AARHUS UNIVERSITY

Coversheet

This is the accepted manuscript (post-print version) of the article.

Contentwise, the post-print version is identical to the final published version, but there may be differences in typography and layout.

How to cite this publication

Please cite the final published version:

Bøggild, T., & Pedersen, H. H. (2018). Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation. *European Journal of Political Research*, 57(4), 883-899.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12256>

Publication metadata

Title:	Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalization
Author(s):	Troels Bøggild & Helene Helboe Pedersen
Journal:	<i>European Journal of Political Research</i> , 57(4), 883-899
DOI/Link:	https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12256
Document version:	Accepted manuscript (post-print)

General Rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Campaigning on behalf of the party?

Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

Troels Bøggild and Helene Helboe Pedersen

Abstract: This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party-focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters' ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, we argue that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, we show how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation, and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. We discuss how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.

Keywords: Personalisation; electoral campaign; party organisation; party democracy; EP election

A growing literature shows that individual candidates face electoral incentives to *personalise* their campaigns and communication with voters at the expense of the party programme (McAllister 2007; Deschouwer et al. 2014: 4). Personalisation of politics implies that the importance of political individuals increases at the expense of political groups – most importantly political parties (Balmas et al. 2014). In terms of campaigning, this means that when balancing the promotion of the party versus the individual candidate, personalisation tilts the balance towards the candidate. Personalised campaigning thus poses potential problems for parties as their candidates become less loyal to party policy and interests, making it increasingly difficult to formulate, communicate and enact unified political programs. Moreover, it has been argued that personalised campaigning constitutes a threat to modern democracy as it limits the capacity of parties to build and maintain stable majorities and the ability of voters to hold political actors accountable (Manin 1997: 219; Balmas et al. 2014: 47; Swanson & Mancini 1996; Wolfsfeld 2011).

This article argues that most political candidates face important constraints from their party on following electoral incentives to personalise their election campaigns. We build on the extensive literature on party organisation (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Kam, 2009; Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Scarrow, 2013, 2014) and argue that candidates adjust their campaigns according to their party's control over candidate selection and campaign financing. Specifically, we expect that candidates from parties in which party officials exert stronger control over the nomination process and campaign finances are more likely to both experience rewards and risk sanctioning by their party and, in turn, less likely to personalise their campaigns.

To test our theoretical argument, we estimate fixed effects regression models based on a large-scale, cross-national survey among candidates during the 2009 European Parliament election campaign linked with national-level and party-level data. Our results demonstrate that candidates whose parties exerted stronger control over the nomination process and were able to sponsor the

main share of the election campaign funds were considerably less likely to focus on personal messages at the expense of the party programme. This confirms our argument that candidates who depend on party officials for selection and campaign finances face stronger party constraints and are less likely to act upon incentives to personalise their election campaigns.

Our findings advance the existing literature in three ways. First, they shed new light on how candidates balance the tasks of promoting their party and themselves in election campaigns. Scholars disagree on whether politicians act upon incentives to engage in personalised behaviours (Swanson & Mancini 1996; Manin 1997; Karvonen 2007, 2010; Balmas et al. 2014), and extant work has mainly analysed party dissent in roll call votes in parliament (e.g., Faas 2003; DePauw & Martin 2009; Kam 2009; Önnudóttir 2016) rather than candidates' campaigning strategies. In contrast, we analyse the incentives and constraints that candidates face in personalising their campaigns at the expense of party discipline during election campaigns. Second, by integrating the two literatures on party organisation and personalisation, we illustrate how decentralisation of power in political parties can remove some of the constraints and rewards that keep candidates from engaging in personalisation. This implies that strong political parties with a hierarchical structure can serve as an effective buffer against personalisation. Third, these insights have important normative implications in terms of how they outline a dilemma facing representative democracy in general. Whereas scholars and practitioners have suggested that decentralising decision-making power within parties can help re-establish public trust and engagement in party activities and politics (Cross & Katz 2013: 2–10; Scarrow 2014; Scarrow 2005: 15), our findings imply that such initiatives can simultaneously prompt higher levels of personalisation and weaken party discipline. Personalisation and low party discipline can make it increasingly difficult for voters to understand and assess the political alternatives available to them and, ultimately, make informed choices and hold individual politicians to their election promises. This puts reformists and practitioners in a

difficult dilemma with regard to advancing different democratic ideals, as initiatives to make citizens more confident and engaged in party activities through, for instance, inclusive candidate selection procedures can also weaken democratic accountability.

Electoral incentives for personalised campaigning

Existing work has argued that political candidates face electoral incentives to personalise their election campaigns. By advancing personal opinions and stances at the expense of party programmes and discipline, candidates can seek to increase their chances of (re)election. First, personalisation can help generate attention from the media and, in turn, make the candidate more visible to potential voters. Current high levels of individualisation and mediatisation in most Western societies cause the public and the media to pay attention to the campaigns and positions of individual candidates rather than those of political parties (Swanson & Mancini 1996; Bauman 2001; Shenhav & Sheafer 2008; Wolfsfeld 2011). For example, Kam (2009) has provided correlational evidence that politicians who dissent from their party enjoy higher name recognition and approval ratings among voters (see also Carson et al. 2010). Second, in certain instances, candidates can benefit from personalisation by appealing to new voter segments located spatially to the left or right of the party. Such a strategy should be particularly effective to court the median voter and non-partisans who might dislike established parties and partisan politics (Webb 1996). Third, a candidate can use personalised communication to convey integrity. As demonstrated by Campbell et al. (2016) in a survey experiment, personalisation can work as a valence signal by portraying an unwillingness to compromise political beliefs for party-related and career-related concerns. Finally, the rise of new media such as websites and social media has enabled political candidates to follow these incentives by reaching voters directly without their parties as intermediaries (Druckman et al. 2009).

A number of scholars have expressed concerns about the democratic consequences of personalisation among politicians. Although some have suggested that personalisation can create a stronger connection and understanding between citizens and elites (Kruikemeier et al. 2013), many argue that it undercuts the important functions parties carry out in representative democracies. As laid out in the Responsible Party Model, unified political parties serve to structure and simplify elite debate and competition for voters. This allows voters to make informed decisions regarding the political alternatives they face in elections and hold elites accountable without knowing the election promises and legislative voting of individual politicians (Schattschneider 1942; Downs 1957; Converse 1964). In addition, unified parties make government and policy-making stable and predictable for citizens. With this in mind, many scholars have argued that personalisation and weakening of party discipline constitutes ‘a crisis in representation’ (Manin 1997: 219) which will ‘affect the mechanisms that limit and constrain the power of leadership’ (Balmas et al. 2014: 47; see also Swanson & Mancini 1996; Wolfsfeld 2011).

Against this backdrop, this article investigates under which conditions political candidates become more or less likely to engage in personalised campaigning. Although voter-level studies convincingly show that electoral incentives for personalised campaigning exist, it remains less clear whether and to what extent political candidates in fact follow such incentives (Swanson & Mancini 1996; Manin 1997; Karvonen 2007, 2010; Balmas et al. 2014). Below, we integrate two literatures on personalisation and party organisation and argue that party control over candidate selection and campaign financing constitute important constraints on personalised campaigning.

Party constraints on personalisation in election campaigns

Although personalisation in election campaigns can benefit the individual candidate in the competition for votes, it can also introduce substantial costs for the party in general in realising

vote-related, office-related and policy-related goals. This has led scholars to propose that parties will often have incentives to keep the individual candidate loyal to the party programme and serve as a ‘buffer’ against personalisation (Carey & Shugart 1995; Kam 2009).¹

First, although candidates personalising their campaigns can help the party obtain more votes in the short run, it can also have long-term negative effects on the party’s overall perceived positions and ‘reputation’ on specific issues or general ‘governing capacity’ among the electorate (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991: 43–44; Carey & Shugart 1995). That is, over time, personalisation and low party discipline can create confusion among voters regarding the party’s positions on key issues and, ultimately, lead to a loss of issue ownership or general confidence in the party’s ability to govern effectively (Ferrara & Weishaupt 2004; Grynaviski 2010). This implies a gradual deterioration of the party ‘cue’ or image, which could result in a long-term decline in electoral support.

Second, in general, the party should have clear policy-related incentives to constrain personalisation. Realising policy preferences once in office is difficult for a party if its elected candidates must answer to an array of different or even contradicting election promises made to constituents (Kam 2009). This means that campaign personalisation can result in intraparty disagreement and paralysis during negotiations and policy-making. Ultimately, the party risks that their elected representatives who have run personalised campaigns will end up supporting policies crafted by other coalitions or even switch to another party during an election term.

Third, and related, the party needs a stable majority behind its key policies to remain in office throughout the election term. This requires individual politicians whose main commitment is to the party programme. Indeed, governments often fail to pass policies and even break down

¹ The incentives for parties to constrain personalisation might differ across types of candidates (Papp & Zorigt 2016). For example, incumbent politicians, who are typically experienced and popular among voters, might enjoy more leeway from their party in running a personalised campaign in order to win votes for the party compared to non-incumbent candidates. We return to this in the analyses below focusing on the robustness and scope conditions of our argument.

altogether due to intraparty disagreement and a lack of party unity (Müller & Strøm 2000: 584–587). Evidence shows that MPs running a personalised campaign are more likely to act on their own convictions in legislative votes when in conflict with the party (André et al. 2014: 103–4; Zittel & Nyhuis 2017).

This means that parties face a classic collective action problem in which their individual candidates have interests (personalising their campaign) that sometimes differ from the interests of the group at large (campaigning for the party). Such a situation creates incentives for candidates to freeride by letting other party members propagate party policy and securing their own election through more personalised campaign efforts.

According to the extensive literature on collective action problems (e.g., Olson 1965; Oliver 1980), groups typically employ two types of means to keep their members loyal to the interests of the collective: positive and negative *selective incentives*. Such selective incentives can either be negative in the form of a sanction for freeriding at the expense of the group or positive in terms of a reward or benefit for displaying group-oriented behaviour. In this article, we argue that such selective incentives indeed curb candidate personalisation and help maintain party unity in election campaigns.

One negative incentive that keeps candidates from personalising their campaigns is the party's control over the candidate nomination process. Influence over candidate nomination is typically concentrated among the party leadership or a selected group of party officials, but recent democratisation initiatives have resulted in some variation across parties. In some instances, parties have made their internal decision-making procedures more inclusive in terms of transferring power over the nomination of candidates, election campaign matters and policy-making from the party leadership to lower-level members and non-members (Ware 1979; Bille 2001; Cross & Katz 2013; Gauja 2015; Scarrow 2014). Such initiatives aim to accommodate public perceptions of parties as

elitist, unresponsive organisations and offer citizens a purpose and incentive to engage in party activities (Bille 2001; Scarrow 2014; Accetti & Wolkenstein 2016; see Katz 2013 for a critical discussion). As also noted by Scarrow (2014: 177), some parties have responded to declining membership figures by ‘offering several types of selective political benefits, including privileged political information and influence within the parties’. Hence, in some instances, the candidate nomination process is highly inclusive, including voters and activists, while in other instances, this task is more exclusive and lies solely with party officials (Gallagher & Marsh 1988; Hazan & Rahat 2010).

This variation in the inclusiveness of the candidate nomination process results in different incentives for candidates to engage in personalised campaigning. When the nomination process is exclusive and lies only with party officials, it serves as an effective sanctioning mechanism or deterring device for the party since candidates are fundamentally dependent on being nominated for election before they are able to realise higher-order goals, such as winning office (Strøm 2012). In such instances, the party should be able to punish – or threaten to punish – candidates who stray from the party line by choosing a different candidate in a future election. In addition, an exclusive nomination process could also serve as an effective screening mechanism, allowing the party to recruit only those candidates that are most committed to and hold opinions consistent with the party programme. However, this mechanism should become less effective as the nomination process becomes more inclusive by giving lower-level members, activists or voters a voice in the process. As surveyed above, citizens often prefer candidates who stand out and speak their minds, even at the expense of the formal party line. A few existing studies have demonstrated that the more a party includes lower-level members, activists or voters in the candidate nomination process, the less likely its candidates are to vote in line with the party in parliament (Faas 2003; Kam 2009) and to think of themselves as ‘partisans’ rather than ‘trustees’ (Önnudóttir 2016). In a

similar vein, we expect that the inclusiveness of the candidate nomination process will also shape the behaviour of political candidates in election campaigns.

H1: The more influence the party has over the candidate nomination process, the less likely the candidate is to focus on personal rather than party messages in election campaigns.

Candidates also face positive selective incentives in terms of rewards or benefits directed at those who follow the party line. One positive incentive is when the party is able to sponsor the candidate's campaign finances. Although parties have gradually lost revenue from civil society due to waning party membership, many have managed to increase state funding (Katz & Mair 1995; van Biezen & Kopecký 2007; Koss 2010). Parties therefore remain a significant sponsor of campaign finances for their candidates (van Biezen 2010). Since candidates in modern campaigns require a certain level of campaign funds to be successful (Norris 2000), we would expect them to be responsive to the potential rewards or benefits offered by their party through campaign financing. However, some variation exists in the capacity and opportunity of parties to sponsor their candidates, resulting from recent democratisation initiatives in the form of country-level legislation and internal party rules (van Biezen 2010; Scarrow 2013: 159–160). Some European parties have adopted internal regulations and formal country-level legislation that tighten external control and expenditure limits on party financing of MP and candidate activities and, thus, lower the capacity of the party to impose discipline on individual candidates through financial rewards (van Biezen 2010; Scarrow 2014; van Biezen & Piccio 2013). Such efforts are intended, at least in part, to strengthen transparency and alleviate the public perceptions of parties as professional organisations motivated by power and money and, in turn, increase trust, engagement and membership among citizens (Rashkova & van Biezen 2014: 890; Scarrow 2014).

The variation in party campaign financing should also create differences in the extent to which candidates must raise finances themselves and how dependent they are on other actors beyond their party. Scarrow (2013: 159), for example, notes that ‘[p]ersonal campaign networks can undercut the central party’s power over its legislators, diminishing its ability to enforce party policy decisions’ (see also Kiewit & McCubbins 1991). Similarly, we expect that the more the party is able to finance its candidates’ campaign activities, the more likely the candidates are to act according to the party programme during election campaigns. Hence, candidates whose campaigns are funded primarily by their party should be more likely to campaign according to the party programme, whereas candidates without much party financing should be freer to communicate personal messages at the expense of the party line.

H2: The larger the share of campaign finances the party can sponsor, the less likely the candidate is to focus on personal rather than party messages in election campaigns.

Research design and measures

To test our theoretical expectations, we utilise a dataset (N = 1,576) based on a survey fielded to political candidates for the European Parliament (EP) in all 27 member countries during the 2009 election campaign (Wessels 2011).² We link this survey data with country- and party-level data (EES 2009).³ From the total population of just over 10,000 candidates running for the EP, 6,500 were randomly chosen to receive an invitation to the survey via email and the postal service. Of these 6,500 candidates, 1,576 returned a survey, resulting in a 24.3% response rate, which is

² For other applications of this dataset, see Giebler & Wüst (2011) and Giebler & Wessels (2013).

³ The contextual data study is part of the European Election Study and the PIREDEU Project (Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy in the European Union, www.piredeu.eu). Details about the contextual data study can be found in Czesnik et al. (2010). We collected additional data to fill out missing values for some political parties and to avoid losing observations (data available upon request).

standard and generally considered acceptable for elite surveys (for further details, see the methodological annex by Giebler & Wessels 2010).

We consider the European Parliament election a useful case for testing our expectations for several reasons. On the one hand, we expect that candidate personalisation in EP campaigns can also constitute a problem for political parties and that candidates therefore need to adjust their campaigns according to positive and negative incentives provided by their parties in this setting. Personalised campaigning in European Parliament elections should entail risks of long-term decline in electoral support for national parties since these elections are fought mainly on national political issues, and voters treat them as second-order national elections (Hix & Høyland 2011). Moreover, personalised campaigning will minimise the likelihood of the candidate realising the party's policy preferences in the European Parliament once elected (André et al. 2014).

On the other hand, we also expect that the pressures EP candidates face from their parties could be weaker compared to national parliament elections. First, voters are less inclined to follow and vote in European Parliament election campaigns than in national elections (Hix & Høyland 2011). This suggests that personalisation might be less harmful to the party's image or issue ownerships. Second, unlike in national elections, candidate personalisation in EP campaigns does not create office-related problems for national parties in terms of maintaining a majority and power after the election (Hix & Lord 1997; Raunio 2000). The collective action problem faced by parties in an EP context could therefore be smaller, making it a least-likely case for testing our argument compared to the national context. Hence, if we find that party control over nomination and financing affect campaign personalisation of candidates in this setting, we also expect this to be the case in national election campaigns.

The survey data provides a unique opportunity for testing our expectations across a wide range of countries and parties and obtaining the necessary variation in our key variables.

Importantly, this article does not study the content of concrete messages from the candidates across the 27 countries but instead relies on the candidates' general, self-reported evaluations of their communication content and campaign strategy. This approach could result in potential problems with social desirability bias or strategic responses aimed to please the national party. However, the candidates were informed that their answers would only be publicly available in aggregate form with no information traceable to specific candidates, which we expect would dampen potential issues with biased self-reporting. Moreover, existing work has demonstrated substantial correlations between survey answers to such general campaign personalisation questions and personalised information on the candidates' homepages and campaign posters (Giebler & Wessels 2013).

The independent variable *party nomination power* measures the perceived influence of party officials in nominating candidates for the EP election according to the candidate. It was constructed based on two items. The first item asked how important the candidate's 'National party officials' were in the selection of candidates for the European Parliament on a 1–5 scale ranging from 'Not at all important' to 'Very important'. This item was rescaled 0-1, indicating minimum and maximum influence of national party officials, respectively. The second item asked 'Who officially nominated you to run in the European Parliament elections?'. The response categories were: 'Voters', 'All party members', 'Elected party members (delegates)', 'Appointed party members', and 'The executive board of your party'. We recoded this variable 0-1 such that candidates indicating that voters controlled the nomination (the least centralised nomination procedure) were coded 0, and those indicating the executive board (the most centralised nomination procedure) were coded 1.⁴ Because these two items were correlated we summed them into an additive index and rescaled 0–1 ($r = 0.354$; $M = 0.703$; $SD = 0.265$). The other independent

⁴Additional analyses show that candidate personalisation decreases consistently when moving up one category on this variable, implying that this variable is suitable for index construction.

variable, *party financing*, was measured using a single item asking how large a percentage of the candidate's campaign budget was sponsored by their party. We rescaled this variable from 0–1, indicating 0 and 100 per cent party campaign financing, respectively ($M = 0.495$; $SD = 0.387$).

To measure our dependent variable – the candidate's focus on personalised relative to party messages – the variable *campaign personalisation* was constructed based on two items. The first item asked 'What is the primary aim of your campaign? Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "to attract as much attention as possible for me as a candidate", and 10 means "to attract as much attention as possible for my party"?'. We reverse coded this item and rescaled it 0–1. The second item asked the candidates to what extent their campaign focused on 'Your party's election programme' on a 1–4 scale ranging from 'Very little' to 'Very much'. This item was also reverse coded and rescaled 0–1, with 1 indicating a candidate focused as little as possible on the party programme. Because the two items were correlated, we summarised them into an additive index that was rescaled 0–1 ($r = 0.375$; $M = 0.247$; $SD = 0.218$). Figure 1 displays the distribution of the candidates across the *campaign personalisation* variable. It is evident that most candidates focus mainly or exclusively on the party programme in their election campaign. At face value, this may seem surprising given that voter-level studies imply that candidates face electoral incentives to personalise their communication. Below, we analyse how party control over candidate nomination and campaign financing can help explain this pattern.⁵

⁵ For studies analysing how national-level factors such as the election system can influence personalisation, see e.g., Carey & Shugart 1995; Heitshusen et al. 2005.

Figure 1: Distribution of candidates across campaign personalisation variable

Note: $n = 1,322$

Finally, the dataset allows for including a number of control variables that could potentially confound the effects. To rule out third variables at the national level, we specify fixed effects regression models, which disregard or control for all between-country variance. We also control for characteristics of the candidate's party. First, we control for party family (e.g., socialist, conservative etc.) as certain types of parties typically adopt more decentralised internal structures (e.g., socialist parties) and their candidates might for ideological reasons also be more community oriented (i.e., party-focused) in their election campaigns. Second, we control for party incumbency at the national level. Candidates from incumbent parties could receive more resources from their party but also face stronger incentives to distance themselves from the party (i.e., personalised campaigning) due to the cost of ruling associated with incumbency. Moreover, we use standard

errors clustered at the party level to rule out problems with autocorrelation. Finally, we employ candidate-level controls, including total campaign spending in euros and incumbency at the local, regional, national and EU levels.⁶ Candidate incumbency could correlate positively with both the level of funding received from the party and an inclination to campaign in line with the party programme (for operationalisations, see Appendix A in the online supporting information). To ease interpretation, all variables are rescaled 0–1.

As our dataset is based on elite surveys collected among candidates during an election campaign, it suffers somewhat from missing values on the items constituting our dependent variable and independent variables. We could accommodate this through data imputation to increase the number of observations and representativeness of our results. However, because the validity of our measures would suffer from this procedure, we report the raw data and include only respondents who provided answers to all our key variables ($n = 845$). Importantly, we obtain substantially similar and significant results when imputing missing data (following existing procedures, see e.g., Giebler & Wessels 2013) and analysing the full sample, prioritising representativeness over measurement validity (see Appendix B in the online supporting information). We also risk losing observations due to missing values for our control variables. Hence, we face a dilemma in reporting results that are vulnerable to bias from either omitted variables or low representativeness in the sample. To substantiate that our results are not driven by either, we report the fixed effects models both with and without control variables at the party and individual levels. Finally, we use a weight variable to correct for non-response bias across parties.⁷

Results

⁶ We do not control for basic demographic factors such as age or education since such variables do not generally correlate with politicians' representative styles or behaviours in existing work (Deschouwer & Depauw 2014). Additional analyses including such variables confirm this finding (not reported here).

⁷ Our results remain significant without applying analytical weights (see the online supporting information).

To test the theoretical expectations expressed in H1 and H2, we regress *campaign personalisation* on the *party nomination power* and *party financing* variables. These tests are reported in Table I. Starting with H1, Model I shows that *party nomination power* has a significant negative effect on *campaign personalisation*, as expected. This effect remains significant when controlling for party characteristics (Model II) and the candidate-level characteristics total campaign spending and incumbency (Model III).

Table I: Effects of party nomination power and party financing on campaign personalisation (fixed effects OLS regression)

	<u>Model 1</u>	<u>Model 2</u>	<u>Model 3</u>
Party nomination power	-0.150** (0.046)	-0.152*** (0.043)	-0.143** (0.053)
Party financing	-0.079*** (0.022)	-0.064** (0.022)	-0.064* (0.025)
Party family		-	-
Ecologists		-0.114** (0.038)	-0.140*** (0.041)
Communists		-0.124** (0.042)	-0.114* (0.049)
Socialists		-0.043 (0.041)	-0.046 (0.047)
Liberals		-0.034 (0.035)	-0.044 (0.038)
Christian Democrats		-0.048 (0.041)	-0.048 (0.044)
Conservatives		0.002 (0.047)	-0.050 (0.050)
Nationalists		-0.073 (0.043)	-0.129** (0.046)
Centre/Agrarian		-0.038 (0.036)	-0.035 (0.040)
Ethnic/Linguistic		-0.076 (0.042)	-0.076 (0.046)
Incumbent party		0.065**	0.079**

	(0.024)	(0.027)	
Campaign spending		0.000 (0.078)	
Local incumbent		-0.032 (0.022)	
Regional incumbent		0.024 (0.029)	
National incumbent		-0.061* (0.028)	
EP Incumbent		0.138*** (0.031)	
Constant	0.498*** (0.044)	0.540*** (0.057)	0.538*** (0.075)
N	845	845	631
Adj. R²	0.289	0.327	0.353

*Note: Coefficients from OLS regression models with party-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Reference category for party family variable is 'Other'. All tests are two-sided.*

The effect is displayed graphically in Panel a, Figure 2 (estimated from Model III, Table I). As depicted, candidates from parties in which the nomination process is fully centralised within the party (coded 1) focus 14.3 percentage points less on personal relative to party messages compared to candidates from parties with a fully decentralised nomination process (coded 0). Importantly, for a majority of the candidates, the nomination process within their party is highly centralised (72% score over 0.5 on the party nomination power variable), while relatively few candidates belong to parties with a decentralised nomination process (as also depicted by the broad confidence intervals at the low end of the scale). This means that a majority of candidates face constraints from their party due to centralised nomination when organising their election campaign. Due to the uneven distribution across the *party nomination power* variable, we also estimate the effect of a two-standard deviation change on personalised campaigning, amounting to a 7.58

percentage-point effect. In sum, the more centralised the nomination process within the party, the less likely the candidates are to focus on personal rather than party messages in their election campaigns. These results support H1 and the notion that candidates from centralised parties respond to negative incentives to run a party-focused campaign.

Figure 2: Effects of party nomination power (Panel a) and party financing (Panel b) on campaign personalisation

Note: Grey area represents 95% confidence intervals. Estimated from Model III, Table I.

Turning to H2, Model I in Table I reveals a significant effect of *party financing* on *campaign personalisation*. This effect remains significant when controlling for party characteristics (Model II) and when introducing controls for candidate-level characteristics (Model III). Panel b in Figure 3 displays this graphically.

As illustrated, comparing a candidate whose campaign is financed 100% by the party (coded 1) to a candidate whose campaign is sponsored 0% by the party (coded 0) results in an extra 6.4 percentage point focus on party over personal campaign messages. Hence, in line with H2, the more a candidate's campaign finances are sponsored by the party, the more the candidate remains

focused on the party programme during the election campaign. This supports the notion that candidates whose party is able to sponsor their election campaigns respond to such positive incentives or rewards by running a more party-focused election campaign. A two-standard deviation change in the party financing variable results in a 4.9 percentage point change in campaign personalisation. This suggests that the party's control over the nomination process is a more important factor or control mechanism than party campaign financing. This makes sense theoretically, as re-nomination is a precondition for candidates to reach higher-order goals such as re-election, whereas campaign finances can be obtained from outside the party (Strøm 2012).

Finally, we report a set of tests probing the robustness and scope conditions of the findings (for full models, see Appendices B-F in the online supporting information). First, we turn to the question of whether experienced top candidates, who should be able to garner a substantial number of votes for the party, face more leeway in organising and personalising their campaigns relative to less prominent candidates (as discussed in the theory section). Specifically, we tested whether incumbents at the EP or national level were less responsive to their party's control over nominations and campaign financing than other candidates when deciding between a personalised or party-focused campaign (i.e., an interaction effect). We did not find such differential effects across incumbents and non-incumbents, suggesting that candidates respond to the incentive structure set up by their party regardless of incumbency and experience (but see Papp & Zorigt 2016).

Second, we reran the analyses without weighting the data to correct for non-response bias across different parties. Since different practices exist concerning the use of analytical weights in elite surveys, we find it important to stress that our results hold up and remain substantially similar and significant without applying weights in the analyses.

Third, because our dependent variable is right-skewed with relatively few observations at the high end of the scale (as depicted in Figure 1), we ran two-limit Tobit regression models only including observations within one or two standard deviations from the mean to avoid extrapolation based on outliers. Our results remain significant using this approach. In fact, the effects consistently become stronger when restricting observations on the dependent variable in this way.

Fourth, we reran our analyses using random effect models in which we control for a number of country-level variables, such as the election system and demographic characteristics. Our results remain significant and substantially similar with this modelling approach. Moreover, corroborating existing work (Carey & Shugart 1995; Heitshusen et al. 2005), we find that personalisation is less pronounced in closed list systems compared to open list systems (in which the parties hold another control mechanism in terms of candidate list placement). This further underlines how transferring power from party officials to lower-level members and non-party members can induce personalisation and decrease party unity in election campaigns.

In sum, the results allow us to draw three conclusions. First, the EP candidates in our study generally ran party-focused rather than personalised election campaigns. Second, this finding can be explained, in part, by the fact that most candidates depend on national party officials for (re)-nomination, and that they need to adjust their campaign strategies accordingly. Third, many candidates also depend on their party for campaign financing, which also prompts them to communicate party rather than personal messages.

Discussion

Existing voter studies imply that political candidates face electoral incentives to personalise their election campaigns at the expense of party policy. While these findings have raised concerns about the prospects of party governance and voter accountability, it remains unclear whether and when

political candidates in fact follow such incentives for personalisation. Against this background, this article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints that candidates face from their parties in personalising their election campaigns. We argue and demonstrate empirically that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrain most political candidates in running a personalised election campaign.

Our findings have important implications at the empirical, theoretical and normative levels. At the empirical level, the results help explain why (European) election campaigns remain highly party-focused despite the electoral incentives for personalisation facing individual candidates. By focusing on the internal organisations of parties and the control mechanisms most parties hold over their candidates in terms of candidate nomination and campaign financing, we increase explanatory power to account for this pattern in candidate communication with voters.

At the theoretical level, the findings advance our understanding of the incentive structure political candidates face when they decide between running a party-focused or personalised campaign. Our results imply that candidates can be discouraged from engaging in personalised campaigning when their party holds the means to introduce positive and negative incentives to follow party policy and interests. This means that some candidates face a dilemma or cross-pressure between the incentives provided by their party (to communicate party policy) and by their voters (to communicate personalised messages). More generally, this implies that personalisation is not an automatic and inevitable outcome caused by high levels of mediatisation and electoral incentives; rather, it is contingent on the incentives provided from political parties and the political system. Thereby, this article adds to the existing literature on how institutional factors shape the propensity for party dissent and cultivating a personal vote among politicians (see e.g., Carey & Shugart 1995; Kam 2009).

At the normative level, our findings have important implications for the current state and development of party democracy. Recent democratic reforms have sought to decentralise decision-making power within political parties, and creating more democratic and inclusive decision-making within parties is a formally stated goal of many public agencies in Western countries (Cross & Katz 2013: 2–10). Such reforms are sometimes encouraged because intra-party decentralisation and democratisation are perceived as ends in themselves. Often, however, these reforms are conveyed as a means to re-establish trust and participation in party activities and, ultimately, parties' capacity to aggregate the demands of citizens into the political system. In contrast, our findings highlight that decentralisation can increase personalisation at the expense of party unity and discipline among political candidates. This can make it increasingly difficult for parties to carry out one of their main democratic functions, namely organising and structuring political competition by offering distinct party programmes and ideological packages and, in turn, help voters simplify their choice between candidates. In addition, if parties lose their capacity to restrain candidates from communicating personal messages and pledges, it will become increasingly difficult for voters to hold politicians to their election promises (Schattschneider 1942; Downs 1957; Converse 1964; Dalton 1985; Cox & McCubbins 1993; Strömbäck 2005). This leads to a conclusion that might initially appear counter-intuitive: efforts to make intra-party decision-making processes more open and inclusive may not necessarily strengthen democracy at large. Decentralising political parties might make citizens more engaged in political affairs but can also make it increasingly difficult for parties to control their candidates and supply meaningful party programmes and cues for citizens to follow when voting for and holding politicians accountable (for further discussion about potential unintended consequences of intraparty democracy, see Rahat et al. 2008; Katz 2013). This suggests that reforming party organisations involves a dilemma or trade-

off between strengthening distinct democratic functions, where pursuing one democratic ideal might come at the expense of another.

Although personalisation can pose a challenge to party unity and stable governance, it is important to note that it could also entail certain positive implications. First, personalisation could lead to higher levels of public trust in politicians by reducing the perceived distance between elites and citizens. In particular, it could make candidates and politicians come off as less motivated by partisan conflict, gamesmanship and career advancements and as more responsive to the interests of constituents or societal problems in general. However, at this point, little empirical research exists on the relationship between politicians' representative styles and political trust (but see Campbell et al. 2016; Bøggild 2016). Second, some researchers propose that citizens may be more interested in and attentive to information about individual politicians than about political parties (e.g., Kruikemeier et al. 2013). This would imply that personalisation could raise political interest and knowledge among citizens. Politicians and the news media could 'piggyback' political information onto personalised news coverage focusing on individual politicians and, as such, appeal to segments that would otherwise opt out of politics. However, again, the potential for piggybacking political information remains unprobed in the existing literature. Given the prominence of personalisation in political news coverage, future research should analyse its implications among citizens.

In sum, our article demonstrates that the campaigning behaviour of politicians is significantly constrained by their parties. Efforts to reform intra-party politics can therefore entail important side effects in terms of a weakening of such party constraints, which can have unintended and not necessarily beneficial consequences for political representation and democracy in general. We do not propose that parties and practitioners give up on making internal decision-making processes more transparent and open to members and citizens in general. However, we find it crucial to call attention to the importance of the structuring and governing functions parties serve

and the organisational characteristics that assist these activities as we discuss the future of party democracy.

References

- Accetti, C.I. & Wolkenstein, F. (2016). The crisis of party democracy, cognitive mobilization and the case for making parties more deliberative. *American Political Science Review* 111(1): 97–109.
- André, A., Freire, A. & Papp, Z. (2014). Electoral rules and legislator's personal vote-seeking. In K. Deschouwer & S. Depauw (eds), *Representing the people: A survey among members of statewide and sub-state parliaments*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Balmas, M., Rahat, G., Sheafer, T. & Shenhav, S.R. (2014). Two routes to personalized politics: Centralized and decentralized personalization. *Party Politics* 20(1): 37–51.
- Bauman, Z. (2001). *The individualized society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bille, L. (2001). Democratizing a democratic procedure: Myth or reality? Candidate selection in Western European parties, 1960–1990. *Party Politics* 7(3): 363–380.
- Bøggild, T. (2016). How Politicians' Reelection Efforts Can Reduce Public Trust, Electoral Support, and Policy Approval. *Political Psychology* 37(6): 901-919
- Campbell, R., Cowley, P., Vivyan, N. & Wagner, M. (2016). Legislator dissent as a valence signal. *British Journal of Political Science (first view)*, 1–24.
- Carey, J.M. & Shugart, M.S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 417–439.
- Carson, J.L., Koger, G., Lebo, M.J. & Young, E. (2010). The electoral costs of party loyalty in Congress. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(3): 598–616.
- Converse, P.E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. Apter (ed), *Ideology and discontent*. New York: Free Press.
- Cox, G.W. & McCubbins, M.D. (1993). *Legislative leviathan: Party government in the House* (California series on social choice and political economy; 23). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cross, W.P. & Katz, R.S. (2013). *The challenges of intra-party democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Czesnik, Mikolaj; Kotnarowski, Michal; Markowski, Radoslaw (2010), EES (2009) Contextual dataset Codebook, Advance Release, 16/05/2010. (www.piredeu.eu)
- Dalton, R.J. (1985). Political parties and political representation. Party supporters and party elites in nine nations. *Comparative Political Studies* 18(3): 267–299.

- Depauw, S. & Martin, S. (2009). Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective. In D. Giannetti & K. Benoit (eds), *[Intra-party politics and coalition governments in parliamentary democracies](#)*. London: Routledge.
- Deschouwer, K., Depauw, S. & André, A. (2014). Representing the people in parliaments. In K. Deschouwer & S. Depauw (eds), *Representing the people: A survey among members of statewide and sub-state parliaments*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. *The Journal of Political Economy* 65(2): 135–150.
- Druckman, J.N., Kifer, M.J. & Parkin, M. (2009). Campaign communications in US congressional elections. *American Political Science Review* 103(03): 343–366.
- Faas, T. (2003). To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group pressures on MEPs and their consequences for party group cohesion in the European Parliament. *European Journal of Political Research* 42(6): 841–866.
- Ferrara, F. & Weishaupt, T. (2004). Get your act together: Party performance in European Parliament Election. *European Union Politics* 5(3): 283–306
- Gallagher, M. & Marsh, M. (1988). *Candidate selection in comparative perspective*. London: Sage.
- Gauja, A. (2015). The individualisation of party politics: The impact of changing internal decision-making processes on policy development and citizen engagement. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 17(1): 89–105.
- Giebler, H. & Wessels, B. (2010). *2009 European election candidate study: Methodological annex*. Berlin: WZB.
- Giebler, H. & Wessels, B. (2013). Campaign foci in European parliamentary elections: determinants and consequences. *Journal of Political Marketing* 12(1): 53–76.
- Giebler, H. & Wüst, A.M. (2011). Campaigning on an upper level? Individual campaigning in the 2009 European Parliament elections in its determinants. *Electoral Studies* 30(1): 53–66.
- Grynaviski, J.D. (2010). *Partisan bonds: Political reputations and legislative accountability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hazan, R.Y. & Rahat, G. (2010). *Democracy within parties: Candidate selection methods and their political consequences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Heitshusen, V., Young G., and Wood, D. (2005). "Electoral Context and MP Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom" *American Journal of Political Science* 49: 32-45.
- Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011). *The political system of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hix, S. & Lord, C. (1997). *Political parties in the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kam, C.J. (2009). *Party discipline and parliamentary politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Karvonen, L. (2007). *The personalization of politics: What does research tell us so far, and what further research is in order?* Paper presented at ECPR Conference, Pisa, 6–8 September 2007.
- Karvonen, L. (2010). *The personalization of politics: A study of parliamentary democracies*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Katz, R.S. (2013). Should we believe that improved intra-party democracy would arrest party decline? In W.P. Cross & R.S. Katz (eds), *The challenges of intra-party democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Katz, R.S. & Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party democracy the emergence of the cartel party. *Party Politics* 1(1): 5–28.
- Kiewit, R. & McCubbins, M. (1991). *The logic of delegation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Koß, M. (2010). *The politics of party funding: State funding to political parties and party competition in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kruikemeier, S., van Noort, G., Vliegenthart, R. & de Vreese, C.H. (2013). Getting closer: The effects of personalized and interactive online political communication. *European Journal of Communication* 28(1): 53–66.
- Manin, B. (1997). *The principles of representative government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McAllister, I. (2007). The personalization of politics. In R.J. Dalton & H.D. Klingermann (eds), *The Handbook of political behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, Wolfgang & Strøm, K. (2000). Conclusion. Coalition Governance in Western Europe. In W. Müller & K. Strøm (eds), *Coalitional governments in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Norris, P. (2000). *A virtuous circle: Political communications in postindustrial societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
- Oliver, P. (1980). Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations. *American Journal of Sociology* 85: 1356-1375
- Papp, Z. & Zorigt, B. (2016). Party-directed personalisation: the role of candidate selection in campaign personalisation in Hungary. *East European Politics* 32(4): 466-486
- Pilet, J.B. & Cross, W. (2014) (eds) *The selection of political party leaders in contemporary parliamentary democracies: A comparative study*. London: Routledge.
- Rahat, G. (2007). Candidate Selection: The Choice Before the Choice, *Journal of Democracy*, 18(1): 157–70.
- Rahat, G., Hazan, R. & Katz, R. (2008). Democracy and Political Parties: On the Uneasy Relationships between Participation, Competition and Representation. *Party Politics* 14(6): 663-683
- Rashkova, E.R. & van Biezen, I. (2014). The legal regulation of political parties: Contesting or promoting legitimacy. *International Political Science Review* 35(3): 265–274.
- Raunio, T. (2000). Losing independence or finally gaining recognition? Contacts between MEPs and national parties. *Party Politics* 6(2): 211–223.
- Scarrow S. (2005) Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives. Implementing Intra-Party Democracy. National Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Available at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1951_polpart_scarrow_110105_5.pdf. (accessed July 3, 2017).
- Scarrow, S. (2013). Intra-Party Democracy and Party Finance. In W. Cross & S. Katz (eds.), *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scarrow, S. (2014). *Beyond party members: Changing approaches to partisan mobilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schattschneider, E.E. (1942). *Party government*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Shenhav, S.R. & Sheaffer, T. (2008). From inter-party debate to inter-personal polemic: Media coverage of internal and external party. *Party Politics* 14(6): 706–725.
- Strøm, K. (2012). Roles as strategies: towards a logic of legislative behaviour. In M. Blomgren & O. Rozenberg (eds), *Parliamentary roles in modern legislatures*. London: Routledge.

- Strömbäck, J. (2005). In search of a standard: Four models of democracy and their normative implications for journalism. *Journalism Studies* 6(3): 331–345.
- Swanson, D.L. & Mancini, P. (1996). *Politics, media, and modern democracy: An international study of innovations in electoral campaigning and their consequences*. Westport: Greenwood.
- Van Biezen, I.C. (2010). Campaign and party finance. In L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi and P. Norris (eds), *Comparing democracies: elections and voting in global perspective*, 3rd ed. London: Sage.
- Van Biezen, I. & Kopecký, P. (2007). The state and the parties public funding, public regulation and rent-seeking in contemporary democracies. *Party Politics* 13(2): 235–254.
- Van Biezen, I. & Piccio, D.R. (2013). Shaping intra-party democracy: On the legal regulation of internal party organizations. In W.P. Cross & R.S. Katz (eds), *The challenges of intra-party democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ware, A.J. (1979). *Logic of party democracy*. London: Macmillan
- Webb, P. 1996. Apartisanship and Anti-Party Sentiment in the United Kingdom: Correlates and Constraints. *European Journal of Political Research* 29 (3):365–82.
- Wessels, B. (2011). *European Parliament Election Study 2009, Candidate Study*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5048 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11323.
- Wolfsfeld, G. (2011). *Making sense of media and politics: Five principles in political communication*. New York: Routledge.
- Zittel, T. & Nyhuis, D. (2017). The Legislative Effects of Individualized Campaigns. A Text-Based Analysis on the Behaviors of German Legislators. Paper presented at the international workshop on personalisation, Aarhus, Denmark, 3-4 April 2017.
- Önnudóttir, E.H. (2016). Political parties and styles of representation. *Party Politics* 22(6): 732–745.

Online Supporting Information

Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

Contents

Appendix A: Full overview and operationalisations of control variables	32
Appendix B: Analyses rerun after data imputation, replacing missing values with means from other candidates within the candidate's party.....	34
Appendix C: Effects of Party nomination power and Party financing on Campaign personalisation moderated by incumbency of candidate at EU and national levels (control variables included but not reported)	37
Appendix D: Analyses rerun without using weight variable to correct for non-response bias across parties (control variables included but not reported).	39
Appendix E: Analyses rerun using two-limit Tobit regression models with censoring at different levels of the Campaign personalisation variable (control variables included but not reported).	40
Appendix F: Analyses rerun with random effects models, controlling for relevant country-level variables. .	42
Appendix G: Population lists of countries and political parties	45

Appendix A: Full overview and operationalisations of control variables

Variable	Question formulation/ Operationalisation
Total campaign spending in Euro	<p>“Thinking about your campaign budget, what would be your best estimate of the financial resources you use for your campaign (including party funds, donations, and private funds)?”</p> <p><i>(Measured in national currency and then transformed by research team according to exchange rates at the time)</i></p>
Candidate incumbency	<p>“Can you tell us about your political experience? Are you now or have you ever been a member of any of the following bodies?”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local representative body - Regional representative body - National representative body - Member of the European Parliament <p>For each category, candidates were coded 1 if answering “Yes, at the moment” and 0 if answering “Yes, in the past” or “No, never”</p>
Party family	<p>Categorization of party family/type made by national experts according to the following categories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ecologists (N=129) - Communists (N=71) - Socialists (N=242) - Liberalists (N=190) - Christian Democrats (N=156) - Conservatives (N=90) - Nationalists (N=112) - Centre/Agrarian (N=47) - Ethnic/Linguistic (N=104) - Others/Missing information (reference category) (N=205)

	<i>For detailed categorization procedure, see Giebler, Haus, & Wessels (2010)</i>
Incumbent party	Candidates from parties in national government at the time of the 2009 EP election were coded 1. Non-incumbents coded 0.

Appendix B: Analyses rerun after data imputation, replacing missing values with means from other candidates within the candidate's party.

Table II: Effects of party nomination power and party financing on campaign personalisation
(fixed effects OLS regression)

	<u>Model 1</u>	<u>Model 2</u>	<u>Model 3</u>
Party nomination power	-0.065 (0.043)	-0.080* (0.039)	-0.130* (0.052)
Party financing	-0.076*** (0.021)	-0.056* (0.022)	-0.069** (0.025)
Party family		-	-
Ecologists		-0.092** (0.035)	-0.124** (0.039)
Communists		-0.132*** (0.038)	-0.121** (0.043)
Socialists		-0.029 (0.034)	-0.042 (0.039)
Liberals		-0.008 (0.033)	-0.017 (0.034)
Christian Democrats		-0.0380 (0.039)	-0.053 (0.038)
Conservatives		0.0583	-0.020

	(0.058)	(0.044)
Nationalists	-0.072	-0.109**
	(0.037)	(0.041)
Centre/Agrarian	-0.0509	-0.0244
	(0.041)	(0.037)
Ethnic/Linguistic	-0.073	-0.058
	(0.047)	(0.042)
Incumbent party	0.044	0.062*
	(0.023)	(0.028)
Campaign spending		-0.039
		(0.062)
Local incumbent		0.007
		(0.032)
Regional incumbent		0.010
		(0.026)
National incumbent		-0.071*
		(0.032)
EP Incumbent		0.125***
		(0.030)

Constant	0.403*** (0.048)	0.457*** (0.062)	0.507*** (0.068)
N	1535	1535	789
Adj. R²	0.275	0.325	0.357

*Note: Coefficients from OLS regression models with party-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Reference category for party family variable is “Other”. All tests are two-sided.*

Appendix C: Effects of Party nomination power and Party financing on Campaign personalisation moderated by incumbency of candidate at EU and national levels (control variables included but not reported)

TABLE III. Interaction effects between EU incumbency and Party nomination power (Model I) and Party financing (Model II) (Fixed effects OLS regression).

	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model II</u>
Party nomination power (A)	-0.143** (0.054)	-0.144** (0.529)
Party financing (B)	-0.064* (0.025)	-0.059* (0.025)
EP incumbent (C)	0.133 (0.122)	0.178** (0.048)
A * C	0.007 (0.156)	-
B * C	-	-0.154 (0.132)
N	631	631
R²	0.353	0.354

*Note: Coefficients from OLS regression models with party-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. All control variables included in Model III, Table 1 (main text) are included (not reported). Reference category for party family variable is “Other”. [†] $p \leq 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$. All tests are two-sided.*

TABLE IV. Interaction effects between National incumbency and Party nomination power (Model I) and Party financing (Model II) (Fixed effects OLS regression).

	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model II</u>
Party nomination power (A)	-0.150** (0.055)	-0.142** (0.053)
Party financing (B)	-0.063* (0.025)	-0.066* (0.027)
National incumbent (C)	-0.151 [†] (0.086)	-0.072** (0.052)
A * C	0.113 (0.121)	-
B * C	-	0.023 (0.081)
N	631	631
R²	0.353	0.353

*Note: Coefficients from OLS regression models with party-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. All control variables included in Model III, Table 1 (main text) are included (not reported). Reference category for party family variable is “Other”. [†] $p \leq 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$. All tests are two-sided.*

Appendix D: Analyses rerun without using weight variable to correct for non-response bias across parties (control variables included but not reported).

TABLE V. Effects of Party nomination power and Party financing on Campaign personalisation – unweighted results (fixed effects OLS regression)

	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
Party nomination power	-0.134** (0.042)	-0.141** (0.038)	-0.137** (0.041)
Party financing	-0.080*** (0.020)	-0.071** (0.019)	-0.062** (0.02)
Fixed effect (country)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party controls	No	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls	No	No	Yes
N	845	845	631
R²	0.222	0.275	0.312

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression models with party-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. All tests are two-sided. Reference category for party family variable is “Other”. Yes and No indicate whether relevant controls are included. [†] $p \leq 0.10$; $*p \leq 0.05$; $**p \leq 0.01$; $***p \leq 0.001$.

Appendix E: Analyses rerun using two-limit Tobit regression models with censoring at different levels of the Campaign personalisation variable (control variables included but not reported).

TABLE VI. Effects of Party nomination power and Party financing on Campaign personalisation – with censoring below and above one standard deviation from the mean of the Campaign personalisation variable (fixed effects Tobit regression)

	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
Party nomination power	-0.185** (0.057)	-0.185*** (0.053)	-0.152* (0.061)
Party financing	-0.098** (0.029)	-0.076** (0.029)	-0.063* (0.032)
Fixed effect (country)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party controls	No	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls	No	No	Yes
N	845	845	631
Pseudo R²	0.355	0.410	0.444

*Note: Coefficients from Tobit regression models with party-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.. Reference category for party family variable is “Other”. Yes and No indicate whether relevant controls are included. [†] $p \leq 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$. All tests are two-sided*

TABLE VII. Effects of Party nomination power and Party financing on Campaign personalisation – with censoring below and above two standard deviations from the mean of the Campaign personalisation variable (fixed effects Tobit regression)

	<u>Model I</u>	<u>Model II</u>	<u>Model III</u>
Party nomination power	-0.196** (0.058)	-0.192*** (0.053)	-0.173** (0.064)
Party financing	-0.097*** (0.027)	-0.078** (0.028)	-0.074* (0.030)
Fixed effect (country)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party controls	No	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls	No	No	Yes
N	845	845	631
Pseudo R²	0.430	0.505	0.536

Note: Coefficients from Tobit regression models with party-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*[†] $p \leq 0.10$; * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$. All tests are two-sided. Yes and No indicate whether relevant controls are included.*

Appendix F: Analyses rerun with random effects models, controlling for relevant country-level variables.

TABLE VIII. Effects of Party nomination power and Party financing on Campaign personalisation (Random effects OLS regression)

	Model I
Party nomination power	-0.095** (0.035)
Party financing	-0.062** (0.023)
Open vs. closed list system	-0.194*** (0.029)
Parliamentary system	-
Semi-presidential (president-dominated)	-0.014 (0.045)
Semi-presidential (parliament-dominated)	0.031 (0.030)
Proportionality	0.004 (0.005)
Other elections at same time	0.128* (0.055)
GDP	0.000** (0.000)
Population	0.000*** (0.000)
Party Family	-
Ecologists	-0.074* (0.035)
Communists	-0.051 (0.043)

Socialists	-0.009 (0.030)
Liberals	0.020 (0.030)
Christian Democrats	-0.018 (0.036)
Conservatives	-0.017 (0.041)
Nationalists	-0.101* (0.040)
Centre/Agrarian	0.069 (0.046)
Ethnic/Linguistic	-0.070 (0.037)
Incumbent party	0.010*** (0.022)
Total campaign spending	0.019 (0.118)
Local incumbent	-0.008 (0.020)
Regional incumbent	0.007 (0.028)
National incumbent	-0.051 (0.035)
EP incumbent	0.123** (0.042)
Constant	0.441*** (0.059)
<hr/>	
N	631
rmse	0.203

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression models with standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for Party Family variable is “Other”. For operationalisations of country-level control variables, see Czesnik, Mikolaj; Kotnarowski, Michal; Markowski, Radoslaw (2010), EES (2009)

Contextual dataset Codebook, Advance Release, 16/05/2010. * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$. All tests are two-sided.

Appendix G: Population lists of countries and political parties

<u>Country</u>	<u>Name of party (English)</u>
Austria	Austrian People's Party
	Social Democratic Party of Austria
	Hans-Peter Martin's List
	Freedom Party of Austria
	The Greens
	Alliance for the Future of Austria
	Young Liberals
	Communist Party of Austria
Belgium (Duth region)	Christian Democratic and Flemish Party
	Flemish Liberals and Democrats
	Flemish Interest
	Socialist Party Different
	New Flemish Alliance
	Green!
	List Dedecker
	Belgian Labour Party
	Social Liberal Party
	LSP
	Committee for Another Policy
	Socialist Party (German Minority)
	Freedom and Progress Party
Belgium (French/Wallonia)	Socialist Party
	Reformist Movement
	Ecolo
	Humanist Democratic Centre
	National Front
	Wallonia First
	Rally Wallonia France
	Workers' Party of Belgium
	LCR-PSL
	Committee for Another Policy
	Communist Party (Wallonia)
	MS
Belgium (German Electoral College)	Christian Social Party
	PFF
	ECOLO
	SP
	ProDG

	VIVANT
	EUROPA der WERTE
Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)
	Coalition for Bulgaria (BSP)
	Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)
	National Union Attack (ATAKA)
	National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV)
	Blue Coalition (SDS-DSB)
	Lider
	Order, Lawfulness, and Justice (RZS)
	Others
	NAPRED
	Bulgarian New Democracy (BND)
	United Democratic Forces
	Democrats for Strong Bulgaria
	Agrarian Peoples Union (until 2006 was Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union – People's Union)
Cyprus	Democratic Rally
	Progressive Party of Working People
	Democratic Party
	Movement for Social Democracy
	European Party
	Ecological and Environmental Movement
	Marios Matsakis (Ind)
	Cyprus Reunification Front
	Others
	National Popular Front
Czech republic	Civic Democratic Party
	Czech Social Democratic Party
	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
	Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party
	Sovereignty
	Others
	European Democratic Party
	Public Affairs
	Mayors and Independents – Your Option
	Green Party
	SNK European Democrats
	Party of Free Citizens
	DS
	PB

	Libertas
	Independent Democrats
	Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09
Denmark	Social Democrats
	Liberal Party
	Socialist People's Party
	Danish People's Party
	Conservative People's Party
	People's Movement against the EU
	Danish Social Liberal Party
	June Movement
	Liberal Alliance
	Red-Green Alliance
	Progress Party
	Christian Democrats
Estonia	Estonian Centre Party
	Indrek Tarand (Independent Candidate)
	Estonian Reform Party
	Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica
	Social Democratic Party
	Estonian Greens
	Martin Helme/Hel
	People's Union of Estonia
	Dimitri Klenski (Independent Candidate)
	Estonian United Left
	Libertas Estonia
	Estonian Christian Democrats
	Russian Party in Estonia
	Others
	Farmer's Union
Finland	National Coalition Party
	Centre Party
	Social Democratic Party of Finland
	Green League
	True Finns
	Swedish People's Party
	Left Alliance
	Christian Democrats in Finland
	Others
	Communist Party of Finland
	For the Poor
	Independence Party
	Workers' Party of Finland

	Senior Citizens' Party of Finland
France	Union for a Popular Movement
	Socialist Party
	Europe Écologie
	Democratic Movement
	The Left Front (Left Party + French Communist Party)
	National Front
	Extreme left (New Anticapitalist Party, Workers' Struggle)
	Libertas (Libertas+ Movement for France+Hunt,Fish, Nature, Traditions)
	Independent Ecological Alliance
	Others
	Arise the Republic
	Workers' Struggle
	Newropeans
	Libertas
	The Greens
	French Communist Party
	Left Party
	Alliance of the Overseas
Germany	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
	Social Democratic Party
	Alliance '90/The Greens
	Free Democratic Party
	The Left
	Christian Social Democrats
	Others
	Free Voters
	The Republicans
	Animal Welfare Party
	Family Party of Germany
	German Pirate Party
	Ecological Democratic Party
	German People's Union
	Feminist Party of Germany
	Party of Bible-abiding Christians
	The Greys
	The Bavaria Party
	The Violets Party
	The German Communist Party
	Newropeans

	National Democratic Party of Germany
	Anarchistic Pogo Party of Germany
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
	New Democracy
	Communist Party of Greece
	Popular Orthodox Rally
	Coalition of the Radical Left
	Others
	Ecologist Greens
	Panellinio Makedoniko Metopo
	Komma Ellinon Kynigon (Fysi - Kynigi - Psarema - Paradosi)
	Union of Centrists
	Liberal Alliance
	Action
Hungary	Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union
	Hungarian Socialist Party
	Movement for a Better Hungary
	Hungarian Democratic Forum
	Politics Can be Different
	Alliance of Free Democrats
	Hungarian Communist Workers' Party
	MCF Roma Uniting Party
	Christian Democratic People's Party
	Party of Hungarian Justice and Life
Ireland	Fine Gael
	Fianna Fail
	Labour Party
	Sinn Fein
	Other Independents/Other Ind
	Libertas
	Maria Harkin (Independent candidate)
	Socialist Party (SP)
	Green Party
	An independent candidate*
	Joe Higgins (Independent candidate)
	Progressive Democrats
Italy	The People of Freedom
	Democratic Party
	North League
	Italy of Values
	Union of Christian and Centre Democrats
	PdCI-PRC-S2000-CU

	Left and Freedom
	Radical Party
	Movement for Autonomy
	Tricolor Flame
	Workers' Communist Party
	New Force
	South Tyrol People's Party
	Valdotanian Union
	Autonomy, Liberty, Democracy
	Communist Refoundation Party
	Rainbow Left
	The Right
Latvia	Civic Union
	Harmony Centre
	For Human Rights in United Latvia
	Latvia's First Party/Latvia's Way
	For Fatherland and Freedom
	New Era Party
	Libertas
	Society for Other Politics
	Latvian Social Democratic Labour Party
	Union of Greens and Farmers
	All for Latvia
	People's Party
	Par Dzimteni!
	Action Party
	Latvian Christian Seniors' Union
	Osipov Party
	Renaissance Party of Latvia
Lithuania	Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats
	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party
	Order and Justice Party
	Labour Party
	Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action
	Liberals' Movement of the Republic of Lithuania
	Liberal and Centre Union
	Lithuanian Centre Party
	Christian Conservatives Social Union
	Frontas Party
	Lithuanian Peasant People Union
	Party of Civic Democracy
	Party of Samogitia

	Nation's Resurrection Party
	National Party "Way of Lithuania"
	New Union (Social Liberals)
	Civic Democratic Party
Luxembourg	Christian Social People's Party
	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party
	Democratic Party
	The Greens
	Alternative Democratic Reform Party
	The Left
	Communist Party of Luxembourg
	Citizens' List
Malta	Labour Party
	Nationalist Party
	Democratic Alternative
	Imperium Europa
	National Action
	Libertas Malta
	Liberal Democratic Alliance
	Alpha Liberal Democratic Party
	Eagle's Party
	Coherence, Unity, Liberty - Europe
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal
	Party for Freedom
	Labour Party
	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
	Democrats 66
	Green Left
	Socialist Party
	Christian Union-Reformed Political Party
	Party for Animals
	Dutch Whistleblowers' Party
	Newropeans
	Libertas
	Liberal Democrat Party
	The Greens
	Solidarity
	Affordable and Sustainable Europe
	European Politics Party
	Reformed Political Party
	Proud of the Netherlands
	Pim Fortuyn List
	Christian Union

Poland	Civic Platform
	Law and Justice
	Election Coalition Committee of the Democratic Left Alliance - Labour Union
	Polish People's Party
	Coalition Agreement for the Future - CenterLeft
	Republic Right Party
	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland
	Libertas
	Union of Real Politics
	Polish Labour Party
	Others
	Democratic Left Alliance
Portugal	Social Democratic Party
	Socialist Party
	Left Bloc
	Democratic Union Coalition (Portuguese Communist Party and the Greens)
	Democratic and Social Center - Popular Party
	Invalid votes
	Hope for Portugal Movement
	Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers - Reorganizational Movement of the Party of the Proletariat
	Earth Party
	Merit and Society Movement
	Humanist Party
	People's Monarchist Party
	National Renewal Party
	Workers' Party of Social Unity
	The Greens
	Portuguese Communist Party
	New Democracy Party
Romania	Social Democratic Party
	Democratic Liberal Party
	National Liberal Party
	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania
	Greater Romania Party
	Elena Basescu
	Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party
	Pavel Avraham
	Civic Force
	Romanian Communist Party
	Conservative Party

Slovakia	Direction - Social Democracy
	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union
	Party of the Hungarian Coalition
	Christian Democratic Movement
	People's Party - Movement for Democratic Slovakia
	Slovak National Party
	Freedom and Solidarity
	Green Party
	Conservative Democrats of Slovakia
	Communist Party of Slovakia
	Free Forum
	Party of Democratic Left
	Agrarian Party
	MISSION 21
	Democratic Party
	LIGA, Civic-Liberal Party
	Green Party
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party
	Social Democrats
	New Slovenia - Christian People's Party
	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia
	For Real
	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia
	Slovenian People's Party
	Slovenian National Party
	Youth Party
	United Greens
	Independent List for the Rights of Patients
	Christian Socialists of Slovenia
Spain	People's Party
	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
	Coalition for Europe
	United Left
	Union, Progress, and Democracy
	Europe of the Peoples-The Greens
	Others
	Internationalist Initiative – The Solidarity among the People/Iniciativa Internacionalista
	Libertas Spain
	Anticapitalist Left
	Social and Democratic Center/Coalition Forum
	The Greens
	Europe of the Peoples

	Convergence and Union
	Basque Nationalist Party
	Canarian Coalition
	Basque Social Democracy
	Republican Left of Catalonia
	Galician Nationaist Bloc
	Navarrese People's Union
	Navarre Yes
Sweden	Social Democratic Labour Party
	Moderate Party
	Liberal People's Party
	Green Party
	Pirate Party
	Left Party
	Centre Party
	Christian Democrats
	June List
	Sweden Democrats
	Feminist Initiative
	Others
	Social Democrats
United Kingdom	Conservatives
	UK Independence Party (UKIP)
	Labour
	Liberal Democrats
	Green Party
	British National Party (BNP)
	Others
	Scottish National Party
	England Democrats
	Christian Party
	Socialist Labour Party SLP
	No2EU: Yes to Democracy
	Plaid Cymru
	Sinn Fein
	Democratic Unionist Party
	Ulster Unionist Part
	Social Democratic and Labour Party
	Pro Democracy: Libertas.eu
	Traditional Unionist Voice - TUV
	Alliance Party
	Green Party
	Animals Count

	Scottish Socialist Party SSP
	United Kingdom First
	Jury Team
	Mebyon Kernow
	Peace Party
	Pensioners Party
	Roman Party
	Scottish Green Party
	Socialist Party of Great Britain