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From Passive to Active Representation

Experimental Evidence on the Role of Normative Values in Shaping

White and Minority Bureaucrats' Policy Attitudes

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Abstract

Studies of representative bureaucracy have shown how minority groups are often underrepresented in public agencies (passive representation) and that the match between bureaucrats' and clients' racial background has important impacts on minority groups (active representation). Much less attention has been devoted to the question of what influences this link from passive to active representation, and, in this case, what factors moderate how bureaucrats' demographic background transforms into attitudes towards multicultural policies. A survey experiment among Texas school principals shows how emphasizing the normative value of ethnic and cultural differences increases the discrepancy between white and minority bureaucrats' attitudes towards a minority-supportive policy. However, emphasizing that research-based evidence supports the policy makes all bureaucrats more positive. These results increase our understanding of how the link between passive and active representation can be moderated.

Introduction

The question of how the bureaucracy represents different client groups has attracted considerable attention for many years. Studies on passive representation examine how the demographic composition of bureaucracies corresponded to the demographic composition of their client populations. The general finding is that women and racial or ethnic minorities are underrepresented (e.g. Cayer and Sigelman, 1980; Lewis, 1988; Riccucci and Saidel, 1997; Hsieh and Winslow, 2006; Riccucci, 2009; see though Llorens, Wenger and Kellough, 2008). The active aspect of representative bureaucracy concerns whether bureaucrats share the values and attitudes of their clients and let these values affect their decisions (Mosher, 1968; Meier and Nigro, 1976). The active component has primarily been studied by analyzing how women and

racial minorities benefit from being serviced by bureaucracies that share their background (e.g. Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Selden, Brudney and Kellough, 1998; Keiser et al., 2002; Dee, 2004; Pitts, 2005; Wilkins and Keiser, 2006; Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2016; see though Wilkins and Williams, 2008, 2009). Taken together, studies of passive and active representation show that an unrepresentative bureaucracy has important, negative consequences for women and minorities.

Much less attention has been devoted to the question of how the link between passive and active representation is moderated by the way minority-supportive policies are presented (Bradbury and Kellough, 2011). As early as 1976, Meier and Nigro emphasized that “the fundamental axiom/proposition underlying the concept of representative bureaucracy is: *if the attitudes of administrators are similar to the attitudes held by the general public, the decisions administrators make will in general be responsive to the desires of the public*” (emphasis in original, Meier and Nigro, 1976, p. 458). Yet, subsequent work on active representation has predominantly focused on the relationship between passive representation (demographic background of the bureaucrats) and outcomes for different client groups. This work has thereby overlooked the role of attitudes or maybe implicitly assumed a direct link between bureaucrats’ background, attitudes and active representation.

The present study examines how the presentation of a minority-supportive policy affects white and minority¹ bureaucrats’ attitudes differently. Even if bureaucrats with different background hold different fundamental values, their demographic background need not predetermine their attitudes towards specific policies. The study thereby contributes to existing research on representative bureaucracy by showing one way the relationship between bureaucrats’ background and policy attitudes may be influenced.

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¹ The terms “white” and “minority” are used in accordance with the use by the U.S. Census Bureau (2011), which is based on self-reports. “Minority” refers to people who reported their ethnicity and race as something other than white.

Since existing research on representative bureaucracy does not say much about how the relationship between demographic background and attitudes may be moderated (even if it does point to other moderators between passive and active representation, see Keiser et al., 2002), this study develops hypotheses about this relationship by combining a core assumption of representative bureaucracy theory—that bureaucrats’ demographic background affects their fundamental values—with insights from the Expectancy-Value Model. This model states that policy attitudes are formed as a weighted average of the evaluation of the policy along a number of value dimensions (see e.g. Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Nelson, Oxley and Clawson, 1997; Chong and Druckman, 2007). If the policy presentation increases the emphasis put on a dimension that is negatively valued by some bureaucrats (as perhaps cultural and ethnic differences) their overall attitude would be affected negatively. Alternatively, managers may emphasize dimensions such as research-based evidence that is expected to be positive to both white and minority staff members. That would create a more positive overall attitude. The irony is that managers and other decision-makers who would want to advance pro-minority policies may typically do so by emphasizing the normative value of cultural and ethnic differences. But that could create a boomerang effect among the bureaucrats who oppose those values most at the outset (Byrne and Hart, 2009; Andersen and Jakobsen, 2017).

These hypotheses are tested in a survey-embedded experiment on school principals in Texas. Survey data are the standard instrument for measuring attitudes. However, testing the effect on attitudes of how minority policies are communicated on observational data would be difficult because the way managers choose to communicate may reflect pre-existing attitudes of their staff rather than staff attitudes being affected by the communication. The survey experiment handles this problem by randomly assigning principals to different presentations of a minority-supportive policy.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework of the study. Then the design and results of the study are presented. The Results section shows how white and minority principals react differently to a presentation that emphasizes normative values of cultural diversity, but react similarly to a presentation that emphasize research-based evidence. The conclusion discusses the generalizability of the findings and the implication for managers as well as for future research.

Theoretical Framework

Passive and active representation

The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that it has a passive and an active component (Mosher 1968). Passive representation occurs when bureaucrats share demographic characteristics such as race and gender with groups within the client population. If the proportion of black bureaucrats in a bureaucracy equates the proportion of black clients in the population being served, the organization is passively representative in this respect. Research has consistently found that bureaucracies are not representative in this sense. An increase in the share of women and people of color in the public work force has been found in studies using data from the 1970s to the 2000s, but progress has been slow, and the work force was still not found to be proportionate to the population (Cayer and Sigelman, 1980; Lewis, 1988; Hsieh and Winslow, 2006). Llorense et al. (2008) find women and black people to be overrepresented in the bureaucracy in some state governments. However, in a study of federal governments, Riccucci (2009) finds that women and people of color remain in lower-level, lower-paying, less prestigious jobs.

Active representation is often referred to as the degree to which bureaucrats advance the interest of client groups *with which they share demographic background*. This designation

in some sense conflates the passive and active aspect of representation, though. The more narrow definition used by Mosher (1968, p. 11) states that active representativeness is found when a bureaucrat “press[es] for the interests and desires of those whom he is presumed to represent, whether they be the whole people or some segment of the people.” In this definition, the administrator (bureaucrat) does not necessarily have to share the demographic background to actively represent groups of people. This subtle distinction is relevant for examining the link between passive and active representation. Studies of active representation itself would scrutinize whether the bureaucracy represents the interests of different groups of citizens—regardless of the demographic background of the bureaucracy. Most studies on active representation, however, examine whether clients benefit from being represented by someone who shares their gender or ethnic background.

A number of studies document this relationship between bureaucrats’ background and outcomes by demonstrating positive associations between share of Latino teachers and Latino students’ achievements (Meier, 1993), between African-American, Hispanic, and Asian-American representation and the share of program resources allocated to those groups (Selden, 1997), between bureaucrats’ race and loan decisions favoring minority farmers’ applications (Selden, Brudney and Kellough, 1998), and between female math teachers and percentage of girls passing math tests (Keiser et al., 2002). Meier et al. (1999) find that both minority and majority students benefit from a higher share of black and Latino teachers (for discussion of this result, see Meier et al., 2001; Nielsen and Wolf, 2001). On the other hand, Willkins and Williams (2008, 2009) find that both black and Latino police officers increase the level of racial profiling, which may be a result of strong socialization within these organizations. A few studies examine the relationship between teacher background and student outcomes at the individual level. For instance, Dee (2004) uses Tennessee’s Project STAR class-size experiment, which randomly matched students and teachers within participating schools. He

found that assignment to an own-race teacher significantly increased the math and reading achievements of both black and white students. In a recent study, Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2016) find that black students are more likely to be in the school's gifted program if they have a black teacher.

Theoretically, the link between passive and active representation has two components. First, bureaucrats share attitudes and values with citizens with their own demographic background. For instance, female bureaucrats share values with women in the population, and black bureaucrats share values with black citizens. Second, values and attitudes shape bureaucratic behavior. For instance, attitudes towards specific policies shape the way bureaucrats implement those policies or programs (Mosher, 1968; Meier and Nigro, 1976; Saltzstein, 1979; Bradbury and Kellough, 2011). Empirical studies confirm the first component: African-American administrators are more positive towards affirmative action than white administrators are. African Americans believe that a workforce that reflects the diversity of the country is more productive and agree that administrators should adopt an African-American representative role. In this way, they are more in line with African-American citizens' attitudes than white administrators are (Bradbury and Kellough, 2008; see also Wilkins, 2007). Similarly, studies on diversity management have found that employees with same cultural background tend to share experiences that shape the way they see the world (Foldy, 2004; Cox, 1994).

The second component of the link from passive to active representation, i.e., the relationship between bureaucrats' values and policy implementation, is a core finding in public administration. A line of research runs from the seminal work by Kaufman (1960) to more recent analyses showing how policy implementation is influenced by bureaucrats' ideology (Stensöta, 2012), institutionalized values (Lipsky, 1980; Keiser and Soss, 1998), and attitudes towards organizational goals (Brehm and Gates, 1997) or specific policies (May and Winter, 2009). Empirical research has shown that general values (e.g., regarding environmental

protection) are weakly correlated with specific behaviors (such as paper recycling). However, more specific attitudes towards a behavior are found to predict actual behavior very well. Of course, other factors such as beliefs about the presence of factors that may further or hinder performance of the behavior are also expected to influence the link from attitudes to behavior, but all else being equal the more favorable the attitude, the more likely the person is to perform the behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2000).

The notion that the link from passive to active representation is mediated by bureaucrats' values and attitudes also receives some indirect support from studies showing that the relationship between female bureaucrats and female clients is stronger in a bureaucracy with a low level of hierarchy. This provides the street-level workers with more discretion to let their attitudes influence their work (Keiser et al., 2002; see also Meier and Bohte, 2001). In addition, the fact that the link between passive and active representation only exists when the distributional consequences of the policy directly benefit the represented clients may indicate that bureaucrats' policy preferences influence the way they administer the rules (Wilkins and Keiser, 2006).

In sum, both theoretically and empirically there are good reasons to believe that bureaucrats who share background with client groups also share basic values with the client groups, that these values affect attitudes towards specific policies and programs, and that these policy attitudes affect the way bureaucrats implement programs. In this way, passive representation seems to transform into active representation.²

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² It is worth noting that passive representation may also have a direct impact on citizens without any active representation, for instance through its symbolic value or through influence from minority to majority bureaucrats. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) find that the percentage of women police officers is positively correlated with the number of reports on sexual assault. This

However, the mechanism linking passive to active representation is not well understood. The many studies on how clients benefit from being represented by someone who shares their gender or ethnic background typically do not examine this question. It is likely that demographic background and basic values regarding minorities shape attitudes towards specific policies. However, different circumstances may affect if and how demographic background and basic values transform into specific policy attitudes. Keiser et al. (2002) developed a theoretical framework of institutional and contextual factors that are either necessary for active representation to occur or that would enhance active representation. Necessary conditions are some level of discretion to influence outcomes and policies that are salient to the represented groups. Enhancing factors are hypothesized to be an organizational mission to assist particular groups of clients, low levels of hierarchy, representation at higher levels of the organization, some critical mass of representatives, as well as professionalization. May and Winter (2009) find that the more street-level bureaucrats endorse the policy they are meant to implement, the more they implement it. However, they also find that when local politicians disagree with the national policy and pay attention to policy implementation, street-level bureaucrats tend to diverge more from the national policy and follow local politicians' preferences. This latter finding suggests

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suggests that women may be more willing to report crimes to female officers. Theobald and Haider-Markel (2009) find that blacks are more likely to perceive police actions as being legitimate if there are black officers present. This result indicates that the symbolic value of being present has an impact even if the officer makes no active enforcement. Relatedly, Ricucci et al. (2014) show in a survey experiment that a more representative police force in terms of gender composition positively affects how citizens perceive the performance, trustworthiness, and fairness of the police.

that along with the list of necessary and enhancing factors in the framework of Keiser et al. (2002), bureaucrats' policy priorities may be influenced by political signals.

Research on framing has repeatedly shown how citizens with the same fundamental values may take different attitudes towards specific policies depending on how the policies are framed (for a review, see Chong and Druckman, 2007). That would suggest that demographic background and deep-seated values do not automatically translate into specific attitudes towards certain policies. Yet it is not obvious that these results translate to bureaucrats. On the one hand, bureaucrats are professionals with expert knowledge about their own policy area, and they may therefore be less susceptible to communication frames. On the other hand, *if* their attitudes are affected by the way new programs are presented, an important but so far overseen role of managers is the way they communicate about new policies that they want their subordinates to implement. While core values within the bureaucracy may be formed during long processes of socialization (Oberfield, 2010), a recent study shows that bureaucrats' attitudes towards specific policies are amenable to the way they are presented (Andersen and Jakobsen, 2017). This is also what the Expectancy-Value Model would suggest. In order to develop more specific hypotheses about how communication may affect the attitudes of bureaucrats with different demographic background, the next section presents this model and links it to the core assumption in theory of representative bureaucracy that bureaucrats with different demographic background hold different values (Meier and Nigro 1976). The purpose is not to test the psychological mechanisms assumed by the model, but to show how it may be used to further develop the theory of how passive representation transforms into active representation.

Expectancy-Value Model

The theoretical backbone of most of the framing research is the Expectancy-Value model by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; see also Nelson, Oxley and Clawson, 1997; Chong and Druckman,

2007). The model states that individuals evaluate new programs or any other object along a series of dimensions. These could be whether the program adds to the bureaucrat's workload, whether the program is likely to increase performance, or whether the program benefits client groups that the bureaucrat sympathizes with. The bureaucrat's attitude towards the program will be the sum of these evaluative beliefs weighted by how much emphasis he or she puts on each of those evaluative dimensions. Formally, the model is written:

$$A = \sum v_i * w_i \quad [1]$$

where A is the attitude towards the object in question, v_i is the evaluation of the object on dimension i , and w_i is a salience or importance weight attached to the dimension i . The sum of the weights equals 1 ($\sum w_i = 1$).

A framing effect occurs when communication emphasizes a specific evaluative dimension that makes the individual put more weight on that dimension when forming his or her attitude towards the object. For example, a teacher's overall attitude, A , towards a new program requiring him or her to spend more time in the classroom helping students may consist of both negative and positive evaluations. It may be seen as beneficial to the students but also as adding to the teacher's workload. If the teacher values students' performance (dimension $i=1$) and teachers' spare time (dimension $i=2$), then v_1 is positive, and v_2 is negative. The overall attitude would then depend on the magnitude of v_1 and v_2 as well as how much weight is put on each of the two evaluative beliefs. Managers may therefore affect bureaucrats' attitudes towards a new program by emphasizing evaluative dimensions that are positive to the bureaucrats.

However, in the case of racial issues, the theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that the values of African-American and white administrators differ (Bradbury and Kellough, 2008). The theoretical notion is that shared demographic characteristics give rise to

shared experiences and thereby shared values and understandings. For instance, minority bureaucrats may themselves have experienced that their cultural background was not reflected in the curriculum and teaching when they went to school and therefore shares values of openness to different cultures with minority students. Indeed, the prevalence of such experiences may differ between countries and may be more pronounced in countries or states that have witnessed racial conflicts. But the general notion in representative bureaucracy theory would be that minority bureaucrats treasure fundamental values of ethnic and cultural diversity more than white bureaucrats because diversity will be beneficial to the citizens they passively represent.

There is not much strong empirical evidence on the more fundamental values of white and minority bureaucrats. But as mentioned, empirical studies support that the attitudes of African-American administrators are more in line with African-American citizens' attitudes than white administrators on issues such as affirmative action, that a workforce that reflects the diversity of the country is more productive, and that administrators should adopt an African-American representative role (Bradbury and Kellough, 2008). In the present study, it is assumed (not tested) that on the dimension "ethnic and cultural diversity" minority bureaucrats value a minority-supportive policy more positively than white bureaucrats do (Assumption 1). It is worth emphasizing that this assumption may depend on the political context and not necessarily hold outside an American context.

At the same time, the study assumes that on normative dimensions that evoke both white and minority bureaucrats' shared background as professionals, they share certain values. Norms of basing actions and decisions on research-based knowledge to serve clients are at the core of professionalism stemming from shared background at institutions of higher education (Etzioni, 1969; Lipsky, 1980, pp.201–2; Wilson, 1989, p.60; Darling-Hammond, 1990, p.25; Freidson, 2001). This is not to say that professions always or only act based on research-

based evidence in the interests of the clients. Professions are also found to act to protect their status and privileges as a profession (Hargreaves and Goodson, 1996; Hargreaves, 2000). However, theoretically and empirically, professionals are characterized as building on research-based evidence as a strong norm shared by (at least teacher) professions in very different contexts (Andersen and Jakobsen, 2017). The present study therefore assumes that on dimensions of research-based evidence on how to benefit clients, whites and minorities evaluate policies almost equally, and they both place positive value on this dimension (Assumption 2) (at least in professionalized occupations as studied here).

Following these two assumptions based on previous research on representative bureaucracy and professionalism, three hypotheses can be derived from the model in equation 1:³

Hypothesis 1: Bureaucrats with minority background will all else being equal be more positive towards a program that promotes the interest of minority groups than white bureaucrats will.

The explanation is that if no special emphasis is put on any of the dimensions (as in the control condition of the experiment), minorities' more positive value of diversity (Assumption 1) will make their overall attitude more positive.

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³ For simplicity, only two dimensions, "diversity" and "evidence", will be considered. Many more dimensions may enter bureaucrats' overall evaluation.

Hypothesis 2: If the presentation of the policy increases the weight put on the diversity dimension, minority bureaucrats' attitudes will be more positively affected than white bureaucrats' attitudes will.

The reason is that more emphasis is put on a dimension where the evaluative beliefs are more positive for minorities than for white bureaucrats (Assumption 1). This also means that the difference between white and minority bureaucrats' attitudes will increase.

Hypothesis 3: Emphasizing professional values that are positive to both white and minority bureaucrats, such as research-based evidence regarding children's prejudice, will make both groups more positive towards the program. The effect will be almost the same on both groups.

The reason for the third hypothesis is that in this case more weight is put on a dimension where the evaluative beliefs of white and minority bureaucrats, according to Assumption 2, do not differ.⁴

Studying White and Minority School Principals in Texas

To test how bureaucrats with different racial or ethnic background respond to different ways of presenting a new program, an experiment was embedded in a survey of all school principals in Texas. The experimental method is suitable because it allows isolation of the effect of the

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⁴ Mathematically, increasing the weight put on the evidence dimension would decrease the weight put on other dimensions (given that the sum of the weights equals 1). If this reduction of influence of other dimensions is spread out over many dimensions (not just the diversity dimension as in the simplified case here), the effect is assumed to be negligible.

communication from other factors that may influence both the communication and the attitudes of the bureaucrats. Especially in observational settings, managers' choice of communication strategy may be influenced by bureaucrats' prior attitudes, which may create a spurious correlation between communication and subsequent attitudes.

The Texas school setting is a relevant case since school programs supporting minorities is a salient issue. The state holds a large share of “minority” groups (54.7% are minorities—defined as something other than non-Hispanic white—according to the 2010 US Census), and in Texan public schools in 2013–14, Hispanic students accounted for the largest percentage of total enrollment (51.8%), followed by white (29.5%), African-American (12.7%), Asian (3.7%), and multiracial (1.9%) students (Texas Education Agency, 2014). The non-white students are not represented proportionately among the school principals. In the sample, 18% of the principals define themselves as other than white.

Results from a study of Texas school principals may not necessarily generalize to bureaucrats in other contexts with different professional norms and other minority experiences. However, Pitts (2005) finds that the more representative Texas school managers are of their students in terms of race, the better students perform and the less dropout they experience. This suggests that passive representation does translate into active representation in this specific context, which makes it relevant to examine what moderates the relationship between racial background and attitudes towards minority-supportive policies in this setting.

Design of the Experiment

School principals were asked to respond to a survey that was part of a research study conducted by Texas A&M University with the purpose of gaining “more information about principals and how they manage their schools.” (For a full wording of the introduction to the survey, see Table A3 in the appendix). The survey contained more than 200 items in total. As part of the survey principals were presented with a vignette asking them to imagine that the Texas

Education Agency decides that all schools must offer a multicultural curriculum.⁵ A multicultural curriculum is a way of representing students with different racial and cultural backgrounds in the courses that are taught in school. Proponents have argued for a long time that multicultural education reduces conflicts between the cultural knowledge within minority students' communities and the school's pedagogical knowledge, norms, and expectations, thereby giving all students an equal chance in school (Banks, 2013). An impact evaluation of ethnic studies, which is a component of multicultural education (Banks, 2012), uses a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of this kind of programs. It makes use of the fact that several schools in San Francisco assign students with eighth-grade GPAs below a threshold to an ethnic studies course. Since it is as good as random whether students' GPAs are just above or below the threshold, comparing the achievements of students around the threshold provides a credible estimate of the causal effect of being assigned to the course. Results show positive effects on student attendance, GPAs and credits earned in ninth grade (Dee and Penner, 2016). Introducing a mandatory multicultural curriculum may thus be seen as a way of advancing the interest of minority students.

At the same time, multicultural curriculum has been a highly contested issue – not least with the passage of a bill in Arizona that became effective on 1 January 2011 and “bans ethnic studies courses that ‘are designed primarily for pupils of one ethnic group’, that ‘advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals’, or that teaches ‘resentment toward a race or class of people’” (Banks, 2012, 467). As mentioned, salience of the policy has been argued to be a requirement for active representation to occur (Keiser et al. 2002).

Even if principals in this survey may have different notions of a “multicultural curriculum”, the main question in this study is whether white and minority bureaucrats react

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⁵ The fictitious vignette (“Imagine that...”) was used for ethical reasons to make sure respondents were aware that this was a hypothetical example.

differently to different ways of presenting such a program. Respondents were therefore randomly allocated to three versions of the vignette (see Table 1). In the control group, no additional information was provided. In the first treatment group, called Normative Value Treatment, respondents were told that this was done in order to value ethnic and cultural differences. This emphasizes the value of diversity, which is expected to be more prevalent among principals with minority background. Based on the theoretical hypothesis, the expectation is that minority principals will react more positively to this value emphasis than white principals will. Comparing the attitudes of the Normative Value Treatment to the control group will identify the effect of emphasizing the value of ethnic and cultural differences. Often managers who want to promote multicultural curricula may do so exactly by referring to the value of diversity.

[Table 1 around here]

An alternative to giving no further reasons would be to provide information that emphasizes evaluative dimensions that are positive to both white and minority principals. To test the effect of this alternative, a second treatment was included in the experiment. In this treatment group, called Research-based Evidence Treatment, respondents were told that the decision about multicultural curriculum is made because research has shown that such programs can reduce children's prejudices.⁶ This information emphasizes two evaluative dimensions: research and children's prejudices. None of them are directly related to different racial values in the same way as "ethnic and cultural differences" are. Both white and minority principals may value research and open-minded children since this aligns with professional norms of being client-oriented and knowledge-based (Darling-Hammond, 1990). The expectation would

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⁶ Such research can for example be found in Cameron and Rutland (2006).

therefore be that both types of principals will respond positively to this emphasis. The attitude is measured by asking respondents “To what extent do you agree or disagree that this is a good idea?” with response categories on a five-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Data

Respondents were assigned to the three experimental conditions by simple randomization. Table 2 shows that the background of the principals is similar across each of the experimental conditions. Only the number of assistants or vice-principals, total student enrollment and TAKS pass rates differs significantly between the Research-based Evidence Treatment group and the control group. Results are essentially unaffected by controlling for the principal characteristics. The analyses presented are based on simple OLS regressions. Similar results are found when an ordered logit model is used. For these robustness checks, see Table A5 in the appendix.

[Table 2 around here]

The full population list of schools encompasses 8,578 unique campus IDs. 8,558 have some basic school information. 7,878 email addresses were identified. However, some school districts had opted out of the survey in previous years and were therefore removed from the list. Also, some emails bounced and could not be delivered to the email address. Finally, some email addresses were duplicates. Because of these constraints 6,509 principals were contacted by e-mail. The overall survey response rate was 22% (1,428 respondents out of 6,509 that were contacted by e-mail), whereas 17% responded to the question used in this study. Broadly speaking, the sample reflects the population of school principals quite well. Table A1 in

the appendix shows minor differences between responding and non-responding schools. The share of black students among non-respondents is 13% and 10% among respondents. Latino shares are 50% vs. 47%. The share of non-respondents in suburban areas is 24% vs. 22% of respondents in suburbs. The share of schools in urban areas is 17% among non-respondents vs. 9% among respondents. Table A2 in the appendix shows that some these differences are statistically significant: Schools in urban areas with large black and Latino populations were slightly less likely to respond. However, other school characteristics (share of low income students, teacher salary, total enrollment, and standardized test performance) are not significantly correlated with the probability of responding. Nevertheless, this is a selected sample.

Whether the difference between the sample and the population biases the treatment effect estimates depends on whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects not accounted for by the model. As demonstrated by Druckman and Kam (2011), a biased sample will still provide an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect as long as the treatment effect is homogenous across the population, or if any heterogeneous treatment effects are modelled. The present study estimates separate treatment effects for white and minority school principals. So the effect estimates would be biased only if the treatment effects differ between other subgroups than white and minority principals and these subgroups are misrepresented in the sample. The generalizability of the findings is discussed in the concluding section.

Results

The first hypothesis reflects the basic proposition in the theory of representative bureaucracy, i.e., that bureaucrats' attitudes reflect their demographic background. In this case, bureaucrats with minority background are more positive towards programs that promote diversity and thereby support minorities within the client population. The hypothesis is tested using only the

control group that was not presented with any specific justification for the program. Figure 1 confirms that principals with minority background in the control group are indeed significantly more positive towards the program than white bureaucrats. Figure 1 also shows that in this sample, the black principals are significantly more positive towards the program than Latinos, who, again, are significantly more positive than white principals. The attitudes of other minorities are similar to those of Latinos but not significantly different from Whites (probably because of the small sample size in this group). The control group contains 22 black principals, 9 “other minorities” (Asian or Native American), and 73 Latinos. Because of the small number of principals in these subgroups, these figures are not necessarily representative of all school principals in Texas.

[Figure 1 around here]

The next question is how principals react to the two different presentations of the multicultural curriculum program. Figure 2 shows the average treatment effect of the two different presentations (see also Table 3, model 1). These results would suggest that the Research-based Evidence Treatment makes principals more positive towards the program whereas the Normative Value Treatment has no substantial effect on the attitudes. This conclusion would be premature, though. Hypothesis 2 suggests that the Normative Value Treatment has a different impact on bureaucrats with white background than on bureaucrats with minority background, so the average treatment effect may conceal very different effects.

[Figure 2 around here]

To test this, an interaction term between the two treatment groups and the two groups of bureaucrats (white and minority) was included in the model (see Table 3, model 2). The interaction term with Normative Value Treatment is statistically significant, demonstrating that the Normative Value Treatment has different effects on white and minority principals. Effects of the treatment on each group of principals are separately presented in Figure 3. The results confirm both Hypothesis 2 and 3. The Research-based Evidence Treatment has a positive effect on both groups of bureaucrats. The effect is a little stronger for minorities but not significantly different. However, the Normative Value Treatment only has a positive effect on the principals with minority background.

[Figure 3 around here]

The effect on the white principals is actually negative though not significant. While strong inference cannot be made based on this, the result indicates that a presentation emphasizing diversity values may have a boomerang effect on white bureaucrats. Boomerang effects have been found when individuals comprehend the intention of a message but become angry, experience reactance, and react contrary to the intent (Byrne and Hart, 2009). The assumption of the Expectancy-Value Model is that this is because the Normative Value Treatment emphasizes an evaluative dimension that is more negative to the white principals than the alternative weighting of dimensions in the control group. It should be stressed that this underlying assumption is not tested here.

The effect of the Normative Value Treatment on white versus minority bureaucrats is significantly different. This means that the Normative Value Treatment magnifies the discrepancy in attitudes between white and minority bureaucrats that was found in the control group. In other words, this way of presenting the diversity program strengthens the link from

passive to active representation of clients with minority background. On the other hand, the Research-based Evidence Treatment has a positive effect on both groups of bureaucrats. The effect size is not trivial. The standard deviation of the attitude variable in the control group is 1.15. With an average treatment effect of .32, this amounts to an effect size of .28 of a standard deviation. While it is notoriously difficult to interpret such effect sizes, it should be borne in mind that this is the result of a very brief change in the presentation of a new policy.

Table 3, model 3, presents an analysis that splits the minority group into black and Latino principals (the small residual category of 14 other minority groups is left out of this analysis). The results show that the effect of the Normative Value Treatment is positive for both blacks and Latinos but only statistically significant for latinos. This may, however, be due to some ceiling effects for the group of black respondents. Figure 4 presents the average attitudes by subgroups and treatment conditions (based on Table 3, model 3). It shows that the average response of black principals is above 4, which is “Tend to agree”. The maximum, 5, is “Strongly agree”. Combined with the relatively small sample size in this subgroup of black principals, there is probably not enough statistical power to detect effects on top of the quite positive attitudes in this group. With the Normative Value treatment, Latino principals reach a level comparable to the black principals.

[Table 3 around here]

[Figure 4 around here]

Table 3 also presents what can be considered a “placebo test”. As mentioned, theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that demographic characteristics of the bureaucrats matter only when the issue is salient to the demographic characteristic in question. In the present case, neither research-based evidence on how to reduce children’s prejudices nor

the value of ethnic and cultural differences is a particularly gendered issue. Therefore, the theory would not expect these treatment vignettes to have particularly strong effects on female bureaucrats. Testing the effect on women can therefore be seen as a placebo test in the sense that the treatment effect should not be present in this group. Model 4 in Table 3 confirms this. Female bureaucrats in the control group are more positive than their male counterparts towards the multicultural curriculum. However, there are no significant interaction effects. The women do not react more to the treatments than the men in the sample.

Two other robustness checks are presented in Table A5 in the appendix. The first robustness check uses data from two previous surveys on Texas school principals that contain information about whether the school offers a multicultural curriculum. When this variable is used as covariate in the regression model (together with other covariates of principal characteristics), the effect of the Normative Value Treatment on white principals is much more negative and statistically significant (see Table A5, models 2 and 4 in the appendix). However, only 432 principals out of the 1,096 in the experiment have responded to the question about multicultural curriculum in at least one of the previous surveys, so this result should be interpreted a bit more cautiously. Controlling only for the principal characteristics does not affect the point estimate or the significance level much (results not presented). The other robustness check uses an ordered logit model that produces similar results in terms of significance and directions of the treatment effects.

Finally, the concurrent validity of the attitude item is assessed in Figure 5. The question is whether principals' attitude towards a mandatory curriculum is related to active and passive representation. Are principals who are more positive towards a multicultural curriculum also more likely to promote active and passive representation in other aspects of their jobs as principals? Self-reported behavior from other parts of the survey can be used to assess this by examining the bivariate correlations between the multicultural curriculum attitudes and tokens

of passive and active representation. Figure 4 summarizes the results of these analyses. As expected, the figure shows that the attitude outcome measure used in the experiment is positively and significantly correlated with a number of measures of promoting of passive and active representation. These results thereby support the concurrent validity of the outcome measure.

[Figure 5 around here]

Conclusion

The theory on representative bureaucracy suggests that bureaucrats' demographic characteristics affect their attitudes and that these attitudes make them implement policies in ways that are favorable to clients who share their demographic background. Empirical research supports both the notion that bureaucrats' attitudes resemble those of citizens who share their racial background and that clients benefit from being served by bureaucrats who share their racial background. However, the degree to which demographic background translates into minority-supportive attitudes and how communication may affect the link from passive representation to policy attitudes has not been examined so far.

This study shows that this linkage is not predetermined. Minority school principals in Texas do tend to be more positive towards a minority-supportive policy than whites, but the relationship between background and attitudes is moderated by the way this policy is presented, and some presentations amplify attitudinal differences between whites and minorities. In other words, the strength of this central linkage from passive to active representation is dependent on how specific policies are introduced. Furthermore, white and minority principals react to different presentations as predicted by the Expectancy-Value

Model: Emphasizing normative values of diversity increases minority principals' positive attitudes whereas white principals' attitudes are drawn in the opposite direction—though not statistically significant in all model specifications. The theoretical interpretation would be that bureaucrats make up their opinion by weighting different concerns against each other. The Normative-Value Treatment puts more weight on a dimension where white and minorities differ in their deep-seated values.

On the other hand, both white and minority principals' support for the policy is enhanced when they are presented with the information that the same policy is backed up by research-based evidence showing that it reduces all children's prejudices. This is consistent with the theoretical interpretation that all bureaucrats share professional values about using research-based evidence and values against prejudices in general. The robustness of these results is supported by a number of alternative model specifications.

The ironic conclusion is that policymakers who want to introduce minority-supportive policies may typically do so because they hold normative values about diversity. However, if they use that argument, it will have no (or maybe even a negative) impact on the white bureaucrats who are most against the policy at the outset. If policymakers instead present the exact same policy but for other reasons, namely reasons that are more commonly shared among those who are going to implement it, they gain more support for the policy from the beginning.

The internal validity of these conclusions is high due to the experimental design. The correlation between the way the policy is presented and the principals' attitudes towards it can neither be a result of policymakers responding to previous attitudes of the principals nor of contextual factors that would affect both presentations and attitudes. The randomization of the treatment assignment ensures that the presentation of the policy is not caused by any other factors.

As mentioned in the introduction, it is a core assumption of representative bureaucracy theory that bureaucrats' attitudes affect their decisions (Meier and Nigro, 1976), and research on the consistency between attitudes and behavior does suggest a relatively close relationship when it comes to attitudes toward specific policies (as studied here) rather than more abstract values (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2000). Yet, the link from attitudes remains an important assumption in the theory of representative bureaucracy that is not tested in this study. However, analyses of the correlations between the attitude measure and self-reported measures of promotion of passive and active representation do support the concurrent validity of the measure used in the study.

The main contribution of this study is to show that the link between bureaucrats' racial background and their attitudes towards diversity-related policies is not as firm as may have been assumed in previous work. Recent work has shown how the passive representation of women and minorities may have an impact on citizens' perceptions of the bureaucracy – without any specific decisions made by these bureaucrats (Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009; Riccucci, Ryzin and Lavena, 2014). But besides such symbolic effects one theoretical implication of the present study is that it will be important to examine the degree to which the effect of passive representation is mediated by bureaucrats' attitudes and how that link can be moderated.

Another theoretical implication is that the importance of other moderators of the link from passive to active representation may depend on how policies are presented. Existing theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that the link from passive to active representation is dependent on the bureaucrats' level of discretion and the salience of the issue for demographic characteristics of the client population. The results of the present study do not question these theoretical insights. Rather, the moderating effect of the way policies are presented will probably work in tandem with these other moderators in the sense that the

presentation of new policies for active representation is more important in situations where bureaucrats have a high level of discretion and the policy is highly salient for minority groups.

Future research should examine how these moderators work together. Due to the slow progress in changing the public workforce to be more representative of minorities and women—especially at higher levels—it is important for future research on representative bureaucracy to understand how the link from passive to active representation can be moderated for any given workforce composition. Affecting the way deep-seated values transform into specific attitudes towards minority-supportive policies and actions seems to be a central feature in this endeavor.

Another set of questions concerns whether the results found here for white and minority principals generalize to other political contexts, other occupations and other demographic characteristics of the bureaucrats. As expected, the treatments tested in this study did not affect female principals differently than male principals since the treatments were not particularly gendered. It may also be expected that policy presentations emphasizing cultural diversity may have less effects in political contexts in which conflicts between minorities and majorities are less pronounced than in Texas. Similarly, the effect of professional norm cues may be less effective in less professionalized occupations. The Expectancy-Value Model and the survey experimental method to the study of representative bureaucracy introduced in this study presents a framework that could be used to test the generalizability of the findings in different contexts.

The assumptions of the Expectancy-Value Model about different value dimensions and how minority and white bureaucrats differ on these dimensions have not been tested in this study. Doing so would be another important step for understanding what kinds of policy presentations would affect different groups differently, and might lead to an understanding of how especially white bureaucrats may be affected.

Besides their relevance for understanding the mechanisms in representative bureaucracy, the findings may also be of practical relevance to public managers. Leaving aside the normative issue about whether bureaucrats should actively further the interests of specific client groups, managers who want to or are required to do so may gain important insights from these findings. Managers who are going to make their organization more supportive of, for instance, racial minorities could do so in different ways. The classic approach would be to change the passive representativeness of their organization by hiring and firing bureaucrats in a way that makes the work force resemble the client population. However, that is a long and slow process as demonstrated by studies of passive representation (Cayer and Sigelman, 1980; Lewis, 1988; Hsieh and Winslow, 2006; Riccucci, 2009).

Another manager approach would be to influence the degree to which the demographic background of the bureaucrats transforms into attitudes towards specific policies. The findings presented here show that some ways of introducing new policies increase the attitudinal differences between white and minority bureaucrats. Naturally, this should be avoided if the purpose is to reduce such differences. It is noteworthy, though, that none of the policy presentations that were tested here *reduced* the initial difference found in the control group between white and minority bureaucrats. The policy presentation emphasizing research-based evidence increased the support from both minorities and whites, but it did not reduce the difference. That may be a more difficult task. Future studies could test if presenting reasons that accord with fundamental values predominantly held by white bureaucrats would reduce differences in attitudes and whether that translates into better outcomes for minorities.

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Table 1: The three vignettes

Control group	Normative Value Treatment	Research-based Evidence Treatment
Imagine that the Texas Education Agency (TEA) decides that all schools must offer multicultural curriculum.	Imagine that the Texas Education Agency (TEA) decides that all schools must offer multicultural curriculum in order to value ethnic and cultural differences.	Imagine that the Texas Education Agency (TEA) decides that all schools must offer multicultural curriculum, because research has shown that such programs can reduce children's prejudices.
To what extent do you agree or disagree that this is a good idea?	To what extent do you agree or disagree that this is a good idea?	To what extent do you agree or disagree that this is a good idea?

Note: Bold text added here to highlight the treatments. Response categories: Strongly agree; Tend to agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Tend to disagree; Strongly disagree; Don't know. "Don't know" is coded as missing.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the three experimental conditions

Variable	Control group			Normative Value			Research-based Evidence		
	Mean	Std.dev	N	Mean	Std.dev.	N	Mean	Std.dev	N
PRINCIPAL									
CHARACTERISTICS									
Non-white	0.24	(0.43)	402	0.20	(0.40)	349	0.22	(0.42)	345
Female	0.60	(0.49)	399	0.58	(0.49)	345	0.58	(0.49)	344
Years being principal	7.83	(6.32)	400	7.72	(6.51)	348	7.87	(5.82)	337
Teaching experience (years)	12.35	(6.34)	399	11.84	(7.19)	347	12.29	(6.01)	343
Management experience before becoming principal (years)	0.40	(0.49)	401	0.37	(0.48)	347	0.38	(0.49)	345
Any principal training	0.58	(0.49)	401	0.59	(0.49)	346	0.56	(0.50)	344
Number of assistants/vice- principals	1.10	(1.19)	401	1.25	(1.56)	346	1.34*	(1.45)	345
SCHOOL									
CHARACTERISTICS									
Percentage of students who are black	10.10	(12.50)	398	9.18	(13.50)	345	10.39	(13.54)	336
Percentage of students who are Latino	47.23	(29.69)	398	46.10	(29.79)	345	45.96	(28.27)	336
Percentage of students who are low-income	61.18	(24.46)	398	59.57	(25.06)	345	58.56	(24.52)	336
Average teacher salary (1,000 USD)	46.90	(4.68)	398	47.24	(4.52)	345	47.49	(4.46)	335
Total student enrollment	557.9	(428.9)	398	617.1	(557.1)	345	629.8*	(542.7)	336
TAKS pass rate	75.25	(11.97)	369	77.13*	(11.09)	319	75.30†	(12.14)	314
Urban areas	10.55	(30.76)	398	9.28	(29.05)	345	11.31	(31.72)	336
Suburban areas	21.36	(41.03)	398	23.77	(42.63)	345	20.24	(40.24)	336
Other areas	68.09	(46.67)	398	66.96	(47.11)	345	68.45	(46.54)	336

* Significantly different from Control group at 5%-level. † Significantly different from Normative value

group at 5%-level. No other significant differences between any of the groups.

Table 3: The effect of treatments on average and for subgroups

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Normative Value	-0.0226 (0.0837)	-0.125 (0.0909)	-0.125 (0.0907)	0.104 (0.130)
Research-based Evidence	0.318** (0.0840)	0.307** (0.0917)	0.307** (0.0915)	0.458** (0.130)
Minority		0.541** (0.128)		
Black			1.058** (0.253)	
Latino			0.420** (0.148)	
Female				0.373** (0.116)
Minority X Normative Value		0.598** (0.194)		
Minority X Research-based Evidence		0.0966 (0.192)		
Black X Normative Value			0.261 (0.373)	
Latino X Normative Value			0.743** (0.224)	
Black X Research-based Evidence			-0.121 (0.354)	
Latino X Research-based Evidence			0.0822 (0.220)	
Female X Normative Value				-0.210 (0.169)
Female X Research-based Evidence				-0.254 (0.169)
Constant	3.172** (0.0571)	3.042** (0.0627)	3.042** (0.0626)	2.950** (0.0904)
Observations	1,096	1,096	1,082	1,105
R-squared	0.018	0.099	0.109	0.028

Standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note to Figure 1

Note: Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. Whites are the reference group. Horizontal line marks the level of the White reference group. The figure is based on the regression presented in Table A4 in the appendix.

Note to Figure 2

Note: Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. The figure is based on Table 3, model 1.

Note to Figure 3

Note: Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. The figure is based on the regression in Table 3, model 2. Confidence intervals are based on separate models using white/minority as reference group.

Note to Figure 4

Note: The figure is based on Table 3, model 3.

Note to Figure 5

Note: The figure show regression coefficients and 95%-confidence intervals for bivariate regressions of the attitude question used in the experiment on other survey measures of passive and active representation. Item wordings (in order of the figure): My school conducts special training and programs on cultural differences and values; There are special programs in place in my school to manage diversity among assistant principals, teachers, and staff; I discuss racial/ethnic diversity issues with: [Superintendents; Teachers; Parents]; Hiring and promoting employees from underrepresented groups is a priority in my school; It is the school board's job to maintain racial balance in schools; It is my job to maintain racial balance in schools.

Appendix to

From Passive to Active Representation. Experimental Evidence on the Role of Normative Values in Shaping White and Minority Bureaucrats' Policy Attitudes

Simon Calmar Andersen

Table A1. Balance of respondents and non-respondents

Variable	Non-respondents			Respondents		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs
Percentage of students who are black	13.1	(18.1)	7,130	10.2	(13.6)	1,428
Percentage of students who are Latino	49.8	(30.7)	7,130	47.2	(29.8)	1,428
Percentage of schools with black/latino majority	63.4	(48.2)	7,130	57.4	(49.5)	1,428
Percentage of students who are low-income	62.9	(27.0)	7,130	60.7	(24.7)	1,428
Percentage of schools with low-income is majority	71.5	(45.2)	7,130	70.7	(45.5)	1,428
Average teacher salary	47703.3	(4786.4)	6,870	47154.8	(4567.6)	1,424
Total student enrollment	589.8	(492.3)	7,130	598.9	(506.7)	1,428
TAKS pass rate	75.1	(12.8)	6,353	75.6	(11.8)	1,324
Urban areas	16.8	(37.4)	7,130	9.9	(29.8)	1,428
Suburban areas	24.0	(42.7)	7,130	21.8	(41.3)	1,428
Other areas	59.3	(49.1)	7,130	68.3	(46.5)	1,428

Table A2. Attrition analysis

Percentage of students who are black	-0.0141** (0.00279)
Percentage of students who are Latino	-0.00627** (0.00183)
Percentage of students who are low-income	0.00329 (0.00225)
Average teacher salary	3.97e-06 (8.73e-06)
Total student enrollment	9.46e-05 (6.96e-05)
TAKS pass rate	-0.00427 (0.00333)
Urban areas	-0.00563** (0.00115)
Suburban areas	-0.00173* (0.000877)
Constant	-1.117* (0.481)
N	7,645

Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A3. Introduction to the 2013 Texas Middle Management Survey

You are being invited to take part in a research study being conducted by Texas A&M University. You are being asked to read this form so that you know about this research study. The information in this form is provided to help you decide whether or not to take part in the research. If you decide you do not want to participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefit you normally would have.

The purpose of this study is to gain more information about principals and how they manage their schools. You are being asked to be in this study because you are a school principal in the state of Texas. 6900 principals across the state will be invited to participate in this study.

The online questionnaire takes approximately 20 minutes to complete. Please note that you may complete the survey in one sitting or return to complete later. If you wish to take the survey in more than one sitting, click "Exit Survey" at the top righthand corner of page and your answers will be saved. Simply relick the link given in the email and you will be returned to the survey.

The things that you will be doing have no more risk than you would come across in everyday life. There is no compensation attached to this survey. Aside from your time, there are no costs for taking part in the study. All responses are strictly confidential and the Texas Educational Excellence Project will not reveal to anyone how any individual principal responded to the survey. Only aggregated information will be released. Please note that you are free to omit answers to any questions that you wish. If you have any questions or concerns about this survey, please contact [Name] (CoInvestigator) at [e-mail address] or [phone number]. For questions about your rights as a research participant; or if you have questions, complaints, or concerns about the research and cannot reach the Principal Investigator or want to talk to someone other than the Investigator, you may call the Texas A&M Human Subjects Protection Program office at [phone number] or [e-mail address].

Note: The full survey and response distributions can be found at <http://perg-tamu.com/data-reports>

Table A4: Regression table for Figure 1

	(1)	(2)
White	Ref.	Ref.
Minority, average	0.541** (0.132)	
Black		1.058** (0.261)
Latino		0.420** (0.152)
Other		0.358 (0.509)
Constant	3.042** (0.065)	3.042** (0.065)
Observations	402	398
R-squared	0.040	0.046

Standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A5: Robustness checks

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Ologit	(4) Ologit
Normative Value	-0.125 (0.0909)	-0.354** (0.135)	-0.205 (0.151)	-0.655** (0.240)
Research-based Evidence	0.307** (0.0917)	0.346* (0.143)	0.472** (0.150)	0.576* (0.247)
Minority	0.541** (0.128)	0.481* (0.220)	0.903** (0.211)	0.908* (0.392)
Minority X Normative Value	0.598** (0.194)	0.669* (0.319)	1.014** (0.318)	1.117* (0.554)
Minority X Research-based Evidence	0.0966 (0.192)	-0.180 (0.304)	0.209 (0.315)	-0.347 (0.538)
Female		0.153 (0.106)		0.251 (0.188)
Years being principal		-0.00592 (0.00810)		-0.0132 (0.0144)
Teaching experience (years)		-0.0108 (0.00744)		-0.0248 (0.0146)
Management experience before becoming principal (years)		0.00624 (0.108)		0.0407 (0.189)
Any principal training		0.0401 (0.104)		0.0647 (0.181)
Number of assistants/vice-principals		0.145** (0.0408)		0.260** (0.0719)
Multicultural curriculum ¹		0.172 (0.111)		0.341 (0.195)
Constant	3.042** (0.0627)	3.019** (0.199)		
Cut 1			-2.034** (0.134)	-2.218** (0.388)
Cut 2			-0.885** (0.111)	-1.000** (0.364)
Cut 3			0.581** (0.109)	0.574 (0.359)
Cut 4			2.297** (0.132)	2.520** (0.383)
Observations	1,096	432	1,096	432
R-squared	0.099	0.173		

Standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

1. Data on previous use of multicultural curriculum is achieved from two previous surveys on Texas school principals. Since not all respondents in the experiment participated in the previous surveys, the number of observations is reduced in models 2 and 4.

Figure 1: Attitudes towards mandatory multicultural curriculum in the control group

Figure 2: Average treatment effect of the two presentations

Figure 3: Treatment effect of the two presentations on white and minority bureaucrats

Figure 4: Average attitudes by subgroups and treatment conditions

Figure 5: Correlations with other measures of passive and active representation