kugler, *The Great Strategy Debate: NATO's Evolution in the 1960s* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1991) for a detailed account of the shift from massive retaliation to mutual assured destruction (MAD) in US strategic thinking, reflecting the recognition that neither the US/West or the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war since both sides possessed enough nuclear weapons to absorb a first-strike and respond with a devastating second-strike.

⁹ *Anti-Ballistic Missile: Yes or No?* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1969), p. x.

¹⁰ See *Anti-Ballistic Missiles: Yes or No?*; J.I. Coffey, "The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 45, issue 3 (April 1967): p. 403-413; Thomas A. Halsted, "Lobbying Against the ABM, 1967-1970," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 27, no. 4 (1971): p. 23-28; Aaron Wildavsky, "The Politics of ABM," *Commentary*, vol. 48, no. 5 (Nov. 1969): p. 55-63.

¹¹ Coffey, *The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate*, p. 404.

¹² The Golash ABM system was deployed around Moscow in the 1960s. It possessed 64 long-range nuclear-armed interceptors that would be launched against incoming enemy warheads. The system was supported by two long-range surveillance radars. See George Lewis and Theodore Postol, "Portrait of a bad idea," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (July/August 1997): p. 18-25.

¹³ *Anti-Ballistic Missiles: Yes or No?*, p. xxvi.

¹⁴ Wildavsky, *The Politics of ABM*, p. 58.

¹⁵ *Anti-Ballistic Missiles: Yes or No?*, p. xxvi.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. xxv.

¹⁷ Wildavsky, *The Politics of ABM*, p. 56-57.

¹⁸ *Anti-Ballistic Missiles: Yes or No?*, p. xxv.

¹⁹ Edward Reiss, *The Strategic Defense Initiative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 22-23.

²⁰ John Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada*. Toronto: New Press, 1970, p. 203.

²¹ Reiss, *The Strategic Defense Initiative*, p. 27; Donald R. Baucom, *The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), p. 33. It should be noted that the offensive option was not necessarily always the cheapest. See John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, "Britain and the chevaline project: The hidden nuclear programmes, 1967-82," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 26, issue 4 (2003): p. 124-155, for an account of the massive cost over-runs of the United Kingdom's secret 'Chevaline' project aimed at improving the ability of the country's nuclear-armed missiles to penetrate the Soviet Golash ABM system around Moscow.

²² Baucom, *The Origins of SDI*, p. 33.

²³ Francis J. Gavin, "Nuclear Proliferation: Rogue States and Lessons from the Past," (LBJ School of Public Affairs, 10 November 2004) <<http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/fall2004/gavin.html>>

²⁴ Baucom, *The Origins of SDI*, p. 26-27, 33-34.

²⁵ Reiss, *The Strategic Defense Initiative*, p. 26-27. For further information on McNamara's opposition to ABM systems, see Baucom, *The Origins of SDI*, p. 22-24.

²⁶ Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems," *Scientific American*, 218/3 (March 1968): p. 21.

²⁷ Ronald Purver, "Ballistic Missile Defence and Canada," in Charles-Phillipe David, Lawrence S. Hagen, John G.H. Halstead, Ronald G. Purver, *Canadian Perspectives on the SDI* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985), p. 11.

²⁸ Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, p. 2.

- ²⁹ House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 7 March 1968, p. 327. For discussion on the formulation of Pearson's September 1967 ABM statement, see Privy Council Office, *Cabinet Discussions*, 18 September 1967.
- ³⁰ Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth*, p. 206.
- ³¹ Tom Hazlitt, "PM 'regrets' US missile plan," *Toronto Daily Star*, 23 September 1967.
- ³² See John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, vol. 2, *Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), p. 383.
- ³³ For a detailed account of evolving Canadian perspectives on the formation and rationale behind NORAD, see David Cox, "Canada and NORAD, 1958-1978: A Cautionary Retrospective," *Aurora Papers 1* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985).
- ³⁴ Paul Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 79-80; Joel J. Sokolsky, "Changing Strategies, Technologies and Organization: The Continuing Debate on NORAD and the Strategic Defense Initiative," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 19, no. 4 (Dec., 1986): p. 756.
- ³⁵ Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 383-384.
- ³⁶ Greg Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), p. 116.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 117 and Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 384.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 384.
- ⁴⁰ See Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 383-384, for an overview of the relationship between the renewal of NORAD and Canada's possible participation in the US ABM system.
- ⁴¹ Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies*, p. 117.
- ⁴² Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 384.
- ⁴³ House of Commons, *Debates*, 22 June 1967, p. 1817.
- ⁴⁴ Fergusson, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009*, p. 46-50.
- ⁴⁸ Hilliker and Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs*, p. 384. According to David Cox, Canada opted out of possible participation in an ABM system because it was clearly at odds with Ottawa's "broad agenda for strategic arms control." David Cox, "Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense," in Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (eds.), *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1992), p. 253.
- ⁴⁹ Reiss, p. 30; Baucom, p. 41.
- ⁵⁰ Richard Nixon, "108 – The President's News Conference, March 14, 1969," The American Presidency Project: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1951>.
- ⁵¹ House of Commons, *Debates*, 19 March 1969, p. 6854, 6851. Trudeau elaborated on these issues following Question Period on 17 March in discussions with reporters. See "Prime Minister's Remarks Following Question Period, March 17, 1969," *Voice of Women Papers*, vol. 44, file 24, Library and Archives Canada.
- ⁵² House of Commons, *Debates*, 23 May 1969, p. 8996-8997.
- ⁵³ John W. Finney, "Safeguard ABM System to Shut Down," *New York Times*, 25 November 1975.
- ⁵⁴ Reiss, p. 32.
- ⁵⁵ See "ABM Treaty: 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty": <http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/74protocol.htm>
- ⁵⁶ Kenneth Hilborn, "Balance of Terror," *Canada Month* (6/69): p. 18. See also House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 19 June 1969, p. 1762-1763.
- ⁵⁷ Hilborn, "Balance of Terror," p. 18.

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- ⁵⁸ House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 27 May 1969, p. 1655.
- ⁵⁹ *Calgary Herald*, 21 September 1967.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 17 March 1969. The newspaper erroneously stated the the US would not strike first with nuclear weapons – the US maintained a ‘first-use posture’ in the 1960s and continues to do so today.
- ⁶¹ *Windsor Star*, 21 March 1969.
- ⁶² Kenneth Hilborn, “Realism and the ABM,” *Canada Month* (5/70): p. 12.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁴ See Coffey, *The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate*, p. 403, 405, for a discussion about the belief among some that ABM systems were technically feasible.
- ⁶⁵ John Gellner, “The new rules for Canada’s NORAD role,” *Globe and Mail*, 21 April 1967.
- ⁶⁶ Gellner, “The new rules for Canada’s NORAD role.”
- ⁶⁷ Hilborn, “Balance of Terror,” p. 18.
- ⁶⁸ House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 21 May 1969, p. 1589.
- ⁶⁹ John Gellner, “Mixed-up Sentinel,” *Globe and Mail*, 13 June 1968.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.* It should be noted that Canadian military staff would have been present at some, but not all, of these radar sites.
- ⁷¹ House of Commons, *Debates*, 19 March 1969, p. 6871.
- ⁷² *Calgary Herald*, 21 September 1967.
- ⁷³ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 March 1969.
- ⁷⁴ House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 22 May 1969, p. 1644.
- ⁷⁵ *Windsor Star*, 21 March 1969.
- ⁷⁶ House of Commons, *Debates*, 19 March 1969, p. 6860.
- ⁷⁷ House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 21 May 1969, p. 1615; 22 May 1969, p. 1615, 1624, 1644.
- ⁷⁸ House of Commons, *Debates*, 11 April 1967, p. 14790.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7428-7429.
- ⁸⁰ *Montreal Star*, 17 March 1969.
- ⁸¹ House of Commons, *Debates*, 11 April 1967, p. 6848.
- ⁸² John C. Polanyi, “Questioning Nixon’s decision to expand Safeguard,” *Globe and Mail*, 10 February 1970.
- ⁸³ Thomas Hockin, “The Dangers of Thinking of an Anti-Missile Defence,” *Commentator*, v. 10, no. 4 (April 1966): p. 16.
- ⁸⁴ Glen Allen, “U of T professor says ABM imperils Cold War balance,” *Toronto Daily Star*, 24 March 1969.
- ⁸⁵ *Toronto Daily Star*, 17 April 1969.
- ⁸⁶ *Globe and Mail*, 9 January 1967; See *Globe and Mail*, 18 March 1969.
- ⁸⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 22 September 1967.
- ⁸⁸ Simon, “ABMs for Canada”, *Canadian Forum* (September 1969): p. 125-126.
- ⁸⁹ John Warnock, “Canada and North American Defence,” in Lewis Hertzman, John Warnock, Thomas Hockin, *Alliances and Illusions: Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1969), p. 79.
- ⁹⁰ *Globe and Mail*, 5 April 1967.
- ⁹¹ New Democratic Party (Canada), *New Democratic Policies, 1961-1976*, (1976): p. 100.
- ⁹² House of Commons, *Debates*, 23 April 1969, p. 7890.
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6043.

- ⁹⁴ E.L.M. Burns, *Megamurder* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited, 1966), p. 3, 7, 223-224, 255.
- ⁹⁵ Hockin, "The Dangers of Thinking of an Anti-Missile Defence," p. 17.
- ⁹⁶ Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth*, p. 202.
- ⁹⁷ Letter from Trent University professors to Prime Minister Trudeau, 21 March 1969, Denis Smith Papers, box 1, file 27, Trent University Archives.
- ⁹⁸ Coffey, *The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate*, p. 411.
- ⁹⁹ Hockin, "The Dangers of Thinking of an Anti-Missile Defence," p. 17.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Globe and Mail*, 21 September 1967. The formal negotiations on the NPT ended in August 1967 when the US and the Soviet Union separately introduced identical draft treaties to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. While formal negotiations had ended, the *Globe and Mail* was concerned with the future ratification of the treaty, particularly by smaller non-nuclear countries.
- ¹⁰¹ W.H. Pope, "Canada, NORAD and Anti-Ballistic Missiles," *Canadian Dimension*, v. 4, no. 4 (May-June 1967): p. 6.
- ¹⁰² House of Commons, *Debates*, 22 June 1967, p. 1854.
- ¹⁰³ Hockin, "The Dangers of Thinking of an Anti-Missile Defence," p. 16-17.
- ¹⁰⁴ Warnock, "Canada and North American Defence," p. 71-72; *Globe and Mail*, 8 May 1969. Allen, "U of T professor says ABM imperils Cold War balance."
- ¹⁰⁵ Allen, "U of T professor says ABM imperils Cold War balance." It should be noted that "phantom missiles" are a problem with or without ABM systems.
- ¹⁰⁶ House of Commons, *Debates*, 19 March 1969, p. 6878.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Globe and Mail*, 21 September 1967; see also Bruce MacDonald, "Pentagon covets site in Canada for anti-ballistic missile system," *Globe and Mail*, 20 September 1967.
- ¹⁰⁸ House of Commons, *Debates*, 9 March 1970, p. 4526-4527.
- ¹⁰⁹ House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, 19 June 1969, p. 1741.
- ¹¹⁰ *Toronto Daily Star*, 13 November 1969.
- ¹¹¹ Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth*, p. 208-209.
- ¹¹² *Toronto Daily Star*, 20 March 1969.
- ¹¹³ Denis Smith Papers, box 1, file 27, Trent University Archives.
- ¹¹⁴ *Globe and Mail*, 9 January 1967.
- ¹¹⁵ House of Commons, *Debates*, 19 March 1969, p. 6848.
- ¹¹⁶ Warnock, *Partner to Behemoth*, p. 215-216. See also House of Commons, *Debates*, 13 October 1967, p. 3062.
- ¹¹⁷ *Montreal Star*, 17 March 1969.
- ¹¹⁸ See Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "NORAD does not need saving," *International Journal*, vol. 70/2 (2015): p. 188-195.
- ¹¹⁹ Thomas Donnelly, "Giving Trump's national security speech its due," 7 September 2016: <https://www.aei.org/publication/giving-trumps-national-security-speech-its-due/>.
- ¹²⁰ Jon Harper, "Trump expected to ramp up missile defense," *National Defense (NDIA's Business and Technology Magazine)*, January 2017: <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2017/January/Pages/TrumpExpectedtoRampUpMissileDefense.aspx>
- ¹²¹ See Roger Jordan, "Canada Preparing to Join US Ballistic Missile Defense," *Global Research.ca*, 4 May 2016: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/canada-preparing-to-join-us-ballistic-missile-defense/5523460>
- ¹²² "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy" (Department of National Defence [Canada], 2017): <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/index.asp>. In response to questions in late August 2017, Prime Minister Trudeau reiterated Canada's long-standing ambiguous stance stating that

Canada's position on ABM/BMD would be determined based on the "best interests of Canadians" but that Canada's position would not "be changed any time soon." Lee Berthiaume, "Canada won't join U.S. missile defence, send troops to Afghanistan, Trudeau says," *Toronto Star*, 23 August 2017:

<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/08/23/trudeau-says-no-plans-to-send-troops-back-to-afghanistan-join-us-missile-defence.html>.

¹²³ See "Canada refuses further role in missile defence," *Globe and Mail*, 24 February 2005.

¹²⁴ This issue is particularly relevant currently following North Korea's underground nuclear tests and missile tests. See Mark Mackinnon, "A new kind of erratic in N. Korea," *Globe and Mail*, 30 May 2009.

¹²⁵ See David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Jessica Blitt (eds.), *Canada and National Missile Defence* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000).