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What is issue ownership and how should we measure it?

Abstract

Recently, the concept of issue ownership has attracted increasing attention by students of electoral behaviour as well as party competition. However, both the definition and measurement of issue ownership – often drawn from Petrocik’s seminal 1996-article – is unclear. This constitutes a serious drawback to the further development and understanding of issue ownership itself and its purported effects. The paper addresses these problems by, first, establishing a definition of issue ownership at the individual level. On this basis, the standard ‘which party is best at handling issue X’ measure of issue ownership is assessed. The analyses using experiments embedded in a nationally representative panel survey indicate that the measure lacks validity and is partially redundant. Consequently, its replacement with a better performing alternative is recommended.

Key words:

Issue ownership, public opinion, political parties, question wording.

Recent scholarship has devoted considerable attention to issue ownership as an important aspect of party competition and voting behaviour (Dolezal et al. 2014; Geys 2012; Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Lachat 2014; Martinsson 2009; Meguid 2005). The basic idea is that parties can win elections by promoting issues on which they are perceived by large numbers of voters as ‘best at handling’ problems (see, e.g., Budge and Farlie 1983a; b; Green-Pedersen 2007; Petrocik 1996). Among voter-level analysts, this idea has received some backing from analyses showing that voters do indeed tend to vote for parties that they find competent at handling various issues (see, e.g., Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Green and Hobolt 2008; van der Brug 2004; Wright 2012). Issue ownership, in other words, seems to play an important role in determining the balance of power in contemporary democracies.

These findings and the increasing scholarly attention to the concept makes it the more perplexing that, as noted by Egan (2013; see also Therriault 2015; Walgrave et al. 2016), the definition of issue ownership is all but clear and consensually shared in the research community. In fact, as Egan (2013, 51) points out there exists ‘a conceptual vagueness about what issue ownership actually means in the first place’ just as ‘[f]undamental questions about the concept remain unsettled’. Thus, although most of those working with the concept are in agreement about measuring issue ownership by means of survey questions asking respondents which party is ‘best at handling’ given issues (Egan 2013, 49-50) there is much less agreement about what issue ownership actually is. Most scholars draw upon the works of Budge and Farlie (1983a; b) and Petrocik (1996) when defining the concept, but the definitions provided herein are far from equivocal and leave open the possibility for different sub-aspects of the definition – such as parties’ success at solving problems or their mere association with a given issue – to play varying roles. Indeed, the influence of mere party-issue associations has led scholars to argue for the existence of an independent dimension of so-called associative issue ownership (cf. Tresch et al. 2013; Walgrave et al. 2012). As each

of such sub-dimensions may be related differently to other variables, including being driven by different factors, the theoretical quagmire characteristic of the field impedes a fuller understanding of the causes and consequences of issue ownership.

In addition to the absence of general agreement about the definition of the concept, issue ownership research is also challenged by the possibility that ownership perceptions, however defined, are little more than mirror images of other, more well-established, constructs like party identification or policy attitudes. Thus, research has found that such factors play important roles in determining ownership perceptions (Bellucci 2006; Kuechler 1991; Stubager and Slothuus 2013; Therriault 2015; Walgrave et al. 2016). To the extent that the relationships between the perceptions and such factors are strong, it becomes doubtful what and how much is gained both theoretically and analytically by operating with an independent concept of issue ownership: If it is merely a reflection of party identification and/or attitudes, we become little wiser by using a special label.

In response to these challenges this paper has three goals each addressing their challenge. First, to distil the theoretical core of the issue ownership concept from the seminal texts in order to present a clear definition of the concept at the individual level. Second, on this basis, to assess how the standard, ‘best at handling’-measure captures the theoretical core, i.e., to assess whether the current measurement practice is theoretically sound. Third, to assess the degree to which the measure is redundant *vis-à-vis* party identification and policy attitudes, i.e., to assess whether the current measurement practice is empirically sound.

The analyses are based on an experiment embedded in a panel survey carried out on a nationally representative sample of Danish voters involving six different measures of issue ownership across four different issue areas. The analyses show a consistent pattern with answers to the standard item being much more influenced by short-term dynamics and less stable than the seminal texts leads us to expect just as they are strongly influenced by voters’

predispositions as tapped by measures of party identification and policy agreement. The conclusion suggests the replacement of the standard measure with an alternative that outperforms it on several points as the best solution to the problems identified.

Issue ownership: A concept in need of a definition

To address the first challenge of the issue ownership literature – the absence of a clear definition of the concept – this section discusses the two seminal contributions to the literature, those of Budge and Farlie (1983a; b) and Petrocik (1996) as well as a prominent recent attempt at developing such a definition (Egan 2013).

The founding fathers

The first discussion of issue ownership appears in the work of Budge and Farlie (1983a; b). While they offer no direct definition, the authors (1983a, 287) describe issue ownership as the perception among voters that for a given issue there is ‘one party that is much more dependable in carrying out the desired objective than others’. Whether or not an objective is desired depends upon policy benefits for voters: Do they stand to gain or not by policy action in the issue area? Thus, a party is said to own an issue where its preferred course of action benefits a majority of voters so that when the issue becomes salient, the majority of voters will prefer the party (Budge and Farlie 1983b, 41-2). Parties are, furthermore, ‘bound to gain in net votes’ from the emergence of their owned issues in elections as such issues are ‘always, on balance, favourable’ to one party or the other (Budge and Farlie 1983a, 287, 289). Issue ownerships are, hence, based upon ‘invariant’ (Budge and Farlie 1983b, 150) associations between parties and specific policies grounded in the parties’ cleavage based appeals to certain groups (Budge and Farlie 1983b, 27) as well as ‘the *general* association between certain events and a particular party’s tenure of office’ (Budge and Farlie 1983b, 25; emphasis added). In other words, issue ownership reflects a stable, positive evaluation in the voters’ minds of the ability of a given party to deliver desired policies on a given issue.

Rather parallel formulations are found in the most commonly referenced definition of issue ownership, i.e., the one proposed by Petrocik (1996, 826, emphasis removed). He sees ownership as deriving from parties' abilities to 'handle' 'problems facing the country' where "[h]andling" is the ability to resolve a problem of concern to voters. It is a reputation for policy and program interest, produced by a history of attention, initiative, and innovation toward these problems, which leads voters to believe that one of the parties ... is more sincere and committed to doing something about them'.

Petrocik (1996, 827) delineates two sources of such ownerships: 'Ownership of problems is conferred by the record of the incumbent and the constituencies of the parties.' The former is much less stable than the latter, however: 'The record of the incumbent creates a handling advantage when one party can be blamed for current difficulties. ... But wars, failed international or domestic policies, unemployment and inflation, or official corruption can happen at any time and provide one party with a "lease" –short term ownership– of a performance issue.' In contrast, '[p]arty constituency ownership of an issue is much more long-term ... because its foundation is (1) the relatively stable, but different social bases, that distinguish party constituencies in modern party systems and (2) the link between political conflict and social structure'. This latter source, incidentally, seems more in accordance with Petrocik's initial statement (cf. above) that the parties' 'history' constitutes the foundation of issue ownership perceptions.

When inspected closely, thus, Petrocik's definition is unclear when it comes to the time frame: Issue ownership is both stable and unstable. However, as noted by Bellucci (2006, 551), 'there need not be a strict correspondence between long term issue ownership and short term competence on those issues'. This inconsistency creates a tension in Petrocik's definition that is difficult to reconcile. To escape this predicament for the concept, Bellucci (2006) proposes to separate long-term 'issue ownership' from what he dubs short-term 'party

competence’. The latter, it should be noted, is similar to Petrocik’s (1996, 827) idea of an ‘issue lease’. From the perspective of both theoretical clarity and empirical usefulness, this distinction seems pertinent. Theoretically, it reserves the issue ownership label for a phenomenon that has a much clearer demarcation *vis-à-vis* other concepts – such as parties’ day-to-day performance in office (which provides the foundation for issue leases). In the process, further, the distinction saves the issue ownership concept from the empirical predicament entailed in the possible lack of internal as well as external consistency that comes with Bellucci’s observation that there need be no direct association between the short- and long-term aspects contained in Petrocik’s discussion.¹

Applying Bellucci’s clarifying differentiation among the factors discussed by Petrocik – i.e., separating out the short-term party competence aspect – what stands out is that also in Petrocik’s definition do we find the core ideas that issue ownership is a stable phenomenon and involves the perception among voters that a given party is better able to solve problems within a given issue area – a positive association, in other words.

A step towards clarification

The most comprehensive (if not the only) recent attempt to tackle the problems of the indeterminacy of the issue ownership concept and the accompanying theoretical and empirical confusion is Egan’s book from 2013. Egan begins from the sources discussed

¹ Internally, the absence of correlation between the two aspects may blunt the expression of it: If a person ranges a given party high on the lease aspect but low on the ownership aspect, the two might offset each other. Externally, the two aspects are likely to be differentially correlated with third variables which will make a combined concept hard to apply in analyses as it can be difficult to know which aspect dominates any relationships found just as such relationships may be weakened if the two aspects have opposing relations with third variables.

above (mostly Petrocik, however) and uses an empirical strategy of delineating the drivers of aggregate level issue ownership perceptions over time to reach a new, clearer definition of the concept according to which '[i]ssue ownership describes the long-term positive associations between political parties and particular consensus issues in the public's mind – associations created and reinforced by the parties' commitments to prioritizing these issues with government spending and lawmaking.' (Egan 2013, 156).

This definition represents a step forward for the field by focusing attention on what the concept actually entails. As can be noted, the definition focuses on positive connotations between parties and issues and that over the long run. On these aspects, the definition is in line with Budge and Farlie's definition as well as the long-term component of Petrocik's although the idea of 'positive associations' is somewhat vague. Where Egan parts company with the seminal texts is in the insistence that issue ownership has relevance only for so-called 'consensus issues'² and that it has its roots in parties' prioritization of the relevant issues. These delineations, which Egan (2013, 156) himself sees as advantages of the proposed definition, seem to me to fall into Sartori's (1984, 55) category of 'accompanying properties' rather than 'defining properties': Whereas the former are properties 'that may, but also may not, accompany the object' the latter 'are *true by definition*', i.e., they make up the core of the concept. By including these two aspects in the definition, Egan seems to risk the problem pointed out by Sartori (1984, 32-3) that the definition incorporates aspects that are, in essence, empirical questions. In this case, thus, it seems an empirical question whether

² While Egan (2013, 30-1) differentiates between 'consensus issues' and valence issues, the distinction seems to be of minor relevance in this context and I shall, hence, not pursue it further.

issue ownership should be confined to consensus (or valence) issues just as the origins of issue ownership is an empirical question.³

A definition of issue ownership

The discussion shows that both the seminal texts and the most comprehensive recent contribution share a common core in their understanding of issue ownership. This core is captured in the following definition of issue ownership at the individual level: *Issue ownership is the perception in a voter's mind that a specific party over the long term is most competent at handling – in the sense of delivering desired outputs on – a given issue.* This definition is focused on the core aspects that emanated from the discussion of the seminal texts (and were also contained in Egan's recent definition): the focus on parties' handling or delivering on a given issue, the long-term perspective, and the positive valence of the evaluations, i.e., that the voters' perceptions are beneficial to the parties. In Sartori's (1984, 55) words these aspects '*are those that bound the concept extensionally.*'

The proposed definition has several advantages. First of all, it is derived from the seminal texts in the field which means that it is in line with these, although clearer. It is not, in other words, intended to introduce a new concept to the discipline but rather to clarify an existing that suffers from ambiguities as discussed. Second, the definition is focused on a central part of what voters want from politics: delivered output (cf. Budge and Farlie 1983a; b). Parties' competence in the sense of *capacity to deliver* desired outputs, thus, is what is of ultimate interest to voters (at least those acting according to an issue ownership logic)⁴ – not whether

³ At least at the individual level, existing research shows that issue ownership perceptions originate in a range of different aspects (cf. Bellucci 2006; Kuechler 1991; Stubager and Slothuus 2013).

⁴ 'Competence', according to the specialized, psychological literature on the subject (e.g., Weinert 2001; cf. also Cuddy, Fiske and Glick 2007), essentially means the capacity to enact

or not parties, e.g., devote attention to issues, have a reputation for talking about them, or adopt a specific policy position which they may or may not be capable of translating into policy.⁵ This is the main driver behind the positive valence component of the definition and, thus, the aspect that makes issue ownership an asset to political parties. In underlining voters' motivation in relation to issue ownership, the definition places the concept on a solid and theoretically (and expectedly also empirically) distinct foundation separate from other voter motivations such as partisanship and policy agreement. With respect to the latter, the central difference to issue ownership is exactly the capacity to deliver. Thus, a voter may well agree with the policy position of a given party, but if the party is incompetent (over the long run) at delivering on its policies, it will not be seen as the issue owner.

Third, the definition avoids some of the problems entailed in previous definitions. This applies in relation to Egan's (2013) inclusion of the causes of issue ownership perceptions in the definition as well as his restriction of the concept to valence issues. Both of these elements are seen as unnecessary restrictions that are better left as empirical questions. It also

or deliver on goals. This capacity, therefore, is what is at the centre of the definition.

However, both the definition proposed here and those found in the seminal texts are silent about how parties might exactly 'handle' or 'deliver on' issues. This is deliberate in the sense that attempts to specify how parties 'handle' an issue risks biasing the concept in a particular direction. Were, e.g., the definition to stipulate that 'handling' implies putting in place specific policies, ownership perceptions would effectively be reduced to policy agreement. Parallel reasoning applies for other specifications of handling and so for the concept to have meaning in addition to such other concepts, it should be defined without such biases.

⁵ This does not imply that, e.g., issue attention, policy positions or short-term party performance are unimportant or uninteresting. The point merely is that they are better dealt with as something separate from issue ownership.

applies in relation to Petrocik's (1996) confusing inclusion of both long- and short-term components in the concept (an aspect not found in Budge and Farlie, 1983a; b) which creates the problems discussed by Bellucci (2006). The long-term component does not, it should be noted, imply that ownership perceptions are constants (cf. also Petrocik 1996, 826, 827). They should be relatively stable over shorter time spans, but may exhibit volatility over the long run (e.g., if parties change behaviour – see the conclusion for an elaboration of this point).

Dimensions of issue ownership?

Recently, Walgrave and colleagues (Tresch et al. 2013; Walgrave et al. 2012; 2016) have introduced a sub-division of the issue ownership concept. In addition to the competence dimension captured by the definition above they identify a so-called associative dimension. In contrast to the competence dimension, associative issue ownership is defined as the spontaneous association between an issue and a party and derives from 'long-term party attention' to a given issue (Walgrave et al. 2012, 772). Experimental as well as non-experimental evidence show the two dimensions of ownership to be almost uncorrelated and as having quite varying relationships with other variables (Walgrave et al. 2012; 2016). From the perspective of the definition presented above, this makes good sense. First, the associative dimension is clearly differentiated from the handling aspect of the definition which it explicitly by-passes. Second, as pointed out by Lachat (2014, 726), '[a]ssociative ownership does not seem to represent a reason to favour (or oppose) one given party, as not all voters who consider a party to care most about a given issue will share the party's proposed solutions.' In other words, the associative dimension does not seem to contain the positive valuation forming part of the ownership concept as discussed above. This means that we should not expect associative issue ownership to have any particular role in voters' party choices and, consequently, for party competition.

The associative dimension is, in other words, both definitionally and operationally different from the competence dimension. Indeed, these differences raise the question of whether it is expedient to use the term ‘issue ownership’ in connection with the associative dimension. While it is certainly evocative, the associative dimension should, based on my reading of the seminal issue ownership texts, be seen as a different concept altogether rather than a sub-dimension of issue ownership.

Issue ownership in action: How is the concept measured?

With the proposed definition it is possible to address the second challenge to the issue ownership literature, i.e., the question of what is captured by the standard individual level measure of issue ownership. At the semantic level, the core features seem to be addressed – but other aspects are less clear.

The standard measure asks respondents ‘which party is best at handling issue X’ (or some very close alternative). As pointed out by Egan (2013, 50; see also Petrocik 1996, 831), this is the dominant type of measure in the literature and it derives its ‘superiority’ to other measurement approaches from its ‘generality’ and from the fact that it refrains ‘from asking respondents to state which party they agree with on policies’. Comparing the measure to the definition it is clear that the measure contains both the focus on parties handling abilities (although it is not specified what ‘handling’ implies) and the positive valuation. In that sense the measure seems a good operationalization of issue ownership as defined above. But problems lurk just beneath this surface.

First, the temporal aspect is not specified leaving respondents to draw on both short- and long-term considerations when answering the question. Although Egan (2013) ends up defining issue ownership as a long-term phenomenon, he (Egan 2013, 53-4) himself points out and recent scholarship (e.g., Christensen et al. 2015; Stubager and Seeberg 2016; Walgrave et al. 2009) shows that issue ownership assessed using the standard measure can be

unstable at both the aggregate and individual levels. This instability is what would be expected based on public opinion theories of priming, agenda-setting (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; McCombs 2004), and top-of-the-head answering of survey items (cf. Zaller 1992). Thus, priming theory holds that voters' opinion formation to great extent is based on the issues and events that top the current agenda while more distant considerations are likely to play a smaller – if any – role. If this is the case, it has substantial implications for how we should expect issue ownership to arise and operate – indeed for what issue ownership is (when tapped by the standard measure).

Second, it is unclear how the 'handling'-aspect is to be interpreted (cf. Egan 2013, 51). According to the definition, considerations about parties' competencies should dominate ownership perceptions, but considerations about their policies and policy positions may also be in play. Thus, a recent study by Therriault (2015) compares the standard measure to two alternatives, one highlighting parties' policy positions and the other highlighting their qualifications at handling a given issue. His analyses show that responses to the standard item align much more with those to the policy position alternative than the qualifications alternative. To the extent that this result holds up, it indicates that the standard measure is faring badly with respect to capturing the core of the concept. Walgrave and co-authors (2016) have, however, found a closer relationship between the standard measure and the qualification alternative, but their study does not include a comparable policy focused alternative and so remains inconclusive on this point.

Finally, the suggested two-dimensionality of issue ownership also raises questions about the functioning of the standard measure. To the extent that, as argued above, associative issue ownership is a concept separate from issue ownership one would expect that measures of associative issue ownership produce results very different from those of the standard (competence) measure. If this is not the case, the standard measure would appear even blunter

than suggested by the previous considerations. Examining how the standard measure fares on these three counts address the second goal of the paper.⁶

Voter predispositions and issue ownership

The third challenge to the issue ownership literature is the charge of redundancy in the sense that issue ownership perceptions are little more than restatements of voters' party identification and/or policy preferences. This would imply that issue ownership is always and almost automatically accorded to the party with which a voter identifies and/or with which s/he agrees policywise – a suspicion that is fuelled by studies (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2006) showing voters to be strongly influenced by their predispositions when forming opinions about issues. It seems likely that this may also apply for perceptions of issue ownership.

Regarding the possible effect of partisanship, it has, since the seminal presentation of the concept in *The American Voter*, been acknowledged that '[i]dentification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation' (Campbell et al. 1960, 133). Lately, this point has been incorporated in the broader theory of motivated reasoning (see, e.g., Taber and Lodge 2006) where the central point is that both partisanship and other predispositions including prior attitudes, tend to bias voters' perceptions of and reactions to various attitudinal objects – such as issue ownerships. The same may apply for policy attitudes. Thus, ownership perceptions may also to a large extent be driven by whether or not voters agree with the policies proposed by the parties in a given issue area.

Prior research seems to lend at least some credibility to these suspicions. Studies of the individual level roots of ownership perceptions (see, e.g., Bellucci 2006; Kuechler 1991;

⁶ Also, focusing on the relationship of the associative dimension to the proposed core of issue ownership permits an evaluation of the theoretical point that the associative dimension is best seen as separate from issue ownership.

Stubager and Slothuus 2013; Wagner and Zeglovits 2014) have found considerable effects of both party identification and policy attitudes on such perceptions. Although none of these studies show a complete determination of issue ownership by partisanship and policy attitudes, the effects found are strong enough to warrant specific attention to the question – particularly in light of the conceptual vagueness discussed above.

While it is difficult to form expectations regarding the absolute level of influence on answers to the standard issue ownership measure exerted by party identification and policy attitudes the degree hereof can be assessed in comparison to other measures highlighting the various aspects discussed above, i.e., the long- or short-term, the policy or qualifications or the associative perspectives. This comparison facilitates the third goal of the paper.

Research design

Following the lead of other recent studies in the field (e.g., Therriault 2015 and Walgrave et al. 2016) the analysis was conducted using survey experiments where respondents are randomly assigned to different versions of issue ownership measures.⁷ As an innovation on existing studies, the design added a panel component. Thus, the initial respondents were re-interviewed after three years thereby facilitating a thorough evaluation of the temporal aspect of issue ownership through comparison of the over-time stability of the answers. Throughout the analyses, the idea is to compare the standard measure to various other measures – highlighting different temporal aspects, a policy or qualification focus, or the associative dimension – in order to assess the drivers and (relative) performance of the standard measure.

⁷ The experimental design was set up to accommodate a number of research questions only one of which is pursued here. Thus, only six out of a total of ten experimental conditions are examined. See the supplementary material for full details about the experimental design as well as a discussion and parallel analysis of the four measures not discussed below.

The analysis involves six different measures of issue ownership. The first is the standard ‘handle’-version which will function as the reference point in the analyses:

1. Which party is in your opinion best at handling [issue X]?

To investigate the temporal aspect two new measures were constructed:

2. If you disregard the current situation and look, instead, at the last 30-40 years which party is then in your opinion best at handling [issue X]?
3. If you disregard the last 30-40 years and look, instead, at the current situation which party is then in your opinion best at handling [issue X]?

The choice of the 30-40 years time-frame is somewhat arbitrary and is mainly intended to induce respondents to take into account a longer time perspective.⁸ The assessments of the policy and qualification aspects are based on the following measures derived, respectively,

⁸ The choice of this exact wording may constitute a problem for younger respondents and/or for parties that have not existed for 30-40 years. The problem should not be overstated, however. First, young respondents can be expected to possess some knowledge about developments before their first encounter with politics. Second, for parties younger than 30-40 years, respondents may rely on what history a given party has. In both cases, the important thing is to induce respondents to think beyond the immediate context and for this purpose the 30-40 years time-frame appears preferable to a less precise description like, e.g., ‘over the long run’ as respondents’ interpretation hereof would likely vary considerably. Finally, it should be noted that the percentages of ‘Don’t know’ responses for the long-term measure is not systematically larger than that for the other versions in tables 1 and 2. This also applies among respondents under the age of 30 (not shown). This indicates that respondents – young and old – did not find this measure more difficult than the others. See the supplementary materials for further investigation of the topic of the time frame of the long-term measure showing that the 30-40 years performs better than a shorter time frame.

from the Norwegian, Swiss, and Swedish, election studies (Karlsen and Aardal 2011, 139; Lachat 2014; Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013, 244) and from Therriault's (2015) study:

4. In your opinion, which party has the best policy on [issue X]?
5. Which party do you think is best qualified to handle [issue X]?

Finally, the sixth version is the measure of associative issue ownership developed by Walgrave et al. (2012):

6. When you think about [issue X], which party do you spontaneously think about?

The response categories on all six versions were all of the nine parties eligible to run for parliament in Denmark at the time of the study (the Social Democrats, the Social Liberals, the Conservatives, the Socialist Peoples' Party, the Liberal Alliance, the Danish People's Party, the Liberals, the Red-Green Alliance and the Christian Democrats) as well as 'The parties are equally good/bad at it' and 'Don't know'. In the first and second rounds of analyses, all response categories are included whereas the two non-party options as well as the Christian Democrats (which are only selected by very few, if any, respondents and are not represented in parliament) are excluded in the second round of analyses.

The six different versions of the issue ownership question are asked for four different issues selected to span both position and valence type issues. The issues (substituted for [issue X]) were 'the immigration policy', 'the tax policy' (both seen as reflecting a positional logic) as well as 'the unemployment' and 'the Danish economy' (seen as reflecting a valence logic). Having both types of issue in the study permits an evaluation of whether the results apply across issue type. See the supplementary material for full question wordings in Danish.

Data and analytical methods

The data for the study comes from a nationally representative sample of Danish voters collected by the polling agency Epinion.⁹ The first wave was conducted September 4 to October 3, 2013 while the second wave was conducted November 17 to December 15, 2016. Respondents were drawn from Epinion's so-called 'Denmark panel' which is a standing panel of respondents from which participants for a given survey can be randomly sampled. Respondents are recruited onto the panel from surveys of randomly drawn samples conducted either online or over the phone with special measures taken to recruit specific hard-to-get groups. The response rate for the first wave was 66 percent and a total of 2,568 respondents took part in the experiments analysed here. These respondents were representative of the general Danish population on age, gender, and region of residence. For the second wave, 1,525 of the respondents were still active in the company panel. These were each sent up to 12 reminders and in the end 632 (i.e., 25% of the initial) respondents answered the questions used in the analysis. To counter the effects of panel attrition, responses to the second wave were weighted to achieve national representativeness on age, gender and region of residence.

In the first part of the analyses focus is upon the degree of overlap between answers to the six different versions of the question in the first wave of the panel. The degree of overlap can then be used to determine how much of a role each of the aspects play in influencing answers to the standard question format, the logic being that the smaller the difference, the more influence a given aspect has on answers to the standard item. I use the so-called Duncan index for this purpose. For each of the alternative versions, the Duncan index is calculated by summing the absolute deviations between the proportions giving each answer on the standard and the alternative version of the question, respectively, and then dividing by two. The score, thereby, reflects how many percentage points of responses would have to re-allocated

⁹ Data and replication code for the analyses is available at

<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/9DAQH4>.

between the parties on either the standard or alternative version in order for the two distributions to be identical (see Brandenburg 2005, 320).¹⁰ Hence, the lower the score, the more similar are the answers to two versions. Bootstrapping is used to test the significance of the difference between scores.¹¹

In the second part of the analysis which is devoted to the temporal aspect, the panel component of the data set is used to assess the instability of the responses from wave 1. This is possible as respondents were asked the exact same questions in both waves. The extent of instability is assessed by simply calculating the percentage of respondents who give different answers to the ownership questions on the two waves. Inspection of these results will permit an evaluation of how stable responses to the standard measure are compared to the alternatives and, hence, an assessment of how strong short- and long-term dynamics are in influencing answers. To the extent that the standard measure captures the long-term component entailed in the definition, thus, it should exhibit the same degree of stability as the long-term measure and be more stable than the short-term measure.

In order to uncover, in the third part of the analysis, how much of the variation in the answers to the issue ownership questions is accounted for by the two predispositions, I use

¹⁰ Formally, the index score for two versions of the issue ownership measure, a and b, is defined as $D_{ab} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^q |p_{ia} - p_{ib}|}{2}$ where p_{ia} is the proportion pointing to party i on measure a, p_{ib} is the same proportion on measure b, while q is the number of parties.

¹¹ Bootstrapping involves re-estimating the quantity of interest – here the Duncan index – a large number of times (1,000 in this case) each time using a sample generated by random draws, with replacement, from the original sample. Thereby, the sampling distribution of the quantity of interest is simulated and inferences made possible. Bootstrapped confidence intervals for the Duncan scores appear in Table A1 in the supplementary material.

conditional logit models with the answers to the different issue ownership measures on the first panel wave (where the higher number of respondents provide for more precise and reliable estimates) as the dependent variables and party identification and policy agreement with each party as the independents.

Policy agreement is assessed by asking respondents ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with the parties’ policies when it comes to [issue X]? Please use this scale where 0 is ‘Completely disagree’ and 10 is ‘Completely agree’.’ These questions were asked for all parties and all four issues. Party identification was assessed through a series of questions asking, first, if respondents perceive themselves as ‘adherents of a particular party’, second, which one, and, third, if they see themselves as ‘strong’ or ‘not so strong’ adherents. Those not seeing themselves as adherents of a particular party are asked whether they lean towards a particular party. In the analyses, these answers are condensed into one variable taking the value of 0 for parties with which a respondent does not identify/lean, 1 for a party to which a respondent leans, 2 for a party with which a respondent identifies not so strongly, and 3 for a party with which the respondent identifies strongly. For most parties, thus, each respondent will score a 0 and a non-zero value will only appear for one party.

As focus is not on the specific effects of each of these two variables – but on their combined influence on issue ownership perceptions – I will illustrate their explanatory power by means of McFadden’s pseudo R^2 from two sets of models for each combination of question version and issue.¹² The first set of models, the baseline, will include only party fixed effects in order not to force the equivalent of a regression through the origin-assumption on the model. The fixed effects can, furthermore, be seen as reflecting the degree of

¹² McFadden’s pseudo R^2 is defined as $R^2 = 1 - L_1/L_0$ where L_0 is the loglikelihood value of an empty model (i.e., without even the party fixed effects) and L_1 is the loglikelihood value of a given model.

consensus across respondents, i.e., they pick up the degree of initial agreement. In the present context, thus, these fixed effects will account for larger shares of the variation the more answers are concentrated on one or a few parties. The second set of models adds the party identification and policy agreement measures to gauge how much variation over the baseline these two factors explain for each of the six versions of the dependent variables. The comparison of this added explanatory power for the standard measure with those for the alternatives permits an assessment of its (relative) performance.¹³

Results

The presentation of the results follows the three steps set out above: First, the overlap between answers to the standard measure and each of the five alternatives is analysed to assess what drives responses to the standard measure. The temporal aspect hereof is further analysed in the second step where focus is on the stability of responses. The third step looks

¹³ Tests of the significance of the differences between the explanatory power of the models are run on the coefficients of the two predispositions, i.e., by testing whether their effects vary between the different question versions. Due to low statistical power resulting from small numbers of respondents and a considerable correlation between the two predispositions it is difficult to detect significant differences across two versions of ownership measures when both party identification and policy agreement are included in the models. For this reason, the tests appearing in Table 4 are based on models including only one of the variables at a time. Bootstrapped confidence intervals for the estimated values of McFadden's R^2 are presented in Table A2. It should be acknowledged that the models estimated may be subject to some amount of endogeneity. This is, however, less problematic in the present context than usually. Thus, the experimental set-up means that one should expect the problem to be about equally severe across the various measures implying that they can be compared as suggested.

at the potential redundancy of issue ownership perceptions by analysing how much variation they have in common with party identification and policy agreement.

What drives responses to the standard issue ownership measure?

The analysis of the drivers of responses to the standard measure appears in tables 1 and 2.

Before delving into the exact numbers, it is instructive to consider how the parties are ranked on the 24 question version-issue combinations. Thus, if we focus on which parties appear in first place, we find a fairly stable pattern that, furthermore, does not surprise observers of Danish politics: On immigration, the Danish People's Party is the modal choice across all six versions; on taxation and the Danish economy, the Liberals occupy all first places while on unemployment the Social Democrats are in the lead on all six versions. Also in second and third place, we can observe a high degree of stability across the versions.

From this perspective, the discussion above might seem as much ado about nothing: the voters don't seem to pay too much attention to the fine print when it comes to issue ownership and a common structure tends to prevail across different versions of the question. In some sense, this might be regarded as good news for the literature since the lack of conceptual clarity doesn't appear to have any major repercussions for the results obtained.

While this conclusion might seem sufficient for researchers mainly interested in the aggregate patterns of issue ownership (e.g., as input in models of party competition) both they and most certainly researchers focused on the individual-level causes and consequences of issue ownership have reason to pause. Thus, even though the ratings may be stable across versions, the absolute levels of support vary substantially. The differences are clearly of relevance to party analysts since, even though coming out in first place in both instances, it makes a lot of difference to a party whether it is clearly ahead of other parties or just has a narrow lead (compare, e.g., the differences between the figures for the Social Democrats and the Liberals on the long- and short-term measures for unemployment in Table 2 or for the

long-term and best qualified measures on tax policy in Table 1). Whereas in the former situation it would seem a good bet that the party would benefit the most from attention to the issue, the outcome might be very different in the latter situation where gains for competing parties might outweigh those for the party itself (cf. Geys 2012).

Going further into the tables it can, first, be noted that the questions seem to work equally well for both valence and positionally framed issues. There are no discernible patterns in the

Table 1. Issue Ownership of Immigration and Tax Policy, Per Cent and Duncan Index Scores.

	Standard IO	Long- Term IO	Short- Term IO	Best Policy IO	Best Qua- lified IO	Associa- tive IO
Immigration						
Social Democrats	16.3	16.7	16.2	10.9	14.7	5.4
Social Liberals	7.4	8.1	7.0	8.8	9.1	3.7
Conservatives	1.5	2.2	2.6	2.9	1.1	0.6
Socialist People's P.	4.3	2.9	4.4	5.9	5.7	1.7
Liberal Allinace	1.7	0.8	1.5	2.7	1.9	0.8
Christian Democrats	0.4	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.8	0.3
Danish People's P.	32.1	25.7	28.9	31.5	27.6	76.1
Liberals	10.6	13.4	12.2	7.4	10.2	1.9
Red-Green Alliance	5.9	4.9	3.9	12.0	8.5	2.2
Equally Good/Bad	9.6	12.4	12.7	6.1	10.2	5.5
Don't know	10.2	12.2	10.5	11.6	10.2	1.7
Duncan Index		9.8*	6.1*	12.9*	6.8*	44.0*
Index Difference		3.7		6.1*		
Tax Policy						
Social Democrats	19.5	22.0	19.3	17.6	21.4	21.8
Social Liberals	5.3	4.3	6.1	5.9	6.8	4.6
Conservatives	3.8	5.7	4.1	5.3	5.1	8.3
Socialist People's P.	2.5	1.4	2.2	4.6	3.6	2.1
Liberal Allinace	5.5	1.2	4.4	7.4	4.5	9.8
Christian Democrats	0.2	0.2	0	0	0.6	0.1
Danish People's P.	4.9	3.1	3.5	5.0	4.7	3.2
Liberals	25.3	30.1	28.2	21.6	23.1	31.8
Red-Green Alliance	4.2	2.2	3.3	7.6	5.3	1.7
Equally Good/Bad	16.3	14.9	17.7	9.9	15.5	13.1
Don't know	12.7	14.9	11.2	15.1	9.5	3.5
Duncan Index		11.5*	5.3*	12.1*	7.4*	17.6*
Index Difference		6.2*		4.7		
N	529	491	543	476	529	2,180

Note: *: $p < .05$. IO: Issue Ownership. Entries are percentages giving each answer. The Duncan index is calculated with respect to the Standard IO version and the index differences show the difference between the index scores for, respectively, the long- and short term versions and the best policy and qualified versions. Significance tests are based on bootstrapping using 1,000 replications.

use of the non-party categories across the two issue types and answers also appear equally consistent with the parties' behaviour for both issue types. There is not in this material, therefore, any empirical basis for restricting the use of the issue ownership concept to only one issue type. A second notable, general point is that answers seem to be fairly spread out across parties as well as the two non-party response categories – particularly on the five first ownership measures listed where no party attains the support of more than 1/3 of

Table 2. Issue Ownership of Unemployment and the Danish Economy, Per Cent and Duncan Index Scores.

Index Scores.

	Standard IO	Long- Term IO	Short- Term IO	Best Policy IO	Best Qua- lified IO	Associa- tive IO
Unemployment						
Social Democrats	23.1	32.6	23.8	19.3	23.1	40.3
Social Liberals	2.8	2.2	3.1	5.3	5.1	1.3
Conservatives	1.5	2.0	1.8	2.5	1.5	.6
Socialist People's P.	3.6	3.3	2.0	5.5	3.8	3.9
Liberal Allinace	2.5	1.0	2.8	3.2	4.2	2.0
Christian Democrats	0.2	0.2	0.2	0	0.6	0.1
Danish People's P.	5.1	2.0	2.4	5.0	4.2	3.1
Liberals	18.9	23.2	21.4	15.5	16.4	12.8
Red-Green Alliance	8.3	4.3	8.7	14.1	11.3	14.0
Equally Good/Bad	22.7	14.9	23.2	13.7	19.1	18.9
Don't know	11.3	14.3	10.7	16.0	10.8	3.0
Duncan Index		17.3*	4.9*	16.4*	7.5*	23.2*
Index Difference		12.4*		8.8*		
The Danish Economy						
Social Democrats	21.6	23.6	21.0	21.0	21.2	28.6
Social Liberals	6.6	6.3	6.8	9.0	8.1	8.9
Conservatives	2.8	7.1	3.1	3.2	2.8	2.7
Socialist People's P.	0.9	0.4	1.3	2.9	1.3	0.7
Liberal Allinace	2.8	1.0	2.8	3.4	4.0	3.0
Christian Democrats	0.4	0.2	0.2	0	0.6	0.1
Danish People's P.	5.1	1.8	3.1	5.0	3.6	3.3
Liberals	28.5	33.8	29.3	26.1	26.5	31.4
Red-Green Alliance	2.8	2.2	3.1	4.6	4.0	2.0
Equally Good/Bad	18.1	13.4	18.0	9.5	17.0	16.2
Don't know	10.2	10.0	11.2	15.3	11.0	3.1
Duncan Index		11.6*	2.9	12.2*	5.1*	12.4*
Index Difference		8.7*		7.1*		
N	529	491	543	476	529	2,180

Note: *: $p < .05$. IO: Issue Ownership. Entries are percentages giving each answer. The Duncan index is calculated with respect to the Standard IO version and the index differences show the difference between the index scores for, respectively, the long- and short term versions and the best policy and qualified versions. Significance tests are based on bootstrapping using 1,000 replications.

respondents. On the associative measure, a higher degree of concentration can be noted. Even for this version, it is only on immigration, however, that a single party (the Danish People's Party) can be seen as *the* issue owner in the sense that it dominates completely. The use of the two non-party categories also deserves notice. These are used fairly widely, totalling between 7.2 and 34.0 percent of responses. The two categories, but 'Don't know' in particular, are used least in the associative version. This result should not be too surprising since this measure asks for respondents' immediate reactions. The high prevalence of non-party answers in some versions underlines the need to include such categories on ownership measures and tells the substantive story that up to 1/3 of voters may be rather confused about issue ownerships.

Turning then to the question of what drives responses to the standard measure, the lower two rows for each issue in Tables 1 and 2 provide the relevant information in the form of the Duncan index scores indicating how many percentage points a given distribution of answers would have to change to match that of the standard measure. The index scores have been graphed in Figure 1. Looking first at the temporal aspect as reflected in the overlap between the standard measure and the short- and long-term measures, respectively, Table 1 and Figure 1 show a score of 9.8 for the long-term measure on immigration. This means that 9.8 percentage points of the answers to the long-term measure would have to change to arrive at the distribution of answers to the standard measure. This difference, furthermore, is significant at the .05-level. For the short-term measure, the comparable figure is 6.1. Comparing these two figures, as is done in the following row, shows that they are statistically indistinguishable – i.e., their difference of 3.7 is not significantly different from 0. For the other three issues, however, the differences are significantly distinguishable from 0 (cf. also Figure 1). Results are, in other words, somewhat mixed. Yet, with three out of four differences being significant and all four showing the score for the long-term version to be

larger – the balance of the evidence clearly shows that responses to the standard measure, in contrast to what Budge and Farlie (1983a; b) and Egan (2013, 156) proposed, are more influenced by short- than long-term considerations.¹⁴ The standard measure does not, in other words, primarily capture the long-term aspect of the concept.

Regarding the question of the influence of policy and qualification considerations on answers to the standard measure, the results are more in line with the thoughts of the founding fathers. Thus, although only three out of four differences are significant, they all show that answers to the standard measure are more like those to the qualification than the policy focused measure (see also the third and fourth lines of Figure 1). This finding, which mirrors Therriault’s (2015) results, is good news for the standard measure in the sense that on

Figure 1. Overlap between Standard Issue Ownership Measure and Five Alternatives, Duncan Index Scores.

Note: The figure shows the value of the Duncan Index-measure of the extent of overlap between each of the five issue ownership measure versions and the standard ‘handling’-format. See tables 1 and 2 for details.

¹⁴ Apart from the differences between the best policy and qualification measures shrinking somewhat and therefore losing significance, all of the results reported are upheld if the response categories ‘Equally good/bad’ and ‘Don’t know’ are removed from the analysis.

this point it may be better at capturing the theoretical core of issue ownership than theories of motivated reasoning would otherwise lead us to believe.

The final aspect of the examination of the drivers of answers to the standard measure pertains to its overlap with the associative measure. As can be seen from the last columns of tables 1 and 2 as well as the last line of Figure 1, the score of the Duncan index is always higher for the associative measure than for any of the other four measures across all four issues. The index scores are, furthermore, all significant. In this respect, the results accord with those of Walgrave and co-authors (2012; 2016) and show that the standard measure is relatively clearly differentiated from the associative dimension. This is good news for the standard measure, but it reiterates the question of whether it is more expedient to see associative issue ownership as a dimension of issue ownership or as a separate concept altogether. I return to this discussion below.

How stable are responses over time?

The first round of analyses showed responses to the standard measure to be more aligned with those to the short-term alternative than those to the long-term alternative; i.e., that the measure is not a valid operationalisation of the long-term aspect of the concept. To pry further into this problem for the standard measure this section investigates the over-time stability of responses to the measures. To do so, I rely on the panel component of the study. Table 3 presents, across measures and issues, the percentage of respondents who give a different answer to the ownership questions on the panel waves (see Table A2 in the supplementary materials for the confidence intervals for the scores in Table 3).

The table shows that the measures vary substantially with respect to the degree of instability and that in a way that conforms to the results from the first round of analyses. Most notably, the table shows that the standard measure is among the least stable. Thus, its level of instability is indistinguishable from that for the short-term measure on all four issues. At the

same time, the long-term measure has the overall lowest score implying that it is the most stable measure. As in the previous section, therefore, the conclusion seems to be that short-term factors are stronger than long-term ones when it comes to influencing answers to the standard issue ownership question which, therefore, seems ill suited to capture the long-term component of issue ownership – particularly compared to the long-term alternative. There appears to be no particular pattern to the stability of the remaining three measures, except that they are all less stable than the long-term one (except on immigration).¹⁵

Table 3. Instability of Issue Ownership Measures, Per Cent

	Standard IO	Long-Term IO	Short-Term IO	Best Policy IO	Best Qualified IO	Associative IO
Immigration	60.5	54.1	54.7	41.7*	42.7*	27.7*
Tax Policy	51.6	35.6*	49.1	51.4	58.3	71.6*
Unemployment	58.1	40.9*	59.5	61.9	57.9	58.9
The Danish Economy	49.8	43.6	53.3	49.7	61.6*	53.2
Mean	55.0	43.5	54.1	51.2	55.1	52.9

Note: *: Difference from standard measure is significant at $p < .05$. All figures are significantly different from 0.

How much of the variation picked up by the standard measure of issue ownership is unique?

As noted, the influence of party identification and policy agreement on answers to the six versions of the issue ownership question across the four issues is gauged by means of McFadden's R^2 from conditional logit models with the latter as dependent and the two former, as well as a set of party constants, as independent variables. The overall results appear in Table 4 while the coefficients of the estimated models appear in the supplementary material.¹⁶ To illustrate the results, Figure 2 plots the added explanatory power for each

¹⁵ As was the case for the Duncan indices in the previous section, the overall result is upheld if the 'Equally good/bad' and 'Don't know' categories are excluded from the analysis.

¹⁶ The coefficients appear in tables A13-A36 while confidence intervals for the estimated values of McFadden's R^2 appear in Table A3.

combination of issue ownership measure and issue (i.e., the contents of the ‘Difference’ rows for each issue in Table 4).

Overall, the table and figure reproduce the core findings of the first two sections of the analysis: the standard measure behaves more like the short-term one which is to say worse than the long-term measure. Taking the immigration issue as example, the results show that whereas the two predispositions add some 44.3 percentage points (i.e., the difference between 48.9 and 13.8) explanatory power when it comes to predicting answers to the standard measure, the comparable figures are 35.1 and 43.3, respectively, for the long- and short-term versions. And whereas the difference between the figures for the long-term and standard measures is significant, this does not apply for the difference between the short-term and

Table 4. Predispositions and Issue Ownership, McFadden’s R^2 .

	Standard IO	Long-Term IO	Short-Term IO	Best Policy IO	Best Qualified IO	Associative IO
Immigration						
Empty model	12.4	13.8	14.0	6.6	9.2	61.3
Full model	56.7	48.9	57.3	61.1	60.8	63.8
Difference	44.3*	35.1*	43.3*	54.5*	51.6*	2.5*
Difference to std. mea.		-9.2*	-1.0	10.2*	7.3*	41.8*
Tax Policy						
Empty model	17.8	30.6	20.3	7.5	13.5	19.6
Full model	67.4	59.4	63.7	63.8	59.4	23.2
Difference	49.6*	28.8*	43.4*	56.3*	45.9*	3.6*
Difference to std. mea.		-20.8*	-6.2	6.7	-3.7	46.0*
Unemployment						
Empty model	19.1	34.6	22.5	11.4	14.1	32.3
Full model	60.3	64.2	65.3	58.2	63.5	33.9
Difference	41.2*	29.6*	42.8*	46.8*	49.4*	1.6*
Difference to std. mea.		-11.6*	1.6	5.6	8.2	39.6*
The Danish Economy						
Empty model	24.6	32.5	25.3	18.7	20.9	28.7
Full model	71.1	63.2	71.1	66.5	68.1	44.3
Difference	46.5*	30.7*	45.8*	47.8*	47.2*	15.6*
Difference to std. mea.		-15.8*	-0.7	1.3	0.7	30.9*

Note: *: $p < .05$. IO: Issue Ownership. Entries are explained variance as measured by McFadden’s R^2 from conditional logit models multiplied by 100. The empty models include only party intercepts whereas the full models add party identification and policy agreement between respondents and the parties. Significance tests are based on the coefficients of the party identification and policy agreement variables. Asterisks indicate that at least one of the two variables differed significantly across two models compared.

standard measures. This pattern is, furthermore, replicated across all four issues. Not only are answers to the standard measure dominated by short-term factors as shown above, this dominance is also associated with a significantly higher degree of redundancy *vis-à-vis* the predispositions than is the case for the long-term measure.

There are, on the other hand, no stable patterns when comparing the standard measure with the best policy and best qualified alternatives. Thus, on all issues except immigration, on which responses to the two alternatives are more influenced by the predispositions than those to the standard measure, these two measures fare about the same as the standard measure. That cannot be said for the associative measure in the last column of the table and the bottom line of the figure, however. Responses to this version are only influenced by voter predispositions to a very limited extent which is also reflected in the large differences between the added explanatory power for this measure and that for the standard measure.

Figure 2. Added Explanatory Power from Predispositions across Six Measures of Issue Ownership, McFadden's R^2 .

Note: The figure shows the change in the value of McFadden's R^2 when adding party identification and policy agreement to conditional logit models predicting answers to the six different measures of issue ownership. See Table 4 for more details.

This finding, which parallels the very high Duncan scores in tables 1 and 2, most likely reflects the point noted above, that the mere association between a party and an issue entails no evaluative component; hence, the motivated reasoning mechanisms propelling respondents to align their ownership perceptions with their partisanship and attitudes are not triggered. This provides further evidence that the associative dimension is a separate construct to issue ownership as traditionally conceptualized and measured.

The question naturally arises as to whether the influence of the predispositions is problematically high. For most individual level analysts used to substantial levels of measurement error and underspecified models, the added explanatory power of close to 50 per cent for the standard measure would probably be sufficient to create concern about the independence of the measure. But to provide a standard of comparison outside the issue ownership framework, parallel analyses of party choice show that the predispositions explain 68-69 per cent of the variation in this variable. Taking this figure as an upper bound of how much one might expect the predispositions to explain net of measurement error etc., the figures for the standard measure do appear problematic. Finding that the predispositions attain 60-70 per cent of their explanatory potential on party choice (which they are expected to influence) for issue ownership (which they are not expected to influence to any substantial degree) does raise concerns about the independence of ownership perceptions as assessed by the standard measure (and the measures that behave like it) This, in turn, raises the question of how to deal with the problems for the standard measure that have been identified – the topic of the concluding discussion.

Conclusion

This paper has addressed three challenges to the issue ownership literature: 1) the lack of a clear definition, 2) the possibility that the standard measure of issue ownership does not adequately capture the theoretical core of the concept and 3) the possibility that issue

ownership as assessed by the standard measure is little more than a reflection of respondents' party identification and/or policy attitudes. The first challenge was addressed in a discussion of the seminal contributions to the literature out of which individual level issue ownership was defined as *the perception in a voter's mind that a specific party over the long term is most competent at handling – in the sense of delivering desired outputs on – a given issue*. This definition has the advantage of focusing the concept on three defining aspects: 1) perceptions about parties' handling of issues 2) the long-term perspective and 3) the positive aspect entailed in the party being seen as 'best'; this is the aspect that makes such ownerships interesting to parties as a possible way to win votes.

The second and third challenges were addressed in empirical analyses experimentally comparing responses to the standard 'which party is best at handling issue X' measure of issue ownership to other issue ownership measures highlighting different aspects that may or may not influence the standard one. The results show that the standard measure is problematic on two counts. First, the measure fails to adequately tap the long-term component of the definition. Rather, answers to it are driven more by short-term considerations which also shows up in substantial levels of instability in responses to the standard measure. Second, responses to the standard measure share large amounts of variation with such well-established concepts as party identification and policy attitudes. Also in this respect, incidentally, is the measure more like the short-term than long-term one. These problems have serious implications: The lack of ability to capture a core aspect of the definition means that the standard measure has low validity and the high levels of shared variation (hovering in the 50 per cent range) means that the measure is (at least) partially redundant thereby having a limited contribution to our understanding of public opinion.

These problems may be handled in (at least) two ways: 1) Maintaining the standard measure and revising the definition of issue ownership to focus on the short term or 2)

Maintaining the definition and revising the measure of issue ownership. For some, probably not least students of party competition, the first solution may seem tempting. Research (e.g., Christensen et al. 2015; Stubager and Seeberg 2016; Walgrave et al. 2009) has shown, and the tests above confirmed, that issue ownership assessed by the standard measure is a short-term phenomenon that varies substantially across time. Both the founding fathers and Egan (2013), thus, seem to have been wrong on the temporal dimension. Rather, issue ownership can be seen as a summary measure of how a party ‘stands’ in the eyes of the electorate on a given issue at a given point in time, as a sort of issue specific ‘approval rating’. In this perspective, focus would not so much be on what goes into forming ownership perceptions, but more on their predictive power when it comes to explaining aggregate election outcomes.

For individual level analysts, however, solution 1) is far from appealing. Thus, the finding that responses to the standard measure are determined to such high degree by predispositions in the form of party identification and policy agreement means that the measure is problematic to use at the individual level: It overlaps too much with these other factors and, consequently, risks obscuring individual level voting models since it becomes difficult to determine the independent effect of ownership perceptions. This, in turn, implies that solution 1) should not really be appealing to analysts of party competition either. By choosing it, they would effectively be building on sand. It might well be that ownership as measured by the standard measure has predictive power, but it is unclear how much independent variation it adds over voter predispositions and, therefore, how we should expect it to react to various types of party behaviour. The predictive power, in other words, would be bought at the price of empirical clarity.

This line of argument leads me to suggest as preferable the second solution: to maintain the definition presented above which is based on the seminal texts in the field and comports with the intentions laid out therein, but to replace the measure of issue ownership.

Fortunately, the analyses point to a suitable alternative measure. Thus, a combination of the long-term measure and possibly (to assure the focus on parties' qualifications) the qualification focus of the best qualified measure seems the optimal solution. Such a measure would look like this: 'If you disregard the current situation and look, instead, at the last 30-40 years which party is then in your opinion best qualified to handle [issue X]?' Theoretically, such a measure contains all three of the core aspects of the definition (focus on handling qualifications, the long term and the positive valuation) – it is, in other words, a valid measure. Empirically, the long-term measure tested above has much less variation in common with the two predispositions – it picks up more unique variation, in other words. It is, furthermore, also a more stable measure. These points imply that the proposed new measure is superior to the standard one. It is therefore my recommendation to replace the standard measure with the one proposed here.

The emphasis on the long-term aspect of issue ownership in both the definition and measure proposed should not as also noted by Petrocik (1996, 826, 827) be interpreted to mean that issue ownership is a constant. Also long-term perceptions can – and do as the panel analysis showed – change over time. While we do not know much about it yet, it would be my expectation that such changes are associated with a transition phase during which ownership perceptions are blurred and/or less of an asset for parties. It should be expected, thus, that voters place more faith in – and therefore react more on – a long-held ownership than a recently established lease. Ownerships should, therefore, be particularly potent arguments in political campaigns since the long-term aspect confers a high level of trustworthiness (cf. Petrocik 1996). In this temporal respect, issue ownership can be seen as a parallel to the concept of party identification in the traditional Michigan school version (Campbell et al. 1960): it is a standing perception of a long-term association between a party and an issue that – just as voting one's party identification – may be challenged at a given

point in time by short-term forces. Only if such forces persist, should ownership change follow.

While the proposed new measure is, in my assessment, preferable to the existing one, two potential challenges for it should be mentioned. First, the 30-40 years time frame which, as discussed in the supplementary materials, seems necessary to achieve the desired independence of responses from voter predispositions, does imply some degree of imprecision with regard to parties that have not existed for such a period of time or voters who may lack information about the period. As noted, these problems should not be overstated, but they point to a potential for further refinement in that future studies may explore better ways to focus respondents' attention on the long-term perspective. Second, the absolute level of instability of responses to the long-term measure may give cause for some consideration about the extent to which it is successful in picking up respondents' long-term perceptions.

Two points should be noted in this context. Firstly, the data reveals that on average only 16 per cent of respondents change from one party to another between the two panel waves. This is (also) the lowest figure for all six measures and particularly considering possible measurement error and the three year time span between the panel waves, it is a rather low figure showing the expected degree of stability in perceptions. It does, however, also imply that the non-party categories may be used by respondents as more temporary response alternatives perhaps reflecting short-term generated doubts (i.e., the 'blur' referred to above). Thus, and secondly, the instability revealed by Table 3 shows that even though the measure is designed to focus on the long term, it does pick up some amount of short-term influences too just as it is influenced by predispositions to some extent (on both counts, however, less so than the standard measure). This may be unavoidable given the stronger presence in respondents' memories of recent events. But just like the 30-40 years time frame it indicates a

point where future research may be able to identify an even better alternative. At present, however, the long-term measure seems preferable to the standard one for the reasons discussed here.

Regarding the discussion of a possible associative sub-dimension of issue ownership, the analyses have confirmed the expectation that responses to a measure of associative issue ownership deviate markedly from those to the five other measures examined. Likewise, the associative measure is very differently related to respondents' predispositions. These results thereby underline the question of whether it is helpful to consider the associative dimension as part of the issue ownership concept. Although the dimension is derived from one of the (several) aspects mentioned in Petrocik's (1996) definition of issue ownership, it does not contain the fundamental positive valance of seeing a party as 'best' at dealing with an issue. Therefore, the associative dimension should neither be expected to have the same causes nor effects – including on election outcomes which drove initial interest in issue ownership – as ownerships traditionally understood. This expectation is supported by the results above. In my view, consequently, it adds more semantic confusion than clarity to talk of 'associative issue ownership'. This does not mean that what is picked up by such measures is uninteresting – indeed the analyses showed it to be fairly unique *vis-à-vis* the predispositions. But it appears theoretically as well as analytically more fruitful to address the question of what it is and does under a different heading than issue *ownership*.

In drawing these conclusions, two caveats concerning the present study have to be kept in mind. First, the study contains only one country, Denmark. The country's multi-party political system implies that more parties are in play as possible issue owners than in, e.g., the USA or the UK. On the one hand, this may imply that Denmark is a critical case as the relatively large number of parties may make it more difficult for voters to ascribe issue ownership than in systems with fewer parties, thereby blunting the mechanisms expected to

differentiate between the various measures. On the other hand, differences, e.g., in terms of the degree of conflict overlap between two- and multiparty systems may also be so large that issue ownership dynamics differ qualitatively thereby limiting the generalization potential of the present study. Against this argument, I would, however, point to the fact that the results above replicate those from similar studies from multiparty systems such as Belgium (Walgrave et al. 2012; 2016) and Switzerland (Lachat 2014) as well as the US two-party system (Therriault 2015). On this basis, I would expect the results to generalize well beyond Denmark although, of course, future analyses will have to confirm this.

Second, the study only included four issues. While these have been selected on specific theoretical grounds set out above, it is necessary to raise the possibility that issue specific logics may be at play. To explore the generality of the findings, future studies should include more issues. With the new definition and measure of issue ownership in hand researchers conducting such future studies will in any case have a stronger theoretical and empirical base to work from and thereby a better chance of improving our understanding of both the causes and consequences of issue ownership.

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**Supplementary material for “What is issue ownership and how should we measure it?”,
by Rune Stubager, published in Political Behavior.**

This supplementary material contains seven items:

1. A description of the set-up of the experiment and the selection of measures for the main analysis.
2. The Danish language version of the issue ownership measure used.
3. Confidence intervals for the Duncan index scores, stability scores and McFadden's R^2 values presented in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the manuscript.
4. Analyses of the four versions of the issue ownership measure not analysed in the manuscript.
5. A follow-up study of the time frame of the long-term measure
6. Full results of the conditional logit models parts of which are presented in Table 3 of the manuscript.
7. Full results of the conditional logit models parts of which are presented in Table A6.

Experimental set-up and selection of measures for the main analysis.

The experiment was designed to examine three different, specific research questions about the wording of issue ownership measures: 1) The research question examined in the manuscript, 2) The existence of sub-dimensions of associative issue ownership, and 3) The comparability of answers to issue ownership items having all parties as response categories versus measures having only the two major competing governing blocks (which is the standard way of measuring issue ownership in Denmark). Of these three research questions, the first took priority over the others in determining the distribution of respondents over the ten experimental conditions that were included in the experiment (cf. below).

Each respondent was asked two types of ownership questions. First, one of the three associative measures (to maintain consistency with the numbering of measures in the main manuscript, the measures appearing there have the same number below; numbers in parentheses after each measure indicate which of the three research questions they were related to):¹⁷

6. Associative issue ownership (IO; 1,2): When you think about [issue X], which party do you spontaneously think about?
7. Emphasis IO (2): In your opinion, which party places the most emphasis on [issue X]?
8. Attention IO (2): In your opinion, which party pays the most attention to [issue X]?

¹⁷ All versions, except #9, had all parties as well as 'The parties are equally good/bad at it' and 'Don't know' as response categories. Version #9 had the following response categories: 'A Social Democratic led government', 'A bourgeois government', 'No difference', and 'Don't know'.

Even though the measures were assigned at random to the respondents, the probability of receiving the different measures was adjusted so as to allocate more respondents to the measure involved in the research question investigated in the manuscript. Thus, the chance of receiving version #6 was 50% while it was 35.7% and 14.3%, respectively, for #7 and 8. For each respondent, the allocated measure was repeated for all four issues in the study ('the immigration policy', 'the tax policy', 'the unemployment', and 'the Danish economy'). Next, each respondent was asked a second question, now randomly assigned (with the exception noted below) to one of the following seven conditions:

1. Standard IO (1): Which party is in your opinion best at handling [issue X]?
2. Long-term IO (1): If you disregard the current situation and look, instead, at the last 30-40 years which party is then in your opinion best at handling [issue X]?
3. Short-term IO (1): If you disregard the last 30-40 years and look, instead, at the current situation which party is then in your opinion best at handling [issue X]?
4. Best policy IO (1): In your opinion, which party has the best policy on [issue X]?
5. Best qualified IO (1): Which party do you think is best qualified to handle [issue X]?
9. Standard IO – two block (3): Which government is in your opinion best at handling [issue X]? Is it a Social Democratic led government or a bourgeois government?
10. Disregarding general attitude IO (1): Later, we will ask you about your general attitude towards the parties. Please therefore disregard your general perception of the parties when you answer the following questions.

Which party is in your opinion best at handling [issue X]?

For the second round of randomization, respondents receiving versions #6 and 7 on the first randomization had a chance of 14.3% (i.e., 1/7) of receiving each of the seven versions in the second round. However, because of limited interest in the difference between answers to version #8 and those to the versions in the second round, respondents receiving this version on the first randomization were randomly allocated to either version #1 or 9 on the second randomization.

Another, and perhaps more intuitive, way to explain the randomization is to view it as randomly dividing the respondents into 14 groups with equal probability. Seven of these (i.e., 50%) received version #6 and one of versions #1-5, 9 or 10. Five of them (i.e., 35.7%) received version #7 and one of versions #1-5, 9 or 10. The final two (i.e., 14.3%) received version #8 and either version #1 or 9.

This slightly complicated procedure has two implications that should be noted. First, the number of respondents receiving the different versions varies considerably. With the exception mentioned below, however, the randomization assures that the groups are fully comparable. Second, the decision to allocate respondents receiving version #8 to only versions #1 and 9 on the second round of randomization means that the group of respondents receiving these two versions differ from respondents receiving versions #2-5, or 10 since none of these respondents received version #8 on the first randomization. To counter this potential contamination of the experimental design, I have deleted respondents receiving version #8 on the first randomization from analyses of the measures from the second round of randomization.

As noted, only six (i.e., #1-6) of the ten versions are analyzed in the manuscript. The decision to focus on these six rests on the following considerations. As noted above, versions #7 and 8

were intended to probe differences within the associative issue ownership dimension. In order to focus the discussion of the manuscript this aspect was, however, left out. The same applies to version #9 which was intended to probe the comparability of answers across different response scales. Both of these research questions were deemed substantially less relevant to a wider audience and were therefore not pursued in the manuscript.

Regarding version #10 the situation is different. This version has been excluded from the discussion due to a suspected problem in the execution of the experiment. Thus, the text instructing respondents to disregard their general attitudes towards the parties was printed at the top of the screen containing the four questions (i.e., one for each issue). This means that to the extent that respondents saw this instruction – of which one cannot be sure – they might have forgotten about it as they started answering the actual questions that were otherwise identical to the standard measure (version #1). In other words, it is doubtful whether the experimental manipulation worked as intended for this version. What should have been done instead, was to insert the instruction to disregard the general attitude towards parties in each of the four specific questions. In spite of these differences in the origin of the four measures, analyses, parallel to those in the manuscript, of answers to them have been included below in order to document the functioning – or not – of the four omitted versions.

The Danish-language version of the issue ownership measures used.

- 1) Hvilket parti er efter din mening bedst til at håndtere [issue X]?
- 2) Hvis du ser bort fra den aktuelle situation og i stedet tænker på de seneste 30-40 år, hvilket parti er så efter din mening bedst til at håndtere [issue X]?
- 3) Hvis du ser bort fra udviklingen de seneste 30-40 år og i stedet tænker på den aktuelle situation, hvilket parti er så efter din mening bedst til at håndtere [issue X]?
- 4) Hvilket parti har efter din mening den bedste politik i forhold til [issue X]?
- 5) Hvilket parti er efter din mening bedst kvalificeret til at håndtere [issue X]?
- 6) Når du tænker på [issue X], hvilket parti kommer du så umiddelbart til at tænke på?
- 7) Hvilket parti lægger efter din mening mest vægt på [issue X]?
- 8) Hvilket parti er efter din mening mest opmærksomt på [issue X]?
- 9) Hvilken regering er efter din mening bedst til at håndtere [issue X]? Er det en socialdemokratisk ledet regering eller en borgerlig regering?
- 10) Vi vil senere spørge dig, om din generelle holdning til partierne. Du bedes derfor se bort fra hvad du generelt synes om partierne, når du besvarer de næste spørgsmål.

Hvilket parti er efter din mening bedst til at håndtere [issue X]?

The issues, substituted for [issue X], were 'Udlændingepolitikken', 'Skattepolitikken', 'Arbejdsløsheden', and 'Danmarks økonomi'.

Confidence intervals for the Duncan Index Scores and McFadden's R^2 values presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 of the manuscript.

Table A1. Confidence Intervals for Duncan Index Scores in Tables 1 and 2.

	Long-Term IO	Short-Term IO	Best Policy IO	Best Qualified IO	Associative IO
Immigration	4.8-14.9	1.6-10.5	7.8-18.0	2.3-11.3	42.2-45.9
Tax Policy	7.0-15.9	1.1-9.6	7.1-17.1	3.0-11.7	15.7-19.6
Unemployment	11.8-22.8	1.0-8.9	10.8-21.9	3.1-12.0	21.1-25.2
The Danish Economy	6.8-16.5	-0.9-6.7	7.2-17.1	1.0-9.2	10.6-14.2

Note: Entries are 95% confidence intervals for the Duncan index scores presented in Tables 1 and 2. The intervals are estimated using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. See Tables 1 and 2 and the text for further details.

Table A2. Confidence Intervals for Instability Scores in Table 3.

	Standard IO	Long-Term IO	Short-Term IO	Best Policy IO	Best Qualified IO	Associative IO
Immigration	51.8-69.2	45.6-62.6	45.6-63.9	32.5-50.8	34.1-51.2	23.2-32.1
Tax Policy	42.7-60.5	27.4-43.8	39.9-58.3	42.1-60.7	49.8-66.8	67.1-76.1
Unemployment	49.3-66.9	32.5-49.3	50.5-68.5	52.9-70.9	49.4-66.4	54.0-63.7
The Danish Economy	41.0-58.7	35.2-52.1	44.1-62.5	40.4-59.0	53.2-70.0	48.3-58.2
Mean	41.6-68.4	36.2-51.0	38.0-70.3	39.2-63.1	44.4-65.8	48.3-57.4

Note: Entries are 95% confidence intervals for the instability scores presented in Table 3. See Table 3 and the text for further details.

Table A3. Confidence Intervals for McFadden's R^2 Values in Table 4.

	Standard IO	Long-Term IO	Short-Term IO	Best Policy IO	Best Qualified IO	Associative IO
Immigration						
Empty model	0.08-0.17	0.09-0.18	0.09-0.19	0.03-0.10	0.05-0.13	0.58-0.65
Full model	0.50-0.63	0.42-0.56	0.51-0.64	0.55-0.67	0.54-0.67	0.61-0.67
Tax Policy						
Empty model	0.12-0.21	0.24-0.37	0.15-0.26	0.03-0.12	0.09-0.18	0.17-0.22
Full model	0.61-0.74	0.52-0.67	0.58-0.69	0.58-0.70	0.53-0.66	0.21-0.26
Unemployment						
Empty model	0.14-0.25	0.28-0.41	0.16-0.29	0.07-0.16	0.09-0.19	0.29-0.35
Full model	0.54-0.67	0.58-0.71	0.59-0.72	0.52-0.65	0.57-0.70	0.31-0.37
The Danish Economy						
Empty model	0.19-0.29	0.26-0.39	0.19-0.31	0.13-0.24	0.15-0.27	0.26-0.31
Full model	0.65-0.77	0.57-0.69	0.65-0.78	0.42-0.55	0.62-0.74	0.41-0.47

Note: Entries are 95% confidence intervals for the McFadden's R^2 values presented in Table 4. The intervals are estimated using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. See Table 4 and the text for further details.

Analyses of the four versions of the issue ownership measure not analysed in the manuscript.

In general, the analyses of the four versions of the issue ownership experiment that are not included in the manuscript are conducted in the same way as the analyses that are included. The main exception to this procedure relates to the two block version of the standard issue ownership measure for which the response scale, and therefore parts of the analytical set-up, is different. I shall discuss these differences along the way. The first step in the analysis is the presentation of the distributions of responses as well as Duncan index scores calculated for the distributions on each of the alternative measures (except the two block one where this calculation does not make sense) and that of the standard measure. The relevant figures appear in tables A4 and A5 which also reproduce the distributions for the standard measure for comparison (the confidence intervals for the Duncan index scores in tables A4 and A5 appear in Table A6).

The first point to note is that the suspicion, mentioned above, that the experimental manipulation did not work for the disregarding general attitude measure finds some support in the rather low scores on the Duncan index. In general, these scores are at the level of those for the short-term and best qualified measures. This indicates that either respondents were not fully capable of disregarding their general attitudes or the manipulation did not work. As noted, I strongly suspect the latter, but either way, the results for this measure do not contribute much interesting variation, hence their inclusion only in this supplementary analysis. The results for the emphasis and attention measures rather closely resemble those for the associative measure in the main analyses. This is a small surprise as they were intended as variations of this measure. Thereby, they also confirm the conclusions drawn for the associative measure in the manuscript.

Table A4. Issue Ownership of Immigration and Tax Policy, Per Cent and Duncan Index Scores.

	Standard IO	Standard IO – two block	Disregar- ding gen. att. IO	Emphasis IO	Attention IO
Immigration					
Social Democrats	16.3		11.8	4.8	4.2
Social Liberals	7.4		8.4	4.1	4.1
Conservatives	1.5		1.8	0.7	0.2
Socialist People's Party	4.3		5.6	1.4	1.9
Liberal Allinace	1.7		1.8	0.8	0.5
Christian Democrats	0.4		0.8	0.2	0.4
Danish People's Party	32.1		36.3	68.2	62.2
Liberals	10.6		9.4	3.0	2.1
Red-Green Alliance	5.9		5.4	5.3	8.5
Social Democratic led gvt.		31.2			
Bourgeois government		40.5			
Equally Good/Bad	9.6	22.1	9.6	3.2	2.8
Don't know	10.2	6.2	9.2	8.3	13.1
Duncan Index			7.2*	36.1*	35.5*
Tax Policy					
Social Democrats	19.5		16.6	11.3	9.4
Social Liberals	5.3		6.0	3.8	3.4
Conservatives	3.8		4.4	10.7	10.1
Socialist People's Party	2.5		2.0	1.2	1.2
Liberal Allinace	5.5		5.2	16.6	14.7
Christian Democrats	0.2		0.0	0.0	0.2
Danish People's Party	4.9		4.8	4.6	4.8
Liberals	25.3		29.5	27.0	24.6
Red-Green Alliance	4.2		3.2	3.3	6.7
Social Democratic led gvt.		25.7			
Bourgeois government		43.9			
Equally Good/Bad	16.3	24.4	16.4	7.4	8.0
Don't know	12.7	6.0	12.0	13.9	17.1
Duncan Index			5.6*	21.0*	22.4*
N	529	565	501	1,454	566

Note: *: $p < .05$. IO: Issue Ownership. Entries are percentages giving each answer. The Duncan index is calculated with respect to the Standard IO. Significance tests are based on bootstrapping using 1,000 replications.

Table A5. Issue Ownership of Unemployment and the Danish Economy, Per Cent and Duncan Index Scores.

	Standard IO	Standard IO – two block	Disregar- ding gen. att. IO	Emphasis IO	Attention IO
Unemployment					
Social Democrats	23.1		20.8	19.0	17.0
Social Liberals	2.8		4.4	1.8	1.9
Conservatives	1.5		1.6	1.7	0.7
Socialist People's Party	3.6		4.6	5.3	4.4
Liberal Allinace	2.5		4.4	2.6	2.5
Christian Democrats	0.2		0.0	0.1	0.4
Danish People's Party	5.1		4.6	6.4	6.5
Liberals	18.9		20	10.2	9.9
Red-Green Alliance	8.3		8.8	29.5	30.0
Social Democratic led gvt.		32.6			
Bourgeois government		32.0			
Equally Good/Bad	22.7	28.0	20.6	11.0	10.1
Don't know	11.3	7.4	10.4	12.5	16.6
Duncan Index			6.1*	25.7*	29.5*
The Danish Economy					
Social Democrats	21.6		18.4	17.2	14.8
Social Liberals	6.6		9.4	8.4	8.0
Conservatives	2.8		2.8	4.3	2.7
Socialist People's Party	0.9		1.2	0.7	1.4
Liberal Allinace	2.8		3.0	6.6	5.1
Christian Democrats	0.4		0.0	0.1	0.2
Danish People's Party	5.1		3.8	5.5	5.7
Liberals	28.5		33.7	29.4	29.7
Red-Green Alliance	2.8		2.2	2.2	3.9
Social Democratic led gvt.		26.4			
Bourgeois government		41.9			
Equally Good/Bad	18.1	25.0	14.6	12.4	13.3
Don't know	10.2	6.7	11.0	13.3	15.4
Duncan Index			9.1*	11.4*	12.1*
N	529	565	501	1,454	566

Note: *: $p < .05$. IO: Issue Ownership. Entries are percentages giving each answer. The Duncan index is calculated with respect to the Standard IO version. Significance tests are based on bootstrapping using 1,000 replications.

Table A6. Confidence Intervals for Duncan Index Scores in Tables A4 and A5.

	Disregarding gen. att. IO	Emphasis IO	Attention IO
Immigration	2.6-11.9	33.8-38.4	32.6-38.5
Tax Policy	1.0-10.2	18.8-23.3	18.7-26.2
Unemployment	1.8-10.1	23.2-28.2	25.5-33.4
The Danish Econ.	3.9-14.3	9.0-13.7	8.7-15.5

Note: Entries are 95% confidence intervals for the Duncan index scores presented in Tables A4 and A5. The intervals are estimated using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. See Tables A4 and A5 and the text for further details.

As for the two block measure, it is not possible to compare directly with the other measures. However, what should be noted is that the response category ‘Equally good/bad’ – which for this version was phrased as ‘No difference’ – is used much more frequently than for the other measures. In contrast, the ‘Don’t know’ option is used less frequently than for all other measures except the associative one. These differences make good sense as they reflect the lower number of response categories which, on the one hand, imply that respondents’ are forced to be less specific in their answers and may, therefore, be unable to differentiate clearly between the two government alternatives (both of which may contain parties with good as well as bad capabilities on a given issue) while, on the other hand, they are not forced to make a choice between parties about all of which they may not have sufficient information. These response patterns also mean that it is not possible to simply aggregate responses given on a scale having all parties as response categories together in the two government alternatives in order to arrive at responses to the two block measure.

The next set of analyses appears in Table A7, which mirrors Table 4, and Table A8 which contains the confidence intervals for the figures in Table A7 (again, results for the standard measure are reproduced for comparison; full results of the models estimated appear in tables A37-A52). A number of observations can be made. First, responses to the disregarding general attitudes measure seem to be somewhat less influenced by the two predispositions

than those to the standard measure. This may indicate that the manipulation did have at least some of its intended effect. Given the potential problems noted above, however, it is difficult to know how much confidence to have in this interpretation. It should be noted, also, that the predispositions have even less influence on the long-term measure (cf. Table 4). Second, although the influence of the predispositions on the emphasis and attention measures is considerably lower than for the standard measure, it is somewhat higher than for the associative measure reported in Table 4. This means that the latter appears more unique than the two former and may, therefore, be seen as a more interesting measure of this aspect of voters' images of parties.

Table A7. Predispositions and Issue Ownership, McFadden's R^2 .

	Standard IO	Standard IO – two block	Disregarding gen. att. IO	Emphasis IO	Attention IO
Immigration					
Empty model	12.4	0.2	13.8	55.5	50.3
Full model	56.7	59.6	56.8	60.8	59.6
Difference	44.3*	59.4*	43.0*	5.3*	9.3*
Tax Policy					
Empty model	17.8	1.0	20.1	15.9	14.0
Full model	67.4	66.7	59.2	25.8	31.5
Difference	49.6*	65.7*	39.1*	7.3*	11.8*
Unemployment					
Empty model	19.1	0.6	15.5	20.1	20.1
Full model	60.3	63.9	49.3	41.7	43.8
Difference	41.2*	63.3*	33.8*	21.6*	23.7*
The Danish Economy					
Empty model	24.0	0.8	25.6	18.9	18.2
Full model	71.1	73.8	63.3	48.4	49.6
Difference	47.1*	73.0*	37.7*	29.5*	31.4*

Note: *: $p < .05$. IO: Issue Ownership. Entries are explained variance as measured by McFadden's R^2 from conditional logit models multiplied by 100. The empty models include only party intercepts whereas the full models add party identification and policy agreement between respondents and the parties. Significance tests are based on the coefficients of the party identification and policy agreement variables. Asterisks indicate that at least one of the two variables differed significantly across two models compared.

Tabel A8. Confidence Intervals for McFadden's R^2 Values in Table A7.

	Standard IO	Standard IO – two block	Disregarding gen. att. IO	Emphasis IO	Attention IO
Immigration					
Empty model	0.09-0.16	-0.02-0.03	0.09-0.19	0.51-0.60	0.43-0.57
Full model	0.53-0.63	0.45-0.74	0.50-0.63	0.57-0.65	0.53-0.66
Tax Policy					
Empty model	0.12-0.21	-0.03-0.05	0.14-0.26	0.13-0.19	0.09-0.19
Full model	0.62-0.72	0.53-0.80	0.52-0.67	0.23-0.29	0.26-0.37
Unemployment					
Empty model	0.13-0.22	-0.03-0.04	0.10-0.21	0.17-0.23	0.15-0.25
Full model	0.56-0.66	0.48-0.80	0.42-0.56	0.38-0.45	0.37-0.50
The Danish Economy					
Empty model	0.18-0.27	-0.03-0.04	0.19-0.32	0.16-0.22	0.13-0.24
Full model	0.66-0.76	0.61-0.86	0.57-0.69	0.45-0.52	0.43-0.56

Note: Entries are 95% confidence intervals for the McFadden's R^2 values presented in Table A7. The intervals are estimated using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. See Table A7 and the text for further details.

Third are the results for the two-block measure. For this, the independent variables had to be coded slightly different. First, there was only one constant term (one less than the number of response categories when 'No difference' and 'Don't know' are excluded). Second, the party identification measure was recoded such that respondents identifying (strongly or not) with or leaning towards one of the four parties backing a Social Democratic government (i.e., the Social Democrats, the Social Liberals, the Socialist People's Party or the Red-Green Alliance) were coded as identifying (strongly or not) with or leaning towards a Social Democratic led government while those identifying with or leaning towards one of the four parties backing a bourgeois government (the Conservatives, the Liberal Alliance, the Danish People's Party or the Liberals) were coded as identifying with or leaning towards such a government. Third, the policy agreement measures for each government alternative were calculated as weighted averages of respondents' perceived agreement with the four parties backing each government alternative where the agreement with each party was weighted by the party's share of the combined support for the four parties on a simple question of

preferred vote choice if an election were held today. In this way, the analyses are set up to replicate, as far as possible, the procedure for the other measures.

The results show a distinctive pattern where only very little variation is explained by the government alternative constant while the predispositions explain so much that the full model for this measure has the highest value of McFadden's R^2 for two issues and comes in second place on the two others. As a consequence, the added explanatory power stemming from the predispositions clearly outperform what is observed for the other measures. Thus, the results seem to indicate that the two block measure has relatively little to offer in terms of unique variation. When combining this with the observation that the 'No difference' category is used more frequently for the two block measure, the conclusion seems to be that this measure does not perform well.

In sum, the analyses of the four measures excluded from the main analysis seem to have supported the conclusions drawn there while at the same time bringing forth a number of relatively minor details related to the specific content and/or set-up of the four measures.

The time frame of the long-term measure

As noted, the 30-40 years time frame of the long-term measure of issue ownership may be a cause for some concern about how well the measure functions with respect to parties that have not existed for such a period of time as well as voters that do not possess information about such a period of time. Since the choice of this particular time frame is somewhat arbitrary and is mainly intended to induce respondents to consider the long- over the short term, it is worth investigating whether a parallel measure with a shorter time horizon would have the same properties as the measure included in the main study. To conduct such an investigation, a follow-up study was run in the latter half of November 2016. The set-up for this study was identical to the one employed in the main study except that it only included three versions of the issue ownership question: the standard and long-term versions from the main study as well as a new alternative, labelled ‘10 years issue ownership’, phrased as follows:

If you disregard the current situation and look, instead, at the last 10 years
which party is then in your opinion best at handling [issue X]?

The study was run by the same company, Epinion, using the same standing panel as in the main study. With 925 respondents answering all questions, the response rate was 75.4% and respondents are representative of the general, voting age population on gender, age and region of residence.

To gauge the performance of the 10 years measure compared to that of the standard and long-term ones, I conducted the same analyses as in the manuscript – except, of course, those using the panel component of the main study. The first analysis, thus, compares the Duncan index scores for the long-term and 10 years measures calculated with respect to the standard measure in order to see whether the two former overlap with the latter to the same extent. As Table A9 shows, the overlap is not identical and although the differences between the scores

for the two alternative measures are not significant, the pattern is clear in the sense that responses to the 10 years measure consistently overlap more with those to the standard measure than do those to the long-term measure. The two alternatives do not, that is, seem to perform in the same way.

Table A9. Overlap between Standard Issue Ownership Measure and Two Alternatives, Duncan Index Scores.

	Long-Term IO	10 Years IO	Difference
Immigration	13.2*	7.6*	5.6
Tax Policy	11.8*	10.4*	1.4
Unemployment	15.1*	8.1*	6.9
The Danish Economy	14.2*	10.2*	4.0
N	354	347	341

Note: *: $p < .05$. IO: Issue Ownership. The Duncan index is calculated with respect to the Standard IO version. Significance tests are based on bootstrapping using 1,000 replications.

Table A10. Confidence Intervals for Duncan Index Scores in Table A9.

	Long-Term IO	10 Years IO
Immigration	7.6-18.6	2.5-12.7
Tax Policy	6.9-17.2	4.5-16.3
Unemployment	8.9-21.3	3.7-13.6
The Danish Econ.	8.1-20.3	4.8-15.6

Note: Entries are 95% confidence intervals for the Duncan index scores presented in Table A9. The intervals are estimated using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications.

The differences in the performance of the two alternatives become more pronounced when turning to the analyses of the added explanatory power of the predispositions party identification and policy agreement in Table A11. Across all four issues, thus, results for the 10 years measure resemble those for the standard one more than do those for the long-term one. And whereas the differences between the long-term and standard measures are significant or nearly so on three of the four issues, this is only the case on one issue for the 10 years measure which generally seems to perform similarly to the standard one on this test.

The conclusion emanating from the follow-up study, thus, is that rather than mirroring the performance of the long-term measure, the 10 years measure behaves much more like the standard measure. It seems, therefore, that the 30-40 years time frame is necessary to induce the desired properties of the long-term measure, particularly the lower level of shared variation with the two well-known predispositions. Regarding the comparison of the standard and long-term measures, incidentally, the follow-up study nicely replicates the results from the main study thereby reinforcing confidence in these findings.

Table A11. Predispositions and Issue Ownership, McFadden's R^2 .

	Standard IO	Long-Term IO	10 Years IO
Immigration			
Empty model	13.1	8.7	9.8
Full model	53.1	44.5	55.7
Difference	40.0*	35.8*	45.9*
Difference to std. mea.		-4.2	5.9
Tax Policy			
Empty model	13.3	16.5	6.1
Full model	58.9	49.6	54.2
Difference	45.6*	33.1*	48.1*
Difference to std. mea.		-12.5*	2.5
Unemployment			
Empty model	19.6	27.0	14.2
Full model	61.4	56.8	48.1
Difference	41.8*	29.8*	33.9*
Difference to std. mea.		-12.0 [†]	-7.9*
The Danish Economy			
Empty model	17.6	22.4	11.9
Full model	65.1	56.8	60.3
Difference	47.5*	34.4*	48.4*
Difference to std. mea.		-13.1*	0.9

Note: *: $p < .05$; [†]: $p < .08$. IO: Issue Ownership. Entries are explained variance as measured by McFadden's R^2 from conditional logit models multiplied by 100. The empty models include only party intercepts whereas the full models add party identification and policy agreement between respondents and the parties. Significance tests are based on the coefficients of the party identification and policy agreement variables. Asterisks indicate that at least one of the two variables differed significantly across two models compared.

Tabel A12. Confidence Intervals for McFadden's R^2 Values in Table A11.

	Standard IO	Long-Term IO	10 Years IO
Immigration			
Empty model	6.3-19.8	2.8-14.7	4.1-15.4
Full model	43.3-63.0	34.2-54.7	46.0-65.4
Tax Policy			
Empty model	6.3-20.2	9.1-23.9	1.3-10.9
Full model	49.5-68.4	40.5-58.7	44.9-63.4
Unemployment			
Empty model	11.1-28.1	17.8-36.2	6.5-21.9
Full model	51.3-71.6	47.1-66.6	37.8-58.5
The Danish Economy			
Empty model	9.8-25.5	14.1-30.7	5.2-18.7
Full model	55.6-74.6	48.1-65.5	51.4-69.2

Note: Entries are 95% confidence intervals for the McFadden's R^2 values presented in Table A11. The intervals are estimated using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. See Table A11 and the text for further details.

Full results of the conditional logit models parts of which are presented in Table 4 of the manuscript.

Table A13. Predispositions and ‘standard issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.19*	0.26	1.44*	0.35
Social Liberals	0.53	0.29	0.97*	0.37
Conservatives	-0.98*	0.44	-0.23	0.54
Socialist People’s Party	0.04	0.32	0.51	0.39
Liberal Alliance	-0.93*	0.44	-0.31	0.59
Danish Peoples’ Party	1.44*	0.25	2.06*	0.41
Liberals	0.86*	0.27	1.00*	0.40
Party Identification			0.64*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.79*	0.08
McFadden’s R^2	0.124		0.567	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 273.

Table A14. Predispositions and ‘long-term issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.18*	0.26	1.39*	0.32
Social Liberals	0.61*	0.29	1.01*	0.35
Conservatives	-0.55	0.38	-0.01	0.46
Socialist People’s Party	-0.43	0.36	-0.20	0.40
Liberal Alliance	-2.82*	1.03	-2.18*	1.08
Danish Peoples’ Party	1.23*	0.26	1.77*	0.37
Liberals	1.00*	0.27	1.14*	0.36
Party Identification			0.47*	0.09
Policy Distance			-0.63*	0.06
McFadden’s R^2	0.138		0.489	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 273.

Table A15. Predispositions and ‘short-term issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.92*	0.36	2.30*	0.47
Social Liberals	1.22*	0.38	1.79*	0.49
Conservatives	0.42	0.43	1.22*	0.56
Socialist People’s Party	0.79*	0.40	1.28*	0.49
Liberal Alliance	-0.48	0.56	0.44	0.68
Danish Peoples’ Party	2.24*	0.35	3.11*	0.50
Liberals	1.80*	0.36	1.97*	0.49
Party Identification			0.65*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.76*	0.07
McFadden’s R^2	0.14		0.573	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 274.

Table A16. Predispositions and ‘best policy issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	0.00	0.23	-0.12	0.34
Social Liberals	-0.15	0.24	0.01	0.34
Conservatives	-1.07*	0.32	-0.24	0.46
Socialist People’s Party	-0.55*	0.27	-0.50	0.34
Liberal Alliance	-1.10*	0.35	-0.29	0.50
Danish Peoples’ Party	0.58*	0.20	1.19*	0.41
Liberals	-0.47	0.26	-0.55	0.43
Party Identification			0.52*	0.11
Policy Distance			-1.23*	0.12
McFadden’s R^2	0.066		0.611	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 240.

Table A17. Predispositions and ‘best qualified issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	0.93*	0.25	1.10*	0.38
Social Liberals	0.48	0.27	1.03*	0.38
Conservatives	-1.51*	0.50	-0.61	0.63
Socialist People’s Party	-0.02	0.30	0.48	0.40
Liberal Alliance	-0.77	0.40	-0.29	0.62
Danish Peoples’ Party	0.98*	0.25	1.99*	0.46
Liberals	0.48*	0.27	0.75	0.45
Party Identification			0.71*	0.10
Policy Distance			-1.05*	0.11

McFadden's R^2	0.092	0.608
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Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 247.

Table A18. Predispositions and 'associative issue ownership' of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.05*	0.20	0.72*	0.21
Social Liberals	0.71*	0.21	0.78*	0.21
Conservatives	-1.42*	0.39	-1.31*	0.40
Socialist People's Party	-0.15	0.25	-0.11	0.25
Liberal Alliance	-0.83*	0.33	-0.73*	0.33
Danish Peoples' Party	3.60*	0.18	3.79*	0.18
Liberals	-0.07	0.25	-0.41	0.26
Party Identification			0.75*	0.06
Policy Distance			0.00	0.02
McFadden's R^2	0.613		0.638	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 1,366.

Table A19. Predispositions and 'standard issue ownership' of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.01*	0.34	2.92*	0.55
Social Liberals	0.88*	0.37	1.99*	0.61
Conservatives	0.38	0.41	1.76*	0.66
Socialist People's Party	0.18	0.42	1.03	0.59
Liberal Alliance	0.59	0.39	2.28*	0.65
Danish Peoples' Party	0.59	0.40	1.23	0.65
Liberals	2.30*	0.33	3.08*	0.59
Party Identification			0.76*	0.11
Policy Distance			-1.00*	0.10
McFadden's R^2	0.178		0.674	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 279.

Table A20. Predispositions and 'long-term issue ownership' of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	3.04*	0.51	3.77*	0.63
Social Liberals	1.44*	0.56	2.37*	0.68
Conservatives	1.83*	0.54	2.87*	0.68
Socialist People's Party	-0.02	0.71	0.40	0.80
Liberal Alliance	-0.63	0.87	0.14	0.97
Danish Peoples' Party	1.24*	0.57	1.82*	0.69

Liberals	3.35*	0.51	3.95*	0.64
Party Identification			0.61*	0.11
Policy Distance			-0.66*	0.08
McFadden's R^2	0.306		0.594	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 260.

Table A21. Predispositions and 'short-term issue ownership' of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.31*	0.37	3.50*	0.58
Social Liberals	1.33*	0.40	3.00*	0.62
Conservatives	0.89*	0.42	2.96*	0.66
Socialist People's Party	0.27	0.47	1.31*	0.64
Liberal Alliance	0.76	0.43	2.87*	0.66
Danish Peoples' Party	0.57	0.44	1.70*	0.67
Liberals	2.66*	0.37	4.02*	0.61
Party Identification			0.68*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.80*	0.08
McFadden's R^2	0.203		0.637	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 297.

Table A22. Predispositions and 'best policy issue ownership' of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	0.93*	0.23	0.92*	0.38
Social Liberals	0.06	0.28	0.36	0.44
Conservatives	-0.22	0.30	0.39	0.48
Socialist People's Party	-0.25	0.30	-0.20	0.44
Liberal Alliance	-0.12	0.29	0.83	0.48
Danish Peoples' Party	-0.30	0.31	-0.86	0.52
Liberals	1.02*	0.23	0.80	0.43
Party Identification			0.81*	0.11
Policy Distance			-1.05*	0.11
McFadden's R^2	0.075		0.638	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 260.

Table A23. Predispositions and 'best qualified issue ownership' of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.54*	0.26	2.78*	0.47
Social Liberals	0.58*	0.29	2.30*	0.51
Conservatives	0.19	0.32	2.07*	0.55
Socialist People's Party	-0.15	0.34	1.24*	0.50

Liberal Alliance	-0.14	0.35	1.76*	0.58
Danish Peoples' Party	-0.12	0.35	0.91	0.55
Liberals	1.58*	0.26	2.72*	0.50
Party Identification			0.64*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.87*	0.09
McFadden's R^2	0.135		0.594	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 287.

Table A24. Predispositions and 'associative issue ownership' of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.72*	0.21	2.56*	0.22
Social Liberals	1.33*	0.23	1.34*	0.23
Conservatives	1.86*	0.22	1.92*	0.22
Socialist People's Party	0.43	0.27	0.42	0.27
Liberal Alliance	2.08*	0.22	2.17*	0.22
Danish Peoples' Party	0.75*	0.25	0.62*	0.26
Liberals	3.09*	0.21	2.96*	0.21
Party Identification			0.49*	0.04
Policy Distance			-0.03*	0.01
McFadden's R^2	0.196		0.232	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 1,363.

Table A25. Predispositions and 'standard issue ownership' of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.00*	0.21	1.26*	0.30
Social Liberals	-1.12*	0.35	-0.70	0.44
Conservatives	-1.54*	0.42	-1.28*	0.56
Socialist People's Party	-0.66*	0.30	-0.09	0.36
Liberal Alliance	-1.27*	0.38	-0.73	0.51
Danish Peoples' Party	-0.54	0.29	-0.69	0.43
Liberals	0.94*	0.21	0.79*	0.34
Party Identification			0.71*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.80*	0.09
McFadden's R^2	0.191		0.603	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 267.

Table A26. Predispositions and 'long-term issue ownership' of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.30*	0.30	3.01*	0.41
Social Liberals	-0.35	0.44	0.05	0.54

Conservatives	-0.45	0.46	-0.11	0.59
Socialist People's Party	0.01	0.40	0.65	0.49
Liberal Alliance	-2.44*	1.04	-2.44*	1.13
Danish Peoples' Party	-0.40	0.46	-0.69	0.57
Liberals	1.97*	0.31	2.10*	0.42
Party Identification			1.01*	0.12
Policy Distance			-0.54*	0.07
McFadden's R^2	0.346		0.642	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 261.

Table A27. Predispositions and 'short-term issue ownership' of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.31*	0.22	1.58*	0.34
Social Liberals	-0.75*	0.35	-0.32	0.48
Conservatives	-1.15*	0.40	-0.83	0.56
Socialist People's Party	-0.97*	0.37	-0.73	0.49
Liberal Alliance	-0.72*	0.35	0.09	0.50
Danish Peoples' Party	-0.81*	0.36	-0.68	0.53
Liberals	1.22*	0.22	1.10*	0.37
Party Identification			0.89*	0.11
Policy Distance			-0.73*	0.09
McFadden's R^2	0.225		0.653	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 258.

Table A28. Predispositions and 'best policy issue ownership' of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	0.33	0.19	0.12	0.28
Social Liberals	-0.77*	0.26	-0.83*	0.36
Conservatives	-1.81*	0.38	-1.73*	0.49
Socialist People's Party	-0.94*	0.27	-1.12*	0.36
Liberal Alliance	-1.36*	0.32	-1.58*	0.49
Danish Peoples' Party	-1.11*	0.30	-1.63*	0.44
Liberals	0.23	0.19	-0.50	0.35
Party Identification			0.85*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.77*	0.08
McFadden's R^2	0.114		0.582	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 246.

Table A29. Predispositions and 'best qualified issue ownership' of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.

Social Democrats	0.74*	0.19	1.15*	0.31
Social Liberals	-0.58*	0.26	0.07	0.40
Conservatives	-1.73*	0.41	-1.10	0.58
Socialist People's Party	-0.74*	0.28	-0.26	0.37
Liberal Alliance	-0.83*	0.29	-0.27	0.50
Danish Peoples' Party	-1.50*	0.37	-1.87*	0.61
Liberals	0.41*	0.20	0.34	0.37
Party Identification			0.75*	0.11
Policy Distance			-1.04*	0.11
McFadden's R^2	0.141		0.635	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 253.

Table A30. Predispositions and 'associative issue ownership' of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.02*	0.08	0.94*	0.08
Social Liberals	-2.31*	0.21	-2.32*	0.21
Conservatives	-3.20*	0.32	-3.17*	0.32
Socialist People's Party	-1.30*	0.14	-1.30*	0.14
Liberal Alliance	-1.88*	0.18	-1.85*	0.18
Danish Peoples' Party	-1.67*	0.16	-1.75*	0.16
Liberals	-0.16	0.10	-0.29*	0.10
Party Identification			0.36*	0.05
Policy Distance			-0.01	0.02
McFadden's R^2	0.323		0.339	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 1,262.

Table A31. Predispositions and 'standard issue ownership' of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.65*	0.42	3.82*	0.68
Social Liberals	1.57*	0.45	3.15*	0.72
Conservatives	0.76	0.49	2.21*	0.77
Socialist People's Party	-0.23	0.61	0.53	0.83
Liberal Alliance	0.51	0.52	2.36*	0.80
Danish Peoples' Party	1.21*	0.47	2.06*	0.74
Liberals	2.91*	0.42	3.97*	0.71
Party Identification			0.97*	0.13
Policy Distance			-0.95*	0.11
McFadden's R^2	0.246		0.711	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 281.

Table A32. Predispositions and 'long-term issue ownership' of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.85*	0.46	4.06*	0.70
Social Liberals	1.58*	0.49	3.10*	0.73
Conservatives	1.80*	0.48	3.76*	0.75
Socialist People's Party	-0.95	0.84	0.11	0.98
Liberal Alliance	-1.56	1.10	-0.02	1.24
Danish Peoples' Party	0.47	0.57	1.87*	0.80
Liberals	3.23*	0.46	4.63*	0.72
Party Identification			0.42*	0.12
Policy Distance			-0.90*	0.09
McFadden's R^2	0.325		0.632	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 282.

Table A33. Predispositions and 'short-term issue ownership' of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.26*	0.35	3.56*	0.59
Social Liberals	1.26*	0.38	3.01*	0.63
Conservatives	0.44	0.43	2.35*	0.69
Socialist People's Party	-0.85	0.60	-0.05	0.80
Liberal Alliance	0.02	0.47	2.21*	0.73
Danish Peoples' Party	0.52	0.42	2.03*	0.68
Liberals	2.55*	0.35	3.93*	0.63
Party Identification			0.82*	0.12
Policy Distance			-1.02*	0.12
McFadden's R^2	0.253		0.711	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 287.

Table A34. Predispositions and 'best policy issue ownership' of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.85*	0.31	3.06*	0.58
Social Liberals	1.11*	0.33	2.49*	0.60
Conservatives	0.05	0.40	1.64*	0.67
Socialist People's Party	-0.23	0.43	0.94	0.66
Liberal Alliance	-0.09	0.42	1.12	0.69
Danish Peoples' Party	0.22	0.39	0.83	0.67
Liberals	2.05*	0.31	2.92*	0.61
Party Identification			0.84*	0.11
Policy Distance			-0.95*	0.11
McFadden's R^2	0.187		0.665	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 266.

Table A35. Predispositions and ‘best qualified issue ownership’ of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.75*	0.29	2.93*	0.52
Social Liberals	1.00*	0.32	2.59*	0.56
Conservatives	-0.03	0.39	1.95*	0.65
Socialist People’s Party	-0.99	0.52	-0.38	0.71
Liberal Alliance	0.11	0.37	2.15*	0.64
Danish Peoples’ Party	-0.27	0.42	0.69	0.66
Liberals	2.01*	0.29	3.40*	0.57
Party Identification			0.86*	0.13
Policy Distance			-0.98*	0.11
McFadden’s R^2	0.209		0.681	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 268.

Table A36. Predispositions and ‘associative issue ownership’ of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.77*	0.19	2.74*	0.21
Social Liberals	1.74*	0.20	1.94*	0.22
Conservatives	0.51*	0.23	0.84*	0.25
Socialist People’s Party	-1.10*	0.37	-1.04*	0.38
Liberal Alliance	0.44	0.24	0.86*	0.26
Danish Peoples’ Party	0.61*	0.23	0.38	0.25
Liberals	2.85*	0.19	2.77*	0.21
Party Identification			0.76*	0.05
Policy Distance			-0.22*	0.02
McFadden’s R^2	0.287		0.443	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 1,307.

Full results of the conditional logit models parts of which are presented in Table A7.

Table A37. Predispositions and ‘standard (two-block) issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Bourgeois government	-0.10	0.14	0.13	0.25
Party Identification			0.36	0.19
Policy Distance			-0.73*	0.13
McFadden’s R^2	0.002		0.596	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 202.

Table A38. Predispositions and ‘disregarding general attitude issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	0.82*	0.26	1.16*	0.38
Social Liberals	0.54*	0.28	1.17*	0.38
Conservatives	-1.04*	0.44	0.02	0.53
Socialist People’s Party	0.06	0.30	0.54	0.38
Liberal Alliance	-0.70	0.40	0.09	0.55
Danish Peoples’ Party	1.63*	0.24	2.47*	0.41
Liberals	0.52*	0.28	0.64	0.42
Party Identification			0.48*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.84*	0.08
McFadden’s R^2	0.138		0.568	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 273.

Table A39. Predispositions and ‘emphasis issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	-0.06	0.21	-0.44*	0.22
Social Liberals	0.01	0.20	0.01	0.21
Conservatives	-1.55*	0.35	-1.47*	0.35
Socialist People’s Party	-1.01*	0.28	-1.07*	0.28
Liberal Alliance	-1.82*	0.41	-1.65*	0.41
Danish Peoples’ Party	2.69*	0.15	3.08*	0.17
Liberals	-0.58*	0.24	-0.95*	0.26
Party Identification			0.76*	0.07
Policy Distance			-0.11*	0.02
McFadden’s R^2	0.555		0.608	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 859.

Table A40. Predispositions and ‘attention issue ownership’ of immigration, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	-0.73*	0.30	-1.33*	0.35
Social Liberals	-0.47	0.28	-0.38	0.30
Conservatives	-3.49*	1.02	-3.38*	1.03
Socialist People’s Party	-1.34*	0.38	-1.30*	0.39
Liberal Alliance	-2.27*	0.60	-2.13*	0.62
Danish Peoples’ Party	1.96*	0.19	2.42*	0.23
Liberals	-1.49*	0.39	-2.07*	0.45
Party Identification			0.91*	0.03
Policy Distance			-0.13*	0.03
McFadden’s R^2	0.503		0.596	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 311.

Table A41. Predispositions and ‘standard (two-block) issue ownership’ of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Bourgeois government	0.23	0.13	0.18	0.26
Party Identification			0.51*	0.18
Policy Distance			-0.94*	0.16
McFadden’s R^2	0.01		0.667	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 235.

Table A42. Predispositions and ‘disregarding general attitude issue ownership’ of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.93*	0.36	2.16*	0.48
Social Liberals	1.03*	0.39	1.62*	0.52
Conservatives	0.55	0.42	1.86*	0.57
Socialist People’s Party	-0.28	0.50	-0.14	0.60
Liberal Alliance	0.54	0.42	1.65*	0.59
Danish Peoples’ Party	0.63	0.41	1.15*	0.57
Liberals	2.48*	0.35	2.89*	0.51
Party Identification			0.51*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.92*	0.09
McFadden’s R^2	0.201		0.592	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 258.

Table A43. Predispositions and ‘emphasis issue ownership’ of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.27*	0.20	1.11*	0.21
Social Liberals	0.40	0.23	0.44	0.24
Conservatives	1.42*	0.20	1.71*	0.21
Socialist People’s Party	-0.79*	0.31	-0.76*	0.32
Liberal Alliance	1.86*	0.19	2.33*	0.21
Danish Peoples’ Party	0.44	0.23	0.40	0.24
Liberals	2.22*	0.19	2.19*	0.20
Party Identification			0.51*	0.05
Policy Distance			-1.20*	0.02
McFadden’s R^2	0.159		0.258	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 867.

Table A44. Predispositions and ‘attention issue ownership’ of taxation, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	0.59*	0.28	0.17	0.32
Social Liberals	-0.38	0.35	-0.28	0.38
Conservatives	0.91*	0.27	1.37*	0.32
Socialist People’s Party	-1.19*	0.47	-1.24*	0.48
Liberal Alliance	1.30*	0.25	1.97*	0.31
Danish Peoples’ Party	-0.32	0.35	-0.33	0.39
Liberals	1.52*	0.25	1.55*	0.30
Party Identification			0.52*	0.09
Policy Distance			-0.33*	0.04
McFadden’s R^2	0.140		0.315	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 295.

Table A45. Predispositions and ‘standard (two-block) issue ownership’ of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Bourgeois government	-0.19	0.14	-0.51	0.28
Party Identification			0.77*	0.20
Policy Distance			-0.66*	0.15
McFadden’s R^2	0.007		0.639	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 201.

Table A46. Predispositions and ‘disregarding general attitude issue ownership’ of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	0.84*	0.20	0.62*	0.27
Social Liberals	-0.65*	0.29	-0.61	0.35
Conservatives	-1.72*	0.44	-1.60*	0.51
Socialist People’s Party	-0.65*	0.29	-0.60	0.34
Liberal Alliance	-1.02*	0.34	-0.95*	0.44
Danish Peoples’ Party	-0.94*	0.33	-1.51*	0.43
Liberals	0.73*	0.21	0.11	0.30
Party Identification			0.68*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.66*	0.08
McFadden’s R^2	0.155		0.493	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 248.

Table A47. Predispositions and ‘emphasis issue ownership’ of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	-0.54*	0.09	-1.15*	0.11
Social Liberals	-2.69*	0.22	-3.23*	0.24
Conservatives	-2.90*	0.24	-3.60*	0.27
Socialist People’s Party	-1.68*	0.14	-1.86*	0.15
Liberal Alliance	-2.56*	0.21	-3.03*	0.24
Danish Peoples’ Party	-1.55*	0.14	-2.35*	0.17
Liberals	-1.16*	0.11	-2.38*	0.16
Party Identification			0.73*	0.05
Policy Distance			-0.34*	0.03
McFadden’s R^2	0.201		0.417	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 789.

Table A48. Predispositions and ‘attention issue ownership’ of unemployment, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	-0.65*	0.15	-1.27*	0.19
Social Liberals	-2.45*	0.31	-2.94*	0.34
Conservatives	-3.40*	0.51	-4.15*	0.56
Socialist People’s Party	-1.62*	0.22	-1.91*	0.24
Liberal Alliance	-2.43*	0.33	-3.15*	0.40
Danish Peoples’ Party	-1.69*	0.23	-2.72*	0.31
Liberals	-1.14*	0.18	-2.51*	0.28
Party Identification			0.75*	0.09
Policy Distance			-0.37*	0.04
McFadden’s R^2	0.201		0.438	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 293.

Table A49. Predispositions and ‘standard (two-block) issue ownership’ of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Bourgeois government	0.21	0.13	0.18	0.28
Party Identification			0.44*	0.19
Policy Distance			-1.44*	0.27

McFadden's R^2	0.008	0.738
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Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 235.

Table A50. Predispositions and 'disregarding general attitude issue ownership' of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.17*	0.37	2.33*	0.49
Social Liberals	1.67*	0.38	2.18*	0.51
Conservatives	0.13	0.49	1.00	0.61
Socialist People's Party	-0.50	0.57	-0.48	0.67
Liberal Alliance	0.35	0.47	0.95	0.63
Danish Peoples' Party	0.41	0.46	0.40	0.59
Liberals	2.71*	0.36	2.91*	0.51
Party Identification			0.80*	0.11
Policy Distance			-0.77*	0.09
McFadden's R^2	0.256		0.630	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 279.

Table A51. Predispositions and 'emphasis issue ownership' of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden's R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	2.27*	0.24	2.77*	0.31
Social Liberals	1.69*	0.25	2.61*	0.32
Conservatives	1.01*	0.27	2.09*	0.34
Socialist People's Party	-0.79	0.40	-0.43	0.46
Liberal Alliance	1.42*	0.26	2.88*	0.34
Danish Peoples' Party	1.07*	0.27	1.57*	0.34
Liberals	2.77*	0.24	3.48*	0.31
Party Identification			0.89*	0.06
Policy Distance			-0.41*	0.03
McFadden's R^2	0.189		0.484	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 802.

Table A52. Predispositions and ‘attention issue ownership’ of the economy, conditional logit coefficients, standard errors and McFadden’s R^2 .

	Model I		Model II	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Social Democrats	1.53*	0.31	1.88*	0.41
Social Liberals	1.15*	0.32	2.00*	0.43
Conservatives	-0.06	0.40	0.96	0.51
Socialist People’s Party	-0.48	0.45	-0.10	0.53
Liberal Alliance	0.58	0.35	1.68*	0.47
Danish Peoples’ Party	0.47	0.36	0.95*	0.48
Liberals	2.23*	0.29	2.77*	0.42
Party Identification			0.74*	0.10
Policy Distance			-0.52*	0.06
McFadden’s R^2	0.182		0.496	

Note: *: Significant at the .05-level. N = 290.