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Title

A congruence analysis of the inequality-conflict nexus: Evidence from 16 cases

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Abstract

The relationship between inequality and civil conflict has attracted considerable interest in conflict research. Recent large-N studies have shown that inequalities significantly contribute to the outbreak of civil conflict and have proposed a number of causal pathways to account for this. These pathways, however, have rarely been assessed in systematic case-based research. This study implements a ‘middle-N’ qualitative congruence analysis of 16 conflicts, focusing on the observable implications of the pathways through which inequalities are typically theorised to influence conflict. The study finds evidence to support some of the main pathways proposed in the quantitative literature. Furthermore, the analysis finds that different types of inequalities relate to different conflict categories. Specifically, vertical inequalities relate to non-ethnic governmental conflicts (via an ‘individual deprivation pathway’), regional inequalities to non-ethnic territorial conflicts (via a ‘separatist pathway’), and horizontal inequalities to ethnic conflicts (via a ‘group deprivation pathway’).

Keywords: inequality, relative deprivation, grievances, civil war, armed conflict, congruence analysis, causal pathways

Word count: 9,788

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Author's note

An online appendix with case studies supporting this article can be accessed via a supplementary data file hosted on SAGE's CMPS website.

Introduction

The relationship between inequality and civil conflict has attracted considerable interest in conflict research. Recent studies have shown that inequalities between ethnic groups (e.g., Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011), social classes (e.g., Bartusevičius, 2014), regions (e.g., Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 2009), and administrative units in federations (Deiwi, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2012) significantly contribute to the outbreak of civil conflict or civil war (hereafter conflict).¹ However, most of this research has relied on quantitative cross- or sub-national data. Systematic case-based evidence on the inequality-conflict nexus remains relatively sparse. While quantitative analyses are arguably superior at assessing the effects of inequality on conflict, case-based research can complement large-N studies with more specified tests of the theorised pathways through which inequality generates conflict.

In this study, I employ case-based analysis techniques to assess the main explanations of the inequality-conflict nexus proposed in previous large-N research. I start with a survey of the literature and identify a set of causal pathways that have been proposed to account for how inequality generates conflict. Here, I focus on economic inequality, as most of the large-N research has analysed inequalities in economic goods (such as income or land).² I find that

¹ The findings of these recent studies stand in contrast to previous research (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003); the non-findings of previous studies on the inequality-conflict nexus have largely been attributed to the failure to adequately operationalize independent and dependent variables (e.g., Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014).

² Exceptions include Besancon (2005) and Østby (2008a), who have analyzed inequalities in education. Recently, researchers have also focused on ethno-political exclusion (e.g., Wimmer,

economic inequality is typically theorised to influence conflict through three pathways: by generating individual ('individual deprivation pathway') or group relative deprivation ('group deprivation pathway'), which motivates and facilitates the mobilization of the disadvantaged to challenge the status quo, and by generating motivation among the advantaged to secede ('separatist pathway').

Following the logic of congruence analysis (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Beach & Pedersen, 2016: Ch. 8; Møller 2017), I then specify a set of observable implications of the three pathways. In line with Haggard and Kaufman (2012) and Ross (2004), this study takes the middle ground between large-N research and in-depth analysis, and focuses on pathways at a relatively high level of aggregation. Particularly, the specified observable implications of the three pathways relate to the economic status of individuals who join the fight in conflicts. The first two pathways predict that individuals participating in conflicts should either be among the most economically disadvantaged or represent social groups that are among the most economically disadvantaged. The third pathway predicts that territorial conflicts should be initiated by advantaged individuals residing in regions that are among the most economically advantaged.

Using a stratified sampling method and a random sampling technique, I then select 16 cases of conflict onset. The sample encompasses one-fourth of all ethnic governmental, ethnic territorial, non-ethnic governmental and non-ethnic territorial conflicts recorded in the post-Cold

Cederman, & Min, 2009), which one could conceptualize as 'political inequality'. However, the concept of ethno-political exclusion contains a number of other attributes (such as 'political relevance' of ethnic groups or particular characteristics of ethnicity) that are beyond the scope of this study.

War period (1992–2010). Finally, I assess the plausibility of the three causal pathways by matching the specified observable implications to the actual data in the 16 conflicts.

The analysis finds considerable evidence to support the individual and group deprivation pathways and some evidence to support the separatist pathway. In addition, it reveals that the three pathways are associated with different conflict categories. Specifically, individual deprivation and separatism are linked to non-ethnic governmental and non-ethnic territorial conflicts respectively, while group deprivation is linked to ethnic conflicts (both governmental and territorial).

While this study does not test the micro-level mechanisms through which inequalities lead to conflict, it presents a meso-level plausibility test for the causal theories that have been proposed in the quantitative conflict literature. In doing so it lays the ground for further, more in-depth work at the micro level, focused on the actual steps in the theorised causal chain that connects inequality to conflict. The study concludes with a claim that research on the inequality-conflict nexus can be significantly advanced via the study of the actual causal mechanisms through which inequalities lead to conflict. To facilitate this, the study ends with a discussion of ways to implement such analyses, highlighting potential research avenues and likely challenges.

State of the art

A search in the ISI Web of Science using ‘civil war’ AND ‘inequality’ (within *Political Science* and *International Relations*) returns 77 articles published in 2011–2015. In 14 of these, inequality is the main, or one of the main, explanatory variables and conflict onset is the main, or one of the main, dependent variables. Of these, 13 employ large-N (cross- or sub-national) quantitative analysis techniques (Bartusevičius, 2014; Baten & Mumme, 2013; Buhaug et al.,

2011; Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014; Cederman, Weidman, & Gleditsch, 2011; Cederman, Weidmann, & Bormann, 2015; de la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2012; Deiwiiks, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2012; Gubler & Selway, 2012; Han, O'Mahoney, & Paik, 2014; Koubi & Boehmelt, 2014; Roe & Siegel, 2011; Rustad et al., 2011; Vadlamannati, 2011). Only a single study (Basedau, Vüllers, & Körner, 2013) examines the role of inequality in conflict using a qualitative strategy.³ Arguably, large-N quantitative design is preferred when research aims to establish empirical patterns between Xs and Ys (Jackman, 1985). Yet, when it comes to exploring the actual pathways through which Xs generate Ys, case-based research may be a more appropriate option, in particular if fine-grained quantitative data does not exist.

Prior research on the inequality-conflict nexus has argued that individual or group-based inequalities lead to conflicts by generating motivation among the disadvantaged to challenge the status quo (e.g., Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014), or that regional inequalities lead to conflicts by generating motivation among the advantaged to secede (e.g., Buhaug et al., 2011). However, the aggregate state- or region-level data employed in such research does not allow for directly assessing these claims. The fact that states with high levels of inequality experience greater risk of conflict provides little information on who actually takes part in conflicts (and whether inequality is the motivating factor). Likewise, the fact that wealthy regions or countries

³ Note that this list only includes articles that were published in the journals that are indexed in the ISI Web of Science during the five-year period. There are notable working papers (e.g., Stewart, 2002) and edited volumes (e.g., Stewart, 2008a), as well as less recent articles (e.g., Midlarsky & Roberts, 1985) that employ qualitative strategies to study the inequality-conflict nexus.

with high regional inequality are more likely to experience territorial conflicts provides little clue as to who actually fights or initiates territorial conflicts.

To assess who fights or initiates conflicts (and infer whether inequality is a likely motivating factor), we need to scale down. One way to identify the status of those who join the fight is survey research (e.g., Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). Yet due to security and logistical concerns, survey data on violence is difficult to attain. Moreover, since they pertain to politically sensitive issues, individual self-reports on participation in violence potentially suffer from various reporting biases. Another way to assess the status of conflict actors is qualitative case-based design.⁴ In what follows, I introduce an example of such a design and employ it to assess the above-mentioned theories linking inequality to conflict.

Analytical Approach

On a general level, this study follows an approach similar to that of Haggard & Kaufman (2012) and Ross (2004), where analysis takes the middle ground between large-N and in-depth design, focusing on causal pathways at a relatively high level of aggregation. Instead of delving into the micro-processes of a single case, I focus on observable implications at the ‘meso’ level in a relatively large number of cases (‘middle-N’) (see also Møller, 2017). This allows for generating insights that are potentially generalizable to a larger pool of conflicts.

Congruence analysis is a theory-testing approach that:

⁴ Recent disaggregated analyses show that such questions can also be plausibly assessed in a large-N setting (e.g., Cederman, Weidman, & Gleditsch, 2011). However, the quantitative data used in these studies is still of limited resolution and coverage (Ibid.: 486–487).

Focuses on drawing inferences from the (non-)congruence of concrete observations with specified predictions from abstract theories to the relevance or relative strength of these theories for explaining/ understanding the case(s) under study (Blatter & Blume, 2008: 320; see also Beach & Pedersen 2016: Ch. 8).

Predictions in congruence analysis can include assumptions about the ‘most important...actors, their perceptions and their motivations...the corresponding structural factors...or other fundamental elements of the theory’ (Ibid.: 326). Unlike covariational approaches, congruence analysis involves theoretically deduced predictions on causal process observations such as sequences and events—not just predictions on specific values of independent and dependent variables, as is the case in covariational approaches.⁵

Congruence analysis involves four main steps: (1) stating the theory; (2) deducing predictions or observable implications that we should observe if the theory is valid; (3) testing the (non-)congruence between the deduced predictions and the actual data; and (4) assessing the strength of the test(s) of congruence by evaluating the *certainty* and *uniqueness* of the deduced predictions (this step can be combined with or precede Step Three).

Certainty of prediction refers to the degree of certainty to which we believe the prediction would (in)validate the theory: If we have a highly certain prediction and it fails, then we can, with high certainty, ‘refute’ the theory (and vice versa). Uniqueness of prediction refers to the extent to which we believe the predicted outcome can be explained by our theory (and not by

⁵ Note therefore that Blatter & Blume (2008) attest to a different conception of congruence analysis than that of George & Bennet (2005: 181–204) or Van Evera (1997: 58–63), according to which congruence analysis is limited to predictions on specific values of independent and dependent variables.

alternative theories): ‘The most unique predictions forecast outcomes that could have no plausible cause except the theory’s action. If the prediction succeeds, the theory is strongly corroborated because other explanations for the test outcome are few and implausible’ (Van Evera, 1997: 31).

Following this framework, (1) I first define inequality and delineate the causal pathways that have been proposed to explain the relationship between inequality and conflict. (2) I then deduce observable implications of the theorized causal pathways, and (3) assess the congruence between the deduced predictions and actual data in conflicts. (4) I assess the strength of the congruence tests in ‘Discussion’ section.

A Congruence Analysis of the Inequality-Conflict Nexus

Economic inequality

Economic inequality is defined as an unequal distribution of economic goods/opportunities in a given society. The economic goods/opportunities over which inequalities exist are hereby defined broadly; they can include ‘access to and ownership of assets (financial, land, livestock and human and social capital), employment opportunities and incomes’ (Stewart, 2008b: 13). The criterion for including a good/opportunity in the definition of economic inequality is its widely acknowledged value and the fact that its possession significantly influences individuals’ socioeconomic status.

The inequality-conflict literature categorizes inequalities as ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’. Horizontal inequalities ‘are inequalities between culturally defined groups or groups with shared identities. They are called *horizontal* to distinguish them from inequalities among individuals, [referred] to as *vertical inequalities*’ (Ibid.: 12).

While vertical inequalities are often referred to as ‘interpersonal inequalities’, they indirectly capture a group dimension as well. Individuals are not stratified into millions of layers with respect to their share of economic goods; rather, individuals possessing a comparable share of economic goods typically form socioeconomic groups (or ‘social classes’), which, like other social groups (e.g., ethnic groups), share particular attributes such as geographic concentration or common social identity (e.g., Jackman & Jackman, 1983; Wright, 1997). Thus, distribution of economic goods in the total population not only captures the distribution of economic goods among individuals, but also indirectly accounts for the distribution of economic goods among socioeconomic groups. The distinction between horizontal and vertical inequalities, however, needs to be taken into account when theorizing the pathways through which inequalities lead to conflict—an issue I turn to next.

Causal pathways

A survey of previous large-N research suggests that inequality and conflict are typically linked via three causal explanations: an ‘individual deprivation pathway’, a ‘group deprivation pathway’, and a ‘separatist pathway’. In the following, I briefly summarize each of these.

Individual deprivation pathway. Early studies on the inequality-conflict nexus argued that inequalities generate perceptions (or ‘feelings’) of relative deprivation among the disadvantaged (e.g., Gurr, 1970; Nagel, 1974; Runciman, 1972; Sigelman & Simpson, 1977). ‘A person’

is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X, (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X (Runciman, 1972: 11).

Subsequently, relative deprivation can motivate the disadvantaged to use violence against those that have caused their deprivation. The actual psychological mechanism via which *relative deprivation*⁶ generates such motivations was explicitly addressed in early studies (e.g., Gurr, 1970), but rarely in more recent research. Indeed, without explicitly explaining why or how, current studies tend to simply assume that relative deprivation, whenever present, will generate the motivation to use violence or join a collective action to challenge the status quo.⁷

From the perspective of the early research, relative deprivation generates violence via the ‘frustration-aggression’ mechanism: ‘Men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in proportion to the intensity of their frustrations’ (Gurr, 1970: 37).⁸ The question of whether relative deprivation generates violence via a frustration-aggression link or some other analogous psychological mechanism is beyond the scope of this study. What matters

⁶ The question of how relative deprivation leads to violence is different from the question of how inequality leads to violence (i.e., relative deprivation is only one of the likely outcomes of inequality).

⁷ This is not surprising as the actual mechanism that links the perception of relative deprivation to the use of aggression/violence is essentially psychological and thus is within the realm of social psychological research; for an overview of social psychological research on relative deprivation, see, e.g., Jost & Kay (2010).

⁸ The frustration-aggression mechanism was first proposed by Dollard et al. (1939) and clarified by Miller (1941). It was then revised and updated by Berkowitz (1989). The actual psychological mechanism of frustration-aggression is beyond the scope of this study, as study of it involves psychological individual-level research. For an elaboration of the early frustration-aggression hypothesis see, for example, Rummel (1977).

for the present study is that both early and current research concur that relative deprivation generates the motivation to use violence or join a collective action to challenge the status quo distribution of resources. Such motivations, in turn, predispose the disadvantaged to being mobilized for armed action, increasing the chance of civil conflict.

Group deprivation pathway. Relative deprivation develops not only from comparison of oneself to others, but also from comparison of one's own group to others:

Suppose a person succeeds in reaching a position of equality with his comparative group.

Did he want to rise out of his membership group, or with it? If the first, then he was dissatisfied with his position as a member of what he saw as his group; if the second, then he was dissatisfied with the position of what he saw as his group relative to other groups in the larger system (Runciman, 1972: 37).

Thus, just as with inequalities between individuals, inequalities between *groups* (ethnic or socioeconomic) can motivate the use of violence among members of the deprived groups (via the same frustration-aggression or some other analogous psychological mechanism).

More recent research has further stressed that horizontal inequalities or group relative deprivation may not only *motivate* the use of violence but also *facilitate* collective action among members of deprived groups (e.g., Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014; Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Østby, 2008a; Stewart, 2008b).⁹ Members of socioeconomic or

⁹ Thus, the group deprivation pathway potentially has two sub-pathways (and these two-sub pathways potentially contain other sub-pathways, and so on), assessment of which requires analysis at the micro level, which is not attempted in this paper (see Conclusion).

ethnic groups share a common social identity, and inequalities between groups can strengthen the salience of these identities (e.g., Gurr, 2000: 68; Østby, 2008a: 147; Østby, 2011: 31–34). Salient social identities, in turn, can facilitate the mobilization of solitary individuals for collective action by increasing commitment and solidarity among members of the same group (Hunt & Benford, 2004: 448), which in turn reduces the chances of free-riding and helps to overcome the collective action problem (Olson, 1965).

Thus, just as with individual deprivation, group deprivation predisposes members of the deprived groups to being mobilised for collective action. Yet, unlike individual deprivation, group deprivation also contributes to the mobilization process itself, suggesting that inequalities between groups are particularly likely to generate conflict.

Separatist pathway. Conflicts in unequal societies are typically thought to be initiated by the disadvantaged. Some studies argue, however, that conflicts over autonomy or secession can be initiated by the advantaged as well (Buhaug et al., 2011: 817–821; Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011: 483; Horowitz, 1985: 249–254; Østby, 2008b: 138). This is commonly the case when the advantaged, residing in wealthier regions, perceive that they ‘are subsidizing poorer regions’ (Horowitz, 1985: 250) or that ‘state-level redistribution denies them the fruits of their success’ (Cederman, Weidman, & Gleditsch, 2011: 483). The oft-cited example to illustrate this is the Basque conflict in Spain, where ‘Myths have grown up in the Basque country that the hardworking Basques are supporting less productive peoples and regions of Spain’ (Horowitz, 1985: 250; for other examples, see Buhaug et al., 2011: 817–818; Deiwiks, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2012: 292–293).

The three causal pathways are by no means exhaustive. Inequality, for instance, can result in resource concentration in the hands of the ruling elite, which motivates them to defend the political status quo. Defending the status quo may involve violence: ‘The prospect of possible loss of political power can act as a powerful motive for state-sponsored violence which occurs with the aim of suppressing opposition and maintaining power’ (Stewart, 2008b: 12; see also Haggard & Kaufman, 2012). State-sponsored violence often leads to violent response, which, in turn, can develop into civil conflict (e.g., Muller, 1985; Gurr & Moore, 1997).

A number of other pathways are also plausible, but the main aim here is not to present an exhaustive list. Rather it is to identify and evaluate pathways that have been used most commonly in prior research, and individual or group deprivation and separatism are arguably the most prominent of these.

Observable implications

What are the potential observable implications of the three pathways specified above? In other words, what would we observe if inequality indeed generated conflicts through the individual deprivation, group deprivation or separatist pathways?

If, as suggested by the individual deprivation pathway, inequality results in relative deprivation, and relative deprivation predisposes individuals to mobilise for a collective action challenging the status quo, then we should observe that (some of) the most deprived individuals constitute a significant proportion of rebels in conflicts.¹⁰ This should apply equally to ethnic and

¹⁰ While I have not applied any numeric threshold, I use ‘significant proportion’ to refer to ‘at least half of’ the rebel forces.

non-ethnic conflicts, as well as governmental and territorial conflicts. Thus, in a more formalized fashion:

Observable implication of the individual deprivation pathway: The most (or some of the most) economically deprived individuals constitute a significant proportion of rebels in conflicts.

If, as suggested by the group deprivation pathway, inequalities between groups result in relative deprivation among members of these groups, and this, in turn, predisposes (and facilitates mobilization of) the disadvantaged to engage in a collective action challenging the status quo, we should observe that members of (some of) the most deprived groups constitute a significant proportion of rebels in conflicts.

In ethnic conflicts we should expect members of (some of) the most deprived *ethnic* groups to constitute a significant proportion of the rebels, and in non-ethnic conflicts (i.e., conflicts between socioeconomic groups) we should observe members of (some of) the most deprived *socioeconomic* groups constituting a significant proportion of the rebels. Thus:

Observable implication of the group deprivation pathway(1): Members of the most (or some of the most) economically deprived ethnic groups constitute a significant proportion of rebels in ethnic conflicts.

Observable implication of the group deprivation pathway(2): Members of the most (or some of the most) economically deprived socioeconomic groups constitute a significant proportion of rebels in non-ethnic conflicts.

The predictions of the individual and group deprivation pathways are not incompatible: observing members of the most deprived groups among rebels, as well as the most deprived

members of these groups constituting a significant proportion of the rebels, would lend support to both pathways. Yet certain other forms of rebel composition would only lend support to one of the pathways. For example, observing that the most deprived individuals, who are not members of the most deprived groups (as a whole), constitute a significant proportion of rebels would lend support to the individual deprivation pathway but not the group deprivation pathway. Consider, for example, the conflict between al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (or the Islamic Group, IG) and the Government of Egypt (onset year: 1993). The original membership (and leadership) of the IG was predominantly university students (e.g., Qasim et al., 1996: 40; Metz, 1991: Chapter 4), who, as a whole, were not among the most economically deprived socioeconomic groups in Egypt. However, the particular students that staffed the IG mainly came from economically disadvantaged Upper Egypt and hailed from poverty-stricken families (e.g., Kepel, 1993: 137; Nedoroscik, 2002).

By contrast, observing members of the most deprived groups, but not the most deprived members of these groups, among conflict participants would lend support to the group deprivation pathway but not to the individual deprivation pathway. Consider, for example, the conflict between the Government of Niger and the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) (onset year: 2007). The MNJ was mainly composed of Tuaregs,¹¹ who were one of the most economically marginalized ethnic groups in Niger (e.g., Emerson, 2011). However, the membership of the MNJ, in its initial phases, primarily composed of ex-army professionals and

¹¹ The MNJ also included members of Toubou, Hausa and other groups who were among the most economically deprived in Niger (for further details and references, see the Online Appendix).

political cadres residing in France (Guichaoua, 2009), who were not among the most economically deprived individuals.

Finally, what are the potential observable implications of the separatist pathway? If inequalities motivate the advantaged residents of wealthier regions to secede, then we should observe territorial conflicts (conflicts over autonomy or secession) initiated by members of advantaged groups residing in wealthier regions (wealthier relative to other regions in the same state). The same logic should apply to both ethnic and non-ethnic territorial conflicts. Thus:

Observable implication of the separatist pathway: Territorial conflicts are initiated by wealthier individuals (relative to other individuals in the same state) residing in wealthier regions (relative to other regions in the same state).

The four observable implications of the three causal pathways are obviously non-exhaustive. The three causal pathways could also be assessed on the basis of statements of rebellion leadership, personal accounts of individual rebels, etc. While not denying the usefulness of assessing the three causal pathways on other types of observable implications (I return to this in ‘Discussion’ section), I limit this study to the basic ones that are implied in most prior studies on inequality and conflict.

Case selection

As this study focuses on the pathways through which inequalities lead to conflict onset, I selected cases (as in Haggard & Kaufman, 2012 and Ross, 2004) based on positive values of the

dependent variable (i.e., conflict onset($Y = 1$)).¹² While such a selection technique does not allow for producing general inferences on the relationship between inequality and conflict (i.e., whether inequality causes conflict or how much variation inequality explains in conflict), it does allow for generating inferences on how inequality contributes to conflict in cases where inequality has *potentially* (as we cannot rule out alternative explanations) contributed to conflict.

I used the Categorized Disaggregated Conflict dataset (Bartusevičius, 2016) as a starting point, which encompasses the period 1946–2010 and contains 331 conflict onsets, categorized into ethnic governmental (59), ethnic territorial (128), non-ethnic governmental (124) and non-ethnic territorial (20) conflicts.¹³ I subsequently limited the pool of conflict onsets by introducing three stratifying criteria:

1. I restricted the pool to the post-Cold War period. While the debate on whether ‘old’ (Cold War period) and ‘new’ (post-Cold War period) conflicts are ‘fundamentally different’ is far

¹² In covariational research (both quantitative and qualitative) focused on whether X causes Y, selection of cases based on positive values of a binary dependent variable would lead to selection bias (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 129). In research focused on how X causes Y, however, such a selection is the only option: we need a positive outcome (i.e., $Y = 1$) to observe how that outcome was produced (e.g., Beach & Pedersen, 2017).

¹³ The CDC is a direct extension of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011, 1946–2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themner & Wallensteen, 2011). Thus it employs the UCDP/PRIO definition of intrastate armed conflict: ‘A contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’.

from settled (Kaldor, 1999, 2013; Kalyvas, 2001; Henderson & Singer, 2002), it is likely that analysis of recent conflicts will produce inferences more applicable to the contemporary period than analysis of the conflicts that took place in 1950s, 1960s or 1970s. Restricting the time span to 1992–2010 decreased the number of conflict onsets to 119 (see Table OA1 in the Online Appendix).

2. To restrict the pool to truly post-Cold War conflicts, I excluded conflict onsets that constitute *relapses* of conflicts that had started in 1946–1991 (marked in grey in Table OA1). For example, I excluded the relapse of the conflict between the Government of Peru and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in 2007, as it was a continuation of the conflict between the two parties that had started in the 1980s. Following the same logic, I excluded relapses of conflicts that started in the post-Cold War period. Thus, for instance, I excluded the relapse of the conflict between Government of Eritrea and EIJM-AS (Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement – Abu Suhail faction) in 2003, as it was a continuation of the conflict between the two parties that had started in 1997. Applying this criterion further decreased the number of conflict onsets to 70.
3. Finally, to restrict the pool to conflicts where the predicted observable implications of the three pathways can *possibly* be observed, I excluded coups and coup attempts (marked with an asterisk in Table OA1). Coups and coup attempts, by definition, are limited to an elitist struggle among incumbents—they do not involve popular participation (e.g., Powel & Thyne, 2011). In conflicts that do not involve popular participation we cannot, by definition, detect

the observable implications of the three pathways specified above.¹⁴ Applying this criterion further decreased the number of conflict onsets to 66.

The three criteria thus limited the pool to post-Cold War conflict onsets that have involved popular participation. From this pool I randomly selected one-fourth of the conflict onsets. To ensure that different conflict categories were equally represented in the final sample, I selected one-fourth of each of the four conflict categories mentioned above: ethnic governmental (4), ethnic territorial (5), non-ethnic governmental (5), and non-ethnic territorial (2) (see Table I).¹⁵

[Table I about here]

¹⁴ This criterion follows a similar logic to that suggested by Mahoney & Goertz in the ‘possibility principle’, which ‘holds that only cases where the outcome of interest is *possible* should be included in the set of negative cases; cases where the outcome is *impossible* should be relegated to a set of uninformative and hence irrelevant observations’ (2004: 653). While the possibility principle has been introduced to guide selection of negative cases (i.e., non-revolutions, non-civil wars) in comparative analyses ‘that seek to *test theory* about the causes of outcomes’ (Ibid.: 654), it can also be usefully applied in selection of cases for analysing causal pathways, as it suggests that only cases where the pathway of interest is possible should be included in the analysis.

¹⁵ As the overall pool of conflicts is relatively small, random selection from the whole pool could potentially underrepresent or exclude altogether the less-common conflict categories (i.e., non-ethnic territorial and ethnic governmental).

Sources and data

To assess the predictions of the three pathways, I relied on various secondary and primary sources, including research articles, NGO documents, reports by various news agencies, individual accounts reported in media, public statements by conflict parties, and country-specific socioeconomic and demographic data. While the economic data on separatist regions and particular ethnic or socioeconomic groups was, in most cases, sufficient to properly assess group deprivation and separatist pathways, the data on the economic status of individual rebels in a number of cases was not sufficient to assess the individual deprivation pathway. The assessment of this pathway, therefore, involved a great deal of extrapolation based on available (often aggregate) qualitative data. For example, I used aggregate data on the rural populations in Nepal to assess the economic status of the CPN-M rebels (knowing that the CPN-M rank and file came from rural backgrounds). I also assumed, for instance, that the Ninja militias who were described as ‘poor, unemployed school dropouts from provinces’ (e.g., Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999: 41–44) were (some of) the most deprived individuals in the Republic of the Congo (without really being able to assess their economic status in relation to other individuals in the same state). The findings of the present study need to be considered in light of such data limitations.

Data and sources used to inform the assessment of the plausibility of the three pathways are elaborated in full in the Online Appendix. The appendix also documents the rationale and degree of uncertainty behind my assessments. For each of the 16 cases, the Online Appendix provides:

- *General information:* brief description of the conflicting parties and the events leading to the outbreak of conflict.

- *Observable implications of the three causal pathways*: description of the facts on which I based assessment of the three causal pathways.¹⁶
- *Additional information (alternative explanations)*: description of the facts potentially relevant for an explanation of a conflict outbreak, but irrelevant for an assessment of the three causal pathways (provided only for some cases).
- *References*: sources used to inform the assessment of the three causal pathways.

Findings

[Table II about here]

Assessment of the individual deprivation pathway

As can be seen from Table II, I found evidence in seven cases (43.75% of all cases) suggesting that a significant proportion of rebel forces were indeed composed of the most (or some of the most) economically deprived individuals. In the vast majority of these cases, the economically deprived were poor, unemployed youth. See, for example, Englebert & Ron (2004: 65, 72–73) on the Ninja militias in the Republic of the Congo, Swift (2012: 3) on al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and IRIN (2011) on Boko Haram.

¹⁶ Note that for ethnic governmental and non-ethnic governmental categories I only provide information on the individual and group deprivation pathways, as the separatist pathway can only be observed in territorial conflicts.

Considering the differences in particular conflict categories, one pattern clearly stands out. The individual deprivation pathway seems to be at play mainly in non-ethnic conflicts. In non-ethnic governmental conflicts, the observable implications of this pathway were seen in all five cases, whereas this was the case for none of the non-ethnic territorial conflicts.¹⁷ Combined with the findings on the group deprivation pathway (see below), this suggests that vertical inequalities are particularly prone to fuel non-ethnic conflicts, especially governmental ones, while horizontal inequalities are particularly prone to fuel ethnic conflicts. This evidence is in line with the theoretical propositions and empirical patterns established in recent large-N research. See, for example, Besancon (2005) and Bartusevičius (2014) on non-ethnic conflicts and Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch (2011) and Østby (2008a) on ethnic conflicts.

Assessment of the group deprivation pathway(1)

In seven cases of ethnic conflicts (77.77% of all cases where this pathway could be observed), I found evidence suggesting that rebel forces were indeed composed of members of the most (or some of the most) economically deprived ethnic groups, making the group deprivation pathway(1) a particularly plausible explanation of the inequality-conflict nexus. Examples of some of the most economically deprived ethnic groups rebelling against their governments include indigenous peoples (Mayas) in Mexico (e.g., Nash, 1997), Tuaregs in Niger (Guichaoua, 2009), and Somali in Ethiopia (CHF International, 2006).

Assessment of the group deprivation pathway(2)

¹⁷ Note, however, that data on the individual deprivation pathway was very limited in four (out of nine) cases of ethnic conflicts; this finding therefore needs to be treated with caution.

In only two cases (out of a total of seven where the group deprivation pathway(2) could be observed) did I find evidence suggesting that rebel forces were composed of members of the most, or some of the most, economically deprived socioeconomic groups. In one of these cases (Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist rebellion in Nepal) the economically deprived were peasants (see, for example, Sharma, 2006) and in the other (United Tajik Opposition rebellion in Tajikistan) the economically deprived were regional groups (Gharmis and Pamiris) (see, for example, Foroughi, 2002).¹⁸ In the rest of the conflicts, rebels came from diverse socioeconomic groups that were not among the most economically deprived; for example, former policemen and army soldiers, ex-military officers, and workers in the conflicts in Bosnia (e.g., Christia, 2008) and Moldova (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 1993) or university students in the Islamic Group rebellion in Egypt (e.g., Nedoroscik, 2002). The fact that economically deprived ethnic groups were observed more often among rebel forces than were economically deprived socioeconomic groups can be explained by the fact that ethnic identities are stronger than socioeconomic ones (e.g., Smith, 1991: 1–18; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). As argued above, strongly shared identities facilitate mobilization of group members for collective action.

Assessment of the separatist pathway

Finally, in three cases out of seven where the separatist pathway could be observed, I found that conflicts were indeed initiated by members of wealthier groups residing in wealthier regions. Notably, this pathway seems to be at play mainly in non-ethnic territorial conflicts (though the small number of cases precludes any firm conclusions): in both cases of non-ethnic territorial

¹⁸ One could argue that Gharmis and Pamiris more closely resembled ethnic communities (rather than socioeconomic groups), lending even less support to this pathway.

conflicts the separatist regions (and separatists) were considerably wealthier, whereas in four (out of five) ethnic territorial conflicts the separatist regions were considerably poorer.

Interestingly, in none of the seven cases of territorial conflicts did I find that the separatist regions were economically similar to the mainland territories: in all of these cases separatist regions were either considerably above or considerably below the average on most national economic indicators. This is, once again, in line with the theoretical propositions and empirical findings of large-N research on regional inequality and conflict (e.g., Buhaug et al., 2011; Deiwiks, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2012).

As can be seen in Table I, the three causal pathways, in some cases, operated simultaneously. For example, in Mexico, the Zapatista National Liberation Army was composed of (some of) the most economically deprived individuals (poverty-affected peasants from eastern Chiapas) from (some of) the most economically deprived ethnic groups (indigenous Maya) (see, for example, Collier & Quaratiello, 1994). However, in the majority of cases, I found evidence to support only one of the three pathways (as in the above-mentioned cases of Egypt and Nigeria). Furthermore, it appears that the separatist pathway is mutually exclusive with the group deprivation pathway (both 1 and 2): the most economically deprived ethnic or socioeconomic groups rarely reside in considerably wealthier regions.

In terms of proportion of conflicts explained (or rather, proportion of cases where supporting evidence was found), the group deprivation pathway(1) seems to be the single best explanation of the inequality-conflict nexus, corroborating the growing body of work on horizontal inequalities and conflict (e.g., Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014 Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Østby, 2008a; Stewart, 2008a).

Discussion

Evidence from 16 cases lends considerable support to the individual and group deprivation pathways in non-ethnic and ethnic conflicts respectively, and some (due to small N) support to the separatist pathway in non-ethnic conflicts. The question of the strength of support, however, significantly depends on the strength of the tests that have been used to assess the plausibility of the causal theories. In other words, how certain and unique were the tests of the causal pathways in suggesting that these pathways are indeed valid explanations of the empirical phenomena analysed in this study?

Assessing the certainty of predictions

Finding out that the rebels, in most cases,¹⁹ were not the most deprived members of the most deprived groups (ethnic or socioeconomic) would provide strong evidence against the plausibility of the individual and group deprivation pathways. This was indeed the case for the individual deprivation pathway in ethnic conflicts, and group deprivation pathway(2) in non-ethnic ones. Likewise, finding out that only a few territorial conflicts take place in considerably wealthier regions (and are not initiated by wealthier groups residing in the wealthier regions) would provide strong evidence against the plausibility of the separatist pathway, which was the case for ethnic territorial conflicts. Discovering the opposite (that is, evidence that supports the three pathways), however, would not necessarily imply that it is exactly the three causal

¹⁹ As the causal theories on the inequality-conflict nexus are of a non-deterministic nature, I operate in ‘more/less’ terms (rather than ‘all/none’) when assessing the plausibility of the causal pathways.

pathways that are at play—an issue that leads to a consideration of the uniqueness of the congruence tests.

Assessing the uniqueness of predictions

Finding out that the most deprived members of the most deprived groups (ethnic or socioeconomic) constitute a significant proportion of rebels in conflicts would suggest that the individual or group deprivation pathways are plausible, but would not rule out the possibility that the rebels are fighting for reasons other than economic inequality; for example, poverty or political exclusion.²⁰ Similarly, finding that a significant proportion of separatist conflicts are initiated by members of wealthy groups residing in wealthy regions would suggest that the separatist pathway is plausible, but would not rule out alternatives. Separatist conflicts in wealthier regions can happen because of grievances over unequal distribution of revenues accruing from the exploitation of natural resources in the separatist regions (e.g., Ross, 2004) and not necessarily because of wealthier regions' attempts to curtail the subsidizing of the poorer ones.²¹

²⁰ Indeed, as I document in the Online Appendix (under 'Alternative Explanations'), I find significant evidence to suggest that political exclusion, in a number of cases, was among the primary drivers of conflicts. This finding corroborates a number of recent studies on ethnic exclusion and civil war (e.g., Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009).

²¹ In fact, I found evidence that unequal distribution of revenues accruing from localized resources was among the primary reasons for rebellion in several conflicts (see the Online Appendix).

Hence, the observable implications of the three causal pathways specified in this study allow for assessing the plausibility of the three causal pathways, but do not allow for discriminating between the three causal pathways and alternative explanations. This makes the observable implications tested in this study highly certain, but not unique, precluding a complete assessment of the three causal pathways.²²

While it does not allow for a complete assessment of the causal pathways, the congruence analyses demonstrate that the three causal explanations withstand a critical test in a relatively large (and, arguably, representative) pool of conflicts. This suggests that the three causal explanations provide plausible answers to the question of how inequality generates conflict, and that they are indeed valid theoretical tools for a subsequent in-depth examination of the micro-processes operating in particular conflicts.

Conclusion

This study has presented a qualitative congruence test of the causal theories proposed in the literature on the inequality-conflict nexus. The study has found considerable evidence to support two common explanations of the inequality-conflict nexus (the individual and group deprivation pathways) and some evidence to support a third (the separatist pathway). In addition, the study has found that the three causal pathways are linked to different conflict categories. In addition to the patterns revealed in the previous sections, this study provides several broad suggestions for future research.

²² In other words, the congruence tests presented in this study prove necessary but not sufficient evidence to confirm the theorized causal pathways.

Owing to recent disaggregated large-N studies, a consensus seemingly emerged that inequalities, especially horizontal ones, are significant predictors of civil conflict. While the link between vertical inequalities and non-ethnic conflicts still needs to be researched, the link between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflict appears to be robust (e.g., Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). Thus, research on the inequality-conflict nexus is arguably at a stage in which scholars need to ‘make sense of successful quantitative social inquiry’ (Johnson, 2006: 239–240). This implies, most importantly, finding out *how* inequalities lead to conflict. Only by specifying the processes through which inequalities lead to conflicts will we be able to generate concrete guidelines for policymakers aimed at preventing conflicts. To avoid conflicts, we first need to know how they start. Advice to merely ‘reduce inequality because inequality is correlated with a higher risk of conflict’ provides little guidance for policymakers working to prevent conflicts. To prevent conflicts, we need to know *how* it is that inequality (or any other X) generates conflicts (Sambanis, 2004: 273).

One way to make sense of our quantitative findings is to explore the ‘how’ question at the micro level by using process tracing techniques (e.g., Beach & Pedersen, 2013; George & Bennet, 2005: 205–232; Gerring, 2007: 172–185). This study has implemented a number of basic tests at the meso level and found that the main causal pathways proposed in previous large-N research are largely plausible. The next step is to assess these causal pathways at a lower level of analysis focused on each of the causal steps in the theorised causal chain connecting inequality to conflict. This could involve examining (1) the link between inequality and relative deprivation (e.g., does objective inequality indeed lead to subjective feelings of relative deprivation?); (2) the link between relative deprivation and the motivation to use violence or join a collective action (e.g., does relative deprivation indeed motivate individuals to use violence?); (3) the link

between an individual predisposition to use violence (or join a collective action) and large-scale mobilization (e.g., how inequality facilitates mobilization of solitary individuals for a collective action?); (4) and, finally, the link between large-scale mobilization and the onset of civil violence (e.g., why inequality leads mobilized individuals to use violence and not pursue their aims via other means?).

However, in-depth analyses of the micro processes in particular conflicts are not without challenges. Process tracing involves extensive work in the field, which generates additional logistical costs. Data collection in micro-level analyses also involves a number of practical difficulties. For example, reaching conflict participants for interviews can be difficult and data gathering in conflict zones can be obstructed by security concerns.

Given these difficulties, conflict researchers could consider non-field alternatives, including survey and laboratory experiments. Manipulation of variables linked to particular aspects of the causal theories (e.g., whether relative deprivation indeed motivates political violence) in a simulated setting could potentially result in valuable insights into how the inequality-conflict nexus operates at the micro level. Here, theoretical and methodological developments within social psychological research could be of particular use, as social psychologists have analysed the relationship among relative deprivation, collective action, and aggression for at least as long as conflict researchers have analysed the inequality-conflict nexus (e.g., Jost & Kay, 2010: 1134–1136; or Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008: 505–507).

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Table I. Cases selected for empirical analysis

ID	Side A	Side B	Onset year
<i>ETHNIC GOVERNMENTAL</i>			
91	Government of Chad	Rally for Democracy and Liberty	2005
205	Government of Mexico	Zapatista National Liberation Army	1994
214	Government of Congo	Ninjas	1993
255	Government of Niger	Niger Movement for Justice	2007
<i>ETHNIC TERRITORIAL</i>			
133	Government of Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front	1994
198	Government of Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia	1992
254	Government of DRC	Kingdom of Kongo	2007
258	Government of India	Dima Haram Daogah–Black Widow	2008
259	Government of India	People’s United Liberation Front	2008
<i>NON-ETHNIC GOVERNMENTAL</i>			
33	Government of Yemen	al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula	2009
72	Government of Nepal	Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist	1996
100	Government of Nigeria	Boko Haram	2009
196	Government of Egypt	Islamic Group	1993
200	Government of Tajikistan	United Tajik Opposition	1992
<i>NON-ETHNIC TERRITORIAL</i>			
199	Government of Moldova	Dniestr Republic	1992
202	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia	1993

Table II. Case study findings

Conflict ID	Individual deprivation	Group deprivation(1)	Group deprivation(2)	Separatist
<i>ETHNIC GOVERNMENTAL</i>				
91	—	+	n/a	n/a
205	+	+	n/a	n/a
214	+	—	n/a	n/a
255	—	+	n/a	n/a
<i>ETHNIC TERRITORIAL</i>				
133	—	+	n/a	—
198	—	+	n/a	—
254	—	—	n/a	+
258	—	+	n/a	—
259	—	+	n/a	—
<i>NON-ETHNIC GOVERNMENTAL</i>				
33	+	n/a	—	n/a
72	+	n/a	+	n/a
100	+	n/a	—	n/a
196	+	n/a	—	n/a
200	+	n/a	+	n/a
<i>NON-ETHNIC TERRITORIAL</i>				
199	—	n/a	—	+
202	—	n/a	—	+
Total supported (% of all possible)	43.75%	77.77%	28.57%	42.85%

+ indicates support for the causal pathway; - indicates no support for the causal pathway;
symbols in grey indicate support/no support based on very limited data.

ONLINE APPENDIX

A CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS OF THE INEQUALITY-CONFLICT NEXUS: EVIDENCE
FROM 16 CASES

Table OA1. Civil conflicts onsets (1992–2010)

ID	Side A	Side B	Onset year
ETHNIC GOVERNMENTAL			
86	Government of Democratic Republic of Congo	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa	1996
86	Government of Democratic Republic of Congo	National Congress for the Defence of the People	2006
91	Government of Chad	Armed Forces of the Federal Republic, Movement for Democracy and Development	1997
91	Government of Chad	Rally for Democracy and Liberty	2005
118	Government of Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army	1994
131	Government of Angola	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola	1998
143	Government of Iran	The Free Life Party of Kurdistan	2005
184	Government of Djibouti	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy – Ahmed Dini faction	1999
205	Government of Mexico	Zapatista National Liberation Army	1994
209	Government of Pakistan	Mohajir National Movement	1995
214	Government of Congo	Ninjas	1993
214	Government of Congo	Cobras, Cocoyes	1997
214	Government of Congo	Ntsiloulous	2002
222	Government of Central African Republic	Military faction (forces of André Kolingba)	2001*
222	Government of Central African Republic	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity	2006
222	Government of Central African Republic	Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace	2009
223	Government of Macedonia	National Liberation Army	2001
224	Government of United States of America	The Base	2001
225	Government of Cote d'Ivoire	Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast, Ivorian Movement for the Greater West	2002
255	Government of Niger	Union of Forces of the Armed Resistance	1997
255	Government of Niger	Niger Movement for Justice	2007
266	Government of Tajikistan	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	2010
267	Government of Mauritania	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb	2010
ETHNIC TERRITORIAL			
6	Government of Iran	Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran	1993
6	Government of Iran	Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran	1996
23	Government of Myanmar	Karen National Union	1995
26	Government of Myanmar	Beik Mon Army	1996
37	Government of Israel	Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Palestinian National Authority	2000
54	Government of India	National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isaac-Muivah faction	1992
54	Government of India	National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isaac-Muivah faction	2000
54	Government of India	National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang faction	2005
56	Government of Myanmar	Karenni National Progressive Party	1992
56	Government of Myanmar	Karenni National Progressive Party	1996
56	Government of Myanmar	Karenni National Progressive Party	2005
67	Government of Myanmar	Mong Tai Army	1993
67	Government of Myanmar	Shan State Army–South command	2005
112	Government of Philippines	Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro National Liberation Front	1993
119	Government of United Kingdom	Real Irish Republican Army	1998
133	Government of Ethiopia	Muslims Unity	1993
133	Government of Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front	1994
134	Government of Indonesia	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor	1992
134	Government of	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor	1997

	Indonesia		
139	Government of India	All Tripura Tiger Force	1992
139	Government of India	National Liberation Front of Tripura	1995
152	Government of India	People's Liberation Army	1992
152	Government of India	United National Liberation Front	2003
168	Government of Ethiopia	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front	1996
170	Government of India	United Liberation Front of Assam	1994
171	Government of	Free Aceh Movement	1999
	Indonesia		
177	Government of Mali	Muslims Arab Front of Azawad	1994
178	Government of Niger	Coordination of the Armed Resistance	1994
192	Government of Angola	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Armed Forces of Cabinda, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Renewed	1994
192	Government of Angola	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Armed Forces of Cabinda, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Renewed	2002
192	Government of Angola	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda–Armed Forces of Cabinda	2007
193	Government of Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	2005
194	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbian irregulars, Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992
195	Government of Croatia	Serbian irregulars, Republika Srpska Krajina (Serbian Republic of Krajina)	1992
195	Government of Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	1995
197	Government of Georgia	Republic of Abkhazia	1992
198	Government of Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia	1992
198	Government of Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004
198	Government of Georgia	South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic	2008
203	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatian irregulars, Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina	1993
206	Government of Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1994
206	Government of Russia	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1999
207	Government of Yemen	Democratic Republic of Yemen	1994
212	Government of Niger	Democratic Front for Renewal	1995
218	Government of Serbia (Yugoslavia)	Kosovo Liberation Army	1998
220	Government of Russia	Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district	1999
227	Government of India	National Democratic Front for Bodoland	1993
227	Government of India	National Democratic Front for Bodoland – Ranjan Daimary faction	2009
228	Government of Myanmar	United Wa State Army	1997
248	Government of Thailand	Patani insurgents	2003
250	Government of Nigeria	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force	2004
251	Government of Israel	Hezbollah (Party of God)	2006
254	Government of Democratic Republic of Congo	Kingdom of Kongo	2007
258	Government of India	Dima Haram Daogah – Black Widow faction	2008
259	Government of India	People's United Liberation Front	2008
263	Government of India	Kuki National Front	1997
364	Government of Myanmar	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army	2009
NON-ETHNIC GOVERNMENTAL			
33	Government of Yemen	al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula	2009
62	Government of Iraq	Al-Mahdi Army, Supporters of Muslims, The Monotheism and Jihad Group	2004
72	Government of Nepal	Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist	1996
80	Government of Venezuela	Military faction (forces of Hugo Chávez)	1992*
90	Government of Burundi	National Council for the Defense of Democracy	1994
90	Government of Burundi	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People–Forces for National Liberation	2008
95	Government of Peru	Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)	2007
100	Government of Nigeria	Boko Haram	2009
111	Government of Guinea	Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea	2000
130	Government of Eritrea	Eritrean Muslims Jihad Movement – Abu Suhail faction	1997
130	Government of Eritrea	Eritrean Muslims Jihad Movement – Abu Suhail faction	2003
137	Government of Afghanistan	Taliban	2003
141	Government of Somalia	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council	2001
141	Government of Somalia	Supreme Muslims Council of Somalia	2006
143	Government of Iran	People's Mujahideen	1997
179	Government of Rwanda	Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda	1996

179	Government of Rwanda	Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda	2009
186	Government of Haiti	National Front for the Liberation of Haiti, OP Lavalas (Chimères)	2004
188	Government of Turkey	Maoist Communist Party	2005
196	Government of Egypt	Islamic Group	1993
200	Government of Tajikistan	United Tajik Opposition	1992
201	Government of Azerbaijan	Military faction (forces of Suret Husseinov)	1993*
201	Government of Azerbaijan	Special Police Brigade	1995*
204	Government of Russia	Parliamentary Forces	1993
205	Government of Mexico	Popular Revolutionary Army	1996
209	Government of Pakistan	Movement for the Enforcement of Muslimsic Laws	2007
216	Government of Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	1998
217	Government of Lesotho	Military faction	1998
221	Government of Uzbekistan	Muslimsic Movement of Uzbekistan	1999
221	Government of Uzbekistan	Jihad Muslimsic Group	2004
NON-ETHNIC TERRITORIAL			
74	Government of Iraq	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	1995
129	Government of Pakistan	Baluchistan Liberation Army	2004
177	Government of Mali	May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change – Ibrahim Bahanga faction	2007
199	Government of Moldova	Dniestr Republic	1992
202	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia	1993
213	Government of Comoros	Anjouan People's Movement/Republic of Anjouan	1997
219	Government of Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front	1998
249	Government of Nigeria	Followers of the Prophet	2004
257	Government of Russia	Caucasus Emirate	2007

Grey colour indicates conflict relapses. *Coups/Coup attempts.

CASE STUDIES

ETHNIC GOVERNMENTAL

ID: 91 (2005): Government of Chad versus Rally for Democracy and Liberty

General information

The event that sparked the conflict between the Government of Chad and the Rally for Democracy and Liberty (RDL) was the RDL's attack on the border town of Adré on 18 December 2005 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 10 July 2013).

The RDL mainly recruited among the Tama (from Chad and Sudan), Chadian Arabs (particularly the Eregat of Dar Tama), and Ouaddaïans²³ (Tubiana, 2008: 33, 66; Human Rights Watch, 2007a: footnote 23). According to Campbell (2006), the RDL was dominated by the Tama and consisted of 2,000 fighters.²⁴ Leader Mohammed Nour Abdelkerim was Tama (Tubiana, 2008: 32; Human Rights Watch, 2007a: 16).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; limited data)

Information on the socioeconomic background of the RDL troops is limited. According to Amnesty International (2006), at its establishment, the RDL was dominated by former ANR

²³ *Ouaddaïen* is a 'geographic term that describes sedentary farmers originating in Ouaddaï region who speak the Maba language, primarily from the Khosta ethnic group. Also present in Darfur, where they are known as the Bergo. Associated with Janjaweed groups in Chad and various Chadian rebel groups' (Human Rights Watch, 2009: 5).

²⁴ Massey & May (2006: 445) suggest that the RDL consisted of 3,000 fighters.

members. The ANR, or Alliance Nationale de la Résistance (the National Resistance Alliance), was a Chadian opposition group based in Darfur (Sudan). It was founded by Mahamat Garfa (Tama), former Chief of Staff of Chad's armed forces (Human Rights Watch, 2007a: 67), and dominated by the Tama (Tubiana, 2008: 42).²⁵

Several sources suggest that the RDL's membership included deserted soldiers from the Chadian Army (Human Rights Watch, 2007a: 16; IRIN, 19 December 2005) as well as 'political deserters from the Chadian government' (Cornwell, 2006) including 'high-ranked government officials' (Sudan Tribune, 2006). There is also evidence suggesting that part of the RDL troops were recruited forcefully (Human Rights Watch, 2007b: footnote 62).

Nour himself came from a well-off background, being a son of a Tama Sultan (Africa Confidential, 2006: 2; Tubiana, 2008: 32). Before the 18 December attacks, he held various military positions in the Chadian and Sudanese armies (Tubiana, 2008: 33). According to Massey & May (2006: 444), just before the attacks (in 2003), Nour 'built a profitable career in the oil industry'. It appears thus that the leader of the RDL fared well financially.

The RDL itself also seems to have had a strong financial base. According to International Crisis Group,

Unusual for a rebel group, its troops have new uniforms, with berets, bullet-proof vests, identification patches and flags, and even headlamps. They have new Land Cruisers mounted with machine guns, are well equipped with AK47s and RPGs, and allegedly have artillery and heavy weaponry (2006: 11–12).

According to another (eyewitness) account,

²⁵ The ANR was most likely composed of deserted members of the Chadian Army (though I could not find any reliable source to confirm this).

Truckloads of young men and supplies, including brand new weapons, were arriving every day at the well-secured camp. Heavy weapons including rocket and mortar launchers were out of sight just beyond the deceptively simple entry checkpoint of a branch and two stones. There appeared to be no shortage of funds (Sudan Tribune, 2006).

This, however, does not necessarily correctly indicate the prior socioeconomic status of the RDL's foot soldiers. It is known that the RDL received substantial support from external players, particularly Khartoum (International Crisis Group, 2006: 12; Tubiana, 2008: 28–29).

Information gathered so far does not allow for reaching firm conclusions. The fact, however, that the RDL's membership included army soldiers, as well as government officials, indicates that (at least part of) the rebels were not coming from the most economically deprived strata.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (1) (supported; very limited data)

Data on the economic status of the Tama is very limited. It is known that Tama people are sedentary farmers (Human Rights Watch, 2007: footnote 7) practising subsistence agriculture. The missionaries of the Worldwide Evangelisation for Christ (WEC International) portray the Tama as very poor:

Lack of water for people and animals is a real problem in the area. During a good rainy season, however, many of the roads in the region become impassable. Even the major road between Guereda and Abeche requires 4-6 hours to travel its 164kms in the dry season, often longer in the wet. There are some Tama villages accessible only by foot or by donkey, not by vehicle. Finding trained teachers willing to work in isolated regions is very difficult and often schools are left without teachers or with sub-standard teachers. The school year is often only 4 or 5 months long due to strikes and the late arrival of teachers. There is a lower secondary school in Guereda but never nearly enough teachers. Those interviewed during the linguistic survey all said that it would be good to have initial primary schooling in Tama, with Chadian Arabic as a

second choice...With 120 children in a Year 1 class it is difficult for students to get a good educational foundation and after four years of school many cannot even read and write their own name. Most Tama are sedentary and cultivate small fields, mainly millet but some sorghum, peanuts and beans...Some have cattle, sheep and goats but many of these have been stolen in recent years. In the past the Tama had many more camels and cattle but as another people group has moved into the Tama region many have been stolen to the point that camels owned by Tamas are now very rare. Some have a rainy season hut close to their fields and another hut in or near their garden as well as their hut in their village or town. Often the men travel with their animals to find grass during part of the year. Village houses and fences are built with straw or grass with mud brick constructions normally only seen in towns. Extreme poverty and lack of hope means that alcohol (millet beer) is a big problem for many Tama. Farming is very much at a subsistence level with all hoeing, weeding and harvesting done by hand. There is rarely enough surplus to last a second year if the rains do not come. I have met families who faced surviving on millet and dirty water only for many months until the next rains. There was no money to buy oil, tomatoes, onions, salt or soap. And then, tragically, the rains didn't come the following year either. People were forced to move away. The majority of Tama men have lived an average of 4-5 years outside of their traditional region, while women often don't go further afield than their nearest big market unless they become refugees in times of drought or war. Many people moved and many died during the great famines of 1912-13 (when many villages were totally wiped out), 1950 (called "his family doesn't want him"), 1973 ("they were driven out"), and 1984 ("black cat"). Again in 1997 much of the population left the region due to a poor harvest one year followed by drought the next. During the civil war from 1979-1987 there was also much suffering and many died...While Guéréda is calm at the moment the whole of the east of Chad is rather unstable and one never knows when and where rebels or bandits will strike next. There is a heavy military presence in the region. Many young people relish the power they have as soldiers (cited in Joshua Project, 10 July 2013).

Additional information (alternative explanations)

Some facts suggest that personal agendas on the part of the RDL leader could have contributed to the conflict:

In April 2006, military offensive came within an ace of overthrowing Deby. Six months later...[Nour]...pledged allegiance to the central government, after agreeing to sign a peace accord, against the wishes of his own fighters. His military allies accused him of sacrificing his own troops in return for a rich reward from the regime and the promise of a role in politics. He secured the post of defence minister but found himself marginalised within the government, and thus once again opted for rebellion in the upheavals of February 2008 (International Crisis Group, 2009: footnote 31).

It is also known that the Tama (just like many other Chadian ethnic groups) were politically excluded under Deby's regime, which was dominated by the Zaghawa (Deby was Zaghawa himself):

[Zaghawa,] representing just two percent of the population...have profited from presidential patronage and dominate all ranks of the armed forces and government. Their domination has antagonized the country's other ethnic groups (Massey & May, 2006: 443).

In addition, it is known that the Tama persecution by another ethnic group – Zaghawa – inspired some of the local Tamans to join the rebels.

The Tama reside in Dar Tama (an administrative unit in the eastern region of Wafi Fira), where they constitute an ethnic majority. Dar Tama is also a home to a significant minority of ethnic Zaghawa. When Deby came to power, he installed Zaghawa officials in 'ranks of local government and police...and these officials did little to protect Tama civilians or to pursue prosecutions for Zaghawa raids against Tama villages. The climate of impunity helped inspire majority-Tama rebel movements such as the *Alliance Nationale de la Résistance* (National Resistance Alliance, ANR) in 1994' (Human Rights Watch, 2007b: 14).

However, it appears that the communal conflict between the Tama and the Zaghawa peaked after the commencement of the RDL rebellion:

Historically, relations between the Tama and the Zaghawa have been strained, though the two groups coexisted peacefully enough to permit intermarriage until underlying tensions exploded in the second half of 2006, when dozens of civilians were killed and thousands displaced in communal violence informed and inflamed by the political dynamics of armed rebellion in Chad (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 25).

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ID: 205 (1994): Government of Mexico versus Zapatista National Liberation Army

General information

The conflict started on 1 January 1994, when indigenous peasants – identifying themselves as Ejército Zapatista de liberación nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army) (EZLN) – took control of four municipalities in the southern state of Chiapas. The EZLN declared a series of demands for economic and social change in the region, culminating in a declaration of war against the government and a statement of intent to depose President Salinas (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 22 July 2013). The Mexican government responded by sending army forces to Chiapas, which eventually developed into armed clashes.

The participants of the January uprising were members of the indigenous ethnic groups: Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Chol, Tolojobal, and Mam (Nash, 1997: 262; Stephen, 2003: 195) (often collectively referred to as Mayas). The second communique from the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee – General Command of the EZLN makes it clear that

The commanders and the troops of the EZLN are mostly indigenous people of Chiapas because the indigenous are the poorest and most dispossessed of Mexico, but also, as now can be seen, because they are the most dignified. We are thousands of indigenous people up in arms, and behind us are tens of thousands of people in our families. Add it up; we amount to many thousands of indigenous people in struggle. The government says that this is not an indigenous uprising, but we think if thousands of indigenous people have risen up in struggle, then it must be an indigenous uprising. In our movement are also Mexicans of varied social origins and from different states of our country. They agree with us and have united with us because they are opposed to the exploitation that we suffer. Just as these non-indigenous Mexicans have united with us, more will do so in the future because our struggle is national and not limited to the state of Chiapas. Currently, the political leadership of our struggle is completely indigenous. One hundred percent of members

of the indigenous revolutionary clandestine committees in the combat zones belong to the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol, Tojolabal, and other ethnic groups (cited in Stephen, 2003: 195-196).

The EZLN did not have a strict hierarchical structure and had no clear leadership. Notable members include Subcomandante Marcos (Spanish ancestry), Comandante Ramona (indigenous Maya), Subcomandante Elisa (non-indigenous), Comandante Hugo (indigenous Maya), Subcomandante Moises (indigenous Maya), and Subcomandante Pedro (non-indigenous).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (supported; sufficient data)

Those who took up arms in January 1994 were primarily poor indigenous peasants (Collier & Quaratiello, 1994; Stephen, 1995). It is important to note that peasants and indigenous people do not constitute economically homogeneous groups in Chiapas:

Chiapas is filled with paradoxes that defy easy categorisation. In addition to indigenous peasants who weave and wear the traditional *huipul* (tunic) and carry loads on tumplines, there are peasants who dress in jeans and drive trucks. Within even the tiniest Indian hamlets there are wealthy entrepreneurs who own such modern luxury items as televisions and videocassette recorders; poor, marginalized farmworkers; and opportunistic political bosses (Collier & Quaratiello, 1994: 7).

And it was exactly the poor peasants of indigenous groups, primarily from eastern Chiapas, that constituted the rank and file of the EZLN during the January rebellion (Collier & Quaratiello, 1994: 7–9).

This, in combination with the facts presented below, suggests that the rebels were composed of (some of the) most economically deprived members of (some of the) most deprived ethnic groups, which lends support to both individual deprivation pathway and group deprivation pathway (1).

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (1) (supported; sufficient data)

It is well known that Chiapas was one of the poorest states in Mexico and that the most deprived within Chiapas were the indigenous people:

Chiapas lags behind the rest of Mexico in almost every way measurable: household income, education, and basic standard of living fall far behind the national average, and infant mortality is much higher. Many indigenous people in Chiapas are illiterate, and only about half of the men and a tiny percentage of the women speak Spanish. According to the census figures for the period prior to the rebellion, only 11 percent of adults earned what the government called moderate incomes of at least \$3,450 per year (versus 24 percent nationally); less than 50 percent of households have running water (versus 67 percent nationally); and only 14 percent have televisions (versus 45 percent nationally)...Ironically, nearly half of Chiapas was without electricity at the time of the rebellion, including most of the regions peopled by Indians (Collier & Quaratiello, 1994: 16-17).

Economic concerns and inequality are clearly reflected in the public statements of the EZLN spokesmen. For instance, the demands issued during the first days of the January uprising included ‘work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, justice, and peace’ (Stephen, 2003: 195). In March, after a cease-fire, the EZLN opened a dialogue with the government stating the following reasons for their rebellion:

- (1) The hunger, misery, and marginalization that we have always suffered.
- (2) The total lack of land on which to work in order to survive.
- (3) The repression, eviction, imprisonment, torture, and murder with which the government responds to our fair demands.
- (4) The unbearable injustices and violations of our human rights as indigenous people and impoverished peasants.
- (5) The brutal exploitation we suffer in the sale of our products, in the work day, and in the purchase of basic necessities.

- (6) The lack of all basic services for the great majority of the indigenous population.
- (7) More than sixty years of lies, deceptions, promises, and imposed governments. The lack of freedom and democracy in deciding our destinies.
- (8) The constitutional laws have not been obeyed by those who govern the country; on the other hand, we the indigenous people and peasants are made to pay for the smallest error. They heap upon us the weight of a law we did not make, and which those who did make are the first to violate (cited in Gilly, 1998: 305).

The statement on the reasons for rebellion was followed with the following demands:

Truly free and democratic national elections; the resignation of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari; recognition of the EZLN as a belligerent force; political, economic, and cultural autonomy for Indian municipalities and communities; new elections in Chiapas; revision of the NAFTA/TLC; annulment of Salinas' revision of Article 27; hospitals and doctors in rural municipalities; the right to true information and "an indigenous radio station...directed by indigenous people and run by indigenous people"; housing, electricity, potable water, roads, sewer systems, telephones, transportation; free education from preschool up to university; official recognition of the languages of all ethnicities; respect for the rights and dignity of indigenous people, recognizing their cultures and traditions and agreeing that they may administer justice in their own communities according to their own customs and traditions; decent jobs; a fair price for products from the countryside and the cancellation of all debts; cooperative stores with fair prices; freedom for political prisoners; removal of the federal army and all police forces; indemnification for the damages produced in the days of war; revocation of the Chiapas penal Code, which "doesn't permit us to organize in any way other than with arms, since any legal and peaceful struggle is punished and repressed"; the return of displaced people to the communities from which they were expelled by the *caciques*; and one special point with twelve specific demands from the "indigenous peasant women," including childbirth clinics, day-care centres, food for children, collective kitchens and dining halls, technical assistance for family farms, craft workshops, schools for women, and transportation (Gilly, 1998: 305–306).

Additional information (alternative explanations)

It is known that indigenous peoples were politically excluded. There is also evidence that ‘many of the leaders and members of independent peasant and indigenous organizations in Chiapas have been jailed, tortured, and continually harassed for trying to organize for peasant land rights and for protesting human rights abuses’ (Stephen, 1995: 89).

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ID: 214 (1993): Government of Congo versus Ninjas

General information

The conflict broke out in the aftermath of the re-run of legislative elections (May 1993) that were won by Pascal Lissouba's party, the Union Panafricaine pour la démocratie sociale (UPADS).

The opposition, which included Bernard Kolelas' party, the Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement integral (MCDDI), refused to accept the results. The armed clashes started in November 1993, when the MCDDI militia – the 'Ninjas' – confronted the Congolese army in Bakongo district. Like Kolelas, most members of the Ninjas were Lari (Clark & Decalo, 2012: 284; United States Department of State, 2000).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (supported; sufficient data)

According to Bazenguissa-Ganga (1999: 38) and Englebert & Ron (2004: 65), the Ninjas were led by police and military officers and staffed by local youths living in Brazzaville. It is known that militias during the conflict were recruited from among young, unemployed, poor school dropouts (Sundberg, 1999: 6–7, 11–14; Clark, 1994: 56; Englebert & Ron 2004: 72–73). In the later stages of the conflict (1997), the Ninjas were primarily composed of young, unemployed, poor youths from provinces (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999: 41-44). It is also known that (in 1997) the Ninjas lacked arms and equipment (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1999: 43).

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (1) (not supported; very limited data)

Information on the socioeconomic background of the Lari is very limited. It is known that the Lari were primarily residing in the southern suburbs of the Brazzaville and Pool regions (Lefort,

2001: 17). Some sources suggest that (at least at the time of independence in 1960) the Lari had relatively better higher education and civil service opportunities (Eaton, 2006: 45). So far, however, I have been unable to find any other reliable information that would allow for comparisons of the socioeconomic status of the Lari to other Congolese groups.

Additional information (alternative explanations)

There is some evidence suggesting that the conflict was driven by the personal agendas of the leadership and, more generally, an elitist struggle for the control of state revenues (e.g., Englebert & Ron, 2004).

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ID: 255 (2007): Government of Niger versus Niger Movement for Justice

General information

The conflict started in 2007 (the number of battle-related deaths reached 25 in July 2007) when the Niger Movement for Justice (NMJ) attacked military installations and infrastructure of the uranium and oil-industry in the northern Niger (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 24 July 2013).

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, the MNJ was a Tuareg-led rebellion, but also included ‘disaffected members of the Toubou, Arab, Peul, Hausa and other nomadic or semi-nomadic groups dwelling in northern Niger’ (Ibid.; see also Sehmer & Welsh, 2008a). The leader of the MNJ was Aghaly Alambo, a Tuareg and a former member of *Front de l’Air et del’Azawak* (FLAA) – a Tuareg rebel organization that fought the Nigerian Government in early 1990s (Al Jazeera, 2008).

The reasons for the MNJ rebellion, according to the MNJ leaders, were ‘political and economic marginalization of the northern populations, unequal and opaque distribution of the uranium rent – exploited in the northern mining town Arlit’ (Guichaoua, 2009: 3).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; sufficient data)

According to Guichaoua, the MNJ membership included three elements: ‘opportunistic professionals of violence,’ ‘politicized activists giving advice from abroad,’ and ‘youths carrying out their “own revolution”’ (2009: 22).

The first were composed of the ex-FLAA combatants that were either left aside from the peace deals of 1994–1995²⁶ or defected from the national army because of ‘a lack of consideration and marginalization within their new military corps, illustrated by delayed promotions and the use of derogatory language against them’ (Guichaoua, 2009: 12–13). At the start of the rebellion, the MNJ was primarily composed of these ex-FLAA combatants.

The second were the ‘political cell’ of the MNJ, composed of prominent political cadres, intellectuals based in France. The political cell

firmly played the environmental card to publicise their struggle, enlisting French anti-globalisation movements, Green Party officials (including the popular MP Noel Mamère) or anti-nuclear activists into their cause. This was the result of a deliberate attempt to broaden the media coverage of the conflict. Such a wide mobilisation among diverse groups was made possible by the activation of personal ties by French sympathisers of the Tuareg cause – often running small NGOs in the Air region... – and hosts of exiled Tuareg dignitaries. Numerous cultural events such as gigs of Tuareg blues, small political rallies and happenings at the front door of the French nuclear giant AREVA – which, until the very recent months, had the monopoly of exploitation of Niger’s uranium – were organised. A great deal of expertise in environmental activism was then transferred from French semi-professional activists to Tuareg activists (Guichaoua, 2009: 16–17).

The third were the so-called *ishumar*, the ‘youths of Agadez and Arlit who thought the situation was ripe for them to join’ (Guichaoua, 2009: 18). These fighters did not join the MNJ

²⁶ Various Tuareg rebel groups (who took part in the 1990–1995 rebellion, see Uppsala Conflict Data Program 25 July 2013) signed a number of peace deals with the government in 1994–1995 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 26 July 2013), according to which ex-combatants were to be integrated into the national army or provided with employment opportunities (so called *réinsertion*, see Guichaoua, 2009: 11, footnote 8).

from the very beginning, and unlike the ex-FLAA members mentioned above, were not ex-combatants of the 1990–1995 rebellion. The reasons behind the *ishumar*'s decision to join the MNJ included

three interconnected themes: racism, unequal access to jobs and territorial sovereignty. The educational trajectories of the interviewees are full of anecdotal evidence of open rejection of their Tuareg identity by the teachers or non-Tuareg classmates. These discriminatory behaviours were perpetuated after school when these young men sought jobs and tried to pass interviews or exams: I was told countless episodes of candidates “not known by anyone”, “not born in Agadez”, “not brought up among us”, and, importantly, “not more qualified than we are” finally being granted the job they were coveting. The feeling of injustice is reinforced by the fact that MNJ combatants consider the northern region as their own. This does not just express sentimental attachment. As stressed above, Tuaregs have plenty of very practical competences intimately linked to their life in the desert which sustain their sense of territorial belonging. The desert is their land and there is a shared feeling among our respondents that the Tuaregs are being dispossessed of it. In fact the view that Agadez is suffering a second colonisation by the “Southernners” is commonplace in the interviews I have carried out, not only in Tamanrasset but also in 2007 in Agadez and Niamey. This brings about racial statements: “we’re occupied by the Blacks” - as Tuaregs consider themselves as “Whites”. This distinction carries a heavy historical weight since, in past centuries, the sedentary “Blacks”, notably the Hausa, used to live under the Tuaregs’ supremacy who regularly raided them and used them as slaves. Struggling to get jobs, feeling discriminated against, the fighters I met, lived the typical life of the *ishumar*, made of temporary jobs in tourism and idleness with other non-married male fellows consisting of playing the guitar, smoking, drinking and running political debates (Guichaoua, 2009: 19–20).

Thus, while a number of economically deprived individuals took part in the rebellion, the individual deprivation pathway cannot be said to have been supported, as the MNJ membership (especially in the initial phase of the conflict) was dominated of ex-combatants (some of whom were employed in the national army) and political cadres residing in France – most of whom were not among the most economically deprived individuals in Niger.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (1) (supported; sufficient data)

While the rebels of MNJ, as individuals, were not coming from the most economically deprived background, Tuaregs, as a group, were. According to Guichaoua, ‘the MNJ was created against the backdrop of Tuaregs’ longstanding social, political and economic destitution, a process that started under French colonization and resulted in recurrent armed contestations’ (2009: 8). Under the French, and immediately after the independence, Tuaregs were politically and economically marginalised:

When establishing the administrative structures of the colony, France promoted to offices an educated elite mostly coming from the South of Niger and, particularly, from the Djerma and Songhay ethnic groups...It resulted, at the time of independence, in the early 60s, in an alienation of the Tuaregs from state positions...reinforced by a demographic disadvantage compared to other Niger ethnic groups following a design of state boundaries leaving them scattered over five national territories...This political destitution was paralleled by a rapid economic decline. The livestock of Tuareg herdsmen was dramatically downsized following Kaocen’s military defeat...and was hit again by major droughts in the 70s and the 80s. Long-distance trans-Saharan trade progressively became obsolete due to the opening of new commercial routes (by air or boat from the Gulf of Guinea coastal metropolis...thus forcing large sections of the population to abandon their nomadic mode of production, at the price of serious internal hierarchical reversals. Partial abandonment of caravanning and nomadic activities meant that nobles and their tributary chiefs, owners of camels par excellence lost prestige and political influence over their obliged traditional subalterns, namely the blacksmiths (providing them with tools, jewels and arms and singing their praises during social events) and former slaves (looking after livestock and performing domestic chores) attached to their families. In the new economic climate, blacksmiths as well as slaves had a relatively greater disposition to adapt to sedentary activities such as artisanship or gardening and sometimes became economically better off than their former masters...Historically entrenched reasons for discontent among the Tuaregs have been numerous and multidimensional: economic, political and social. Tuareg migrants experimenting exile in Algeria and Libya

– where they also acquired military competence – constituted the frontrunners of a revolutionary project that unfolded in the 90s. As we will now see, today’s insurgency can be viewed as an offshoot of the 90s rebellion due to the poor management of micro-political tensions that arose in the post-conflict (Ibid.: 8–9).

Grievances over economic marginalization dominated Tuareg accounts on the reasons for the MNJ rebellion:

In Niger, the Tuareg-led Niger Movement for Justice is fighting for justice -- fair and equal treatment of all Nigeriens, and incorporation of the Tuareg people as equal citizens. The members of MNJ say that the Tuareg people have been treated very badly for some decades, and have been politically and economically marginalized within the country. The results of this ethnic marginalization can be seen in unequal distribution of development funds and relief aid. Schools, hospitals, wells, roads, and jobs are severely lacking in Tuareg territories. Niger is a very poor country, but the people who are getting the worst of it, according to MNJ, are the Tuareg people, because of their ethnicity. The Tuaregs feel this inequality especially, because they live on land that is rich in natural resources -- uranium and oil, among others. Niger is one of the foremost suppliers in the world today of uranium; the uranium is in the middle of Tuareg territories; and yet, the Tuaregs live in abject poverty, with high infant mortality, malnutrition, food insufficiency, lack of education and development, and joblessness. Their drinking water and pasture lands have become polluted from the radioactive waste that the uranium companies have spilled on their land (Tanat, 2008).

A member of the MNJ told Al Jazeera, ‘We were forced to take up arms because we have no future...We are not even considered citizens in our own country. We have no means to develop at all...we live in misery. We live in ignorance and disease’ (Sehmer & Welsh, 2008a). Similarly, a spokesman for the MNJ told IRIN ‘The movement was created because nothing has been done by the government...There is no work, no schools, not even drinking water in all Niger. It’s terrible, it’s a genocide, and the government is corrupt, taking money from people and leaving them to live in poverty’ (IRIN, 2007).

A Toubou commander (who joined the MNJ) pointed out that ‘In terms of education we are the most backwards people in the entire country. This is a policy of the state, not because people don't want to go to school’ (Ibid.). Likewise, a member of Fulani who joined the MNJ said that ‘The government always gives the priority to the farmers over the herders and this is what we're seeing today...I joined MNJ because of the injustice. The Fulani in this country are suffering a lot...Every day, because of conflicts between farmers and herdsmen, people are being killed’ (Ibid.).

These accounts largely match the objective economic conditions among the Tuaregs (and other nomad people in the north), who are, indeed, economically marginalized against ‘black’ southerners, who have traditionally dominated the government (see, for example, Emerson, 2011; Krings, 2006).²⁷

Additional information (alternative explanations)

Once again, the conflict could have been related to political exclusion:

Some fought the government in the first Tuareg rebellion, a five-year insurgency that came to an end in 1995 when the main groups signed a peace deal with the government, brokered by France, Burkina Faso and Algeria. The MNJ say the 1995 agreement was never properly implemented. They want greater political representation, with more Tuareg recruited into the army and the police (Sehmer & Welsh, 2008a).

Though, according to one member of the parliament,

²⁷ Niger itself is considered one of the poorest countries in the world. Based on data collected in 2004, the United Nations ranked Niger 177 (out of 177) on its Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme, 2006: 286)

In reality there is no ethnic group in Niger the state doesn't care about. We are sitting in the parliament, we have all the ethnicities of Niger present in the parliament – even the most reclusive areas are given special constituencies so they don't have to compete like in urban areas. Now if you want to talk about what's going on in the north, those men have made a choice to take up arms in order to air their point of view – they are free to make this choice but today in a democracy like Niger I have to found a political party and air my point of view (Sehmer & Welsh, 2008a).

There was also a drought only two years prior to the MNJ rebellion:

A catastrophic second drought hit the country in 1983, and in 2005 drought conditions and one of the worst locust infestations the country had ever seen destroyed crops, bringing, according to UN estimates, 3.5 million people close to starvation (Sehmer & Welsh, 2008b).

It is known that droughts especially affected Tuaregs (who are predominantly herders).

In addition, the Tuareg rebellion of 1990–1995 (where, as suggested above, the MNJ had its roots), could have been sparked by state-sponsored punitive actions against Tuareg civilians in 1990 (see, for example, Krings, 1995: 60).

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ETHNIC TERRITORIAL

ID: 133 (1994) Government of Ethiopia versus Ogaden National Liberation Front

General information

The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was formed in 1984. However, it was not until March 1986 that the ONLF made a public announcement of its existence (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 31 July 2013). In the announcement, ONLF chairman ‘Sheik Ibrahim Abdulah defined the Ogaden as “an oppressed nation colonized by Ethiopia”, and pledged to establish an independent Ogaden state with full sovereignty in the line with the aspirations of its people’ (Ibid.).

In 1992, the ONLF won regional elections in Ogaden and took over the region’s administration. The conflict started in February 1994, when regional parliamentarians voted to exercise the right of self-determination, enshrined in the national charter (Ibid.). Soon, the ONLF militants started sporadic attacks against the government forces.

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; very limited data)

It is known that the ONLF was established by a splinter group of young Ogaden intellectuals from the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) (Abdullahi, 2007: 556). Information on the ONLF membership, especially foot soldiers, is very limited.

There is some evidence suggesting that the ONLF cells operated in the rural areas. According to Human Rights Watch, the ONLF was (is) a ‘rurally-based guerrilla force consisting mostly of small units (20-30 fighters) assigned to different zones’, who regularly interacted with ‘civilians, particularly pastoralists in the area frequented by the ONLF, and obtain food and

water in the countryside and from a network of civilian supporters in the town and villages’ (2008: 28). There is also some evidence that the ONLF recruited among the refugees of the Shiraro and Shimble refugee camps in Ethiopia (Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, 2013). This information, however, is not sufficient to support/not support the individual deprivation pathway with certainty.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (1) (supported; sufficient data)

While the information on the socioeconomic status of ONLF members as individuals is very limited, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the ONLF membership was coming from one of the most economically deprived ethnic groups.

Around 96% of Ogaden inhabitants are Somali (CHF International, 2006: 9). Thus, the socioeconomic status of the region largely overlaps with the socioeconomic status of Ogaden Somalis, who constitute the ONLF membership.²⁸

According to CHF International, Ogaden is among the poorest regions in Ethiopia:

Reliable data on living standards is extremely difficult to come by, but a recent Central Statistical Agency report provides health data that is indicative of the extent of poverty. For example, 85.6 per cent of children in Somali Region suffer from anemia and only 7.4 per cent of pregnant mothers receive antenatal care from a

²⁸ Note, however, that not all Ogaden Somalis supported (support) the ONLF (see, for example, Abdullahi, 2007: 557). The ONLF primarily received support (and recruited) from the Ogaadeen clan (Ibid.: 557–558), which constitutes 40–50% of all Ethiopian Somalis (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 13). So far, I have been unable to determine the economic differences between Somalis who were among the ranks of the ONLF and those who were not; therefore, I extrapolated the socioeconomic status of the former using aggregate data for the whole region.

health professional. Literacy in the region was estimated at 26 per cent in 2004 and Devereux estimates rural literacy at 13 per cent (compared to roughly 43 per cent nationwide). Less than 3 per cent of the population gets drinking water from their own tap and less than 7 per cent gets water from a protected well or spring. There are no paved roads outside the regional capital of Jijiga and roads throughout region are in deplorable condition. For instance, on the road between Gode and Hargelle, two zonal capitals, three bridges are partially destroyed and have been so for several years, rendering them impassable and forcing vehicles to traverse the ravine (and sometimes the river) below. Because of this, during the rainy season Kebeles and Weredas can be completely cut off from one another for weeks, leaving people effectively stranded. Educational opportunities are extremely limited. Informal estimates are that roughly 15 per cent of youth attend school (the government's 2004 estimate is 21 per cent for the region), the majority of them in urban areas or settled rural communities. Islamic Koranic schools are more numerous than secular schools, with most children attending a Koranic school before they attend secular school, if they do so at all. Several interviewees said that the idea and importance of education had not really taken hold in the region until the past decade or so. But in urban areas and settled communities the importance of education has strongly taken hold, as many interviewees professed a desire to see their children receive the education they could not enjoy, which contributes to the heightened expectations of government (2006: 10–11).

Prior to the conflict, Ogaden suffered from severe droughts: in 1980, 1984, 1990-91 (Hogg, 1991: 271), and 1994 (CHF International, 2006: 12) – the year when the conflict broke out. Droughts have led (or contributed) to famine in some parts of Ogaden (Hogg, 1991: 271).

The effects of droughts were exacerbated by the lack of governmental services and ‘virtually no local infrastructure’ (Hogg, 1991: 272). It is known, for example, that

The whole region remained without secondary schools until the mid-1990s...hospitals exist...in a dilapidated condition with no medical supplies...The patient-doctor ratio is about a million to one. In terms of road infrastructure there is only one old gravel road build by the Italians in the 1930s that connects the major urban center (Khalif, 2000: 334).

Observable implication of separatist pathway (not supported; sufficient data)

Information presented above (see group deprivation pathway) suggests that Ogaden was one of the poorest regions in Ethiopia – which lends little support to the separatist pathway.

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ID: 198 (1992) Government of Georgia versus Republic of South Ossetia

General information

The conflict started in the aftermath of South Ossetia's vote for independence from Georgia on 21 December 1991. Witnessing the massing of the Georgian government troops, South Ossetians declared a state of emergency and called for general mobilization on 23 December 1991 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1 August 2013). Fighting escalated in the spring of 1992. Uppsala Conflict Data Program codes August 1992 as the start of the conflict, though significant fighting had already taken place in January 1991 – see, for example, International Crisis Group (2004: 3) or Zurcher, Baev, & Koehler (2005: 268).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; sufficient data)

It is known that the paramilitary forces of South Ossetia were built from scratch (Zurcher, Baev, & Koehler, 2005: 270). In early 1990 South Ossetians had only 300–400 'poorly-armed' fighters, but within six months that force grew to about '1,500 full-time fighters plus some 3,500 "minuteman" volunteers' (Ibid.: 271).

According to Parastaev, South Ossetian forces came from three groups. The first were neighbourhood groups, formed in various districts of the town. The most stable of these groups were those organized around 'pickets', in the bordering districts of the town and in Ossetian-populated villages close to Georgian-populated villages (2003: 8).

The second were

occupational groups, ie people belonging to the same profession or occupation. There were groups made up of artists, sportsmen, Komsomol (Communist Youth League) leaders and veterans from the war in Afghanistan. A group of police officers from the Tskhinval internal affairs division who refused to take

orders from Tbilisi also organized a group, which later became the backbone of the most combat-ready structure, the South Ossetian OMON (Special Police Detachment). Criminal elements also joined the South Ossetian fighters, since they had weapons and a good level of organisation derived from their operations in peacetime. Criminals participated to a greater or lesser extent in virtually all of the groups. However, purely criminal “groups” were not apparent either at that stage or later. The events described here happened during a period in which the market was uncontrolled and anarchic, and businessmen were forced to operate according to somewhat criminal business practices. This, above all, meant owning weapons or even keeping bodyguards. It was difficult to draw a clear boundary between simple criminals and a nascent class of businessmen, and between them and the armed groups of South Ossetia (Ibid.)

The third were ‘leadership-driven’:

ie set up around a charismatic leader, around whom his friends and advisers rallied, forming the leading backbone of a future “group”. There were two influential groups, who were the first to be properly armed even at the first stage of the conflict and were noted for their discipline. One of the groups retained its original composition until the end of the conflict and didn’t take in any new members. By contrast, the commander of the second group sought to increase the quantity of fighters and to attract respected lone fighters as much as possible. This group soon began to play a significant role in the political scene in the Caucasus. Even after the tragic death of its leader, his group kept his name and its structure, and even now maintains contact and meets regularly. When it became clear to everyone that armed conflict was inevitable, the *Nyvs* movement was organised. Its most active members were representatives of those involved in the black market and young businessmen. Representatives of this movement had information from the Georgian power structures and understood the full extent of the dangerous implications of the Georgian leadership’s support for extremist-orientated forces and their power divisions. This movement was prepared to fight back against any attacks from the Georgian side and even announced that it had enough arms to provide adequate defence. *Nyvs* did indeed have several machine-guns and several dozen carbines at its disposal. However, its leaders, having taken on themselves the task of defending South Ossetia and having thereby calmed the population, did not reckon on the scale of the coming conflict. Most likely, the close links between participants of this group and police officers from Georgia that still existed played a part in their

miscalculation. Individuals in the Georgian power structures widely believed that conflict was inevitable, but not on the scale that later occurred. When in winter 1991 Tskhinval was occupied by several thousand Georgian police officers together with the informal armed groups, *Nyvs* was unable to provide serious resistance. *Nyvs* nevertheless represented the first attempt to create a South Ossetian armed organisation, and an umbrella-body to co-ordinate the Ossetian armed response in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict of 1989–92 (Ibid.: 8–9).

This information suggests, then, that the rebels were not coming from the most economically deprived backgrounds.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (supported; sufficient data)

While a majority of the rebels, as individuals, were not coming from the most economically deprived backgrounds, it appears that South Ossetians, as a group, were. It is known that South Ossetia was one of the poorest regions in Georgia (Cornell, 2002: 190; Kolstø, 2006: 728; Zurcher, Baev, & Koehler, 2005: 276):

In contrast to Abkhazia, South Ossetia had no tourist attraction, and did not have much economic activity in the Soviet times. It had little industry, some mining activities in the northwest of the autonomous Oblast, but remained a mainly agricultural area even though climatic and topographic conditions made agriculture difficult. Basically, South Ossetia was one of the more disadvantaged areas in Georgia, comparable to mountain regions like Khevsureti or Racha, or for that matter Javakheti. It subsisted through the “marginal allocation of industrial resources from Moscow” (Cornell, 2002: 190).

According to Zurcher, Baev, & Koehler, average income in South Ossetia was ‘perhaps 30–40 percent lower than the average for Georgia’ (2005: 275).

Observable implication of separatist pathway

As suggested above (see group deprivation pathway), there is little evidence to support separatist pathway.

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ID: 254 (2007) Government of Democratic Republic of Congo versus Kingdom of Kongo

General information

Kingdom of Kongo (Bundu-dia-Kong, BDK), an ethnic-based political and religious movement, was formed by Bernard Mizele Nsemi in 1986 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1 August 2013). The BDK believes the territory of the former Kongo Kingdom belongs to ethnic Bakongos. In 2002 Nsemi proclaimed himself king of the territory of the ancient kingdom from his home in Bas-Congo Province. The conflict erupted on 31 January-1 February 2007, when members of the BDK protested against electoral corruption and clashed with security forces (Ibid.).

The BDK is based in Bas-Congo province (where Nsemi declared his kingdom) and is composed entirely of Bakongos.

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; very limited data)

Information on the socioeconomic background of BDK members who took part in the January-February 2007 demonstrations is virtually non-existent. Media reports from the conflict zone provide no clues on the socioeconomic background of the protesters (e.g., Agence France-Presse, 2007; BBC News, 2007; Deutsche Presse Agentur, 2007; IRIN, 2007; Reuters, 2007). A Human Rights Watch mission (2007), established to investigate the January-February 2007 events, only indicates that the protesters ‘carried rocks and sticks but had no firearms’. A special MONUC (UN Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, 2008) inquiry into the clashes between the BDK members and Congolese police next year (February and March 2008) contains no such data either.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (not supported; sufficient data)

Information on the relative socioeconomic status of the Bakongo is very limited. However, regional data suggests that Bakongos residing in Bas-Congo province (from which the BDK drew its supporters and recruits) could hardly have been among the most deprived ethnic groups in the DRC.

Bas-Congo is considered the third-most developed province in the DRC, after the capital Kinshasa and the southern part of the former Katanga province (Kisangani & Bobb, 2009: 289, 333). The province is a major producer of livestock and a major supplier of food for Kinshasa (Ibid.: 290). Bas-Congo is also a producer of one-third of DRC's manufactured goods and 'is home to industries in the metal, woodworking, cement, textile and sugar' industries (Ibid.) It is known that Bas-Congo, together with Kinshasa and two other provinces (Haut-Katanga and Lualaba), contain most of the DRC's asphalt roads (Ibid.: 458). In addition, Bas-Congo is rich in minerals, including diamonds, gold and bauxite (Tull, 2010: 649). The capital of Bas-Congo – Matadi – contains one of the largest ports in Africa, serving the whole DRC, as well as the Inga hydroelectric complex which contains 'one-half of the country's electrical generating capacity' (Ibid.: 160). All of these assets make Bas-Congo the second-largest contributor to the national budget (Liegeois, 2008: 11).²⁹

Observable implication of separatist pathway (supported; sufficient data)

²⁹ Note, however, that the distribution of the revenues accruing from the exploitation of the provinces' resources is perceived as unjust by the BDK (Tull, 2010: 646).

separatist pathway can be said to have been supported as Bas-Congo was one of the richest provinces in the DRC (see above, group deprivation pathway).

Additional information (alternative explanations)

There is some evidence that Bakongos felt grievances over political exclusion from local institutions:

BDK denounces the weak representation of the BaKongo in state institutions and state-owned companies at the provincial level. This is perceived as a deliberate policy by the central government to marginalise the BaKongo and subjugate them to the domination of “foreigners” (Tull, 2010: 649).

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ID: 258 (2008) Government of India versus Dima Haram Daogah – Black Widow faction

General information

The conflict was fought over the demand for an ethnic homeland for the Dimasa population residing in the parts of India's north-eastern states of Assam and Nagaland (mainly in the North Kachar Hills, the Karbi Anglong and the Kachar districts of the state of Assam) (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2 August 2013). The first Dimasa group advocating armed struggle, Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF), emerged in the 1980s. It was succeeded by the Dima Haram Daogah (DHD) in the mid-1990s. However, it was only in 2008 that the conflict between Dima Haram Daogah – Black Widow (DHD-BW) (a faction of DHD) and the government crossed the threshold of 25 battle related deaths (Ibid.)

The DHD-BW was led by Jewel Garlosa and was composed of a few hundred Dimasa militants.³⁰ The rebels claim an ethnic homeland in the north-eastern Indian state of Assam, comprised of areas with both significant and sporadic Dimasa populations. The claim encompasses North Kachar Hills, Karbi Anglong, Kachar Hills (all in Assam) and the Dimapur district (in the state of Nagaland).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; very limited data)

According to Anuj Chopra, an Indian reporter from Assam, the DHD-BW was known to be a wealthy and well-equipped group:

As you move toward the rural interior, the forest becomes denser, the population conspicuously sparse and concrete roads morph into rutted mountain tracks. Rebels hiding in these forests are led by four formidable

³⁰ South Asia Terrorism Portal (2013) sets the number to about 300 fighters.

commanders, backed by nearly 300 sure-footed fighters adept at guerrilla warfare, armed with a sophisticated inventory of Chinese-made AK47s, M16s and rocket launchers, and who know the jungle terrain like the back of their hands (2009).

When a number of the DHD-BW members surrendered in 2009, the Times of India described the militants' arms as a 'huge cache of hi-tech foreign made weapons' (2009). The DHD-BW's funding sources include extortion and abduction for ransom, but also significant aid from wealthy Dimasas residing in various parts of Assam (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2013). This, however, does not necessarily correctly indicate the prior socioeconomic status of the DHD-BW recruits.

It is known that a faction that split from the DHD-BW in 2003 – DHD-N (Nunisa) – was recruiting among children:

A recent video of a DHD (N) training camp situation deep in the jungles of Cachar district revealed that the outfit is training young boys and girls, aged 12 to 18, to handle sophisticated weapons. Phaizan Dimasa, Assistant Commandant at the DHD Haranhajao Camp, admitted that there were nearly 500 child or teenage insurgents in his outfit (Goswami, 2012: 185).

However, specific data on the socioeconomic background of the DHD-BW is virtually non-existent.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (supported; sufficient data)

Data on the socioeconomic background of the Dimasa – as an ethnic group – is very limited; yet there is sufficient regional data allowing reasonable extrapolation.

While scattered across a number of Assam state's districts (Cachar, Karbi Anglong, Nowgong and Karimganj) (as well as in the Dimapur region of Nagaland State), Dimasa are

primarily concentrated in the Dima Hasao District (previously 'North Kachar Hills'), where they form a majority among the indigenous peoples (Barbora, 2002: 1285).

Dima Hasao is generally known to have been underdeveloped (e.g., Barbora, 2002: 1285), and, perhaps, one of the poorest districts in India. In 2006 the Indian government listed Dima Hasao among the country's 250 most backward districts (Ministry of Panchayati Raj, 2009: 13). The population is predominantly rural (around 80% of the district's population in 1991 were situated in rural areas) (Barbora, 2002: 1285) and inhabitants are largely subsistence farmers:

Most of the local inhabitants of the villages in NC Hills practice shifting cultivation not out of choice alone, but also out of necessity. In the absence of agricultural and/or labour markets of any significance, the Dimas villagers of the area are forced to continue with this mode of land use. The returns from shifting agriculture are very low and because it requires a comparatively larger area of production, it is often said to be "unproductive" (Barbora, 2002: 1288–1289).

The 1991 census classified more than half population as 'illiterate'. There were only 1620 urban and 750 rural high school graduates in 1991 (in a total population of 150,801). Dima Hasao is known to have had the lowest percentage of students who passed the High School Leaving Examination in the whole of Assam (in 1997–2000) (Government of Assam, 2003: 70). Dima Hasao (in 2003) also lagged behind the Assam State's average with respect to the Human Development Index (though was leading the state on the Gender Development Index) (Ibid.: 110).

Assam State itself is generally considered backward. According to the Assam Human Development Report,

Development, or the lack of it, has contributed to the disquiet that has characterised much of the North East for several decades. The region continues to be marked by low agricultural productivity, poor infrastructure,

tenuous communications and nascent levels of industrial activity...there is evidence based on objective criteria to show that the gap between the North East and the rest of the country has widened. More importantly, the region continues to perceive itself as distant and distinct, and unable to participate in the benefits of an expanding, growing economy (Government of Assam, 2003: i).

In 1998, the average per capita income in Assam was almost two times lower than the average in the country (while it was only marginally (4%) lower at independence) (Government of Assam, 2003: ii). Further, '36.09 percent of the State's population continue to live below the poverty line, a figure appreciably above the national average of 26.10 percent' (Ibid.).

Observable implication of separatist pathway (not supported; sufficient data)

As indicated above (see group deprivation pathway), Dima Hasao District (where the DHD-BW operated), as well the whole of Assam State, were among the poorest regions in the country, providing little support for the separatist pathway.

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ID: 259 (2008) Government of India versus People's United Liberation Front

General information

The People's United Liberation Front (PULF), a Pangal (Manipur Muslim) organization, was formed in the aftermath of the 1993 ethnic riots in Manipur (a north-eastern Indian state), during which some 150 Pangals were killed (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2 August 2013). Initially established to protect the Manipur's Muslim minority (i.e., the Pangals), the PULF eventually embraced separatism and stated their wish to create an Islamic state. Soon, the PULF confronted the government's forces (the conflict crossed the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in November 2008).

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the PULF has always been relatively small (100–150 cadres) and recruited among Manipur's small Muslim minority (though in later years also among Assam's more numerous population of Muslims) (2 August 2013). It is known that in 2007 the PULF was joined by another Muslim outfit operating in Manipur – the Islamic National Front (INF) (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2013).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; very limited data)

Information on the socioeconomic background of PULF fighters is very limited, with data on socioeconomic status of PULF members as individuals virtually non-existent. The only information potentially linked to the socioeconomic status of the PULF is data on the PULF's equipment and funding from the South Asia Terrorism Portal:

PULF was in possession of rusty and locally-made weapons in its formative years. However, the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), which trained its cadres mostly in the Ukhrul district and also in Myanmar, is reported to have provided the outfit with sophisticated weapons.

The outfit now possesses an unspecified number of AK-series rifles, stenguns, carbines, though most of its attacks involve the use of explosives, hand grenades and gelatin sticks. Extortion targeting the civilian population and traders in its areas of operation constitute the major source of funding for the PULF. Further, the outfit is known to have indulged in the smuggling of arms and explosives for money. For instance, on April 21, 2005, four Mizo youths were arrested at Behara railway station in Cachar district of Assam along with packets of detonators, eight packets of gelatine sticks and 400 packets of the explosive rolls. The youths were being used by the PULF as carriers. On April 18, 2005, another Mizo youth was arrested along with 294 gelatin sticks from the Cachar Express train near Silchar in Assam (2013).

And Global Security:

Its strength is approximately 50-60 with 15 to 20 assorted weapons including country made weapons...PULF has not been able to establish itself as a potent militant group due to its limited funds, cadre strength and other constraints. The group as such resorts to gun running, drug trafficking and smuggling. It is active in Muslim-dominated areas of Bishenpur, Thoubal, Churachandpur and Chandel districts. It draws support from Madrassas all over Manipur (2013).

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (1) (supported; sufficient data)

While the information on the socioeconomic background of the PULF members as individuals is scarce, there is sufficient information on the socioeconomic background of Pangals as a group.

Pangals are generally considered 'socially, educationally and economically backward' (Ahmed, 2009: 20). According to the 2001 Census, Pangals constitute 7% of Manipur's total population and are settled in Lilong, Yairipok, Sangaiyumpham, Kshetrigao, Moirang, Mayang, Imphal, Thoubal, Bishenpur, Chandel and Churachandpur (Rizwan, 2010). According to the All-Manipur Muslim United Coordinating Committee (AMMUCOC), a Muslim representative body in the state, the literacy rate among Pangals is 58.6% (compared to the state's average of 70.5%)

(Ibid.). Out of 135,000 Pangals, ‘by the end of the year 1995 there were only 5,704 matriculates, [and] 1,822 graduates in addition to 86 technical and professional graduates’ (Ibid.).

Thoubal district, where PULF reportedly had its stronghold (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2013), is considered one of the poorest districts in Manipur State. According to the Manipur State Development Report (Institute for Human Development, 2006: 23), per capita income in Thoubal was second-lowest among the eight Manipur State districts.³¹ Literacy rate was also lower in Thoubal than the average in Manipur (67.90% compared to 68.87%) (Ibid.: 13).

Thoubal’s Muslims (i.e., the Pangals) fared considerably worse than other inhabitants of the district. In 2001, the literacy rate among Thoubal’s rural Muslims was 54.5%, and 71.0% among urban Muslims (compared to 63.5% and 74.3% among Hindus and 74.8% and 81.7% among Christians) (Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development; Guwahati, 2008: 13). Thoubal’s Muslims also had the fewest households with a domestic power connection (Ibid.: 40), a larger proportion of households with income under the poverty line, and a smaller proportion of households with income higher than Rs.6000 (Ibid.: 43).

Manipur State itself lagged behind the country’s average with respect to most socioeconomic indicators. For example, per capita income in Manipur in 2001-2002 was 28% lower than the country’s average (Institute for Human Development, 2006: 2). Rural poverty in

³¹ Per capita income in Chandel, another Manipur’s district where the PULF reportedly operated (South Asia Terrorism, 2013), was fourth-lowest among the eight Manipur’s districts (Institute for Human Development, 2006: 23).

Manipur in 1999-2000 was 42.59% (compared to 27.09% in all of India); however, urban poverty was considerably lower in Manipur (7.95% compared to 23.62% in all of India) (Ibid.).³²

Observable implication of separatist pathway (not supported; sufficient data)

There is little evidence to support separatist pathway. As indicated above (see group deprivation pathway), Thoubal district (where the PULF had its stronghold), as well the whole Manipur State (where the PULF operated), were among the poorest regions in the country. The Manipur Pangals specifically fared comparatively worse than other inhabitants of these regions.

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³² Note, however, that almost 80% of Manipur's population is rural (Institute for Human Development, 2006: 13).

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NON-ETHNIC GOVERNMENTAL

ID: 33 (2009) Government of Yemen versus al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

General information

According to Uppsala Conflict Data Program, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed in January 2009 after a merger of local al-Qaida branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia (25 July 2013). The leaders of the AQAP were presented as ‘Shaykh Abu Sufyan al-Azdi Said al-Shihri (the Secretary-General of the al-Qaida Organisation in Saudi Arabia), Shaykh Abu Basir Nasir al-Wahishi (the Commander of AQAP), Shaykh Abu Hurairah Qasim al-Rimi (the Military Major of AQAP) and Shaykh Abul-Hareth Mohammed Al-Awfi (the Field Commander of AQAP)’ (Ibid.) (for a more extensive list of the key AQAP members, see Koehler-Derrick, 2011: 6–7).

While precise estimates do not exist, it is thought that the AQAP was/is a relatively small organization – estimates vary from 100 to 600 combatants (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2013). According to al-Shishani, 56% of the AQAP members are Yemenis, 37% Saudis and 7% foreigners (2010). 52% of the AQAP members were from southern tribes and 48% from northern tribes (Ibid.)

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (supported; very limited data)

While it is often claimed that the AQAP received substantial support (and recruited) from Yemeni tribesmen (e.g., al-Shishani, 2010), Koehler-Derrick’s report ‘informed by extensive primary sources and twelve months of fieldwork’ finds no evidence of ‘formal tribal sanctuary or

broad popular backing for AQAP in any of the three governorates long thought to represent the group's center of gravity' (see also pp. 97–140). In fact, Koehler-Derrick claims that the AQAP commanders and low-ranking fighters appear 'far more an urban than a rural phenomenon. The individuals most frequently cited in AQAP media releases hail from poor neighbourhoods in or near Sana'a, Ta'izz, Hadramawt, Hudayda and various cities within Saudi Arabia' (2011: 15).³³

There is some evidence to support that the AQAP targeted (and successfully recruited) young, poor and unemployed Yemenis. According to Swift, Ansar al-Shari'a, a subsidiary of the AQAP,

targets Yemeni youth with the promise of a new rifle, a new car, and salaries as high as \$400 per month. The organization reportedly derives these revenues by raiding public institutions, including banks, police garrisons, and government offices...Whatever the source of these funds, salaries incentivize recruiting in tangible, sometimes irresistible ways. For unemployed teenagers with little education and even less status, joining the insurgency offers the material and financial trappings of manhood. For underemployed adults, an Ansar al-Shari'a salary provides a means of lifting their families out of poverty. Within nearly half of Yemen's population surviving on less than two dollars per day, al-Qa'ida's compensation offers a level of security and sustenance that many tribal leaders cannot provide. Empowerment also operates at the village or district level. In communities plagued by chronic drought or hunger, tribal elders have reportedly recruited fighters for Ansar al-Shari'a in exchange for new wells, new irrigation systems and even food (2012: 3).

There is also some evidence suggesting that the AQAP's membership also included university graduates, who, presumably, did not come from the most economically deprived background.

³³ This, however, does not imply that AQAP has not operated in the rural areas and that there was no interaction between AQAP and the tribesmen. Quite the contrary: AQAP – in spite of not being directly supported by the tribesmen – entangled certain tribes with networks of dependency and exploited inter-tribal conflicts (Swift, 2012).

Further information on the socioeconomic background of the AQAP membership is very scarce, however, which does not allow supporting/not supporting the individual deprivation pathway with certainty.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (not supported; very limited data)

There is little evidence to suggest that AQAP recruits were members of any particular economically deprived group. However, (un)availability of data does not allow ruling out such a possibility with certainty.

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ID: 72 (1996): Government of Nepal versus Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist

General information

In February 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) launched its armed struggle against the government of Nepal. Their stated goal was to overthrow the constitutional monarchy and install a communist government. The announcement was followed by attacks on political, military, and commercial targets all over the country (the conflict crossed the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in August 1996) (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 26 July 2013).

The reasons for conflict, according to the CPN-M, were social and economic injustice against the poor, particularly in rural and remote areas (Sharma, 2006: 1238).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (supported; sufficient data)

The CPN-M was highly ethnically heterogeneous – it included people from all ethnic and religious backgrounds (Sharma, 2006: 1238). Socioeconomically, however, the CPN-M was more homogeneous. It is known that the CPN-M controlled (and recruited from) rural areas (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 27 July 2013), where poverty and unemployment rates were several times higher than in urban areas (Sharma, 2006: 1241-1245).³⁴

³⁴ Note, however, that about 87% of Nepal's population lives in rural areas (Sharma, 2006: 1239), suggesting that the CPN-M could have recruited from among the rural population simply because of its availability (and not necessarily because of the fact that the rural population was more susceptible to recruitment).

Inequality and injustice have been named as the primary reasons for the rebellion by the CPN-M. In an interview arranged by a Nepali newspaper, Baburam Bhattarai, the president of CPN-M, pointed out that

What you term “law and order” problem is basically a socio-economic problem of extreme poverty and exploitation in the rural areas of Nepal under the present semi-feudal and semi-colonial dispensation. How do you expect social peace and harmony to prevail in a socio-political system which increasingly generated poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and all-round underdevelopment for more than ninety percent of the toiling population in mostly rural areas and filthy richness and extravagance for a handful of parasitic classes in rural and urban areas? (The Independent, 1995).

Just as in the other cases, it seems that the rebels were particularly successful at recruiting unemployed rural youth:

By the mid-1990s, unemployment remained very high, particularly in the rural areas, and there was no alternative source of employment, which significantly increased frustration and resentment among youth. These frustrated youth, regardless of their ethnic and religious backgrounds, were mobilized by the Maoists in their fight against the political and economic system (Sharma, 2006: 1245).

It is known that in the later stages of the conflict, the CPN-M managed to penetrate major cities; still, at the beginning of the rebellion, the CPN-M seems to have predominantly recruited among unemployed rural youth.

After being underground, Maoists began mobilizing and training unemployed youth, particularly from rural and remote areas, who have failed to see the benefits of development. By the mid-1990s, they trained about 2,000 armed fighters, which enabled them to declare a people’s war on February 13, 1996 (Sharma, 2006: 1245).

The fact that rural youth (including women)³⁵ constituted the bulk of the CPN-M's fighters is confirmed by many other sources (Bhurtel & Ali, 2006: 8; Eck, 2010; Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 2001: 6).

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (supported; limited data)

As suggested above, the CPN-M fighters, at the start of the conflict, were predominantly peasants. As peasants constituted the most deprived socioeconomic group (see above), the observable implication of group deprivation pathway could be said to have been supported. The problem is, however, that most of Nepal's population was peasants. This suggests that there could have been substantial differences within peasant communities (so far, I have been unable to find any reliable data on this).

Additional information (alternative explanations)

The conflict could have been linked to the dynamics in socioeconomic conditions.

Unemployment and poverty rates were rising in the mid-1990s, particularly in rural areas:

By the mid-1990s, lackluster agriculture performance, together with slow growth in labor-intensive manufacturing, contributed to high unemployment, poverty, and inequalities (both vertical and horizontal).

At the national level, the unemployment rate reached about 17%, while over 32% of the economically active population was underemployed. This was even higher in the rural and remote areas. Poverty levels rose from 33% in 1976–77 to 42% by 1995–96. When the incidence of poverty was broken down according to the rural–urban classification, it was significantly higher in rural (44%) than in the urban areas

³⁵ According to the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (2001) report, women (in 2001) constituted 'a third of the Maoist movement in some of the most affected districts'.

(20%)...also...poverty has been rising more rapidly in rural areas while in urban areas it has marginally declined (Sharma, 2006: 1244).

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ID: 100 (2009): Government of Nigeria versus Boko Haram

According to Uppsala Conflict Data Program (27 July 2013) Boko Haram (or Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad) was formed in 2002 or 2003 in Maiduguri, Borno state, northern Nigeria. The stated goal of the Boko Haram was to topple the government and set up a puritanical Islamic state. The conflict started in July 2009, when the Boko Haram launched an attack against a police station (Ibid.).

The Boko Haram was initially led by Mohammed Yussuf and later (from August 2009) by Mallam Sanni Umaru. The organization did not represent any particular ethnic group – the followers of the Boko Haram were drawn from ‘various ethnic groups and social backgrounds’ (Ibid.).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (supported; sufficient data)

In 2002 Mohammed Yusuf established a religious complex in Maiduguri, which included a mosque and an Islamic school. The school has attracted ‘many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria, as well as neighboring countries,’ and eventually became a ‘recruiting ground for jihadis to fight the state’ (Chothia, 2012). According to Eric Guttschuss, a Human Rights Watch researcher, the membership of Boko Haram is driven by poverty, unemployment, poor governance and corruption:

Guttschuss said former leader Yusuf gained support “by speaking out against police and political corruption” on behalf of the country’s “vast numbers of unemployment youth [who] he was able to tap into for recruits... Boko Haram is essentially the fallout of frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment...The young generation see how [the nation’s resources] are squandered by a

small bunch of self-serving elites, which breeds animosity and frustration, and such anger is ultimately translated into violent outbursts” (IRIN, 2011).

Damian Ugwu, a Nigerian human rights researcher, largely corroborates these statements:

Rights activist and expert on the causes of political violence Damian Ugwu says Boko Haram’s support base is mostly unemployed northern youth who see a corruption-addled government stealing the country’s vast oil wealth. “I see Boko Haram as the end result of manifestation of bad policies and impunity in Nigeria,” said Ugwu. “For me it is a society where the wealth of the country is being cornered by the elite who do not care what happens to the rest of the country. You are bound to see a lot of people who are angry with the system” (Voice of America, 2011).

The fact that the Boko Haram recruited among ‘unemployed northern youth’ is supported by many other sources (e.g., Forest, 2011: 69; Walker, 2012: 3–4; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012: 1).

It is known that the Boko Haram membership was not *exclusively* composed of the most economically deprived – it also included some university lecturers and students, as well as officers of state. Nevertheless, individuals from the poorest socioeconomic groups constituted the majority of the Boko Haram’s membership:

Membership in the group cut across the broad spectrum of the society, but a preponderant number came from among the poorest social groups. Thus, beyond former university lecturers, students, bankers, and commissioners and other officers of state, membership extended to drug addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people (Adesoj, 2011: 106).

This is also supported by International Institute for Strategic Studies:

While Boko Haram's founders and original members came initially from upper- and middle-class backgrounds, new recruits now come most commonly from the ranks of northern Nigeria's disenfranchised, unemployed youth. Aside from its religious message, the group has tapped into the grievances of the

majority-Muslim population in the north, who feel marginalized by the Christian dominated government from the south and that they are victims of social inequality and economic underdevelopment (2012: 1).

More generally, the poverty of Nigeria's northern regions is thought to be one of the root causes of the rebellion:

The continued killing and corruption perpetrated by the police on people connected to the group; the brutal manner in which the police behave to the public at large; the financial corruption of the government; the moral corruption of the religious establishment (as perceived by Boko Haram); a festering conflict in Plateau state; a perceived wider attack on Islam by a government currently led by a Christian president; the end to the "zoning deal" that saw power rotate between north and south; *and the terrible political economy, the general poverty, and the poor state of northern Nigeria* [my emphasis]. It is anger at these issues that sustains the group and gives it recruits to continue its work (Walker, 2012: 13).³⁶

There is some evidence that Boko Haram fighters included foreigners (from Chad and Niger) (BBC News, 2009); their socioeconomic status, however, remains unclear.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (not supported; sufficient data)

³⁶ LeVan also states that 'Boko Haram's violence is embedded within a broader, legitimate northern critique of failed Nigerian governance. The United Nations estimates that out of Nigeria's 36 states, the five with the lowest levels of development for women are all in the north-east...The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics' National Poverty Profile for 2012 similarly documented high rates of food insecurity (51 per cent of the population) and absolute poverty (69 per cent) in the north-east. The figures are identical for the north-west, where Boko Haram has had virtually no presence, suggesting that poverty is not the insurgency's only driver. Politicians from the south have been quick to make this point, but that does not diminish the harsh realities of life in the north-east, and the Jonathan administration's political distance from it' (2013: 10–11; see also pp. 6–9).

There is no evidence to suggest that Boko Haram recruits were coming from a particular, economically deprived, socioeconomic group. While it is known that those who joined the Boko Haram were primarily poor youth from Northern Nigeria, they did not seem to represent any particular socioeconomic group (i.e., workers, students, peasants, etc.).

Additional information (alternative explanations)

There is some evidence suggesting that the conflict could have been driven by the political exclusion of northern Nigerians:

NOPRIN's Nwanguma said there is speculation politicians from northern Nigeria are surreptitiously funding Boko Haram to force the current government to relinquish power. This follows recent controversial elections...Michael Utasha of think-tank Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) told IRIN he had heard similar accusations: "Unconfirmed reports have it that there are disgruntled members of the political class in Nigeria who are bent on destabilizing the government of President Goodluck [Jonathan] and giving the impression that he is a weak and indecisive leader" (IRIN, 2011).

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ID: 196 (1993): Government of Egypt versus Islamic Group

General information

al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (or the Islamic Group, IG) took shape around 1974. At that time the IG was an Islamic student association. Unlike other organizations within the broad Islamic movement opposing the secularist government, the IG followed the militant teachings of Sayid Qutb. The teachings of Qutb read that,

Islam should be the sole source of authority, law and governance and that states should be ruled based on the teachings of the Quran. Qutb also taught that the use of force against governments that were not Islamic was acceptable according to the Quran and that the teachings that jihad (holy war) should only be pursued for defensive purposes was a misconception (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 28 July 2013).

The conflict started in 1992 when the IG implemented a small number of attacks in the Assiut (or Asyut) province (Southern Egypt) and in Cairo. The number of battle-related deaths reached 25 in early March 1993 (Ibid.).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (supported; sufficient data)

The IG was founded and led by university students (Qasim et al., 1996: 40). Its initial membership was also predominantly university students (Metz, 1991: Chapter 4). Later (right before the conflict onset), the IG's membership was supplemented with Islamist militants.

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya has historically been made up of two types of members, one of which has a strong connection to Afghanistan and the al-Qaeda network. The first type consists of Egyptians recruited locally from Upper Egypt, including those who rose and who continue to rise through the ranks of the universities. A second and important type of member includes those Upper Egyptians who fought in the war of independence in Afghanistan and then returned home to their native country. Indeed, as the Islamic

Revolution in Iran fuelled Islamic extremism in Egypt in the 1970s, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent formation of an Islamic state boosted the fundamentalist movement in Egypt in the 1990s. Alongside the Afghan *mujahideen* who were fighting against the Soviets were between 5,000 and 10,000 zealous youths from around the Muslim world, including many from Egypt. These youths were trained in military camps set up along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border and sent to the front lines. These camps continued to operate after the rise to power of the Taliban, and continued to be a training ground for youths from around the Muslim world who prescribed a more militant form of Islam. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, these young fighters, fresh from battle, looked throughout the Muslim world for places where they could try to replicate their victory. Many sided with al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya in its fight against the Egyptian government. The subsequent rise in terrorist attacks in the 1990s in Egypt is largely a result of the return home of fighters from Afghanistan’s war of independence (Nederoscik, 2002: 61 – 61).

The students who founded, led and staffed the IG hailed from Upper Egypt (southern Egypt), which was an economically backward region. According to Nederoscik, poor socioeconomic conditions in the Upper Egypt was among the ‘root causes’ of the IG’s rebellion:

The Egyptian government has mostly fought violence with violence. Whereas they have succeeded in keeping the movement under control in recent years, the root causes of the Upper Egyptian movement continue to exist: the bleak socio-economic conditions characterizing the lives of most Upper Egyptians. As a result, Upper Egypt has become the breeding ground for the fundamentalist movement and is the area where the movement receives its most widespread support. Still, the media, the Egyptian government and the international community focused on the violence itself and largely ignored its root causes (2002: 49).

The students who founded the IG themselves hailed from economically deprived groups:

The Upper Egyptian movement, as an entity separate from other Islamic organizations, originated in the 1970s at Asyut University and its various regional campuses across southern Egypt. The movement’s leadership consisted of university students. This was in sharp contrast to the fundamentalist movements in northern Egypt that were made up of doctors, engineers and other professionals from the bourgeoisie. Unlike their northern brothers, these southern students who sought solace in Islam were mainly from lower middle-

and working-class families. Many were the sons and daughters of *fallaheen*, Egypt's peasant farmers, who were able to get an education thanks to the reforms of President Nasser. Even though their education was free, the conditions in which these students had to study were often destitute, especially in Asyut (Nederoscik, 2002: 63).

In addition, Kepel notes that

In Asyut in particular there has grown up around the university what can only be called a "belt", al-Hamra. An entire universe of poverty-stricken students is packed into it, cut off from their family milieu and highly receptive to any voices that manage to make themselves heard and promise an improvement in their conditions (1993: 137).

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (not supported; sufficient data)

While the students that joined the IG hailed from the poor families of Upper Egypt, students, as a socioeconomic group, could not be said to have been among the most economically deprived groups in Egypt.

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ID: 200 (1992): Government of Tajikistan versus United Tajik Opposition

General information

The conflict started in the aftermath of the presidential elections (November 1991) that brought Rahmon Nabiyeu to power. The election results were contested by the opposition, and rallies organized by Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the Democratic party, and the Rastokhez (Rebirth) movement – who later together came to be known as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) – were held in the spring of 1992 in Dushanbe (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 19 July 2013). The supporters of the government confronted the opposition and armed clashes between the two started in May of that year.

It is known that the government was dominated by *Leninabadis* (people from Leninabad – or, from 1991, Sugd – province in the north of Tajikistan), and supported by *Kuliabis* (people from the former Kuliab Oblast [administrative unit] in the southern Khatlon province) (Human Rights Watch, 2001). The opposition drew its support primarily from *Gharmis* (people originating from the Gharm and Qarateguine Vallyes in the centre and northeast of Tajikistan) and *Pamiris* (people from the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous province in the east of Tajikistan) (Ibid.; see also Human Rights Watch, 1994).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (supported; very limited data)

According to Keith Martin, the demonstrators that took part in the spring rallies mentioned above came ‘mainly from the poorer regions of Dushanbe and from areas of Kurgan-Tyube Oblast [or Qurghonteppa Oblast, see below]. Many of them were unemployed rural youths, apparently

attracted as much by the offer of free meals as by the ideological message of the organizers’ (1993: 20).

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (supported; sufficient data)

It is known that Leninabad (Sugd) was the richest administrative unit in Tajikistan (Foroughi, 2002: 54; Walker, 2006: 24–25). In 1991, Leninabad Oblast was ‘reported to have accounted for 65% of Tajikistan’s gross national product’ (Martin, 1993: 18). Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous province (from which Pamiris originate), in contrast, was one of the poorest regions in the entire former Soviet Union (Martin, 1993: 18).

According to Foroughi, Gharmis residing in Qurghonteppa Oblast³⁷ were relatively better off than people residing in Kulob Oblast³⁸ (2002: 53–54; see also Harris, 1998: 658–659 and Walker, 2006: 25). However, Kulob Oblast itself was the poorest region in Tajikistan (Ibid.: 54). Compared to Leninabad, Qurghonteppa was relatively underdeveloped (Martin, 1993: 18).

Additional information (alternative explanations)

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the conflict could have been linked to political exclusion of Gharmis and Pamiris, who were underrepresented in government (Human Rights Watch, 1994; 2001; Martin, 1993; Walker, 2006: 25, note 50). ‘Since the creation of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic in 1929, Leninabad Oblast, in the north, has dominated the republic’s

³⁷ Due to Soviet resettlement schemes, many of the Gharmis were forced to move from Gharm and Qarateguine Valleys to Qurghonteppa Oblast in Khatlon province (see above).

³⁸ Qurghonteppa Oblast and Kulob Oblast were administrative units in Tajikistan until 1992, when they were merged to create Khatlon Province (see above).

politics, providing all the Tajik Communist Party first secretaries from 1943 until the end of Soviet Rule' (Martin, 1993: 18) (see Kasymov, 2013, for an extensive overview of the composition of the government and administrative institutions in different periods).

There were also several political imprisonments prior to the conflict:

The *nomenklatura* from Leninabad Oblast, and its supporters in the south, endeavoured to quash the opposition at all costs. The first step to achieving this goal came after the November 1991 presidential elections, which were won by the former communist party leader Rakhmon Nabiev. While Nabiev most likely would have won even if the elections had been fair, the opposition alleged that there had been widespread vote-rigging...the situation was exacerbated when, in early 1992, the conservative communist forces, mostly from Leninabad Oblast, sought to eliminate potential opposition within the parliament and government... When the Nabiev government jailed Dushanbe Mayor Maksud Ikramov...and criticized a leading figure, Internal Affairs Minister Mamadaez Navzhuvanov, in the spring of 1992, demonstrations began a continuous siege of the parliament...The government, in an effort to show that it, too, had popular support, organized a counterdemonstration in a square only about 500 meters away from the other group...The civil war itself erupted when the Tajik National Security Committee (NSC), the successor to the Tajik KGB, indiscriminately distributed large quantities of arms and ammunition to progovernment demonstrators on 3 May 1992. Opposition militants quickly armed themselves as well, mostly with weapons taken from local police stations (Martin, 1993: 19–20).

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NON-ETHNIC TERRITORIAL

ID: 199 (1992): Government of Moldova versus Dniestr Republic

General information:

On 27 August 1991, Moldova declared independence from the Soviet Union. On 2 September, leaders of the Dniestr Republic (or Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, PMR) voted to join the Soviet Union. Soon, the PMR started taking over former Moldovan institutions, such as police stations and media, and – when the Moldovan police returned fire – the conflict broke out (reaching 25-battle related deaths in March, 1992) (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 17 July 2013).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; limited data)

The PMR's primary force was the Transnistrian Republican Guard (TRG), an outgrowth of paramilitary 'worker's detachments' that had been created in Transnistria in late 1990 (Vahl & Emerson, 2004: 6). The TRG was aided by Cossack volunteers from Don and Kuban (Ozhiganov, 1997: 175-76; Vahl & Emerson, 2004: 6) and some elements of the 14th Army (which initially was under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Independent States and later under that of the Russian Federation) (Vahl & Emerson, 2004: 7; Ozhiganov, 1997) (see below).

The number and composition of forces fighting for the PMR cause cannot be established with certainty. According to one PMR official, in March 1992 (when the conflict broke out), there were 150 people in the Dniester battalion, around 1,000 in the TRG, and around 100 Cossacks (Ozhiganov, 1997: footnote 45). These numbers, however, seem to be underestimates.

According to Ozhiganov, ‘best estimates suggest that there were approximately 200-300 Cossacks’ (1997: 176).³⁹ A Human Rights Watch report points out that ‘military formations fighting for the DMR...numbered between 4,000 and 5,000’ (1993: 20).

Human Rights Watch describes the role of the 14th Army in the following way:

Although the Russian 14th Army was the primary supplier of arms, both intentionally and accidentally, to both sides in the conflict, elements of the army participated in the armed engagements only on the side of the DMR. The Army also provided critical moral support to the DMR through its widespread sympathy with the secessionist movement...A large element of the 14th Army staff has lived for extended periods in the region...It is unclear how many of those engaged in active fighting or supplied arms to the insurgents, although these numbers are probably not more than 1,000. Arms were made available to insurgents primarily through outright gifts by sympathetic 14th Army personnel and through organized raids, many of which are believed to have been tacitly permitted by the guards on duty...Leading figures in the DMR and Russian governments...originally denied any participation of the 14th Army in the combat in eastern Moldova...Subsequently, however, DMR officials began acknowledging the participation of elements of the 14th Army in the conflict. In an address on September 2, 1992, in honor of the second anniversary of the declaration of the DMR, President Igor’ Smirnov hailed the involvement, saying “the republic has survived only thanks to Russia and the 14th Army.” Two weeks later Grigorii Maracuta stated at a press conference that “Russia’s support for the Dniester region [is] not only moral and political but also material and military” (1993: 21–22).⁴⁰

³⁹ Cossacks (ethnic Slavs) who fought in Transnistria came primarily from the Don and Kuban regions, but also Siberia and the Caucasus (Human Rights Watch, 1993: 20).

⁴⁰ According to Vahl & Emerson, ‘The role of 14th Army was crucial. In addition to its direct intervention in the battle of Bender, the 14th army provided arms to the Transnistrian paramilitary groups, including the transfer of an entire battalion to the Transnistrian authorities, as well as training for the “Republican Guard”’ (2004: 7).

The DMR forces thus generally came from three groups: workers, mercenaries (i.e., Cossacks),⁴¹ and 14th Army soldiers and militaries. While the socioeconomic status of these groups remains unclear, it is very unlikely that they were among the most economically deprived groups in Moldova (or Transnistria). The leadership of the DMR was not coming from an economically deprived background either:

[DMR leadership] did not spring up from below, but was in the hands of communist *nomenklatura* elites, mainly Russian and russified Ukrainians, who staffed the local party apparatus, the local soviets, and the large enterprises concentrated in Transnistria, most of which were All-Union enterprises directly controlled from Moscow rather than Chisinau... They were supported by the mainly Russian and russified anti-*perestroika* wing of the Moldovan Communist Party, which had broken away and withdrawn its deputies from the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1990; and had the sympathy of officers of the Soviet 14th Army, stationed in Transnistria (Batt, 1997:38).

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (not supported; sufficient data)

There is little evidence to suggest that the DMR rebels represented any particularly deprived socioeconomic group (see above, individual deprivation pathway).

Observable implication of separatist pathway (supported; sufficient data)

It is known that 'Post-war economic policy sought to develop western Moldova as an agricultural area, while industrialization – often of a defence-related nature – was concentrated in Transdnistria, where 17 per cent of the MSSR's total population provided almost 90 per cent of

⁴¹ According to Human Rights Watch, DMR 'not only encouraged the Cossacks' participation but paid for their services, at wages allegedly many times higher than they paid for their own forces' (1993: 21).

the republic's energy and more than one-third of its industrial production' (Waters, 2003: 135). As a result, at the time of the conflict, Transdniestria was 'urbanized and heavily industrialized' (Ibid.), with most of its urban population employed in large industrial plants (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998: 107). According to Roper (2001), 'most of Moldova's light industries and energy facilities [were] located in this region. Almost 25 per cent of the country's industrial production [were] located in Transnistria, and 87 per cent of Moldova's electricity and 100 per cent of its large electric machinery output [came] from this region'. As a consequence, in 1990 Transdniestria accounted for about 40% of the gross national product of Soviet Moldova (MSSR), despite the fact that its population comprised only 15.2% of the total and its territory 12.4% of the country's land mass (Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms, 2001: 2).

It is thus not surprising that (before the outbreak of the conflict) Transdniestria enjoyed 'higher economic development and productivity in the agricultural sector, higher wages, and higher overall living standards' (International Crisis Group, 2004: 14). Indeed, the standard of living in Transdniestria was among the highest in the whole CIS area in 1991–1992 (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998: 113). According to the World Bank, in 1991 wages in Transnistria were 6% higher than in the rest of the country (9% higher for industrial workers) (1998: 28).

Based on data presented above (see, in particular, General information), the conflict appears to have been initiated by the DMR.

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ID: 202 (1993): Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina versus Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia

General information

In 1993, the Bosnian President agreed to divide Bosnia into three ethnically based territories. This was rejected by Fikret Abdic, a member of the Bosnian state presidency from the Bihac region (or Cazinska Krajina). In September 1993, Abdic declared the ‘Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia’ in the area around the town of Velika Kladusa. The conflict started in late September 1993, when the Bosnian government declared the claim of autonomy illegal and sent in the army troops (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 23 July 2013).

Observable implication of individual deprivation pathway (not supported; sufficient data)

Before the conflict, Fikret Abdic (nicknamed *Babo*, or ‘Dad’) was a director of *Agrokomerc*, a food company in Velika Kladusa that employed more than 13,000 workers (Habul, 2001).

Agrokomerc contributed significantly to the region’s economy:

“Agrocommerce” had transformed the entire region, which was barely surviving for years in a quagmire of poverty. Back in late sixties, Velika Kladusa had barely fifty meters of asphalt road, one TV set kept under lock and key in the community centre and endemic syphilis and infectious hepatitis were raging across this over-populated area. “Agrocommerce” paved the streets in the villages around Velika Kladusa and Cazin, brought electricity and a water supply system and poultry farms and factories kept cropping up all around. Once markedly poor villages, whose inhabitants survived by earning their living as hired labourers all over Croatia and Slovenia, skipped the century of backwardness and joined civilisation overnight. I remember an old man saying, “There is now no house without two salaries” at the time when all of Bosnia celebrated the success of this firm and its creator (Habul, 2001).

By providing employment and a high standard of living, Abdic 'secured the undying loyalty of most of the inhabitants of Bihac, especially those in Velika Kladusa' (Lischer, 1999: 7). The economic development 'brought about by Agrokomerc gave Abdic cult status among his people' (Christia, 2008: 470). Residents of Velika Kladusa 'treated Abdic "like a god" and "were ready to do whatever he said"' (Ibid.: 8).

During the conflict, Abdic's forces were primarily recruited from the locals (Lischer, 1999). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (23 July 2013), Abdic's forces consisted of 'armed civilians' and 'dissident policemen' and later (December 1993) were joined by Croats and Bosnian Serbs. Lischer notes that two brigades of the Bosnian army's 5th Corps had defected and joined Abdic (1999: 10). Christia claims that there were four such brigades (2008: 469). Most of these defected soldiers were former employees of Agrokomerc and their children (Ibid.)

Thus there is little evidence to suggest that Abdic recruits were coming from economically deprived backgrounds. The data presented above (as well as below, see separatist pathway) suggests exactly the opposite: people living within the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia were economically better-off than people in other regions.

Observable implication of group deprivation pathway (2) (not supported; sufficient data)

There is little evidence to suggest that Abdic's recruits were members of any economically deprived socioeconomic groups (as suggested above, they were primarily workers [employees of Agrokomerc], army soldiers and policemen).

Observable implication of separatist pathway (supported; sufficient data)

As can be seen from the information provided above (see individual deprivation pathway), the region fared considerably better than most other Bosnian territories. This is also corroborated by Christa:

While the per capita income in the Cazinska [Cazinska Krajina] area of Bosnia that witnessed the intra-Muslim civil war was in relative terms higher than in other areas of Bosnia – that is, the opportunity cost of fighting was high – and even though the area was not rich in any natural resources, it still saw conflict (2008: 463).

Subsequently, based on data presented above the conflict appears to have been initiated by Abdic and his followers.

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