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Ethnic Exclusion and Civil Resistance Campaigns: Opting for Nonviolent or Violent Tactics?

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Abstract

Previous research has argued that political inequality between ethnic groups increases the likelihood of both nonviolent and violent protest. In his study, I focus on civil resistance campaigns and argue that the probability that these large-scale, organized movements will take violent over nonviolent forms increases with the share of a country's population that is excluded from political power on the basis of ethnic affiliation. I expect this to be so because ethnically exclusive regimes are more likely to counter political demands with violent repression, which increases the cost and decreases the anticipated success of nonviolent relative to violent resistance. I test this proposition in a global sample of countries for the period 1950–2006 and find, first, that high levels of ethnic exclusion makes civil resistance campaigns more likely to occur violently than nonviolently. Next, to assess the mechanism at play, I conduct a mediation analysis and show that almost half of the effect of ethnic exclusion on violent campaign onset is mediated by the latent level of violent repression in a country. This result suggests that political authorities' repressive strategies are key to explaining why regime opponents do not always opt for nonviolent forms of civil resistance.

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Note on contributor

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Introduction

Recent popular uprisings, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, have raised the question of why civil resistance campaigns emerge nonviolently in some settings and violently in others.¹ Group-based grievances are usually seen as being among the main motives for political action, but previous studies have not systematically investigated whether political inequality between ethnic groups, or ethnic exclusion, is particularly associated with one of the two resistance tactics. Gurr argues that collective disadvantages motivate protest in general and that protesters' choice of opting for nonviolent or violent tactics instead is determined by political institutions and state capacity.² More recently, Cunningham has suggested that politically excluded groups seeking self-determination are more likely to engage in both nonviolent and violent action than in conventional politics, which is perceived as an unviable strategy in exclusivist settings.³ Jazayeri likewise argues that ethno-political inequalities in the Middle East and North Africa increase the prevalence of both nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns.⁴ However, these studies do not explicitly discuss whether the rationale of engaging in nonviolent versus violent tactics could be influenced by the power distribution between ethnic groups, and the empirical findings are mixed.⁵ Should we, then, expect ethnic exclusion to have an uneven effect on the two types of resistance?

In this study, I argue that civil resistance campaigns are more likely to erupt violently than nonviolently in ethnically exclusive regimes, that is, in countries where a large part of the population belongs to ethnic groups without political representation at the executive level of government.⁶ I expect this relationship to be driven by the repressive strategies of political authorities in these regimes, which previous studies have found to be particularly fierce.⁷ The inclination to counter political demands with violent repression in ethnically exclusive regimes will likely radicalize the opposition, that is, commit it to the use of violent forms of civil resistance, through two mechanisms.⁸ First, the high potential cost of protesting against a violent regime deters would-be moderates and leaves room in the protest arena for radical elements. Second, other would-be moderates become inflamed by the regime's actions, which are perceived as illegitimate and lead people to believe that political change cannot be accomplished through peaceful means.⁹

To illustrate this reasoning, take for instance apartheid South Africa in the early 1980s where increased black militancy was a direct result of previous decades' violent regime crackdowns.¹⁰ The share of township residents who approved the use of armed struggle had risen to 40%, and an

overwhelming majority of 80% now rejected the thought of a power-sharing compromise with the regime in Pretoria.¹¹ In Thailand, by contrast, where the majority of the population has been ethnically included, the political authorities have been reluctant to engage in violent repression, and the opposition has consistently been dominated by moderate forces.¹² As John F. Kennedy once eloquently put it, “[t]hose who make peaceful revolutions impossible will make violent revolutions inevitable.”¹³ Quite simply, because regime opponents in ethnically exclusive regimes are or expect to be countered with violent repression, they deem peaceful action unlikely to succeed and become more likely to opt for violent tactics.¹⁴

To test this proposition, I analyze civil resistance campaigns in 161 countries for the period 1950–2006 based on the NAVCO 2.0 dataset.¹⁵ This data source is ideal for my purpose because it is constructed to compare nonviolent and violent campaigns, that is, continuous series of mass tactics that have at least 1,000 observed participants, a coherent organization, and pursue regime change, independence, or self-determination.¹⁶ I aim to explain the onset of civil resistance campaigns, which is coded nonviolent if the primary forms of resistance in the first year of a campaign were nonviolent, for example, strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and sit-ins. An onset is coded violent if tactics such as sabotage and bombings, hit-and-run guerilla attacks, and street battles are predominant in the first year of a campaign. Violent campaigns will to a large extent correspond to what is typically termed armed conflict or civil war but not entirely so as they are defined by the mass participation in violent tactics instead of the number of combat-related deaths.¹⁷

The results show that the likelihood of violent campaign onset increases with the share of the population that belongs to ethnic groups without political representation at the executive level of government (based on EPR-ETH 2.0 dataset).¹⁸ After controlling for other relevant factors such as income, democratic institutions, and population size, the predicted probability of experiencing a violent campaign onset triples when ethnically inclusive countries are compared with the most exclusive ones in the sample such as Rwanda, Syria, and Taiwan until the late 1980s. The probability of nonviolent campaign onset, by contrast, seems to drop with the size of the excluded population, and there is a statistically significant difference between the two types of campaign onsets for high levels of ethnic exclusion.

To assess the mechanism behind this observed pattern, I include Fariss’ new latent variable estimate of repression, which covers a longer period than previous indicators.¹⁹ It also matches the

theoretical argument put forward here because it focuses on violations of physical integrity rights such as political imprisonments, torture, and killings, what I term violent repression, and because it measures a country's latent level of repression not just as a function of the observed violations in a given year but as dependent on the same country's values in previous years.²⁰ As I spell out below, regime opponents' choose their resistance tactics based on a pattern of repressive strategies and not just based on the level of repression in a single year. The results show that ethnic exclusion no longer is able to explain the choice of campaign tactics when the latent level of violent repression is held constant across countries. I examine this result more thoroughly by employing mediation analysis and find that the statistically significant mediation effect accounts for nearly half of the total effect of ethnic exclusion on violent campaign onset and that the direct effect is statistically insignificant.

I interpret the findings as an indication that the use of violent repression in ethnically exclusive regimes is an important explanation for the predominance of violent resistance campaigns. This interpretation is supported by anecdotal evidence from diverse cases such as ethnic conflicts in Iraq, Northern Ireland, and South Africa where regime opponents justify their violent tactics with reference to political authorities' repressive strategies, which are considered to be unjust and to make peaceful resistance futile. The direct comparison between violent and nonviolent resistance tactics in this study thus highlight state repression as an important escalation mechanism that have been given inadequate attention in previous quantitative conflict studies.

Ethnic Exclusion and the Rationale behind Resistance Tactics

Regime opponents pick their tactics based on the costs of engaging in those tactics weighed against the anticipated chance of success.²¹ Certain conditions will thus favor nonviolent over violent resistance and vice versa.²² Recent studies have provided strong evidence that ethnic exclusion increases the risk of armed conflict, and it has further been suggested (albeit not empirically supported) that this association could be explained by regimes' use of repression to counter claims for political inclusion.²³ If the repressive strategies employed by political authorities in ethnically exclusive regimes affect the cost and the anticipated likelihood of success of engaging in protest, then ethnic exclusion should help explain some of the empirical variation in campaign tactics.²⁴ Below, I suggest two mechanisms explaining why regime opponents would opt for violent tactics in exclusivist settings. I regularly illustrate these mechanisms with reference to cases of ethnic conflict to show their real-world relevance.

Radicalization of Regime Opponents in Ethnically Exclusive Regimes

In general, we should expect that individuals would prefer to engage in nonviolent forms of civil resistance. The physical risk of protesting rises dramatically when arms enter the equation, and most people are unwilling to commit acts of violence against others.²⁵ With a seemingly higher mobilization cost, why would challengers ever opt for violent resistance? According to Tilly, “collective violence is a by-product of the same political processes which produce nonviolent collective action.”²⁶ What this means is that the political process of ethnic exclusion lays the foundation for (i.e., it motivates) both nonviolent and violent resistance. It does not, however, mean that the two forms of collective action are equally likely outcomes of ethnic exclusion. In this regard, Tilly sees the main line between nonviolent and violent struggle as a product of repeated challenger-government interactions in which the government forcibly resists challengers’ claims.²⁷ It is this radicalization process, in which regime opponents increase their commitment to and use of violent tactics,²⁸ that I suggest is made increasingly likely by the repressive strategies of ethnically exclusive regimes.

Rørbæk and Knudsen have recently shown that countries are more likely to engage in violent forms of repression when a large share of their population is ethnically excluded.²⁹ They argue that rulers representing a small ethnic constituency face more demands for political change and that the cost of accommodating these demands, relative to that of suppressing them with force, increases with the size of the excluded population.³⁰ This corresponds with Svobik’s more general argument that repression is less costly than alternative strategies where the few hold a disproportionate share of power and wealth.³¹

As proposed here, violent repression has, first, a *deterrent effect* as it increases the cost of collective action. This is so because the actual or threatened use of political imprisonments, torture, killings, and other physical abuses makes people refrain from taking to the streets. The potential cost is simply too high for most people to be willing to protest peacefully. Repressive strategies do not in the same way alter the cost of violent protest, which is high in even the least repressive societies.³² As an example of this mechanism the number of anti-apartheid protesters in South Africa was significantly reduced after periods with high levels of state repression, and nonviolent protest was particularly likely to be deterred when the South African police used violent repression.³³ By contrast, protesting is less costly when political authorities are reluctant to use their violent capabilities. In Thailand, for instance, where nonviolent campaigns occurred in 1992, 2005–06, and 2010, police officers have not been allowed

to carry fire arms when responding to peaceful rallies and demonstrations.³⁴ The deterrent effect of violent repression thus radicalizes challengers by discouraging moderates, thereby leaving room in the protest arena for radicals.³⁵

Second, repression has an *inflammatory effect* as it pushes would-be moderates towards accepting violent means of resistance.³⁶ Ethnic exclusion is in itself perceived as illegitimate due to an unequal distribution of political power and wealth, but violent repression reinforces the justifiability of challenging the regime violently. Repression may fuel fear, hatred, and resentment that can motivate individuals to commit acts of violence.³⁷ As mentioned in the introduction, the proportion of township residents approving armed struggle against apartheid increased to 40% following years of violent repression.³⁸ The 1988–89 ethnic pogroms in Azerbaijan likewise paved the way for a violent campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh by convincing the Armenians that they would never be able to live safely under Azeri rule.³⁹ Also, more recent qualitative evidence from the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey shows that “a majority of recruits who joined since the early 1990s personally experienced state violence or witnessed victimization of family members who were not involved in insurgency.”⁴⁰

However, “inflammation” is not only an emotional mechanism. According to Lichbach, repression of nonviolent protest leads rational challengers to reduce their nonviolent activities and increase their violent activities.⁴¹ If regime opponents come to see nonviolence as ineffective, violent resistance may be regarded the only way to transform the political system and thus the strategic choice.⁴² As White argues in the case of Northern Ireland:

Participation in organized political violence appears to be a reaction to state violence that is conditioned by a commitment to one's peers and community and by the belief that a given state is not reformable. If the state is reformable, repression does not take place. The accounts also show that political violence was seen as an effective alternative to ineffective peaceful protest.⁴³

The 1991 uprising in Iraq is another example of how ethnic exclusion through intense use of violent repression pushes opposition movements toward violent tactics. For decades the Ba’ath government had reacted heavy-handedly to any possible threat posed by the Shia community.⁴⁴ Both leaders and members of opposition groups were executed, entire families were imprisoned, and the remaining opposition was forced underground. When the opportunity to challenge the regime finally presented itself after the Iraqi

loss in Kuwait, a large part of the Shia community had come to believe “that the best possible choice for securing their future was rebellion against the regime.”⁴⁵

It is important to note that the effect of repression on dissent behavior has been widely debated.⁴⁶ However, when it comes to indiscriminate violent repression most scholars agree that it tends to backfire and escalate conflicts.⁴⁷ This kind of repression is exactly what we would expect to see in ethnically exclusive regimes where members of the excluded population are potential targets just because of their ethnic affiliation. As Roessler argues, these regimes often have “little choice but to resort to indiscriminate violence” because they exclude large segments of the population and thus lack “the local leverage and access to information necessary to produce selective violence.”⁴⁸ What this means is that members of the excluded population are likely to join or support violent protest simply because they cannot assure themselves of immunity from repression by refraining from political action.⁴⁹ In this sense, ethnically exclusive regimes have weak policing capabilities and infrastructural power, which makes it harder to completely crush challenges in the making.⁵⁰

Yet this does not mean that ethnically exclusive regimes never succeed in repressing dissent. In South Africa, for instance, ruthless repression in the 1950s and 1960s effectively crushed all organized opposition for some 15 years, and the minority-controlled Ba’ath governments in Iraq and Syria likewise managed to hold on to power for decades relying on violent repression.⁵¹ However, as these cases show, repression might be successful in the short run, but it has the unintended effect of increasing the likelihood of violent uprisings when the opportunity for political actions presents itself.⁵²

The case of contemporary Syria raises the additional question of whether all campaigns start out nonviolently and then turn violent if the regime decides to repress but is unsuccessful in this endeavor. This is definitely a likely scenario in regimes that use their repressive and accommodative strategies inconsistently and thus make it difficult for challengers to predict the government’s response. However, when a large share of the population is ethnically excluded we should anticipate that most uprisings either start out violently or at least turn violent rather quickly. Simply, if challengers have a clear expectation of being met with repression they are unlikely to engage in strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins. This may help explain, as Chenoweth and Stephan observe, that “many violent campaigns do not even attempt nonviolent resistance in the early stages of the conflict, opting to use violence from the onset.”⁵³

In sum, I expect that the probability of violent relative to nonviolent campaign onset increases with ethnic exclusion and that the use of repression in ethnically exclusive regimes, which tend to be

violent and indiscriminate, largely explains this relationship. As McCauley and Moskalenko conclude, “[p]olitical radicalization of individuals, groups, and mass publics occurs in a trajectory of action and reaction in which state action often plays a significant role.”⁵⁴ Violent repression radicalizes opposition movements by deterring would-be moderates and by convincing others that violent resistance is legitimate and even a necessary means to overthrow the regime. I thus propose the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The probability of violent relative to nonviolent campaign onset increases with the share of a country’s population that is excluded from political power on the basis of ethnic affiliation.

Hypothesis 2: The association between ethnic exclusion and campaign onset is largely driven by the level of violent repression in a country.

Data and Research Design

Dependent Variable

The NAVCO 2.0 dataset seems ideally suited to test these propositions. It contains yearly data on 250 civil resistance campaigns around the world for the period 1945–2006 and is specifically constructed to compare nonviolent and violent resistance. Campaigns are defined as “series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” with at least 1,000 observed participants and a coherent organization that at one time held a maximalist goal of overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupation, or achieving self-determination.⁵⁵ As the data collection is based on encyclopedias, bibliographies, existent dataset, and expert knowledge, underreporting represents a potential bias. However, the fact that campaigns are defined by their continued mass participation makes them less likely to be overlooked than small-scale protests and riots, and there is little reason to expect that potential underreporting should not be similar across nonviolent and violent campaigns.⁵⁶

Campaigns are coded as “violent” in a given year if resistance primarily was carried out by armed persons relying on physical violence. In the same way, campaigns are coded as “nonviolent” in a given year if “prosecuted by unarmed civilians who did not directly harm the physical well-being of their

opponent.”⁵⁷ A campaign that last for several years may thus be coded violent in some years and nonviolent in others. But as the focus here is whether campaigns erupts violently or nonviolently, I only look at the first year of a campaign. Accordingly, the analysis does not attempt to test subsequent factors such as campaign duration or success rate, which are affected by numerous factors other than the dissidents’ choice of resistance tactics. The dependent variable, *campaign onset*, is trichotomous and unordered where nonviolent onsets are coded “1” and violent onsets “2” with years with no campaign onset as the reference category (“0”).⁵⁸ Following Cunningham and Wimmer, Cerderman, and Min, I use multinomial logistic regression because the three possible outcomes are nominal and regarded as alternative strategies.⁵⁹ As the hypotheses are about the tactical choice between violent and nonviolent tactics, I test whether the coefficients are statistically significantly different (i.e., $p(\beta_{\text{Nonviolent}} = \beta_{\text{Violent}})$) in the models reported below. The standard errors are clustered on countries as observations are assumed to be dependent within but not across countries.⁶⁰

[Figure 1 about here]

Several of the campaigns in the dataset took place in non-sovereign states, and due to data limitations on the independent variables the analysis includes 185 campaigns in 161 countries for the period 1950–2006.⁶¹ Figure 1 provides some initial, descriptive evidence regarding the distribution of campaign onset according to the level of ethnic exclusion in countries (operationalized below). As shown, more than half of the 82 nonviolent onsets in the sample occur in countries where less than 10% of the population belongs to ethnic groups without political influence. Only around one-fourth (27/103) of the violent onsets occurs in the same set of countries. However, this picture changes dramatically when we look at the subsamples with intermediate and high levels of ethnic exclusion. Countries where 10–20% and 20–50% of the population is excluded have experienced almost twice as many violent as nonviolent campaign onsets, and in countries ruled by an ethnic minority (where more than 50% of the population is excluded), 29 of the 39 campaign onsets in the sample are violent. The descriptive statistics in Figure 1 thus lend compelling support to Hypothesis 1; however, it is still important to test whether the association is confounded by important covariates such as economic development and regime type. The independent variables are presented below.

Independent Variables

The main predictor, *ethnic exclusion*, ranges from 0–1 and indicates the share of a country’s population that belongs to ethnic groups without de-facto influence at the executive level of government (based on the EPR-ETH 2.0 dataset).⁶² To exemplify, South Africa’s exclusion score is around .9 in the years before 1994 where all but the approximately 8% white Afrikaners were politically excluded. The score drops to zero in 1994 when apartheid is abolished and the new multi-racial regime is institutionalized. Besides ethnic exclusion, the baseline model (Model 1) includes two variables for *ongoing campaign* reflecting whether a country experienced nonviolent and/or violent civil resistance in the previous year. A *peace-year* variable that counts the years since the last time a country experienced either nonviolent or violent civil resistance is also included. These variables are intended to control for the potential time-dependency in the dependent variable. Finally, the model includes *region dummies*⁶³ to account for “bad neighborhood” effects or other geo-cultural factors that might foster civil resistance, and a *time-trend* variable (measuring years since 1950) is included because nonviolent/violent resistance campaigns might have become more/less likely over time.

In the main model (Model 2), I further control for *per capita GDP* (logged, from the Maddison Project)⁶⁴ since ethnic exclusion is more likely in low-income countries, which at the same time are expected to experience more civil resistance. Next, although ethnic representation is not guaranteed by democratic institutions, ethnically exclusive regimes are most often autocratic. Democracies are also likely to experience fewer resistance campaigns, and to control for this association I include the *Polity IV index* (ranging from -10 to 10).⁶⁵ The main model also accounts for *population size* (logged, from the Maddison Project)⁶⁶ because mass participation defined as 1,000 observed participants is more likely in populous countries, which also may experience more conflict due to center-periphery tensions. To minimize simultaneity bias, the time-variant independent variables are lagged one year in all models. Summary statistics and correlation matrix are presented in the online appendix (Table A1 and Table A2).

To test the robustness of the results, I include additional control variables in a third model (Model 3). First, *political instability* is a dummy variable indicating whether a country’s Polity score has changed at least three points in any of the previous three years. Instability in government arrangements may be a sign of disorganization and provide opportunities for challengers.⁶⁷ Next, *ethno-linguistic fractionalization* is included to test whether the ethnic composition of society, rather than the ethnic power distribution, has an effect on campaign onsets.⁶⁸ Finally, *oil production* (metric tons per capita,

logged)⁶⁹ is often an important source of wealth in developing countries and might thus motivate both ethnic exclusion and regime challenges.

Mediating Variable

To test Hypothesis 2, I present the same three models in a second table; only here violent repression is included as an additional independent variable. I expect that this addition will diminish the effect of ethnic exclusion on the choice of campaign onsets. To further investigate the potential mediating effect I conduct mediation analysis, which lets me test how much of the total effect of ethnic exclusion is mediated by violent repression.⁷⁰

Regarding measurement, I use Fariss' new latent variable estimate of repression.⁷¹ The indicator estimates a country's yearly violations of physical integrity rights and is constructed from several standard- and event-based measures including the Political Terror Scale, the Harff and Gurr Dataset of massive repressive events, the CIRI Physical Integrity Dataset, and UCDP's One-sided Violence Dataset.⁷² As argued in the introduction, the variable is preferred not only because it covers a longer period,⁷³ but also because it fits the theoretical argument of the study. First, it measures *violent* repression since the data sources are indicators of extrajudicial imprisonment, torture, killings, genocides, etc. Second, it measures the level of repression for a country in a given year based on the value for the same country in previous years.⁷⁴ As I have theorized, the radicalization of regime opponents is an ongoing process that depends on people's experiences with violent repression based on which they form their expectation about future state responses. As illustrated by the case examples above, challengers do not turn violent overnight but through a history of repression that justifies the use of violent tactics.⁷⁵

Empirical Results

Table 1 displays the empirical models testing Hypothesis 1. The baseline model shows that ethnic exclusion has a positive and statistically significant effect on violent campaign onset. That is, countries are more likely to experience outbreak of violent campaigns (compared to "no onset") when a larger share of their populations belongs to ethnic groups without political influence. This finding supports the previously established association between ethnic exclusion and civil war.⁷⁶ The effect of ethnic exclusion on nonviolent campaign onset is, by contrast, statistically insignificant. Although this seems to speak in favor of the more general argument that ethnic exclusion makes violent campaigns relatively

more likely than nonviolent ones, the model cannot, as shown in the third column in Model 1, reject that the two coefficients are equivalent at the .10 level of significance (two-tailed test).⁷⁷

[Table 1 about here]

However, this result may be confounded by covariates not included in the model, and when economic development, population size, and democratic institutions are accounted for in the main model, the same test shows that ethnic exclusion indeed does make violent onsets relatively more likely than nonviolent ones (statistically significant at the .10 level). Model 3 includes three extra control variables, political instability, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and oil resources, but this does not change the statistically significant difference in the effect of ethnic exclusion on the two campaign tactics. Models 2 and 3 even indicate that outbreaks of nonviolent campaigns are more prevalent in ethnically inclusive regimes, but the negative coefficient of ethnic exclusion is statistically insignificant. All in all, Table 1 substantiates Hypothesis 1 and suggests that higher levels of ethnic exclusion make it more likely that civil resistance campaigns will emerge violently than nonviolently. Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities of this main finding. As shown, the predicted probabilities of experiencing a violent onset triples from .01 to well over .03 when we compare the most inclusive and the most exclusive countries in the sample. By contrast, the predicted probability of nonviolent onset is about .01 in the entire interval.

[Figure 2 about here]

A potential alternative explanation for this main finding is that ethnically exclusive regimes primarily experience territorial conflicts, which due to their peripheral nature tend to be predominantly violent. In the online appendix, I investigate this proposition by controlling for whether a given campaign is has a goal of greater autonomy or territorial secession (Table A4, Model A4). However, the results remain and even if only governmental conflicts are included in the analysis (Model A5), ethnically exclusive regimes are more likely to witness violent than nonviolent resistance campaigns.⁷⁸ Of additional sensitivity analyses, I have used multinomial probit instead of multinomial logit (Table A3, Model 1) and substituted the Polity index for Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's dichotomous democracy

measure (Table A3, Model 2).⁷⁹ I have also included cubic peace-year polynomials⁸⁰ and explored whether the Cold War period conditions the effect of ethnic exclusion on resistance tactics (not reported). None of these alternative specifications questions the main results.⁸¹

In general, the empirical results back Chenoweth and Lewis' notion that violent and nonviolent campaigns emerge in very different types of setting.⁸² Consistent with their results, I find that poor countries are in particular risk of violent campaigns and that democratic institutions make nonviolent campaigns less likely. The former result indicates that violent resistance is more likely in weak regimes,⁸³ whereas the latter points to the lack of institutional channels for voicing grievances in autocracies. Not surprisingly, populous countries seem more likely to experience resistance campaigns in general. If we look at the additional controls included in Model 3, political instability favors violent tactics, and a large oil production helps shield regimes against nonviolent campaigns. The first result is consistent with Chenoweth and Lewis who find, however, that oil increases the likelihood of violent campaign onset.⁸⁴ Finally, ethno-linguistic fractionalization seems to be positively correlated with both nonviolent and violent campaign onset, but the correlations are statistically insignificant and fractionalization does not seem to help explain the choice of resistance tactics (that is, the test in the third column of Model 3 cannot reject that the two coefficients are equivalent).⁸⁵

[Table 2 about here]

The general support for Hypothesis 1 leads back to the question of *why* violent resistance is seemingly the most prevalent campaign tactic in ethnically exclusive regimes. In Table 2, I include the latent estimate of violent repression (the models are otherwise identical to those in Table 1). As shown, the previously statistically significant effect of ethnic exclusion on violent onset vanishes in all three models, and there is no longer a statistically significant difference between the choice of resistance tactics when violent repression is added to the main model (Model 5) and the model including the additional controls (Model 6). That is, when the latent level of violent repression is held constant across countries, ethnically exclusive regimes are no more likely than their inclusive counterparts to experience violent uprisings. Interestingly, the effect of ethnic exclusion on nonviolent onsets hardly changes when violent repression is added to the model (from -.27 in Model 2 to -.25 in Model 5) but the effect on violent onset is more than cut in half (from 1.17 in Model 2 to .52 in Model 5). It thus seems that violent repression

takes over, so to speak, the effect of ethnic exclusion on violent campaign onset, indicating that the effect is mediated as proposed theoretically.

To get a better picture of this potential indirect effect I investigate it further in Figure 3, which is an illustration of a two-equation mediation analysis based on Model 5 (the full results of the analysis are reported in Table A5 in the online appendix).⁸⁶ In the first equation, the mediator, violent repression, is the dependent variable, and in the second equation violent repression is included as a covariate with violent campaign onset as the outcome. Based on this, the analysis estimates how much of the total effect of ethnic exclusion on violent onsets is mediated by violent repression. As illustrated in Figure 3, there is a positive and statistically significant total effect of ethnic exclusion on violent campaign onset (.020 [.003; .042]), but the direct effect, that is, the one driven by potential mechanisms other than violent repression, is statistically insignificant (.011 [-.004; .028]). The effect mediated by violent repression is, on the other hand, statistically significant and accounts for 46% of the total effect of ethnic exclusion (.009 [.003; .018]). This finding further supports Hypothesis 2, which proposed that the association between ethnic exclusion and outbreaks of civil resistance campaigns largely is driven by the level of violent repression in a country.

[Figure 3 about here]

One worry regarding this finding is whether the mediation analysis is in fact “causal” or merely correlational. In other words, we can be fairly confident that resistance campaigns are no more likely to emerge violently in ethnically exclusive regimes when we hold constant the latent level of violent repression in a country, but this is not the same as saying that violent repression caused by ethnic exclusion explains the prevalence of violent onsets in these regimes. Cross-country studies like this will never get us all the way and, as elaborated below, systematic qualitative investigation of the sequence leading up to outbreaks of resistance campaigns could be useful in this regard. However, one potential criticism that can be accommodated here is whether it would be just as meaningful to claim that ethnic exclusion is what mediates the effect of violent repression on violent campaign onsets. That is, one could argue that ethnic exclusion emerges in violent settings as a way for ruling elites to shield themselves, which then would motivate segments of the excluded population to rebel. In Table A5 in the online appendix, I therefore re-estimate the mediation analysis but this time with violent repression as the main

independent variable and ethnic exclusion as the mediator. Importantly, the results clearly show that ethnic exclusion does not mediate the effect of violent repression on violent campaign onsets. The mediation effect is statistically insignificant and is estimated to account for a mere 2% of the total effect (compared to the 46% mediation effect illustrated in Figure 3). Accordingly, although the sequential logic behind the mediation analysis mainly rests on the theoretical argument and the anecdotal case evidence presented above (and although some recursiveness cannot be precluded), the results suggest that political authorities' repressive strategies are key to explaining the predominance of violent campaigns in ethnically exclusive regimes.

Conclusion

At Nelson Mandela's defense speech in Pretoria, 1964, he admitted being one of the founders of *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, the militant wing of ANC, which was formed "as a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of [his] people by the Whites." Mandela further stated that because "violence in [South Africa] was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence" and that only after "the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did [they] decide to answer violence with violence."⁸⁷ These quotes nicely summarize the theoretical argument of this study: When a sizable share of a country's population is excluded from political power on the basis of ethnic affiliation there will likely be a widespread demand for political change, and whether opposition groups will opt for nonviolent or violent tactics largely depends on their perception of how the regime will respond. If challengers are, or can expect to be, countered with violent repression, which is likely the case in ethnically exclusive regimes,⁸⁸ large-scale and highly organized protest, like civil resistance campaigns, should be expected to emerge violently. In support of this argument, the statistical results show that the probability of violent relative to nonviolent campaign onset increases with ethnic exclusion in a global sample of countries for the period 1950–2006 and that almost half of this effect is driven by the latent level of violent repression in a country.

The study thus differs from those arguing that political inequality between ethnic groups makes both violent and nonviolent challenges more likely.⁸⁹ Surely, political exclusion motivates both nonviolent and violent resistance, but the challenger-government interactions in ethnically exclusive regimes make large-scale resistance more likely to take violent forms.⁹⁰ Yet there are limitations to what

can be concluded here. The availability of data restricts the analysis to the country level, and both group- and individual-level evidence would greatly increase the certainty of the examined processes. Such investigation do exist for single cases,⁹¹ but we need to be able to generalize these processes across cases. In lieu of data that is more conducive to testing the dynamics of the relationship, one strategy would be to assess the proposed sequence – whether ethnic exclusion leads to violent repressions and thereby increases the risk of violent resistance campaigns – in a larger number of case studies. In some cases the sequence will expectedly be messier than it has been portrayed here, and this only underlines the need for more systematic, qualitative investigation. Finally, the study has shown that we cannot focus exclusively on armed conflict if we want to understand why only some political conflicts escalate and turn violent. It is necessary to ask why challengers do not always opt for the much preferred nonviolent resistance tactics when the opportunity for large-scale political action presents itself. As argued here, we can only answer this question by taking into account political authorities' repressive strategies.

Figure 1. Distribution of campaign onsets at different levels of ethnic exclusion

Note: The total number of campaign onsets in the sample is 185 of which 82 are nonviolent.

Figure 2. The predicted probability of violent and nonviolent campaign onset

Note: Based on Model 2 in Table 1. The dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 3. Mediation analysis

Note: ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed tests). The full results for the analysis are reported in Table A5 in the online appendix.

Table 1. Ethnic exclusion and nonviolent and violent mass movements for regime change (multinomial logistic regression)

	Model 1. Baseline			Model 2. Main model			Model 3. Additional controls		
	<i>Reference category: No onset</i>			<i>Reference category: No onset</i>			<i>Reference category: No onset</i>		
	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$
Ethnic exclusion _{t-1}	.25 (.45)	1.09** (.36)	.16	-.25 (.58)	1.17** (.37)	.05	-.35 (.60)	1.09** (.39)	.06
GDP/capita (log) _{t-1}				.26 (.19)	-.43** (.12)	<.01	.42* (.19)	-.36** (.13)	<.01
Pop. size (log) _{t-1}				.34** (.10)	.18* (.08)	.25	.48** (.09)	.01 (.02)	.06
Polity score _{t-1}				-.12** (.03)	-.26 (.66)	<.01	-.12** (.02)	.008 (.02)	<.01
Political instability _{t-1}							-.54 (.47)	.56* (.28)	.05
Ethno-ling. frac.							1.04 (.64)	.62 (.70)	.67
Oil/cap. (log) _{t-1}							-.16** (.05)	-.04 (.06)	.13
Ongoing, nonviolent	-1.45 (1.02)	-.39 (.67)		-1.95+ (1.03)	-.26 (.66)		-1.91+ (1.05)	-.28 (.67)	
Ongoing, violent	.03 (.32)	.07 (.30)		-.05 (.30)	.04 (.26)		.009 (.32)	.02 (.27)	
Constant	-6.08** (.70)	-5.85** (.70)		-13.66** (2.48)	-5.37** (1.75)		-17.26** (2.38)	-6.59** (1.83)	
N° onsets	82	103		80	102		80	102	
N° ctr./obs.	161/7,166			157/6,932			157/6,932		

**p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country). Region dummies, peace years, and time-trend included (not shown).

Table 2. Including latent measure of violent repression (multinomial logistic regression)

	Model 4. Baseline			Model 5. Main model			Model 6. Additional controls		
	<i>Reference category: No onset</i>			<i>Reference category: No onset</i>			<i>Reference category: No onset</i>		
	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$	Nonviolent onset	Violent onset	$p(\beta_N=\beta_V)$
Ethnic exclusion _{t-1}	.003 (.48)	.46 (.33)	.44	-.27 (.59)	.53 (.36)	.26	-.36 (.60)	.40 (.37)	.30
Violent repression _{t-1}	.48** (.12)	.96** (.13)	<.01	.05 (.17)	1.01** (.17)	<.01	.04 (.17)	1.01** (.18)	<.01
GDP/capita (log) _{t-1}				.27 (.19)	-.30* (.12)	.01	.43* (.19)	-.25+ (.14)	<.01
Pop. size (log) _{t-1}				.33** (.10)	-.04 (.02)	.02	.47** (.10)	-.003 (.12)	<.01
Polity score _{t-1}				-.11** (.03)	.04* (.02)	<.01	-.12** (.03)	.03+ (.02)	<.01
Political instability _{t-1}							-.54 (.47)	.39 (.31)	.09
Ethno-ling. frac.							1.03 (.63)	.99 (.70)	.96
Oil/cap. (log) _{t-1}							-.16** (.05)	-.06 (.06)	.20
Ongoing, nonviolent	-1.68 (1.04)	-.45 (.66)		-1.96+ (1.04)	-.27 (.67)		-1.92+ (1.05)	-.27 (.67)	
Ongoing, violent	-.53 (.36)	-.74* (.35)		-.10 (.32)	-.75* (.34)		-.03 (.34)	-.73* (.35)	
Constant	-5.70** (.69)	-5.37** (.74)		-13.48** (2.48)	-2.31** (1.93)		-17.10** (2.39)	-3.54+ (1.95)	
N° onsets	82	103		80	102		80	102	
N° ctr./obs.	161/7,166			157/6,932			157/6,932		

**p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country). Region dummies, peace years, and time-trend included (not shown).

Notes

¹ Erica Chenoweth and Kathleen G. Cunningham, “Understanding Nonviolent Resistance: An Introduction,” *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 50 (May 2013): 271–276.

² Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), Ch. 5.

³ Kathleen G. Cunningham, “Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (May 2013): 291–304.

⁴ Karen B. Jazayeri, “Identity-based Political Inequality and Protest: The Dynamic Relationship between Political Power and Protest in the Middle East and North Africa,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, OnlineFirst (2015): 1–23.

⁵ Whereas Cunningham (see note 3 above) finds a positive association between ethnic exclusion and the probability of nonviolent campaigns, Jazayeri (see note 4 above) finds a negative one, and none of these findings are statistically significant.

⁶ Cf. Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brain Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set,” *American Sociological Review*, no. 74 (April 2009): 316–37.

⁷ Lasse L. Rørbæk and Allan T. Knudsen, “Maintaining Ethnic Dominance: Diversity, Power, and Violent Repression,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, (OnlineFirst 2015): 1–20; see also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Violence* (London: MIT Press, 2003), Ch. 8; Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11.

⁸ Violent repression is defined as physical sanctions such as political imprisonment, torture, and killings undertaken by state agents or affiliates in order to impose a cost on an individual or an organization; cf. Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, no. 10 (2007): 1–23. Repression of political rights and civil liberty restrictions are not included in this definition to make sure that the concept does not conflate with ethnic exclusion.

⁹ Donatella della Porta, *Clandestine Political Violence* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 67–68; see also Mark I. Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation?: The

Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, no. 31 (June 1987): 266–97; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, no. 20 (2008): 415–433.

¹⁰ Robert M. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Ch. 2.

¹¹ Ibid., 197–198.

¹² See Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 208.

¹³ The quote is from Kennedy’s “Address on the first Anniversary of the Alliance of Progress” in 1962, available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9100>

¹⁴ See also Jeff Godwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

¹⁵ Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 50 (May 2013): 415–423.

¹⁶ Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, “Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project,” available at http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html

¹⁷ Although the correlation between violent campaign onset and onset of armed conflict as defined by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is a modest .24, only 14 of the 103 violent campaigns included in the main model do not coincide or commence one or two years before an observation of armed conflict. The remaining 14 violent cases are either campaigns that never reach the threshold of 25 battle deaths within a year or campaigns that escalate to do so several years later. See Nils P. Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946–2000: A New Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 39 (September 2002): 1–29.

¹⁸ Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer & Brian Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?: New Data and Analysis,” *World Politics*, no. 62 (January 2010): 87–119.

¹⁹ Christopher J. Fariss, “Respect for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability,” *American Political Science Review*, no. 108 (May 2014): 297–318.

²⁰ See also Keith E. Schnakenberg and Christopher J. Fariss, “Dynamic Patterns of Human Rights Practices,” *Political Science Research and Methods*, no. 2 (April 2014): 1–31.

²¹ Cunningham (see note 3 above), 292.

²² Of course, most conditions favor conventional politics or civil obedience over any kind of large-scale resistance; Chenoweth and Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns” (see note 15 above); see also Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

²³ Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Ch. 3; Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 16.

²⁴ One might wonder whether the potential effect stems from *ethnic* exclusion or social exclusion more generally. Political discrimination can be expected to be more salient for individuals when based on ethnic markers rather than markers that do not relate to descent (such as ideology and class), and ethnic movements occur relatively frequently because they build on dense social networks, which minimize mobilization costs; Susan Olzak, *The Global Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Mobilization* (Stanford University Press, 2006), 66–67; see also Elaine K. Denny and Barbara F. Walter, “Ethnicity and Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 51 (May 2014): 199–212. I therefore expect ethnic exclusion to be particularly effectual. In the statistical analysis I control for ethno-linguistic fractionalization to test whether ethnic diversity in itself explains the variation in campaign tactics, but this does not seem to be the case.

²⁵ Chenoweth and Stephan (see note 12 above), Ch. 2.

²⁶ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 188.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 179–180; see also Goodwin (see note 14 above); Hafez (see note 14 above).

²⁸ McCauley and Moskalenko (see note 9 above), 416.

²⁹ Rørbæk and Knudsen (see note 7 above).

³⁰ Ibid., 5–6.

³¹ Svolik (see note 7 above); see also Bueno de Mesquita et al. (see note 7 above).

³² Armed dissidents will also expect to be met with violence by the police and security forces in countries operating under the rule of law.

³³ Susan Olzak, Maya Beasley, and Johan L. Olivier, “The Impact Of State Reforms On Protest Against Apartheid In South Africa,” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 8 (January 2003): 27–50; Johan L. Olivier, *Collective violence in South Africa: A study of ethnic Collective Action in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Triangle Area, 1970-1984* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1989).

³⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan (see note 12 above), 208.

³⁵ della Porta (see note 9 above), Ch. 2; McCauley and Moskalenko (see note 9 above), 425.

³⁶ Cf. Christian Davenport, David Armstrong, and Mark I. Lichbach, “Conflict Escalation and the Origins of Civil War,” *Unpublished paper* (2003), available at:

http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/MARYLAND_conflictescalationoriginscivilwar.pdf

³⁷ Cf. Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2002). In particular, Petersen finds that resentment has been an important driver behind ethnic violence in Eastern Europe.

³⁸ Price (see note 10 above), 197–198.

³⁹ Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, *For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2008), 95.

⁴⁰ Günes M. Tezcür, “Ordinary People, Extraordinary Risks: Participation in an Ethnic Rebellion,” *American Political Science Review*, no. 2 (May 2016): 247–264, 256.

⁴¹ Lichbach (see note 9 above); see also Will H. Moore, “Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing,” *American Journal of Political Science*, no. 42 (July 1998): 851–873.

⁴² Another rational response to violent repression is simply that people take up arms or join militias to be able to defend themselves. Radicals often exploit such mechanisms by purposely provoking state violence in order to expand their ranks; Goodwin (see note 14 above), 48-50; see also Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle, “Domestic Terrorism:

The Hidden Side of Political Violence,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, no. 12 (2009): 31–49.

⁴³ Robert W. White, “From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army,” *American Journal of Sociology*, no. 94 (May 1989): 1277–1302, 1294; see also Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, no. 19 (2007): 289–306.

⁴⁴ Lawrence E. Cline, “The Prospects of the Shia Insurgency Movement in Iraq,” *Journal of Conflict Studies*, no. 20 (Fall 2000): 1–16.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴⁶ E.g., Moore (see note 41 above); Lichbach (see note 9 above).

⁴⁷ Goodwin (see note 14 above); David Hess and Brian Martin, “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events,” *Mobilization*, no. 11 (June 2006): 249–67; T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, “The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror,” *International Studies Quarterly*, no. 33 (1989): 175–198, 175; see also Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (see note 42 above).

⁴⁸ Philip Roessler, “The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa,” *World Politics*, no. 63 (April 2011): 300–346, 315.

⁴⁹ Mason and Krane (see note 47 above), 175.

⁵⁰ Goodwin (see note 14 above), 49–50; see also Gurr (see note 2 above), 136.

⁵¹ Price (see note 10 above), 23–24. Of course, minority rules seek various strategies to legitimize themselves exactly because repression is unlikely to ensure their survival in the long run; Oded Haklai, “A Minority Rule over a Hostile Majority: The Case of Syria,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, no. 6 (Autumn 2000): 19–50.

⁵² See also Joseph K. Young, “Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War,” *Political Research Quarterly*, no. 66 (2012): 516–532.

⁵³ Chenoweth and Stephan (see note 12 above), 77. Of course, collective action problems that do not result from state repression can also make nonviolent resistance less feasible, not least given the fact that nonviolent movements often rely on great numbers. Low levels of development, restricted political liberties, and ethnic fractionalization are some of the factors that might have this effect and which I account for in the empirical model.

⁵⁴ McCauley and Mosalenko (see note 9 above), 430.

⁵⁵ Chenoweth and Lewis, “Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes” (see note 16 above), 2.

⁵⁶ Chenoweth and Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns” (see note 15 above), 420.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 418. Mainly nonviolent campaigns often have “radical flanks.” Adding this variable to the main empirical model (based on the NAVCO 2.0 dataset) does not significantly alter the results (see Model A6, Table A4 in the online appendix).

⁵⁸ NAVCO 2.0 is structured by campaign-year and not country-year. However, as no country in the sample experienced both violent and nonviolent onsets in the same year, it was unproblematic to match the campaign-year structure with that of the independent variables.

⁵⁹ Cunningham (see note 3 above); Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (see note 6 above). As Cunningham notes (footnote 14), this method might be problematic if a fourth alternative, concurrent violent and nonviolent campaign onset, exists, but as noted that is not the case in the sample.

⁶⁰ The analysis is conducted in STATA 14. Data- and do-file will be made available upon request.

⁶¹ The time period is restricted because the data on violent repression is only available from 1949; Fariss (see note 19 above).

⁶² Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (see note 18 above). The most important executive-level institutions typically include the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration and the army. Ethnic groups are considered excluded if they are not meaningfully represented in these institutions; see also Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (see note 6 above).

⁶³ The six geo-cultural regions are “the West” (including Australia and New Zealand), Latin America, Eastern Europe and former Soviet states, South and East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

⁶⁴ Jutta Bolt and Jan L. van Zanden, “The Maddison Project: Collaborative research on historical national accounts,” *The Economic History Review* 67 (2014): 627–651.

⁶⁵ Monty G. Marshall, Ted R. Gurr, and Keith Jagers, “Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2013,” Dataset users' manual, available at:

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

⁶⁶ Bolt and van Zanden (see note 64 above).

⁶⁷ James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, no. 97 (January 2003): 75–90.

⁶⁸ Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” *Journal of Economic Growth*, no. 8 (2003): 155–194. For a few countries where Alesina et al.’s fractionalization data is not available, I instead rely on Fearon and Laitin’s data (see note 67 above). In the online appendix, I substitute the measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization with ethno-linguistic polarization. Yet this does not significantly affect the results.

⁶⁹ Michael L. Ross, “Oil and gas data, 1932–2011,” available at: <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlr>

⁷⁰ Cf. Reymond Hicks and Dustin Tingley, “Causal mediation analysis,” *Stata Journal* 11 (2011): 605–619.

⁷¹ Fariss (see note 19 above); see also Schnakenberg and Fariss (see note 20 above).

⁷² See Fariss (see note 19 above) for a thorough description.

⁷³ Alternative indicators such as the Political Terror Scale or the CIRI physical integrity rights index are only coded from 1976 and 1981, respectively, which would reduce the number campaigns by more than a third.

⁷⁴ Schnakenberg and Fariss (see note 20 above), 2.

⁷⁵ See also della Porta (see note 9 above), Ch. 2.

⁷⁶ E.g., Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (see note 6 above).

⁷⁷ The test indicates that the assumption that violent onset is relatively more likely than nonviolent onset would be wrong 16% of the time.

⁷⁸ This test also addresses the potential underreporting bias that might be associated with territorial conflicts. Even if such did exist it is not what drives the main findings of this study.

⁷⁹ José A. Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited,” *Public Choice*, no. 143 (2010): 67–101.

⁸⁰ Cf. David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino, “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data,” *Political Analysis*, no. 18 (2010): 271–292.

⁸¹ I do, however, find some indication that the tendency to opt for violent over nonviolent tactics in ethnically exclusive regimes is particularly salient in “the West” and in Eastern

Europe and the former Soviet states, but this result should be treated with caution due to the low number of violent campaign onsets in these regions.

⁸² Chenoweth and Lewis (see note 15 above). Chenoweth and Lewis do not include measures of ethnic exclusion in their analysis.

⁸³ Cf. Fearon and Laitin (see note 67 above); Goodwin (see note 14 above); Gurr (see note 2 above).

⁸⁴ Chenoweth and Lewis (see note 15 above).

⁸⁵ Note also that Models 2 and 3 in Table 1 indicate that nonviolent onsets are less likely to emerge if there is an ongoing nonviolent campaign in a country. One explanation would be that additional challengers choose to join the ongoing movement to make a bigger impact.

⁸⁶ See also Hicks and Tingley (see note 70 above).

⁸⁷ The quotes are from Mandela's statement at "the Rivonia Trial" in Pretoria, 1964, available at <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3430>

⁸⁸ Cf. Rørbæk and Knudsen (see note 7 above); see also Bueno de Mesquita et al. (see note 7 above), Ch. 8; Svolik (see note 7 above), 11.

⁸⁹ E.g., Gurr (see note 2 above); see also Cunningham (see note 3 above); Jazayeri (see note 4 above).

⁹⁰ Cf. Tilly (see note 26 above).

⁹¹ E.g., Price (see note 10 above); White (see note 43 above).