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On Knud E. Løgstrup's "Humanism and Christianity"

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Abstract: Dieser Beitrag bietet eine umfassende Diskussion des Textes "Humanismus und Christentum" (1950) des dänischen Philosophen und Theologen Knud E. Løgstrup. Er verortet den Text in seinem geistesgeschichtlichen Kontext und analysiert seine wichtigsten Argumente wie auch seine zentrale These, der zufolge Humanismus und Christentum einen entscheidenden Grundsatz teilen, insofern beide die Ethik als "stumm" oder "unausgesprochen" verstehen. Darüber hinaus wird dargelegt, wie Løgstrups Text zentrale Überlegungen in dessen späteren Publikationen, besonders in dem Hauptwerk *Die ethische Forderung* (1956), vorwegnimmt.

Keywords: Knud E. Løgstrup, Humanism, Christian Ethics, Rudolf Bultmann, Søren A. Kierkegaard

Knud E. Løgstrup's article "Humanism and Christianity" (1950)¹ is a discussion of the relation between the two schools of thought mentioned in the title, but in a way that is set against key ideas in ethics which Løgstrup was developing at this time, and which came to full expression in his main work *The Ethical Demand* that was published six years later. While this can perhaps make the article hard to follow for those who are unfamiliar with Løgstrup's thought, it also gives it a kind of depth and originality that is not often found in debates between humanists on the one hand and Christians on the other, and also provides Løgstrup with a striking opportunity to find a novel kind of common ground between the two.

¹ References given in the text are to K. E. Løgstrup's paper "Humanisme og kristendom." *Heretica* 3 (1950): 456–474 (before the slash) and to the translation on pp. 132–146 in this journal (after the slash). Our article is a companion piece to this translation.

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We will begin by outlining the main ideas put forward in the article, and then set Løgstrup's ideas in context against the background of debates in his time concerning the relation between humanism and Christianity and what this tells us about the development of Løgstrup's own thinking on these fundamental issues.

1 The Article

The article begins in an arresting and rather puzzling way: "Humanism is – among many other things – having the sense of a certain conflict, the implication being that where the sense of the conflict is lost, inhumanity arises. What conflict?" (456/133). This can be somewhat puzzling to the reader, because Løgstrup does not immediately answer his question and tell us what the conflict is; rather, he instead sets off to specify the context that is necessary for his eventual answer, which comes two pages later – and where that context is provided by his distinctive conception of the ethical relation between individuals, which is that we are dependent on one another, and so hold each other's lives in our hands. The conflict, it thus turns out, is whether in relating to other people in this way, we should do what is best for them, or simply do whatever it is that they ask of us. To do the latter, Løgstrup argues, would be to ignore the ethical demand that arises when others need our help, for this is "silent" or "unspoken" in the sense that it is not simply to be equated with what others say they need, as this can go against their actual needs and interests. On the other hand, to seek to do what we think is best for them instead has obvious dangers of intrusion and encroachment, where we risk imposing our own understanding of life over theirs, and using that understanding as an "ideology" or fixed set of values to ride roughshod over them. And we cannot get out of this conflict by fooling ourselves into thinking that really others don't need us at all, or that they have a right to autonomy which means we should just do what they ask, whatever that may be; rather, we have to find a way to strike a balance between these competing pressures. It is this conflict, Løgstrup suggests, that humanism recognizes, and so stands at a crossroads between "philistinism" and "ideology", "retaining a lively awareness that we always stand in the conflict between a consideration which amounts to indulgence, acquiescence and flattery on the one hand, and an inconsiderateness that for our own understanding of life's sake becomes intrusion and encroachment on the other" (463/138).

Having introduced humanism in this way, Løgstrup then turns to Christianity. He argues that unlike humanism, once it takes on an institutional form, Christianity is at grave risk of becoming insensitive to this conflict, as its under-

standing of life all too easily becomes ossified and absolute, and if that happens, it will then see no difficulty in imposing this understanding of life on people for their own good. Moreover, Løgstrup suggests, there is an extra temptation for contemporary Christianity to take this route, as the pressures of secularization push it to find a role for religion, which it then locates in trying to regulate civil and political life in terms of its religious understanding of how we should live.

However, despite this divergence between humanism and institutional Christianity, Løgstrup maintains that Christianity at a more fundamental level, as expressed in Jesus's proclamation to love the neighbour, is not that distant from humanism, insofar as both treat this ethical relation of neighbour love as essential to what makes us human. Moreover, both (when rightly understood) see in that ethical relation something "ungraspable" and "mysterious", and so recognize that "our life's mystery is not the gender difference and fertility that connects us with nature and is nature in us, but it is the unspoken demand, that lies in the life that we have together" (466 f./140). Løgstrup characterizes the demand as ungraspable and mysterious in this way because we cannot simply grasp it, both in the sense of escaping it or controlling it, as we cannot escape our responsibility for the other and are given no chances for claiming our own right through reciprocity; while it is mysterious in the sense that it is hidden below the immediate surface of our lives, as it is not based on any reciprocal agreement, or connected to any social or personal ties, and may even ask us to love the enemy. A Christianity that sees itself as just organizing social life around certain religious doctrines, and a Hobbesian humanism that sees itself as just organizing social life to safeguard our individual interests, may both lose a sense of the centrality of this ethical demand – but Løgstrup takes these to be degenerate versions of both positions, and in their right form, Christianity and humanism should be able to converge on this centrality.

Nonetheless, of course, Løgstrup notes that even with regard to just the ethical demand, Christianity will differ from humanism in taking that demand to come from God, which will therefore give Christianity a different take on what it is that makes the demand "silent" and non-reciprocal: namely, that we cannot simply do what the other asks, because it is God who asks us to act instead, while God himself gives to us without expecting anything in return. The Christian therefore bases their ethical conception on a religious framework. Nevertheless, Løgstrup argues, the fundamental *ethical* outlook of both Christianity and humanism should be seen as being the same, namely that of being required to do what is best for the other person whose life is in your hands, in a way that is then "silent" and non-reciprocal, even if the one position offers a religious explanation for these features in a way that the other does not.

Løgstrup then considers a possible challenge to this claim of convergence:

namely, it could be argued that he is mistaken to claim that for the Christian, ethics is “silent”, as the words of Jesus can be used to give it a kind of content and determinacy that Løgstrup has suggested it lacks, and which can then form the basis for a socially enforced religious ethics concerning sexual and cultural matters, for example. Løgstrup, however, rejects any such claim regarding a specifically Christian ethics. His response to this challenge is therefore to argue that in fact, if one looks at the biblical evidence, Jesus rarely specifies in any detail how we should behave towards one another, so that “[a]ll his words speak of the one demand, but with not one word does he break its silence” (473/145). Instead, Løgstrup argues, it is the kind of institutionalized Christianity he mentioned earlier which has tried to “fill” this silence with all sorts of rules and regulations – but these come from the Church and its structures, and not from Jesus himself.

Thus, Løgstrup concludes, like humanism, as he has characterized it, Christianity, when properly conceived, should fully appreciate the conflict with which he began, which arises out of the silence of the ethical demand. Anything that tries to minimize this conflict by turning ethics into an ideology is just as much a betrayal of Christianity as it would be a betrayal of humanism, so that in this way, when properly conceived, these two positions can be said to find common ground in an ethical outlook such as Løgstrup’s own.

2 The background

Krogerup Folk High School, Humlebæk 20-03-50

Dear Koste²

Please, do not become too excited by receiving a letter from me. Let me start out by addressing a different matter than what is my real reason for writing to you. [...]. But now, let us turn to the main issue. On June 2–4, here on Krogerup, we will invite some people to attend a weekend with the purpose of discussing what we nowadays mean with all the chatter about “humanism”. We are inviting 50–60 people. No short newspaper paraphrases. It is not supposed to amount to anything useful; we are not trying to find out who is stronger; we just want to talk completely free from obligations. [...]. You will be talking about Christianity’s position on the problem. [...]. You cannot say No. [...]. Of course, I have my fears that you may become too quibbling, [...]. So, you will come. You will not be paid, but we will cover travel expenses and lodging. You can make it by taking the fast train from Aarhus Friday morning and taking it back home Sunday evening. Please send your Yes immediately.

² “Koste” was Hal Koch’s nickname for Løgstrup, referring to his thick and dense hair; “kost” in Danish means “broom”.

Your
Hal Koch.
Greet everyone from me!³

This is how Løgstrup's "invitation" to give the paper on humanism and Christianity read when he received it in late March 1950. It was written by his friend Hal Koch (1904–63), who was now the principal of Krogerup Folk High School,⁴ and with whom he had been close friends since they both attended the Danish "Gymnasium" (equivalent to American "high school" or English "sixth form") in 1921, which was Løgstrup's first and Koch's third year. It is plain to see that Koch would not take "no" for an answer, but rather he is commissioning Løgstrup to deliver his thoughts on humanism and Christianity, without being paid. In effect, Løgstrup is given a compulsory question to discuss – and only two months to write his contribution. Løgstrup thus came to present the text as a paper intended for a group of people specifically invited to discuss humanism – but in fact, in spite of the audience being ideally suited for a discussion of Løgstrup's paper on this topic, no one actually said anything in response! It was only after Hal Koch had given a lengthy paraphrase of Løgstrup's main points – and after Løgstrup's own confirmation that this was indeed what he had said – that the discussion then got going.

When reading Løgstrup's article, we quickly get a sense that he seems to be struggling a bit with the term "humanism". He certainly has an agenda and things he wants to say, but at the same time he tries to combine this agenda with humanism and the topic he was set by Koch, namely "humanism and Christianity". He returns at least three times to the discussion of how to define the key term, and at several points in the text he examines ways in which these two schools of thought could be said to relate to each other. However, it is striking that Løgstrup chooses a very idiosyncratic way to define "humanism", doing so without referring to common or standard definitions, which would usually focus on 1) the value of human agency, 2) the importance of human freedom in realizing our potential, and 3) the significance of human products and activities, i. e. *culture*, to name just a few.

"Humanism" was much debated in the years following World War II, hence the "chatter" to which Koch refers in his letter to Løgstrup. Sartre published "Existentialism is a Humanism" in 1946, to which Heidegger wrote his "Letter On Humanism" as a critical response, published the following year in 1947. For

³ Knud E. Løgstrup, Hal Koch, *Venskab og strid*. Aarhus: Klim, 2010, 219–220, our translation.

⁴ Danish Folk High Schools (Folkehøjskoler) have existed since the days of N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783–1872) and are institutions for adult education intended for *Bildung* rather than academic degrees.

Heidegger and Sartre, the context for the discussion was secular and universalist, and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* from 1948 can be seen as a clear manifestation of the post-WWII orientation towards humanism as a universal foundation for politics and ethics.

This meant that humanism also became a crucial topic to be re-evaluated in a theological context, because in the 20th Century, following World War I, “humanism” had become an increasingly problematic term in modern German and Danish Theology. In fact, humanism was the main antagonist for many modern theologians, most prominently Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) who can be seen as the founding father of *theological existentialism* – a breakaway branch of Karl Barth’s (1886–1968) *dialectical theology*.⁵

Interestingly, Bultmann also wrote an article called “Humanism and Christianity”; in fact, he wrote more than one.⁶ The first was written in 1947 and published in January 1948.⁷ Almost two years later, in November 1949, it was translated into Danish and published in the Danish theological existentialist journal *Tidehverv*.⁸ Although there can be no doubt that he had read Bultmann’s article, Løgstrup never mentions it; as Hans Hauge puts it in his doctoral dissertation from 1992, *K. E. Løgstrup: En moderne profet* [*K. E. Løgstrup: A Modern Prophet*], Løgstrup’s article belongs to the genre of “texts without references”,⁹ even though references would have been useful in many places (such as for the

5 To use Stefan Zweig’s famous title, the dialectical and existentially oriented theologians saw *the world of yesterday*, the old world from before the Great War, as the epoch of humanism where human beings indulged in idealistic optimism concerning mankind. However, the new world, the world emerging from the horrors of World War I, was the epoch of realism about the failure of human beings and of culture.

6 Cf. also Rudolf Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum.” *Historische Zeitschrift* 176 (1953): 1–15; translated as “Humanism and Christianity.” *Journal of Religion* 32 (1952): 77–86.

7 Rudolf Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, originally published in *Studium Generale*, 1 (1948): 70–77, reprinted in Idem, *Glauben und Verstehen. Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Band 2. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1965, 133–148 [subsequent references are to the reprinted version]; translated into Danish as “Humanisme og kristendom.” *Tidehverv* 23 (1949): 77–88, translated into English by James C. G. Greig as “Humanism and Christianity.” In Rudolf Bultmann, *Essays Philosophical and Theological*. London: SCM Press, 1955, 151–167.

8 *Tidehverv* is a journal founded in 1926. The title means “Turn of the Times”, which clearly indicates the theological orientation of the editors (by alluding to the title of the German dialectical theological journal *Zwischen den Zeiten* [Between the Times]), who saw themselves as Barthian dialectical theologians. Later on, Rudolf Bultmann became a central figure, but the biggest influence on *Tidehverv*’s theology was Kristoffer Olesen Larsen’s (1899–1964) reading of Kierkegaard. Olesen Larsen features as Løgstrup’s main opponent in the polemical epilogue in his main work *The Ethical Demand* and throughout Løgstrup’s confrontation with Kierkegaardianism.

9 Hans Hauge, *K. E. Løgstrup: En moderne profet*. Copenhagen: Spektrum, 1992, 219, our translation.

statement concerning idealistic ethics of the nineteenth century and how "it is severely criticized today by both philosophers and theologians" (461/136) – "who?" one might ask, and "where?"). Still, Bultmann's earlier article provides an illuminating context for us when we try to understand what is really going on in Løgstrup's article bearing the same name.

Given the antagonism between humanism and Christianity, one might very easily think that Løgstrup's attempt to focus on the similarities and common ground between the two was highly controversial, and that it is thus an early indication of the future debate between Løgstrup and the Kierkegaardians of *Tidehverv* – a debate that culminated with *Controverting Kierkegaard* in 1968. And scholars have indeed drawn this conclusion.¹⁰ One clear example is found in Hauge, who states that "Humanism and Christianity" symbolizes "the beginning of Løgstrup's liberation from Theological Existentialism", and he finds further evidence for this in the fact that Løgstrup's article was published in the journal *Heretica*, which was highly critical of *Tidehverv*.¹¹ Another example is found in Jes Fabricius Møller's biography of Løgstrup's friend Hal Koch, where Fabricius Møller writes that "if Løgstrup had still been a member of Tidehverv [tidehvervsmand]" at the time of writing "Humanism and Christianity", then he would have claimed "that Humanism and Christianity are like East and West and that the two could never meet." He continues by stating that now, however, "Løgstrup was turning into a Løgstrupian, and this involved first and foremost a confrontation [opgør] with Kierkegaard and a new attempt at combining the religious command with what is human."¹²

However, a closer inspection of Bultmann's article on humanism and Christianity gives us good reason to reconsider these conclusions. In his paper, Bultmann sets out, just as one might expect, by defining humanism as having "faith in the nobility of the human being" through having "faith in the spirit", while at the same time claiming that "human beings belong to the spiritual world", and by implication that this means that human beings, as spiritual creatures, belong to "the realm of the true, the good, and the beautiful", which is also to say that the true, the good, and the beautiful *belong to us* as human, spiritual beings.¹³ Humanism thus conceived involves the task of learning to "restrain

¹⁰ We would like to thank Kees van Kooten Niekerk for his valuable contributions, given in his unpublished manuscript on "Humanism and Christianity", which he presented at a research seminar in systematic theology at Aarhus University in March 2010. Many of the key points in the following are based on his findings.

¹¹ Hauge, K. E. *Løgstrup*, 214, our translation.

¹² Jes Fabricius Møller, *Hal Koch: En biografi*. Copenhagen: Gad, 2009, 250, our translation.

¹³ Bultmann, "Humanismus og Christentum", 133–134 / "Humanisme og kristendom", 82 / "Humanism and Christianity", 151–153.

and ennoble” our drives and urges and to thus become a person through the art of perfecting ourselves.¹⁴ This means that according to humanism, we human beings are the highest end; we carry the highest end and highest significance as part of our own nature, and therefore we are faced with the ultimate task of *realizing* ourselves and our potential. In humanism, *the idea of the true* guides us in our quest to master the world; *the idea of the good* chastens our will and raises us up towards harmony; and *the idea of the beautiful* drives art to give rise to ideals that can serve as invisible goals and ends for our spirits. And it comes as no surprise that Bultmann, after this definition of humanism, defines Christianity as its virtual opposite, because God is *transcendent*, not immanent, which means that the true, the good, and the beautiful are *not* to be found within our finite world, but rather outside it. Therefore, according to Christianity, human beings can have no knowledge of *the true*, there can only be faith, which is an entirely different category according to Bultmann; *the good* can only be seen as God’s command, commanding us to love and at the same time revealing our guilt for not loving as we should; and *the beautiful* found in this world can only be seen as temptation, leading us away from the real beauty beyond the finite world. Consequently, the “spirit” central to humanism is a spirit that belongs to *this world*, it is a manifestation within the finite world of finite ends; whereas the spirit at the core of Christianity is *God*, and God is not found in the world of finite ends, but rather he is an absolute and eternal end beyond this finite world.

So far, then, Hauge and Fabricius Møller seem fully justified in their conclusion that Løgstrup’s attempt to find common ground between humanism and Christianity was in fact a break with theological existentialism. However, after having defined humanism and Christianity as opposites, Bultmann poses the question whether the relationship between the two is to be conceived of as an either/or: “humanism or Christianity”?¹⁵ And to this, his answer is “no”. First of all, there are common points of view between the two, for instance, both humanism and Christianity (understood correctly!) reject the idea of a specifically Christian ethics in favour of a universal ethics. As Bultmann puts it, “admittedly there are such things as a Christian shoemaker, but there is no Christian way to make shoes”.¹⁶ However, Bultmann goes much further than this. Apart from

¹⁴ Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, 133–134 / “Humanisme og kristendom”, 82 / “Humanism and Christianity”, 151–153.

¹⁵ Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, 142 / “Humanisme og kristendom”, 86 / “Humanism and Christianity”, 161.

¹⁶ Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum”, 138 / “Humanisme og kristendom”, 84 / “Humanism and Christianity”, 156.

sharing some common ground, humanism and Christianity are involved in a rich and productive *tension*, where each individual person repeatedly has to resolve this tension for themselves, just as each cultural epoch has to resolve the relationship between these powers in its own way. While one epoch may have to focus on the *differences* between the two, another epoch may have to focus on what is *common*, and although Bultmann does not spell it out, it seems clear that he is in fact thinking of the *turn of the times* in his own lifetime. Where the epoch between the two great wars focused on the opposition between humanism and Christianity, the epoch following World War II calls for a different agenda, namely for humanism and Christianity to jointly fight a common enemy: nihilism and subjectivism!¹⁷

Therefore, even though Bultmann acknowledges that humanism and Christianity are opposites, they do in fact share common ground, and they can meet (just as East and West can when they have come full circle, one could say in response to Fabricius Møller), among other things because they are both enemies of subjectivism and relativism. As such, they share the outlook that there are objective standards and truths, although in the end humanism has a mistaken conception of these truths and standards – and how to reach them.

Moreover, aside from Bultmann's article, *Tidehverv* also featured another article on the topic of humanism and Christianity: "The Gods of the Times and Christianity" [Tidens Guder og Kristendommen] by Løgstrup's friend Tage Wilhjelm, published in March 1949. Here, too, we find the approach that even though humanism (which Wilhjelm equates with *idealism*, among other things because it is founded on an idealization of *the human*) and Christianity are opposites, they nonetheless do share important features. Wilhjelm focusses on the emphasis on and importance of ethics in both, namely the acknowledgment that there is an ethical demand on us and that the neighbour therefore lays a claim on us.¹⁸ Additionally, just as Bultmann did, he highlights that both humanism and Christianity (as he conceives it) reject the idea of a specifically Christian ethics, seeing instead the ethical as a universal category.

Given that both Bultmann and Wilhjelm were key figures in and for *Tidehverv*, it therefore seems safe to assume that the idea of Christianity and humanism being opposites, *but still closely connected*, was in fact not a very controversial thing for Løgstrup to say in 1950 when he gave his paper. And seeing also that a crucial connection between the two is to be found within the field of ethics, while at the same time rejecting the idea of a *Christian* ethics, Løgstrup's

¹⁷ Bultmann, "Humanismus und Christentum", 146 / "Humanisme og kristendom", 87 / "Humanism and Christianity", 165.

¹⁸ Tage Wilhjelm, "Tidens Guder og Kristendommen." *Tidehverv* 23 (1949): 25–31, here 29.

position in “Humanism and Christianity” is in fact very close to the theological existentialism of his time.

This important insight can now lead us to a better understanding of Løgstrup’s position in his article. Rather than seeing it as a break with theological existentialism and Christianity, suggesting that Løgstrup is starting to side with the humanists against the Christians, the fact of the matter is really close to the opposite. The reason why Løgstrup is having such a hard time defining “humanism”, and why he returns to it several times through the article, is that he does not side with humanism *in opposition to* Christianity, but that he is trying to speak of each side as allies in his search for a universal ethics. And he does this without thereby engaging in a controversial confrontation with Tidehverv and theological existentialism, because they, too, subscribed to the same general idea, namely that ethics must be conceived of as universal, and that Christianity and humanism share a common conception on this point.

In trying to make humanism an ally, Løgstrup draws attention to the universal ethical fact that we are each other’s world, because we hold something of the other person’s life in our hands. Thus, Løgstrup’s humanistic ally is a different version of humanism than the humanism of the previous epoch, the humanism Bultmann and theological existentialism had fought against, for *that* humanism was an *idealism* intent on perceiving every person as an island, an autonomous individual working on their own perfection. This is why “[i]n the nineteenth Century, my topic would probably not have been called humanism and Christianity, but idealism and Christianity”, as Løgstrup writes in the article (461/136). However, the humanism Løgstrup is addressing here is based on a different anthropology, namely one that has recognized that the human being is not sovereign and in control of their own life, because we are too fundamentally dependent on other people. The Christians know this from Jesus’s proclamation, but through humanism’s pursuit of *the true*, the humanists have now come to know this from “psychology’s and psychiatry’s demonstration of how a child’s life is determined for their whole future by the adult’s behaviour towards it [...]” (456/133).

Six years later, this and many other statements from “Humanism and Christianity” were repeated (often word for word) in *The Ethical Demand*, and by that time, there was indeed a conflict between Løgstrup and the Kierkegaardians that was plain for all to see. However, as we have been able to gather from our discussion of “Humanism and Christianity”, the conflict was *not* caused by Løgstrup’s attempt to use humanism as an ally in finding a common ground within a universal ethics. It was rather caused by other things, such as (to name just a few) Løgstrup’s position on *understanding* (truth), namely that truth is not wholly transcendent, but that genuine truth is found in what the Kierkegaardians

ans referred to as the finite world; and that the good (ethics) is not mainly about our own responsibility, but rather is centred around the other person and how to help them to the best of our abilities in their worldly lives. The main source of the controversy was in fact another text from the same year, namely Løgstrup's publication of his German lectures on Kierkegaard and Heidegger, where he criticized the Kierkegaardian conception of the ethical demand.¹⁹ Here, we find a highly critical response from Olesen Larsen, which leads to yet more critical responses where Olesen Larsen labels Løgstrup as a humanist, but again this is because of Løgstrup's objections to Kierkegaard in other texts – not because of his position in "Humanism and Christianity." These two texts from 1950, along with other texts from the early 1950s, come together in *The Ethical Demand*. It was published on November 27th, but a few months earlier, on September 8th, Hal Koch sent the following letter to Løgstrup after having read the full manuscript:

Dear Koste!

It is now 1 am and since 5 o'clock I have (with brief interruptions) enjoyed intense pleasure from reading your book! I wanted to tell you this. I am impressed by the confidence and authority with which you write, and you have – in manifold ways – provided lucidity and coherence where I saw only confused bits and pieces when speaking of Christianity, ethics, politics, etc. I agree completely with your elucidations, and I envy your clarity. I jolly well didn't know that you are this clever. I would that I dare write a review, but it lies beyond my abilities. I doubt that Søe²⁰ – the oaf – understands it, but I will assist him.

It was good to see you! Greet Rosemari for me!

And thank you for the book!

Your

H. K.²¹

19 Cf. Knud E. Løgstrup, *Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung*. Berlin: Eric Blaschker Verlag, 1950; *Kierkegaards og Heideggers Eksistensanalyse og dens Forhold til Forkyndelsen*, ed. Svend Andersen. Aarhus: Klim, 2013; *Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation*, translated by Robert Stern et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

20 Niels Hansen Søe (1895–1978) was Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Copenhagen from 1939–1966. He was one of the first Danish theologians to be influenced by Barth and dialectical theology. A central point of controversy between Løgstrup and Søe through the years was their positions on ethics, where Søe objected to Løgstrup's resistance towards a specifically Christian ethics. On this, Søe held that Jesus's demand was indeed *not* silent, and so Jesus's ethical teaching should be understood as a Christian ethics.

21 Løgstrup, Koch, *Venskab og strid*, 220, our translation.