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How the Host Nation's Boundary Drawing Affects Immigrants' Belonging

Kristina Bakkær Simonsen

Abstract

Across Western democracies, the place for newcomers in the host society is debated, involving often a questioning of immigrants' belonging to their new nation. This article argues that immigrants' feeling of host national belonging depends on how the host nation imagines its community and its concomitant boundaries. Utilizing survey and country level data in multi-level regressions, immigrants' belonging is found to vary significantly across the 19 countries included. A central contribution is the finding that citizenship policies do not explain this cross-national variation. Instead, what matters is the informal boundary drawing produced in the majority population's conception of what is important for being part of the national "us". Thus, immigrants' belonging is significantly greater when the majority population prioritizes attainable criteria of national membership. In addition, these priorities are shown to have deep historical roots as immigrants' belonging is greater in settler countries and in nations which democratized early. By showing that national imageries have consequences for a country's welcoming capacities, and by showing that these welcoming capacities are historically path-dependent, the study contributes to the debate within nationalism studies about national identity's causal significance.

Keywords: boundary drawing, national identity, belonging, historical path-dependency

Introduction

Integration of immigrants is perhaps *the* most explosive topic in contemporary societal debates in recipient societies (Bertossi and Foner 2011:1535; Duyvendak et al. 2014:1-2; Martiniello and Rath 2010:7). Across Western democracies, immigrant integration is an increasingly politicized and problematized issue, which provokes strong opinions about the host-immigrant relationship and the place for newcomers in their adoptive nations. In particular, concerns about securing national unity and cohesion have led politicians, debaters and large segments of the public to question immigrants' attachment to their new community, presenting their integration more often as "failed" than successful (Goodman 2010a:754; Tillie et al. 2013:9; Bertossi 2011:1567-86).

Despite concern about the issue in public debates, scholarly attention to the affective dimension of integration – that is, whether immigrants identify with and feel that they belong to the host nation – has been sparse (recent exceptions include Reeskens and Wright 2014; Maxwell and Bleich 2014; Wu, Schimmele and Hou 2012). Research has instead focused on the socioeconomic and to some extent also the political and cultural adaptation of immigrants. The relative academic disregard of the subject is unfortunate, not least because belonging is considered a basic human need (Baumeister and Leary 1995; Fiske 2004) and essential for meaning-making (Lambert et al. 2013). Its denial is often noted as a reason for people to develop reactionary identities which may lead to extremism and radicalization (Döring 2007; Rumbaut 2008; Hartmann 2011) – i.e. expressions of failed integration as understood in public discourse. In addition to the positive effects on individual well-being, widespread belonging to a common national identity should, on the societal level, increase community cohesion and encourage cooperation among newcomers and established majorities (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Brubaker 2004). The study of belonging thus seems a much needed addition to the functional agenda which has hitherto preoccupied empirical research on immigrant integration.

Motivated by the heated public discussions regarding the place for newcomers in their adoptive nations, this article is concerned with the impact of the host nation's identity on immigrants' feeling of host national belonging. The focus on the host nation's identity is not intended to deny that many individual level factors may also affect the degree to which immigrants identify with the new community. For present purposes, however, I deliberately downplay attention to these factors in order to spotlight the issue of how belonging might be complicated or facilitated depending on how newcomers are received by their hosts. To be more

specific, I define national identity as the national community's self-image (cf. Anderson 1991); an image which requires not only ideas of who belongs, but also of who does not belong to the national community. In this perspective, national identity is constructed and maintained in boundary drawing, i.e. in processes of exclusion (Barth 1969; Triandafyllidou 2001, 2002; Armstrong 1982; Evans 1996). I argue that variations in national imageries across Western democracies manifest themselves in different boundary definitions and thus in different beliefs about the room for "them" to become part of "us" (see Wimmer 2013:27-29; Bail 2008 for similar arguments).

Research on citizenship policy has already demonstrated that criteria for naturalization vary across countries (Brubaker 1992; Bauböck 2006; Goodman 2010a; Howard 2006), while other authors document different attitudes towards and discourses about immigrants across nation-states (Hochschild and Lang 2011:83; Favell 1998; Kunovich 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Sides and Citrin 2007). These studies contribute importantly to illuminating the connection between how the nation is imagined and the inclusivity of national community, but regrettably they do not investigate the other side of the boundary, i.e. how it is perceived by immigrants. Since individual identification with a group largely relies on perceptions of that group's acceptance (Wu, Schimmele and Hou 2012:382-87; Weiner 1996:53), variations in how the boundary towards non-nationals is drawn are expected to affect immigrants' experience of prospects of belonging. By analysing levels of identification with the host community among immigrants across different nations, this article attends to both sides of the national boundary (i.e. to both host nationals and immigrants). In addition, effects of both policies and majority attitudes are analysed, enabling evaluation of their respective importance. In a broader perspective, the study's findings will thus inform the recurrent academic debate on whether and how national identity may matter.

The present study of boundaries and belonging utilizes individual level survey data and country level data on immigrant receiving nations in multilevel regressions. Most other studies of immigrant integration focus on only one or very few countries (Bail 2008; Berry et al. 2006) with the consequence that "it occurs rather often that [an] important factor is not taken into account when the integration of migrants is discussed: the host society" (Council of Europe 1997:10; also Heisler and Kurthen 2009:139; Favell 2010:394; Bail 2008; Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012:16). In particular, comparisons of traditional European nation-states and the settler societies of Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand are sparse (Bertossi and Foner 2011:1536; Duyvendak et al. 2014:1-2). Data for this study come from both

Western European and settler societies and thus ensures greater variation in national boundary drawing than any comparative study within each of the two country groups singly. As such, the greater empirical scope of the study has the potential to illuminate what Heisler and Kurthen hope to be “additional and different insights” than what has hitherto been gained from comparative research within Europe only (2009:164).

The article starts by presenting policies and majority attitudes as the two central modes of boundary drawing expected to affect immigrants’ host national belonging. It then goes on to discuss the historical conditions of contemporary boundary drawing. With the theoretical framework in place, the article introduces the data and design utilized to test the study’s hypotheses about how the host nation’s identity affects immigrants’ belonging. The section that follows presents the study’s results, after which the article concludes, pointing out central implications for the ongoing debate about the historical roots and causal significance of national identity.

Forms of Boundary Drawing

Pursuing the idea that nations do not draw boundaries towards non-nationals in a uniform way, much writing within nationalism studies has been preoccupied with developing typologies or ideal types of national identity.¹ In a critical commentary, Bertossi charges the tendency to treat abstracted “national models” as an independent variable without specifying, nor thoroughly studying, how exactly such models should translate into empirical reality (2011:1564). Being responsive to Bertossi’s point, this study goes into greater detail with the mode through which boundaries may or may not perform their function. Following the national identity literature, I focus on policy and majority attitudes as two different manifestations of national boundaries. While it should be acknowledged that the two forms of boundary drawing are interconnected, policies and majority attitudes differ with respect to their formalization and with respect to the level at which boundaries are formulated (by elites or by ordinary people). In turn, they may differ in the manner and degree to which they affect immigrants’ feeling of belonging, if at all. Below follow the expectations that can be generated from the literature about the effects of each form of boundary drawing.

In the literature, citizenship policy is often treated as the institutional realization of national boundaries, reflecting underlying definitions of “us” and “them” (Brubaker 1992; Goodman 2010b:6-7, 2012:663). This understanding is grounded in Brubaker’s (1992) de-

tailed comparison of French state-centred assimilation and the German ethno-cultural differentialist definition of citizenship, which he holds “reflect deeply rooted understandings of nationhood” (ibid.:3). Also Favell’s (1998) notion of philosophies of integration has been influential in forming the idea that differing national approaches to immigrant integration are based on “this more general question about the unity and order of the nation, and the public myths and traditions that hold it together” (ibid.:3).² From the immigrant perspective, these different policy regimes constitute a formal barrier to belonging by setting requirements that must be met in order to be included in a national community (as officially defined). Easier access to citizenship can signal to immigrants that they are welcome to formally become members of the host society, while stricter regimes signal exclusiveness.³ The expectation therefore is that immigrants’ belonging is greater in countries with relatively liberal citizenship policies.

Turning to the other form of boundary drawing, namely majority attitudes, these contrast the formal, elite-formulated mode of boundary drawing characteristic of policies by being purely informal. Majority attitudes constitute national boundaries as formulated in ordinary people’s conceptions of who belongs to “us”. Since belonging is a feeling which stems from perceptions of having a place in a community, I expect the attitudes that meet immigrants in everyday life to be of utmost importance to prospects for identifying with the host nation.

Appreciating the complexities of national identity, I follow up on Bail’s (2008) quest to disaggregate the boundary concept in order to add analytical sensitivity to the many standards by which immigrants may be marked as “other”. In this, I suggest the concept of boundary markers to denote the ideas prevalent among members of the native population about what is required to be a true national. These ideas take form as criteria by which immigrants may be in- or excluded. In concert these criteria serve to substantiate the boundary that distinguishes “us” from “them”. The boundary marker approach thus contrasts the ideal type conceptions of nationhood which Bertossi is critical of and empirical analyses such as that of Reeskens and Wright (2014), who dichotomize majority attitudes (distinguishing between civic and ethnic nationhood, each identified by a single boundary marker). Allowing for (many) different criteria to appear on the national boundary, the approach is more detailed and enables the comparative evaluation of the impact of different boundary conceptions.

I examine eight boundary markers, understood as criteria of national membership: national ancestry, being of the national religion, birth on the country’s soil, having lived in the country for most of one’s life, language skills, respect for the country’s laws and institutions, having host national citizenship, and feeling as part of the nation. It is of course an empirical

question how immigrants perceive each of the eight markers, but theoretically they seem to vary in rigidity with some appearing to allow for easier boundary crossing than others. Thus, the ascriptive⁴ markers of ancestry, religion⁵, birthplace, and having lived on the country's soil for most of one's life can be expected to constitute a rather manifest and rigid boundary and hence lead to more difficult prospects for immigrants to develop feelings of belonging. Language skills, respect for the country's laws and institutions, having host national citizenship and feeling as part of the nation appear to be more attainable. If a community attaches great importance to those four criteria in the national self-understanding, it may be understood to reflect a readiness to include immigrants on the condition that they acquire the relevant marker. If this is true, immigrants' belonging should be greater.

Where Boundaries Originate: Historical Conditions as Cultural Repertoires

By focusing on policies and majority attitudes, this study gives a snap shot image of national identity boundary drawing. The literature on boundary drawing – especially in the context of national identity – holds, however, that boundary definitions do not just pop up out of the blue. Historical conditions are important, it is argued, since they shape the cultural repertoire available for boundary drawing (Lamont 1992:7, 87). This implies that national boundaries are path dependent (Alba 2005:41); a feature which appears to explain the fact that national identity is associated with a sense of permanence (which is one of the reasons for the nation's value as a stable source of belonging). In turn, this means that boundaries are not reconstructed from one moment to the other; they depend on historical definitions of “us” and “them”. A recent challenger of this perspective is Joppke (2007:1), who holds that “a key feature of the policy solutions that have been offered in response to the integration crisis [the idea that integration has failed, ed.] is the weakening of national distinctiveness”. In short, Joppke's argument is that Western European states are all converging towards a civic integration paradigm, in effect doing away with whatever historically distinct notions of national identity that may have once existed (ibid.).

The present study allows an evaluation of the discussion about the contemporary significance of national identity's historical roots by analyzing three central conditions which are thought to affect boundary drawing: whether the country has a long immigration history, whether it democratized relatively early, and whether it engaged in large-scale overseas colonialism over a sustained period of time.

The literature suggests that settler societies – i.e. societies founded on an immigrant population – have greater “welcoming capacities” than traditional, and relatively more homogeneous, e.g. European, nation-states. This expectation is motivated with reference to immigration’s centrality in settler societies’ national histories and self-perceptions (Martiniello and Rath 2010:7; Crul and Mollenkopf 2012:8; Hutchinson 1994:164). Alba (2005) even claims that in the context of immigrant integration, Europe is marked by “bright” boundaries (i.e. boundaries which are very hard to cross), while boundaries in the United States (a settler society) are “blurred” (easier to cross over time). Elaborating on this, several authors point to the fact that settler countries allow immigrants to adopt hyphenated identity labels (e.g. “Asian-American”), which signal attachment both to their ethnic group and to the new homeland. It is argued that the perception that the national majority recognizes and values one’s ethnic distinctness will enable stronger attachment to the host national group. In many European societies, by contrast, self-definitions such as “Turkish-German” or “Moroccan-Dutch” are uncommon and problematic, signalling that “some immigrants appear to put their ethnic or religious identity in contrast to their new homeland belonging” (Verkuyten 2014:104; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2012:86). These considerations amount to the expectation that immigrants’ host national belonging is greater in settler societies than in European nation-states.

Another historical condition concerns the timing of democratization. Howard (2005; 2009) suggests that early democratization (before the nineteenth century) increases the likelihood that countries have a more inclusive conception of national identity, whereas countries that only democratized later would have a more exclusive idea of who can become part of the national group. His argument goes that “[b]y establishing popular access to elections ... decades before large-scale migration came into the picture, states developed a national identity tied to liberal principles” (Howard 2009:45), or what he elsewhere calls a “civic national identity”. Thus, immigrants’ belonging is expected to be greater in host countries that democratized early.

The final historical condition, which may affect the welcoming capacities of host societies, is having a history as a colonial power. After World War II and the abolition of colonialism, many European countries experienced – much to their own surprise (and regret) – immigration of former colonial populations (Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie 2012:6; Berry et al. 2006:16). These great inflows of immigrants have, in contrast to settler societies, not led recipient European communities to regard themselves as immigrant nations. Quite on the contrary, most of these countries still do not recognize or even outright reject being countries of immigration (Joppke and Torpey 2013:143; Amersfoort and Niekerk 2006; Martiniello and

Rath 2010:7). The motivation for distinguishing former colonial powers from non-colonizers is founded in the contention that the racism and stereotyping which historically legitimized colonialism have carried over into the postcolonial period (Kamali 2008:301-2; Bosma 2012:13-14; Alba and Holdaway 2013:9; Bosma, Lucassen, and Oostindie 2012:1-22). Thus, immigrants to former colonizing societies may face more intense everyday racism and prejudice because inferiorization of other cultures is much more ingrained in these societies. The expectation is that immigrants' belonging is lower in former colonizing countries than in countries that have not had overseas colonies.

Having introduced the two modes (policy and majority attitudes) through which boundaries of national identity are expected to affect immigrants' belonging and having presented the potential historical roots of boundary drawing, I will now explain how the study is designed to analyse the question of whether, and in turn how, national identity affects immigrants' host national belonging.

Data and Design

Assessing whether (and if so, how) host national identity matters for immigrants' belonging requires not only data on the receiving nation but also individual level data on immigrants. Data on immigrant belonging and on immigrant background characteristics stem from the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) National Identity modules from 2003 and 2013. Pooling the two rounds of the survey programme secures a bigger sample than would have otherwise been possible and thus provides for a better test of the theoretical hypotheses. The ISSP is particularly well suited for the study, since it contains both the dependent variable and important individual level data. Including central individual level variables accommodates the otherwise relevant concerns about self-selection, which regards the potential problem that immigrants with characteristics promoting belonging systematically migrate to certain countries rather than others. We know, e.g., that immigrants to Canada generally have greater human capital resources than migrants to Europe (Sam et al. 2008). If individual human capital affects the ease with which immigrants come to identify with the host nation, such differences will on the surface appear to be contextual, while they are in fact produced by individual differences. Fortunately, the individual level variables included in the study (see below) control for this issue to a great extent, reducing the potential bias from self-selection.

The ISSP consists of random samples of the adult population in the participating countries. Data collection was done by national agencies in the form of face-to-face interviews combined with self-completion questionnaires. Since I am interested in host countries that have experienced great inflows of immigrants over the last decades, I keep only Western European and settler nations⁶ in the dataset.

The ISSP was not designed specifically to study immigrants' belonging, but fortunately it does contain immigrant respondents from all the countries included in the survey. Based on information on the citizenship of the respondents and their parents, an immigrant sample is singled out for analysis. A respondent is regarded as immigrant if (s)he is not a citizen of the host country *or* if both parents were non-citizens of the host country at the time of the respondent's birth.⁷ Considering issues of representativeness, it is possible that the ISSP sample is biased towards the better integrated or more belonging immigrants. For example, immigrants without a minimum of language skills are excluded from participating in the study, since it is conducted in the host national language(s). Also illegal immigrants and immigrants low in trust of national agencies may generally refrain from participating in a survey. This means that the level of belonging may be overestimated. Such overestimation is, however, assumed to apply equally to all countries in the study and would thus not affect the country-comparative conclusions. In addition, one reason for including the country level control variables which will be presented below is to reduce potential bias stemming from the fact that some countries may provide conditions for easier assimilation.

The dependent variable, belonging, is constructed from a question which asks the respondent how close (s)he feels to the host country (with four response categories ranging from "very close" to "not close at all"). By underscoring subjectivity and the affective dimension to national identification, the question captures the connotations of ties, relatedness and connectivity that are central to the theoretical belonging concept.

The focus on "how close" in the question wording may trigger thoughts about distance rather than linkage, because the respondent is in a sense asked to measure the space *between* the national group and him-/herself. To avoid triggering such thoughts, the question could have been phrased in terms of whether the respondent sees him-/herself as part of the national group, since such a choice of words escapes installing measurement logic. The estimation-of-distance logic inherent in the question is, however, in one sense advantageous, since it will force the immigrant respondent to consider exactly those issues that boundaries would set in motion, namely whether (s)he really is part of the national "us". As such, the question is particularly well suited to provoke the thorny, complicated considerations that immigrants often

deal with when thinking about host national belonging. In addition, while the level of belonging may be under-estimated due to the wording of the question, this should affect immigrants to different countries in a uniform way. In other words, it will not hamper the cross-country comparative aim of the study, and it may actually counter-balance some of the bias associated with the potential over-sampling of the better integrated immigrants noted above.

Although the variable is ordinal in its original format, I treat it as continuous, since substantial results do not differ between models using the ordinal versus the continuous measure. To ease interpretation of results, I therefore scale the measure to range from 0-1 with 1 indicating the most intense feeling of belonging and 0 indicating a lack of host national belonging. The mean for the total immigrant sample is 0.73. Figure 1 shows the country mean on immigrants' belonging for each of the two survey rounds, sorted in ascending order according to the overall mean for both years (note that a few countries only participated in one of the two survey rounds and therefore only have one mean value plotted in the figure).

Figure 1. Immigrant Sample Mean on the Belonging Measure

The statistical model used for the analyses is the hierarchical linear regression model with random coefficients. This model choice is motivated with reference to the fact that it allows for estimation of country level effects (i.e. the concern of the study's hypotheses). In addition, it takes into account the expected issue that observations (immigrants) within the same group (host country) will tend to have correlated outcomes, i.e. that immigrants' belonging will vary across countries, even when controlled for different distributions of immigrant characteristics. This violates the OLS assumption of uncorrelated error terms and hence makes

simple OLS estimation inappropriate. One first step in the examination of the significance of host national identity is therefore to test the hierarchical linear model (which introduces an additional error term pertaining to the macro level) against an OLS model (which has only one error term). The test shows that there is significant variation on the dependent variable across countries (with an intraclass coefficient of 0.04). In other words, all individual level variables being equal, immigrants' belonging is relatively greater in some countries than in others.

Below I present the independent country level variables, hypothesised to account for some of the country level variation. To ease interpretation and comparison of effects, all continuous country level variables are scaled to range from 0-1.

Policies

I use two different indices for citizenship policy as no measure to my knowledge covers both of the survey round years (2003 and 2013). This means that the analysis of a potential policy effect must be split in two, with each policy index tested only on the survey round for which its year of measurement applies to. It would of course have been ideal to use the same index across the full sample but should the two indices show similar effects in each of the two survey rounds, trust in the overall conclusions about policy effects is strengthened.

Howard's (2005) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) is used for the 2003 survey data. The index includes three dimensions: whether birth on the country's soil entitles to citizenship, the duration of residency in the country required for naturalization, and whether dual citizenship is permitted. Higher scores indicate a more liberal (inclusive) citizenship policy regime. Country scores cover the full spectrum of the index (0-1), with a mean across countries of 0.63 (see also appendix 1). Figure 2 displays country scores (countries for which 2003 survey data does not exist are included in the figure without a CPI score).

Figure 2. Citizenship Policy Index Score

The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) initiative is a database covering a range of policies relevant for immigration and integration. I use the MIPEX's Access to Nationality Index for 2013 (on the 2013 survey data). In addition to Howard's three dimensions, the index also looks at whether there are conditions (such as citizenship tests and income/job) required for obtaining citizenship. As with the CPI, higher scores indicate more inclusive policies. The mean across countries is 0.57 (with country scores varying between 0.23 and 0.86). Figure 3 displays country scores (countries for which 2013 survey data does not exist are included in the figure without a MIPEX score).

Figure 3. MIPEX Access to Nationality Score

Majority Attitudes: Boundary Markers

I utilize the majority samples, i.e. the samples of non-immigrant respondents, from each of the two survey rounds of the ISSP to capture national identity boundary markers. This is ideal, since the measures of the majority populations' boundary markers (the independent variable) and immigrants' host national belonging (the dependent variable) are collected at the same point in time, which means that the timing issues concerning policy measures mentioned above are avoided. The test of majority attitudes' effect on immigrants' belonging can thus be performed on the full (pooled) sample.

Respondents are asked to rate each of the eight criteria of nationality (ancestry, religion, birthplace, having lived in the country for most of one's life, language skills, respect for the country's laws and institutions, citizenship, and feeling) from "not important at all" to "very important" for being part of their nation. I first examine whether individual responses from non-immigrant survey participants can be treated in accordance with the theoretical considerations given above, i.e. with one group of criteria being ascriptive and the other group being more attainable. Principal-components factor analysis with rotation supports the idea that the eight boundary markers cluster in two groups.⁸ Item-item correlations for the four attainable criteria (language skills, respect for the country's laws and institutions, citizenship, and feeling), respectively the four ascriptive criteria (ancestry, religion, birthplace, having lived in the country for most of one's life), all give gamma values above 0.3.⁹ In addition, item-scale analyses for the two groups of boundary markers further warrant treating each group of four criteria as meaningful indices (alpha values for the attainable index range 0.65-0.72, for the ascriptive index 0.72-0.85).

On the basis of these analyses I construct an index of attainable criteria and an index of ascriptive criteria and calculate index scores for each non-immigrant respondent. Using these individual scores, I then generate country means for both survey years. A country score close to 1 on the ascriptive index indicates that ascriptive criteria are highly valued in the majority sample, while a score closer to 0 indicates that ascriptive criteria are not salient markers in the configuration of the national boundary (and parallel for the attainable index). Figure 4 and 5 give the country scores on each index for each of the surveyed years. Note that there is practically no correlation between the two indices (-0.02), giving further support to treating them as independent dimensions in the majority population's attitudinal boundary drawing. Note too that means vary quite substantially across countries (while the within-country variation over time is rather small for most countries), adding strength to the belief that the study

design secures sufficient cross-national variation to be ideal for testing the hypotheses about majority attitudes.

Figure 4. Majority Sample Mean on the Attainable Boundary Marker Index

Figure 5. Majority Sample Mean on the Ascriptive Boundary Marker Index

Historical Conditions

Dichotomous measures are constructed for the three historical conditions. Settler countries are Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Following Howard (2006) and the

Polity IV database, early democratizers are Great Britain, France, and the four settler countries. Finally, former colonial powers are Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal.

Country Level Controls

Although belonging varies across countries, this may not be caused by differences in national identity, but instead by other factors that vary by country. I therefore control for the majority population's level of national belonging, two macro-economic conditions and one demographic condition.

Including the level of national belonging in the majority population both has a control purpose and a more substantial purpose. As for the control aspect, the analyses should enable an examination of whether the proposed national identity boundary mechanisms contribute to (or prohibit) making immigrants reach a level of belonging comparable to *their hosts*. It is this which seems the right standard of comparison, rather than an absolute level of belonging which applies across countries. In this light, including the mean level of belonging in the majority population corresponds to centering the dependent variable according to each host country's standard. As for the more substantial purpose, the majority population's level of belonging may be seen as a potentially important component of national identity which may affect immigrants' host national belonging. To my knowledge, however, this has never been theorised nor tested on empirical data. It seems possible to formulate hypotheses which run counter to each other, as a high level of national belonging in the host population may both encourage and discourage immigrants' host national belonging. Rather than centering the dependent variable (which the control purpose suggests), I include the majority population's level of belonging as a country level variable, to allow for explicit examination of the more substantial considerations. The variable is constructed by taking, for each of the two survey rounds, the country means of non-immigrant respondents' answers to the belonging question (observed range 0.65 to 0.87).

The next control variable concerns the country's employment level, since several authors refer to economic crises to explain an upsurge in hostility towards immigrants and an increase in nativist feelings (e.g. Crul and Mollenkopf 2012:4). The greater the economic strain on a country, the greater the expected opposition to immigrants, because immigrants are then seen to be taking "our" jobs (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010:323). The OECD databank provides data on employment. A score of 1 indicates full employment (observed range 0.55 to 0.80)

The other macro-economic factor which may affect the reception of immigrants concerns the country's welfare state regime. Two expectations that run counter to each other may be formulated. On the one hand, social democratic welfare state regimes can be expected to be more inclusive of immigrants, since the priority given to economic redistribution is said to originate in a "caring" mind-set which emphasizes values of solidarity and inclusion of all citizens. This can, according to Sainsbury (2012:3) "combat the emergence of permanent social and political divisions in society" and be enabling for the development of individual resources that function as a buffer against marginalization and exclusion. This leads to the expectation that social democratic welfare state regimes are more inclusive of immigrants than liberal and Christian democratic welfare state regimes.

On the other hand, socially vulnerable groups (among which immigrants are overrepresented) put greater economic strain on state finances in social democratic than in liberal and Christian democratic welfare state regimes. Thus, following the line of reasoning concerning the expectation for the country's employment level, we may expect majority populations in social democratic welfare states to be more hostile and to draw harder boundaries towards immigrants.

The classification of countries with respect to welfare state regime follows Esping-Andersen (1990) and the welfare state literature more generally (Kersbergen and Manow 2011). Liberal welfare states are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland, Switzerland, Great Britain, the United States, Iceland; Christian democratic welfare states are Austria, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Spain; and social democratic welfare states are Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

The demographic condition included as a control is the percentage of immigrants out of the total population in the country. One might expect that when host nationals are more accustomed to the presence of immigrants in society, the general climate will be more welcoming (cf. also the reasoning about the historic condition for settler countries). In addition, immigrants are likely to more easily develop a feeling of belonging when they can mirror themselves in a more ethnically mixed population. Data stem from the OECD's statistics for the foreign-born population as a percentage out of the total population (observed range 0.03 to 0.27).

Finally, for all regression models a dummy for survey year (2013 = 1, 2003 = 0) is included to control for any trend effects (of course, for the models which include either of the two policy measures this control drops out, as the sample is split according to survey year).

Individual Level Controls

Individual level variables included in the analyses are traits and characteristics thought to affect host national belonging. Since these may not be evenly distributed across host countries, they must be controlled. The first individual level control included is self-identification with a non-Christian religion. As all countries in the study have a Christian heritage, being of another religion is theorised to complicate host national belonging.

The other controls mainly concern the issue that immigrants who are better integrated in the host society in socio-economic and political terms might also be higher in belonging. This regards years of schooling, labour market incorporation (split into six categories ranging from paid employment to being unemployed or out of the workforce), whether the respondent has host national citizenship and whether (s)he voted at the latest national election. Sex and age are included as standard controls (see appendix 2 for descriptive statistics for individual level controls).

The next section presents the results and discusses their implications for the debate about national identity's causal significance and historical roots.

Findings

As already noted, testing the hierarchical linear model against an OLS model reveals significant variation in immigrants' belonging across countries. The main purpose of analysis is to test whether policies and/or majority attitudes have significant effects on immigrants' host national belonging, i.e. whether national identity boundary drawing accounts for all, or some of, the hitherto unexplained country level variance. As the independent country level variables are correlated with each other, I include each of these variables one at a time in a regression model which contains all individual- and country level control variables, and the control for survey year. Table 1 gives the overview of the results.

Table 1. Country Effects on Immigrants' Host National Belonging

Parameter	Coefficient	N (respondents)	n (countries)
<i>Historical Conditions</i>			
Settler	0.04** (0.01)	3,667	19
Early democratizer	0.04*** (0.01)	3,667	19
Colonizer	-0.00 (0.02)	3,667	19
<i>Policies</i>			
CPI 2005 (2003 survey data only)	0.02 (0.02)	1,716	17
MIPEX 2013 (2013 survey data only)	0.07 (0.07)	1,951	14
<i>Boundary Marker Indices</i>			
Attainable	0.54*** (0.10)	3,667	19
Ascriptive	-0.08 (0.08)	3,667	19

Note: the table displays seven separate multilevel regression models with random coefficients. Included in all models are all individual- and country level control variables, and a dummy for survey round.

*:p<0.05; **:p<0.01; ***:p<0.001. Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

The first observation from table 1 is that only one of the two modes of national identity boundary drawing appears to affect immigrants' belonging. Namely, neither of the two policy measures have statistically significant effects, while the attainable boundary marker index is statistically significant. Two historical conditions have statistically significant effects (these will be discussed in the next section).

One interpretation of what distinguishes significant and insignificant country variables is that the formal mode of boundary drawing matters less for immigrants' perceptions of inclusion than the discourses which they meet in everyday interactions with members of the majority population. Developing this interpretation further, one may speculate that the lacking belongingness effect of citizenship policy stems from the fact that immigrants engage less frequently and less directly with these formal boundaries, as compared to the attitudinal boundaries which would seem to influence any encounter with the majority community. In addition, "decoding" the boundary drawing messages of the host country's citizenship rules might be somewhat of a challenge because it requires quite extensive knowledge about the details of the rules. The results do not preclude that policies may be important for e.g. formal incorporation (e.g. in the labour market or in the political arena), but in terms of identificational integration (belonging) I find no proof of an independent effect.

While the causal path from the host nation's identity to immigrants' belonging is in empirical reality quite complex, these results suggest that belonging is more a matter of informal

and subtle boundary drawing performed in everyday interactions between immigrants and majority members rather than being a matter of elite-formulated definitions of “us” and “them”. The results thus resonate with Reeskens and Wright (2014), whose study of immigrants to Europe find liberal integration policies to have no effect on pride in the host nation and, if anything, to lead immigrants to identify more with a European or world identity rather than the host nation (though this effect is, in the words of the authors, “weak and ambiguous”).

I performed what can be considered a robustness test of the policy explanation on the Eurobarometer 2010 survey data, which contains the dependent variable and most individual level controls.¹⁰ For the analysis I used the MIPEX Access to Nationality measure, this time from 2010 in order to fit with the survey year. The analysis on the Eurobarometer data echo those reported above on the ISSP 2003 and 2013 as there is no significant effect of citizenship policy on immigrants’ belonging (see appendix 3 for the results). This strengthens my belief in the above conclusions about the lack of a policy effect.

The fact that the attainable index displays a statistically significant and positive effect supports the hypothesis that attainable criteria lead immigrants to perceive the boundary to the host nation as relatively more permeable (easy to cross). Majorities which value language skills, respect for basic civic principles, citizenship and feelings appear to be signalling that those who are able and ready to feel part of “our” community are welcome to be part of “us”. Below I discuss and test whether these attitudes are premised on historical conditions as suggested in the literature, i.e. whether the significant historical conditions from table 1 are mediated by attitudinal boundary markers.

Discussing Historical Conditions

As table 1 shows, two historical conditions significantly affect immigrants’ belonging and both with the hypothesized sign. Immigrants have an easier time identifying with the host community in settler societies ($\hat{\beta} = 0.04^{**}$) and early democratizing societies ($\hat{\beta} = 0.04^{***}$), whereas there is no statistically significant difference between living in a country with a colonizing versus non-colonizing history.

The fact that two historical conditions affect contemporary immigrants indicates that the welcoming capacities of Western societies are very path dependent and in turn suggests that the way in which national communities imagine their identities has deep historical roots. Approximating a test of the idea that history matters *because* it shapes the cultural repertoire

available for boundary drawing, I perform stepwise regressions with each of the two significant historical conditions and the significant attitudinal boundary marker index, including all individual- and country level controls, the index for ascriptive markers (as a control), and the survey year dummy. Table 2 displays the results and also reports coefficient estimates for the country level controls (full models, reporting also the individual level effects can be found in appendix 4).

Table 2. Stepwise Regressions of Historical Conditions and Attitudinal Boundaries

Parameter	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b
<i>Explanatory country level variables</i>				
Settler nation	0.04** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)		
Early democratizer			0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04 (0.02)
Attainable Boundary Marker Index		0.62*** (0.13)		0.76*** (0.16)
Ascriptive Boundary Marker Index		-0.04 (0.08)		-0.12 (0.09)
<i>Country level control variables</i>				
Level of belonging in majority population	0.45*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.09)	0.41*** (0.08)	0.40*** (0.09)
Employment level	0.29** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.26** (0.10)	-0.07 (0.12)
Welfare regime				
Liberal	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Christian-Democratic	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Social-Democratic	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.10** (0.03)
Immigrant population	0.11 (0.10)	0.23 (0.12)	0.23* (0.11)	0.11 (0.14)
<i>Individual level control variables</i>				
Survey year dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: N (respondents) = 3,667, n (countries) = 19

*, p<0.05; **, p<0.01; ***, p<0.001. Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

For both the settler regression and the early democratizer regression, the historical conditions lose significance in these bloc recursive models (compare models 1a and 1b, and models 2a and 2b), indicating that settler countries and early democratizers affect immigrants' belonging in a positive way *because* their populations value attainable or "loose" (as opposed to

rigid) criteria of nationality. The results thus lend support to the idea that historical conditions shape the cultural repertoire available for boundary drawing in significant ways.

The fact that early democratization is completely mediated by attainable boundary markers strengthens Howard's (2006, 2009) claim that early democratizers developed more inclusive conceptions of the national community. Giving basic democratic rights to the population early on seems to have set in place a commitment to civic principles of national membership. Further, the fact that it is settler societies, more than European nations, which adopt these attitudes to newcomers, supports the idea that settler nations think of their societies as "permanently unfinished" (Portes and Rumbaut 2006:xv). This contrasts European populations, which tend to see nation-building as a finished project with both the national identity and the national community as fixed entities. In Chávez et al.'s (2012:232) words, European majorities display a "lack of imagination" about how newcomers can belong, because history has not trained them to do so. The reverse is true of settler nations where most people perceive themselves as descendants of immigrants (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2010:20-26), leading – as the analysis here suggests – to the prioritization of attainable criteria of belonging, in turn easing the mutual identification among newcomers and established majorities.

All in all, this discussion point to the importance of the rather informal, community-formulated boundaries of national identity and attests to the historical rootedness of this form of boundary drawing. In the study of immigrants' host national belonging, these findings underline the need to go beyond a narrow focus on policy regimes and "national models".

On a final note, the fact that the level of belonging in the majority population has a strong positive effect in all models warrants a few, broader considerations about the links between host national identity and immigrants' belonging. I think that it is an interesting finding, since one may have expected immigrants to perceive very 'patriotic' national communities as tightly knit and therefore rather closed to new members. But, as the results show, immigrants seem more encouraged to belong in countries where most majority members strongly identify with the imagined national community. I think that this finding merits further studies and theorising, not least because it paints a counter picture to the scare campaigns running both in popular and academic discourse about the supposedly excluding forces inherent in patriotism.

Concluding Remarks

The findings of this study support the proposition that national identity boundary drawing has significant effects on the ease with which newcomers come to feel included in their new community. My analyses indicate that it is far from irrelevant which national community the individual immigrant arrives to, since communities appear to differ with respect to how welcoming they are of immigrants and how much room there is for newcomers in the host nation's self-understanding.

This informs the debate concerning the causal significance or explanatory value of national identity. While there are indications of support to Joppke's rebuttal of national models at the policy level (or, rather, their *effects* on immigrants' host national belonging), other elements shaping or reflecting national boundaries do appear to be important. In particular, this study of different modes of national identity boundary drawing suggests that it is "national membership in a more informal sense" which is important, and this "is not administered by specialized personnel [or policy-makers] but by ordinary people in the course of everyday life, using tacit understandings of who belongs and who does not" (Brubaker 2010:65, my insertion in square brackets).

My findings not only support the idea that national identity and its effects are largely mediated through cognition, perceptions and discourse, they also indicate a degree of discursive path dependency in national boundaries, which resists – or persists in spite of – the suggested convergence in citizenship policy and its effects. This is reflected in the study's finding that the historical conditions of settler societies and early democratizers make for a repertoire of less rigid boundary drawing towards immigrants, because inclusivity has been a condition from the very beginning of any imagination of the nation.

While I consider this study to have given sound and grounded indications of the continued relevance of national identity and its concomitant boundaries, it is limited in relying only on correlational data and statistical analyses. Future studies should try to specify in greater detail the mechanism leading from (perceptions of) boundaries to feelings of belonging. This would require data of a more nuanced and detailed kind, e.g. in-depth interviews. Also, assessment of the suggested path dependency is a topic of utmost relevance for future research, since for a full evaluation of the argument advocated in this article, we would want to know how persistent boundaries are and how much they change over time.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Scoring Countries on the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI)

Howard's (2005) Scoring Scheme

Score	0	1	2
Dimension			
Citizenship by birth	No		Yes
Residency requirement	10 years or more	6-9 years	0-5 years
Acceptance of dual citizenship	No		Yes

Since Howard only scores the EU-15 countries, I have scored the remaining countries according to the scheme and rescaled scores to range from 0-1. See table 1 below.

Scoring of Countries not Included in Howard (2005)

Dimension Country	Citizenship by birth	Residency requirement	Acceptance of dual citizenship	Total score (re-scaled 0-1)
Australia	0	2	2	4 (0.67)
Canada	2	2	2	6 (1)
New Zealand	2	2	2	6 (1)
Norway	0	1	0	1 (0.17)
Switzerland	0	0	2	2 (0.33)
The US	2	2	2	6 (1)

Appendix 2. Overview of Individual Level Control Variables

Individual level variable	Operationalization	Distribution or mean in sample
Sex (male)		48 %
Age (interval: 16-97)		46 years
<i>Social Identity Orientation</i>		
Religion	Christian religion (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Christian orthodox and other Christian religions)	55 %
	Non-Christian religion (Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, other eastern religions, other religions)	21 %
	No religion	24 %
<i>Incorporation</i>		
Years of schooling	Years of schooling in total	13 years
Labour market incorporation	In paid work	56 %
	Seasonal employment	1 %
	Student	6 %
	Unemployed	5 %
	Out of workforce	32 %
	Military service	0 %
Citizenship status	Citizenship in the country of residence	55 %
Voting behaviour	Voted at last national election	49 %
	Did not vote at last national election	27 %
	Was not eligible to vote at last national election	24 %

Appendix 3. Multilevel Regression with Random Coefficients, Test of Citizenship Policy Hypothesis on Eurobarometer 2010 Survey Data

Parameter	Coefficient
<i>Explanatory country level variable</i>	
MIPEX Access to Nationality 2010	0.07 (0.05)
<i>Country level control variables</i>	
Level of belonging in majority population	0.75*** (0.11)
Employment level	0.30* (0.15)
Welfare regime	
Liberal	Reference
Christian-Democratic	0.04* (0.02)
Social-Democratic	0.02 (0.02)
Immigrant population	-0.37 (0.26)
<i>Individual level control variables</i>	
Sex (male)	-0.00 (0.01)
Age	0.00 (0.00)
First-generation immigrant	-0.03* (0.01)
Employment status	
Paid work	Reference
Self-employed	-0.05* (0.02)
Student	-0.04 (0.02)
Unemployed	-0.01 (0.02)
Out of workforce	0.05* (0.02)
House-work	-0.04 (0.02)
Constant	0.67*** (0.02)
N (respondents)	1,182
n (countries)	16

Note: *:p<0.05; **:p<0.01; ***:p<0.001. Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix 4. Stepwise Regressions of Historical Conditions and Attitudinal Boundaries, Full Models

Parameter	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b
<i>Explanatory country level variables</i>				
Settler nation	0.04** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)		
Early democratizer			0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04 (0.02)
Attainable Boundary Marker Index		0.62*** (0.13)		0.76*** (0.16)
Ascriptive Boundary Marker Index		-0.04 (0.08)		-0.12 (0.09)
<i>Country level control variables</i>				
Level of belonging in majority population	0.45*** (0.08)	0.37*** (0.09)	0.41*** (0.08)	0.40*** (0.09)
Employment level	0.29** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.26** (0.10)	-0.07 (0.12)
Welfare regime				
Liberal	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Christian-Democratic	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Social-Democratic	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.10** (0.03)
Immigrant population	0.11 (0.10)	0.23 (0.12)	0.23* (0.11)	0.11 (0.14)
<i>Individual level control variables</i>				
Sex (male)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Religion				
Christian	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Non-Christian	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
No religion	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.00)	-0.02* (0.00)	-0.02* (0.00)
Years of schooling	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
Employment status				
Paid work	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Seasonal employment	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Student	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Unemployed	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Out of workforce	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)

Military service	0.09 (0.17)	0.08 (0.17)	0.09 (0.17)	0.08 (0.17)
Citizen of country of residence	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Voting behaviour (last national election)				
Voted	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Did not vote	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Was not eligible to vote	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)
Survey year (2013)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Constant	0.06 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.11)	0.09 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.11)

Note: N (respondents) = 3,667, n (countries) = 19

*:p<0.05; **:p<0.01; ***:p<0.001. Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

Endnotes

¹ Most prevalent among these is the distinction between civic and ethnic nationhood in its different variants (drawing on works of Kohn 1944, Meinecke (1970[1908]) and Smith 1991).

² This forms Favell's explanation of the French integrationist model of citizenship versus British multiculturalism – an opposition which he understands to be reversed mirror images.

³ Note the counter-argument sometimes put forward that stricter naturalization requirements may in fact promote immigrant integration – e.g. by encouraging immigrants to learn the national language. In terms of signal effects, the study maintains the reverse expectation, in line with most researchers in the field.

⁴ 'Ascriptive' in the sense that they are criteria which are more or less impossible to acquire if an individual does not have them in the first place.

⁵ Of course, one may change religion (in that sense making it an attainable rather than an ascriptive trait), but religious affiliation is generally seen as a rather permanent trait.

⁶ These are: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, France, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Great Britain. Note that for a few countries, the survey has only been conducted in one of the rounds.

⁷ Unfortunately, with this operationalisation (and with no information in the data set about the respondent's birthplace), it is not possible to distinguish between first- and second-generation immigrants. As such, the results from the regression models in this study are mean effects across the two generations.

⁸ For both surveyed years, two factors are extracted (eigenvalues above 1). On the first factor all eight items load relatively high with no clear pattern, but on the second factor the four (theoretically) attainable criteria (language skills, respect for the country's laws and institutions, citizenship, and feeling) have high positive loadings (all above 0.4), while the four (theoretically) ascriptive criteria load very poorly (0.02-0.20).

⁹ The citizenship criterion shows somewhat lower correlations with some of the other attainable criteria but is included in the index of attainable criteria on the basis of theoretical considerations, the factor analysis, and high item-scale correlations.

¹⁰ The Eurobarometer also includes questions about national identity boundary markers, but the drawback of this battery is that respondents are forced to choose a maximum of three nationality criteria, rather than – as in the ISSP – rank all criteria according to importance. This is unfortunate since in the boundary drawing perspective, there is no limit to how many (or how few) markers may figure on the national boundary. For this reason, I did not perform analyses with this majority attitude measure.