Mikkel Thorup

In Defence of Enmity
- Critiques of Liberal Globalism

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Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas
Department of the History of Ideas
University of Aarhus, Denmark

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Mikkel Thorup:

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- Preface -

This PhD-dissertation was written at the Institute for Philosophy and the History of Ideas, Department for the History of Ideas at the University of Aarhus from February 2003 to January 2006 on a scholarship from the Danish Research Council for the Humanities (now the Research Council for Culture and Communication. The dissertation handed in at the Department for the History of Ideas prior to this one was about friendship. It seems, then, only appropriate that this one, independently from the previous, is about enmity. The friends as much as the enemies helped this work progress. No need to thank the enemies. As for the friends, I want to thank my two supervisors at the Department, Jens Erik Kristensen and Hans-Jørgen Schanz for practicing a generous kind of supervisory laissez-faire hopefully in the conviction that I could manage the freedom. I also want to thank the rest of the staff at the department, both academic and secretarial, for their kind company, encouragement and many conversations, not least Ole Morsing, Peter Abooe Sørensen, Carsten Sestoft and Morten Hauggard Jeppesen. The same goes for my fellow PHD-students at both departments, especially Frank Beck Lassen.

I want especially to thank Mads P. Sørensen who showed me the ropes and taught me to sail the strange vessel called ‘the Department for the History of ideas’ whose inner workings gradually became less of a mystery. Without him I would still be looking for the copying machine. I owe him a great many thanks. To him as well as the rest of the editors of Slagmark – tidskrift for Idéhistorie [Battlefield – journal for the history of ideas], I’m very grateful. It was a lot of extra work but it has been (and still is) a great joy and opportunity.

Academic work is not only standing on the shoulders of giants; it is also rubbing shoulders with fellow ‘giants’ at conferences, seminars, symposiums etc. I’ve benefited greatly from three of these: Nordic Summer University, The Network for Political Theory in Denmark and Sociological Forum. Among many others I want to thank: Anders Dræby Sørensen, Carsten Bagge Lauststen, Anders Fogh Jensen, Gitte Sommer Harrits, Jon Boiesen, Jakob Bek-Thomsen, Niklas Olsen, Øjvind Larsen, Adam Diderichsen, Anders Petersen, Søren Axelsen, Per Mouritsen, Søren Hviid Pedersen, Lars Thorup Larsen, Svend Thorhauge, Frederik Rosén, Asger Sørensen, Marie Østergaard Sørensen, Uffe Juul Jensen, Lars Erslev Andersen, Rune Slothuus and Gorm Harste. I’ve also benefited from the Danish PhD-environment, greatly encouraged by Uffe Juul Jensen and Peter Clemens Kjærgaard, the latter of which I also owe thanks in so many other regards. I have also been given many opportunities to talk of my work in public and academic forums, opportunities I greatly
appreciate. My stay in London prospered greatly from conversations with David Held and Costas Douzinas. I would like also to thank the students at the department for many hours spent discussing and drinking and especially those attending my two seminars: ‘Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment’ and ‘Liberalism and Freedom’ for questioning my hard-won insights and pushing my thought in new directions. Finally I want to thank all those friends and family whom I haven’t seen enough in the last three years. They all showed more understanding than I deserved.

This dissertation is driven by a schizophrenic split between liberalism and its critique. The author understands himself as a troubled liberal. The existing liberalism will not and cannot fulfil its promises under the current institutional and distributional conditions. It comes fraught with problems, shadow sides, and repressions all its own. The position of this dissertation can be said to suffer from the feeling, Richard Rorty once noted when in Aarhus (and to among others a bunch of historians of ideas): “You are a people living in Paradise wondering: Is this all there is?”

Bibliography
Sections of this dissertation have been published elsewhere in somewhat different form:

“’Hvorledes globaliseringen af Europa overvinder barbariet’ - den liberale brug af globaliserings-begrebet til afpolitisering af nation og stat”, *Distinktion*, no. 8, 2004, pp. 113-128


“Oplysningstidens historiefilosofiske opgør med det kirkelige historiesyn”, pp. 32-36 in Stine Grumsen & Gry Vissing Jensen (ed.), *Perspektiver på de jødisk-kristne ideers historie*, Aarhus: Department for the History of Ideas

“’A world without substance’ - Carl Schmitt and the Counter-Enlightenment”, *Distinktion*, no. 10, 2005, pp. 19-39
“I Leviathans bug: Carl Schmitt i staters tjeneste – biografi over årene 1888-1945, Slagmark, no. 43, 2005, pp. 15-21


"Den totale fjende og antiterrorstaten - Schmitt og den totale kritik af den liberale stat”, Grus, no. 74, 2005, pp. 48-69

(with Carsten Bagge Laustsen): "Fjendskabet – politisk, eksistentielt, præsent” in Mehdi Moffazari (ed.), Totalitarisme: Venskab og Fjendskab (to be published)


“Introduktion” in Mikkel Thorup (ed.), David Held: Kosmopolitik, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006 (to be published)


"’Afvigere, ballademagere, pirater og gangstere’ - nye krie i det postpolitiskes grænseland” in Mikkel Thorup (ed.), Den ondeste mand i live – læsninger af Carl Schmitt, Museum Tusculanum, 2006 (to be published)

I’ve also benefited from conduction a number of interviews, whose themes and arguments have found their way into the dissertation:


(with med Mads P. Sørensen): ”’Uundgåeligt side om side’. Interview med David Held”, Slagmark, no. 41, 2004, pp. 27-38 (an English version cab be founds at www.polity.co.uk/global/sidebyside.htm)

“På grænsen til kosmopolis. Interview med David Held” in Mikkel Thorup (ed.), David Held: Kosmopolitik, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006 (to be published)

(with Frank Beck Lassen): “’Where did Nazism come from? Tibet? - Interview with John Gray”, Slagmark, no. 45, 2006 (to be published)
- Introduction -

The critique of formally universalist critique, which is the condition for a permanent Aufklärung of Aufklärung, is all the more necessary because the propensity to universalize the particular case, the root of all forms of ethnocentrism, is in this case supported by all the appearances of generosity and virtue. (Bourdieu 2000: 71)

It seems the present world is filled with more ends than normally. Endings are rapidly accumulating: The end of history and the end of ideology are closely connected and claim that politics is now all about administration of the existing framework. No new system and no real challengers are forthcoming. The end of the nation state and the end of sovereignty are the most potent statements of liberal globalization theory and allege that the nation state is an inadequate form of organization in an era of global flows. The same argument is heard in the thesis on the end of authority, that is, authority understood as vertical, hierarchical command. Postmodernity, feminism and individualization obscure the effectiveness and legitimacy of authority. Lurking behind all of these endings is the most supreme prize of them all: The end of the political. The endings is ultimately depended upon the end of the political, as they all presuppose a certain understanding of the political as centralistic, sovereign and coercive, that sustains and protects the other subjects (and a counter-idea of politics as liberal-parliamentarian deliberation). The political is under attack. Beck’s concept of subpolitics and Giddens’s of life politics signal a crisis for conventional understandings of the political. They are anti-political in that they presuppose a certain liberal image of ‘the political’ as intimately, solely and necessarily tied to the nation state – either directly embodied within the state or as ‘external’ demands and energies pushed upon the state. All the endings presuppose the political in its liberal form as something one can inflate, deflate and, ultimately, overcome.

This text is an exercise in the history of ideas, which means that it is more concerned with how and why things make sense for people, than if they indeed actually do make sense. We’ll explore the obvious rather than the true; the ideas people take for granted about the world and themselves rather than their correspondence with the actual. I’m more interested in their legitimization value than in their truth value. This means, that we will not investigate the connection or discrepancy between liberal ideas and liberal practice systematically, apart from the way it pertains to the issue of the international and the enemy. We’re interested in how liberalism constructs its universe and itself. We’ll pursue the guiding assumptions, the naturalized ideas, of an idea complex, that is, a more or
less coherent set of interconnected, spoken and unspoken, ideas and conceptions. The endurance of an idea complex allows us to explore parallels between ideas and readings of the social in both the Enlightenment and the present. This is not to say that nothing has happened in between, but I attempt to substantiate the claim that the system of ideas and presumptions inherent in the idea complex of liberalism has shown itself remarkable constant. Its basic assumptions remain largely the same, even when its conceptualization of the national and international changes in the movement from liberal internationalism to liberal globalism.

Another way we’ll approach this idea complex is to examine its oppositional formulations, that is, the establishment of a seeming unity of ideas through a series of simultaneous exclusions and constructions, as we see it, for instance, in the construction of the violent aristocrat versus the peaceful merchant. We’ll argue that this construction of self through exclusion of other is largely unacknowledged by liberalism, which reserves it as the work of its opponents; they construct enemy images, liberalism does not. This is one of the liberal narratives, we’ll try to explore and criticize.

The critical errand of the history of ideas is, firstly, to explore and question the naturalization, universalization and eternalization of contingent and local ideas; and, secondly, to examine the implicit preconditions and unacknowledged implications of the idea complex. This is done mainly with an eye to the international and to the enemy. The following is not a systematic dissertation, that is, one pursuing ideas and their intrinsic development minutely through time and space, but rather an explorative one, developing concepts and clusters of ideas, suggesting possible connections and implications in order to grasp the object at hand. To that effect, I’ve attempted a dynamic style of exploration and writing. The aim is to both diagnose and document the arguments and debates. Hopefully the amount of references and quotations will not be seen as an empty and pretentious show-off, but rather as an attempt to document and substantiate the various debates, arguments and readings.
I. Post-Politics and the Return of the Political

All the attributes which once defined politics and the political realm are declared finished, exhausted, superseded. Some proponents of endism bemoan these changes, but many exult in them. They look forward to the end of politics itself. (Gamble 2000: 2)

In his *Politics and Fate*, Andrew Gamble mentions two kinds of anti-political arguments that are often conflated. He says, that the proponents of anti-politics claim that “the political is waning. The public domain is shrinking and sovereignty is weakening, as technical administration expands and conflicts between states recede” (2000: 4-5). The first component of the anti-political development has a liberal-democratic view of politics. Politics is democratic and public deliberation. It is what goes on inside the state. The anti-political tendency is the emptying of democratic debate. The second component has a conflict perspective on the political. The political is high politics, security and survival between states. The anti-political tendency is the argument that we (in and among the West) needn’t concern ourselves any longer with ‘hard politics’, that there is, in a certain sense, no longer international politics. The debates on depoliticization and post-politics mainly have the first meaning in mind. This is consistent with liberalism’s own understanding of politics, because liberalism tends to view only the first component as a legitimate part of the political domain. It is often being portrayed as politics as such. One can, given the definitions of this text, describe liberalism as the escape from or denial of the political understood as genuine conflict among enemies. The anti-political tendency of liberalism, that this text is interested in, concerns the conflict component of the political. Post-politics, then, becomes the argument of the *end of enmity*. Liberal endism is basically an argument of the end of the enemy.

We understand the enemy in its political sense as the recognized other, with whom one fights, but who is also acknowledged as one’s equal, so that the fighting is conducted within some rules and restraints; it can stop before final extermination; and fighting can then give way for negotiations, peace treaties and eventually peace, friendship and cooperation. What is significant about political enmity is its symmetry between enemies. Non-political enmities are characterized by asymmetry, that is, one doesn’t recognize the other as one’s armed equal, but as someone inferior, morally, biologically, civilizational etc. These are, of course, ideal types. The real world of politics is a lot more muddy and messy. Still, one can distinguish between two main forms of enmity: the symmetrical and the asymmetrical. This text alleges that liberalism operates with both registers. Internally in liberal societies and in liberal Europe the symmetrical or political enmity is being observed: Diplomacy, rules of warfare and the sovereignty principle are manifestations of political
enmity (liberal societies have obviously also conducted asymmetrical wars internally against ‘domestic enemies’ or ‘domestic strangers’). Outside or beyond the line of liberalism the asymmetrical enmity reigns. This is an enmity, where one side is not recognized, wherefore the conflicts tend to be exterminalist as colonial wars testifies to.

The following concerns the, often implicit, argument for the end of enmity, that is, the European liberal claim to have overcome conflictuality. This is mainly ‘achieved’ by not seeing the asymmetrical enmity as an actual relation of enmity or as something perpetrated by liberal societies; and by declaring political enmity over (at least in the West or in Europe). I claim, that this denial of enmity originates in the Enlightenment and that it has been a persistent feature of liberalism ever since. At present, it has achieved its high point in the liberal globalization debate, in the position, I’ll call liberal globalism. The critical purpose of this text is, then, to explore the presence or returns of enmity. It is an investigation into how asymmetrical enmity arises from the denial of enmity.

The Post-Political Borderlands

The borderland in Europe used to be equivalent to that of present day Afghanistan, where only the centre and its immediate surroundings is under effective political control. The borderland is the unruled, uncharted territory beyond political knowledge and control. “In the frontaliers”, Zygmunt Bauman says, “fences and stockades mark intentions rather than realities. The efforts to give the conflicts a territorial dimension, to pin the divisions and mutual enmities to the ground, seldom bring results” (2002a: 83). The borderland is characterized by indistinction and lawlessness (as both lack of order and lack of law). It “refers to an area on the peripheral regions of a state (not necessarily adjoining another state) in which the political authority of the centre is diffuse or thinly spread” (Giddens 1985: 50). The inhabitants of or travellers in the borderland cannot be clearly distinguished as friends or enemies. They are strangers and this creates, firstly, what Bauman calls ‘the horror of indetermination’ and then a fight against indeterminacy because:

The strangers are not, however, the ‘as-yet-undecided’; they are, in principle, undecidables. They are that ‘third element’ which should not be. The true hybrids, the monsters: not just unclassified, but unclassifiable. They therefore do not question this one opposition here and now: they question oppositions as such, the very principle of the opposition, the plausibility of dichotomy it suggests. They unmask the brittle artificiality of division – they destroy the world. They stretch the temporary inconvenience of ‘not knowing how to go on’ into a terminal paralysis. They must be tabooed, disarmed, suppressed, exiled physically or mentally – or the world may perish. (Bauman 1990: 148-9)
The impulse is, therefore, to ‘colonize’ the borderland and to establish/re-establish differences and distinctions. Indistinction is unsustainable and unbearable. Modernity can be understood as the process of making the unknown known, making the stranger into either friend or enemy. The story of modernity is also the story of the repression or taming of the borderland. The modern nation state is the opposite of the borderland. Europe became a space of states, whose borders were disputed but still fairly stable, recognizable and demarcated. The indistinct space between states, which used to be wide, is reduced to a line on a map. Statehood is projected all the way to the border as codification, centralization and nationalization fill up the space; as cartography, statistics and education saturates the now national space with meaning and signs (Anderson 1991; Neocleous 2003a, b). According to Carl Schmitt, the modern nation state is characterized by an internal pacification or depoliticization. The inner space was emptied of friend/enemy-relations and political energy was projected outwards to foreign policy and interstate war. The state claimed and won a monopoly on violence (the outlawing of non-state users of violence) and definition (a national system of education, science and religion). Schmitt says that:

… the classical European state achieved something quite extraordinary: To create peace internally and to expel enmity as a juridical concept. It managed to abolish the feud, an institution in the law of the Middle Ages; to end the confessional civil wars of the 16. and 17. centuries, which on both sides had been fought as especially just wars; and to create peace, security and order on its territory. As is known, the formula ‘peace, security, order’ served as definition of the police. Inside such a state was in fact only police and no longer politics – unless one calls court intrigues, rivalries, oppositions and rebellions of the discontented, in short ‘disturbances’, politics. (1996a: 10)

The repression of the borderland, or the creation of a known and regulated territory, helps us to understand liberalism’s problem with the exception. Every exception opens the possibility of the borderland; it questions the liberal normality, the liberal filling of the political space. The repression of the borderland is also a juridification, where internally the borderland is shifted from a common and geographic category to an exceptional and juridical one. The borderland can be understood as a territory of the exception. When a sovereign declares a state of exception, we can understand this as the opening of the borderland within the state. The inhibitions and limitations of normality is suspended, the stranger reappears in the space between friend and enemy. The borderland, then, is a perpetual exception. It is, as is shown in chapter 4, like Hobbes’s state of nature in Leviathan (1985), where no one can claim stable or acknowledged distinctions between mine and yours, right and wrong. There is a marked lack of predictability, routine, clarity, recognized norms, standards
and names. In the borderland is a clear and noticeable deficit of political order and organization. Enmity in the borderland tends to become total, because in an environment devoid of clear distinction any stranger is a potential enemy. It is a war of all against all – at least potentially so – and that forces everyone to act as if it is the reality.

Hobbes’s work, as the state paradigm he helped formulate, was an attempt to turn borderland into known land, turning empty – unoccupied or uncultivated (colonialists, like Locke, saw much of non-European space as empty because it wasn’t being used the European way, commercially and agriculturally) – into settled and domesticated land. Seen from Europe, the borderland is the opposite of the state space. It is where the state or statehood ends and something completely different starts. The borderland is Hobbes’s state of nature; it is his and Locke’s America; it is Carl Schmitt’s sea; and it is (or used to be) the international. It is in effect non-European space, non-Europeanized space. Borderland is a highly European concept which, since the formation and consolidation of European space into states, has designated non-Europe. The indistinctions of the borderland is the lack of European distinctions. European modernity has a strong element of expelling the borderland from Europe to the periphery or to the barbarian lands. These were not (and are not) borderlands in their own, indigenous, sense. They are so only from a European perspective, where they are characterized by a lack of proper distinctions.

The borderland is displaced to the borders of Europe (think Turkey and the Balkans then and now), the white parts of the European map, the non-state parts of the world, the uncivilized, barbaric, despotic, premodern territories and peoples. A crucial distinction is made between Europe and the rest of the world. Wars between European states are codified and regulated through diplomacy, rules of warfare and a sense of commonality. But beyond the line, outside Europe, the same states fight unconventionally and ‘total’ against each other and against the natives. All non-European space is borderland, where the rules of and in Europe do not apply. Schmitt says, that it is the difference between “a European state space consisting of a valid state order and peace” and then a “non-European space open for free European expansion” (1991c: 68; see also 1995f: 242).

The non-European borderland is viewed as a space devoid of morality and conventionalism, where explorers, mercenaries, adventurers, big game hunters, soldiers, imperialists, criminals of all state and non-state kinds can act with impunity; it’s the land of Oriental imaginations and savage sensuality, where Europeans can project force and repressed dreams. Beginning with the colonialization, the effort has been to eradicate the borderland from the colonized area and from the inner self of the colonized:
Colonial occupation itself was a matter of seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over a physical geographical area – of writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations. The writing of new spatial relations (territorialization) was, ultimately, tantamount to the production of boundaries and hierarchies, zones and enclaves. (Mbembe 2003: 25-6)

Continuing through the decolonialization process, the borderland has been expelled to disputed border regions, thinly populated jungles, mountain or desert areas (where rock climbing, polar expeditions, jungle excursions, races on foot, car or motorcycle across deserts and the like has become the present day equivalent to latter days explorations and conquests and endowed with the same aura of transgression, gentlemanship, imperial notions of national glory, heroism etc.), to the failed states and to the areas being kept artificially ‘native’ for the pleasure of Western tourists hunting the original. Some even claim (filled with racist stereotypes, as we saw in the alleged but non-occurring rioting in New Orleans after the Katrina hurricane) that Western inner cities are becoming ‘black holes’, where criminal youth gangs are challenging the state monopoly on force.

What we now see, paradoxically, is that at the exact moment, right after decolonialization and the stateification of the world, where the borderland has been pushed back to ever more remote areas, when everything is counted, drawn up, occupied, cultivated, capitalized, in the moment when we allegedly live on an ever shrinking globe, where history is over (for some), right then we witness what is apparently a generalization of the borderland. There is at present two strong theories of the spreading of the borderland: The liberal globalization theory and the radical liberal-critical theory. The liberal theory alleges that the nation state distinctions between friend/enemy, war/peace, public/private, work/play, foreign/domestic, in/out etc. are dissolving. Globalization is said to make borderlands out of modern nation states, where the state space is becoming uncontrollable and unknowable through the classical means. This is what we’ll discuss in chapter 6. It is also a common assertion from radical liberalism-critique that the exception has become normality (Agamben 1998, 2005); the borderland has become planetary; we live in a zone of indistinction (Diken & Laustsen 2002). A good example is President Bush’s simultaneous proclamation of the war against terror and then “to go back to work” (quoted from Johnson 2002: 214), the constant invocations of present dangers and imminent attacks and then the pledge to go on living and consuming like before. Two weeks after 9/11 George W. Bush told employees at the O’Hare airport in Chicago that “one of the great goals of this war is to tell the travelling public: Get on board” (quoted from Gregory 2004: 256-7). It may be one of the most bizarre reasons ever for going to war, to get people flying and consuming again, but it illustrates the thesis that the distinctions between exception and normality, war and peace apparently dissolve. Indistinction is spreading.
I allege that what we’re witnessing is a *second global repression of the borderland*. Emanating from the West and projected outwards we first had a process of conquest, colonialization and decolonialization which imposed a Western standard of modernity – the nation state – upon the world. Now, we’re seeing a re-drawing of distinctions: A new turning of strangers into friends and enemies and a re-ordering of space. Nation state-space is the new borderland in liberal globalist theory. It is not indistinction spreading but a re-configuration of distinctions that is beings asserted. Liberalism may understand itself – and be understood as such by its critics in the Counter-Enlightenment and in what I’ll later called the ‘alarmed’ position in the globalization debate – as a doctrine of indistinction, but I intend to show that this is a misrepresentation. Liberalism and liberal globalism are ‘merely’ a different configuration of distinctions, but no less rigid than what came before – and ultimately also quite coercive.

War exiled the borderland from European space; and war is at the centre of the present day second repression. Bauman (2001a) differentiates between two kinds of war in the global era: Firstly, *globalizing wars*, which is the Western kind of warfare, waged on behalf of an as yet not-existing global community, creating a globalized world and manifesting itself as humanitarian interventions and the war on terror. Secondly, *globalization-induced wars* caused by globalization’s weakening of already fragile states, manifesting itself in ethnic wars, kleptocracy, warlordism and terrorism, ‘inviting’ the globalizing wars.

There is another current theory of the borderland: Samuel Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilization, which is basically about what he (in very territorial language) calls the ‘fault line wars’ between Islam and the West, the borderland between the West and Islam which, according to Huntington, is bloody because of Islam’s ‘ranks of militants, warriors, and migrants’ (1996: 120). Two of many problems with Huntington’s thesis is that it subscribes to an idea that there exists an obvious, static, almost trans-historical in/out differentiation between civilizations (or at least that it can and should be re-established through a de-multiculturalization and an anti-universalist international politics) and that evil comes solely from the outside. His primary problem in this context is that he reduces the borderland to a geographical category, as when he says that “Islam’s borders are bloody” (1996: 258). He is trying to establish a political tectonic where conflict emerges in the fault lines of civilization. This reveals his indebtedness to a classical nation state paradigm and his lack of understanding of the new characteristics of the borderland and its repression.
I want to trace the construction of the first repression of the borderland internally in Europe and outwardly beyond Europe. This is done in the second part: ‘Formulating the dream’. Then, I’ll proceed to its second and present manifestation in part three: ‘Living the dream’, where we’ll trace the re-ordering and the returns of the enemy. Speaking from within the transformation of one anti-borderland paradigm to the next, we’ll try to trace some of the difficulties in finding the enemy, renaming the distinction and re-ordering the space. Nation state modernity was the name of the first repression of the borderland and containment of war. Democratic peace is the name of its second manifestation. Democratic peace is what Europe now calls its internal pacification and the concept of its differentiation toward large parts of the world. When only Europe was full of statehood, it was non-state lands that were beyond the line of equal recognition. Now, that statehood has encircled the globe, it is non-democratic states and even ‘stubborn’ nation states which are beyond the line.

At the exact moment when nation state sovereignty paradigm is globally accepted and sought after, it is being compromised at its centre, by the very same powers who introduced and exported it. Should one venture an explanation it would probably be that with its generalization the sovereignty principle, which served Western interests domestically and foreign so well, has ceased to be an instrument of superiority and domination. It may actually threaten the position of the West, as it is now a numeric minority. This sets in motion a search for a new principle of sovereign inequality.

What we’re witnessing is the second export of ‘modernity’, this time a post-national one, which opens for new ways and forms of what Schmitt above called ‘free European expansion’, where humanitarianism and the war on terror gives licence to kill, colonize and dominate with impunity:

During the 1990s, the leading ‘homeland’ states, as it were, remapped the zone of exception in terms of a global ‘borderland’ of failed states, shadow networks, rogue states, and so on. Today, this new cartography of risk encapsulates the terrorist threat … The global borderlands have once again become zones where anything becomes possible; an open-range where you can kill without committing murder. (Duffield 2004: 8-9)

Just as the first global repression of the borderland apparently caused an internal division within the West between a new America and an old Europe, this time we allegedly see another split inside the West. I want to argue that the claims of a growing divide between Europe and America tend to hide the fact that they are both furthering the new global repression of the borderland with significant more internal agreement than the transatlantic bickering suggests.
Politics/Anti-Politics: Liberalism and the Political

Liberalism is born out of the painful experience that Judith N. Shklar has called ‘liberalism of fear’ (1989), and whose most important idea is: “Throughout history, war and punishment have been the primary functions of government. No liberal ever forgets that governments are coercive.” It is, according to Shklar, the “most undeniable of all facts” (Shklar 1984: 244). What we find in liberalism is an identification of the political with state violence. Karl Popper has expressed this even stronger: “the history of power politics is nothing but the history of international crime and mass murder (including it is true, some of the attempts to suppress them)” (1966: 270). Keeping with this, Voltaire equates history with public or political history and says: “All history, then, is little else than a long succession of useless cruelties … history in general is a collection of crimes, follies and misfortunes” (1968b: 549). It is out of this experience, not least with the state, that liberalism was born (Rotschild 1995). Not only is politics identified with state violence, but the question of violence and unfreedom is also often restricted to emanating from the state, at least in the forms that are to be dealt with politically. In his The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, Anthony Arblaster says that when liberalism “thinks of power, or authority, it thinks of political power or authority. It thinks of laws and the state apparatus … So freedom, for liberals, continues to mean, above all, freedom from control, compulsion, restriction, and interference by the state” (1984: 58). My take on liberalism focuses on its horror of violence. Michael C. Williams says that its “vision emerged in a context of fear, violence and conflict” (1998: 210). Liberalism can be read as modernity’s way of dealing with violence; Liberalism is informed and motivated by what Hans Joas calls the ‘dream of a modernity without violence’ which I take to be the most pointed formulation of liberalism’s errand:

In the philosophy of liberalism, wars and violent domestic conflicts necessarily appeared as the relics of a dying age that had not yet been illuminated by the dawn of Enlightenment … Just as torture and public punishments had to be banished from the realm of criminal justice, war and violence of every sort against persons and things had to be eliminated from modern, that is, civil society. (Joas 2003: 30-I)

The dream of a modernity without violence – and the assumption of its possibility – is what unites diverse liberalisms across space and time. The main versions of this have of course focused its attention on the state and its inner workings. As Shklar says: ”The assumption, amply justified by every page of political history, is that some agents of government will behave lawlessly and brutally in small or big ways most of the time unless they are prevented from doing so” (1989: 28).
Liberalism is, therefore, first and foremost a political doctrine concerned with the limitation of state power. The history of liberalism is the history of attempts to tame state power and to avoid disputes turning into conflicts; conflicts understood as disputes, which has reached a level of intensity in which no mediation, compromise or reconciliation is possible, and where conflict can only cease, when one party has triumphed and another has lost. One could also say that liberalism aims at ‘translating’ relative gains, where one wins and the other loses, into win-win situations, as it is being attempted in the translation of conflicts into economic competition. Stephen Holmes argues convincingly in his brilliant *Passions and Constraints* (1995) that the liberal state in actual fact increases its effective power by imposing limitations upon itself: It increases its legitimacy by leaving people’s lives alone, it enlarges its tax base by withdrawing from direct intervention in the economy etc. But this increase in power is not articulated as such – which is one of the points of this dissertation. It is generally being articulated as the opposite, as a decrease of state power. It makes a supreme and unprecedented possession and projection of force appear as its opposite.

The history of liberalism is closely connected to the history of the Enlightenment; one could describe liberalism as the political element of the Enlightenment. This is not to say that liberalism exhausts the political possibilities of the Enlightenment as both conservatism and socialism shares many features with both liberalism and the Enlightenment. It is just that liberalism can be said to be the purest or the one closest to the full ‘programme’ of the Enlightenment, in terms of both its progressive and reactionary features – for instance fear of democracy. Liberalism and the Enlightenment share a common preoccupation with arbitrary violence and coercion as evidenced in Voltaire’s fabulous critique of his time, *Candide*, from the late 1750s, where, what Voltaire describes as the incredible experiences of one man, is the experience of the whole of society: War, rape, shipwreck, earthquake, religious persecution, pirates, plague, slavery, superstition, corrupt courts and terrible prisons, lustful and greedy priests and so on (Voltaire 1968a). Sudden and violent death is everywhere; arbitrariness and persecution is endemic. This is the context of the Enlightenment as well as of liberalism. The Enlightenment ‘project’ can be described as the political, economic, scientific, moral, medical etc. program for the scaling back of violence, death and coercion. According to Isaiah Berlin, the men of the Enlightenment thought:
… that a logically connected structure of laws and generalisations susceptible of demonstration and verification could be constructed and replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance, mental laziness, guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy, and, above all, the ‘interested error’ maintained by the rulers of mankind and largely responsible for the blunders, vices and misfortunes of humanity. It was further believed that methods similar to those of Newtonian physics … could be applied with equal success to the fields of ethics, politics and human relationships in general, in which little progress had been made; with the corollary that once this had been effected, it would sweep away irrational and oppressive legal systems and economic policies the replacement of which by the rule of reason would rescue men from political and moral injustice and misery and set them on the path of wisdom, happiness and virtue. (1979a: 1-2)

The Enlightenment is more than anything else a struggle against the old regime and the old beliefs. Peter Gay writes in his magnum opus on the Enlightenment that ”their language was redolent with metaphors of battle and the physical act of penetration: they spoke of the beam that pierces corners of darkness, the blow that levels barriers of censorship, the fresh wind that lifts the veil of religious authority, the surgical knife that cuts away the accumulation of tradition, the eyes that sees through the disguise of political mystymongers” (1967: 132). Such an enthusiasm was bound to exaggerate its belief in its own abilities and doomed to be disappointed. But before that it gave room for an idea, which Stuart Hampshire has called the ‘the positivist theory of modernization’: ”The positivists believed that all societies across the globe will gradually discard their traditional attachments to supernatural forces because of the need for rational, scientific and experimental methods of thought which a modern industrial economy involves” (2002: 642). A thesis which is implicit in much modernity theory and liberal globalization theory (Gray 2003). One should understand the ‘progress thesis’ as an ideal type to which few, if any, fully adheres to. It is always in practical life and thought mixed up with other less straight and optimistic considerations.

The thesis, however, was made plausible by the development of the sciences (Pollard 1968; Gay 1970; Fox, Porter & Wokler 1995). It did not seem unrealistic that things would continue to improve indefinitely (perfection thought as indefinite improvability not a reachable state of being). The belief was, as Hume said, that society was overcoming “the three great scourges of mankind, war, pestilence and famine” (1963: 383). The French Revolution was the first (and by far the most important) sign that history may not have a singular direction or purpose and that things weren’t as plastic or manageable as perhaps expected. Since then, the naïve progressivism of some parts of the Enlightenment (which was not shared by all and not even most) has been challenged, buried – and resurrected – many times. But one of its primary causes: The rebellion against the old regime and its concomitant notion of living in a qualitatively different social, political, economic and moral order is still an effectual defining element in liberalism. The distinction between old and new, darkness
and light, barbarity and civilization is at the heart of liberal self-understanding: “The violence of relations, the bewildering antagonism between human beings, could only be relegated to a long-ago past. Exit hostility … The time for war was over, along with its attendant evils: vendettas, assassinations, duels, battles of honor, reprisals” (Saint-Amand 1996: 4).

As the philosophes (and to a considerable lesser extent also common man) saw life become better, more secure, easier, longer and more predictable; as there didn’t seem to be any end to what the sciences could reveal and provide; as politics and planning seemed to replace destiny and chance, it wasn’t an unreasonable assumption that violence and repression could be overcome as well. It is from this, at the time, reasonable assumption of a modernity without violence that conflicts and violence became under-theorized, as it was understood as merely relics from a dying age, as the last spasms of defeated warrior classes, pigheaded kings and unenlightened masses (Gay 1970: 401-7).

That is why Voltaire in his Philosophical Dictionary from 1764 could write: “But war … comes to us from the imaginations of three or four hundred persons scattered over the surface of this globe under the name of princes or ministers” (1972: 231). With such an idea about the cause of war, its abolition is not unthinkable as enlightenment and the republican polity spreads. Peter Gay writes: “Later critics have often wondered that men of the eighteenth century should have been optimists; we should rather wonder how they could have been anything else” (1970: 38). This ‘streak of naïveté’, as Thomas Spragens calls it, was, of course, also ideologically useful, as the bourgeoisie sought to strengthen their status: “No greater balm for the conscience could be devised than the identification of one’s own political ascendancy with the alleged disappearance of coercion from everyday social life” (Spragens 1981: 8).

It seems especially understandable in an Anglo-Saxon and French context. Great Britain basically enjoyed peace in the period from 1815 till 1914 and France from 1815-1870, why there weren’t great need for theories of war and conflict. At the same time the two great powers were more than happy with what Michael Mann calls ‘pacifist transnationalism’ (1988: 147); that is, the global opening of the world for capitalism and industrialism served as the expansion of civilization and peace. The third great European power, Germany, served in both the first and second world war as the whipping-boy of pacifist transnationalism, as the example of failed modernization and of the still barbaric state. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is in Germany that we find the main theorizations over war and conflict, the ‘militarist school’ in the social sciences (just as realism was predominant in the US during the Cold War, often influenced and formulated by German emigrants such as Morgenthau). This, of course, helped further marginalize both Germany and the conflict
theorists. Genuine conflict theory is a loser’s game; the winners need theories of peace and corporation to legitimate their conquest. For them there is no conflict to theorize about; for the losers there is not much else (perhaps one can detect a parallel to the left’s current conflict theorizing, to which we’ll return). Liberalism is a theory and hope of peace.

It is also a highly contested concept. Almost every work on liberalism starts by emphasizing its elusive nature. I’m not claiming any originality in offering yet another definition, which is not meant to be exhaustive or final. It is a working definition, which highlights certain common aspects in liberalism, but which is silent on the differentiations within liberalism. If not before, then at least since 1989, liberalism has become a catch-all phrase losing any coherence it may once have had. Still, I hope to show in the coming chapters that there is indeed a discernible liberalism at work. In a sense, we’re (in the West) all liberals, at least on the level of basic values, so this is not an anti-liberal treatise, but one in agreement with Arblaster who says that “the best of liberalism is too good to be left to the liberals” (1984: 348). This text aims to highlight dangers within the liberal paradigm. Whether the dangers are terminal or inseparable from liberalism itself remains to be seen. But that fear is prompting the post-liberal nature of this text, which is not to deny or overcome liberalism but to improve and radicalize it.

For the purposes of this text, I want to define liberalism as the doctrine of the spontaneous self-organization of freedom(s). The implications hereof will be developed in chapter 4. For now, it suffices to say that it explains liberalism’s aversion to state power. The arbitrary state was the main impediment to the free development of individuals and liberalism’s energies were, therefore, rightly projected against this obstacle. This framed the liberal understanding of freedom as primarily negative and of violence and coercion as primarily state-induced. Sheldon Wolin explains that this:

… left little scope and less prestige for the political. The political became identified with a narrow set of institutions labelled ‘government’ … The offspring of this kind of theorizing was a non-political model of a society which, by virtue of being a closed system of interacting forces, seemed able to sustain its own existence without the aid of an ‘outside’ political agency. (2004: 261-2)

Liberalism is the political self-definition of modernity, as capitalism is its economic and rule of law its judicial. The story that liberalism tells about itself, is a story of the overcoming of religious, political, social and ideological conflictuality. The religious conflictuality is overcome through secularism and the doctrine of tolerance; the political conflictuality is overcome through the party-parliamentary system; the social conflictuality is overcome through systematic redistribution via the
welfare system; and one could add that in Fukuyama’s thesis of post-history lies the claim of having overcome *ideological conflictuality*. Those are the themes of chapter 4, which outlines the liberal dream of a modernity without violence. It serves as an entrance to the primary subject and conflictuality: the *interstate conflictuality*; a conflictuality, which in many ways has been thought to be of a qualitatively different and more difficult kind but which liberal globalism now believes we’re in the process of overcoming. This is the theme of chapters 5-8.

**Liberalism Critique: The Permanence of the Political**

Way back in 1983, Christopher Lasch made a tired comment: “In theory, the liberal order should have collapsed a long time ago” (1983: 105). Countless are the proclamations of liberalism’s death and so are the theories of why it didn’t. Liberalism has, however, been deemed obsolete many times – not least by the interwar conflict theorists such as Carl Schmitt – as both a philosophical and societal paradigm. There exist a number of contemporary post-liberal theses (Gray 1993, 1995a; Wallerstein 1995; Gottfried 1999; Hirst 1996), which repeat Lasch’s bewilderment. Basically, the argument goes, that liberalism was constructed in an age entirely different from ours and that it has not managed to develop adequate instruments to deal with for instance the working class, postmodernity, monopoly capitalism, globalization, the welfare state, the motorization of legislation etc. This text focuses on another dimension of the post-liberal thesis, namely that liberalism does not deal sufficiently or adequately with the conflictual dimension of the political. Given the historical conditions of liberalism’s genesis, power and conflict have been systematically under-theorized in liberal theory despite the fact that it has, as the theory also goes, not been absent from liberal practice or liberal societies.

The crisis for both liberal theory and practice is said to be its pacifism, which then begs the question how liberal societies have emerged victorious from its encounters with supposedly strong militarist societies. I allege, that there is a glaring discrepancy between liberal theory, which presents itself as pacifist and post-political, and then actual liberal practice, which have been and is highly coercive and fully capable of projecting force internally and externally. The post-political nature of liberal societies is, then, first and foremost a self-description of liberalism. I want to trace the continued existence (or in my terms, the returns) of the political in liberal theory and practice.

The (self-)story of liberalism has been the dominant political narrative in the West in the past 200 years. But it has never monopolized the discourse. There has been dissent, counter-narratives, rebellions, which have told a different story about the nature of the social and the political. These
voices came for instance from the Counter-Enlightenment, radical conservatism, anarchism, communism, fascism, nazism etc. What is common to them is that they failed – ideologically, militarily, economically and politically – and that they have been marginalized and ignored by liberalism as legitimate narratives. The world is a better place without their political and military presence, but as Paul Hirst notes: “The shock of Nazism and Stalinism scared the vast mass of Western politicians and their electorates into a rigid adherence to liberal democratic doctrines. The agenda of political discussion rigidified to an excessive degree, and it remains rigid” (1990: 106). The reason for taking up some of the counter-narratives is to open up the field of political debate and innovation. In the first section, two critical positions are discussed. Chapter 2 explores the Counter-Enlightenment critique and chapter 3 that of Carl Schmitt. Contrary to what some think, the ‘return of the political’, the re-reading of Carl Schmitt and other conflict theoreticians, is not an attempt to overthrow liberal democracy but to expand it. This is the intention of this text too. Chapter 3 concludes by a discussion of the left’s engagement with Schmitt, who is considered not a friend but an enemy in the political sense of an equal and recognized enemy with whom one can engage in (conceptual and ideological) battle. Taking one’s opponents seriously is hardly promoting them. It is instead insisting upon reading the margins and the marginalized of political debate. Besides their failure the counter-narratives share a conflictual view of the political; Marxism’s disclosure of history as class warfare, the inequality behind the apparent equality of the wage contract, the ‘so-called primitive accumulation’, is an example of the preoccupation with the inevitability of conflict and the coercion behind the liberal social peace. The Counter-Enlightenment is another: Self-interest, the invisible hand, the pacifying effects of the economy, the civilizing of enlightenment etc. are not acknowledged as adequate to replace tradition, hierarchy, religion, family but also repression and coercion as the instruments of socialisation. The coherence of liberal society is questioned. When Joseph de Maistre insists on the executioner as an image of societal cohesion, it should first and foremost be read as a critique of the idea that the order of society can be maintained without violence. The same, albeit in less dramatic form, goes for the insistence on prejudice as pre-rational socialization. They are both critiques of liberalism’s idea of spontaneous socialization and self-organization. According to the Counter-Enlightenment, liberal socialisation will by necessity end in the return of violence as exemplified by the terror regime. A third and somewhat different example is the realist perspective within international politics theory, which basically insists on two interconnected things: 1) the international is static as opposed to its perfectibility in liberalism and 2) violence has a lasting place in the international (Waltz 1959;
Viotti & Kauppi 1987: chap. 2; Jackson & Sørensen 1999: chap. 3). The liberal pursuit of a rule-based and peaceful world order has not meant a qualitative change in international relations. War, survival and power remain constants of human interaction. Liberals deceive and endanger society, if they do not realize the brutality of politics and act accordingly. The interaction between persons, nations, states and civilizations is and will remain political, that is conflictual. Huntington and several like him is theoretically re-politicizing human interaction. Conflicts will not be definitively settled; order will not manifest itself uncoercively; peace will not last; there is no post-political possibility. And liberalism is a dangerous creed because of its idealist universalism, which doesn’t acknowledge any limitations. Realism is, accordingly, a theory of prudent limits and limitations.

The strategy of different liberalism critiques is to insist on a conflictual view of the political; to insist that conflict, power, violence, coercion, exclusion etc. are still present and active elements in the social; that they are not overcome by market economy and liberal democracy. This is the common denominator of all liberalism critique. They all criticize the basic liberal idea of the free and spontaneous self-organization of society. Liberalism is the dream of a modernity without violence and often becomes an argument for the existence of just that. Critiques of liberalism insist upon the presence of violence – inherent in human (or biological) nature, in society, in interpersonal or interstate relations etc. One could say that conservatism emphasizes the beneficial and necessary effects of coercion, whereas socialism emphasizes the still violent nature of liberal society and the possibility of an, in fact, fully developed liberal society known as the communist society.

Liberalism continuously reproduces its own dissatisfactions as a direct result of its successes. The more tranquil and normalized society becomes, the more prone it will also be to a certain kind of dissatisfied opposition because, as Hirschman writes about liberalism’s economic component: “capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature” (1977: 132). Liberalism has a lack which nurtures a longing; a longing whose satisfaction is in contradiction to the reproduction of liberal society. Liberal man does not risk his life or security; there is no ‘berserker-gang’, no screaming or shouting, no potlatch of human greatness; only the quiet and anonymous pursuit of modest goals. This lack of depth, of fullness, of risk – what Peter Gay in his discussion of Weimar culture called ‘the hunger for wholeness’ (1968: chap. 4) – is what drives the longing for excess and transgressions. It’s a constant theme in anti-liberalism. This is also one of the reasons, why so much anti-liberal rhetoric is filled with the ‘figures of excess’: The revolutionary, the guerrilla, the terrorist, the suicide-bomber, the soldier etc. The modern is the post-heroic age, where the sacrifice of death isn’t demanded or offered. This is also why much
counter-enlightenment material is filled with war, the battlefield, the joy of killing – examples are Ernst Jünger’s *Storm of Steel*, or when a Taleban fighter says about his American counterpart: “They love Pepsi-Cola, but we love death” (quoted from Buruma & Margalit 2004: 49). Stephen Holmes says: “War resists all rationalist attempts to dispel darkness with light” (1993: 29).

Another danger inherent in the conflict perspective is the always present inclination to reiterate the importance of conflict and violence and to downplay or even despise the importance of peace, institutions and consensus. In and through the glorification of the conflictual, the critique of liberalism, therefore, risks ending as a caricature of its opponent. This is one of the themes in chapter 1, which explores depoliticization and strategies of critique. Liberalism critique portrays liberalism as in various forms an escape from the political and the serious. But there is a disagreement among (and sometimes in) the critiques: is liberalism really apolitical or is its depoliticization a cover for the political? Liberalism as truly apolitical lies behind the claim that liberalism is indecisive, not able to defend itself, merely oriented towards consumerism and amusement. This form of critique often portrays liberalism as weak and cowardly, being opposed by an opponent who is strong due to his willingness to sacrifice (of both himself and others). It is common in much debate on the supposed confrontation between liberal societies and Islamic or nationalist fundamentalists (Berman 2003).

The second approach insists that liberalism uses depoliticization and apolitical language-strategies to hide its political nature and agenda. Behind the façade of post- and anti-politics, liberalism is in fact highly political. This is consistent with the thesis that the political is inescapable. The critiques, I use, endorse the second approach. Paradoxically, what emerges from the critique of liberalism’s escape from the political is liberalism as deeply political. The most basic insight from liberalism critique is the disclosure of liberalism as political and of depoliticization as a political tool. This may sound as no great achievement or revelation, but given liberalism’s claim to be apolitical and to possess the instruments of post-politics this is a disclosure which goes to the heart of liberal self-understanding because, although seldom couched in those terms, there is in this critical perspective no doubt that liberalism sees itself as truly apolitical and as aiming towards post-politics. Liberalism is, contrary to its own assertions, inescapably but tacitly political. What separates liberalism from other political ideologies is its consistent, or perhaps just successful, strategy of depoliticization. Liberalism has stylized itself as *the* legitimate narrative. It has, as already mentioned above, done so partly through the marginalization and defamation of counter-narratives and partly through a ‘forgetting’ of the power-political preconditions for its success. Freedom and liberalism are
beautiful ideals but it was tanks and warships, bombings of Dresden and Hiroshima, a life under the atomic umbrella that made Western Europe ‘safe for democracy’. Nothing in history or in liberalism itself guaranteed its success. The ‘liberalization’ of Western Europe was conditioned upon historically contingent circumstances, which were often accompanied by war and violence. The ‘democratization’ was perhaps even less obvious and was the result of often violently repressed struggles, where marginalized groups (the bourgeoisie, the workers, women, blacks) fought their way to a place and a voice in the polity. Liberals generally acknowledge Weber’s definition of the modern nation-state as the organized and legitimate monopoly of violence but they also tend to overlook or under-theorize the use of violence that historically and actually is present to establish and maintain this monopoly (Volkov 2000). The modern nation-state is unique in history for its successful exclusion of all other forms of violence than its own as legitimate (i.e. ‘pirates’, ‘criminals’ on one side, ‘soldiers’ and ‘policemen’ on the other). This fact is surprisingly absent in liberal thought. Michael Mann writes in an eye-opening article on the shadow side of liberal democracy as the perpetrator of ethnic and political violence that, “organic nationalism, excluding to the point of murderous cleansing, has been one of Europe’s contributions to modernity. Of course, once the nation is cleansed, it requires little further violence. Impeccably liberal nation-states can bloom above the mass graves of the cleansed” (1999: 42). This is what liberalism tends to ignore and what anti-liberalism tends to emphasize to the point of celebration. In liberal thinking it is the barbaric, totalitarian state whose foundation and existence is conditioned upon violence, not the liberal state. Liberalism has, given its self-understanding, difficulties with acknowledging its dependence on violence. We may not agree totally with either the politics or the very polemical tone of Paul Gottfried’s remark: “Unlike the Communist garrison-state or the Italian fascist ‘total state’, the managerial state succeeds by denying that it exercises power … managerial rule has consistently presented itself as collectively administered assistance” (1999: 140-1); but this text is in agreement with the theme of his claim: That liberalism projects overwhelming force without recognizing or acknowledging it as such.

This text tries to meet the challenge from the counter-narratives in trying to, so to speak, reinstate violence in liberalism. Not, of course, in liberal society, where, so the theory goes, there is plenty of violence inscribed in its systems, but in liberal theory where it is surprisingly absent despite the successful projection of force by liberal societies both internally and externally. The important thing to expose and criticize is the reluctance to talk of war and repression as exactly that.
II. The Text

Freedom’s utter frustration in fascism is, indeed, the inevitable result of the liberal philosophy, which claims that power and compulsion are evil, that freedom demands their absence from human community. No such thing is possible; in a complex society this becomes apparent. This leaves no alternative but either to remain faithful to an illusionary idea of freedom and deny the reality of society, or to accept that reality and reject the idea of freedom. The first is the liberal’s conclusion; the latter the fascist’s. No other seems possible. (Polanyi 1957 [1944]: 257)

No doubt an advance must be made on the liberalism of the 19th century. But this is precisely what cannot be done by any movement such as Fascism, which declares itself anti-liberal. (Ortega y Gasset 1932: 94)

The Chapters to Come

The dissertation has three parts. The first part, ‘Criticizing the Dream’, starts by exploring the concepts and critical strategies of the political and depoliticization. This first chapter develops a dichotomy between a conflictual and a pacifist view of the political, where one is often delegitimized in favour of the hegemony of the other. I insist on their interdependence but take my inspiration from the conflictual view of the political as this is the critical position in a liberal democracy. In a totalitarian or war-mongering state the critical position would be the pacifist version of the political. The chapter then proceeds to discuss depoliticization and its two basic versions as, again, conflictual and pacifist. The second chapter deals with the Counter-Enlightenment as one influential yet hardly discussed critical set of ideas. The first part deals with the first formulations of the counter-enlightenment argument, whereas the second part discusses 20th century counter-enlightenment liberalism. The last chapter in this first part deals with the immediate inspiration for this text’s critique of liberal globalism, Carl Schmitt. Its first part explores his concept of the political, his thoughts on enmity and his critique of liberal internationalism. It ends with an examination of the past and present leftist engagements with Schmitt. The second part, ‘Formulating the Dream’, turns to liberalism itself. It is an exploration of the first formulations of the liberal dream of a modernity without violence. It deals firstly in chapter 4 with liberalism applied to the domestic field and in the subsequent chapter with liberalism applied to the international field. We’ll see various applications of depoliticization and the first repression of both borderland and enmity. Methods and assumptions applied to the domestic field are projected
outwards in what is a liberal internationalism as it presupposes both state and the international. The setting of distinctions, formulations of in/out, marks also the return of the enemy both internally as the disturber of peace and externally as the barbarian. These two chapters serve as a setting for the third and contemporary part and as a first ‘test’ of the critical perspective outlined in the first part. The third and final part, ‘Living the Dream’, explores the contemporary expressions of liberalism applied to the international. I argue for the existence of a new liberal paradigm, liberal globalism, which presents itself as post-nation state and as stepping beyond the distinctions of the nation state era. This, I allege, are better understood as the second global repression of the borderland and the re-establishment of in/out distinctions. Chapter 6 tries to present an overview of the positions in the globalization debate before dealing more extensively with two representative liberal voices in the debate: Manuel Castells and Jürgen Habermas. Chapter 7 deals with two contentious issues in the international debate: The apparent split between America and Europe, which presents itself as a quite unique case for studying the European liberal reformulation of its position; secondly, the chapter investigates the most ambitious liberal answer to globalization, cosmopolitanism, and asks what ‘masters’ they may actually be unintentionally serving. Chapter 8 takes up the issue of war, humanitarian intervention and the war on terror, as the creation and legitimization of the new global order. It also serves to reintroduce the discussion from chapter 3 of the enemy and its various reappearances in a contemporary setting. The dissertation ends by concluding on the findings and with an explanation of what the title – defence of enmity – can possibly mean.

**Practical Notes**

Unless otherwise stated, all quotations from Danish, German or other languages have been translated by me. The utmost care has been taken, wherever possible, to refer and translate from original sources. Italics in quotes not marked ‘my italics’ is the italics of the original text. Throughout the text I differentiate between ‘xxx’ for “xxx”. The latter is reserved to sentence-long quotations whereas the former is used more liberally. Square brackets [] indicate either the word in its original language or my intervention in a quote. Capital letters for Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment refers to the historical period whereas ‘enlightenment’ and ‘counter-enlightenment’ refers to their general ideas and afterlife. This dissertation suffers under the prolific use of the words ‘political’ and ‘politics’ to designate other phenomena and spheres than those I refer to with these concepts. Hopefully, their meaning will be evident from the use and context in the text.
III. Abstracts

English Abstract

This dissertation concerns liberalism and its relations to the international, the political and the enemy, or rather: The aim of the dissertation is, as its title indicates, to investigate the concept of enmity in relation to international politics, and not least to liberal ideas and theories on the international. Both enmity and the international is border concepts in liberalism, that is, they figure uneasily in its conceptualization and understanding of self and world; the endeavour is to suppress or overcome both the figure of the enemy and the international, understood as a sphere distinct from the internal; and, lastly, liberalism seems to meet its limit of ‘liberalization’ in these exact concepts. The third border concept of this text is the political, which is defined, with inspiration from Carl Schmitt, as the distinction between friend and enemy.

This definition of the political is deliberately one-sided, as explained in the first part of the dissertation, ‘Criticizing the Dream’; the dream being what Hans Joas calls the liberal dream of a modernity without violence. Chapter one deals with the question of the political and singles out two main forms of the political: A conflictual and a pacifist. Politics as conflict is the chosen paradigm of the dissertation, not because it’s truer, but because it serves as a corrective to an otherwise dominant liberal-pacifist understanding of the political, which equates it with rational liberal-parliamentarian deliberation. Politics as conflict is used as a critique of a concept of the political, which only sees and acknowledges one element of what I take to be the two sides of it. Liberalism, then, is in this perspective seen as being anti-political. It denies both politics as conflict and the enemy as anything but the amorality of non-liberal others.

The critique of liberalism is conceptualized in the first three chapters. Firstly, as already mentioned, attention is given to the concept of the political, to liberalism’s reduction of it to only one of its main features. This serves us to understand another crucial concept in the dissertation, ‘depoliticization’, which occupies the second part of the first chapter. Again, we encounter two versions: One is the liberal, which understands depoliticization as the emptying of democratic debate. This is an important version, but we focus on it as the claim of going beyond the distinction between friend and enemy, that is, of escaping politics as conflict. This, and the claim of an eternal ‘return of the political’, is the basis on which to ground our critique.

The conflictual concept of the political is inspired by Carl Schmitt, who belonged to the tradition of the Counter-Enlightenment. In the second chapter, then, we turn to the ferocious critiques of the Enlightenment coming from Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre and Juan Donoso Cortés and we ask
how much their depiction of the Enlightenment as cold, abstract and ending (necessarily) in terror informs the general, also present-day, understanding of the Enlightenment. We also explore their arguments as an arsenal of anti-liberal critique, not least with a view to the highly influential distinction between the concrete and grounded presence here-and-now versus the abstract and disembodied existence then-there-and-everywhere. This dichotomy is most powerfully present in much subsequent anti-modern thought, not least in Carl Schmitt, but also in contemporary left-wing critiques inspired by Schmitt, which aims to disclose liberal-humanist universalism as a cover for particularistic interests and where some try out various localist or regionalist alternatives to liberal globalism. The chapter on the Counter-Enlightenment also takes us to the 20th century and a number of liberal thinkers who, inspired, directly or indirectly, by the Counter-Enlightenment constructs a critique of a ‘crusading and expansionist liberalism’, which doesn’t acknowledge the limits (however founded) to its ambitious project of a total re-ordering of both the world and man. This gives us the basis, in the third chapter, for understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and the contemporary, mostly left-wing, use of his critique. The chapter explores his concept of the political, its relation to the particularist-universalist dichotomy, which in Schmitt’s theory is mainly given the form of an opposition between a land-based, true existence, as individual and as state, and then an ungrounded, untrue existence in, what Manuel Castells will later call the ‘global flows’. We then investigate the various concepts of the enemy in his work and construct a ‘pure’ concept of the political enemy, that is, a symmetrical enmity among recognized equals, to serve as a critical corrective to the asymmetrical concepts of the enemy. Schmitt takes his liberalism critique to the liberal internationalism of his time, not least its Anglo-Saxon version, and formulates a critique of what he sees as a new, deterriorialized and indirect imperialism, which have a number of significant parallels to our time. The second part of the chapters takes Schmitt’s critiques to the present in its left-wing versions, which serves the dual purpose of elaborating on the dimensions of liberalism critique and of presenting the critical background of the dissertation itself. The second part, ‘Formulating the Dream’, turns to liberalism itself and tries to apply our critical apparatus to the actual texts of Enlightenment-liberalism. Chapter four investigates the domestic version of liberalism, its machines of pacification, not least the private sphere and the market but also the application of law to the state as a way to make politics predictable and peaceful. In this process certain fields and expressions are excluded from the public realm in order to make the social and the political manageable: Passions, outward religiosity, the political decision and enmity. The internal pacification constructs an image of liberal man and society as peaceful, mediocre even,
and an outside or other, which is violent and dangerous. The argument of the dissertation is that this internal depoliticization produces exclusions, unacknowledged others, who are not recognized as enemies, certainly not as political enemies, but who are, and is treated as, asymmetrical enemies. The fifth chapter explores liberalism’s ambivalent relation to the international. The international is, as first conceived by liberalism in the Enlightenment, both a realm beyond law, that is a distinct sphere resistant to pacification, and a realm to be conquered through a domestic analogy, where the instruments of pacification used internally is meant to apply also to the external, turning it from an unpredictable, unsocialized and violent sphere into one of cooperation, trade and commonality. This confusion, as to whether the international is naturally and necessarily different from, and a stranger to, the pacifications of the national space, has followed liberalism ever since. One way to solve the problem has been to split the world between Europe and the rest, which has very profound consequences for the question of the enemy.

The domestic pacification was projected onto the European space so as to make wars in Europe unlikely, because, as Benjamin Constant said, “Even the division of Europe into several states is, thanks to the progress of enlightenment, more apparent than real”. Peace is, accordingly, more likely than war. The relations between the European nations are dominated by common interests: ”Between the interests of nations, there is nowhere any real conflict”, as Jeremy Bentham said. Accordingly, internally in Europe peace reigns, as the liberal instruments of internal pacification are applied externally, turning enemies into competitors and strangers into friends even. The internal liberal space becomes European; inside is Europe. In that sense, it postulates a post-political Europe of unending deliberation and commerce beyond conflict and enmity.

Beyond the line of post-politics lies non-Europe. When Bentham says that there isn’t any real conflict between nations, it is only because the non-European part of the world is not acknowledged as consisting of nations, of adequate social, political and economic organization worthy of recognition. In his Second Treatise, Locke said that, “there are still great Tracts of Ground to be found, which (the Inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of Mankind, in the consent of the Use of their common Money) lie waste”. Non-Europe is still borderland, uninhabited land, land void of the distinctions and demarcations of liberal modernity and, therefore, in a state of non-use, freely available to European conquest. A line is drawn between a familiar Europe of sovereign nations, which acknowledge each other as equals, codified in international law and rules of both diplomacy and warfare and then an outside, where Europe acknowledges no equal and where, accordingly, the rules of morality and combat do not apply.
This dissertation investigates the intimate connection between the construction of a post-political Europe, where the enemy, both inside each country and, in theory at least, between the countries, is translated into the economic competitor and the parliamentarian opponent, that is, into conflict partners rather than deadly enemies and then the return of the enemy beyond the line. It is argued, that an interdependence exists between internal pacification and external enmification, which Enlightenment-liberalism sensed in relation to the international, but which they repressed and forced further outwards onto the non-European space.

The third part, ‘Living the Dream’, takes the discussion to the present and suggests the contemporary reappearances of the enemy in, firstly, chapter six, which takes on liberal globalization theory. Here we encounter a construction of the nation state and its defenders as the new barbarian. The single most important institution of modernity is now, in what Jürgen Habermas calls the post-national constellation, a figure of barbarity and violence, domestic and foreign. The criteria for being considered civilized has changed. Now, it is no longer the nation state but its dissolution into a postmodern, world-open state, which is accorded legitimacy. What we’re witnessing is a hardening of a liberal anti-pluralism, which progressively narrows the field of the acceptable. The new humanist discourse of sovereignty-critique attacks a state form, which Europe once exported to the world as the only acceptable construction of politics and society. Now, as William Rasch says about the non-European countries, “Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty”. Europe is once again writing the law of and for the world, exporting its own experience and model as the only adequate and legitimate one.

This liberal globalist discourse creates a new range of barbarians, both the chaos of the failed states and the danger of the modern states. One of these centres of danger is America. This is the theme of the first part of chapter seven, which discusses the debate between Europe and the US on the nature and future of international politics. The new barbarism in European liberalism is unilateralism and America is barbarism’s premier representative. It is increasingly being presented as the other of a post-sovereign Europe, which is then presented as a force of good in the world surrounded by barbarians of various sorts, who stubbornly stick to an outdated nation state paradigm. This is also evident in the second part of the chapter, which discusses cosmopolitanism as the most ambitious expression of liberal globalism. A highly constructivist reading of history sets up a choice between cosmopolitanism and ethnic cleansing; all opposition to the new post-sovereign, humanist and globalist discourse is dismissed as amoral and jingoist. I argue that both liberal globalism and cosmopolitanism is formulating a new sovereigntist language, which isn’t more benign or adequate.
than the nation state one, but which, on the contrary, may signal a re-entrenchment of state power and the use of armed force.

The argument of the dissertation is that this liberal globalist self-understanding reproduces the split between a post-political Europe and the world, allowing a differentiated arsenal of politics and force. Europe is being described as the post-historical, post-political area of democratic peace and all around it is the barbarians lurking, opening up for humanitarian interventions and the war on terror. This is the theme of the eight and final chapter, which asks, what kinds of wars are shaping the new state. Humanitarian warfare is being presented as anything but war, as police operations conducted out of moral imperatives rather than national interests. They signal a change from a political vocabulary to a moral one, which is thought to be an improvement, but which I argue may actually be a regression to a premodern state of just wars and asymmetrical enmities.

In this chapter we return to the concepts of the enemy and update its conceptualization from chapter three with the moral, the abstract, the biopolitical and the privatized enemy (where I concentrate on the first two). The enemy of humanitarian warfare is the moral enemy, who is depoliticized as psychopath and/or criminal and the ones, being intervened to protect, are thought of in equally depoliticized terms as helpless victims without agency. The result is a new kind of liberal imperialism re-ordering the non-European borderland. The war on terror is an example of the abstract enmity, the enemy without a face; it’s a war on an abstract concept such as poverty, crime, terrorism, one of whose characteristics is that the war cannot be won. War becomes unending and metaphorical but also total in destruction and impact. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri says, that “Counter-insurgency is a full-time job”. There is apparently no separation between civilian and combatant, peace and war, information and propaganda. It’s all part of an effort, which in actuality makes every home a battlefield and no one a neutral or civilian. The enemy returns in the post-political borderlands of liberal globalism.
Danish Abstract

Denne afhandling angår liberalisme og dens forhold til det internationale, det politiske og fjendskabet. Eller rettere, målet for og med afhandlingen er, som dens titel antyder, at undersøge fjendskabet i forhold til international politik og til liberale ideer og teorier om det internationale. Både fjendskab og det internationale er liberale grænsebegreber. Det vil sige, at de passer dårligt ind i ordinær liberal begrebsliggørelse og forståelse af selv og omverden; de forsøges undertrykt, overvundet eller ifht. det internationale omdefineret hinsides genkendelighed og hinsides dets status som en sfære distinkt fra det nationale rum; og endelig så synes liberalismen at møde grænsen for sin 'liberalisering’ i netop mødet med disse begreber. Det tredje grænsebegreb i afhandlingen er det politiske, som med inspiration fra Carl Schmitt defineres som distinktionen mellem ven og fjende.


Den kritiske ramme bliver, som allerede sagt, begrebsliggjort i første del. Først gives opmærksomhed til det politiskes begreb og den liberale reduktion heraf. Det tjener os i anden del af det første kapitel til at forstå et andet meget væsentligt begreb: afpolitisering. Igen finder vi to versioner, hvor liberalismes forstå afpolitisering som tømningen af den demokratiske samtale, hvilket selvsagt er en vigtig og aktuel problemstilling, men her vælger vi at koncentrere os om dets anden version, der er påstanden om at have nået en fjendeløs tilstand; eller rettere at fjendskabet ikke er nogen relevant kategori, da man er kommet hinsides politik som konflikt. Denne påstand og tesen om det politiskes evige genkomst er grundlaget for afhandlingens tematik.

Det konfliktuelle politikbegreb er inspireret af Schmitt, der tilhører traditionen for modoplysning. Kapitel to behandler derfor den kritik af oplysningsprojektet, som vi finder hos bl.a. Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre og Juan Donoso Cortés, og vi spørger, hvor meget deres afbildning af oplysningen som kold, abstrakt og som (undgåeligt) kulminerende i terror, der egentlig informerer


Det femte kapitel undersøger liberalismens ambivalente relation til det internationale. Det internationale blev i oplysningsliberalismen både betragtet som et område uden lov, dvs. en distinkt sfære der modsatte sig kodificering og pacificering og som et område, der kunne erobre og fredeliggøres af ikke-statslige relationer, hvor de pacificerings-instrumenter, der virkede på det nationale rum, også kunne anvendes på det internationale. Denne forvirring om det internationales karakter har fulgt liberalismen lige siden. En måde at løse problemet på har været at opdele verden i Europa og de andre, hvilket har og har haft enorme konsekvenser for spørgsmålet om fjenden.

Den indenrigspolitiske pacificering blev overført til det europæiske rum. Som Benjamin Constant sagde: ”Selv opdelingen af Europa i forskellige stater er på grund af oplysningens fremskridt mere tilsyneladende end reel”. Fred er derfor mere sandsynlig end krig. Relationerne mellem de europæiske nationer domineres af fælles interesser og en følelse af samhørighed og ligeværd: ”Mellem nationernes interesser er der intetsteds nogen reel konflikt”, som Jeremy Bentham sagde.

Altså hersker der fred internt i Europa, idet appliceringen af den interne pacificering på det internationale gør konkurrenter eller endda venner ud af tidligere fjender. Det indre liberale rum bliver europæisk; indenfor er Europa. På den vis postuleres et postpolitis Europa karakteriseret af evig samtale og samhandel hinsides konflikt og fjendskab.

Hinsides den postpolitiske linje ligger ikke-Europa. Når Bentham siger, at der ikke er nogen reel konflikt mellem nationer, så er det kun fordi, at den ikke-europæiske del af verden ikke anerkendes som bestående af selvstændige nationer med passende sociale, politiske og økonomiske organiseringer værdige til europæisk respekt. I sin Anden afhandling skriver John Locke, at ”der kan stadig findes store områder (indbyggerne heri ikke har forenet sig med resten af menneskeheden i brugen af penge), hvor jorden ligger øde hen”. Ikke-Europa er stadig grænseland, ubeboet, ukultiveret land uden den liberale modernitets afgrænsninger og markeringer og derfor


Fjenden vender tilbage i den liberale globalismes postpolitiske grænseland.
Part 1:

Criticizing the Dream
Depoliticization/Repoliticization and Forms of the Political

In Italy for thirty years under the Borgians they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance; in Switzerland, they had brotherly love, they had five hundred years of democracy and peace, and what did they produce? The cuckoo clock! (Orson Wells in The Third Man)

On October 1, 2001, three weeks after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, professor at the Carr Centre for Human Rights at Harvard University, Michael Ignatieff, published an article in The Guardian: ‘It’s war – but it doesn’t have to be dirty’ (2001a), which is of interest here because it is representative for much commentary on the attacks and because it serves as an illustration of what we’ll label depoliticization in the discussion below. In the article, he says:

But September 11 was not politics by other means. There were no demands, and there never will be. No one took political responsibility for the act, and no one ever will. This was a deed committed without any expectation of attaining a political objective … What we are up against is apocalyptic nihilism. The nihilism of their means – the indifference to human costs – takes their actions not only out of the realm of politics, but even out of the realm of war itself. The apocalyptic nature of their goals makes it absurd to believe they are making political demands at all. They are seeking the violent transformation of an irremediably sinful and unjust world. Terror does not express a politics, but a metaphysics, a desire to give ultimate meaning to time and history through ever-escalating acts of violence which culminate in a final battle between good and evil. People serving such exalted goals are not interested in mere politics.¹

What Ignatieff does, as Andreas Behnke (2004: 279) says, is “the juxtapositioning of politics and metaphysics as two irreconcilable domains”. The metaphysical non-politics is characterized by expressing no demands, taking no public responsibility, having no stated objective. It is apocalyptic nihilism, indifferent toward human costs, violent, total in its ambition and it views the world as a battle between absolute good and absolute evil. As his article goes on, this position is characterized by ‘hatred’, by a desire to ‘extirpate’ the world of its opponent, its perpetrators are ‘monstrous impersonators’ of Islam, filled with ‘rage’, they ‘cannot be reasoned with’, their action have only an

¹ See also Ignatieff 2003b: 7; 2005: 99, 100-111. Just to illustrate the pervasiveness of this view and its exclusion of non-deliberative politics as politics: Bruce Cummings wrote: “In its utter recklessness and indifference to consequences, its craven anonymity, and its lack of any discernible ‘program’ save for inchoate revenge, this was an apolitical act” (2002: 198): And an otherwise critical man such as Edward Said said: “it was not meant to be argued with. No message was intended with it … It transcended the political and moved into the metaphysical. There was a kind of cosmic, demonic quality of mind at work here, which refused to have any interest in dialogue and political organization and persuasion” (quoted from Falk 2003: 49).
‘apocalyptic content’ and a ‘nihilistic moral meaning’, they represent only ‘their own criminal designs’, it was an ‘insane massacre’. The other position, the liberal-democratic one, is less spelled out but can be inferred through its opposition to the nihilistic one. It expresses its demands in public and takes responsibility for its actions, the goals are attainable and this through non-violent means, it is pragmatic, sensitive to human costs, open to reason, legal, sane etc. Ignatieff defines a legitimate politics characterized by reasoned public deliberation by rational and pragmatic actors, who pursue legal and piecemeal objectives through non-violent accommodating strategies. This definition excludes large parts of/elements in politics. It leaves only the liberal side to politics. Behnke states my reason for opening with this liberal delegitimization of non-liberal politics:

Ignatieff’s own reliance on ‘History’ and ‘Good and Evil’ supports the suspicion that such metaphysical categories are indispensable in the definition and delineation of conceptual boundaries. The very act of boundary drawing, however, is of course already a political act. The very distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ that Ignatieff seeks to accomplish in this article is arguably the defining moment of the Political. (2004: 281)

What it illustrates, is the widespread and “deep hostility to any discussion of these events in political terms – in terms of power and conflict” (Jayasuriya 2002: 132). The understandable horror of the events serves to ban the political explanation as it is then interpreted as an excuse. Instead, the attacks are ‘used’ to strengthen an opposition between a genuine deliberative politics and a illegitimate metaphysical and nihilist non-deliberative politics. This is a common way to depoliticize the unwanted. Contemporary politics is characterized by anti-politics, that is, by a closure of the realm of public possibility. The range of public or societal impossibility is growing. This anti-political trend is a constant feature of ‘politics’ and what we’re witnessing is a radicalization of some deep underlying trends. The present anti-politics is liberal and liberalism has proved to be the hitherto most effective anti-political force. The attempt to go beyond the political is inscribed in the very fabric of liberalism and it works on the assumption of a certain understanding of the political. Liberalism teaches that the political has a distinct domain, which can expand or contract. This makes anti-politics possible. The political is not inscribed (at least potentially) in every societal act or institution. It has certain circumscribed areas and practices. Anti-politics is, as already mentioned, often reduced to anti-state or anti-parliamentarism. Andreas Schedler (1997) has a very useful distinction between four kinds of anti-deliberative anti-politics, where the perpetual discussion of liberal societies are criticized. Firstly, there is instrumental anti-politics, which aims to replace politics with expert administration. Secondly, amoral anti-politics,
which sees politics as a corrupt scramble of vested interests. Thirdly, moral anti-politics, which invokes eternal, unquestionable truths rather than the temporary and negotiable truths of parliamentarism. Fourthly, aesthetic anti-politics, which makes a spectacle out of politics, degrading it to entertainment and theatre without any content or substance. The first two are consistent with certain elements of liberalism, whereas the last two are contrary to liberal politics.

Liberal endism is complementary to the larger liberal tradition of power critique; perhaps even to some tendencies deeply embedded in the Western tradition. Gamble says: “A persistent theme in western political thought has been the dream of a world without politics and without conflict” (2000: 2); and Sheldon Wolin adds: “The main trends in political thought, irrespective of national or ideological variations, have worked towards the same end: the erosion of the distinctively political” (2004: 260). Wolin identifies a momentum for this trend in the nineteenth century with:

…the attempt to substitute administration for politics as the central method for handling social problems. In the bizarre theories of the Utopian Socialists, such as Fourier and Owen; in the managerial or technocratic society depicted by Saint-Simon; and, finally, in the Marxist-Leninist conception of the ‘withering away of the state’, there was common agreement that society, given certain reforms, would spontaneously generate its own life. Politics and the political order, on the other hand, existed only because of the social cleavages stemming from outmoded forms of economic organization. (2004: 281)

Deborah Stone continues the line of anti-political social theory in her book, Policy Paradox and Political Reason:

The fields of political science, public administration, law, and policy analysis have shared a common mission of rescuing public policy from the irrationalities and indignities of politics, hoping to conduct it instead with rational, analytical, and scientific methods. This endeavour, what I call ‘the rationality project’, includes James Madison’s effort to ‘cure the mischiefs of faction’ with proper constitutional design; the Progressives’ attempt to make government scientific via expert regulatory commissions, professional city managers, and non-partisan elections; Frederick Winslow Taylor’s application of scientific principles of efficiency to labor management; Christopher Langdell’s vision of a ‘legal science’, with the law library as its laboratory and appellate decisions as its specimens; Herbert Simon’s quest for a ‘science of administration’; Harold Lasswell’s dream of a ‘science of policy forming and execution’; and the current effort of universities, foundations, and government to foster a profession of policy scientists. (1988: 4)
And just to update the list, Slavoj Žižek inscribes it within Western culture and consumerism:

On today’s market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant properties: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol … And the list goes on: what about virtual sex as sex without sex, the Colin Powell doctrine of warfare without casualties (on our side, of course) as warfare without warfare, the contemporary redefinition of politics as the art of expert administration, that is, as politics without politics, up to today’s tolerant liberal multiculturalism as an experience of the Other deprived of its Otherness (2002a: 10-11)

We should perhaps just mention two other kinds of anti-politics before proceeding. Firstly, a form of anti-politics, which are often associated with anti-liberalism, and which Barry Hindess (1997) calls ‘political anti-politics’. This is the rejection of traditional politics in favour of another kind of politics, a more genuine, more democratic politics. This is the anti-politics of populism and republicanism. Secondly, a rejection of politics in favour of aesthetic, philosophical or religious activities. We are concerned with the present reappearance of anti-politics within sociological theory and political debate. But, again, the focus is less upon politics as parliamentarian or state politics, which is what Schedler, Wolin and Stone refers to, but with conflictual politics. Those are critiques of liberal-democratic politics. We are concerned with the liberal critique of politics, that is, the critique of politics as conflictual, with the argument that we are witnessing an end of the political as anything but liberal deliberative politics.

Depoliticization is the attempt to close the space of public possibility and to let automatism take its place, that is, to discount a certain kind of politics – revolutionary, constitution-making, ‘politics of the street’, the exception – in favour of another kind – the politics of repetition and rule – which is supposed to be the political as such. Liberal anti-politics is all about delegitimizing non-deliberative, non-procedural forms of the political and to claim democratic politics as the only form of the political. Other forms are non-political and are renamed nihilism, crime, murderous passion or whatever. But there exists another version of politics, which takes the opposite view of politics proper. This version discounts the liberal-democratic politics as inauthentic or banal and emphasizes instead the violent or coercive aspects of the political. This goes to show the difficulty of speaking about politics and anti-politics. When I refer to the political (unless the context proves otherwise), I’m talking about what will later be referred to as the conflictual view of the political and anti-politics refers to the liberal attempt to ignore, discount or combat that view of the political.
The political is notoriously difficult to define. I will not engage in a genealogical, philological or historical examination (see Morgenthau 1929: 59-72; Sellin 1978; Rubinstein 1987, Rhonheimer 1989) nor is this meant as an exhaustive discussion of the concept or practice of the political. It is only meant to serve as an introduction to the discussions below.

The definitions heard in contemporary debate often tend to assume a democratic polity and thereby in actual fact restrict politics to modern democratic societies. But the political eludes easy definition. Just as liberals tend to see only one side of the political – the pacific and rational – the critics of liberalism tend to see only its other side – the violent and conflictual. Actually there’s a battle raging over the definition of the political where each side reproduces a certain one-sidedness.

We can summarize the debate as one between those who see politics as structured around the confrontation between friends and enemies – this is the conflict perspective – and those who dismiss this as bellicose and wrong and who ‘translate’ the distinction into one between competitors and discussants (but also, as we’ll see later, into moral/unmoral, rational/non-rational, good/evil etc.) actually transforming the enemy category into two manageable forms: the non-enemy opponent and the unacknowledged enemy. More on that later.

This text is mainly about the potential dangers of the liberal approach to politics. But this is not turning it into an unqualified defence or advocacy of the conflict perspective. As an illustration of the dangers of what we can call ‘manichean decisionism’, I’ll briefly mention an article on Schmitt’s concept of the political by Bernard Willms (1991), in which he classifies two traditions of political thinking: political realism and political fictionalism (try to guess his position!). Political fictionalism “subordinates politics to ‘higher’ principles or ‘truths’”, whereas political realism is “the permanently repeated attempt to conceive of politics as what in fact it is” (1991: 371). It is a (unintended) caricature on the self-professed realist’s sense of superiority because of their courage and ability to confront the really real reality:

Political fictionalisms help to satisfy man’s need for consolation, edification, hope and sense, tending to veil real conditions of government. The political realist seeks to identify necessities – irrespective of their severity and without consideration for any need for deceit under the existing government. (1991: 371-2)

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2 This dissertation of Morgenthau’s was meant as a critique of Schmitt’s Der Begriff des Politischen. Schmitt wrote a complimentary letter, inviting Morgenthau to his house in Berlin. They met, but Morgenthau was less than impressed; see Morgenthau 1984 for his description of the meeting. Schmitt altered his concept of the political in (unacknowledged) response to Morgenthau’s concept of the political as characterized not by a special area but as an intensity of relations. For Schmitt and Morgenthau see Pichler 1998; Scheuerman 1999: chap. 9; Koskenniemi 2000, 2001; Frei 2001 and see Slagmark, no 43/2005, pp. 99-102 for my introduction to and translation of Morgenthau’s description of the meeting.
This is the kind of reductionism of the political that I want to avoid. Working with Schmitt’s categories and critiques entails a danger of falling in the (very self-comforting) trap of proclaiming only one true and ‘hard’ version of the political and of dismissing all others as fictions and wishful thinking. Primacy of the political becomes primacy of foreign policy, organized violence etc. The political is effectively reduced to a few areas – which is just what liberalism is criticized for doing. The friend/enemy distinction or conflictuality may often be a dominant feature of the political, but that is not to say that it is then the political. As Ankersmit (1996: 127) says, that would be the same as making the unavoidability of marital disagreements into the very foundation of marriage as such. I want instead to argue that the political contains a number of styles, sides, variants (or whatever one want to call it) that can very loosely and ideal-typically be grouped in two main forms: Politics as conflict and politics as technique, where neither of them can claim exclusivity. So, I want to avoid a sterile discussion of what the political really is. My interest is far more the various styles of the political that are operative in political debate. Schmitt and many other conflict theoreticians do not see the other face of the political as anything other than a ‘secondary’, ‘dependent’, ‘corrupted’ expression of politics. Liberals tend to exclude politics as conflict, confining it to other spaces in time or geography, as aberration or relapse.

What the two concepts each do is to highlight a certain aspect of the political, and my claim is that they are elements of a unity. There’s a certain pendulum process at work and I’ll give that a number of expressions, which basically states the not very controversial thought that the political world is located between the extremes of repetition and break, stability and change, regime and revolution, or, as I prefer to call them, technique and conflict. Depoliticization, then, is a way to describe the attempts to or methods of making repetition, stability and regime universal and eternal – to place areas, practices and actors beyond change and critique – whereas repoliticization describes the opposite movement – disruption, change, recreation of the entire social space.

This and the following two chapters will pursue the forms of the political, the understandings of the political, from a number of angles, that will hopefully build a foundation for the subsequent exploration of liberalism and the critique of liberal internationalism/globalism. This chapter will explore three axes: firstly, the conflictual view of the political; secondly, depoliticization/repoliticization as preferred strategies of political discourse; and thirdly – throughout the text – two different perspectives on the political, where political thinkers has tended to emphasize the one at the expense of the other. This chapter demonstrates the existence of two main classes of political thought referred to as ‘politics as technique’ and ‘politics as conflict’. The
next chapter will explore the Counter-Enlightenment critique of liberalism and a string of liberalism that I’ll refer to as counter-enlightenment liberalism. The counter-enlightenment advocates an understanding of the political as conflictual, whereas its liberal ‘heirs’ advocates an understanding of politics as technique. What they share is a restrictive view of the political agenda and an insistence on limits, limitations of man and politics. That chapter aims at broadening the discussion initiated in this chapter and to elaborate on the existence of two styles, schools or perspectives on the political. The third chapter uses them in a discussion of Schmitt’s critique of liberal internationalism.

I. The Conflictual View of the Political

Violence cannot be relegated to distant myths, to an Oriental desert, or, as in Voltaire, to a time before the advent of Great History. Violence is not a novelty belonging to the civil state, a shocking lapse into barbarity that takes humankind by surprise. It is not a loss of human nature; on the contrary, it is the fabric of our complex origins. (Saint-Amand 1996: 6)

Liberalism knows of course about violence and coercion. Contrary to what liberal theoreticians like Adam Smith and Tocqueville feared about the defensive capabilities of liberal democracies (see chapter 4) and to what German radical conservatives exclaimed between the two world wars, liberal democracies have been extraordinarily good at projecting force, including military force, as evidenced in WW2, in the Cold War and in the projecting of societal force as evidenced by the smooth functioning of liberal governmentality (Rose 2000). What liberalism has neglected is reflection and recognition about these facts. To anticipate further arguments, I’ll briefly state that the problematic here is liberalism’s tendency to portray its use of force as anything but force and its tendency to ‘hide’ its political nature behind an image of the apolitical, i.e. the rational, the pacific, the economic, the deliberative, the cultural etc. The conflict perspective has lived somewhat of a shadow life primarily as a negative frame of reference in liberalism and as an academic discourse (and diplomatic practice) in international politics as the both academic discourse and practice of realism and neorealism. There has been an effective marginalization of ‘the thinkers of violence’ and their partial ‘translation’ to less radical versions as evidenced in the literature on Machiavelli and Hobbes. Or this was the case until around the mid-1990s, where a renewed interest in the conflict perspective broke through. In my view because of a dissatisfaction with the hegemonic liberal interpretation and management of the West. This coincided with the re-emergence of an idea
of ‘post-liberalism’, which was always more a hope than an actual registration of fact. The argument was that liberalism was a living dead, equally unaware of its own mortality and death. The return of the conflict perspective was and often is couched in various variants of the ‘return of the political’ or more pronounced in reassertions of ‘the primacy of the political’ (Honig 1993; Mouffe 1993, 2005a; Müller 1997). It has also had a more mellow expression as a ‘political turn’ (Beck 1993; Giddens 1994; Bauman 1999) which are basically new pacific understandings of politics. Some of the conflictual perspectives are inspired by Schmitt’s *Der Begriff des Politischen* and there is a sort of dialectics between the return of Schmitt and the return of the political. It is from these very diverse texts – and their motivations – that I take my starting point and it is from the debates on the return of the political that I find the reasons and arguments of this text. The return of the political has many causes. Noël O’Sullivan (1997) lists three: Postmodern theory, radical feminism and multicultural theory. What they have in common is a sensitivity to difference and the oppression behind seeming unity and consensus. The return of the political is also the return of political conflict – at least in academic terms. The concept of post-liberalism and the return of the political are parts of the same dissatisfaction with contemporary liberalism, and not least with what I’ll later term liberal globalism, that is, the projection of liberal values and liberal sociability across the globe. What the conflict perspective highlights is the very political nature and consequences of this antipolitical globalization.

*Take Two Conflicts and Call Me in the Morning*

This work draws upon a conflictual understanding of the political that sets it apart from the liberal. Giovanni Sartori has dichotomized the approach to politics (1987a: 41-2):

The fundamental distinction is … between (a) a warlike view of politics; and (b) a peace-oriented, legalitarian view of politics. In the former, force monitors persuasion, might establishes right, and conflict resolution is sought in terms of the defeat of the enemy – of the ‘other’ looked on as a *hostis*. In the latter, force is kept in reserve as an *ultima ratio*, as a last and worse resort, and conflict resolution is sought by means of covenants, courts, and ‘rightful’ procedures.

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3 Sartori clearly favours the peace-oriented approach but shows (involuntarily?) an understanding of the primacy of the conflict perspective: "there is one paramount rule of the game that must precede all the others, namely, the rule that establishes how conflicts are to be resolved. If a political society does not share a conflict-solving rule, it will conflict over each conflict – and this is civil war, or paves the way to civil war. Actually, civil wars and revolutions end precisely when the winner establishes which rule (if only by which ruler) will peacefully solve conflicts” (1987a: 90-1).
One could also mention Michael Mann (1988: chap. 4 & 5) Hans Joas (2003: chap. 1-4, 7 & 8) and Giddens (1985: 25-7), who all distinguish between a pacifist liberal/Marxist and a militarist approach to war as further illustration of the clash between two concepts of the political. Although the distinction was meant to cover 19. century sociology, I want to argue that it has a broader relevance and application value. Depoliticization is the strategy of the peace-oriented whereas repoliticization is the strategy of the ‘war-like’ concept of the political. Mann describes the two camps or approaches as follows:

Whatever else divided such theorists as Adam Smith, Bastiat, Carey and Schumpeter or St Simon, Comte, Spencer, Marx himself and Durkheim, on one prediction they united. Contemporary militarism between states was ‘archaic’, the declining residue of an earlier epoch (to which they often gave a militaristic name; for example Spencer’s militant society or Bastiat’s, Carey’s and Schumpeter’s age of imperialist plunder). The modern era was to be pacific, because its keystone, industrial capitalism, was transnational.

These views, prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in England, the United States and France, did not go unchallenged. Writers like Gumplovicz, Ratzenhofer, Schmitt, Hintze, Mosca and Pareto stressed the continued vitality of militaristic currents in contemporary society. But several of them seemed actually to approve of militarism. And as, ironically, they all belonged to the defeated powers of the two world wars, their memory was largely suppressed. By and large the Anglo-Saxon and Gallic victors in the West preferred to forget their ideas. (1988: 126)

This text starts from the assumption of Mann (1988: 149), that today both approaches are unacceptable, as the pacifist approach overestimates the pacifying nature of modern developments, whereas the militarist approach exaggerates the all-importance of war. I want to denote the pacifist approach as the liberal (I’ll have a bit to say further on about the pacifism of Marxism). Liberalism is informed by a pacifist or deconflictualized concept of the political. It is in this context that one is to understand my claim of liberalism as an escape from the political; it is an escape from the political as conflictual. Mann defines militarism as “an attitude and a set of institutions which regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity” (1988: 124).

I want, initially, to define the conflictual view of the political as the idea that ‘conflict (and ultimately war) is a recurrent, permanent and deeply ambivalent social activity’. Ambivalent, because it acknowledges that conflict has a range of positive effects but it does not – or at least does not have to – succumb to a glorification of combat.

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4 In his *A History of Military Thought*, Azar Gatt emphasizes more strongly than Mann the intellectual climate from which militarism arose. He sees militarism as a counter-reaction to Enlightenment theories of war (e.g. 2001: 310).

5 Elsewhere he defines militarism quite differently as “the persistent use of organised military violence in pursuit of social goals” (1996: 224). This definition concerns militarism as a practice, the other as a doctrine.
Conflictuality has also invited positive receptions, for instance in some republican interpretations as a cure for corruption (McCormick 1993, 2001) or in historical sociology focusing on the constructive forces unleashed by conflict. As Charles Tilly (1985) famously said: “States made war, and war made states”. Lewis A. Coser wrote in his classic *The Functions of Social Conflict*: “To focus on the functional aspects of social conflict is not to deny that certain forms of conflict are indeed destructive of group unity or that they lead to disintegration of specific social structures. Such focusing serves, however, to correct a balance of analysis which has been tilted in the other direction” (1956: 8). At the same time as the pacifist and the militarist approaches are unacceptable (in their radical form), they are also inevitable and necessary (in the form I use them here). Because they constitute the main sources of political debate and contest. It is the claim that large parts of the history of political ideas can be read and understood through the prism depoliticization/repoliticization, where for instance liberals insist on depoliticization as the way to overcome violence, force, coercion and, in this view, also the political, whereas the different liberalism critiques insist on the permanence of force, coercion and violence as (and as well as) the political. In her book *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*, Bonnie Honig differentiates between two approaches to politics: A ‘virtue theory of politics’, which is a peace-perspective and a ‘virtù theory of politics’, which is a conflict perspective, and her description of the conflict perspective and its use covers very well my use of it here:

To affirm the perpetuity of conflict is not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of perpetual contest, even within an ordered setting, and to identify the affirmative dimensions of contestation. It is to see that the always imperfect closure of political space tends to engender remainders and that, if those remainders are not engaged, they may return to haunt and destabilize the very closures that deny their existence. It is to treat rights and law as a part of political contest rather than as the instruments of its closure. It is to see that attempts to shut down the agon perpetually fail, that the best (or worst) they do is to displace politics onto other sites and topics, where the struggle of identity and difference, resistance and closure, is then repeated. (1993: 15-16)

The liberalism critique of Chantal Mouffe is of the same nature and intent (1995a, 1999, 2005a). In this text I will from a liberal starting point allow an inspiration from the militarist approach, while trying to stay clear of the temptations of both approaches: The liberal temptation to ignore, downplay or dismiss violence and the militarist temptation to get fascinated by and even glorify violence and the battle. The critical part of the dissertation will focus on aspects of the shadow side of the liberal dream. Again I quote Joas: "However, this blunt rejection of violence was
accompanied by a certain tendency to underestimate its importance in the present. It allowed an optimistic gaze firmly fixed on the future to view the bad old world in its death-throes with impatience and without genuine interest.” (2003: 31). The problem with the optimistic gaze is its underestimation of the continued presence of violence and coercion. My main point of criticism will not be a conspiratorial debunking of liberalism which claims that liberalism wilfully hides its political and violent nature, but rather that the ‘blindness’ is inscribed in the particular liberal way of understanding the political and not least the international.

The Political. Attempt at Clarification

The main influence of this text is Schmitt’s concept of the political (1996a), contrasted to what he saw as the liberal escape from the political, which need no repetition here. I will instead suggest a few short points about elements in the conflictual view of the political to illustrate its difference to a liberal understanding. They are all contained within Schmitt’s concept of the political and should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with his work. But at the same time they are not dependent upon the totality of Schmitt’s work and certainly not on his errand. This text is not Schmittian in nature or intent; neither is it an exercise in Schmittology.

The political concerns the relationship between friends and enemies and is, subsequently, both a politics for the friends and one against the enemies, often referred to as domestic and foreign policy or citizens and non-citizens although neither friends nor enemies needn’t be confined to these respective positions. The political is public; it deals with and concerns the common. There is no such thing as private politics. Politics is what we do together with or against each other. The political is omnipresent; it is not about government or the state alone. It is not contained within a few demarcated practices and institutions but can arise wherever and from whatever that has the capacity to structure a situation in friends and enemies. The political is conflictual, since matters do not resolve themselves. The social is not spontaneously self-organizing, as liberals claim. The social as well as the political is characterized by dissent and disagreement before, during, and after a decision. The political praxis is the confrontation between differences, which is why compromise and deliberations is its most peaceful form and war or revolution its most violent. The political is very much about decisions or closures. As Allan Dreyer Hansen writes, a decision presupposes “that the situation or structure is not capable of exercising determination. A decision can only be made if there is somewhat of an open space, a distance to the structure that must be filled with something that the structure is not itself able to provide” (2003: 46). The situation or the structure is
not determining in itself. They cannot provide their own definition. It is the purpose of the political to provide an always only temporary and fragile closure of the political space; a temporary suspension of the conflictual – which is very rarely conceived as temporary (this is the anti-political aspect inherent also in politics as conflict). This, it should be added, is also the purpose of politics as technique in its various forms as institutionalization. The political has a strong element of coercion. In the conflictual background for the necessity of the political decision lies the coercion of the dissenting. A coercion that, in the final analysis, rests upon violence. The political is exclusionary. The decision always establishes a boundary between in and out, included and excluded. Contrary to the law’s claim of universality, the political is particularistic and it reveals law to be so as well. Pascal wrote: “A fine sort of justice that has a river for its boundary! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other” (quoted from Terray 2003: 77). The political is permanent. There is no resolution of the conflictual nature of the social and therefore no apolitical possibility. Finally, the political is creative. It makes what was not before. Žižek says:

… the political act (intervention) proper is not simply something that works well within the framework of existing relations, but something that changes the very framework that determines how things work … One can also put it in terms of the well-known definition of politics as the ‘art of the possible’: authentic politics is, rather the exact opposite, that is, the art of the impossible – it changes the very parameters of what is considered ‘possible’ in the existing constellation. (1999d: 199)

This text does not accept Žižek’s notions of ‘politics proper’ or ‘authentic politics’ when thought of as the exclusively proper or authentic expressions of the political. The conflictual view of the political is in this text merely one perspective on the world of politics. It is not to say that it is the only one or the correct view of the political as such. It helps illuminate certain things of importance to the subsequent analyses. Nothing else and nothing more. This text makes no claims of the conflictual nature of the political, nor does it – as Schmitt does – claim that the liberal conception of the political is mere escape from reality or a smoke screen for real politics. My approach tends to concur with E. H. Carr who in his fabulous and famous critique of utopianism (and realism) wrote: “Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place” (1964: 10). As he saw it then, and as I see it now, to achieve this balance demands a critique of ‘utopianism’.
Any political movement is (in its end goal) anti-political. Every political critique must be eminently political. The political struggle is about whose depoliticization that manages to establish itself as the normal and the given. Every political movement or philosophy has a strong tendency to portray itself as universal and given by the facts of society, human nature, economics, history etc. This I want to elaborate on with a dichotomy between ‘politics as technique’, which is an anti-political and depoliticizing category and ‘politics as conflict’, which is a political and politicizing category. ‘Politics as technique’ and ‘politics as conflict’ are here portrayed in their pure form, which seldom, if ever, is found in reality. They are idealizations, models for contrary trends, and they are only diametrical opposites in this play of concepts. They serve to highlight trends not to serve as enclosed objects to be discovered out there. Just like the pacifistic or militaristic point of view or the ‘rule of law state’ and the ‘power state’ rarely exist in pure form, so neither does these two forms of politics. They are first and foremost heuristic devices highlighting different aspects of the political.

Politics as technique is the instrument of the given order and operates in its liberal form (but there are also others) through rules, the differentiation between political and non-political issues, the administration of things etc. The endeavour of politics as technique is to replace the political confrontation and decision with technical automation. The worst that can happen within this register is the politicization of an issue: It pollutes and disturbs the ‘natural’ workings of things.

Politics as conflict is the critique of this order and not least of its self-legitimization as natural, neutral, in agreement with the societal and economic conditions, just, peaceful etc. Politics as conflict insists exactly on society’s continued conflictuality between classes, sexes, citizens and foreigners etc. It denies that the ‘walls of separation’ (Walzer 1984) are neutrally drawn, that they are only the most practical and efficient way to organize a complex modern society. Politics as conflict insists that the drawing of lines between state and society, the political and the non-political etc. are ideological rather than practical; it is conditional upon the relative strength of social actors rather than upon the logic of the given. The lines have been drawn with specific purposes and to further particular(istic) interests. Perhaps the most famous version of this is Marx’s critique of political economy but one finds it in many forms including Schmitt’s critique of liberalism.

Politics as technique is the operation of the settled order of things; politics as conflict is the disruption of order; the first is administration the latter is creation – maybe even creative destruction. This means that any incumbent power will have to use some form of politics as conflict to disrupt the existing order, the powers that be, whereas once in power it will have to use politics
as technique to secure both its agenda and the continued possession and legitimization of power.
Politics as technique is what makes the machine of society run; politics as conflict is the radical pressure through for example the movements of labour, women, civil rights, students, peace, the environment etc. that politicizes what was considered apolitical before. They force issues onto the political agenda and structure political oppositions on the basis of formerly held apolitical differences. They politicize what politics as technique then tries to re-depoliticize by bringing them within the existing order in a less radical form; this has given us for instance the representative democracy, universal suffrage and the welfare state. Another ‘classic’ depoliticization and pacification strategy is to take a particular demand with a particular content coming from a social or revolutionary movement, accommodating it, and thereby emptying the overall, disruptive and uncompromising demand (Žižek 1999d: 204). Politics as technique will always try to withstand the pressure and criticize politics as conflict for unnecessary polemics or disruption, that is, politicization – examples are the liberal critique of republicanism or populism (Riker 1982). This is also where we find some of the background for the critique of ‘demand overload’ and ‘crisis of democracy’, one of which had the saying subtitle ‘Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission’ (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki 1975, my italics).
Politics as technique ensures the necessary societal stability, whereas politics as conflict provides the necessary political energy that hinders the system from stagnating. At one extreme you have a system grown tired and oppressive; at the other you have war or civil war. Politics as technique hinders political, societal and cultural drive. Politics as conflict hinders a functioning society; it cannot be the foundation for a society. Even the permanent revolution settles down and institutionalizes itself, which is the exact moment when the next critique needs to establish itself. In his Conditions of Liberty, Ernst Gellner provides us with an example of both the liberal view of politics and with its critique of hyper-politicization. In a discussion of why the Soviet Union collapsed, Gellner remarks upon Marxism’s ‘over-sacralization of the immanent’. Marxism sacralized all aspects of social life, making even work a public and political task. The Soviet society was permanently politically mobilized. But, as Gellner says, man “need to relax in profanity”, “a profane bolthole into which to escape during periods of lukewarmness and diminished zeal” Man needs privacy. Man “cannot stand perpetual intoxication with the sacred”, meaning, in this case, the political (1994; 40). Man needs to leave the political, the exalted, the public. This is what liberalism promises. Lastly, Gellner also gives us a more funny example of the difference between a society, which has institutionalized itself and a constantly self-revolutionizing society: “You might say that
a real Civil Society is one which does not rechristen all its railway stations and boulevards and issue a new city plan each time the government changes” (1994: 136).

Politics as conflict is the unexpected, the sudden and possibly the violent. Politics as technique is the predictable, the planned and the peaceful. Politics as conflict is the particular and unique, the only here-and-now. Politics as technique is the universal, the repetitive, the then-and-now, where the specific is subordinated the general, the application of the established norm on the contingent. Politics as conflicts is commandeering and openly value-laden. Politics as technique is procedural and apparently neutral. Politics as conflict presupposes a volatile, unstable and unpredictable environment, whereas politics as technique presupposes one characterised by predictability, illumination and certainties. Politics as conflict is the art of improvisation, as politics as technique is the art of repetition; statesmanship, warrior politics and revolutionary activity vs. bureaucracy and administration. It’s the difference between politics as rational discourse versus politics as anything but rational discourse. They stand hostile towards each other: Politics as technique is dismissed as inauthentic and politics as conflict is condemned as immoral. Politics as conflict focuses on high politics, the great moments and the big decisions. Its paradigmatic space is the war room and its paradigmatic figure the statesman. Politics as technique focuses on everyday politics, the many minor moments and the accumulation of minor decisions. Its paradigmatic room is the office and its paradigmatic figure is the clerk.

A number of differentiations, political demarcations, exist that illustrates the two concepts of either stability or change, and which shows the political nature of their different names: priest vs. prophet, church vs. sect, believer vs. fundamentalist, faith vs. brain-washing is a religious-political act of demarcation excluding some religious expressions from the legitimate or true. In the world of violence we have soldier vs. rebel, policeman vs. robber, (interstate) war vs. revolution, law enforcement vs. terrorism, which aims to exclude certain non-state acts from the arsenal of legitimate expressions. The history of the state is very much the history of exclusion of unauthorized wielders of force, most notably the warlord and the pirate. These are all – as the difficulty of defining terrorism testifies to – highly political exclusions. They are hotly contested, as when rebel-groups try to be defined as soldiers or freedom fighters and their opponent tries to label them criminals or terrorists. The important thing, as Schmitt repeatedly stated, is who decides. Who decides the line of demarcation? Who succesfully names who? Naming is the ultimate political act because it determines how to deal with the one being named.
We can illustrate the difference between the two concepts of politics with Ulrich K. Preuss’s discussion of the difference between the radical-democratic model of politics, where the people retain their political sovereignty unbounded by institutions, rules or higher orders and the institutional model of politics that seeks stabilization through institutionalization. This is also the difference between the people as the constituting power (pouvoir constituent) and the order of the constitution as the constituent power (pouvoir constitue); “The very meaning of ‘constituent power’ is the transformation of the creative, unorganized, and untamed power of the revolution into the constituted powers of a particular political regime” (Preuss 1993: 640). The institutional model or politics as technique is about closure. The order springs from the constituent power or from politics as conflict but once successful the entire endeavour is to end, close, or pacify the order-giving force:

... institutionalist constitutions, largely sceptical and even suspicious of the very revolution from which they originate, determine the close and definite termination of the revolution, setting a clear-cut hiatus between revolutionary and normal politics. Institutionalist constitutions even tend to become hostile toward any attempt to reinvigorate the revolutionary spirit, since they provide regular social mechanisms which guarantee political outcomes that should have the same or even better effect than revolutionary politics without being as costly. (Preuss 1993: 643)

Apart from the constituting act we can also find this duality in another borderline case: The emergency. The emergency institution with its suspension of the law is a perfect illustration of what at first seems a break with (existing) order but what is actually a confirmation and continuation of it. One can, with inspiration from Benjamin, distinguish between two emergencies, a real and an unreal – or in Benjamin’s words between a law-making and a law-preserving violence (see Newman 2004: 572). The unreal emergency is the one codified in constitutions and law books (Rossiter 1948; Koch 1994: chap. 1; Agamben 2005: chap. 1). It aims to restore and return to the existing order. The real emergency is where return is no longer possible: “When a state institution proclaims a state of emergency, it does so by definition as part of a desperate strategy to avoid the true emergency and return to the ‘normal course of things’ … In short, reactionary proclamations of a state of emergency are in actuality a desperate defence against the real state of emergency” (Žižek 2002d; see also his 2004: 158). Here one could also mention Schmitt’s distinction between

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6 A number of ‘models’ exist within democratic theory which centres on the same difference between a mobilization or institutionalization of the polity, for instance protective and developmental democracy (Macpherson 1977; Held 1987) and more generally the difference between republicanism, populism and direct democracy on one side and liberal representative democracy on the other. These models have of course a deep connection with another set of differentiations that we’ll elaborate upon in the next chapter: negative and positive freedom (Berlin); politics of scepticism and politics of faith (Oakeshott); sceptics and crusaders (Canovan) and with what Giovanni Sartori (1987a: 87) calls politicos and perfectionists.
‘commissarial dictatorship’ and ‘sovereign dictatorship’. The commissarial dictatorship “suspends the constitution in order to protect the existence of the selfsame constitution”, whereas the sovereign dictatorship “sees in the entire existing order the thing it wants to overthrow ... It isn’t directed at the present constitution but rather at the coming” (1994a: 133, 134). The commissarial dictatorship represents the restrictive view of politics: It seeks to prevent change, to return to the status quo; whereas the sovereign dictatorship represents the expansive view of politics: it seeks change. The commissarial dictatorship exists to avoid the sovereign dictatorship, just as the purpose of pouvoir constitue is to leave and close the pouvoir constituent. According to Schmitt, liberals do not understand the expansive, order-creating force inherent in the sovereign dictatorship, which is a radicalization of the pouvoir constitue of Emmanuel Sieyès and the Enlightenment (Sieyès 1970; Breuer 1984; Cristi 1998b). They still cling to the instruments of the commissarial dictatorship, despite the fact that the year 1848 signalled the coming of a new, expansive, oppositional force, the organized proletariat, that breaks down old distinctions and instruments of socialization (Schmitt 1926a, 1996b). It is probably more correct to say, that liberals understand the sovereign dictatorship only too well. It’s their nightmare and therefore they cling to the restricted state of exception, the commissarial dictatorship, to avoid the real state of exception (Bobbio 1989; Arato 2000).

In his newest book, On populist reason, Ernesto Laclau tells of a letter from Perón to a leftist organization, Laclau belonged to, in which Péron said that any revolution goes through three stages: “first, the ideological preparation – that is, Lenin; second, the seizure of power – that is, Trotsky; third, the institutionalization of the revolution – that is, Stalin” (2005a: 214-5). We could continue the list and say next comes the ossification – that is, Andropov and others; then another phase of upheaval or preparation – that is, Gorbatjov; followed by a revolution – that is, Jeltsin; this cycle is completed by another institutionalization – that is, Putin. With the concepts of the next section any revolution, of whatever size, it could be ‘the feminist revolution’, ‘the green revolution’, the Russian revolution, the French, the American etc. goes from politicization – that is, contesting and challenging the powers, institutions and ideas that be (i.e. politics as conflict); to depoliticization – that is, decontesting and consolidating the wins through institutionalization (i.e. politics as

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7 The war on terror has triggered a lot of writing on anti-politics as security becomes the dominant discourse at the expense of others and as limitations of freedoms, publicity and debate becomes ever more strict. Kanishka Jayasuriya has summarized some of the anti-political consequences of the war on terror: “This emphasis on security is antipolitical for a variety of reasons: 1) It criminalizes social problems at both the domestic and transnational level, thereby obscuring the underlying relations of power and conflict that underpin a range of social phenomena; 2) It promotes, under the guise of border control, a highly exclusionary form of citizenship; and 3) It relocates power away from deliberative and representative assemblies in a wide range of social and economic areas.” (2002: 138-9). See also Neocleous 2000.
technique); to stagnation – that is, the total bureaucratization. The example of the Russian Revolution can be complemented by another 70-year ‘revolutionary rule’, namely that of Mexico’s dominant party in the twentieth century, the PRI. It started in 1929 as the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR). It quickly went from a revolutionary party, grounded in peasant and worker associations, to a conservative force and was in 1946 renamed as the Revolutionary Institutional Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) and became increasingly repressive, manipulative and, in the far-away corners of Mexico, violent. In elections held July 2, 2000, the PRI lost the presidency, ending 71 years of one-party rule. What is interesting, apart from the cycle of revolution-stagnation-revolution, is of course the ambition inherent in a name, which contains both ‘revolution’ and ‘institutionalization’. This is really an attempt to have your cake and eat it too and was (is) an attempt, like in the Soviet Union, to hide the institutionalist elite and system, the conservatism and the depoliticized ‘struggle’, behind a revolutionary appearance. One final, also Latin American, example, this time from Slavoj Žižek: “The specificity of the Cuban revolution is best expressed by the duality of Fidel and Che Guevara: Fidel, the actual Leader, supreme authority of the State, versus Che, the eternal revolutionary rebel who could not resign himself to just running a state” (2002a: 8, note 5). The institutionalist is never the popular one. It (Fidel) needs the appearance or symbol of revolution (Che) to hide a system grown repressive. Politics as technique lacks the aestheticism, the heroism, the struggle and the grandness of politics as conflict. Who wants to fight and die for a bureaucracy?

Liberalism is, given its institutional success, the prime (but not the only) example of a politics as technique. Liberalism can be described as the history of the institutionalization of the political; political power is codified, divided, and regulated; its boundaries are marked and its functions compartmentalized; it gets embedded in constitution, rule of law and parliament. The horror and violence of its genesis is forgotten (Thomson 1994; Preece 1998; Mann 1999; Neocleous 2003a). But, as Paul Hirst wrote: “To view the state as the settled orderly administration of a territory, concerned with the organization of its affairs according to law, is to see only the stabilized results of conflict” (1990: 109, my italics). The conflict perspective claims that politics as technique is parasitic or dependent upon politics as conflict; that a political decision has been made that replaces conflict with order. The institutionalization of that political decision is the necessary condition and framework for politics as technique. Only through the freezing of conflictuality, through the sovereign decision, through pouvoir constituant, can politics as technique function. So, the political conflict perspective claims a genesis or hierarchy between the two. What most liberalism critique
further claims in various forms is that there remains a residual element of the political decision in the practice and institutions of politics as technique. Foucault’s grand achievement was to highlight the coercion in the very machinery of politics as technique, just as Marx’s was to highlight the coercion operative and constitutive in the supposedly uncoercive capitalist economy, in the slogans of “Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham” (Marx 1988: 189). There is a continued repression (necessary in some critical narratives, abominable in others), a perpetual use of force embodied in the apparently peaceful and uncoerced. The conflict perspective claims that politics as technique cannot acknowledge neither its genesis in a constituting violence nor its continued dependence on an absent but potentially present sovereign violence.

This is all familiar from Schmitt’s *Politische Theologie*, where we see the failure of politics as technique in the liberal inability to understand or deal with the exception; we see the sovereign power of politics as conflict that creates *ex nihilo*; and we find the argument for the relationship between order and chaos; “There is no norm applicable on chaos. Order must be imposed before law and order has any meaning” (1934: 20). It is the job of politics as conflict to challenge this order. Schmitt writes tellingly: “In the exception, the force of the real life breaks through the façade of a mechanics that has ossified through repetition” (1934: 22). In the exceptional or revolutionary moment politics as conflict smashes a politics as technique that have stagnated through repetition - through its rule bounded administrative expansionism.

**II. Depoliticization/Repoliticization**

… designating the adversary as political and oneself as non-political (i.e., scientific, just, objective, neutral etc.) is in actuality a typical and unusually intense way of pursuing politics. (Schmitt 1996a: 21, note 2)

Here I want to examine depoliticization not just as removing some issues from the political agenda but as a strategy for *going beyond the political as such*. Repoliticization thus takes on a distinct form, which differs from its most common usage. It becomes the recognition of and emphasis on the conflictual nature of the political. In the following, I want to offer a perspective on politics that will inform the rest of the text. This is merely one perspective out of many possible ones. It comes with its built-in blind spots – not least a rather crude reduction of liberalism – but hopefully it helps to focus and illuminate the subsequent analyses. It is inspired by, but not dependent upon, Carl Schmitt, and it aims to make the concept of depoliticization more useful in political analysis.
When Politics is a Party

Today, depoliticization is commonly used as departypoliticization; as the move away from parliamentary politics. This is a watered down version of Schmitt’s concept; one could say informed by ‘secondary concepts of the political’ (Schmitt 1996a: 30). Politicization is also often used synonymous with partypoliticization (Sellin 1978: 861-3; Berger 1979; Bosanquet 1983: 14-24); as when the Danish MP, Birthe Rønn Hornbech (1997), complains ‘then it got political’, meaning then an otherwise rational decision process became tainted with party manoeuvres and backroom dealings. Politicization as ‘partying’ is, according to Andrew Gamble, the form of the political closest “to the everyday sense in which the term politics is used. Here, to be political is to take a side, to be partisan … Politics is all about manoeuvres, intrigues, conspiracies, cabals, lobbies, manipulation” (2000: 5). Adrian Leftwich and David Held define strategies of depoliticization as “strategies to have certain issues treated as if they were not a proper subject for politics” (1984: 144); Peter Burnham, in a study of New Labour, says that “depoliticisation as a governing strategy is the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making” (2001: 128); Philip Pettit in a study of the need to depoliticize aspects of democracy defines it as “reducing the hands-on power of the people’s elected representatives” (2004: 58); and in Politics in an Antipolitical Age, Geoff Mulgan firstly makes modern politics to ‘a recent phenomenon’, thereby making politics exclusively liberal-parliamentarian, and then says that the perhaps “most visible symptom of depoliticization is the absence of movements bringing people to the streets” (1994: 9). Although he says ‘streets’ and not parliament he actually means political mobilizing as participation in democratic politics. Depoliticization becomes de-democratization, which is a very common (and, of course, fully legitimate) usage of depoliticization.

One could say that these definitions are, as Schmitt calls them, ‘secondary concepts of the political’ derived from a competitive rather than conflictual view of the political. As politics has become party politics, through the parlamentarization of political conflictuality and through the exhaustion of revolutionary energies, so the concept of depoliticization has become departypoliticization. It is used to describe people’s lack of interest in politics and the falling membership in parties. It is being promoted as an instrument in the arsenal of good governance prescribed by international organisations; and this is also the way it is being understood by globalization-critical activists and the way for instance Pierre Bourdieu used it in his critique of Newliberalspeak (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1999, 2001). One can, as Bourdieu among others convincingly has, use that version of depoliticization in a critique of the existing globalization rhetoric.
The authors mentioned (with the possible exception of Pettit) are all perfectly aware of the political nature of depoliticization; it is “highly political” (Burnham 2001: 136); “There is, in fact, nothing more political” (Leftwich & Held 1984: 144). The problem for the present study is their overly or exclusively democratic or parliamentarian view of the political. It is a view conditioned on the liberal understanding of the political as being located in the state (even though Held would, with some justification, deny this); as being in fact able to depoliticize issues. To stress the point: their concept of depoliticization revolves around an understanding of the political as compartmentalized in the state and parliament. Depoliticization for them is the removal of issues from the ‘political sphere’. For them, depoliticization is destateification or deparliamentification. Repoliticization, then, is bringing issues back into the established political system without questioning the basic functions, rules or distinctions constitutive for and operative in the system.

**Schmitt on Depoliticization**

Schmitt never developed the concept of depoliticization systematically, nor did he – to my knowledge – provide us with a definition. Neither the Schmitt-reception have shown much interest in it. I’m not aware of any thorough study of the concept, its genesis, or its relation to Schmitt’s other concepts. The following will not fill that gap; it will only offer a few comments needed for the subsequent critique. The one place where Schmitt comes closest to an actual definition is in a speech to a group of business leaders in 1932, ‘Starker Staat und gesunde Wirtschaft’, where he writes that a process of depoliticization is “the segregation of the state from non-state spheres” (1995a: 77). This is obviously only a first step in a definition. It hints at a liberal conception of politics understood as separate from other spheres, as having its own sphere that may be enlarged or diminished. In the same speech, he enlarges on the meaning that depoliticization has in liberalism:

… the whole of Germany and the whole planet has echoed the call: *Away with politics!* The solution to all problems was said to be the elimination of politics and the elimination of the state. All matters should be decided by technical and economic experts according to allegedly purely objective, technical and economic points of view. (1995a: 73)

Schmitt notes that the fundamental misunderstanding of all depoliticization endeavours stem from a misunderstanding of the concept of depoliticization itself, since it most commonly refers to departypoliticization in the liberal parliamentarian sense. It thus denotes only an opposition to a certain kind of partypolitics (1996c: 110-111; see also 1994d: 159), which is what I exemplified above. Schmitt goes on to say that this kind of depoliticization utilizes ‘the false ideas of the 19.
century’, that is liberalism, in its assumption that it is possible to single out politics as a sphere separate from economy, religion, law etc. In his work, Schmitt uses a number of connected categories to describe the depoliticizing and/or the non-political. I will list a couple of them to set the tone: ‘scientific, just, objective, neutral’; ‘more juristic, more legal, more peaceful, less polemical’ (1996a: 21 & 31); “The spirit of neutrality uses the concepts of culture, progress, education [Bildung], unpolitical science” (1994e: 309); It is (1996c: 109):

… absolute depoliticization as absolute matter-of-factness … [Depoliticization is] if one tries to organize a system in which there is no longer any political decision, that is, only impartiality and professionalism, where things run themselves and the questions answer themselves … [Then] politics and governing becomes irrelevant and superfluous

This is how the self-proclaimed non-political actor understands himself and structures his environment. He recognizes a world of the political outside himself. His is a world apart defined in opposition to the political that is deemed particularistic, unjust, subjective, arbitrary, unscientific, bellicose etc. Depoliticization itself is inherently political. It is politics in apolitical disguise but politics nonetheless. Alain de Benoist is therefore right to argue that there is – at least in the conflictual understanding of the political – no such thing as depoliticization, since politics is a dimension of the social. The anti-political forces become political, as also Schmitt says. Benoist prefers to talk about ‘unacknowledged politics or politics operating in different guises’ (2002: 29). ‘Displacement of the political’ is probably the best term but I want to keep the concept of depoliticization because even if it doesn’t describe reality it covers very precisely the endeavour.

So, the stuff of politics is the clashes between politics as technique that uses depoliticization as strategy and legitimization and politics as conflict that uses repoliticization as weapon. One can perhaps, in continuation of Schmitt (1989: 44-51, 307-15; 1996c: 82), say that liberalism started as a repoliticizing critique of the absolutist or monarchic state but that its success made it loose its defining opposition, wherefore it took on a depoliticized self-image; it naturalized its own story and saw no longer any enemies (or rather, it saw no one it recognized as enemies in a horizontal sense, that is, that it recognized as ‘the other’ to be fought but respected). There are now only residual pockets of bellicose madmen with whom one cannot stand in a political relationship. One final illustration of my point: Schmitt criticized liberalism for a general tendency to depoliticize primarily the powers of the state. He was in turn criticised for depoliticization himself. Schmitt was

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8 In this very political text he equates a number of his ‘enemies’: “Depoliticization, neutralization, undecidedness, nihilism and finally Bolshevism” (1994e: 309).
criticized by Herbert Marcuse (1970) for hiding the political character of the economy and today Chantal Mouffe (1999: 49-51) and Slavoj Žižek (1999a: 29; 1999d: 241, note 21) criticize his version of the political for hiding internal conflictuality behind an emphasis on external conflictuality. This is the stuff of political critique. Where the left traditionally have been happy to let, for instance, abortion and immigration be depoliticized through the vocabularies of medicine, human rights and morality, the right has been equally happy to let private property and gender issues remain depoliticized through the vocabularies of privacy, biology and economy. 

*Repoliticization is politicization of your enemies’ depoliticizations.*

This also helps to explain what might be understood by the invocations of a ‘return to the political’, that for instance Jan-Werner Müller finds unclear (2003a: 10). It’s about opening the space of political contestation. But we also have to acknowledge the dangers in this primacy of the political that have so often degenerated into a glorification of violence, the exception, war, revolution etc. There is a constant temptation in liberalism critique to overemphasize or even celebrate the violent nature of politics – as Joseph de Maistre did in the Parisian Enlightenment, as Ernst Jünger did in Weimar-Germany, and as one might say Slavoj Žižek does in Brussels-Europe and Jean Baudrillard does in the Washington-empire. We have to agree with Agnes Heller when she says: “This obsession with the exclusively political, as well as the disregard for ‘mere daily practices’ is a typical problematic feature of the radical branch of political philosophy” (1991: 336). If liberalism or politics as technique is constantly in danger of degenerating into pure soulless automatics, then liberalism critique or politics as conflict is in similar danger of degenerating into what Habermas calls “celebration of aestheticized power, haloed greatness, and political charisma” (Habermas & Haller 1994: 21-22). Schmitt balanced precariously on this line.

**Repoliticization as Critique**

Kari Palonen is right to stress that “Politicization thus refers to the act of *naming* something as political, including the controversies surrounding the acceptance of this naming. There is no politics ‘before’ politicization” (2003: 182). Depoliticization is an attempt “to end the inevitable contention over concepts by *decontesting* them, by removing their meaning from contest” (Freeden 2003: 54). Repoliticization is an attempt to re-problematize issues and concepts. As already indicated above, I see repoliticization as a critique strategy more than anything else. Armed with politics as conflict, one can repoliticize and criticize depoliticization manoeuvres. Politicization is about naming something as political. Repoliticization is about insisting on the political nature of the supposedly
depoliticized or non-political. As should be clear by now the political struggle is structured around competing attempts at depoliticization and repoliticization. Where Schmitt tend to limit depoliticization to liberalism, I want to argue that it is an inherent element of the political struggle that all sides participate in:

… there are actually two fundamental and opposed forms or aspects of politics: one depoliticizing, the other repoliticizing. For one can only carry out one’s own particular depoliticizing project (the realization of one’s philosophy, one’s image of the Good), in the face of one’s enemies/competitors, by repoliticizing (that is, making an object of dispute) those things that your opponents have depoliticized (that is, socialized or naturalized) … Politics is thus constituted through an essential tension between depoliticizing and repoliticizing tendencies, each of which, paradoxically, is equally ‘political’. (Osborne 2000)

We can distinguish between two forms of depoliticization: A self-depoliticization, which aims at portraying oneself as non-political, as above politics, ‘scientific, just, objective, neutral etc.’ and an other-depoliticization, which aims at denying political status to some outsider. The other-depoliticization most often uses a quite different vocabulary than the self-depoliticization: The depoliticized other is often portrayed in juristic, moral or psychological terms as criminal, psychopath, ‘beyond the reach of reason’ or otherwise deviant. The other is moved from a political to a non-political vocabulary and from a political methodology to a non-political one (medical, psychiatric, humanitarian, law enforcement). In liberalism, the enemy is displaced to the economic competitor, the debating partner in parliament but also to the criminal or the insane and to the helpless and dependent victim. What they have in common is a denial of their political status. Depoliticization of a political opponent is all about disacknowledging a person’s political status. A somewhat banal but very typical example is the editor of the major Danish newspaper Weekendavisen, Anne Knudsen, who said about the globalization-critical activists that their use of violence “should be seen as an expressive phenomenon rather than a communicative one. It is driven by the urge to express itself not to make itself understandable” (July, 27, 2001; see also Fridolfsson 2004). They are dismissed as ‘riot tourists’, ‘youngsters’, etc., which deprive their protest of political meaning; they are an expressive or aesthetical phenomenon not a political. Another ‘case’ could be the tendency to make leaders like Hitler pathological madmen which, as Costas Constantinou very precisely says, “prevents any serious consideration of the normality of the state in whose name racist and aggressive policies were pathologically pursued” (2004: 23). It exactly hides the normality of racism and aggressiveness within and by states as such.
The prime example of this is, when the liberal West turns against one of its former allies who suddenly goes from being a political equal acknowledged through diplomacy to a criminal (Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Noriega). By re-describing them in depoliticized terms the conditions of engagement are changed; “criminalisation translates the deeply contested history and politics of it into the reified nature of criminality and of the criminal” (Dillon 1998: 560). The different register entails different methods which is the exact point where humanitarian war emerges. As Michael Dillon argues about the international attempts to criminalize social and political violence:

Since not all violence is classified as criminal, however, when certain acts are so classified one has to ask about the occasion of that judgement rather than submit to the forceful (denaturalisation) of violence to which the act of criminalisation resorts. Why this violence rather than that? … It [international law] consequently displays recurrent patterns of argument that constantly allow politics back in while heaping odium upon the enterprise of politics as such … In sum, to ask about the concatenation of forces and circumstances that lead to some acts receiving the qualification criminal is not to elide the question of individual answerability, but to locate it back within the context of power from which it arises in the first place. (1998: 563)

This is the kind of depoliticizations, we’ll uncover in the chapters on globalization, liberal globalism and cosmopolitanism (chapters 6-8) and which have profound consequences for the changes in the global system, in the new wars (civil ethno-nationalist war, humanitarian war and the war on terror) and in liberal self-descriptions.

**III. Summing up: ‘A Definitively Pacified Globe’**

A world in which there is no possibility of such a [real] fight would be a definitively pacified globe. It would be a world without any distinction between friend and enemy and, therefore, a world without politics. (Schmitt 1996a: 35)

Depoliticization cannot recognize limits to itself. Each limit questions the depoliticization already instituted. It hints at the possibility of enmity or alternative – and thereby puts the whole of the depoliticized in question. For liberalism, the foremost limit to depoliticization has always been the state and most notably the nation state in its Weberian sense. Taken to its outermost conclusion contemporary liberal globalism aims at a post-political globe. The obstacle, the barrier for universal depoliticization and eternal pacification, is thought to be the nation state:
For many people the idea of global organization means nothing else than the utopian idea of total depoliticization. Demands are therefore made, almost always indiscriminately, that all states on earth become members as soon as possible and that it be ‘universal’. Universality at any price would necessarily have to mean total depoliticization and with it, particularly, the non-existence of states. (Schmitt 1996a: 56)

I stated earlier that any political movement is (in its end goal) anti-political and that every political critique must be eminently political. This calls for a short explanation. My claim is that every political movement seeks to universalize and decontest their programme. At some level everyone wants to eternalize their politics. Trotsky’s idea of permanent revolution or Mao’s of uninterrupted revolution show an awareness of the dangers of any revolution to ossify and bureaucratize the revolutionary energies. Everyday life returns inevitably, routine becomes endemic. In the words of Agamben, the successful revolutionary party “tends to appear as a duplicate of the State structure” (1998: 42), thereby transforming the constituting power into manageable forms. William Rasch asks very pointedly: “Does not the successful revolution … also represent the successful elimination of politics?” (2004: 65). Once successful further contestation is repressed; the bureaucrats of revolution takes over. Marx’s work can be said to contain two notions of the political. One that interprets history as struggle; conflict is a fundamental and inescapable feature of social reality. Class war is the driving force of history. Conflict is in history. Then there is another notion of the political, the post-historical and anti-political, which comes to the fore after the successful revolution. Here is harmony, no repression, no state nor conflict. The communist society is the fully developed liberal society; it’s the idea of spontaneous self-organization brought to its conclusion. It’s a society beyond history and politics.

Hobbes is often presented as the political philosopher per excellence but there’s an equally strong anti-political motive in his work. Hobbes starts out with a conception of man as a political animal but once the state of society is instituted, the ‘citizens’ are supposed to be only private. There is no longer any public side to the ‘citizens’. As Gershon Weiler (1997: 44) says: “That there ought to be no free discussion of matters politic is one of the cornerstones of Hobbesian antipolitics” (see also Hanson 1984: 345). Although Weiler supposes a liberal-democratic conception of politics it also covers a more conflictual one. Hobbes outlaws public conflictuality in all its forms. This goes to show that liberalism does not monopolize the use of depoliticization or politics as technique. But it has been the doctrine most closely committed to depoliticization.
The critique of depoliticization reminds us to pay close attention to the use of words, to legitimization strategies and discourses in politics – as evidenced in Schmitt’s discussion of the very political difference between the word ‘tribute’ and ‘reparations’ in the German debate on its payments to France after WW1 (1996a: 31, note 12). Words are politically charged even when, or rather especially when, they present themselves as non-political. And they have direct political consequences. It’s all important what one is called in the world of politics. Naming is the first game of politics. It determines if you’re taken seriously as an equal, opponent or friend or disregarded, acted upon, exterminated even. As James Aho says:

… defamatory words rarely, if ever, simply describe things; they also rhetorically ‘accomplish’ them. And what they accomplish is a victim, an evil-doer, ready for violation. In short, the child’s ditty – ‘Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me’ – is patently untrue. Defamatory language prepares audiences cognitively and emotionally to take up sticks and stones. (1990: 20)

My aim is to discuss the use of depoliticization as a ‘defamatory practice’ in the field of international politics. I want to argue an apparently contradictory claim: That depoliticization can be a revolutionary instrument – although it consistently presents itself as the opposite. Depoliticization is not reducible to a reaction against politicizations. Depoliticization revolutionized the pre-liberal world through seemingly anti-revolutionary means. What I aim to show is that contemporary liberal globalist depoliticization is in the midst of a parallel revolutionary depoliticization. What liberal globalist depoliticization aims at is the global denial of an outside. There is no longer to be any legitimate position outside the liberal order. The denial of the enemy is the denial of the legitimate outside and other. I want to trace the re-appearance of the enemy in its ‘non-political’ forms and to trace the return of the political in anti-politics. The ‘barbarian’ in its various forms is the non-political enemy, the enemy not recognized as being within the same horizon as us. This opens for a wholly different arsenal of engagement.

Depoliticization is basically about denying the existence of the political enemy. That, however, does not make a world of friends. Denying political enmity tend to make enemies appear in other ‘perverted’ forms. The same goes for the political and sovereignty. Once denied, they re-appear in other guises. What happens once the political enemy is depoliticized, that is, brought from a political to a non-political register? The thesis is, that the denial of political enmity tends to turn states, even liberal states, into what Giorgio Agamben calls ‘killing machines’ (2005: 86).
There is much truth to the claim that the Counter-Enlightenment invented the Enlightenment. (McMahon 2001: 32)

When Jesus in a story in Dostojevskij’s *The Brothers Karamasov* returns to earth to spread the message of freedom, he is jailed by the grand inquisitor, who says to him: “You gave the human spirit the free choice between good and evil … a boundless confusion and new torments were your entire heritage. … There exist only three powers that can subdue the souls of these feeble rebels and give their conscience peace: *the wonder, the mystery, and the authority*” (Dostojevskij 1968: 254).

In a discussion of the misanthropy of the Spanish Catholic reactionary, Juan Donoso Cortés, Carl Schmitt writes that he has “the self-conscious grandeur of a spiritual ancestor of the grand inquisitor” (Schmitt 1934: 74). The self-conscious grandeur, that Schmitt admires in the grand inquisitor, in Cortés and in the Counter-Enlightenment more generally, is the courage to theoretically and practically take on the leadership of a mankind that cannot lead itself. It is fundamentally a critique of liberal theories of the independent individual, of sub-state self-organization, in favour of a reassertion of defining differences. Schmitt’s fight is with a liberalism, which in his mind will not and cannot exercise political leadership. The reason is a lack of foundation, a last principle, a deep conviction that can function as the source of political action and direction. Liberalism lacks a foundation on which to decide; one could say that liberalism, and modernity more generally, lacks a political theology, understood as absolute principles for understanding and action in the world.

In this chapter, I want first to discuss a powerful, influential but academically neglected school of thought, the Counter-Enlightenment. Darrin McMahon writes: “the light of the *siècle des lumières* did not somehow miraculously shine forth from a historical black hole. It was refracted, turned, deflected at every juncture” (2001: 12). Arguments stemming from this period have directly, or more often indirectly, influenced all subsequent critiques of modernity and liberalism – even in those who see themselves as political opposites to the Counter-Enlightenment. And even those who view themselves as heirs to the Enlightenment are deeply influenced by the portrayal of the Enlightenment that the Counter-Enlightenment constructed. This is evident in the ‘counter-enlightenment liberalism’ (Garrard 1997) of for instance Isaiah Berlin and John Gray, who portray the Enlightenment as a monolithic and narrow-minded defence of reason and reason alone; or in the
connection between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution and subsequently the Terror; and finally in the idea that the Enlightenment wanted and believed in the total re-organization of society and man on the basis of reason and science. Counter-enlightenment liberalism is the theme of the second part of the chapter. The critique of these notions is not my intention in the following – although they ought to be questioned more than they are at present. I want instead to introduce the Counter-Enlightenment as the most radical and contrary critique of liberal modernity and more specifically of the idea of spontaneous self-organization. The core of their critique is that man and society is not self-reliant; that man cannot lead himself; that he cannot understand or shape the world without strong guidance; and that strong, coercive politics is, therefore, needed.

I. The Counter-Enlightenment

The dispute comes down to this: the religious side believes that only if humans get down on their knees can they save themselves from their own destructiveness; a humanist believes that they will do so only if they stand up on their own two feet. (Ignatieff 2003a: 85)

The modern is associated with a strong sense of loss and Edmund Burke was one of the most eloquent and precise conservative diagnostics of this sense of loss, when he wrote in Reflections on the Revolution in France from 1790: “But the age of chivalry is gone. – That of sophisters, oeconomists, and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever” (1969: 170). In this, as Burke calls it, “barbaric philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings” (1969: 170), all differences and ranks are dissolved in a manic pursuit of equality. He gives his revulsion an astonishing literary expression that even anticipates anti-Darwinism: “On this scheme of things, a king is but a man; a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal; and an animal not of the highest order” (1969: 170). Enlightenment philosophy reduces men and women to beasts, absolves all differences of status and sex, lowers mankind to the animal state, breaks all social, moral and political bonds and isolates the individual from all that makes him who he is – family, church, country, station in life etc.

At the core of the Counter-Enlightenment we find an outrage over and a rebellion against the disappearance of defining differences9 and a sense of drift. One of the main problems with the Enlightenment, in this perspective, is that it leaves mankind with no means of orientation. The

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9 For later versions who connect the loss of defining differences with mass society see for example Ortega y Gasset 1932; Struve 1973; Sloterdijk 2002.
critique of tradition and prejudice makes it impossible to situate oneself in the world. Burke writes: “Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, sceptical, puzzled, and unresolved” (1969: 183). A connected theme is, therefore, the role of coercion and pre-rational beliefs. What the Enlightenment philosophers saw as obstacles and residual immaturity, the Counter-Enlightenment saw as indispensable sources of socialization, societal cohesion and individual tranquillity of heart and mind. Prejudice, non-rational beliefs but also coercion and force is necessary for the sociability of man. As we’ll see in the next section, Maistre gives it the shape of the executioner and the complete irrationality of king and family.

The concept of Counter-Enlightenment itself is taken from Isaiah Berlin (1973) and he defines it as “a resistance to attempts at a rational reorganisation of society in the name of universal moral and intellectual ideals” (1979a: 14). In the following, I’ll use Counter-Enlightenment and counter-modernity interchangeably. Its genesis can be said to be opposition to the ideas of 1789 (Nisbet 1967: 13; 1974: 407-18), although its main principles was formulated before the French Revolution. As Darrin McMahon very correctly says “their sense of anxiety arose first and foremost from the secular thrust of the Enlightenment, from its alleged, unmitigated attack on religion. Other concerns – civil, political, and economic – flowed from this basic preoccupation” (2001: 196-7). He has also stated part of the interest of this text in the reactionary thought of the Counter-Enlightenment. They “raised concerns that continue to be our own, dramatizing from the start the cultural costs of disenchantment and laying bare the state of a world in which no appeal could be made to higher sources (religious, political, or moral)” (2001: 14) and further:

For all their exaggeration, hatred, and hostility, enemies of the Enlightenment captured something essential about the modern world, intuited early on that the secularization of society and the desacralization of government would have profound and lasting consequences. In this, whatever their other shortcomings, they were right. It was their ability to play on this realization – to dramatize the cultural costs of disenchantment – that gave their vision sustenance and power. (2001: 197)

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10 See Jerry Z Muller who criticizes the ‘false dichotomy of conservatism and Enlightenment’ (1997: 5, see also 24-5) and who dismisses the notion of conservatism as an oppositional reaction to the Enlightenment. My argument is that there were conservative currents and positions in the Enlightenment but that the Enlightenment’s main direction was liberal and that the main opposition was at first conservative. Samuel Huntington is right to argue that conservatism is a positional ideology and that men “are driven to conservatism by the shock of events, by the horrible feeling that a society or institution which they have approved or taken for granted and with which they have been intimately connected may suddenly cease to exist” (1957: 470; see also Girvin 1988: 2; O’Brien 1988; Steiner 1988). The Enlightenment and 1789 was such a shock.
Any self-conscious enlightenment must take its most formidable critics seriously. Especially, when they articulate concerns, resentments and dissatisfactions which have been with us from – if I may call it that – modernity’s start. They articulate the costs of modernity. The task is to learn the insights of the Counter-Enlightenment without succumbing to its prescriptive program. In this there is a great distance between loyal opposition – enlightenment critique – and then counter-enlightenment. The loyal critique uses enlightenment ideals to criticize their hitherto inadequate formulation and implementation. The counter-enlightenment critique wants all its ideals and institutions replaced with some entirely different.

The concrete presentation is inspired by the division of the Counter-Enlightenment into three distinct generations each opposing a specific revolution, as outlined by Jeffrey P. Johnson (2000: 1-2).\(^{11}\) The first generation emerged as a response to the Enlightenment and not least the French revolution. Here we find for instance Edmund Burke, Louis Bonald\(^{12}\) and Joseph de Maistre. The second generation came as a result of 1848 and the bourgeois revolutions and here we have among others Juan Donoso Cortés. The third generation arose after 1917 and the Russian revolution and includes Carl Schmitt and the German radical conservatism. It may be appropriate to adjust Johnson’s theory concerning the third generation a bit, since it can be argued that, at least for the Germans, it was rather the liberal-constitutional revolution in 1918 and the Weimar-constitution that was the opposing other of Schmitt and the German radical conservatives.\(^{13}\) Thereby we also get a three-stage opposition between anti-liberals on one side and a continuous embedding of the liberal project on the other. An opposition essential for the understanding of Schmitt’s critique of both liberalism and the Counter-Enlightenment.

With each generation, modernity and its institutions penetrate still deeper into the social and the political. And with each generation of counter-enlightenment thinkers a bit more ground is given to modernity. Modernity becomes increasingly difficult to withstand; arguments and legitimizations borrow each time a bit more from its enemy. The theological in their political theology becomes ever thinner, until it’s just an idea or inspiration; a picture of something else and not the explanation in and for itself. Secularization continues to be identified as the root cause of the misery, but with

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\(^{11}\) For a different division see Albert O. Hirschman (1991: 4-6) who – drawing on Marshall’s work on the development of rights - distinguishes between three reactionary phases: the first in response to the French Revolution and the assertion of equality before the law and of civil rights in general; the second wave in reaction to universal suffrage; and the third in opposition to the welfare state.

\(^{12}\) I will not discuss Louis Bonald here but see Reedy 1983, 1995; Müller 1997: 123-133.

\(^{13}\) Schmitt’s connection or lack of such to radical conservatism or the conservative revolution is controversial and will not be discussed here (Wolin 1992; Dupeux 1993; Breuer 1993; Dahl 1995, 1999; Holm 1998). It does seem most correct not to include Schmitt in this group (Klemperer 1957; Woods 1996) without succumbing to Joseph Bendersky’s (1983, 1987a) apologetic denial of any affinities or connections.
and from Cortés a re-theologization becomes problematic, as secularization has gained a momentum that makes it irreversible. This is the exact problematic, Schmitt struggled with. The religious gives way to the political; in the words of Cortés and Schmitt, the religious dictatorship is replaced with the political dictatorship.

Pierre-André Taguieff (1997: 159-160) lists four principles of the anti-modern argument which, with the possible exception or at least qualification of the fourth, I take to be a valid description of the core principles of the counter-enlightenment critique: 1) the modern world is in itself a process of decadence; 2) decadence is a loss of sublime values, the disappearance of absolute norms which means that no authority can establish itself and that no hierarchy can be respected; 3) decadence manifests itself through and is accelerated by the discussability of all principles and self-evident truths which further dissolves all order and authority; 4) the modern process of decadence is irreversible and has an unstoppable direction against the ultimate decadence, the total anarchy and the great collapse. The modern is characterized by the mixture of opposites from the most coarse to the most delicate and by a monstrous ability to assimilate contrasts. It incorporates and digests everything and is principally characterized by its inability to differentiate. The modern is lukewarm, plain and out-smoothing. Taguieff writes: “Modernity erects the in-between and the ’neither this nor that,’ the neutral and the mixed, the at-home-nowhere and the at-home-everywhere, the nomad and the cosmopolitan as normative types” (1997: 162).

First Generation: Joseph de Maistre

Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) was one of the first, most important and most uncompromising critics of the Enlightenment.14 His starting point was the French Revolution and its inherent struggle between Christianity and what he termed philosophism (Maistre 1974: 85):

… in every century, the world’s greatest scourge has always been what is called Philosophy, for Philosophy is nothing but human reason acting alone, and human reason reduced to its own resources is nothing but a brute, all of whose power is restricted to destruction. (1996: 76)

Christianity stands for order, authority, stability, tradition and institutions. Philosophism or Enlightenment philosophy stands for subversion, disorder, anarchy, revolution, terror etc. He writes: “If there is anything evident for man, it is the existence in the universe of two opposing forces,

14 Of the not much academically noticed Counter-Enlightenment, Maistre is one of the fairly well discussed, see Brandes 1900; Greifer 1961; Nolte 1963; Lebrun 1972; Berlin 1990a, 2002; Holmes 1993; Garrard 1994; Bradley 1999.
which are in continual conflict” (1977: 114). This obsession with dichotomization of the world is also present in Cortés and Schmitt (i.e. friend/enemy, normal/exception). Here it only needs to be said that it, of course, has a close linkage to the dismissal of modernity’s equally strong obsession with mixture and blurring of differentiations (to which we’ll return). The Enlightenment is understood as a rebellion against God, which is also why Maistre says that the French revolution has a satanic quality that separates it from all hitherto known revolutions; “though impious men have always existed, there never was, before the eighteenth century, in the heart of Christianity, an insurrection against God” (1977: 161).15 Philosophic and scientific rationality is, according to Maistre, ‘an essentially disruptive force’ (1974: 80). Enlightenment philosophy is theophobia (1965b: 235). The Enlightenment is not a rebellion against a specific king, government or authority, but against government and authority as such. It is motivated by a hatred to all and everyone that demands obedience: “every government, and all the establishments of Europe, were offensive to it, because they were Christian; and in proportion as they were Christian” (1977: 169). In opposition to the reform craze of the Enlightenment Maistre advocates a reflection on the weakness and limitedness of man. It is presumptuous of man, who cannot even create an insect or a piece of moss, to think that he can be the origin of sovereignty, this most important and holy of moral and political principles. Especially, when there are several and indisputable evidences that the sovereign governs by the grace of God. Man’s approval or disapproval has no place where and when God has spoken:

Human reason reduced to its own resources is perfectly worthless, not only for creating but also for preserving any political or religious association, because it only produces disputes, and, to conduct himself well, man needs not problems but beliefs. His cradle should be surrounded by dogmas, and when his reason is awakened, it should find all his opinions ready-made, at least all those relating to his conduct. Nothing is so important to him as prejudices. Let us not take this word in a bad sense. It does not necessarily mean false ideas, but only, in the strict sense of the word, opinions adopted before examination … All known nations have been happy and powerful to the extent that they have more faithfully obeyed this national reason, which is nothing other than the annihilation of individual dogmas, and the absolute and general reign of national dogmas, that is to say, of useful prejudices. Let each man call upon his individual reason in the matter of religion, and immediately you will see the birth of anarchy of belief or the annihilation of religious sovereignty. Likewise, if each man makes himself judge of the principles of government, you will at once see the birth of civil anarchy or the annihilation of political sovereignty. Government is a true religion: it has its dogmas, its mysteries, and its ministers. To annihilate it or submit it to the discussion of each individual is the same thing; it lives only through national reason that is to say through political faith, which is a creed. (Maistre 1996: 87-8)

15 Later, Cortés would say: “The English revolution was a terrible accident in the life of a people, but the French revolution is a new era in the annals of humanity” (1991: 17).
Man is, in the words of Maistre, “too wicked to be free” (1965a: 144); and, therefore, he has to be governed by entities beyond change, dispute and reach. Nature, history and Christianity teach that man needs chains and supervision. It also shows that nothing good or lasting can come from man: Government is not dependent upon man and the social state is not chosen or founded but found. Mankind itself is too weak and imperfect to create durable institutions. It is “as a mathematical proposition that no great institution results from deliberation” (1974: 103). Maistre reserves a special sarcasm to those who think that constitutions are something man can make and remake. Man is so feeble that it shouldn’t deceive itself into thinking that it can improve existing institutions or constitutions. Therefore, Maistre warns against innovations based on simple human theories. Man gives himself nothing, he receives everything.

Maistre advocates faith as the glue of society and the legitimization of political power. Without faith, all existing institutions and practices will collapse. This is why the Enlightenment and the French revolution is first and foremost a rebellion against God. Faith must be destroyed before the king can be toppled. The destiny of king and altar is united. It is the divine origin of the throne, which guarantees its legitimacy. Remove that and the king will be forced to justify his existence and actions by utilitarian arguments. This would be the utmost debasement and the total degradation of the sublime. Who will obey a sovereign they can criticize and even dethrone? Who will obey a law they can change? Only an unquestionable authority can command obedience. Maistre says: "One can say quite briefly: kings order you and you must march” (quoted from Berlin 1990a: 129). Authority is absolute when there is no room for questioning. And it’s omnipotent, when there is no way legitimately to oppose it. The ruler is not infallible because he cannot err, but because he cannot be accused of erring. When a decision is made, discussion ends. This is the source of the dogma of the pope’s infallibility, which Maistre extends to the temporal power as well:

*Infallibility* in the spiritual order and sovereignty in the temporal order are two completely synonymous words. Both give voice to that higher power which rules over all other powers, from which they derive, which governs and is not governed, which judges and is not judged … For every government is absolute, and the moment it can be resisted under the pretext of error or injustice, it no longer exists … View it as you will, give this high judicial power whatever name you like, there must always be within it one person to whom it cannot be said, *You have erred.* (1965a: 131-2)

This conception of absolute rule depends upon a notion we’ll encounter again in Schmitt and which Stefan Breuer has given the name ‘the illusion of politics’: “the conviction that this authority [from above] must be conceived of as a sovereign subject, as caesaristic leader, as party of the new type”
(1982: 77); the illusory idea that what is needed and possible is benign rulers against whom the people then needs no safeguards (Maistre 1996: 39). But as Raymond Tallis coolly remarks: “to conclude from the presumed original sinfulness of mankind that power in society should be deposited in an unaccountable elite, in leaders of great wisdom and strong will, seems at best naïve in the extreme and at worst self-contradictory” (1997: 17).

Maistre had a keen eye for the development of the dream of a modernity without violence. So, as a long line of counter-modern thinkers and doers, he revelled in violence, war and slaughter. This should, I think, first and foremost be seen as a method of critique. When he says: “Unhappily, history proves that war is, in a certain sense, the habitual state of mankind, which is to say that human blood must flow without interruption somewhere or other on the globe, and that for every nation, peace is only a respite” (1974: 51, see also 1965a: 245-258); when he then proceeds to list wars and massacres, then it is a counter-image to Enlightenment beliefs in perpetual peace rather than a sadistic love of violence. It is the unintelligibility of war from a rationalist point of view, which makes it so important for Maistre and his followers to explore, recount and sometimes celebrate (Neocleous 2005). He ponders the mystery that the soldier, who kills innocents, is everywhere honoured and admired, whereas the executioner, who kills the guilty, is everywhere despised (1965a: 246-7). He highlights the irrational admiration we have for the soldier: “Explain why the right innocently to spill innocent blood is regarded as most honorable by the whole of humanity” (1965a: 248). There is no rational or enlightened reason. It can only be explained by the wretched character of man. Man, by his very nature, resists pacification. He wants battle and the slaughter of innocents; he needs the continual shedding of blood:

… when the human soul has lost its strength through laziness, incredulity, and the gangrenous vices that follow an excess of civilization, it can be retempered only in blood … Now the real fruits of human nature – the arts, sciences, great enterprises, lofty conceptions, manly virtues – are due especially to the state of war … blood is the manure of the plant we call genius. (1974: 60)

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16 As Popper teaches, this is the exact opposite approach to the problem of political power than the liberal one who always prepares for the worst kind of ruler: “It is clear that once the question ‘Who should rule?’ is asked, it is hard to avoid some such reply as ‘the best’ or ‘the wisest’.” Instead we must ask: “whether we should not prepare for the worst leaders, and hope for the best. But this leads to a new approach to the problem of politics, for it forces us to replace the question: Who should rule? by the new question: How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?” (1962a: 120-1). Hence the rule of law; or, in the words of Schmitt, hence the shift from sovereign politics to rule-based anti-politics.
His most famous image of the necessity of violence is that of the executioner (Berlin 1990a: 116-119; Holmes 1993a: 27-33). In a gruesome description, he portrays the executioner as the horrible necessity of sociability. He exists contrary to reason, “for reason cannot discern in human nature any motive which could lead men to this calling” (1965a: 191). He is despised and friendless; Maistre portrays him beast-like. He finds joy and pride in saying: “No one can break men on the wheel better than I” (1965a: 192). This is a man and an occupation contrary to enlightenment and reason:

And yet all grandeur, all power, all subordination rests on the executioner: he is the horror and the bond of human association. Remove this incomprehensible agent from the world, and at that very moment order gives way to chaos, thrones topple, and society disappears. (1965a: 192)

The executioner marks the limit of the modernist vision. He is the symbol of its self-delusions, as the emergency becomes for Schmitt. In them is revealed the true and unalterable nature of the social. As Holmes writes, paraphrasing Maistre (but equally true of Schmitt):

Liberals need punitive institutions as much as anyone, but they cannot even discuss physical punishment frankly. Assuming the total transparency or intelligibility of the world, secular humanism desensitizes them to the astonishing and cryptic realities that lie before their eyes – to the fact that the ultimate guarantor of civilized coexistence, the executioner, makes them want to vomit, for example. To reawaken a sense of the indecipherable mystery of society, banished prematurely by the sunny and superficial Enlightenment, Maistre dwells obsessively on the incomprehensibility of the executioner, on the inscrutability of war. (1993a: 30)

Maistre watches with horror as secularism and individualism spreads across Europe and he concludes: “Wills must be either purified or enslaved” (1965a: 146). He lists two possibilities, slavery or true religion. He preferred, and still thought possible, the second and religious option:

Government alone cannot govern. This maxim will appear the more uncontestable, the more it is thought about. Government therefore needs, as an indispensable agent, either slavery, which diminishes the number of effective wills within the state, or divine power, which by a kind of spiritual graft destroys the natural harshness of these wills and enables them to act together without harming each other. (1965a: 145)

What he actually advocated was a union of throne and altar: “Great political institutions achieve perfection and durability in proportion to the closeness of the union of politics and religion within
them” (1996: 79). Despite his harsh criticism of secularism and philosophism, he did not comprehend their depth or irreversibility. In this first generation of Counter-Enlightenment, a principle is formulated, that will structure large part of the argumentation of the subsequent generations: The principle that the onslaught on political power is conditioned upon or equal to the rebellion against religious power; and that religion continues to determine and inform the political despite the efforts to eradicate it. A political theology is formulated as a reaction to the attempts at secularized politics. The concrete formulation of the critique varies with the circumstances but the structure of the argument is stable: The rebellion against religion, *the new faith in man as his own master and his own purpose*, and the employment of philosophy, science and technology as instruments for the furthering of human goals destroys both the moral and political community by making all things equal, by exposing them as nude and penetrable, de-mystified and manageable. The counter-enlightenment argument says that there is nothing stable in a world that must answer to its ability to serve mankind. There is no order in a world where no one allows himself to be governed over, where al authority is distrusted and criticized, and where people do not acknowledge superiors (in whatever form this superiority consists). There is nothing truly political in a world, where no one wants to be led, no one wants to fight or die, and no one believes in anything higher or grander than their self-interest. It is this flat, see-through, enlightened social landscape of modernity that the counter-enlightenment wants to re-enchant and refill with mysteries, hidden wonders and heroic battles. That scepticism is a threat to society has, at least since Maistre, been a regular part of the counter-enlightenment arsenal.

This also reveals a further common argument – a variant of what Albert Hirschman (1991: chap. 2) calls the ‘perversity thesis’ – namely that *liberation does not and cannot lead to liberty* but only to another more brutal form of captivity. Revolution leads invariably to terror, as liberation leads to unfreedom. The anti-authoritarian rebellion carries with it repression. The most important image of this is, of course, the degeneration of the French Revolution into the terror regime (McMahon 2001: 90-120), which has been a commonplace argument against the Enlightenment (both with and without capital E) ever since – whether the terror regime is described as the guillotine, Gulag, the welfare state, the permissive society or whatever – even though the connection is probably spurious at best.\(^{17}\) The argument about the necessary connection between the Enlightenment and the Terror

\(^{17}\) A more recent version is the argument of a connection between the Enlightenment and Auschwitz (Adorno & Horkheimer, Bauman) which is beyond the scope of this text (see Tallis 1997: 53-61 for a critique of this thesis). This is also an argument much sported by the Danish right wing protestant priest and Member of Parliament for the Danish People’s Party, Søren Krarup (Krarup 2000; Nielsen 2004; Thorup 2004).
can be generalized to saying that all anti-authoritarian revolts by necessity change into a particularly fanatical form of paternalism, as it acknowledges no limits to its urge for radical change. Behind this argument is the claim that the unbounded rationality is expansive and greedy for power and will therefore strive to conquer everything and everyone, shape them in its image and destroy all who will not succumb. This is why Maistre, as did Louis Bonald, stated that the Terror regime was God’s just punishment (Nisbet 1967: 13; Holmes 1984: 230). God punished the rebels by letting them fulfil their endeavour (Maistre 1977: 170); an endeavour that was doomed to end in chaos and violence as this is the nature of ungodly transgressions.

Second Generation: Juan Donoso Cortés

Juan Donoso Cortés (1809-1853) exemplifies the second generation of reactionaries by moving from a moderate liberal position prior to 1848 to a strongly reactionary position as a result of the European revolutions of 1848 (Graham 1974: chap. 5). Cortés is Schmitt’s primary counter-enlightenment source and a great inspiration. This is seen most clearly in the discussion of the liberals as ‘una clasa discutidora’, in the pessimistic anthropology as the foundation for a political theory and in the option for the dictatorship. Cortés’s fondness for dichotomization shows itself in his division of the civilization into two phases: The first phase is affirmative, progressive and Catholic. The second phase is negative, decadent and revolutionary; it is negative, because its ideas are based on negations, decadent, because its negations are errors, and revolutionary, because the errors will result in revolutions that will transform the state (2000d: 81). He calls the second phase philosophical, whereby he means Enlightenment-philosophical. In this long but very important quote he dramatizes the difference:

18 The secondary literature is quite limited (see Kennedy 1952; Garcia 1967; Graham 1974; McNamara 1991; Spektorowski 2002; Menéndez 2002) which is strange, given his great influence on the Catholic Church, the Spanish government and crown, Metternich, Louis Napoleon, Bismarck and generations of political reactionaries. Schmitt published a number of essays on Cortés (Schmitt 1950a) and Johnson (2000: 2-3) is right to stress that here is a lacuna in the Schmitt-reception, see however Payne 1978; Gil 1988; Maschke 1988; Dahlheimer 1998: 200-205; Ulmen 2002. 19 Schmitt repeats the anthropological dichotomy of Maistre and Cortés between man as good or evil, that is, man in the Enlightenment as perfectible or man in reactionary Christianity as fallen and sick (Schmitt 1934: 70-5, 1994a: 9, 1996a: 59-68). Schmitt understands man as a “in no way unproblematic but rather ’dangerous’ and dynamic being” (1996a: 61). With analogies to animal fables and to among others Hobbes, Spinoza and Pufendorf the acting subject is being described as an “animal motivated by its needs (hunger, greed, fear, jalousie)” (1996a: 59). Without a foundation in a pessimistic anthropology there is according to Schmitt no need for a political theory or a positive state theory. Man and his relations to others are then expected to regulate themselves. But given this conception of man as evil, there is need for authoritative institutions. Heinrich Meier sees here a Schmittian political theology grounded in original sin (1988: 59-68). But he fails to see that Schmitt’s reference to original sin is merely an example of the understanding of man as evil not its cause. On this point Schmitt is significantly more secularized than his counter-modernity should indicate. It is therefore also Hobbes and Machiavelli that are the main inspirations for Schmitt’s view of man. Cortés is admired for his understanding of man’s evilness not for his explanation thereof.
I believe that Catholic civilization is good without any evil mixed with it. And philosophy is evil without any good mixed with it. Catholic civilization teaches that human nature is sick and fallen; radically fallen and sick in its essence and in all the elements that constitute it. Since human understanding is sick, it can neither invent nor discover the truth, except when it is placed before it. Since the will is sick, it can neither desire nor do good unless it is helped. And it cannot be helped unless it is subjugated and repressed. Since this is the case, it is clear that freedom of discussion necessarily leads to error, just as freedom of action necessarily leads to evil … Philosophical civilization teaches that human nature is sound and healthy; radically healthy and whole in its essence and in the elements that constitute it. Since the understanding of man is healthy, it can see, discover, and invent truth. Since the will is healthy, it can naturally desire and do good. Supposing this, it is clear that reason will arrive at knowing the truth, all the truth, if left to itself. And the will, if left to itself, necessarily will realize the absolute good. So, it is clear that the solution to the great social problem lies in breaking all the bonds that restrain and subjugate human reason and free will. Evil is neither in the free will nor reason, but in those bonds. If evil consist in having bonds, and goodness in not having them, then perfection will consist in not having bonds of any sort. If this is true, humanity will be perfect when it rejects God, who is the divine bond; and when it rejects Government, which is the political bond; and when it rejects property, which is the social bond; and when it rejects the family, which is the domestic bond. (2000b: 60)

They are diametrical opposites, mortal enemies. The radical dichotomization serves to deny any hybridization of opposites, all compromises with the enemy, all influx of subversive influences. It is what Taguieff calls an ‘obsessive fear of mixture’ (1997: 169). It serves to force through a decision between absolute good and absolute evil. The Catholic civilization has three religious affirmations that all confirm a personal God: God exists, God is personal, and God is sovereign. These three religious affirmations have a parallel in the political world: The king exists, the king governs, and the king rules. Cortés ends the parallelization with a statement: “So, the political affirmations are nothing more than the consequences of the religious affirmations” (2000d: 81). There is a direct and necessary relationship between religion and politics that builds on the belief or non-belief in a personal and interventionist God. In 1836, in his period of ‘doctrinaire liberalism’ (McNamara 1991), he said: “From the moment that the authority of the Church was put in doubt, then the thrones of kings started to shake. Europe was starting a reaction against authority, and all its depositaries were to be its victims” (1991: 15). Like Maistre, he sees the attack on authority as preconditioned upon an attack on religion.

The Catholic civilization is in crisis – if not already over – as a result of religious heterodoxy. Cortés’ age is heading for the second phase of civilization, where there are three denials instead of three affirmations. Once in motion, these denials replace each other in an unstoppable downward motion. The first denial is that of the deist, who says, that God may exist and govern but he doesn’t rule. Its political parallel is constitutionalism. The second denial is that of the pantheist, who says,
that God may exist but he has no personal existence. He is everywhere; he is the mass and can therefore neither govern nor rule. Its political parallel is republicanism and universal suffrage. The third and ultimate denial is that of the atheist, who says, that God neither rules nor governs; God is not a person or a mass; God does not exist. The political parallel of this final denial is anarchism and the dissolution of all government (Cortés 2000d: 81-2). Proudhon stands – as he later did for Schmitt – as the symbol of anarchism and socialism, which for Cortés signifies the break up of all hierarchies and differences in a general revolt against all authority (Löwith 1986: 271-4). Cortés says explicitly about the political consequences of his political theology: ”Given the denial of God, who is the fount and origin of all authority, logic demands the absolute denial of authority itself. The denial of universal paternity leads to the denial of domestic paternity. And the denial of religious authority leads to the denial of political authority” (2000g: 108). To question the religious dogma is to subvert the whole social and political order.

Cortés sees the Europe of his time as entering the second denial and moving towards the third, which represents the ultimate darkness. Here there is nothing and no one to control or subdue mankind. Positive civilization can only be maintained through religious dogmas and commands. The belief in man’s own ability to discover the truth, and the idea of discussion as a way to the truth, breeds only confusion, insecurity and disturbances and ultimately leads to socialism: “I reject all rationalist systems that are based upon this absurd principle: that reason is independent of God and competent in everything” (2000c: 72). Mankind rebels against God in the arrogant idea that it can command its own life and destiny. Instead, Cortés insists on mankind as consisting of “men [who] confusedly and blindly traverse the labyrinth of History” (2000g: 104). Error-prone mankind seeks in vain for the truth by consulting themselves and each other. Discussion, one of the core institutions of liberalism, becomes, therefore, the characteristic institution of modernity:

20 Cortés has three other religious-political parallelizations that are almost similar in analysis and errand: ”The first religious error to emerge in recent times is the principle of the independence and sovereignty of human reason. To this religious error corresponds the political error that affirms the sovereignty of the human intellect … Parliamentary monarchies, with their electoral census, division of powers, free press, and inviolable tribunals, originate in this error. The second religious error is related to the human will and consists in affirming that the will is sound in itself and needs neither the call nor the stimulus of grace in order to incline it toward the good. The corresponding political error asserts that since there is no such thing as a sound will, nothing needs to be directed since there is no need for a director. Universal suffrage is founded on this principle and the republican system proceeds from it. The third religious error pertains to the appetites and claims that the appetites of men are excellent. This presumes the immaculate conception of man. The corresponding political error asserts that all governments have one sole end: the satisfaction of all forms of concupiscence. The socialist and demagogic systems are founded upon this principle” (2000g: 109-110, my italics). See also lecture nine in his series A Defense of Representative Government from February 14, 1837, which anticipates a number of these themes (1991: 89-103).
I believe ... that discussion is the fount of all possible errors as well as the origin of all imaginable extravagances. I believe that parliamentarianism, liberalism, and rationalism are, first, a rejection of government; second, a rejection of freedom; and third, an affirmation of insanity. (2000f: 95)

The smallest admittance of human freedom leads to the utmost despair and dissolution. Mankind must therefore be repressed and this has, according to Cortés, again paraphrasing Maistre, only two forms: Religious or political repression. When the religious repression is high, the political is low, and reverse. Now, the situation is that religion has lost its capacity for repression, so there is need for political repression in the form of a dictatorship (2000a). The choice is between a dictatorship from above or below. Dictatorship from below stems from the mob, from atheism and socialism. Dictatorship from above is a dictatorship of political authority. 1848 revealed for Cortés that a simple return to monarchic legitimacy and rule is no longer possible. Political dictatorship is, therefore, the best (secular) solution under terrible (areligious) circumstances. The political dictatorship is to stop or at least slow down the process of disintegration that the Enlightenment has started. The Enlightenment has made mankind ungovernable by liberating it from religious authority and by deceiving it into believing that man is his own master. It is, according to Cortés, not the light of the Enlightenment spreading across Europe but its consequent darkness of atheism, nihilism, anarchism and socialism.

But, as also Schmitt later says, the political elites are not willing or able to decide between Catholicism or philosophy, reaction or enlightenment, Christ or Antichrist. The modern and relativistic have transformed the people in power into a discussing class that cannot withstand the flood wave of depravity. Joseph de Maistre still believed in the union between throne and altar. He did not see or acknowledge the depth of secularization. A simplistic political theology was still possible for him, which is why he opts for the religious dictatorship. Cortés on the other hand has seen into what he perceives as the abyss of secularism. He has understood religion’s loss of power and the irreversible direction of the process. This is why he opts for the political dictatorship. Once doubt is institutionalized, the dogmas of faith cannot be reinstalled. Secular repression is needed.²²

²¹ One can speculate as to whether there is any connection between Cortés political dictatorship and Schmitt’s concept of the Katechon – the delayer of ultimate decadence – but that is beyond the scope of this article. See however Palaver 1995a; Schüller 1996; Bucla 2003.

²² Schmitt’s secularization is seen in the advocacy of what we could call a decisionistic dictatorship in Politische Theologie. In this work Schmitt dismisses Louis Bonald’s traditionalistic religious-royal position, which I call the classic or original reactionary position (Schmitt 1934: 70; 1984: 88, 154, 158, 164-5; 1994a: 99); instead he argues with supposed inspiration from Maistre but mostly from Cortés for a post-classical reactionary position: the non-legitimate decisionistic dictatorship. This decisionism and the political models that followed from it is testimony to the fact of secularism. The decision is pure decision; it knows no before, no references and no limits.
The opposition between a liberal sociability framed in the rhetoric of freedom and an anti-liberal sociability framed in terms of coercion has strengthened the liberal belief in its overcoming of coercive sociability. In this way, anti-liberalism has helped strengthen liberal self-understanding and sense of superiority. The main points above are the critique of spontaneous self-organization; the very impossibility of an enduring liberal regime; the corrosive and dangerous consequences of the critique of authority and hierarchy; the modern is flat, grey and thoroughly unsatisfying; life in modernity is poor in spirit and lax in morality; the importance of borders, limitations and demarcations as opposed to transgressions; the concretely existing man here-and-now versus abstract man existing there-and-everywhere; that discussability of everything is the levelling and ultimately the destruction of everything; the absolute necessity of certainty and clarity as opposed to flux; the liberal hands off-approach to sociability as opposed to the hands-on coercive approach; the missionary zeal of change of modernity in general and liberalism in particular. These are some of the themes that will re-emerge in the rest of this text, as we explore liberalism and its critiques. In the counter-enlightenment critique, levelling and discussability has direct political consequences: It serves to undermine all absolutes and questions all authorities. Maistre said that “the clash of individual opinions left to itself produces only scepticism, which destroys everything” (1996: 107). Everything becomes plastic and manipulable; no one and nothing is immune from change or replacement. Modernity is characterized by what I will call ‘the regimes of temporary truth’: Science tests and rejects established truths; the court listens to evidence, sentence, appeals are filed and other courts uphold or change the verdict; the press recounts and interprets the events of the day; the market values and devalues goods, services and qualifications; the parliament debates, votes and scrutinizes the government; the public discusses and evaluates the politicians etc. This is a thoroughgoing institutionalization of evaluation and discussion, of doubt and temporality. The liberal dogma of toleration is symbolic of the status of doubt in modern societies, which is also why it has become an object of hatred in counter-modern thought. Tolerance is understood as indifference, which is the inability to differentiate between good and evil, important and unimportant. In modernity everything can and will be questioned; exacted explanations and legitimizations. The political world becomes turbulent and unstable in a very profound way. Claude Lefort has written about the effects of the democratic revolution: “The emptying and de-substantialization of society’s fixation points lays it bare for a permanent creation of its own history. Uncertainty and unstability becomes the hall marks of social life” (quoted from Ifversen 1989: 39):
“democracy constitutes and maintains itself through the dissolution of the fixed points of certainty” (Lefort 1989: 28). Enlightenment is first and foremost critique, constant critique. It is a highly unstable way of life for both individual and society. It, therefore, almost by necessity engenders counter-reactions, who will not acknowledge the nervous energy, the institutionalized doubt and the temporality of all things.

This is, of course, the exact point where counter-modernity is conditioned upon modernity. Counter-modernity is highly modern, and could only come about in the modern world. Its arguments become increasingly dependent upon modernity’s categories and defence is only needed when something is either threatened or disappearing. Maistre recognized that the problem of legitimacy was a modern one and he claimed to detest writing legitimist propaganda. The need to write in defence of something is a sure sign of its weakness. He said: “Every false institution writes a great deal, as it is sensible of its weakness and seeks to buttress itself” (quoted from Holmes 1984: 236; see also Holmes 1982). This is parallel with Schmitt’s claim about parliamentarism, which can only marshal still more elaborate versions of ‘if not us, then what?’ in its defence. Running side by side with the uneasiness about modernity’s drift is what Peter Gay calls ‘the hunger for wholeness’ and which he describes thus (1968: 96):

The complex of feelings and responses I have called ‘the hunger of wholeness’ turns out on examination to be a great regression born from a great fear: the fear of modernity. The abstractions that Tönnies and Hofmannstahl and the others manipulated – Volk, Führer, Organismus, Reich, Entscheidung, Gemeinschaft – reveal a desperate need for roots and for community, a vehement, often vicious repudiation of reason accompanied by the urge for direct action or for the surrender to a charismatic leader. The hunger for wholeness was awash with hate; the political, and sometimes the private, world of its chief spokesmen was a paranoid world, filled with enemies: the dehumanizing machine, capitalist materialism, godless rationalism, rootless society, cosmopolitan Jews, and that great all-devouring monster, the city.

The city as an image of decadence will be spelled out in chapter 7. The response to the lack of wholeness, order and certainty is often referred to as political theology, which, as I use it here, is a direct counter-response to the psychological, cultural and not least political consequences of secularization; a reaction against the loss of difference, hierarchy, authority and certainty. It is the attempt to reinstate the absolute truths and the un-questionable authorities and it builds on an idea of a direct connection between the force of religious conviction and the force of political authority and institutions. As Isaiah Berlin has put it in a very precise description of Joseph de Maistre, which could also cover most of the other counter-enlightenment thinkers:
Religion is superior to reason not because it returns more convincing answers than reason, but because it returns no answer at all. It does not persuade or argue, it commands. Faith is truly faith only when it is blind; once it looks for justification it is done for. Everything in the universe that is strong, permanent and effective is beyond and, in a sense, against reason. (1990a: 130, my italics)

The counter-enlightenment sees man’s evilness in man himself and claims that the enlightenment sees it in the institutions that surrounds and limits man. In this view man is inherently good but everywhere debased by institutions and prejudices. Break the chains and man will flourish. In the eyes of the counter-enlightenment, enlightenment, therefore, declares a total war on society in a liberation project that turns out to be the uprooting of the individual from his ordered and limited contextuality. The concrete human beings are sacrificed for the ideal of mankind. The existent for the future; the here-and-now for the then-and-there. As Maistre famously said:

The Constitution of 1795, like its predecessors, was made for man. But there is no such thing as man in the world. In my lifetime I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.; thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never in my life met him; if he exists, he is unknown to me. (1974: 97)

The Enlightenment philosophers ‘frees’ man from the chains, the prejudices, the habits and horizon that makes him a Frenchmen, Italian or Russian. Instead emerges the atomized, unbounded, free man. The counter-enlightenment keeps stressing that man is always already a social being (Maistre 1996). The Enlightenment is in this view a rebellion against sociability itself as its limitations and determinations are felt as degrading and boring. The understanding of freedom as limitlessness, that the intellectual elite hold, is to be made universal, which leaves the majority of the population naked before the forces of the world. As Edmund Burke said:

But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle, and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life, and which, by a bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the super-added ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our naked shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion. (1969: 171)
The Enlightenment and the French revolution was, accordingly, a huge experiment in social engineering – and according to the Counter-Enlightenment doomed to fail. The Enlightenment, in this view, stands in opposition to reality; they rebel against the given, which is limited, confined, historical, contextual etc. Their abstract and rationalistic reasoning, their universalism and their eagerness to reform is in contradiction to the particularity of reality and the slowness of human change. The counter-enlightenment is, what Ludmilla Jordanova (1990) calls ‘the authoritarian response’ to what is perceived as an attack on authority and cohesion as such. But there are also other less radical versions of counter-enlightenment. However, what they share is the critique of alleged mono-causality, imperial universalism and militant self-righteousness of the Enlightenment. They criticize what they see as the doctrine of politics as the art of perfection. What they emphasize instead is restraint, barriers, modesty, smallness in ambition and interference, politics as the art of the possible and the prudent.

Further on in this text, we’ll see the already mentioned opposition between finitude and infinity, the limited and the unlimited, the demarcated difference and the transcendence of differences, borders and the blurring of borders. As already stated, the opposition between the enlightenment and the counter-enlightenment can be seen as one between a philosophy of unboundedness giving expression to ideas of progress, individual freedom, expansionism, universalism and ultimately to the post-political society; and then the counter-enlightenment philosophy of boundedness giving expression to ideas of societal freedom as cohesion, limitedness and ultimately the eternally political regime. These two opposing philosophies are of course to a certain extent constructions, ideal types, but they are nonetheless both illuminating for the matter at hand and operative in political debate. In order to clarify this, and to broaden the picture, we now turn to what we might call a liberal self-critique, which owes a great deal to the Counter-Enlightenment in its construction of the Enlightenment as a mono-theory of infinite progress.
II. 20th Century Counter-Enlightenment Liberalism

What may now be meant by the word ‘liberal’ is anyone’s guess (Oakeshott 1991: 440)

In this section, we’ll discuss what I earlier, with a phrase from Graeme Garrard, called ‘counter-enlightenment liberalism’. It serves a number of purposes. Firstly, it helps qualify the rather rigid dichotomy between liberal enlightenment and counter-enlightenment anti-liberalism which I have presented so far. There is actually a liberal critique of some of what the counter-enlightenment most strongly associates with liberalism. Secondly, it throws further light on a very important aspect of the discussion of liberal modernity, which was also at the heart of the above presentation, namely: Enlightenment-liberalism and the ambition of politics; the extent, possibility and manageability of political change, that is, the claim from both the ‘classical’ Counter-Enlightenment and the counter-enlightenment liberalism that there exist a dogmatic enlightenment-liberal missionary zeal for absolute change. The critique from these two ‘camps’ is that enlightenment-liberalism fails to acknowledge real obstacles for change inscribed in tradition, history, biology, epistemology or whatever, and that this reform craze has dire consequences for both the individual and the collective. Thirdly, and connected with this, it helps broaden our discussion of the forms of the political, as we here have examples of liberal ‘politics as technique’, who show an awareness of the double-sided nature of the political. Fourthly, this discussion will highlight a number of themes that will reappear throughout the remainder of the text. The Counter-Enlightenment criticized the Enlightenment for, as Burke says in a quote above: ‘now all is to be changed’. This is also at the core of the critique of liberal internationalism/globalism: The obsessive desire to dismantle states, strengthen the individual over the collective etc.

The thinkers I want to discuss briefly are mainly Isaiah Berlin, John Gray, Michael Oakeshott and Margaret Canovan, with a few side remarks on Friedrich Hayek and Karl Popper; all of them in their different ways conservative liberals. Despite differences they all articulate a critique of political over-ambition. This has direct connections to the discussion of constituting and constituted powers, discussed in the first chapter, and to the difference between liberalism and populism or direct and indirect democracy. It is yet another variant of the same distinction between an ambitious and a cautious view of the political; or as I will refer to them an expansive and a restrictive view of the political. They claim that there is a pragmatic, realistic and cautious understanding of political possibility on the one side and on the other a perfectionist understanding that will settle for nothing less than ultimate ends and which are prepared to use whatever means necessary to get there.
Isaiah Berlin differentiates between a world of pluralism and political ideologies of monism (Lukes 1994; Lassman 2000). Although he, in his own words, are ‘deeply sympathetic’ to the enlightenment project, he has also dealt with counter-enlightenment figures in a sympathetic way: not only Maistre but also German anti-rationalism (1979b), nationalism (1979c, 1990b), romanticism (1990c, 1999), Georges Sorel (1979d) etc., because they are examples of – often horrific – insights into pluralism, testimonies to the bad of monism (and not because he has ‘gone native’ as some seem to think, Lilla 1994). Berlin sees the various critics of the Enlightenment as voices of repressed truths. They articulate what the Enlightenment downplays, ignores, ridicules or fights. Maistre is portrayed as the father of fascism but also as someone whose value is “the depth and the accuracy of his insight into the darker, less regarded, but decisive factors in social and political behaviour” (Berlin 1990a: 166); “a frightening but brilliant and important critic of the Enlightenment” (in Jahanbegloo 2000: 70). His force was to singled-mindedly emphasize “the persistence and extent of irrational instinct, the power of faith, the force of blind tradition, the willful ignorance about the human material of the progressives – the idealistic social scientists, the bold political and economic planners, the passionate believers in technocracy” (1990a: 166); he was, together with Tolstoy “sharp-eyed foxes, inescapably aware of sheer, de facto differences which divide and forces which disrupt the human world, observers utterly incapable of being deceived by the many subtle devices, the unifying systems and faiths and sciences, by which the superficial or the desperate sought to conceal the chaos from themselves and from one another” (1992: 80). The Enlightenment stand accused of monism:

According to this doctrine, all genuine questions were in principle answerable: truth was one, error multiple; the true answers must of necessity be universal and immutable, that is, true everywhere, at all times, for all men, and discoverable by the appropriate use of reason, by relevant experience, observation and the methods of experiment, logic, calculation. (1979b: 163)

In opposition to this view, Berlin tries to teach the Enlightenment the limits of its illumination of the world and to teach liberalism self-restraint. He does so most eloquently and influentially in his small and controversial essay ‘Two concepts of Liberty’ from 1958, where the insight into the

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23 The fox is the pluralist – ‘he knows many things’ – and the hedgehog is the monist – he knows one big thing’ – in Berlin’s famous essay on Tolstoy’s view of history (1992).

24 The essay has sparked a great deal of debate, see Macpherson 1973: chap. 5; Siedentop 1979; Skinner 1989, 1991; Maccallum 1991; Taylor 1991; Pettit 1993; Carter 2003.
plural nature of the world, according to Berlin, leads to a negative concept of freedom and the monist view to a positive concept of freedom. The utopian reductionism of the Enlightenment is, Berlin says, the claim that there is one discoverable truth, that all values are compatible and that the world need not be tragic or incomplete. Berlin learns from the Counter-Enlightenment that the world defies settlement; that it, in the words of Maistre, is a slaughter-house, which we can remedy but not get beyond; that values clash, so that we must choose, prioritize and settle for less than everything; and that we can stop immediate suffering but not suffering as such. This is not a discussion of the validity of Berlin’s distinction or even an elaboration of the two concepts. I’ll just briefly hint at their connection to the themes above. This also means that the two concepts get presented in a somewhat distorted way. As for their difference, Gerald C. Maccallum has presented it very nicely: “Writers adhering to the concept of ‘negative’ freedom hold that only the presence of something can render a person unfree; writers adhering to the concept of ‘positive’ freedom hold that the absence of something may also render a person unfree” (1991: 108). Political liberty is for Berlin, when “a man can act unobstructed by others … Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act” (1984: 16).

Berlin acknowledges the great humanitarian contributions of the positive concept of freedom; it has spurred many great ideas and actions in the cause of freedom. It is almost presented as a biological need, present trans-historically and universally, whereas negative freedom is the exception, perhaps culturally determined. As Constant, Berlin states, that negative freedom is distinctively modern; it is not older than the state, the renaissance or the reformation. It is limited in time and space; at the outset at least it is confined to the West. Berlin can be said to ask the same question, as Weber did in Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus from 1920, when he in the first sentence asked “what chain of circumstances has meant that is actually here in the West, and only here, that cultural phenomena have arisen which are part of – at least so we usually think – a development of universal importance and validity?” (1995: 3).

Digression: Popper. One could say that just as Berlin advocates a negative concept of liberty, Popper advocates a negative concept of social change working against particular evils rather than the good per se: “The piecemeal engineer will … adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good” (1962a: 158). There is a special political aestheticism involved “with the desire to build a world which is not only a little better and more rational than ours, but which is free from all its ugliness: not a crazy quilt, an old garment badly patched, but an entirely new gown, a really beautiful new world” (1962a: 165). Like Berlin, Popper acknowledges this desire as ‘understandable’ and common to ‘most of us’ – as evidenced in his at times very sympathetic evaluation of Marx’s humanism: “The strength of both the old and the
new totalitarian movements rested on the fact that they attempted to answer a very real need, however badly conceived this attempt may have been” (1962a: 170). This is important, because it acknowledges the necessity of more than the negative approach. There is a dialectics of sorts. They, Popper and Berlin, are nonetheless both best understood as theoreticians of politics as technique. Popper, like Berlin, tries to restrict the political task: “it is our duty to help those who need our help; but it cannot be our duty to make others happy, since this does not depend on us”; “Pain, suffering, injustice, and their prevention, these are the eternal problems of public morals … The ‘higher’ values should very largely be considered as ‘non-agenda’” (1962b: 237). *End of digression.*

Berlin’s stated purpose is to prevent unfreedom in the name of freedom. He joins a long line of political thinkers, which includes Hobbes’ critique of the republicans of his time (Hobbes 1968: chap. 21; Skinner 1998); Constant’s critique of those who refer to antique freedom as the model for the present – Robespierre, Rousseau (Constant 1988b); or JS Mill (1977) who warned against political moralists who in the name of ‘true freedom’ demanded interventions in personal freedoms. What Berlin wants to prevent is the misuse of freedom in the name of something otherwise desirable: Peace, progress, community, democracy: “Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture or human happiness or a quiet conscience” (1984: 18). He wants to dampen the ambitions and expectations mobilized in the name of freedom. It will bring none of those things. Freedom is about personal freedom from the coercion of others – nothing else. Berlin names the position, that judge freedom more expansively, as ‘positive freedom’. It stems from a noble and deeply felt desire in man to be or become his or her own master. Positive freedom is about autonomy or self-determination. According to Berlin, the positive conception of freedom implies a divide of the self in its real free self and its actual, empirical unfree self. As Rousseau says in the first chapter of the *Du Contrat social*: “Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains” (1997: 41). The abuse of freedom starts with this divide, which quickly gets supplemented with an understanding of a higher and a lower self, the latter being the empirical unfree self.

… the ‘positive’ conception of freedom as self-mastery, with its suggestion of a man divided against himself, has, in fact, and as a matter of history, of doctrine and of practice, lent itself more easily to this splitting of personality into two: the transcendent, dominant controller, and the empirical bundle of desires and passions to be disciplined and brought to heel. (Berlin 1984: 25)

From this arises the desire, in the words again of Rousseau, to ‘force men to become free’, often combined with the idea that some few selected ones already are, most significantly the French *philosophes*. From then on, the abuse of freedom in the name of higher goals is a given. The
proponents of positive freedom does not acknowledge any ultimate or lasting difference between higher and lower self, between real and empirical self. The negative concept of freedom is unambitious or restrictive on behalf of mankind. Negative freedom acknowledges the value pluralism of the world: we want different things, and the things we want contradict each other. There is, then, a pluralism both in society and in the individual. There is no solution, which absolves the difference between wish and reality. The core assertion of value pluralism is that not all good things are compatible. Value monism claims the opposite: Our values are, at least in principle, compatible; they can be brought together in a harmonious whole. The positive concept is very ambitious. The end goal is the perfect society. All good things are compatible in a world that can be created. This idea has been the source of much bloodshed throughout history: The desire for unity, purity, connectivity, rest, fullness, wholeness, beauty etc. is the recipe for disaster.

Value monists do not accept an incomplete or imperfect world; they have no patience with the existing, slow and feet-dragging world. Berlin claims, that the value pluralists acknowledge the tragic nature of existence and that they have no illusions about overcoming it. For value monists this is an intellectual, moral and political crime. They are constructors of man and society and they want with haste to bring the world, history, the class, mankind etc. to its true destination. The existing world is a mockery of man’s true potential. In sum, Berlin criticizes the positive notion of freedom for wanting too much, for political over-ambition and he in no small measure blames the Enlightenment for its modern incarnations. Value pluralists acknowledge the existence of what Berlin likes to quote from Kant: ‘the crooked timber of humanity’ of which ‘no straight thing was ever made’. This is a demarcation of the limits of man’s plasticity and, therefore, of the possibilities of politics. It is also – even though stemming from Kant – a core element in the Counter-Enlightenment critique of the Enlightenment for being at war with reality.

The positive concept of freedom has a strong idea of the difference between the political present and the post-political future. In the present, struggle, injustice, politics reigns but this is to be overcome. We can call this the strong version of anti-politics. The negative concept of freedom contains another version of anti-politics, in that they cannot operate with such sharp a distinction between present and future. There isn’t as such any post-political future. The anti-political is here and now in the workings of contemporary society. This we can call the weak version of anti-politics because is has no idea – except as a negative – of the political.
John Gray may not want to be called liberal, not even if it is a counter-enlightenment liberalism.\(^{25}\) He is among those sporting post-liberalism (1989: 239-266; 1993; 1995b: 85-96), which in his version can be summarized as thus: “the Enlightenment project which informed and sustained liberalism is now a dead letter” (1995b: 85). From Gray’s argument it seems that the Enlightenment – and therefore liberalism – was always wrong, their basic principles contradict the way the world really is – so apparently we’ve been living in somewhat of a false society up until, which has existed not because but despite its own principles, but which has now exhausted its energy. We must understand Gray as saying that the enlightenment – the value monism and universalism it proclaimed – always contradicted human nature and sociability, but now it really contradicts them. He says that liberal practices founded upon enlightenment ideals “do not best facilitate the satisfaction of human needs in the late modern context of deep cultural diversity” (1995a: 156) and “As a consequence of mass migration, new technologies of communication and continued cultural experimentation; nearly all societies today contain several ways of life, with many people belonging to more than one” (2000a: 1).

From this it would seem that both the enlightenment and liberalism has only recently gotten into trouble. But in order for his broader argument of value pluralism to make any sense, this cannot be a recent development. Granted he says: “Liberalism may be … the political theory of modernity” (1995b: ix),\(^{26}\) but again, this must mean that modernity as such is in contradiction with human nature, and this is his argument. It is what enables him to bring together a motley collection of ideas, regimes, movements, events etc. as being part of the same deeply problematic ‘modernist project’, which has now, and now again, proved to be false. Having declared the modernist project dead for a decade, he writes in 2003: “The suicide warriors who attacked Washington and New York on September 11\(^{th}\), 2001, did more than kill thousands of civilians and demolish the World Trade Center. They destroyed the West’s ruling myth” (2003a). But still no one listened, as Gray is still writings books. Obituaries for modernity are a thriving business. We find that his post-liberalism is actually an argument for what he – inspired by Berlin (and in terms similar to Chantal Mouffe) – terms ‘agonistic liberalism’. This is a liberalism more suited to the particularity of man. As Maistre, Gray has never met ‘man’ and he doesn’t believe in the existence of universal values, which he equates with value monism:

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\(^{25}\) Gray has politically moved from left to right and possibly beyond, see Colls 1998; Skidelsky 1998; Klein 1999; Wheen 2004: 187-9. For critiques of his treatment of liberalism and Berlin see Mehta 1997; Weinstock 1997; Taliss 2000; Rorty 2001: 31-4.

\(^{26}\) And the sentence continues: “if so, it is far from clear that it is adequate to the dilemmas of the postmodern condition”. Again hinting at an ‘adequate’ enlightenment-modernity, he otherwise rejects.
Agonistic liberalism is an application in political theory of the moral theory of value-pluralism – the theory that there is an irreducible diversity of ultimate values and that when these values come into conflict or competition with one another there is no overaching standard or principle, no common currency or measure, whereby such conflicts can be arbitrated or resolved. (1995a: 68-9; see also 1989: chap 4, 5; 1993: 64-9)

Its counterpart is enlightenment-liberalism, which Gray also constructs in the shadow of Berlin, although with lot less sympathy or sense of the many sides and faces of the enlightenment. Gray doesn’t, as the Counter-Enlightenment, portray the Enlightenment as a total break with the existing. It’s a radicalization of certain aspects of Socratic and Christian thought (2000a: 4-5). This translates into an imperialistic universalism disguised as neutralism, a monism disguised as pluralism, when in actuality one is only allowed to be different within the parameters defined beforehand:

Western societies are governed by the belief that modernity is a single condition, everywhere the same and always benign. As societies become more modern, so they become more alike. At the same time they become better. Being modern means realising our values – the values of the Enlightenment, as we like to think of them. (2003a: 1)

Gray presents us with a less than convincing presentation of the Enlightenment, actually reducing it to a positivist ‘catechism’ with three main tenets: “First, history is driven by the power of science … Second, science will enable natural scarcity to be overcome … Third, progress in science and progress in ethics and politics go together” (2003a: 27). This positivist ‘faith’ has then allegedly spread to become the ‘creed’ of all Western societies and theories.

The modernist project is, by Gray, reduced to the hubristic hope “that the power of technology [can] be used to transform the human condition” (2003a: 12). This ‘human condition’ is not explicated but is obviously an anthropological constant (or maybe even biological as Gray goes to great lengths to dismiss notions of any real difference between human and animals, see 2003b), which resists all attempts at transformation. This is what causes modernist failures. Modernist projects from liberalism to Soviet Communism, from capitalism to Nazi Germany and from American imperial democratism to Al Qaeda, are in opposition to and at war with the world, as it really is. The world and man resists. What is reality then? Mostly, it is local and particular, even when presented as universal: “In contemporary political discourse, it [liberalism] invokes the backward-looking Enlightenment philosophy of history in which modernization is conflated with westernisation and the entirety of humankind is fated to converge on an idealized version of some nineteenth-century western culture” (1997: vii). Universalism is consistently represented as the
imperialism of particularism, that is, the projection of the worldview of a particular socio-economically and intellectually narrow group. Formerly, the worldview and self-image of the *philosophes*, now “the local knowledge of Anglo-American political (or academic) culture” (1989: 234); the latter often represented by John Rawls (1997: chap. 3) Richard Rorty (1995a: 169-78; 1997: chap. 4) and global capitalism (2000a: 23), which he calls “a Maoism of the right … the permanent revolution of unfettered market processes” (1995a: 87). Gray demonstrates great rhetoric skill, when he says that contemporary (academic) political philosophy seems to be mainly interested in coming up “with a transcendental deduction of themselves” (1997: 59). Universalists are just disguised particularists.

Gray is very similar in some of his arguments to the Counter-Enlightenment, when he says:

The trouble with secular myths is that they are frequently more harmful than the real thing. In traditional Christianity, the apocalyptic impulse was restrained by the insight that human beings are ineradicably flawed. In the secular religions that flowed from Christianity, this insight was lost. The result has been a form of tyranny, new in history, that commits vast crimes in the pursuit of heaven on earth. (2004: 44)27

This is directly parallel to the claim of the Counter-Enlightenment that the Enlightenment is an attempt to bring heaven down to earth, to let man take the place of God. Yet another example of man’s insurrection is this peculiar comment: “Humanism is a doctrine of salvation – the belief that humankind can take charge of its destiny” (2003b: 16). What makes it peculiar, unless we view it as a counter-enlightenment statement, is the allegation that humanism is a ‘doctrine of salvation’, that there is something necessarily religious in man taking ‘charge of its destiny’. This can only be so, if one presumes that there is something, God or nature, which already occupies the place. Another by now well-known part of the argument, which Gray also delights in explicating, is that this always ends in hell on earth. Cortés said: “Be assured that the people who yesterday were proclaimed sovereign will write today the charter of rights in ink, and tomorrow they will erase it with blood. This is the fatal law of all revolutions” (1991: 47). The new secular faith is a rebellion against the given and will necessarily end in disaster: “Neo-liberal utopians expected that globalisation would fill the world with liberal republics, linked together in peace and trade. *History is responding* with a flowering of war, tyranny and empire” (2003a: 113, my italics; see also 2004: 1).

27 See Gray (1994: 727), where he denies that his critique “mean embracing any of the reactionary or traditionalist alternatives which have arisen in response to the Enlightenment project. Such alternatives, as we find them in Burke or de Maistre, say, are mirror-images of the Enlightenment and share many of its anachronistic features. Like the Enlightenment project, these reactionary and traditionalist views are Eurocentric in their supposed universalism, sharing with the Enlightenment – though in providentialist Christian form – a philosophy of history of which we are the *telos*”.
Gray in many ways resembles Joseph de Maistre: they both view the history of mankind as an endless slaughter and man himself as a rapacious animal apparently intent on destruction. Gray even ponders, what we might call a secular or biological version of Maistre’s theory of God’s punishment of the *philosophes* by letting their rebellion run its course and ending in the Terror regime. Gray uses Gaia-theory to put forward the idea that population growth will trigger a counter-reaction where nature itself, through natural disasters, ecological degradation, even war, will reduce the number of people on the planet (2003b: 6-12). More importantly, he sees no possibility for progress, the Cold War was a break from history and now we’re seeing “a return to the classical terrain of history, a terrain of great-power rivalries, secret diplomacies, and irredentist claims and wars” (1993: 249; see also 2003a: 59). His static theory of history shows itself in his description of the Cold War as a pause. Now we’re returning to ‘historical normalcy’ (2004: 96; see also 2005a: 5). We are not told why war, rivalry and secret diplomacy is more true and normal than peace, trade and cooperation. This is part of the counter-enlightenment arsenal to depict violence as the ‘normal’. This is Gray’s executioner. This is why he spins world history like this: “Progress and mass murder run in tandem. As the numbers killed by famine and plague waned, so death by violence has increased. As science and technology have advanced, so has proficiency in killing. As the hope for a better world has grown, so has mass murder” (2003b: 96). No matter what, violence, death, slaughter has to be present, no matter the source or explanation, to discredit the modernist project. Another aspect of this is the focus on the ‘tragic’ nature of human affairs. Tragedy, according to the critiques of liberalism, is what liberalism tries to deny. Just as sacrifice is contrary to the demands of liberal modernity, so is tragedy in opposition to the promises of progress. This is why he says: “The good life is not found in dreams of progress, but in coping with tragic contingencies” (2003b: 194). Tragic awareness is the counter-attitude to liberal optimism. We find the same figure in Berlin and in a somewhat radicalized form in Schmitt’s depiction of the Grand Inquisitor. Part of this argument is namely very often also that only a few, the writers included, has had the courage to not only acknowledge the brutality and tragedy of human life but also to draw the consequences therefrom. Gray has a hint of this in his portrayal of the near-universal monopoly of liberal optimism, only challenged by him and a few others (again, this is of course also a trademark of proponents of politics as conflict).
Similar to the Counter-Enlightenment is also the critique of universalism and the view of rationalism as cold and abstract. He talks like Burke of “corruption by rationalist theorizing” (1989: 213). This is a reasoning, which sees possibilities, where there are in fact impossibilities. Again, like the Counter-Enlightenment, Gray presents us with an over-simplification, bordering on misrepresentation, of the Enlightenment. He claims, that their perfectionism doesn’t allow for limits to transformation. It’s all about the right fix: “History’s crimes and tragedies are not thought to have their roots in human nature: they are errors, mistakes that can be corrected by more education, better political institutions, higher living standards” (2004: 86). Gray is the one discussed in this chapter coming closest to a conflictual political position. He calls agonistic pluralism “a ‘political liberalism’ in which the primacy of the political – over the legal or the theoretical, say – is strongly affirmed” (1995a: 75). This primacy of the political consists in deciding – on a continual basis – the governing values and principles of the society. In a critique of Rawls for believing that we can once and for all specify these and thereby render them immune for conflict, Gray says that this “denies the deepest truth of modern pluralism … Our liberties cannot be fixed once for all – least of all by the philosopher – precisely because the political task is to reach a practical agreement on them that is bound to shift with our circumstances” (1997: 54). Gray says, in a critique very similar to an updated Schmittian one, that in Rawls’s position of ’political liberalism’:

… nothing of importance is left to political decision. The basic liberties and the distribution of social goods are matters of justice, and in political liberalism what justice demands is a matter not for political decision but for legal adjudication. The central institution of Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ is not a deliberative assembly such as a parliament. It is a court of law … The self-description of Rawlsian doctrine as political liberalism is supremely ironic. In fact, Rawls’s doctrine is a species of anti-political legalism. (2000a: 16)

The main problem with liberal legalism is that it “cherishes the illusion that we can dispense with politics” (2000a: 117). As liberalism is post-politics, post-liberalism is the return of the political. Gray advocates the political because, “Unlike the legal adjudication of universal rights, political settlements are local, variable and renegotiable … Whereas the adjudication of rights aims for uniformity and finality, the practice of politics allows for changing solutions in different circumstances” (2000a: 118). He fears the positivist ‘myth’, not because it is a myth, but because it teaches the dangerous lesson that conflict can be overcome if this or that is only achieved: The caliphate, the thousand year Reich, the communist society, global capitalism etc., when instead “we should be learning to live with conflict” (2003a: 103).
Liberalism, Gray says, has always had two faces: An idea of an ideal form of life and on the other an idea of human beings flourishing in many different ways of life: “In the former view, liberal institutions are seen as applications of universal principles. In the latter, they are a means to peaceful coexistence. In the first, liberalism is a prescription for a universal regime. In the second, it is a project of coexistence that can be pursued in many regimes” (2000a: 2). The second view recognizes the existence of non-liberal regimes, the first doesn’t. The first position aims at universal rational consensus, the second on peaceful co-existence. It’s Gray’s argument that liberalism, like all modernity’s other manifestations, is inherently imperialistic. Post-liberalism is supposed to be a politics of respecting neighbours: “In the postliberal and pluralist view I now hold, liberal regimes are only one type of legitimate polity, and liberal practice has no special or universal authority” (1995b: ix-x). With force and some justification, Gray has criticized liberalism for being naïve in its belief, that nationalism and religion could be overcome (if in fact it has believed this), but one is compelled to ask, who’s the most naïve, when Gray puts his hopes for a peaceful world on particularities living side by side. As he says: “Contrary to the hopes which buoyed up Enlightenment thinkers throughout the modern period, we find at the close of the modern age a renaissance of particularisms, ethnic and religious” (1995a: 145). Being fond of using history as proof, he should perhaps take a second look on the history of neighbours. Peoples and communities have never needed modernist or universalist aspirations to invade, conquer and kill each other. Pluralism is none less lethal than monism. Steven Lukes, in a wonderful essay on Berlin, notes: “Perhaps the most dramatic example of thoroughly value-pluralist … anti-liberalism is the case of Carl Schmitt” (1994: 710). Be that as it may, Gray’s non-interventionist position is an argument for the co-existence of liberal and non-liberal regimes, for the respect of the principle of sovereign equality. His vision is Westphalian and no less a product of modernity, than the liberal internationalism, he criticizes. In the chapters on globalization and liberal globalism, this critique of contemporary liberalism for not respecting the legitimacy of non-liberal regimes will reappear as an important element of contemporary liberalism critique and the critique of ‘liberal imperialism’ (Gray 2002). Gray is particularly interesting for us because of his critique of universalism and his advocacy for a (liberal) policy of non-intervention which, it must be added, is not the same as ignoring genocides and other such abominations. In March 2000 he wrote a piece on Kosovo in The Guardian called ‘Crushing Hatreds’ in which he said:
The result of Nato doing nothing would have been a newly divided Europe, with much of the Balkans consigned forever to an outer darkness in which human rights count for nothing … If it had not intervened, Europe’s Orthodox and Muslim regions would have ended up beyond the pale of civilized life, prey to ruthless tyranny and subject to gross abuses of human rights. (Gray 2000b)

What this quote may reveal is perhaps, ironically, the part of the same liberalism in Gray himself, that he tries to criticize in others. There is liberal Western Europe intervening, and there is a suggestion of a liberal, civilized life in Europe and an unliberal, uncivilized life at Europe’s edge, ‘an outer darkness’. There are limits to the pluralism of non-liberal regimes even in Gray.

I’ve allowed myself a few critical comments, because Gray’s position in certain ways resembles the argument of this text: Not least in its depiction of modernity as predicated on a doctrine of progress, culminating in a vision of universal civilization and the end of both politics and history. My disagreements with Gray concern firstly the source of the modernist anti-politics, which I’ll try to explain in the chapters 4 and 5 and secondly the extent of its actual reach. I want to advocate a more moderate position, which doesn’t in actuality reduce modernity to this one aspect and which consistently investigate the limits of this explanatory model, not inflating it to the explanation of modernity in all its positive and negative manifestations.

Berlin’s value pluralism is not, as it may appear at first, a version of politics as conflict. His professed aim is the co-existence of opposing values; a peaceful co-existence that counter-enlightenment liberalism makes possible. Politics as conflict tends to dismiss such a possibility, being that values are inherently imperialistic. Berlin’s value pluralism seems to presuppose a decent society. Gray has a somewhat more conflict-oriented viewpoint, but his project is also the co-existence of opposing values through the medium of non-intervention. In his critique of enlightenment-liberalism, Gray advocates a non-missionary approach to political difference – a live and let live-approach. They, therefore, both assume the possibility of peace through the translation of enmity into value pluralism.
Politics of Faith and Scepticism: Michael Oakeshott and Margaret Canovan

The final two discussed under the heading ‘counter-enlightenment liberalism’ is the conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott and the political theorist Margaret Canovan. Oakeshott may be the one discussed here, who comes closest to an actual counter-enlightenment position, and he is also the one who most explicitly distinguishes between two forms of the political. Oakeshott finds ‘the poles of activity of governing, the extremes (both theoretic and historic)’, ‘the nethermost oppositions in modern politics’ (1996: 17, 18) to be politics of faith or scepticism. Politics of faith is hyper-rationalistic and “the activity of governing is understood to be in the service of the perfection of mankind”. It is informed by “the duty and the power to ‘save’ mankind” (1996: 23, 25). It entails a secular but missionary confidence in the powers of man. As Maistre also puts it, Oakeshott claims, that this position sees mankind as “the creatures of the circumstances, and consequently their perfection is identified with a condition of those circumstances” (1996: 24). The term and characterization of politics of faith matches perfectly with Schmitt’s claim (1934: 49) that all important political concepts are secularized theological concepts. Politics of faith is most prominently, but not exclusively, a child of the Enlightenment (he refers to Francis Bacon as the chief architect of the politics of faith and the *philosophes* as its most important chapter, 1996: 52-7, 63; on Bacon see also his 1991: 17-25). It has shaken off its source of confidence but has kept the zeal and the feeling of manifest destiny. The activity of governing will, therefore, be “minute, inquisitive, and unindulgent” (1996: 29). This is phrased very exactly like Tocqueville’s critique of the egalitarian state. The sceptical approach on the other hand is “concerned to impose the least possible uniformity upon the direction of activity”, whereas politics of faith pursues “the total ordering of the activities of the subject” (1996: 106). It acknowledges no object or activity as irrelevant or outside its reach; it aims at transformation according to stated maxims; it pushes forward, ignoring or removing obstacles. Politics of faith is characterized by a missionary excess, which manifests itself in the amount of force (not portrayed as such) that will be used pursuing the ‘salvation’ of mankind: “no quantity of power will be considered excessive” (1996: 28). This is a charge, we’ll encounter again in the critique of for instance humanitarian interventionism. The governing of politics as faith is an unlimited activity. Its institutions are not considered “as means for getting things done or for allowing decisions of some sort to be made, but as means for arriving at the ‘truth’, for excluding ‘error’ and for making the ‘truth’ prevail” (1996: 27).

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In contrast to the ideal of perfection of politics of faith, politics of scepticism sets quite small goals for itself and for the activity of governing. Like Popper, Oakeshott limits legitimate politics to ‘a specific activity’; “In this understanding of politics, then, the activity of governing subsists not because it is good, but because it is necessary. Its chief office is to lessen the severity of human conflict by reducing the occasions of it” (1996: 32). Oakeshott finds its roots in what we can call respectively the counter-enlightenment camp and the Popper camp: “either in the radical belief that human perfection is an illusion, or in the less radical belief that we know to little about the conditions of human perfection for it to be wise to concentrate our energies in a single direction by associating its pursuit with the activity of governing” (1996: 31). Like Hayek, Oakeshott also discusses security, in relation to the two understandings of the task of politics. On the one hand, we have security “understood as the assurance of relief” (1996: 99). On the other, we have security understood as absolute safety and absolute guarantee.

Digression: Hayek on ‘security’. Hayek distinguishes between two forms of security: Firstly, there is his own preference – we could call it the negative concept of security – ‘limited security’. It can be achieved by all, is compatible with the market system and is therefore ‘a legitimate object of desire’. It is “security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all” (Hayek 1976: 89). Secondly, we have ‘absolute security’ – the positive concept of security – which in a free society cannot be achieved by all, nor is it compatible with the market system. It is “the security of a given standard of life” (1976: 89). Absolute security demands a very expansive and interventionist politics to achieve an utopian goal, whereas limited security, according to Hayek, will come about un-politically due to the workings of a free market. Limited security is a safety net, a minimum kind of security and furthers a very restricted policy agenda. Absolute security is never-ending politics; it promises an absolute guarantee against risk, harm, deprivation and accidents. Hayek claims that the name of the political game at his time of writing is absolute security. It is a basic human desire to be free of risk, and political forces of all kinds cater to this need, compromising personal freedom in the process. Freedom is sacrificed for what Hayek calls ‘the security of the barracks’: “Either both the choice and the risk rest with the individual or he is relieved of both” (1976: 94). Absolute security entails an expansive and ambitious concept of the political with no foreseeable end to intervention; limited security entails a restrictive concept of the political with a high degree of trust in self-organization but also with an acceptance of inequality and other evils that absolute security live to address. End of digression.

Oakeshott understands the unheroic and unsatisfying nature of the sceptical version of politics as technique; this ‘menial occupation’, which have no grand victories or struggles but many small achievements; “in the politics of scepticism the activity of governing is manifestly nothing to be enthusiastic about, and it does not demand enthusiasm for its services” (1996: 38). In the politics of scepticism “a high degree of formality will be appropriate, and there will be considerable attention
paid to precedent” (1996: 37). This is what we earlier referred to as the institutionalization of the political. It has an inherent tendency to routine, bureaucracy and change-aversion. He, therefore, also sees politics of faith as ineradicable, as it services the needs neglected by politics of scepticism, and because it is a necessary continuous readjustment of the politics of scepticism: “Without the pull exerted by faith, without the ‘perfectionism’ which we have seen to be both an illusion and a dangerous illusion, itself evoking a nemesis, government in the sceptical style is liable to be overtaken by a nemesis of political quietism” (1996: 108).

In continuation of this, and important in view of Schmitt’s claim (1934: 49) that modernity in general and liberalism in particular cannot comprehend the emergency, is Oakeshott’s claim that in politics of scepticism, “there can be no emergency” (1996: 108). Politics of scepticism is, therefore, as Schmitt also claimed about liberalism, always in danger of not responding to emergencies and dangers, as it lacks the instruments and mind-set. The sceptical style can provide formality and institutional legalism but not “readiness in genuine emergency … here this style is handicapped by its own virtues … it insists upon technicalities; it is narrow, severe and unenthusiastic; it is without courage and conviction” (1996: 109). Continuing with this Schmittian way of thinking, Oakeshott then names his two styles of politics as ‘earnest’ and ‘play’. The sceptical approach has a tendency to reduce politics to play; and by play he means: “activity pursued on certain specified occasions, at fixed times and in a place set apart and according to exact rules” (1996: 110). This is what Schmitt calls liberalism’s escape from the political. Firstly, it gets reduced to a certain domain and then this domain gets narrowed and formalized until it seemingly disappears. Oakeshott says, in what is almost certainly inspired by Schmitt, that:

Political activity is recognized as a limited activity, distinguished from ‘ordinary life’. The insistence upon formality in the conduct of affairs; the terminal result subordinated to the manner of its achievement; the understanding of debate as conversation and as a perpetual partner in the activity of governing; the recognition of devices (such as majority decisions) as nothing more than convenient conventions; the understanding of the limited significance of victory – all these are at once characteristic of the politics of scepticism and of politics as ‘play’. (1996: 111-112)

Opposed to this is politics as earnest, hard politics, the politics of friends and enemies. Oakeshott is another example of a counter-enlightenment liberalism, that deplores the deficiencies of ‘his’ style of politics but which he nonetheless considers better and safer than a style, where politics really matter and where emergencies is not the exception but the rule.
In a fabulous article on populism as democracy’s shadow, Margaret Canovan (1999), with inspiration from Oakeshott, distinguishes between a ‘redemptive style of politics’ and a ‘pragmatic style of politics’. The distance between the hopes and promises of the redemptive style of politics and the often disappointing or unfulfilled realities of the pragmatic style is “a constant spur to populist mobilization” (1999: 3), which is the theme of her article. Populism is the direct appeal to the people – in the name of the people – against an ossified political-bureaucratic apparatus. It is the alleged mobilization of ‘life’ against ‘the system’; direct politics against institutionalized politics. Populism is therefore also “not ordinary, routine politics. It has the revivalist flavour of a movement” (1999: 6). It has an almost revolutionary mood against ‘politics as usual”; against “backroom deals, shady compromises, complicated procedures, secret treaties, and technicalities that only experts can understand” (1999: 6); against the instruments and logic of politics as technique. Here, I want to focus on yet another (and last) differentiation between two forms of the political. In the theory and practice of democracy, we have the already mentioned two faces of firstly (self-)restrictive liberal institutionalism (democracy as procedure) and secondly unbounded populist mobilizationism (democracy as the people’s self-realization); and Canovan explains the difference (see also chapter 4 on the relation between liberalism and democracy):

1. Democracy is a redemptive vision, kin to the family of modern ideologies that promise salvation through politics. Pragmatically, however, it is a way of coping peacefully with the conflicts of modern societies by means of a highly contingent collection of rules and practices.

2. The notion of popular power lies at the heart of the redemptive vision: the people are the only source of legitimate authority, and salvation is promised as and when they take charge of their own lives. But from a pragmatic point of view democracy is simply a form of government, a way of running what is always one particular polity amongst others in a complex world.

3. Pragmatically, democracy means institutions: institutions not just to limit power, but also to constitute it and make it effective. But in redemptive democracy (as in redemptive politics more generally) there is a strong anti-institutional impulse: the romantic impulse to directness, spontaneity and the overcoming of alienation. (1999: 10)

Canovan states that democracy (and politics more generally) needs a sort of ‘halo of sacred authority’ to function; a redemptive impulse. Otherwise the system corrupts. It cannot function as mere pragmatism. That commands no enthusiasm, loyalty or will to obedience and defence. But a system of redemptive overload cannot function either. It then becomes pure creation and movement.

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29 For further on her take on populism as a genuine voice of democracy see Canovan 1981, 1982, 1984, 2004; see also Gottfried 1999: 110-134, who contrasts it with ‘administrative liberalism’; and the discussion on Telos in chapter 3.
without any form or stability. It becomes a daily plebiscite. In order to work, a political system has
to take institutional forms that separate it from spontaneous popular expressions. But in this move it
also separates itself from its source of legitimacy and innovation, the people. So there is a basic and
constantly shifting trade-off between efficiency and democratic legitimacy. Canovan is more aware
and more sympathetic to the populist reaction or redemptive impulse than the others mentioned
above. She seems to take the threat of ossification more seriously than the others, who (perhaps
with the exception of John Gray) more fear the unruly un-institutionalized people’s power. Their
basic point of departure is – as Canovan quotes another liberal, Ralf Dahrendorf – “democracy is a
form of government, not a steambath of popular feelings” (1999: 12). Their tendency is towards
politics as technique or procedure; Canovan tries to balance a bit longer on the precarious line
between two opposing and interdependent styles of politics and democracy.

One more reason for bringing in Canovan is another article of hers, in which she explicitly makes
the connection between variants of domestic and international political positions. The redemptive
approach is here named the ‘crusaders’ and the pragmatic approach ‘the sceptics’. The first position,
the ‘crusading liberalism of universal human rights’, is what interests us here and is the main
purpose of the above discussion. The crusading liberalism is “a universalist creed”; it is “radical in
its confidence that the world can be changed to conform to this universal order” (Canovan 1998).
The argument coming from the sceptical position is that the pole of positive freedom (Berlin), false
rationalism (Popper), absolute security (Hayek), positivist historical philosophy (Gray) and politics
of faith (Oakeshott) has direct consequences in international politics as well. This pole is crusading,
moralistic and revolutionary in goal and methods; it acknowledges no barriers, no limits, no
restraints from itself or others and no excuses for inaction; it seeks to reframe the entirety of
political relations; it is universalistic in ambition and design; and it accepts no legitimate opposition.
III. Summing up: Liberal Globalism as Expansionist Liberalism

Yet liberal humanism is itself very obviously a religion – a shoddy replica of Christian faith markedly more irrational than the original article, and in recent times more harmful. If this is not recognized, it is because religion has been repressed from consciousness in the way that sexuality was repressed in Victorian times. Now, as then, the result is not that the need disappears, but rather that it returns in bizarre and perverse forms. (Gray 2004: 41, my italics)

Summing up, what the ‘counter-enlightenment liberalism’ have in common is a conservative insight into the limits of perfectibility and a critique of what they see as a dangerous tendency in modern societies to go beyond the prudent and restrictive. Most of them explicitly make the connection between the expansive conception of the political and the Enlightenment and they differentiate between a self-restrictive and an unbounded conception of politics, for which an unending list of thinkers could be marshalled, as Raymond Geuss (2001: 93), who differentiates between Jacobins and liberals (excluding, thereby, the liberals from any complicity in political excesses or crimes):

For the Jacobins, the society or political system as a whole is free if it rules, regulates, and governs itself. … For liberals a society is free by virtue of being composed of free individuals, and the individuals are (negatively) free by virtue of being maximally unimpeded or unhindered by external obstacles in their action placed in their path by the government, or more generally if there is as little governmental intervention in the lives of the individual citizens as possible.

Thomas Spragens (1981) differentiates between a conservative rationalism (Voltaire, Condillac, the Physiocrats) that wants to work within the existing political order and a later radical rationalism (Comte, Condorcet, Chastellux, Jefferson, Paine – he calls it Moral Newtonianism), that were more egalitarian, libertarian and democratic, less accommodating to established patterns of authority and more intent upon using social engineering on mankind itself. He also calls it, not unlike Gray, the technocratic tradition, where politics becomes a science instead of a prudential art. It’s a technocratic rationalism (Popper’s ‘false rationalism’) that acknowledges no limits to its rationalisation of man and society. Governing is a form of creation: “The technocrat is a maker of society. He assumes the role of demiurge, imposing order and form on the chaos of human nature. The technocratic ruler, in short, is a deus faber” (1981: 115). The authors mentioned above seem to share an understanding of the necessity for both forms of politics, although we see a marked tendency to fear, criticize and under-theorize the one pole. Despite their counter-enlightenment version of liberalism, they subscribe to the technical style of politics.
As Jerry Muller says with reference to Burke, Oakeshott and Hayek, the critique against liberal and radical thought revolves around the accusation that they “depend upon a systematic, deductivist, universalistic form of reasoning which fails to account for the complexity and peculiarity of the actual institutions they seek to transform” (1997: 14). In Hayek’s case, his liberalism and conservatism go together in an argument for the institutions of freedom – notably the market – and the critique of overblown, ‘deliberate’ planning. Some conservatives focus merely on the latter and critique the former, whereas some liberals only focus on the former. Muller explains further: “Liberals tend to focus upon the unintended positive consequences of actions. The most striking example of this is the competitive market … It is typical of conservatives, by contrast, to emphasize the un-anticipated negative consequences of deliberate social action” (1997: 15-16). A conservative liberal, such as Hayek (or Tocqueville), focuses more or less equally on both aspects. They also share a feature with both the Counter-Enlightenment and some contemporary versions of liberalism critique (of which Gray himself obviously is one) and that is a highly one-sided understanding of the Enlightenment. It is often reduced to its French version (with capital E) and then further reduced to its most utopian, hyper-rationalist and militantly secular version, which is nowhere near representative for neither the Enlightenment nor for its influence on modern thought and politics. Gray is probably the worst in this respect, but it’s a common trait among enlightenment critiques. Another interesting aspect is the use of religious vocabulary to describe the one being criticized. This applies both to the counter enlightenment liberalism’s critique of expansionist politics and present day critiques of liberal interventionism: It’s a ‘creed’, ‘missionary’; it wants to ‘save’, ‘redeem’ etc. Gray says: “With few exceptions, these savants were actually neo-Christians, missionaries of a new gospel more fantastical than anything in the creed they imagined they had abandoned. Their belief in progress was only the Christian doctrine of providence emptied of transcendence and mystery” (2004: 2); and William Rasch simply calls contemporary liberalism a ‘universalist and expansionist religion’ (2004: 121). It serves, of course, a discrediting purpose in that the separation of religion and politics is foundational for modern conceptions of politics. Actually, it is a way of denying the actuality of modernity. But maybe it also has another connection to the Counter-Enlightenment and its argument of religion as the inevitable source of politics. Just as we talk of the return of the political, this way of describing one’s opponent could perhaps be seen as the return of the religious, although perhaps more in the critique spoken than actually in what is being criticized.
We’ll encounter more of that in later chapters. This chapter has tried to elaborate upon the apparent consensus on two concepts of the political, however much the actual formulations and differentiations may vary, where liberalism favours the one – politics as technique – and different varieties of liberalism critique the other – politics as conflict. This chapter has also tried to demonstrate another important dichotomy between expansionism and minimalism, universalism and particularism, which we’ll return to in following chapters. It’s part of the main argument of this text that these two dichotomies are among the main dividing lines in the world of politics. They are among the premier tension poles of political debate. Perhaps we could say that as an ideal type the progressive sees the world as an universum and claims that ‘difference is a deceit’, whereas the anti-progressive or stationary sees the world as a pluriversum and claims that ‘unity is a deceit’. We can label the two positions, locked in enmity, as the theories of the polis and the metropolis.
Schmitt’s Critiques

The enemy is not someone who, for whatever reason, must be defeated and, because of his unworthiness, exterminated. The enemy stands on the same level as I. For that reason one have to engage him fighting in order to win one’s own measure, own limit, own shape. (Schmitt 2002: 87-8)

Carl Schmitt is both an enigmatic and controversial figure. One is often mandated an explanation and a ‘democratic oath’ of ideological distance, when dealing with his work. This is, so we are told, no innocent or harmless preoccupation. Without rebuffing this as true and without ignoring the often well-founded critiques and warnings, in the following we’ll limit our comments on his commitments and actions during the Nazi-era to the absolute minimum, concentrating on his critiques and conceptualizations. Hopefully, it is clear from the text, that it doesn’t share his politics and that the incorporation of his work in the overall critical theory of the text is painstakingly alerted to the possible dangers lurking in his concepts. In the following, we’ll zoom in on a few key themes in his work useful for our further investigations. Instead of a systematic presentation and discussion of Schmitt’s thoughts, we’ll present a more focused exploration highlighting features and themes in his work not commonly discussed together. The main absence in this exploration is his Nomos der Erde from 1950, which are fast becoming the main work of the Schmitt-reception. I’ve chosen to disregard the work in order to concentrate on his numerous smaller pre-war and war writings on international politics, which hasn’t received quite the same amount of attention as the Nomos-book; and we’ll se a bit closer than usual on his concept(s) of enmity.

The first section deals with the interplay between his thoughts on the political, the enemy and the international. It is argued that Schmitt is best understood as a theoretician of limits in the tradition of the Counter-Enlightenment and this thesis is documented through his various attempts to establish a difference between a true particular, limited and (earthly) grounded existence (of individuals, states, partisans and Grossräume) and an untrue universal and disembedded existence. Furthermore, we’ll investigate a number of enmities inherent in his work and establish the foundation for exploring liberalism’s attitude to the enemy. Finally, the section deals explicitly with his pre-war and war critique of liberal internationalism, not least his critique of a new universal, expansive and liberal imperialism.
The next section deals with Schmitt and the left: Both his readings of the left and the left readings of Schmitt. The aim is to understand the incorporation of Schmittian concepts and critiques in contemporary leftist attempts to reformulate a critical post-Marxist position. It has somewhat of a self-investigating aura about it and is meant as an explanation of the critical origin of this text.

I. ‘Delinquents, Troublemakers, Pirates and Gangsters’

Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war-making all belong on the same continuum.

(Tilly 1985: 170)

This section explores Schmitt’s critique of humanitarian justifications of warfare that culminates in the ‘total war’ against the enemy of humanity and where resistance to the humanitarian war will, as Schmitt said, appear as “the illegal and immoral resistance of a few delinquents, troublemakers, pirates and gangsters” (quoted from Koskenniemi 2001: 434). The democratic revolution and its development into a mass democracy have meant new means of “collective passions the worst of which is the easily aroused anger towards the disturber, the plan-impediment, the saboteur. The saboteur is not only a disturber of peace, perturbateur, he is ideologically the last obstacle before paradise; practically, he is an obstacle for traffic” (1991b: 197). This somewhat hysterical and one-sided version of international humanitarianism will serve us as a way to illuminate what David Kennedy (2004) has called ‘the dark side of virtue’. Throughout the remainder of this text, it is important to bear in mind that it is intentionally one-sided in order to highlight, what is often forgotten or hidden in the humanitarian discourse. In the terminology of below, the text is a ‘conflict partner’ with liberal humanitarianism. So much stronger the obligation of critique.

Liberalism, Play and the World State

In a world without politics, there would be “very interesting differences and contrasts, all kinds of competitions and intrigues” but no opposition so strong “that one can demand people to sacrifice their lives or authorize them to shed blood and kill other people” (1996a: 36). Schmitt is horrified of a world without substantive values: “A life that is confronted only with death is no longer life but only powerlessness and hopelessness … for the living fights not against death and spirit not against spiritlessness. Spirit fights against spirit, life against life” (1996b: 95). Schmitt’s critique of liberal modernity is based on a distinction between seriousness and play; or we could say with Peter Gowan (1994: 116) that he “hails the spirit of Sparta against the bourgeois spirit”. Schmitt’s critique of the bourgeois spirit is the theme of this section, which aims to be suggestive rather than
exhaustive. In an early work from 1925, *Politische Romantik*, Schmitt calls the romantic attitude to the world ‘subjectified occasionalism’ (1982: 24) after Malebranche’s occasionalism that abolishes Descartes’ dualism between the material and the spiritual by denying a causal relationship between them. Instead, it postulates God as the occasion [occasio]; God is the actual cause behind both the material and the spiritual. Romanticism takes over the occasional attitude to the world, replaces *causa* with *occasio*; God is then replaced by the genius as the prime creator. The ‘isolated and emancipated individual’ takes over God’s place and becomes its own metaphysical principle. All ties to something objective, absolute, lasting, to anything outside and greater than the individual is thereby torn over. Occasionalism exempts the romantics from the demands of the world. It has no reality in itself. They have before their eyes “a world without substance and functional obligations, without firm leadership, without conclusion and without definition, without decision and an ultimate court” (1982: 25). The romantic individual creates distance between himself and reality and it makes the romantic able to ironically play out realities against each other in a *Phantasiespiel* and thereby escape the limitation of only one reality: “In irony lies the reservation of endless possibilities” (1982: 105). As the romantic doesn’t feel obligated by anything, by any absolute concepts of good and bad, right and wrong, he is free to get excited and inspired by all kinds of impulses, as long as they do not come too close and start demanding commitment or effort:

Neither religious nor moral, neither political decisions, nor scientific concepts is possible in the realm of the only-aesthetic. But all kinds of matter-of-fact like oppositions and differences, good and evil, friend and enemy, Christ and Antichrist can certainly become aesthetic contrasts and material to plots in a novel and can thereby get worked into the total effect of a piece of art. (1982: 21)

Political categories get aestheticized and are turned into material in a novel; conflicts are dissolved in a higher third; decisions are postponed indefinitely. To decide would be to abandon the romantic irony that lifts the romantic far above the tedious reality; a reality, Schmitt sees as characterized by hard and pressing either-or situations demanding a decision. The romantic is therefore unable and unwilling to take a decision. The romantic action theory is passivity; “always without own decision, own responsibility and danger. Political activity is not possible, only critique” (1982: 224). Discussion and conversation, not action, is his preferred activity. And the discussion is carried on indefinitely since its termination would require taking a stand. Discussion and decision are antithetical in Schmitt’s understanding. Paul Hirst is, therefore, right to argue that *Politische Romantik* “clearly formulates Schmitt’s decisionistic theory of ethics and political action” (1990:
As an alternative to the political romantic, Schmitt points to firstly the Counter-Enlightenment thinkers who are “always of the conviction not to be elevated above the political battle but on the contrary committed to stand up for what they perceived as right and decide upon that basis” (1982: 161); and secondly to Don Quixote who, although motivated by romantic ideas, decided to fight his hopeless battle. He was a romantic politician, but not a political romantic, since he put himself in harm’s way to defend what he saw as right (1982: 207). The irresponsible romantic existence is only possible in a liberal age. Schmitt says: “Romanticism is psychologically and historically a product of bourgeois security” (1982: 141). The romantic is a parasite on a social order, where unboundedness are the preferred norm; where self-determination of right and wrong is hailed as the social ideal; where ‘I’ is the highest and only authority; and where political positions and opinions has no serious consequence: “In this kind of society the individual is entrusted to be his own priest. But not only that; because of the central importance and consequence of the religious the individual is therefore also entrusted to be his own poet, philosopher and king, the master builder of his personality’s cathedral” (1982: 26).

The liberal bourgeoisie took over the aesthetic ideal of romanticism and depoliticized the social order by turning politics into endless discussion and romantic playfulness. The belief in endless possibilities and the resolution of conflicts replaced the political struggle and the political decision. ‘Endless talk’, irony and play are one major side of the liberal denial of the political; another is the substitution of the decision for administration. In Politische Theologie, Schmitt agrees with Weber (1984: 452) that the modern state has become like a big factory; “There is to be only organizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks but no longer any political problems” (Schmitt 1934: 82). Different political ideologies, born out of modernity, are different sides to the same depoliticization endeavour – same Weberian “‘functionalization [Versachlichung]’ of all social relations” (1984: 28). They see politics as a problematic diversion that pollutes the effort and applies other measures than rationality, efficiency and profitability (1984: 24-5):

Modern technology makes itself the servant of any purpose. In modern economy a totally rationalized production conforms to a completely irrational consumption. A wonderfully rational mechanism serves always any demand with the same seriousness and precision irrespective of the demand is for silk blouses, poisonous gas or something else.
In this kind of world there is no need for government or political decisions. Everything is left to the immanent regularity of the economical and technical mechanisms. The economic-technical thinking is unable to differentiate between good and bad, friend and enemy. Technical precision, bureaucratic purposefulness and maxims of profitability replace morals and politics.

There is also a distinct differentiation between an ‘untrue’ urban life and a ‘true’ rural one, which permeates Schmitt’s entire work. The romantic is in no small measure a caricature of the salon Enlightenment, the refined snobbish urbanism of a Voltaire and the technician or administrator is also portrayed by Schmitt as removed from any relation with the earth: “In its smallest atoms the fantasy of a big city dweller is filled with technical and industrial ideas” (1984: 22). Schmitt accepts Weber’s thesis on the relation between Protestantism and capitalism and opposes them to a Catholic spirit that remains estranged from a capitalist mode of thinking and which, therefore, remains political. The urban citizen may be rich in possessions but he is poor in spirit. He has a utilitarian approach to the world and in his economic-technical thinking the individual stands for nothing but himself. There is nothing that points beyond self-interest. Schmitt opposes this to the Catholic who is bound to the earth. He is a farmer, foreign to great industry, and always loyal to his native country. The Protestant, on the other side, has an instrumental and functional view of the land: “He can erect his industry everywhere; he can make every spot his place of business and through his ‘mundane ascetics’ make a comfortable home everywhere” (1984: 17-8). The Catholic doesn’t possess the manipulative skills of the protestant. His is a confined, bounded and restricted existence. He remains, as Schmitt says, true to the earth. The Protestant is the prototype of the private man. Weber’s concept of calling is an individualistic concept. The ‘sacralization’ of the private prevents modern man from having a bond of loyalty to anyone but himself. Public life is expected to be self-regulating on the basis of private interactions and transactions, whereas the ‘Catholic’ existence knows its dependence upon the family, the land and the nation.

An important distinction for Schmitt in this regard is one between land and sea, to which we’ll return below, so just this: In his Gespräche über die Macht from 1954, Schmitt has a chapter called ‘Talk on the new space’, a conversation between three figures Schmitt calls Herr Neumeyer, Herr Altmann and Herr Macfuture, which concerns the contrast between a land and a maritime existence. Altmann is the protagonist of the land-existence, Neumeyer for the sea and Macfuture for the air and space.30 Altmann says: “In the middle of the earthly existence – with all its concrete orders – is the house. House and property, matrimony, family and right of inheritance, all this is grounded in a

30 “In addition to the two mythological animals, Leviathan and Behemoth we have to add a third, a great bird” (1981: 105). On the air as the new space see Schmitt 1995b; 1995c: 422; 2002: 82-3.
land being” (1994g: 56). This is also Schmitt’s position. His main opponent is the maritime existence and: “The core of a maritime existence is the ship, which in itself is a far more intensively technical tool than the house. The house is tranquillity, the ship is movement” (1994g: 56). Below we’ll see that this is also a differentiation between a state and a state-free/dissolving existence. Throughout Schmitt’s work, we encounter distinctions like this one. They are expressions of Schmitt as a theoretician of limits. His opponent in various disguises is unlimitedness, expansionism, and universalism. This is basically what Counter-Enlightenment is about: Borders, limits, constraints, non-possibilities, limitations, hierarchies, differences, the concrete, the necessary etc. Opposed to this, they see the Enlightenment and modernity more generally as essentially a blurring of differences and as an expansive movement that denies any limits or constraints to its outward motions. It is a distinction between an order based on the town or the country, a civic or a territorial theory of association (Ely 1996).

This helps us understand Schmitt’s concept of the political, which is based on a distinction between two realities. As Trine Hauge Nielsen writes, comparing Heidegger and Schmitt, they erect a “dualism between the (existential and political) ‘erroneous’ and its then neglected ‘authentic’. In bourgeois society, the life that is being lived (Heidegger), and the politics being carried out (Schmitt), are characterized by their ‘superficiality’” (2003: 85). We see evidence of this in Schmitt’s distinction between the truth of the exception; “it reveals the nature of state authority in its most clarity”; “the normal case proves nothing, the exception proves everything … In the exception the power of real life breaks the shell of a mechanics stagnated through repetition” (1934: 20 & 22); and the falsification produced by normality. Normality hides and degenerates ‘the power of real life’. Turning to his understanding of the political, we see the same figure. The pacification of the internal has had the effect of hiding the real nature of the political. The understanding of what ‘politics’ is, has been reduced to its ‘secondary’ forms (‘church politics, school politics, municipal politics, social politics etc.’) and its ‘parasitical’ forms (‘tactics and practices of all kinds, competitions and intrigues’), which obscures the real meaning of the political (1996a: 30). The parliamentary politics of ‘the daily polemical bawl’ (1930: 24) stifles genuine politics. In his comparison of Schmitt and Lenin, Eckard Bolsinger states that for both of them:

… politics can be best understood as an arena for perpetual strife among collective actors. At times the contentions may be latent or muted, but they are never absent from any political structure. Though struggles may be channelled, institutionalized, and shorn of their more violent manifestations, they can always gain new actuality. (2001: 49-50)
Real politics is first and foremost foreign politics, that is, war and the preparation for war (and secondly, internal peace). He understands ordinary politics as centrifugal, as dangerously weakening the state by allowing ‘total parties’ to over-politicize the internal and make everything into politics which, in turn, weakens the genuinely political. Opposed to this, Schmitt emphasized (to the point of the disappearance of everything else) ‘high politics’. The true political nation state had, prior to its liberal dissolution, pushed the political to the foreign domain: “Politics in an elevated sense, great politics, was back then only foreign politics” (1996d: 11). In contrast to everyday trivial politics, he insists that “the grand moments of high politics are … the moments when the enemy is viewed in concrete clarity as the enemy” (1996a: 67). We could call it the front line battle moment of the political. Unwillingness to face up to this moment of clarity (and action) is a ‘symptom of the end of the political’ (1996a: 67). The loss of the death sacrifice is the clearest example of a disenchanted and empty world (Palaver 1995). The modern is the post-heroic age, where the death sacrifice isn’t demanded or offered. Life, the purely quantitative continuation of life, is the highest standard. Life, for Schmitt and the Counter-Enlightenment, is without meaning, if it doesn’t contain anything more precious, more sublime, than the mere continuation of the individual existence. The political, for Schmitt, is the attempt at reinstating moral seriousness (Strauss 1988: 119; Norris 1998: 71, 78). Schmitt might not have said it quite like that, but he would agree with the main thrust of Helmuth Moltke, when he said: “Without war the world would deteriorate into materialism” (quoted from Gat 2001: 327). The real only exists in its relation to the possibility of death: “The existential core of the political is the real possibility of being robbed of one’s own being by the enemy” (Nielsen 2003: 86). This is what gives the political its distinct character and it explains Schmitt’s repeated warnings, that those who deny the political loose their independence (1982: 228; 1996a: 54): “The concepts of friend, enemy and battle only gain their real meaning because they have and always will have a special relation to the real possibility of physical killing”; “War is also today the serious case [Ernstfall]” (1996a: 33 & 25).

World peace is, in contrast to the ever present possibility of combat, the ‘idyllic goal of complete and final depoliticization’ (1996a: 54); it is a world without enemies, limits, borders etc. Total depoliticization entails the non-existence of states and the idea of global organization and universality at any price (1996a: 55). It is the entire world turned post-historical and based ‘exclusively on economics and on technically regulating traffic’ (1996a: 58); the whole world as the first world; it is a world of ‘culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment, etc.’ (1996a: 54). In a footnote from 1963, he says that, inspired by Leo Strauss’s critique, he would now
put 'play' instead of entertainment as the counterpart to seriousness (1996a: 120). A world of play is also a world without politics, without the distinction between friend and enemy. So, in essence *depoliticization is denial of the existence of an enemy*. A totally depoliticized entity cannot distinguish between friend and enemy (1996c: 112); nor does it even acknowledge that there is an enemy – understood as an equal but oppositional entity or actor. It is not entirely clear, whether Schmitt totally denies this pacified globe as a possibility (‘If and when this condition will appear, I do not know. At the moment, this is not the case’, 1996a: 54). On the whole, he must reject even the possibility. There is no apolitical possibility. If the world state should come about, the political problem would not disappear. Things would not administer themselves. One would have to ask ‘which people this awesome power belongs to’ (1996a: 58).

**The Enemies**

Gil Anidjar rightly says that “We have not sufficiently thought of the enemy” (2004: 37). In his *The Jew, the Arab* (2003), he sketches a preliminary history of the enemy, but it is fair to say that the enemy has been systematically ignored in philosophy and the social sciences. Philosophy has consistently asked, ‘what is a friend?’ whereas the question of the enemy has been reduced to, ‘who is the enemy?’ and, ‘what to do with the enemy?’ Schmitt is one of the few to deal with the enemy from a perspective other than psychology (Riebener 1991; Volkan 1994) or sociology (Keen 1986; Aho 1994), as he tries to outline a historical and political narrative of the *public enemy*. Individual hate or enmity does not interest him. And most importantly, he is one of the very few who doesn’t initiate his investigation out of moral(istic) horror. The main thesis of his work on the enemy is its transformation from a moral/religious register to a political one; a truly great humanist achievement of Europe as it entails a manageable and contained enmity and then the return of total enmity in a liberal international age. He distinguishes between a number of enmities:

*Conventional enmity* (or just enmity). This is the ideal according to which the other enmities are measured. This is the great achievement of the nation state era. It is also what we here describe as political enmity. It describes a relation of enmity between states who recognize, fight and negotiate with each other. The conventional just enemy is recognized as an equal and the war is thus contained through international law and a codex of honour among combatants. This concept of enmity arises through the de-theologization and de-moralization of international relations. *Silete theologi!*, as Schmitt is fond of saying. The new nation state order was conditioned upon a
'dethronement of the theologians' (1985: 65). Julien Freund (1996: 65) reminds us of Oldendorp, a sixteenth century Lutheran jurist who “used to say that a just war was ultimately no war, but the work of justice, whereas the unjust war was no war either, but a rebellion against the just order. Thus verbal dialectic finally does away with the act of war”. But only on a verbal plane. In the world of flesh and bone, warfare was endemic; and it was the banishment of just war in favour of the just enemy who ultimately stopped the ferocious religious wars and created the interstate order. It marks a transition from a discriminatory concept of war and enmity, where the enemy is a moral or religious enemy to be destroyed, to a non-discriminatory concept, where no one can claim moral superiority and where the political enemy is (only) to be defeated, not destroyed (2003c). In a Schmitt-inspired text, Paul Hirst (2001a: 59) elaborates: “Reason of state limits the enmity of interstate relations in that it makes them a matter of pure power technique: one’s enemy is not an implacable foe but an honourable opponent in a conflict of interests”. The enemy is not a criminal. The clear demarcations between war and peace, internal and external, combatant and civilian/neutral help contain the enmity and its implications. It is a limited and regulated enmity, a ‘duel’ between equal sovereigns. The aim is to impose our will on the other, not to annihilate him. In a footnote to the 1963-edition of Begriff des Politischen, Schmitt explicates the meaning of the conventional concept of enmity as consisting not in the elimination of the enemy but in “the prevention, in the clash of forces and in the creation of a common border” (1996a: 119). This is why he insists on the autonomy of the political decision. It is not informed by or dependent upon other criteria: “The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he does not have to be an economic competitor” (1996a: 27). In actual politics, this is of course not true: “In psychological reality the enemy is often treated as evil or ugly because every demarcation – not least the political which is the strongest and most intensive distinction and grouping – uses all available differentiations as support. But this changes nothing of the autonomy of such oppositions” (1996a: 28). To Schmitt, this concept of enmity is tied to the nation state and his concern for the decline of the nation state is intimately connected to the re-emergence of other kinds of enmities. As Andreas Behnke (2004: 285) says: “In order to channel violence into structured conflict, the State is based on the territorialization and spatialization of the decision between Friend and Enemy”. Once the connection between state, territory and decision is loosened the conventional enmity is dissolved in favour of other more sinister and less containable forms. The paradigmatic war of conventional enmity is the interstate war.
Real enmity is an enmity, which cannot be contained within or by international law. The prime example is the partisan, a non-state contractor of violence, where the rules of law do not and cannot apply as they are characterized by the opposite of the regular army: they hide their status as combatants, they merge with the civilian population; they evade the battle; they have no clear hierarchical chain of command: “The partisan leads the regular army away from the traditional theatre of war and into a secret clandestine underground war, without traditional fronts, without emblems or uniforms” (Slomp 2005: 510). Real enmity, according to Schmitt, emerges where a war is being fought by the population or segments of it to expel an intruder. Its first appearance was, according to Schmitt, in the opposition to Napoleon’s war on Spain and Prussia. Napoleon’s army can be considered the first modern army with mass mobilization, national conscription, national propaganda etc. And at the same moment its counter-force emerges. This shows the precarious nature of the conventional enmity, which produces its own challengers and the fight against the partisan takes on an irregular form, where the fight against the partisan entails copying his tactics. The partisan explodes the distinction between enemy and criminal. The partisan knows that his opponents consider him a criminal acting outside both juridical and moral law. The partisan on his part tries to gain political status as a military and political opponent, that is, to turn the real enmity into a conventional one, although his tactics consistently hinders this transformation.

What distinguishes real enmity from the absolute enmity (to be discussed next) is its connection to territory. The struggle may be fierce, fought with unconventional means and between combatants who do not recognize each other as legitimate others, but it is geographically as well as temporally limited. The goal is to expel the invader, not to exterminate him. We could add that during the decolonization struggles, once the colonizing force was expelled, the disrecognized partisan force often transformed itself into a recognized, legitimate and sovereign state. The partisan blurs the distinction of nation state modernity, peace/war, inside/outside, domestic/foreign, which add to the transformation of enmity, but it still has strong elements of the political, as understood by Schmitt, within it. It is highly significant that Schmitt says that partisan warfare started when, for the first time, a people “pre-bourgeois, pre-industrial, pre-conventional” clashed with the army of the French Revolution (2002: 11). A people tied to the native earth versus a universalizing force. Both the conventional and the real enmity have its limiting factor in the relationship to the earth. It is a true relation between man and earth, which also helps explain Schmitt’s positive attitude towards the
tellurian partisan (we’ll return to the two partisan types in chapter 8). Hence, real enmity is relative and defensive rather than absolute and aggressive. The paradigmatic war of real enmity is war of liberation and its present manifestation could be interethnic civil wars where, as Mary Kaldor (1999: 98) says, “the main method of territorial control is not popular support … but population displacement – getting rid of all possible opponents”. One should not mistake real enmity for a benign or bloodless enmity, should such a form exist.

**Absolute enmity** (or total enmity) is the radicalization of real enmity. The goal is no longer concrete and limited but total and universal. Whereas real enmity is carried by ‘freedom fighters’ liberating an occupied nation, absolute enmity is carried by world-aggressive actors fighting for an abstract notion of justice. The goal is liberation of mankind. Schmitt sees this figure as a degeneration of the telluric partisan. The world-aggressive partisan has cut his connection to the ‘real’, concrete fight; the local fight is only one front in a global struggle. The telluric partisan locates his enemy in a concrete geographical and historical setting, whereas the world-aggressive partisan views his enemy as a universal enemy: A class, a race, a religion. In chapter 8 we’ll discuss how a real conflict may easily slide into an absolute one. The enemy is de-humanized; he stands in the way of the final liberation and his total destruction is hence both necessary and justified. This is a war without limitations. All containments are dissolved; all demarcations other than that between friend and enemy are meaningless.

In his diary from the years 1947-51, *Glossarium*, Schmitt explains the difference between conventional and absolute enmity by the different behaviour of the German army on the Western and Eastern front during WW2. Against the West-European (state) enemies, Nazi-Germany fought a basically non-discriminatory war, where the rules of combat were by and large upheld and the enemy was considered an equal; and then a discriminatory against the East-European and Russian total enemies, where all rules of combat and morality were systematically violated and the enemy was considered inhuman (Schmitt 1991b: 117). As always, Schmitt neglects to deal with the plight of the European Jewry, where Nazi-Germany fought a total, discriminatory war. The wars of absolute enmity are total and often perpetual. For our later discussions, it is highly significant that absolute enmity was initially a religious enmity of Christians against Moslems or of Christians

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31 Schmitt implicitly makes a distinction between the partisan of the country-side and the partisan of the town, the farmer-partisan and the intellectual partisan, for instance in his distinction between Mao, who is telluric grounded, and the professional city-revolutionary Lenin (Schmitt 2002: 58-65). Mao still has reminiscences of the real enmity, whereas Lenin ‘invents’ the absolute enmity.
against Christians. In the debate on its return in humanitarian interventions we often hear the movement behind referred to as ‘secular just war’, ‘liberal crusade’ or the like. The paradigmatic war of absolute enmity is revolutionary war and we’ll argue in later chapters that one of its present manifestations are the wars to end all wars, humanitarian interventions, which, under the guise of legality and status quo, pursues what is in actuality a world-revolutionary agenda.

Schmitt’s description of conventional enmity as a historical reality has been met with much criticism (Herz 1978: 28; Münkler 1982; Brown 2004; Brunkhorst 2004; Koskenniemi 2004; Scheuerman 2004). I intend to use the distinctions between enmities as ideal types not to be found in pure form, directional concepts, that is, concepts which illuminate the field of enmity by exaggerating their differences, even if reality is more blurred. In his *Clausewitz – Philosopher of War*, Raymond Aron has a chapter on the partisan inspired by Schmitt. But he criticizes him, not least for the concept of the absolute enemy, which Aron wants to differentiate further between a *biologically absolute enmity*: ‘Ludendorff-Hitler’, that is, an enmity based on a biological or racist philosophy: “I would call this ‘absolute hostility’ as it alone deserves the term ‘absolute’, since it ends logically in massacre and genocide” (Aron 1983: 368); and *ideologically absolute enmity*: ‘Mao-Lenin-Stalin’.  

Aron is, of course, aware that Mao and Stalin murdered more people than Hitler, but that was no logical or necessary consequence of the ideological enmity:

> Hostility based on the class struggle has taken on no less extreme or monstrous forms than that based on the incompatibility of races. But if we wish to ‘save the concepts’ there is a difference between a philosophy whose logic is monstrous and one which can be given a monstrous interpretation. (Aron 1983: 369)

In chapter 8 we’ll try to continue Aron’s way of thinking and identify four contemporary forms of absolute enmity: the abstract, the moral, the biopolitical and the privatized enmity. The distinction between enmities is not invented by Schmitt. We already find it in a work of Richard Zouche from 1650, *An Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law between Nations, and Questions concerning the Same*, (which also seems to have inspired Schmitt somewhat, 2003a: 395) and of course also much earlier in Antique and Roman works. Zouche says:

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32 In a letter to Schmitt on October 1, 1963 he also mentioned ‘politically absolute enmity (Carthago for Cato)’ (Müller 2003a: 100).
Enemies proper are those whom it is lawful to offend and destroy utterly; some of whom are of a worse and others of a better condition. Of the worse condition are those to whom the laws of war do not apply, such as traitors and robbers. Traitors are those who have taken up arms against their prince or commonwealth with hostile intent, and include rebels and deserters, who have revolted from the prince to whose government they were subject. Robbers are those who go about in the manner of enemies without the authority of a state, as brigands on land, and pirates at sea. Those were brigands, who infested the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul, and were harried by Crassus, but they had no leader of sufficient mark, and were neither notorious nor numerous enough in themselves to be called enemies of the Roman people. Among pirates were the Cilicians, who, breaking the treaty of the human race and destroying commerce, swept the seas with war, like a tempest, as Florus says, and were first checked by Servilius, and afterwards utterly crushed by Pompey. Lastly, lawful enemies are those to whom are due all the rights of war; whom Ulpian defines in these words: ‘Enemies are those against whom the Roman people has decreed war, or who have decreed war against the Roman people’; and Cicero says of them: ‘An enemy is one who has a State, Senate, Treasury, citizens consenting and agreeing, and some method of making peace or war, if occasion requires’. (1911: 37-8)

This quote reveals a number of interesting things. Firstly, enemies are those one can lawfully engage in combat with. Secondly, the distinction between lawful and unlawful enemies, the latter of which are non-state actors: Traitors (rebels and deserters) or robbers (brigands and pirates), that is, people who challenge the state. Against them ‘the laws of war do not apply’. They are hostile towards the state but have ‘no leader of sufficient mark, and were neither notorious nor numerous enough in themselves to be called lawful enemies’. And thirdly, the lawful enemy are the one to whom one owes fighting according to ‘all the rights of war’, against whom one makes a public declaration of war, that is, recognize as one’s equal and finally, as Cicero says, one who is a state (for Cicero a republic). Lawful or conventional enmity is only between states, units of similar organization and understanding:

It is true that various other social realms have often throughout history been superimposed on war, especially in propaganda campaigns, such that the enemy might be presented as evil or ugly or sexually perverse, but the modern theorists insisted on this fundamental separation. War, they thought, could thus be isolated to its necessary and rational functions. (Hardt & Negri 2004: 15)

Gary Ulmen (1987: 188) says that “so long as the state retained the monopoly on politics – the enemy was clearly the public enemy”. The decline in enmities is connected to loss of the state’s monopoly on deciding and naming the enemy. Contrary to presentations of Schmitt as celebrating
enmity and war, as the hidden architect behind the wars of the present American administration, it was Schmitt’s intention to limit both enmity and war to its most contained forms. War is only justified in “the situation of a real fight against a real enemy, not through any ideals, programmes or normativities” (1996a: 49). Implicit is the conviction that both enmity and war is ineradicable, which may be true or wrong, but once you accept the thesis of the permanence of the political (as conflict), you’re obligated to find ways to live with enmity and war. His thesis is that the decline of the nation state will not mean less enmity or fewer wars but rather more unlimited enmities and more ferocious wars. The three enmities above are the ones usually discussed in connection with Schmitt. But there are more concepts of enmity implicit in his work:

Unconventional enmity exists beyond the line of Europe’s borders in the colonial frontierland. This is the colonial enmity, where rules of law, civility and reciprocity are not thought to apply as the opponent is an other in such a profound sense that one recognizes nothing of oneself in the other. Achille Mbembe says very precisely that, “colonies are similar to the frontiers. They are inhabited by ‘savages’. The colonies are not organized in a state form and have not created a human world. Their armies do not form a distinct entity, and their wars are not wars between regular armies” (2003: 24). This non-European form is understood as barbaric, savage, against whom one is free to use tactics and weaponry outlawed and morally inconceivable in Europe. Whereas the conventional enmity is a fight of order against order, the unconventional enmity is one of order against disorder. This is, as Reinhart Koselleck demonstrates in an article on three asymmetrical historical-political opposition pairs: Greek vs. barbarian, Christian versus heathen, human versus unhuman, not a new division. In the Greek context a distinction was made between war as stasis – civil war among Greeks and war as polemos – war against the barbarians, who, as Aristotle said, were slaves by nature (Koselleck 1979: 220). This enmity has another form than the real or absolute in that it was/is conducted by a state asserting its supremacy; it isn’t necessarily exterminist (although it often was). The enemy is to be subdued, not necessarily exterminated. And most importantly, it is an enemy without any status. He is not even regarded as a criminal, as this implies an inclusion in the exclusion. He is beyond the line of any recognition and is often regarded as genuinely sub-

See Drury 1997; Turner 2002a: 104; Wolfe 2004; Walker 2004: 15; Fiorenza 2005 for the argument that the Republicans and the Bush-administration is conducting Schmittian politics. This is a remarkable misreading of Schmitt who was deeply critical of universalist arguments and interventions. If anywhere on the American political spectrum, he would side with the classical realists such as Morgenthau and Kissinger. As Mouffe rightly says: “He would certainly not have condoned Bush’s use of the moral category of ‘evil’ to designate his enemies and he would have rejected his messianic discourse about the American duty to bring freedom and democracy to the world” (2005a: 77).
human (unlike the absolute enmity which ‘only’ describes its opponent as such) and have often been given a biological or civilizational legitimization. Schmitt thought this warfare beyond the line a precondition for the European pacification, a sort of safety valve for aggression and state competition (1981: 71-5; 1991c: 68-72).

In his *Frontiers and Ghettos*, James Ron notes the remarkable difference between violent state practices within a state’s territory. In some areas the residents are (heavily) policed – the ghettos – while in others – the frontiers – they are expelled or killed. This shows a doubling of the unconventional enmity within the state. There can also be areas beyond the line inside states: “frontiers are precariously perched on the *edge* of the dominant polity, whereas ghettos are situated squarely *within* it. Frontier residents can be expelled or killed, but ghetto residents can only be harshly policed” (Ron 2003: 18). Ghettos are incorporated into the polity; they are repressed but included. They are objects of policing not extermination. Ghettos are more heavily institutionalized than frontiers; there is high infrastructural power, which helps explain the ‘softer’ police approach. In the frontierland the institutionalization and infrastructural power is weak and sporadic, which triggers despotic use of indiscriminate power to exert control and dominance (Mann 1984). Its use of force is often ‘contracted’ out to paramilitary freelancers, such as Arkan in Bosnia or the British East India Company. Ron explains the difference with reference to the American experience:

> When the frontier was open and indigenous populations were unincorporated into the US polity, they were targeted for dispossession and massacre. Once the frontier was subject to central state regulation, by contrast, aboriginals were locked in reservations, where they were policed and oppressed, but not killed outright. They had lost their freedom and land, but their new institutional setting shielded them from the final act of physical destruction. By passing from frontier to reservation, surviving Native Americans were spared utter liquidation. (2003: 16-7)

This shows that the line, which marks out conventional from unconventional enmity, may not always be identical with nominal state borders. Weak states tend to duplicate the line inside their territory; and strong states are often those who have successfully eliminated the unconventional or internal enemy. The paradigmatic form of the unconventional enmity is the colony-grabbing war or the turning of the frontier into ‘domesticated’ land but some of its characteristics are also present in humanitarian interventions and the war on terror.
Internal enmity (enemy of the state). The state’s premier task is protecting the border from external enemies and securing the normal situation internally. This gives the state the monopoly on the decision also of the internal enemy (1996a: 46-8). Its paradigmatic form is the state of emergency (but also expulsions and genocide) and its present manifestations are the stigmatization of foreigners as potential terrorists, their exclusion from the country and their loss of rights but also what we’ll later call individualized or privatized enmity in islamophobia and racist violence, where non-state actors take it upon themselves to name and punish the enemy.

Depoliticized ‘enmity’ (or displaced/denied enmity) is the pacified enemy. Schmitt both acknowledges depoliticization as one of the premier achievements of modernity and speaks ironically of the liberal interpretation of this as the end of enmity as such. The depoliticized enemy is transformed into the competitor in the economic field and into the debating partner in the field of politics. Instead of a clear distinction between war and peace, we get the dynamics of a perpetual competition and a perpetual discussion (1996a: 28). Liberalism creates a ‘whole system of pacified [entmilitarisierter] and depoliticized concepts’ (1996a: 70). Schmitt maintains that the internal pacification or depoliticization is conditional upon its external projection in both the conventional and the unconventional enmity. But this is not an end of enmity, as liberalism tends to think. Enmity is displaced to other fields such as the international or it is conditioned upon the unconventional or internal enmity. When the international or conventional enmity is denied, enmity will turn inwards and ignite uncontrollable expressions of violence and hate. The paradigmatic form of the depoliticized enmity is what Schmitt (1988: 272) calls ‘conflict partners’. Its present manifestation is hegemonic liberalism and one of its unintended results is the returns of enmity.

Ideological enmity. Throughout his work Schmitt has two genuine concepts of enmity: The external enmity of conventional interstate warfare and the internal political-ideological one. Schmitt repeatedly states that, “All political concepts emerge from a concrete foreign or domestic opposition … Every political concept is a polemical concept. It has a political enemy in view” (1930: 5). This ideological confrontation has both a domestic and a foreign component. Schmitt was embedded in the fight against the Communists on both fronts. And the confrontation has also both a military and a conceptual side. The military side is either civil war or regular (but ideologicized) war. The conceptual side is the mobilization of concepts against the enemy. Liberalism won over monarchism because they coined an opposition between: “freedom, progress and rationality vs.
feudalism, reaction and bellicism; industry, economy and technique vs. state, war and politics; parliamentarism vs. dictatorship” (1966a: 74). Ideological enmity, like any enmity, presupposes both friend and enemy. Liberalism, according to Schmitt, has lost its enemy, the absolutist state and the feudal aristocracy. It is left without an enemy and that makes its concepts obsolete: “Still, the spiritual atmosphere of Europe remains even till this day informed by this 19. century interpretation of history and its formulas and concepts kept at least until recently an energy despite the disappearance of its old adversary” (1996a: 75). This is what we’ll return to as post-liberalism. Schmitt says that, “The critical moment in the history of concepts is the moment in which its opponent falls. Then disappears also its polemical tension and its historical life unless a new opponent emerges” (1930: 17). I want to argue that liberalism retains its polemical tension by radicalizing its previous enemy, the absolutist state, into the modern nation state as such. This has given rise to liberal globalism, which repeats the oppositions listed above. The paradigmatic forms of ideological enmity are civil war, revolution and ideological war and its present manifestations are religious, civilizational and globalist enmity.

Schmitt’s work on enmity is a defence of the non-moral, anti-discriminatory version of enmity among recognized equals, but throughout his work he also showed himself to be ‘a teacher of criminalizing and dehumanizing the enemy’ (Bolsinger 2001: 174; see also Müller 1999; Stirk 2005: 16-21). He demonstrated theoretically and practically the usefulness of constructing images of the enemy, not least the communist enemy painted with ‘the Mongolian face of Bolshevism’ (Schmitt 1926a: 89; see also 1984: 63-5; 1996b). We may take it, paradoxically, as a confirmation of his thesis on the political.

Land, Sea and Liberal Internationalism

In 1942, Schmitt wrote a mythological history of law, Land und Meer, based upon the difference between political organization grounded in either land or sea. The basic claim is that “man is a land being, a walker on earth” (1981: 7) and that a maritime existence is contrary to human nature. The land and sea existence constitutes two completely opposite modes of being: “Every basic order [Grundordning] is a space order … The true, real basic order consists in its core of certain spatial borders and demarcations, of certain measurements and divisions of the earth” (1981: 71). The fault of the maritime existence is that it implodes all distinctions and divisions.
What makes this work interesting is that it can serve us as a way to understand Schmitt’s simultaneous critique and fascination of liberal internationalism, in particular the American ‘new imperialism’. European international law was, according to Schmitt, based, inscribed or grounded in earth, territory, boundaries drawn on the land and, ultimately, on the division into states. From this, as we have already seen, derives the real, the contained, the most peaceful available kind of law, war and enmity. The Europe of land-based law is the classical epoch, the era of the *jus publicum Europaeum*, where Europe writes the law. This state of (idyllized) international relations is disrupted, when Britain turns to the sea. We get what we could call the maritime borderland, which is incomparably stronger to repress, codify and fill with statehood than the continental land mass. A split is introduced in Europe. Law based on land develops, according to Schmitt, a codified war, a contained enmity, where state confronts state, each with a regularized army. Only the fighting armies are in principle enemies and the civilian population is considered beyond the fightings. This is the scene of the conventional enmity. But once a dominant power turns to the sea, all this changes, because the sea is a stateless space, which renders the interstate containment of enmity impossible (2003b: 382). Britain initiates a ‘space revolution’ in its choice of the sea (1981: 54-7). Out of Britain’s maritime dominance (in the hunt to fill the non-European borderland with colonial dominance, which shows that the non-European world beyond the line was both precondition and destroyer of the Eurocentric order), the absolute enmity re-emerges. The sea is a natural borderland. It isn’t owned by anyone, it defies proper institutionalization or demarcation and it evades being filled with infrastructural power. The sea resists the state. The sea, then, offers another law, another organizational, political and juridical modus operandi, which stands in direct opposition to the state or land based order. In the years 1588-1688 the island of England detaches itself from mainland Europe and becomes the metropolis of an overseas world empire and the creator of the industrial revolution, all this without attaining the continental state characteristics (1985: 66-7). Free trade, industry and safe passage became catchwords of a new universalist-liberal world order, which breaks down the line separating Europe from the rest of the world. A line which used to be defined, according to what Schmitt considered substantial notions of similarity and equality, rather than the new functionalist and internationalist notions of a one world (market).

The paradigmatic war of the state/land order is the clash on the battlefield. The paradigmatic war of the maritime order is the sea war. Inherent in the two are, according to Schmitt, completely different concepts and realities of both war and enmity. In the sea war the war effort is also directed against the trade and economics of the enemy. This makes civilians and neutrals direct participants in the
war (1981: 87-8; 1995c-e; 1995f: 253-9): “The British sea war is total in its capacity for a total enmity. It knows, like only one of the great world historical arts of war, how to mobilize religious, ideological, psychological and moral force” (1994k: 271). The war is not won through a decisive battle but by starving and exhausting the enemy: Blockade, economic pressure, sanctions. Sea war is, according to Schmitt, the first liberal war and its implicit logic is a ‘space-abolishing universalism’ (1995d: 390), which, in Schmitt’s understanding, is the first reappearance of the borderland in Europe. The British are, according to Schmitt, not even principally against exodus, against moving their nation elsewhere, which shows the same kind of lack of attachment to the land, as he thought to discover in Protestants who could erect their industry anywhere (1995c: 421). Schmitt’s narrative is based on the presumption of benign limitation, that is, of the moderating effects of being embedded in a particular, limited context and the dangers of universalist disembodiment; and on a very selective reading of the history of warfare, which dramatizes the difference between land and sea warfare. This is important to bear in mind, as much of the strength of Schmitt’s argument is preconditioned upon this difference, but I’ll argue that his critique can be upheld and developed without this questionable real-historical foundation.

The return of absolute enmity threatens to destroy European interstate law and thereby the containment of war inherent in the paradigm. The enemy is no longer the concrete other on the battlefield but is on the contrary being portrayed as the enemy of humanity. As the battlefield shifts to the sea, the constraints of enmity are abolished. The sea war reintroduces the private contractor of violence, which the nation state had incorporated and conquered as a precondition for its sovereign status. Privateers, freebooters and pirates with semi-public authorization enter the war, blurring the boundary between combatant and civilian on the side of both perpetrator and victim. It is also highly significant that the turn to the sea wasn’t a state decision but a move initiated by whalers, privateers, adventurers and trade companies (1981: 29-44; 1995c: 412-4). The former divide between enemy and criminal, combatant and civilian/neutral, war and policing, ultimately between war and peace dissolves. The enemy is criminalized, which again leads to interventions described as police actions or punitive expeditions. The legitimization of war goes from being described in terms

34 The idea of a space-absolving universalism lies behind many of Schmitt’s critiques of liberalism and it forms part of his anti-Jewish commitment during the Nazi-regime (and possibly beyond). During his interrogation he said: “I wrote only once that Jewish theorists have no understanding of this territorial theory” (quoted in Bendersky 1987b: 99). He was probably referring to the following in his *Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung*: “The basic misunderstanding of the Jewish people towards all that have to do with earth, land and territory originate from their kind of political existence. The relationship of a people to a land shaped by its own settling and cultivation and the thereof derived concrete forms of power are incomprehensible to the Jewish spirit” (1991c: 78-9). This was not the only statement of this kind. Without entering the discussion as to whether Schmitt was an anti-Semite or not, I just want to draw attention to two texts (Schmitt 1935: 86-7; 1936) which are of relevance to the issue of Schmitt’s thoughts on Jewry and territoriality.
of state interest to that of morality. This is no sign of progress in Schmitt’s theory. The new sea-based warfare (which is, of course, also conducted on land, it’s a general mode of war) requires a new concept of enmity to justify its means of combat: The concept of ‘enemy of humanity’ is, according to Schmitt, utterly meaningless, as humanity as such cannot have an enemy, as he/she/they would then be effectively non-human. But the concept is still very useful politically-ideologically: “‘Humanity’ is an especially useful ideological instrument for imperial expansions” (1996a: 55). One side is prosecutor, judge and executioner, whereas the other side is ‘enemy and criminal, vermin and criminal’ (1991b: 76). A new discriminatory concept of war emerges. The concept of enemy is lifted from the concrete confrontation; the aim of the war is no longer just the defeat of a present and actual enemy; the interested parties in the conflict are no longer two or a few more states; the battlefield is no longer geographically contained and the duration of the war is no longer temporally contained; the war is now a just war, the enemy a global criminal and the war aim suddenly “concerns the whole world and is of global significance: It is about naming the political opponent as a criminal who acts against the interest of the whole world and who is the last barrier before world peace” (2005c: 664). To invoke humanity is to occupy a universal concept and thereby immunize one’s own position and defame that of the other. Schmitt is fond of quoting Proudhon, who allegedly said: “Whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat” (1996a: 55). This change in operative enmities makes war more not less likely. It provides new possibilities for ‘international hostis-declarations’ and it “legitimates and sanctions some kinds of wars” (1996a: 52 & 57) As Schmitt says in the closing lines of Der Begriff des Politischen, we have seen the introduction of:

… a new, essentially pacifist vocabulary, which no longer knows war but now only executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, arrangements to secure the peace. The adversary is no longer called the enemy but instead breaker or disturber of the peace, hors-la-loi and hors l’humanité, and a war waged to protect and expand positions of economic power must, through the use of propaganda, be turned into a ‘crusade’ and to ‘the last war of humankind’. This is required in the astonishingly systematic and consequent polarity of ethics and economics. But this apparently unpolitical and even anti-political system too serves either existing or newly emerging friend/enemy groupings and cannot escape the logic of the political. (1996a: 77-8)

The enemy returns with other names. Equally interesting is the change in the forms of international domination. William Rasch (2000b: 16) is right to say that, “The great irony of Schmitt’s life may very well be that if Germany had won the First World War, he might never have risen above the level of a mediocre apologist for the status quo”. What triggered his massive outpouring of critique
of liberal international law was the peace treaty ending WW1, which gave him what Gopal Balakrishnan (2000a: 80) calls ‘a lesson in the concrete meaning of national sovereignty’. The intervention of America in the war transformed it from a confrontation between just enemies into a conflict between morality and immorality whose post-war expression was the war guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty, the mandatory disarmament of the German army, the occupation of the Rhineland and, not least, the discretion of the winning parties as to whether German actions within Germany were to be considered an act of aggression or breach of the peace treaty (Schmitt 1994h-j; 2005d).

For Schmitt the experience became a window into the new forms of liberal-internationalist domination, whose genius was to disguise its effective dominance in juridification, formal absence but effective presence and in an economic and moralist language. The new domination denied its own existence. His main interpretation of the institutionalization of the liberal internationalist regime is summarized by Julien Freund:

At the beginning of this century, the disintegration of international European law suddenly accelerated – no longer on the battlefields, but in assemblies and juridico-political texts, with the benediction of the humanitarian pretext of intervening in international relations. Schmitt emphasizes three decisive moments. First, the Treaty of Versailles, which broke with the tradition of direct negotiations between the victors and the vanquished and which, unable to terminate hostilities, only licensed the suspension of military operations. Second, the League of Nations, founded on the idea that certain states have the right to decide which war will be just, resulting in the obliteration of the classical distinction between war and peace. Either one conforms to law and the actions taken no longer really constitute war, or one is outside the law and war becomes a crime. Finally, the Kellog-Briand Pact, which turned war into a mere police action, thereby criminalizing it – a kind of political exclusion of politics. (1995: 35)

Britain’s turn to the sea was part of shift of power from continental to Anglo-Saxon dominance and soon its epicentre moved to America. Its first institutional expression was the Monroe Doctrine, which was first formulated in 1823 and which was, according to Schmitt, ‘the first great stage in the development of American imperialism’ (1994f: 187) and is also later perceived as ‘the first and so far most successful example of a international legal Grossraum-principle’ (1991c: 22). It was decisively political because, firstly, it had a concrete enemy in view: The European powers who were denied access to the Americas; the US claimed to be ‘the true Europe’ (2005c: 662) and in opposition to the violent and immoral practices of European states, ‘the monarchic-dynastic principle of legitimacy’ (1991c: 29); and, secondly, because it was territorially grounded and limited. The doctrine applied only to the Americas, it basically kept Europe out of the Americas and the United States out of Europe. It was a telluric-political doctrine. It was a ‘defensive
Pronunziamento of a small colonial state’ (1994f: 187). This was the ‘real, original Monroe Doctrine’ and it remained ‘true and unforged’ (1994f: 335) until hijacked by the universalist and expansionist strand of American politics.

The doctrine allowed the United States to intervene at its own discretion. The US decided what its doctrine meant and entailed in actual practice, it kept all options open, chose its own commitments and monopolized the interpretation (1991c: 28). Schmitt acknowledges this as both a great achievement and as the characteristic of ‘every real and great imperialism’ (1994f: 191). The US reserved for itself the right to intervene in all the states of the Americas in order to protect them from outside interference or unwelcome internal developments. Another potent instrument is the recognition or dis-recognition of new regimes. The right to interpretation, and the insertion of exceptions in treaties (and in the case of Cuba in the constitution, 1926b: 70; 1994f: 191), which only strong powers can use, gave the US a great power as ‘officially absent but effectively present’ in both the American countries and in the League of Nations, where the US exercised great power despite not being a member. All this meant that the ‘officially sovereign states’ was under a ‘very effective control by the United States’ (1994f: 192). Judicially the states were sovereign and independent but politically their destiny and high politics, that is, their allegiance and political-economic system, was determined elsewhere, namely in Washington. The important feature of the new imperialism is the semblance of independence. The dominated states have nominal sovereignty but not actual, which, as Schmitt repeats throughout, consists in the monopoly of decision (1926b: 26; 1994f: 202; 2005f: 335, 342). Actual sovereignty “consists in the ability of every sovereign state to decide for itself, in a moment of critical danger, all questions relating to its existence and honour” (1926b: 11). The Monroe Doctrine constituted a political alternative to the European-continental principle of monarchism and dynasty. The liberal-democratic-capitalist principle, which initially, with the enemy in clear sight, was a true political force, degenerated into the legitimization for world dominance once it lost its defining concrete other and its telluric foundation. The new Monroe Doctrine substituted its real enemy for an abstract one and transformed thereby the enmity from conventional or real to total. Schmitt explains the difference in a couple of lines filled with subtextual meanings, which point to discussions earlier on the Counter-Enlightenment and the relation between particularism, universalism and the fear of mixture:
The opposite of such a ground norm, thought out of concrete space, is a universalist world principle which includes all the earth and all mankind. This naturally leads to a mixture of all. While the space thought implied a delimitation and distribution viewpoint and from this a ordering principle of law, the universalist laying claim to world-meddling destroys all sensible demarcations and differences. (1994l: 335)

The new Monroe Doctrine introduces, to use the vocabulary of his Partisan-book, a ‘world-aggressive’ approach to politics rather than the contained, ‘telluric’ one of its initial formulation. Roosevelt abuses the original doctrine as ‘pretext for an especially reckless form for liberal-capitalist Dollar-diplomacy’ (1994l: 336), and the original true ‘space doctrine’, which had nothing to do with liberal-capitalist imperialism (it was old-fashioned imperialism, which Schmitt could recognize and appreciate as European), was turned into a ‘space-disdaining transformation of the earth into an abstract world- and capital-power’ (1994l: 336). The line of self-isolation – America/world – is turned into a line of disqualification and discrimination (2005c: 664); the concrete, geographically limited principle is forged into its opposite, a ‘universalist-imperialist principle of expansion’ (1991c: 32), an ideology of global pan-interventionism (1991c: 27).

The transformation of the defensive Monroe Doctrine into a global doctrine of intervention signals a change in imperial dominance. Dominance is now exercised extra-territorially and indirectly; only occasionally does the dominant power intervene directly on the ground and then only to establish the conditions for withdrawal and the re-establishment of indirect rule. One of the reasons behind the new deterritorialized imperialism is the democratic revolution. This makes territorial expansion a lot less attractive, as it now implies an inclusion of its citizens into the polity (1926a: 15-16; 1994h: 33; 2005e: 794). Annexation is no longer the preferred method of control. Other methods have been developed, which maintains the appearance of sovereignty of the dominated; methods which “avoids the open political subordination in favour of letting the dominated state continue as state, even, when necessary, create a new independent state” (1994h: 31). Like Bauman in the introduction, Schmitt says that, “the controlling state secures for itself all the military and economic advantages of an annexation without any of its costs” (1994h: 35). The new non-annexationist drive, which we’ll later see celebrated as the proof of a new era of European development, is the result of a change in the forms of domination and not a sign of its non-existence.

In summary, the new liberal imperialism consists in a deterritorialized system of domination exercised through international institutions and regimes, through the discretionary power to decide a given situation, and through a humanitarian and moral rhetoric, where the humanitarian actor allegedly “doesn’t conduct war, not even when he with armed troops, tanks and armoured cruiser
does what, if done by any other, would evidently be considered war“ (1994f: 200). The new liberal-internationalist system is, then, not a system abolishing wars per se, as the Kellog-treaty stated, but a way to conduct wars by other names. It is only “wars as ‘instruments of national politics’ which are condemned as wars. Then we must, of course, ask: when is war an instrument of national politics and what are the other wars?” (1994f: 199). This is the question, which the liberal-internationalist system denies and represses. Instead, the liberal-internationalist regimes serve as legitimization for liberal-imperialist wars and Schmitt basically regards the liberal-internationalist institutions, such as the League of Nations, as a ‘legalization-system’. It becomes, in the hands of the strong powers, “an instrument for the preparation of especially ‘total’ wars, that is, wars with a supra-state and supra-national claim of being ‘just wars’” (2003c: 2). The last prominent feature of the new imperialism is its economic nature. It arranges an opposition between the political and the economic and shifts the instruments of domination from battles to sanctions: "Economic instruments of power have replaced the military ones” (1926b: 36). The economic nature of the new imperialism helps hide its imperialist nature by opposing ‘industry’ to ‘politics’ but, Schmitt insists, that it is ‘no less intensively imperialist’ (1994f: 185). The new imperialism hides its nature and effects behind a very effective anti-political façade, which is nonetheless highly political.

At the end of the war and beyond, Schmitt developed a positive successor to the *jus publicum Europaeum*: The concept of *Grossraum* or Big Space, whose inner construction we needn’t elaborate upon here. Suffice to say that it becomes Schmitt’s substitute for the state and that its critical function is to serve as both a counter-weight and an alternative to the universalizing tendencies of the capitalist West and the communist East (1991c: 61, 82; 1994l; 1995d: 390; 1995g: 433; 1995h: 661). The political unit, the *Reich*, within a wider *Grossraum* becomes the substitute for the state as a territorial organization of force and law with the capacity for history making, that is, for conquest and domination, “the principal and creating great is no longer, like in the 18. and 19. centuries, states but Reichs” (1991c: 51). And as Mathias Schmoeckel (1994: 58) says: “Trough

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35 Most commentators see the development of this concept as Schmitt’s attempt to explain, justify and shape Nazi-Germany’s conquests and foreign policy goals (Diner 1989; Schmoeckel 1994: 133; Stirk 1999: 373; Balakrishnan 2000: chap. 18; Carty 2001: 62; Müller 2003a: 43; see however Bendersky 1987b: 93; Schwab 1994; Tunander 1997: 40, note 9; Koskenniemi 2001: 421). During his interrogation after the war he said: “My theory of Raum and Grossraum, construed from rational concepts, contradicted party doctrine from the beginning … It rejected biological viewpoints and arguments” (quoted from Bendersky 1987b: 111). This is, to put it mildly, a somewhat distorted and self-serving interpretation of what was obviously meant to serve Nazi-Germany’s needs and motivated by a desire to become its crown jurist. That he failed to do and become so, says nothing of the nature of his efforts.

36 The Grossraum-concept has been tested, mostly with negative result, against two Western post-war institutions: NATO (Tunander 1999) and the EU (Wæver 1997; Harle 2000: chap. 6; McCormick 2003; Joerges 2003). As we’ll briefly see at the end of the next section it is also being reactivated as an alternative to present-day universalizations.
its plurality of *Grossräume* the *Grossraum*-order kept its political and moral dimension”;37 a plurality of regional powers respecting the boundaries of each other’s spheres of influence. It is an attempt to ground a new international law on territory, this time regional rather than national, but the main concern stays the same: To define borders and to stop universalizing tendencies. Commenting on Schmitt’s *Grossraum*-theory, we can agree with Ola Tunander, who says, that the universalist approach replaces the bipolar friend/enemy differentiation with a unipolar cosmos/chaos divide: “Paradoxically, however, this recognition of difference also implies a possible dialogue between these identities. By contrast, the universalist view denies the Other such a dialogue: because from this perspective, the Other does not exist as fundamentally different, with its own identity and its own Cosmos” (1997: 25). And this is the choice Schmitt asks us to make: Friend/enemy or cosmos/chaos. He is, of course, dishonest because the conventional friend/enemy distinction presupposed, according to his own theory, the distinction between a European cosmos and a non-European chaos. What is true in his theory is, however, the apparent shift from a international friend/enemy system organized in nation states to a globalist cosmos/chaos system organized in post-nation states versus the others.

**II. Karl meets Carl: The Left and Schmitt**

The fact that left-oriented intellectuals now turn to the far right for repetition of Marx’s own arguments thus reflect a spectacular crisis of intellectual confidence … the questions posed and answered under the banner of a left-wing Schmittian perspective would (or could) have been posed equally clearly without his assistance (Thornhill 2000: 226)

The best guide is, I’m afraid, a German legal scholar, Carl Schmitt (Mørch 2004: 489)

Karl Marx and Carl Schmitt aren’t exactly the two most obvious interlocutors. They stood firmly on opposite sides in the great European civil war. Still, there has been a lively debate between the left and Schmitt since the 1920s. Schmitt was throughout his life deeply interested in the theory and practice of the left. Segments of the left have engaged with Schmitt as both an inspiration and an opponent. He is often regarded by the left as solely a ‘theorist of the counter-revolution’ (Günther 1985); his theory is being dismissed as’ the bourgeois counterpart to the class war’ (Petzold 1974: 410; Hofmann 1964: 118); and, not surprisingly, his theory is rejected as ‘fascist’ and, therefore, of

37 And he is quite right to emphasize that this is only a plurality of *Grossräume* not of peoples. It is freedom for the leaders of the *Grossräume* not for its inhabitants (1994: 57).
no positive interest to the left (Habermas 1960; 1998f). Still, he has been and is being read. One could say that just as Schmitt recognized the left as the enemy, he in turn is also being recognized as such by the left: A recognized other with whom one is locked in battle. This section starts with a short discussion of Schmitt’s readings of the left and then proceeds with three waves of left-wing engagements with Schmitt, which each seems to originate in a societal crisis situation: The first crisis in the 1920s/early 1930s was very real and concerned the survival and decline of the Weimar republic. The second crisis in the 1960s/1970s felt very real at the time and concerned the cycle of repression/resistance in Western Europe (rebellion, terror, antiterror) and in the world (colonialism/decolonialization). The crisis of today is perhaps more wished for than real and concerns a dissatisfaction with the global projection and embedding of liberalism.

Schmitt Reads the Left

Throughout his life, Schmitt was concerned with the communist threat and with a critique of liberal society’s soft approach to this threat. The year 1848 symbolizes them both. Its paramount importance is that “since then, socialism gained a political status that made it possible that they could one day realize their ideas” (1926a: 65). 1848 is the year of the proletarian mass and the year where the opposition between democracy and parliamentarianism reveals itself. The liberal bourgeoisie shows itself unable to decide between monarchy or proletariat, reaction or revolution (1982; 1989: 308, 312; 1996a: 68-70). As mass democracy develops and parties become ‘total parties’ (1996c, 1998a), liberalism shows itself unable to deal with this new socio-political situation. One aspect of this situation is the counter-revolutionary emergency. In his Die Diktatur, which is about the transition from a commissarial dictatorship – that suspends the constitution in order to save it – to a sovereign dictatorship – that abolishes the constitution in order to create a new order, Schmitt asks, whether the years 1832 and 1848 doesn’t reveal the political organization and strength of the proletariat and therefore a wholly new situation, which requires new emergency institutions and new political concepts? (1994a: 201). Liberalism is unable to comprehend the new situation created by an organized proletariat, which belies the liberal conception of a society consisting of atomized individuals.

According to Schmitt, Marx’s original contribution was the intensification of history to one final battle between two distinct classes: The working class and the bourgeoisie. The diversity of the social and political stratification was narrowed down to just one opposition, which intensified the struggle, linked diverse struggles across space and time, and created the justification for illegality,
sacrifice and terror. The bourgeoisie was transformed from an object of literary resentment to a world-historical figure: The one extreme opposition, which stood between the working class and freedom (1926a: chap. 3; 1996a: 73). This is, according to Schmitt, the political element in Marxism, which is in contradiction with its simultaneous economism, which shares origin and to some extent also goal with its declared opponent. The capitalist and the communist share an anti-political, economic-technical way of thinking that reduces political differences to organizational or sociological problems: “The great entrepreneur has no other ideal than Lenin: an ‘electrified world’. They really only struggle about how to electrify” (Schmitt 1984: 22; see also 2005b: 847). Even though Marxism understood itself to be in opposition to the liberal bourgeoisie, its critique was an internal critique, as the theory and concepts derived from the horizon and world of liberalism (Dotti 1999). Marx incorporates the philosophy of history of the Enlightenment, which suggests a historical development where hierarchy are replaced by horizontality, obscurity by visibility and transparency, authority by self-organization, alienation with self-realization and, finally, the political by universal friendship. Marxism is Enlightenment philosophy of history with one added stage: History does not end in the liberal but in the communist society. As such, rather than its negation, this kind of Marxism can be seen as the natural and logic development of liberalism (Fontana 2000). Liberalism and Marxism share an anti-politics.

The other side of the proletarian challenge is anarchism. Schmitt’s hero, Juan Donoso Cortés, had found his true enemy in the anarchist Proudhon. Schmitt finds his in Georges Sorel, whose *Reflections on violence* came in 1908 (1926a: chap. 4; 1996b; Gourgouris 2000; Müller 2003b). There Cortés and Schmitt found enemies, who understood themselves as such. Those were real ideological enemies because they countered enmity with enmity and not with the denial of enmity, as liberalism does. In the anarchists (and syndicalists) the political was still present as the distinction between friends and enemies. In Sorel’s theory all systems – of thought and institution – are an infringement on and denial of life itself. In contrast to intellectualized systems of thought, Sorel tries to spell out categories from the directly experienced and lived life, from the unmediated life of the working class, from the myth of the general strike (Sorel 1999: chap. 5) – the latter of which is reminiscent in character and purpose to Schmitt’s concept of the exception. The idea of the myth as a practical category of action draws a sharp distinction to the categories of parliamentarianism. The myth is immune to facts and critique. It is mobilizing, not discussing. It is frightening, terroristic even, not accommodating or neutralizing. Sorel is frightened by the thought of an alliance between reformist socialism and the bourgeoisie that substitutes the total revolt with
social peace. Violence is what reinstates the difference by educating the proletariat and by scaring the bourgeoisie into repressive tactics (1999: chap. 1 & 2). The distinction must be re-established for there to be genuine politics. All else is play and diversion.

Schmitt’s reading of Marxism and anarchism is a replay of his figure: politics/anti-politics where Marxism is accused of perpetuating the depoliticization of Enlightenment-liberalism against which anarchism is commended for staying political, for serving as one of the poles of the political. The anarchists, the rebels, the partisans are Schmitt’s ‘hostile brothers’ in the struggle against a system which has outlived itself and in keeping the political present.

_Crisis and Critique: Two Waves of Schmitt-Readings_

The first wave of left-wing readings occurs in the Weimar republic, where people around the later Frankfurter-school read him. Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann took part in his lectures at the Berlin Handelshochschule in 1930-31. On September 2, 1932 Neumann wrote to Schmitt:

> I agree completely with you in the critical part of your book [*Legality and Legitimacy*] … I see it as my task in the coming period to establish the truth of your opinion economically and sociologically. If one takes the position that the fundamental political contradiction in Germany today is the economic contradiction, that the decisive friend-enemy grouping in Germany is that of labor and property, then it is clear that parliamentary government is no longer possible in the face of such a political contradiction. (quoted from Kennedy 1987a: 47)\(^{38}\)

Neumann shares Schmitt’s critique of the practice of the parliamentary democracy of their time but not his general critique of its contradictory nature. And even if Schmitt and Neumann could agree that the basic contradiction now was economic, Schmitt would allege, that political conflicts played out in economical colours, whereas Neumann would insist on the opposite direction, namely that the conflict was basically economic and that it was now becoming political in the opposition between labor and capital. And they would of course also not be on the same side. The left-wing readings often share the analysis and the critique but seldom the underlying motivation and never the alternative. George Lukács wrote in 1928 a positive review of Schmitt’s *Politische Romantik*, which acknowledged his critique of romanticism, while at the same time bemoaning the lacking materialist-sociological grounding of the critique:

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Schmitt doesn’t even try to find a real-historical explanation; he doesn’t once formulate the right question. This limitation lies therein that he in his social-historical analysis confines himself to vague and empty banalities such as ‘bourgeois’ … without considering the specific historical situation, without investigating the inner stratification of the then German bourgeoisie, without asking which segment the German romantics represented, which societal being their structure of thought corresponded to. (Lukács 1968: 696)

Lukács continued the critical reception of Schmitt’s work after WW2. Schmitt wasn’t included in the first two outlines of Die Zerstörung der Vernunft from 1933 and 1942 and his eventual inclusion probably reflects the bipolar climate of the Cold War. Lukács now takes great effort to distance himself from Schmitt, who is discussed under the heading ‘Prefascist and fascist sociology’ together with Othmar Spann and Hans Freyer (Lukács 1962: 557-576). He is portrayed as ideological theorist for American imperialism and Lukács claims that he now “serves the new American masters just as eagerly as he once served Hitler” (1962: 695). Still, he is recognized as a brilliant diagnostician altogether different from the rest of the ideologues of Nazism.39 Herbert Marcuse (1970) wrote in 1934 one of the first longer critical essays on Schmitt which, together with his enlistment in NSDAP on May 1, 1933, effectively blocked any further readings in this period. There was also the more orthodox Marxist readings by for instance Karl Korsch (1973), but it is Benjamin’s readings and exchanges with Schmitt that has drawn the most attention after WW2 – not least because references to Schmitt was edited out of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel-book (1928), as was a 1930-letter from Benjamin to Schmitt in his Briefe, edited by Gershom Scholem and Theodor Adorno.40 There is no room here for spelling out the overt and covert connections between Benjamin and Schmitt. Suffice to say that they shared a number of methodological traits: In Benjamin’s Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspils, Schmitt’s Politische Theologie is cited as a political-theoretical inspiration and in a Lebenslauf from 1928 he names as his methodological inspiration the art historian Alois Riegel and “the contemporary essays by Carl Schmitt, who in their analysis of the political structure makes a similar attempt [as Riegl] to integrate phenomena

39 On Schmitt and Lukács see Essbach 1995; McCormick 1998; Durst 2004: chap. 2. Schmitt too had a shifting relationship to Lukács. In the first edition of Der Begriff des Politischen Lukács is credited with keeping Hegel alive – a Hegel who via Marx and Engels have travelled to Moscow and whose dialectical method have found a new expression in the proletariat/bourgeoisie contradiction. In the 1933-edition, the references to Marx and Lukács are removed to serve his new masters. But in its post-WW2 1963-edition they are back (Schmitt 1996a: 62-3) and in his article ‘Die Lage des europäischen Rechtswissenschaft’ he calls Lukács’s Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein more important and more topical “than the great mass of writings on philosophy of law and natural law published since 1920” (Schmitt 2003a: 425-6). And in his post-war diary, Glossarium. Aufzeichungen der Jahre 1947-1951, Schmitt comments on Lukács and what he sees as their common understanding of the antithesis legality/legitimacy (Schmitt 1991b: 50).

40 The letter is to be found in Noack 1993: 111; Benjamin 1974, vol. 1, no. 3: 887; and 1997, vol. 3: 558 and in a Danish translation in Slagmark no. 43, 2005.
which only apparently can be isolated in different spheres” (1974: vol. 6: 219). This was a methodological and critical inspiration. These readings of Schmitt were conditioned upon the crisis of the state and parliamentarism and they looked to Schmitt among others for concepts and strategies to understand the transformations of the state and the political.

The second wave was in the post-war crisis years of the Federal German Republic in the 1960s and 1970s. A Maoist, Joachim Schickel, interviewed Schmitt for a book on the partisan (Schickel 1970). This is significant for the renewed left-wing interest, where Schmitt is seen as a theorist of the new wars, the wars of decolonialization and the student rebellions. Schmitt’s own work on the partisan from 1963 (which we’ll discuss in chapter 8) was itself inspired by ‘figures of transgression’ (Horn 2004), which he looked upon with horror and anticipation. Horror, because they signalled the final doom of the *jus publicum europaeum*; and anticipation, because they promised to destroy a system grown timid and tired through repetition. Schmitt was studied in some of the radical parts of the German left where they found inspiration and confirmation in his writings on the exception, on the political as the distinction between friend and enemy, on liberalism as an obsolete societal paradigm, on the priority of action, myth and violence over deliberation etc. Some were fascinated by his aura of danger, his self-stylization as the possessor of arcane and esoteric knowledge, his theoretical militancy and his exclusion from the respectable company. A few even changed their libidinal connection from the rebels of the left and turned Schmittians. Among them was Günther Maschke who shifted allegiance from Fidel Castro to Schmitt and who is now a prolific apologist and publisher of his works (Maschke 1980, 1982; Müller 2003a: 152-4). Joschka Fischer was among those reading Schmitt and Ernst Jünger. In 1982, he looked back upon their fascination:

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41 On Schmitt and Benjamin see Rumpf 1976; Pan 1987; Weber 1992; Noack 1993: 110-114; Heil 1996; Eriksen 1998; Bredekamp 1999; Müller 2003b; Weigel 2004; Agamben 1998: 63-7 & 2005: 52-64. Schmitt apparently never answered the letter from Benjamin which comes across as an act of academic courtesy rather than an indication of any personal relation. Schmitt wrote in 1973 to Hansjörg Viesel that “Unfortunately my attempt to answer Benjamin by investigating a great political symbol [Leviathan] remained unnoticed” (quoted from Bredekamp 1999: 261). It is questionable how much truth we should attach to this statement but in the same series of letters, Schmitt writes than he was deeply concerned with Benjamin in the 1930s and that he was in ‘daily contact’ with mutual acquaintances. In the 1960s and 1970s Schmitt followed Benjamin’s renaissance on the West-German left (Lethen 1999) and he also discussed the *Trauerspiel*-book in his *Hamlet oder Hekuba* from 1956 (1985: 62-7), where Benjamin is criticized for characterizing Hamlet as a Christian and for his inability to distinguish between the historical situation in Germany and Britain. He also, very uncommonly, refers to Benjamin’s letter and writes: “in his book Benjamin uses my definition of sovereignty. He thanked me in a personal letter from 1930” (Schmitt 1985: 64).
Both Ernst Jünger and Carl Schmitt counted already under the student rebellion in the SDS as a kind of secret inspiration surrounded by an aura of intellectual obscenity. They were fascists, no doubt about it, but they were still read with great interest. The more militant the revolt turned, the more the ‘fighter’ and the ‘rebel’ took front of the stage, the more obvious the parallel became. It is also significant that both Jünger and Schmitt followed the student revolt with great and not only negative interest (Müller 2003a: 170, 277). They both saw the rebellion as sort of the same struggle against the system, against the depoliticization and the post-heroic consumer-society, against the technocratic universalism of both the capitalist West and the communist East; and Schmitt in particular felt a commonality with the student movement’s sense of alienation from the Bundesrepublik. The terror and the counter-terror made Jünger and Schmitt even more seductive as they subscribed to a longing for transgression and in the case of Schmitt he offered an understanding of state power and state transformation, which seemed to fit the crisis situation. It was in a similar crisis-ridden and terroristic context that he was read in small circles on the Italian left, the so-called ‘Marxisti Schmittiani’ (Maschke 1986: 586-91; Müller 2003a: 177-180). In a situation of terror, counter-terror, state coups and near civil war, Schmitt became inspiration for a new political existentialism, a fascination of the border line and the exception and for an absolutization of enmity. These readings remained marginal on the Italian left but have probably helped as transition to his present Italian readings. This kind of reading in both Germany and Italy mirrored Schmitt’s reading of Sorel. Another significant element in the new readings was Schmitt’s critique of parliamentarianism as ‘untrue’ democracy. His critical works from the pre-war years (Schmitt 1926a, 1927) could be interpreted as a defence of direct or participatory democracy (although that was not his positive version of democracy, which was along the lines of what Stephen Holmes (1993a: 49) calls ‘soccer-stadium democracy’); as a critique of liberal democracy’s institutionalization and depoliticization of the people’s creative and sovereign powers. Johannes Agnoli took up Schmitt’s critique and named parliamentarism a liberal and not a democratic idea; in fact, liberal democracy blocks ‘true’ democracy (Agnoli & Brücker 1968; Müller 2002: 23-8 & 2003a: 171-7). Agnoli but also Jürgen Habermas (1962; Becker 1994; Schüle 1998) told a history of decline not unlike Schmitt’s. Public discussion was initially open and rational but had declined and this questioned parliamentarism as both idea and practice. Once public discussion was opened to those without Bildung und Besitz, once mass democracy was installed, as both Schmitt and Habermas understood it, public deliberation declined.

Schmitt became the ‘proof’ of the bankruptcy of deliberation, reformism and parliamentarism and for the ever-present conflict between enemies. Among a few, political work was denied in favour of a miracle in a political sense, an emergency situation, a general strike, which could create a ‘condensed point of history’, a moment of truth and action. Political economy, the now vilified classical Marxism, was replaced by a left political theology; political diagnostics was replaced by political existentialism or political vitalism. The self-stylization as oppositional and the disparaging of ‘endless talk’, which is at the core of the Counter-Enlightenment and Schmitt, created what Richard Wolin (1992) has called an ‘aesthetics of horror’, a celebration of life as struggle and of struggle as the only real life, which, in the end, seduced a few into terrorism and a significantly larger number into a fascination of terror.

Critique and the Hope of Crisis: Contemporary Schmitt-Readings

The third and contemporary wave of left-wing Schmitt readings can hardly be understood without a reflection on the consolidation of a liberal hegemony and the simultaneous collapse of the socialist alternative. Contemporary Schmitt-readings are meant to serve a dislodging of the grip, liberal concepts have on contemporary society. They are part of what we’ve already referred to as ‘post-liberalism’, that is, the claim that liberal concepts have outlived themselves and that the gap between representation and reality is steadily growing because liberal conceptions tend to hide certain significant trends and facts. The readings are attempts to break the liberal monopoly of definition and to repoliticize the areas that liberalism have depoliticized. The turn to Schmitt also reflects a critique of classical Marxism, coming from the new left and postmodernism. This is now being compensated for by revaluing the political.

The third wave started in no small measure in the American journal of critical theory, Telos, who started introducing him in the late 1980s and they have kept publishing articles of and on him ever since. Another left-wing journal who has engaged with Schmitt is New Left Review. But the difference between the two is quite striking. For Telos it seems to have been an editorial decision to debate Schmitt, whereas only a few of NLR’s editors have done so and seemingly independently from the overall editorial line. This may reflect their different take on the validity of the left/right-distinction. Where Telos finds it totally obsolete, the new conflict axis is non-economic and goes between the educational elite and the people, NLR insists that the political world is still divided between the have and the have-nots and that the ‘classical’ domestic and global power-struggle

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43 It even led to a Danish warning to the left against using Schmitt (Hansen 1986). This was, to my knowledge, the first mention of Schmitt in a Danish context.
This has bearing on the Schmitt-readings. Telos has published a number of biographical and bibliographical articles of a clear apologetic nature (Piccone & Ulmen 1987, 1990; Bendersky 1987; Schwab 1992; Ulmen 2001) and has opened the journal for (Schmitt-inspired) right-wing radicals such as Alain de Benoist, Gianfranco Miglio and Paul Gottfried. NLR has never had articles directly dealing with Schmitt, a number of the editors has written quite critical articles elsewhere (Anderson 1993; Gowan 1994), and one of them has written a convincing yet highly critical biography (Balakrishnan 2000a; see also his articles 2000b, 2003b, 2005 & Balakrishnan & Scheuerman 2001). Much the same goes for the journal Radical Philosophy where one of the editors, Mark Neocleous (1996), warned against Schmitt, but he has since used him in order to grasp the history and transformation of the state (2003b).

Still, he has played a significant role in NLR as inspiration for its turn to global politics and the critique of what I call liberal globalism. Telos is somewhat less interested in that aspect – although articles on the topic have appeared. They are more interested in the distinction between elite and people and the use of moralism and multicultural universalism to control the ‘lower classes’. Much like Christopher Lasch, the journal attempts a merger of American populism with European liberalism critique to halt the dangers of bureaucratic centralism, consumerist conformism, technocratic routinization and capitalist globalization of American daily life. One could say that they attempt the opposite move of that of the globalization-critical movement: They try to localize and particularize. The old divides between capital and labor are being rephrased as one between the governing elites and the general public, between on the one side the centralists of the welfare state, who wants to extend welfare state principles to all problems, who make every political problem into a socio-technical one, thereby maximizing their own power, and then on the other side ordinary people, whose values are those of self-dependency, local autonomy, and who feel invaded and violated by the cultural values and social programmes of the governing elites. Both old and new left are part of the problem as they have, unknowingly, allied themselves with transnational capitalism by turning people into consumers and clients, thereby depoliticizing the social field. This has laid individuals and society bare for an invisible penetration of capital and state turning people into passive recipients, while the new governing elites have secured for themselves both good jobs and a self-understanding as morally good. Opposition to this new welfare state regime is then depicted as evil and obstructivist (or racist as in the opposition to bussing). People are a material on which to perform good. They are not good in and of themselves. They are rather looked upon with suspicion and disdain. Telos is attempting the populist solution to the decline of socialism. At present all
claims to have moved beyond left and right covers up an actual turn to the right and this also goes for Telos. As one of their critics, Boris Frankel (1997: 65), has written, Telos “combines vestiges of critical theory with American small-town populism, anarchist anti-statism, European right-wing regionalism, nationalist mythology and a profound anti-modernism”. Incidentally, this sounds a lot like Schmitt’s eclectic approach and just like he did then, Telos now promotes a conservative critique of capitalism which focuses on its cultural implications rather than its distributive consequences. Their depoliticized culturalist critique of capitalism and state promotes the conservative agenda in America, who brandishes a ‘market populism’ (Frank 2001), which aims to dissolve the redistributive policies and the libertarian cultural policies. NLR’s critique is markedly more in opposition to the global power constellations and its projections of force around the world (this is the kind of critique this text is part of):

The tattered if victorious flag of the Free World has been lowered. In its place the banner of human rights has been erected – that is, first and foremost, the right of the international community to blockade, to bomb, to invade peoples or states that displease it: Cuba, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq – and to nourish, finance, and arm states that appeal to it: Turkey, Israel, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan. (Anderson 2002a: 24)


This use of Schmitt to criticize the emerging liberal global human rights regime has been met with fierce criticism from Jürgen Habermas, who in the 1980s warned against a renaissance of a ‘new conservatism’ (Habermas 1983; 1989: 128-139). In recent years the warnings has increased (1998a: 166; 1998b: 134-5; 2001b: 44, 118-122; 2002b: 174-5). He warns against the “the sons of Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, and Martin Heidegger, men who sought to lure us back into the extraordinary rites of the ‘boldness of Dasein’ with the bloated longing for hardness and weight”; The warning is particularly written for the left and especially for the “Carl Schmitt-inspired Great Suspicion of the subversive left” (Habermas & Haller 1994: 31 & 158). This was an appropriate warning and criticism in the second wave of left-wing Schmitt readings but it doesn’t seem to fit the present one.
It seems Habermas is trying his ‘classic’ manoeuvre of closing off non-liberal options as morally defunct – as he also tried with French postmodernism painting them as new conservatives.44 Besides the warnings, Schmitt has in recent years received quite a lot of attention from Habermas due to his attention on the postnational constellation and the Schmitt-inspired critiques of the same. Schmitt’s thinking on the international has become something to not merely condemn but also refute (Rasch 2000a; Wheeler 2001). For Habermas, the great problem of the Schmittian approach to international law and politics is the implicit claim that behind every universal assertion lurks a particular and strategic interest; that any moral statement is a façade behind which power politics hides. This is the ‘great suspicion’, Habermas spoke of above, and which he is right to stress as a constant danger. Any attempt to codify moral principles in international politics, to establish institutions of cooperation and peace, any talk of humanity and the international community is discarded as politics by a different name; It “senses behind every universal validity claim the dogmatic will to domination of a cunningly concealed particularism … they can recognize such arguments only as the rationalistic masquerade of sheer, existential self-assertion” (Habermas & Haller 1994: 21). This is the problem with the approach taken in this text: the tendency to a perpetual discourse of suspicion and even conspiracy.45

Habermas stresses the ability to learn from catastrophes (2001d), that is, a qualified progressive understanding of history, which opens up for qualitative changes of the national as well as the international, unlike the realist or Schmittian static understanding of the international. But perhaps the difference is not all that great. Both Habermas and Schmitt stress the pacification of the national space and the codification of the international by the modern nation state. The difference being that Habermas endorses going further – and beyond the nation state – while Schmitt bemoans this as a degeneration process with ultimately dangerous consequences, a return to pre-state barbarism. But still, Schmitt promoted a post-nation state model, the Grossraum. Ultimately, they differ on the evaluation of the nation state. For Schmitt, it is “the only carrier of order, progress and humanization” (2003b: 382) and he fears and deplores what he calls ‘the European dethronement’ (1988: 269). Habermas, despite reservations of particular aspects of globalization, welcomes the changes into a postnational constellation. The nation state is no longer the adequate answer. It is increasingly becoming a dangerous and morally reprehensible entity. At first glance, Habermas’s

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44 We’re also beginning to see studies on Schmitt and Foucault, see Ojakangas 2001, 2004: 47-50; Dean 2004; Schmitt and Deleuze, see Ojakangas 2004: 121-6; Watson 2005; Schmitt and Derrida, see McCormick 2000; Diderichsen 2005.
45 As in the left journal Covert Action Quarterly which started by outing CIA-agents but whose suspicion towards an American-led New World Order has led them to ‘support’ or excuse Milosevic as in ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. See the articles by Diana Johnstone 1998, 1999a, b.
position may appear less euro-centric than Schmitt’s, but as I’ll try to demonstrate later, Habermas is just as European in outlook and diagnosis as Schmitt, and just as willing to let a European experience dictate the global one. Habermas rejects Schmitt’s fear that morally legitimated wars will become total wars against the enemy of mankind, because violations of human rights in the ideal cosmopolitan constellation are not “evaluated and fought off in an unmediated way according to philosophical moral standards, but instead are prosecuted as criminal acts within a state-ordained legal order” (Habermas 1996b: 268). This institutionalization of legal procedures is what, according to Habermas, will prevent human rights interventions becoming total wars. But the Schmitt-inspired critique of liberal interventionism fears exactly this institutionalization and criminalization because legality has become ‘an unexpectedly adequate instrument for a permanent revolution’ (Schmitt 1988: 270); a globalizing revolution or rather the legitimization of what Bauman calls ‘globalizing wars’. Habermas continues:

The argument [of total war] is not exactly convincing because the charge of a ‘moralization’ of war becomes empty once a ‘constitutionalization’ means a juridification of the international relations. Once the required procedures are instituted, positive law protects the accused through the rules of law against any premature moral condemnations … The best indicator for the transformation of international relations are the blurring boundaries between domestic and foreign politics. With the fall of the classic demarcation between inside and outside Carl Schmitt’s polemical concept of the political with its unequivocal connection to national self-assertion also falls away. (2004e: 13-14; see also 1997a: 135-149; 1999b: 2001g: 118-122; 2004c: 187-193; Mendieta 2004: 103-5)

Habermas wrongly claims that Schmitt’s concept of the political is by necessity tied to the nation state and that it is, therefore, obsolete. The Schmitt-inspired approach anticipates the returns of the political in the blurring boundaries between domestic and foreign politics. This is what part 3 of this text is all about. Habermas asserts that Schmitt overestimates the benign features of the nation state. This text answers that Habermas greatly overestimates the benign consequences of the postnational constellation, which is less characterized by the disappearance of the distinctions of the nation state than by their returns.

Slavoj Žižek is representative for the Schmitt-readings, who criticize the Habermasian approach for not seeing that the ‘end of the political’ as the distinction between in/out, friend/enemy is not something to be jubilant about, but rather something to fear, as the political returns in the shape of terrorism, humanitarian interventions, racist violence etc. Žižek invokes the figure of Lenin as a counter-image to the post-political ‘collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public
opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists’ (1999a: 30), who translates every political confrontation into a manageable problem to be solved through social engineering and where the political disguises itself as moral condemnation. This is also a critique of those leftist who are not capable or willing to do the necessary: “Those who oscillate, those who are afraid to take the second step of overcoming this form itself, are those who (to repeat Robespierre) want a ‘revolution without revolution’” (2002b: 8). Instead, Žižek wants the political confrontation to show itself as such. As we saw in the chapter on the Counter-Enlightenment, they criticized liberalism for eluding the confrontation. Žižek combines the Leninist and the Conservative, just as Schmitt combined the anarchist and the counter-revolutionary. They are “authentic in the sense of assuming the consequences of his choice – that is, being fully aware of what it actually means to take power and to exert it” (2001: 2). The return of Lenin is the return of the political: “What Lenin did for 1914 we should do for 1990. ‘Lenin’ stands for the compelling freedom to suspend the stale, existing (post)ideological coordinates, the debilitating Denkverbot in which we live. This simply means that we obtain the right to think again” (2002e: 553). Lenin and Schmitt become symbols for thinking beyond both the current liberal hegemony and the left’s attempts at resuscitation through identity politics, the third way, multiculturalism etc.

Another attempt to use Schmitt in order to think beyond the horizon of liberalism, is the work of the late Paul Hirst, who also in his work on globalization showed a remarkable ability to think beyond the conventional liberal dogmas (Hirst 2003; Hirst & Thompson 1999, 2002). Inspired by Schmitt, Hirst writes that in the present liberal-democratic hegemony “we are thinking in terms which were already obsolete in the nineteenth century … The liberal-democratic view of politics is grossly at variance with our political condition” (1990: 105-6; see also 1996: 97, 101; 2000: 288). This is consistent with Schmitt’s claim from Der Begriff des Politischen (1996a: 75) that liberalism hasn’t developed, despite the fact that present society doesn’t resemble the society in which its concepts and institutions were formulated; and from Die Geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1926a) where the precondition for parliamentarism – free and open discussion – has been thwarted by the rise of mass democracy and total parties without any change in the institutions or legitimacy of parliamentarism. Hirst recognizes Schmitt’s thesis that liberalism and parliamentarism had its time in the interval between the absolutist state of the 17. century and the total state of the 20. century (Hirst 1990: 110, 132). The result is that “viewed from a strictly

46 In a number of essays Hirst has also elaborated on Schmitt’s thesis on the liberal escape from the political in a critique of socialists (1986), the peace movement (1990: 138-50), postmodernists and culture critics (1990: 128-137), civil society theorists (1997: 156-181) and cosmopolitans (Hirst 2001; Held & Hirst 2002).
classical liberal standpoint, we are now living in a ‘post-liberal’ society” (Hirst 1996: 108); but we still live with liberal concepts and convictions. Post-liberal society means that the basis of liberal society has vanished due to societal changes: “Each of the three main features of the classical liberal societal architecture – limited government, autonomous civil society and clear separation of public and private spheres – has disappeared” (Hirst 1998: 358). For Schmitt the analysis points towards a reconfirmation of state authority and the primacy of power politics. For Hirst the conclusion is a strengthening of individual autonomy and entrenched democratic control.\(^{47}\) The outline of the critique is similar but the political conclusions diverge quite dramatically.\(^{48}\) Representative democracy was developed in a time of both limited state intervention and of a small bureaucracy and it is inadequate to control a highly interventionist welfare state (2000: 287):

... the institutions of representative democracy were invented in the eighteenth century to govern largely self-regulating societies in which the role of government was strictly limited. Such representative institutions are ineffective at rendering accountable modern ramified public service states, since the government plays the contradictory roles of service provider and the source of accountability for such services ... In its place we have an ‘organizational society’ of state bureaucracies, quasi-governmental agencies, corporations and large bureaucratized bodies in the non-profit sector.

Parliament has in effect been reduced to a machine for what Schmitt (2003a) called ‘motorized legislation’ or to what Hirst calls a ‘tool of party government’ (1990: 118; see also 1986: 102; 1990: 133; 1994a: 4; 1996: 107). The belief in parliamentarism de-democratizes our societies as it hides the fact that power has disappeared from parliament and into a largely unaccountable governmental and state apparatus (Hirst 2001b). The conclusion is (Hirst 1994: 3):

Even in the most effective and responsive of political systems, modern representative democracy offers low levels of governmental accountability to citizens and of public influence on decision-making. Democracy has become far more a means of legitimization of the centralized and bureaucratic government of the nation state than it is a check upon it.

Hirst makes similar analyses on each of the liberal ideas and preconditions such as the autonomous civil society (1996) and the public/private divide (1995, 1998), which he shows to be far off in actual practice from its liberal ideal. The expression ‘liberalism’ obscures that we are living in a society at huge variance with anything resembling classical liberalism.

\(^{47}\) Schmitt solution is the qualitative total state (1994b, c, 1996c, 1998); for Hirst it is associative socialism or democracy (1988; 1994a, b; 1995: 356; 1996: 113; 2000: 287-293).

Schmitt concluded that the post-liberal condition meant that it was too late to revive ‘the age of deliberation’ (1926a: 90) and therefore also to maintain representative democracy. Chantal Mouffe agrees with Schmitt on the critique of liberal democracy, but she says, that “Instead of concluding that party politics has become irrelevant, we must redraw the lines of a confrontational politics in a way that will bring a new vitality to democracy” (1995b: 499; Rasch 1997). Schmitt depoliticized the internal national field and defined democracy as a substantial homogeneous community. Schmitt is anti-political in that he displaces conflictuality to the external. Political unities, for him, are pre-political. His basic distinction is not politically constituted to begin with but is merely the claim of already existing boundaries (Mouffe 1999a: 50; 2005a: 14). Mouffe repoliticizes national community by insisting on confrontational lines across the social field. Pluralism is constitutive for society and democracy is the constituting articulation of the plurality (Mouffe 1993). Identities are relational and interactional (Mouffe 1994, 1995c). The precondition for political democracy is plurality of positions. The political is not, as Schmitt thinks, the defence of political identities, but their constant creation and re-creation. Without defining differences both democracy and its citizens lose orientation and identity.

The problem with contemporary liberal politics is that its post-political machinations empty democracy and political identities of all content. The only remaining political force is right-wing populism, which clearly articulates a number of conflictual distinctions: people/system, citizen/foreigner (Mouffe 1995b, 2005b). The success of right-wing populism is in no small measure due to their use of political passions (Mouffe 1996; 2002). The denial of political agonism, that is, a democratic conflictuality, results in political antagonism, what Slavoj Žižek calls hyper-politics, that is, perverted and dangerous manifestations of the political. Paradoxically, liberal-democratic anti-politics create its own opponents. Right-wing populism is not afraid to emotionalize politics and they are, in effect, the only alternative to a post-political rationalistic and technocratic liberal modernity legitimated by the likes of John Rawls, Richard Rorty and Habermas (Mouffe 1993: chap. 3; 1999b, 2000). The aim of democratic politics is not, what liberalism seems to think, namely the overcoming of conflictuality, but rather its articulation in democratic forms. When this is closed off, political identity-making takes on less benign forms. The theory of the constitutionality of conflicts is antithetical to liberal rationalism, which claims that the obstacles to the full realization of a liberal-democratic society are empirical. Mouffe insists they are ontological and therefore permanent. They are inscribed in the democratic logic, in “the democratic requisite of drawing a frontier between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (1999a: 46): “Liberalism has to negate antagonism
since, by bringing to the fore the inescapable moment of decision – in the strong sense of having to decide in an undecidable terrain – what antagonism reveals is the very limit of any rational consensus” (Mouffe 2005a: 12). Liberalism undermines democracy by closing the political confrontations and renaming moral ones between the good and the evil:

This ‘post-political’ discourse is accompanied by the promotion of humanitarian crusades, ethically correct good causes and the increasing reliance on the judiciary to deal with political issues. What this signifies is the triumph of a moralizing liberalism which pretends that the political has been eradicated and that society can now be ruled through rational moral procedures and conflicts resolved by impartial tribunals. It is the culmination of a tendency inscribed at the very core of liberalism. (2001: 2)

The inherent plurality of modernity denies any closure of the socio-political field, but this is exactly what liberalism tries by defaming opponents as immoral and by presenting their own position as the rational and the universal. Mouffe’s theory points toward the potentially totalitarian implications of any attempt at closure. The social is only temporarily stiffened politics, that is, it is “sedimented, regularized and institutionalized forms of the political” (Dyrberg 1988: 90). It doesn’t allow for any perpetuity or moral superiority. We are not, as the liberal theory alleges, witnessing the decline of political antagonism, but its shift from a political to a moral register between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’. In a discussion of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, Mouffe criticizes, what we’ll later call liberal anti-pluralism, that is, a liberal sense of superiority, which disregards the whole history of regime forms and of acknowledging enemies as equals in favour of a moral defamation:

It is very revealing that the only type of radical opponent which such a model can envisage is the ‘traditionalist’ or the ‘fundamentalist’ who, in reaction against the development of the post-traditional society, attempts to reassert the old certainties of tradition. Those traditionalists or fundamentalists, by their very rejection of the advances of reflexive modernization, place themselves against the course of history and obviously they cannot be allowed to participate in the dialogical discussion. In fact, if we accept the distinction which I have proposed between ‘enemy’ and ‘adversary’, this type of opponent is not an adversary but an enemy, i.e. one whose demands are not recognized as legitimate and who must be excluded from the democratic debate. (2005a: 49-50)

As many other left-wing readers of Schmitt, Mouffe has also in recent years turned her attention towards international politics as the prime arena for liberal post-politics and the liberal shaming of political opponents as morally inferior. Liberal society is not to be exported or presented as the universal good, as the only adequate or legitimate regime. Mouffe are finding inspiration in
Schmitt’s regionalist *Grossraum*-thinking (2005a: 115-8; 2005c). One could call it a global localism meant to erect barriers toward a uniform globalization. Mouffe wants “to take pluralism seriously instead of trying to impose one single model on the whole world, even if it is a well meaning cosmopolitan one” (2005a: 115). The left should acknowledge Schmitt’s dictum that the world is a pluriverse, not an universe, and strive for what we could call a reformed internationalism, that is “the establishment of an international system of law based on the idea of regional poles and cultural identities federated among themselves in the recognition of their full autonomy” (2005a: 117).

**III. Summing up: War is War, Enemy is Enemy**

It is high time to wake up from the dream of Westernization and to realize that the enforced universalization of the Western model, instead of bringing peace and prosperity, will lead to ever bloodier reactions on the part of those whose cultures and ways of life are being destroyed by this process. (Mouffe 2005a: 87)

Schmitt’s work is highly one-sided. John Herz (1992: 309) is right to say that “Schmitt’s political realism comprises only one aspect of the ‘political’, that of conflict and enmity”. It serves the very important purpose as contrast to an equally one-sided liberal understanding. Schmitt’s insistence on the political as conflictual and the attention to its possible returns, serve as a reminder to call war, also and especially humanitarian war, by its proper name and to look for the ways in which the enemies of the new order is being named and dealt with. Schmitt’s work on the enemy and the international may serve us as a forecast. That is very much the purpose of this text, which agrees with the modest, perhaps even amoral, goals of William Rasch:

> What is to be done? If you are one who says there is a war, and if you say it not because you glory in it but because you fear it and hate it, then your goal is to limit it and its effects, not eliminate it, which merely intensifies it, but limit by drawing clear lines within which it can be fought, and clear lines between those who fight it and those who don’t, lines between friends, enemies, and neutrals, lines between combatants and non-combatants. (2005: 260)

This is something else than to fantasize about the end of enmity and war altogether. But given the perspective and thesis of the text it may be all one can hope for. The hope for more may actually make matters worse as the ‘war to end all wars’ become a perpetual series of ‘police operations’, when humanitarian violence is projected as the continuation of democratic peace with other means.
Part 2:

Formulating the Dream
The Liberal Dream of a Modernity Without Violence

Not heroism but hedonism is the motor of history.
(Voltaire, quoted by Garrard 2003: 22)

Ever since Francis Fukuyama proclaimed 'the end of history', it has been ridiculed and dismissed. It’s fair to say that his thesis doesn’t have many declared supporters. Part of the reason lies in a (sometimes deliberate, oftentimes ‘journalistic’) failure to understand, that it was the end of the history of political ideas that he proclaimed, and of course not the end of history understood as the passing of times and events. For those, who managed to read all the way to the last section, which carries the same title as the seldom mentioned second part of the title of the book, ‘the last man’, there is little to justify the dismissal of him as a jubilant neo-liberal. What he does there, is to open the door for the re-emergence of history (thereby playing it safe on both horses or on both historical spirits on horse to speak Hegelian). But that is not the topic here. Fukuyama’s strongest claim is, that “We cannot picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from the present one, and at the same time better” (1992: 46). This is a view, separated from its philosophical grounding, shared by Richard Rorty, who says: “my hunch is that Western social and political thought may have had the last conceptual revolution it needs” (1989: 62). Fukuyama claims that enmity, real ideological confrontation, is the motor of history, and that it’s now over with both history and enmity. Behind the two statements of Fukuyama and Rorty lies a strongly dualistic reading of history common in liberalism. Liberal modernity is contrasted to the Christian era, the middle ages, feudalism, totalitarianism, fundamentalism etc. It is this dualistic view of history, rather than the idea of progress, which characterizes liberalism (Gay 1967: 33-4), although the progressive philosophy of history may be said to be an element of this bifurcation of the world. The view, common to both the Enlightenment philosophers and their critics, that the Enlightenment signalled a decisive break with the old world in both historical and conceptual terms (meaning that the old world can persist or re-emerge in other countries or as a constant peril in the minds of men), is a very important part of the liberal view of the world and itself. It gives the moral superiority that often expresses itself as moralism; it gives the energy, which belies the prejudice that liberal societies are weaker than non-liberal societies; and it gives a moral and political purpose in international politics, as we’ll see in the next chapter. It’s the dichotomy between the premodern and the modern, the barbaric and the civilized, the crude and the polished, the dark and the enlightened, the irrational and the rational, the prisoners of passions and the detached, the violent
and the peaceful etc. These are differentiations that present themselves to liberals as self-evident, and we’ll see them in various forms throughout the remaining chapters. One final version, which is re-gaining strength through the globalization debate, is the West versus the Rest, and not in a Huntington sense as a clash of civilizations, but, as Silvio Berlusconi, to the dismay of many, happened to say: Western civilization (as the only civilization) versus the non-civilized rest. This is really what we’re seeing, although of course not presented as such. The ‘crime’ of Berlusconi and Fukuyama was to state in a crude and public way what liberalism and liberal internationalism/globalism has always ‘known’ and pursued: A world in the image of Europe. When Fukuyama and Rorty say, as they do, it is not because the West won the Cold War. This is not the conflict they’re referring to – although it is the occasion for Fukuyama. The conflict won is the victory of the Enlightenment and liberal modernity over absolutism and barbarism. Rorty writes in succession of the already quoted: “J.S. Mill’s suggestion that governments devote themselves to optimizing the balance between leaving people’s private lives alone and preventing suffering seems to me pretty much the last word” (1989: 63). Add Adam Smith and you have the position of Fukuyama. What they are presenting, is Western liberalism as the end model of the world; the historic and local conflict with and victory over specific rulers and ideas are presented as ‘pretty much the last word’ for the world. Liberalism has no enemies, no equals, and we have, therefore, effectively lived in a post-political West since the Enlightenment.

The following is a small attempt to highlight some of the preconditions and first formulations of the ‘Fukuyama-Rorty thesis of the end of history’. A thesis, I claim, shared by mainstream European liberalism, acknowledged or not, and which have clear consequences for the liberal understanding of the international/global and of the liberal/illiberal. Liberalism expresses and acts what I’ll later call a ‘liberal anti-pluralism’ when it comes to the illiberal, which is rooted in and conditioned upon its struggle with non-liberal politics and sociability; a struggle which coined the liberal idiom and programme and which continues to inform liberal outlooks and interpretations.
I. The Machines that Run Themselves

Man is generally considered by statesmen and projectors as the materials of a sort of political mechanics. Projectors disturb nature … it requires no more than to let her alone. (Adam Smith, quoted from Wolin 2004: 270)

The new social sciences of the Enlightenment introduced a new element of (dis)order in the social: Man himself. Man was now portrayed as restless, ambitious and unsatisfied. For both Kant and Smith there is in man a constant urge to better one’s life; an urge which is man’s nature and purpose (Kant 1966b; 1966c: 90; Smith 1976, I: 362-3). The future became a present concern. It was anticipated by Hobbes’s anthropology and presented itself for the Enlightenment as both the problem and solution of sociability. A restlessness is introduced in the social, which Marx and Engels characterize in 1848, as the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie, and which Adam Ferguson described thus: “If he dwell in a cave, he would improve it into a cottage; if he has already built it, he would still build to a greater extent”; “his emblem is a passing stream, not a stagnating pool … we mistake human nature, if we wish for a termination of labour, or a scene of repose” (1995: 12, 13). The emerging social sciences portray man as expansive and innovative, as stepping over obstacles and going beyond existing limitations. In ‘Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte’ from 1786, Kant (1966c: 87-8) describes it as the exit from the childlike life in paradise; an exit caused by reason transcending the limitations of instinct in the pursuit of a better life – in this case (and important for later discussions) the art and combination of food products. This exit from paradise is the precondition for progress but it’s also the condemnation of a life in uncertainty, want and worry. The future has become a topic for man and with it comes dissatisfaction. Modern man is unsatisfied, in constant struggle to better his station in life. This struggle may be individually motivated but, and this is the great discovery of liberal sociability, it has collective beneficial effects (Kant 1966a: 34; Smith 1976: I, 477-8; Carrithers 1995: 246). This was most famously named and described by Mandeville (1957) as ‘private vices, public benefits’. Restlessness causes man to bump into others in pursuit of the same. For Hobbes, this was ultimately the cause of war. Kant re-describes it as ‘asocial sociability’. There is in man a desire for society and a desire for individuality. It is the desire for individuality or self-assertion (in which sociability is then inscribed in the comparison with others, again something Hobbes knew) that produces a conflictual relation between men (Kant 1966a: 33; 1966c: 95-6). For Kant, it is this conflictuality “which awakes all the powers of man, which brings him to overcome his inherent laziness and, driven by ambition and lust for power and property, makes him secure himself a position among his
fellow men, whom he not actually *likes* but which he can neither stay *away* from” (1966a: 38). Hume discovers the same in his essay ‘On the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’ as his second observation of what we can call his sociology of progress (1963: 120-4). He says, that nothing is more favourable to development and progress than emulation among neighbours, whether the neighbours be nations or individuals.\(^{49}\) The reciprocal jalousie animates ceaseless effort and enterprise. Kant notices the same as ‘the provisional arrangement of nature’, which through war has spread mankind across the globe and "forced it to enter into relations of a more or less regular [gesetzlich] kind" (Kant 1966d: 219, 220). For, after having spread mankind, nature uses language and religion to keep the peoples apart in nations, which at first creates animosity and war but which eventually furthers ‘the lively competition of peoples’ (1966d: 226). Kant also sketches the solution to the asociability: A self-enclosure through the righteous civil constitution, which enables man, like the trees in the forest, to shoot up in the air rather than grow crookedly and uncontrollably in all directions (1966a: 39-40). He does, however, also say that “of so crooked a timber that man is made of, nothing completely straight can be made” (1966a: 41). Man is not all plasticity, but the general argument is, that society leads the asocial energies into beneficinal occupations and pacified forms. Thereby, it makes use of the energy of asociability without its discordant properties. Other human or social energies are viewed with considerable more scepticism, if not outright horror. Those are the energies, which turn the asocial sociability into enmity rather than competition; the centrifugal energies that make enemies rather can competitors out of men. The ‘new man’, described and promoted by Enlightenment-liberalism, is often described as ‘flat’, ‘abstract’, ‘empty’ in contrast to a ‘saturated’, ‘concrete’, ‘grounded’ man, as we saw in chapter 2. An opposition is made in liberal theory between a past, where ‘deep’ convictions were politicized and embedded within the polity, and a liberal future, where those convictions are depoliticized and confined to the private sphere. This is not done out of any weak or impoverished understanding of human nature and motivation but from a conscious exclusion of its legitimate place and significance in the political. Michael C. Williams is, therefore, right to say:

\(^{49}\) The many city-states of ancient Greece is the ideal, the golden age. The Roman-Catholic Europe destroyed the peaceful emulation by unifying Europe. Uniformity darkened Europe: “But mankind having at length thrown off this yoke, affairs are now returned nearly to the same situation as before, and Europe is at present a copy, at large, of what Greece was formerly a pattern in miniature” (Hume 1963: 122). Enlightenment has created the basis for a new golden age; and geography has blessed Europe with natural conditions for progress.
The shift to abstract visions of the person (separable in principle from their religious, ethnic or class 'identities' or 'communities'), was a move toward pacification. The liberal focus on rules and rights as opposed to 'the good' and values emerge not primarily (if at all) from an uncritical certainty concerning the universality of individual 'interests' or a naïve assumption of atomistic egoism. On the contrary, the stress on rules and rights as opposed to substantive visions of justice and community reflects a deep and abiding fear of what happens when ethics of 'absolute ends' leave the realm of personal conscience and enter the field of politics and the contestation for state power. (1998: 214)

Tolerance, scepticism, moderation, impartiality, legalism – the sum of what was in chapter 2 called 'the regimes of temporary truth' – is a barrier against the politicization of passions and convictions. The translation of enmity into competition – which in large part takes place through the 'institutionalization of evaluation and discussion, of doubt and temporality' – is namely conditional upon the relativity and discussability of convictions. If they are not, enmity and conflictuality persists. The institutionalization of doubt is meant to secure the political marginalization of 'the good' (Hall 2002; Mouffe 2002). Passions and convictions are 'translated' into interests to secure the passage from enmity to competition (Hirschman 1992: chap. 2, 1997); from monarchical power to state interest; from aristocratic temper and pride to bourgeois self-interest (Holmes 1995: chap. 2; Ehrenberg 1999: chap. 4). Michael Walzer summarizes the liberal understanding of passions:

Interests can be negotiated, principles can be debated, and negotiations and debates are political processes that, in practice as well as in principle, set limits on the behavior of those who join them. But passion, on this view, knows no limits, sweeps all before it. Faced with contradiction or conflict, it presses inexorably toward violent resolutions. Politics properly understood, politics in its reasonable and liberal version, is a matter of calm deliberation – or, if agreement is, at least partially, in prospect, of mutual accommodation, calculated trade-offs, adjustment and compromise. Passion, by contrast, is always impetuous, unmediated, all or nothing. (2002: 617-8)

According to a study on the Scottish Enlightenment by James Farr (1988), we see there a linkage between the establishment of political science and a 'politics of moderation'; a linkage which contains a critique of the pair, superstition and enthusiasm. There is in the establishment of the social sciences a preoccupation with governability threatened by political, social and not least religious ungovernability. When Hume in the beginning of his essay, 'That politics may be reduced to a science', describes himself as a 'friend to moderation' (1963: 13), it is partly a reflection on his personality and partly a result of an idea of the strong link between moderation and modern politics. Moderation is in contrast to any strongly held beliefs, sects, superstitions etc. Hume writes, therefore, in an article on parties:
As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated; because the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other. (1963: 55; see also pp. 75-80, 211)

The preferred liberal method of depoliticization is, what Michael Walzer (1984: 315) calls ‘the art of separation’, where in which is created “a world of walls, and each one creates a new liberty”. Liberalism, like all world views, draws a particular version of the social map. The picture of absolutism that we have inherited from early liberalism is one of social homogeneity. The social particulars were united or co-dependent. Religion, politics, economy, family were tightly connected and interdependent. They constituted one, firm sociability. In the confrontation with this social reality, liberalism started drawing new lines and erecting walls on the social map. They started to differentiate the elements of the social, defining their different functions and internal modus of operation, thereby making them autonomous. A new socio-political map was drawn up in which a number of ‘social machines’ were constructed, each working in accordance with its own laws and rules. In this way was created the free spheres of science, private life, economy etc. But also a separate sphere called ‘politics’, which was to be confined to the state and which could, accordingly, contract or expand. Adam Smith’s invisible hand is the most famous expression of the internal workings of non/sub-state spheres; of what the liberals put in the place of the dominance of power: The self-regulating and the autonomous (Smith 1976, I: 477; 1982: 184-5; Tully 1993: 92; see however Rotschild 2001: chap. 5). The non-state spheres are expected to regulate, control and perpetuate themselves. The ‘social machines’ are expected to develop specific logics and functionalities, which secures the proper allocation of attention, resources and knowledge. The capitalist economy is, of course, the best known example of this but the idea is common to a number of other ‘spheres of freedom’, other ‘machines’. In each of them rules a hidden hand, a principle of operation, which secures the optimal result. Interference creates sub-optimal outcomes.

The liberal optimism has been eloquently described by Friedrich Hayek in his critique of ‘obscurantist’, reactionary conservatives, who lack “the belief in those spontaneous self-adjustments that makes the liberal accept change without fear, even though he doesn’t know, how the necessary changes will be implemented”. The liberals are, according to Hayek, “the party of life, the party of free growth and spontaneous evolution” (2000: 5, 8). The machines that run themselves have a depoliticizing effect. Once referred to the workings of these societal machines, the material is made non-political and so are the effects. They are neutral and rational; they know no other distinctions or
reasons than the most effective, just, profitable etc. They know of no enemies. They can produce only sphere-specific competition among economic competitors, scientific scholars, lawyers and prosecutors, parties in parliament and so on. They have no internal or external conflictuality, nor do they politicize. As they grow, the political retracts.

This chapter deals with the re-description of the social map in order to create this society of machines that operate independently and differently from the political. The first of these was secularism, the separation of religion and politics. In 1660, Locke wrote that religion had become “a perpetual foundation of war and contention … all those flames that have made such havoc and desolation in Europe, and have not been quenched but with the blood of so many millions, have been at first kindled with coals from the alter” (quoted from Tully 1993: 47). The answer was depoliticization of religion in order to limit the state’s legitimization of wars abroad and repression at home. This will be the first of our themes in this chapter: The ‘dialogue’ between Hobbes and Locke on religion. The next part deals with the most important ‘machine’: The capitalist market, or more precisely, homo oeconomicus and socio oeconomicus, that is, economic man and commercial society, which emerges in critical response to what is perceived as its political counter-parts, namely aristocratic man and the irregular rule. This leads to the next part, liberal man as mediocre and the dissatisfactions created by commercial society. Second part concerns the institutionalization and juridification of the political and the liberal dichotomization of the good, rule-bound, procedural regime versus the barbarian, arbitrary and decisionistic regime; a discussion of representative democracy as a machine for turning internal political enemies into parliamentarian opponents; and the second part ends with a short section on the prerogative as a residual element of the political within liberal societies.

An Exchange on Religion and the Political: Hobbes and Locke

The separation between the public and the private is an all-important element in liberalism allowing for continuous depoliticizations. It serves as the basic model for the idea of a division between something political and something unpolitical. It is a premise for the separation that activity in the private sphere has no direct or determining political consequences and that the social order is not threatened or destabilized by the private. These are the premises pursued here: political/unpolitical and the wall between public and private. The ‘scandal’ of Hobbes is to question this separation. To him, the private is very public and from this he draws illiberal consequences. The separation is deeply problematic because interpretations and organizations in the private have direct and
damaging consequences for the public. Locke, on the other hand, tries to erect a barrier by
maintaining the unpolitical nature of private faith. This discussion serves as an entrance to the
discussion of liberalism and to throw further light on the duality of politicization/depoliticization.
Hobbes may be politicizing religion but he is simultaneously depoliticizing it. Locke may be
depoliticizing religion but that’s an inherently political move; it’s an intervention, a decision of
demarcation. Let’s start by comparing the definitions of the church. Hobbes says:

… I define a CHURCH to be, A company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Sovereign;
at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble. And because in all
Common-wealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant from the Civil Sovereign, is unlawful; that Church also,
which is assembled in any Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawful Assembly. It
followeth also, that there is on Earth, no such universal Church as all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no
power on Earth, to which all other Common-wealths are subjects. (1985: 498)

It is not the status of the church as God’s instrument on earth, which concerns Hobbes. It is the
subordination of the church under the rule of the sovereign. In the question of the individual
Christian’s obedience to the temporal ruler, Hobbes develops a minimalist theology, which simply
states: “Jesus is the Christ” (1999: 144; Manenschijn 1997). This belief is all that is required for
salvation, and the subject can, therefore, be indifferent as to all the outer rituals and dogma that the
sovereign prescribes for his territory. It has nothing to do with individual salvation and the subject
can accordingly be obedient to both God and the sovereign and there is, furthermore, no reason for
doctrinal strife. Religion is subordinated politics, or rather: It is part of politics (Strauss 1992: chap.
5; Martel 2004). Locke, on the other hand, attempts a separation. This is evident in his definition of
the church, which people join for ‘the salvation of their souls’ (1955: 20). Its aim is (1955: 22-3):

… the public worship of God and, by means thereof, the acquisition of eternal life. All discipline ought therefore to tend
to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing out nor can be transcended in this society
relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is here to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever.

Hobbes’s focus was on the right of the sovereign to determine the content of the national faith.
Locke’s is on individual salvation. For Locke, the church’s power is limited to ‘exhortations,
admonitions and advices’. Excommunication from the religious community is ‘the last and utmost
force of ecclesiastical authority’ (1955: 23). It’s the last remainder of the political in the religious.
The authority of the church is concomitant with its confessional borders. It has no voice outside the
church. And the outside has no voice within the church. Locke makes no mention of the sovereign
or to the geographical boundaries of the church. The church, for Locke, is autonomous in a way that
Hobbes would abhor as the prelude to civil war. Although Locke’s primary adversary was the
monarchist absolutist Robert Filmer (1588-1652), and despite the fact that Hobbes is scarcely
mentioned in Locke’s writings (Dunn 1969: 58-83; Tully 1993: 100-1; Laslett 1999: 67-93), it is
here the not very controversial argument that a great part of their thinking is concentrated on the
same political problem: The preconditions of social order and peace. Something they both saw
threatened by religious enthusiasm and sectarianism. The following is based on a somewhat
different attitude to the problematic of their time than the one, C.B. Macpherson (1962, 1985) calls
‘possessiv individualism’. It seems, despite the qualities of his analysis, that the central problem of
the time was political and not economic.
What we perceive as good or beneficial is not so in and by itself but only, according to Hobbes,
because they seem so for us. These perceptions are shaped and conditioned by the desires (and
fears) of man. There is no natural order among things, no necessary or pre-existing harmony or
agreement about their value or ranking. Hobbes says: “For True and False are attributes of Speech,
not of Things” (1985: 105) and further:

… whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good … For these
words of Good, Evill, and Contempible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing
simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects
themselves … (1985: 120)

The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those
Passions till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Laws be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made,
till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it. (1985: 187)

This means, that in the state of nature there is no agreement on the socially important categories
such as right and wrong, yours and mine, God and Devil, sin and non-sin etc.; categories, which
requires a minimal consensus for a society to function. According to Hobbes, this minimal
consensus arise neither spontaneously nor necessarily. The contextual background for Hobbes is the
English civil war, which, according to Hobbes, had its reasons in disputes over interpretation,
disagreement about basic categories (1985: 236-7). Or rather, in disagreement over who had the
right and authority to define the categories. Dispute over the right of interpretation and naming is
the chief cause of civil war. This is the background for his two civil war pieces, *Leviathan* from 1651 and *Behemoth* written about 1668 and first published in its entirety in 1682, three years after his death. Put very simply: *Behemoth* is about the cause of the trouble, *Leviathan* about its solution. Interpretational dispute leads to political strife, which then leads to civil war as people tend to group in warring factions. *Behemoth* is the story of the connection between intellectual dispute and physical strife. Taking a short look at the seven reasons (and seducers) that Hobbes, in the shape of the teacher A, identifies in *Behemoth* for the corruption of the people and the outbreak of the civil war, we see clearly the problem of interpretational dispute: 1) priests who believed they had a right from God to rule their congregation and the congregation a right to rule the country; 2) people who thought the country should be ruled by the pope; 3) people who thought they had the right to interpret the bible themselves, what Hobbes calls ‘liberty in religion’; 4) people who in their youth had read Greek and Roman authors and who therefore mistook monarchy for tyranny; 5) people in London and other important trading cities who compared Britain unfavourably with the riches of the Netherlands after they liberated themselves from the yoke of the Spanish crown; 6) soldiers of fortune and others with unfulfilled ambitions who longed for a war they hoped to win and profit from; 7) people in general who were ignorant of their duty to the king or of the need for a king (1993: 2-4). With the possible exception of the sixth reason they all deal with disagreement on (or ignorance of) the right to interpretation. Civil war is caused by doctrinal liberty.

The English civil war was a rebellion of scholars. It was led by people who, unsupervised and independently, read the Bible and Greek and Roman history. Hobbes writes: “The core of the rebellion … is the universities” (1993: 58). They are, according to Hobbes, “an excellent means to divide a kingdom into factions” (1993: 148). They are the Trojan horses of Britain, employed by the pope to undermine the king and to educate the seducers who with “unintelligible distinctions … blind men’s eyes, whilst they encroach upon the rights of kings” (1993: 40). The state of nature is not, despite Hobbes’ effective formulation, a war of all against, all but of group against group. The state of nature’s main conflict is actually not individuals against individuals but collectives against collectives, not generalised war but civil war. And at this time that meant religious collectives as religion was highly political; or perhaps we should rather say, religion was the medium of politics. It was through religion that political demands could be phrased and mobilized upon.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{50}\) There is here an interesting parallel to Islamic fundamentalism which could be interpreted as the blocked political expression of the Arab street; finding its political voice blocked by repressive regimes, they phrase their political demands in religious terminology. See Fukuyama & Samin 2002 for an interesting interpretation along these lines.
The core of the problem lies in the erroneous continuation of the interpretational freedom of the state of nature in the state of society. In the state of nature everyone has rightly the freedom of interpretation but with the transition to the state of society this is the main right being surrendered. The state of society is characterized by a monopoly of interpretation and naming; a nominal dictatorship. This also means that any interpretative authority not sanctioned by the sovereign is unlawful and, according to Hobbes, highly disruptive of social order and peace. He seems to have left somewhat of a space of tolerance for private dissent unthreatening to the public peace (Lister 1998: 54-6) but that is highly subordinate to the much more present concern with dispelling any dissenting voices. Hobbes’s solution to the social problem of individuality and difference is to hand over the right of decision to the sovereign. He is given the supreme authority over conflicting truths; he gains a monopoly on the differentiation between right and wrong, mine and yours, god and devil etc. and removes people from the ethical and epistemic anarchy that the state of nature is (Williams 1996). This is the primary right or freedom that the subject surrenders in the transition to society. In the state of nature there is not only a lack of authority, order or coordination, of security and trust. There is also a lack of truth, conventionally speaking. Hobbes is not afraid (in a rhetorical strategy we may call ‘learning by fear’) to draw the widest possible consequences of the interpretational anarchy, where everyone has the right to everything, even each other body:

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall virtues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. (1985:188)

Just as the defining characteristic of the state of nature is individual freedom of interpretation; and not the more known and rhetorical strong, “And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (1985: 186); so the defining characteristic of the state of society is the monopoly of definition (1985: 202, 227) and the monopoly on interpreting the word of God (1993: 51-2). On the frontispiece of *Leviathan*, the sovereign holds the secular sword and the religious crosier. There is no talk of a separation between politics and religion (Strong 1993). Hobbes’s goal is, as the subtitle to *Leviathan* says, ‘a common-wealth ecclesiasticall and civill’, and as he says in chapter 39:
“Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double and mistake their Lawfull Sovereign” (1985: 498). This shows that there is no equality between religion and politics. The maintenance of the sovereign monopoly demands the constant repression of other centres of interpretation. The sixth right of the sovereign is that of censorship: "it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace”. This is essential: "For the actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions” (1985: 233)

Out of this monopoly comes property and morality. A famous quote of Hobbes is that “Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words” (1985: 223), wherefrom one could conclude that the monopoly of violence is Hobbes’s primary concern. But one is struck by the very few considerations of this and of the far greater emphasis put on education (the word) rather than on violence (the sword). Despite his recognition of the importance of a monopoly of force it is obviously the monopoly of definition that ensures the peace and interests Hobbes. It is therefore not in line with the rest of the argument when Hobbes notes: "Of all Passions, that which inclineth men least to break the Lawes, is Fear. Nay … it is the onely thing … that makes men keep them” (1985: 343). Unless Hobbes is only talking of passions and not on what in general secures obedience, this famous quote sits uneasy with the main argument of the text. The main argument is focus is on persuasion (1985: 365-8, 379-383). He writes, therefore, in Behemoth: "the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people” (1993: 16). The last foundation of authority is not the suppression of the body but the enchantment of the mind (Holmes 1993b: 16). Andrew Lister (1998: 44) is, therefore, right to argue that the central goal of Hobbes was to reshape public moral discourse through the political demarcation of acceptable and unacceptable.

Hobbes is no liberal (Tarlton 1999, 2001). He entertains no notion of the natural harmony of interests, no theory of equilibrium or balance, no idea of a spontaneous social ordering or of society in any meaningful sense before the state. Society is politically constructed and guaranteed; there is ultimately nothing outside politics. Hobbes’s answer is highly political. It is a political intervention at the societal level to establish those ground rules that doesn’t emerge naturally. Sociability is a construction and there is, therefore, no limits (except prudential ones, Holmes 1995: chap. 5) on the sovereign. He is in liberal terms despotic. Hobbes insists on the political nature of religion. It makes enemies out of worshippers and pits everyone against the sovereign. Every idea is, potentially at least, political. The result, however, is anti-political. Hobbes monopolizes the political in the person of the sovereign. Only he has a political and public face; “The citizens of Hobbes’s polity are to be
completely immersed in private pursuits and so not just politically passive but inert” (Hanson 1984: 350). Hobbes depoliticizes religion by making it so very political that it requires monopolization. The social needs, in the extreme, a political decision in order to be or become. But also only one decision, setting the boundaries and contents of good and evil, right and wrong, mine and yours (implied, but not mentioned by Hobbes, friend and enemy) etc. Once that political decision is made, once the political monopoly has been established and has spoken, it’s all administration and instruction. The political decision ends the political.

Locke makes a rather different move. He describes religion as being inherently unpolitical and, therefore, of no (legitimate) interest to the sovereign. But it’s a very political move, Locke makes, as there is no natural division between religion and politics. It’s a construction of the most political sort. Locke’s *A letter concerning toleration* from 1689 attempts to separate politics and religion: ”The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other” (1955: 27). It is, of course, precisely because the two regiments are not fixed and immovable that Locke has to write his essay. It is the actual and very real blurring and moving between them that constitutes the problem. Locke is not describing an existing separation but arguing on behalf of one. His letter is a textual intervention, a master piece of social-philosophical engineering. He is writing into existence a wall of separation. To do that, he argues that it is not only unwise for politics to dictate religion, it is also impossible. Politics and religion operates on different planes, according to different logics and with different ends in mind. The political society exists to secure the civil interests of the subjects, which he defines as “life, liberty, health, and indolency of the body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like” (1955: 17); all that which he in *Second Treatise* calls ‘property’ (1988: 350, 383). The salvation of the soul is not a political task. The domain of the civil magistrate is limited to ‘the care of things of this world’ and its means are restricted to ‘outward force’ (1955: 20, 18).

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51 See also Locke 1997: 216-21 for the separation of politics and religion; and 1997: 230-5, 246-8 & 276-7 for the toleration essays A-D. Voltaire was most probably inspired by Locke when he wrote in his philosophical dictionary on tolerance: ”What is toleration? It is the prerogative of humanity. We are all steeped in weaknesses and errors: let us forgive one another’s follies, it is the first law of nature” (1972: 387).

52 Locke writes: “No peace and security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be established or preserved amongst men so long as this opinion prevails that dominion is founded in grace and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms” (1955: 27).
Locke is one of the first to create or postulate a zone of inviolability. In the essay on tolerance, it is a zone around individual religious conviction but he actually expands it to include all ‘private, domestic affairs’ (1955: 28-9). All which doesn’t take place in the public realm is ideally privatized, meaning depoliticized, removed from public or political concern and legitimate interference. Beccaria and Montesquieu make a similar move with regard to the juridical field when they allege that only those acts that directly harm society is to regarded as crimes. The rest is to be considered private and beyond the care of the state. In book 12, chapter 4 of De l’ Esprit des Lois, Montesquieu discusses a decriminalization of religious heterodoxy, sexual depravities (especially homosexuality), allegations of witchcraft, heresy and, most importantly, accusations of lese-majesty. Their decriminalization opens a split between public and private. Beccaria and Montesquieu do for criminal law, what Locke does for religion: Depoliticization of ‘the private’.

Locke depoliticizes religion through a double move. Firstly, religion is limited to something private and inner. Secondly, the political system is barred from control with the religious. The state can no longer find strength and legitimacy as the defender of the faith and church; it has no right to dictate religious dogma or rituals; and it can no longer legitimate its actions or existence through religion, which is exactly Locke’s critique of Filmer’s religiously grounded monarchism. The same ban applies to the church. It can no longer pursue its interests by force or coercion; religious arguments are no longer valid in political discourse. The authority of the church ends at the door step to the church. Differences in religious conviction are, therefore, no longer a valid argument for the invasion of other people’s lands, freedom or property: “Nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other upon pretense of religion” (1955: 27). Notice, that he says ‘pretense’. He knows very well the potential in the religious arguments for manipulation and mobilization on behalf of very worldly interests.

Locke thinks, he has found a formula for the peaceful coexistence of the political and the religious. He holds the door open for a possible conflict but says: “But if what has been already said concerning the limits of both these governments be rightly considered, it will easily remove all difficulty in this matter” (1955: 46). The good rule knows its limitations. This preoccupation with disarming the political use of religion as pretence of persecution gets its strongest expression in his insistence, that it is not religion but suppression that animates to rebellion. It is not the plurality of opinions, as Hobbes alleges, but repression and intolerance, that causes uprisings and wars:
For if men enter into seditious conspiracies, it is not religion inspires them to it in their meetings, but their sufferings and oppressions that make them willing to ease themselves. Just and moderate governments are everywhere quiet, everywhere safe; but oppression raises ferments and makes men struggle to cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke. I know that seditions are very frequently raised upon pretense of religion, but it is as true that for religion subjects are frequently ill treated and live miserably. Believe me, the stirs that are made proceed not from any peculiar temper of this or that church or religious society, but from the common disposition of all mankind, who when they groan under any heavy burden endeavour naturally to shake off the yoke that galls their necks. (1955: 54)

There is, again, if they know their limitation, only seemingly a contradiction or confrontation between religion and politics. In and of itself there is nothing political or conflictual in religion. It is repression which politicizes religion. Left to its own devices, it will become depoliticized and pacific. Locke does not, however, depoliticize religion completely. He asks, where the limit of religious tolerance lies and sets up three exceptions, which is another example (the first being the artificiality of the public/private, religion/politics divides) of the political nature of depoliticization. Firstly, the civil magistrate is not to tolerate opinions which contradict the maintenance of society. But, Locke assures, there is few examples of this in the churches (very unlike the opinion of Hobbes). He is probably acutely aware of the easy political manipulation of this, which is why he emphasizes its rarity. Secondly, the civil magistrate is not to tolerate any church whose members then become the subjects of another sovereign. The limit of tolerance becomes equivalent to the boundary of the political unit. Thirdly, the civil magistrate is not to tolerate atheists, as they cannot swear on the Bible and is, therefore, not to be trusted. The exclusion of the atheist reveals the limit of the political society. Locke takes a political decision on the extension of the political community.

Hobbes saw political intervention in society, the political construction of society, as inevitable and necessary. There is no differentiation between politics and society, or one should perhaps say that society is modelled by and dependent upon the political. In Locke, however, the reverse is true. Society is natural, the political entity is constructed. Sheldon Wolin demonstrates convincingly in his *Politics and Vision* the anti-political trend in the “main trends in political thought, irrespective of national or ideological variation” (2004: 260), and he also names Locke as a major player in the liberal anti-politics. He pits society against politics. In Locke, we see that society gradually:

… came to be conceived simultaneously as an entity distinct from political arrangements and as the shorthand symbol of all worthwhile human endeavour; and … these developments left little scope and less prestige for the political. The political became identified with a narrow set of institutions labelled ‘government’, the harsh symbol of the coercion necessary to sustain orderly social transactions. (Wolin 2004: 261)
Wolin continues, with what I call the liberal doctrine of freedom as the spontaneous self-organization, when he writes: “These qualities of social action – absence of authority, spontaneousness, and the tendency towards self-adjustment – were taken to mean that social action lacked the characteristic element of political action, the necessity to resort to power” (2004: 270). Society and its ‘machines’ becomes the substitute for coercive politics. Unlike Hobbes, who saw a political danger in the individual interpretation of religion, Locke sees the primary danger in the political interpretation, which, as his own three exclusions show, must become repressive and excluding. Religion remains political in Hobbes as potentiality, hidden or repressed, under the primary political decision of the sovereign, but always ready to break out again in civil war. Religion becomes private in Locke. He makes the empirical doubtful assertion that religion can stay within its confines and thereby have no political implications. It is this unlikely claim, and the liberal acknowledgment of this, that lies behind the (often hysterical) insistence on the secular divide between religion and politics, the distrust of religious arguments or passions in politics and the, in actuality, liberal intolerance toward religious expressions in the public realm; whether it is in politics or in the public display of faith it gets named ‘fundamentalism’. As Slavoj Žižek says:

… in our secular liberal democracies, people who maintain a substantial religious allegiance are in a subordinate position: their faith is ‘tolerated’ as their own personal choice, but the moment they present it publicly as what it is for them – a matter of substantial belonging – they stand accused of ‘fundamentalism’. (2005: 118)

The flip side, or dark underside, of secularism is the exclusion of those who take religion seriously as the guiding principle of their lives. They are, as they are their religious conviction, in reality excluded from the political community. Depoliticization of religion turns out to be a highly political move. Secularism is presented as the neutral arena for discussion but has actually excluded one party to the discussion. As Ole Wæver says, we present “secularism as our suggestion for a framework for conflict management, as neutral rules wherein there can be religious freedom, pluralism and room for all. What we present as the neutral framework, as the solution, is actually what one side of the discussion fears” (2004: 4; see also Laustsen & Wæver 2000; Jakobsen 2004). The ‘other’ of depoliticized secularism is ‘fundamentalism’.

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Adam Smith has, in the last part of his critique of the mercantile system a sentence, which expresses a revolution in the history of political ideas, an announcement of a new society in the making: “Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production” (1976, I: 179). It is a ‘consumer revolution’ (Muller 2002: 55-60). Although not his errand in this specific place of the work, he does make a clear distinction between commercial society, where production is oriented towards individual consumption, and its predecessor, where it was meant to satisfy the royal and aristocratic interests – conspicuous consumption and warfare. The sentence introduces a paradigm shift, where private consumption, ‘filling the belly’, this hitherto so despised and base (basic) preoccupation becomes the primary individual and state concern. ‘Filling the belly’ was (and is still) despised because of its necessity and universality. It cannot easily serve as a means of distinction. The consumption of the court and nobility was qualitatively (and, of course, also quantitatively) different from mere necessity. Now, and this is what Smith’s sentence indicates, we witness a revaluation of values, where the concerns and concepts of the petit bourgeois changes place with those of the aristocrat. Voltaire said of the English that they “were a long time warriors before they learned to cast accounts” (Voltaire 1968b: 522), and with his usual wit he satirizes the social value system of the day:

In France everybody is a marquis; and a man just come from the obscurity of some remote province, with money in his pocket, and a name that ends with an ‘ac’ or an ‘ille’, may give himself airs, and usurp such phrases as ‘A man of my quality and rank’, and hold merchants in the most sovereign contempt. The merchant again, by dint of hearing his profession despised on all occasions, at last is fool enough to blush at his condition. I will not, however, take upon me to say which is the most useful to his country, and which of the two ought to have the preference; whether the powdered lord, who knows to a minute when the king rises or goes to bed, perhaps to stroll, and who gives himself airs of importance in playing the part of a slave in the antechamber of some minister; or the merchant, who enriches his country, and from his counting-house sends his orders into Surat or Cairo, thereby contributing to the happiness and convenience of human nature. (1968b: 523-4)

Smith has a splendid comparison of the valorisation in ‘rude’ and ‘polished’ societies that is basically an economistic differentiation between a number of pre-capitalist societies and then commercial society (Hont 1987). In the Odyssey, he tells, Ulysses is sometimes asked, whether he is a pirate or a merchant. And, says Smith, at this time the merchant was looked upon with contempt whereas the pirate was treated with respect, as he was a man of military courage. Ulysses always, therefore, responded that he was a pirate. Smith says:
We may observe that these principles of the human mind which are most beneficial to society are by no means marked by nature as the most honourable. Hunger, thirst, and the passion for sex are the great supports of the human species. Yet almost every expression of these excites contempt. In the same manner, that principle in the mind which prompts to truck, barter, and exchange, tho’ it is the great foundation of arts, commerce, and the division of labour, yet it is not marked with anything amiable. (Smith 1978: 527; see also p. 224)

And he continues: “In rude ages this contempt rises to the highest pitch, and even in a refined society it is not utterly extinguished” (1978: 527). He is not free of residual contempt himself, as we shall soon see. It is a truly radical and constitutive change in values and institutions, and the discomfort, even among its most ardent spokesmen, testifies to its revolutionary character. By revaluing a hitherto neglected and despised practice, the liberals attempted to pacify the human urge for recognition as better than others in the inter-personal relations and the state’s urge for the same in the international relations (Hobbes saw very clearly part of the human psyche as the most troublesome. *Levithan* is, according to Job, 41: 24-25, ‘king of all proud animals’ and pride occupies a great part of Hobbes’s work). The revaluation of trade, accumulation and enterprise has as a not insignificant effect the translation of violent conflicts between men and states into peaceful competition. The pursuit of riches rather than domination furthers a peaceful and calculable behaviour, and as Stephen Holmes (1994) has put it: “the desire to destroy by violence the annoyingly superior assets of one’s neighbor must be replaced by the desire to outshine one’s neighbor by means of peaceably acquired and publicly displayable wealth.” Or as Samuel Johnson said at the time: ”There are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money” (quoted from Hirschman 1997: 58). Or as Smith said: “Whenever commerce is introduced into any country, probity and punctuality always accompany it. These virtues in a rude and barbarous country are almost unknown” (1978: 538).

Hume notices a restlessness in man, a permanent and unquenchable entrepreneurial drive. This is, of course, not a new man, but a new description of man. Man is now described as constantly unsatisfied, in perpetual motion, ceaseless creation and self-creation. Smith says, that it is nature’s deception of us, its display of wealth and greatness which “rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind” (1982: 183). What used to be described as an ideal to live by is now regarded as anachronistic; what used to be described as problematic is now regarded as useful, as a truer description of man’s essence. As Harold Laski says in his classic *The Rise of European Liberalism*:

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53 Hume writes that trade was never considered an affair of state until the 17. Century, and that practically no ancient political thinker had given it any thought (Hume 1963: 90). They are, therefore, of limited use in the political science, Hume, Smith and others are establishing.
The banker, the trader, the manufacturer, began to replace the landowner, the ecclesiastic, and the warrior, as the types of predominant social influence. The city with its restless passion for change, replaced the countryside, with its hatred of innovation, as the primary source of legislation … The idea of social initiative and social control surrendered to the idea of individual initiative and individual control. New material conditions, in short, gave birth to new social relationships; and, in terms of these, a new philosophy was evolved to afford a rational justification for the new world which had come into being. This new philosophy was liberalism. (1936: 11-12)

Man is now described as almost revolutionary in his nature and daily task but the implications of this is immediately confined or contained within the new sociability. Hume says: "Deprive a man of all business and serious occupation, he runs restless from one amusement to another … Give him a more harmless way of employing his mind or body, he is satisfied, and feels no longer that insatiable thirst after pleasure" (1963: 309). And this harmless way is, of course, work for pay or profit. Tocqueville says: "I know of nothing more opposed to revolutionary mores than commercial mores. Commerce is naturally the enemy of all violent passions" (2000: 609). So, man is described as self-sustaining, as creative, as unsettled, as border-crossing in all manner of ways, but this is not, as the Counter-Enlightenment thought and its heirs has always thought since, a recipe for the downfall of society but for a new kind of sociability no less ‘thick’, than the one who came before. Its organizing principles are, however, quite different. They are based on the mass of impersonal connections on the market, as a bearer of rights, and not on any ‘deep’ commonality.

The pursuit of riches is a comparatively peaceful activity. Its pacification is not, however, entirely beneficial. Smith looks with worry upon the growing stupidity of ‘the labouring poor’ (1976, II: 302-3; 1978: 539). The problem, besides the moral and martial decline, is the ungovernability of the uninstructed: "The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people besides, are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one" (Smith 1976, II: 309). From this we get the considerations in book 5 of Wealth of Nations – ‘Of the Expence of public Works and public Institutions’ – on education and instruction. Smith suggests two means, whereby the state can unite – without violence – what the

54 The moral concern of capitalism can be said to be often the conservative capitalism-critique, for instance Montesquieu in his chapters ‘On commerce’ and ‘On the spirit of commerce’ (book 20, chaps. 1 & 2). He says, among other things, that “where one is affected only by the spirit of commerce, there is traffic in all human activities and all moral virtue; the smallest things, those required by humanity, are done or given for money”; “Commerce corrupts pure mores” and it stifles hospitality. Adam Smith also noticed, what would become a standard conservative critique, namely the dissolution of families because of capitalism and the welfare state: “In commercial countries, where the authority of law is always perfectly sufficient to protect the meanest man in the state, the descendants of the same family, having no such motive for keeping together, naturally separate and disperse, as interest or inclination may direct” (1982: 223). There was also a strong, anti-capitalist moral critique in the Counter-Enlightenment, see Muller 1990; 1997: 70-5.
warring sects has separated: Public amusements and science and philosophy: "Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition (1976, II: 318). Tocqueville is in agreement with Smith’s worry and asks rhetorically, how much one can expect of a person who spends his life making pin heads? These concerns, however, are consistently compared with the much greater benefits, which allows Tocqueville to say: "I think that all in all, the manufacturing aristocracy that we see rising before our eyes is one of the hardest that has appeared on earth; but it is at the same time one of the most restrained and least dangerous” (2000: 532). Montesquieu also highlights the beneficial and pacifying effects of trade: "the spirit of commerce brings with it the spirit of frugality, economy, moderation, work, wisdom, tranquillity, order, and rule” (book 5, chap. 6); and: "it polishes and softens barbarous mores, as we see every day” (book 20, chap. 1). Smith says of our constant drive to better our conditions that it is ”calm and dispassionate” (1976, I: 362). So, the primary urges are channelled into benign activities and consequences.

Liberalism takes the urge for ‘dominion, superiority, and private wealth’ and turns it into confrontations below the friend/enemy level. There is in the trading spirit and activity something that makes people and states shed their barbarian ways. Ways, that are the exact opposite of the quote above from Montesquieu’s *De l’ Esprit des Lois*. It is not insignificant in this context that Montesquieu chooses to end his rattling with ‘tranquillity, order, and rule’. The civilized virtues are those of the petit bourgeois, as evident in Tocqueville’s description of the pacifist nature of economic man: "Violent political passions have little hold on men who have so attached their whole soul to the pursuit of well-being. The ardour they put into small affairs calms them in great ones” (2000: 609). Trade has an inherent structure of incentives that furthers some actions and limits others. This goes for the individual as well as for society and state at large. Hume says: ”Laws, order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least of commerce and manufacture” (1963: 280).

Montesquieu has in *De l’ Esprit des Lois* (book 21, chap. 20) a very interesting chapter called ‘How commerce in Europe penetrated barbarism’, which contains a number of striking parallels to the globalization discourse of today. In the chapter, he tells the story of how resentment of interest on money made it a trade of ‘dishonest people’ wherefore “it passed to a nation then covered with

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55 In *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, he writes: “Nothing tends so much to promote public spirit as the study of politics, of the several systems of civil government, their advantages and disadvantages, of the constitution of our own country, its situation, and interest with regard to foreign nations, its commerce, its defence, the disadvantages it labours under, the dangers to which it may be exposed, how to remove the one, and how to guard against the other” (1982: 186).
infamy”, the Jews. The barbarism, Montesquieu refers to in the title, is that of states or kings. A barbarism not least perpetrated upon the Jews, who were persecuted in order to rob their money and to avoid paying back the loans. This, for the Jews, unstable situation, could not last, so they invented letters of exchange and then, as Montesquieu says, “one saw commerce leave this seat of harassment and despair” (see also Beccaria 1768). Through this new instrument, “commerce was able to avoid violence and maintain itself everywhere, for the richest trader had only invisible goods, which could be sent everywhere and leave no trace anywhere”. Theologians were forced to ‘curb their principles’ and return commerce to ‘the bosom of integrity’ but more importantly it is “to the avarice of princes we owe the establishment of a device that puts it, in a way, out of their power”. The parallel to today’s talk of dematerialized capital and its flight across the globe imposing new competitive standards and barring welfare standards is obvious. But not only could the Jews now avoid violence:

Since that time princes have had to govern themselves more wisely that they themselves would have thought, for it turned out that great acts of authority were so clumsy that experience itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity. One has begun to be cured of Machiavellism, and one will continue to be cured of it. There must be more moderation in councils. What were formerly called coups d’état would at present, apart from their horror, be only imprudences.

The sentence that ‘great acts of authority were so clumsy’ is almost verbatim like the argument of Habermas and others today (as we’ll see in chap. 6) about the transformation from nation state modernity to the postnational constellation. One cannot either help hearing a contemporary echo in the last sentence which in today’s discourse is the argument of economic necessity and the threat of the punishment of the markets. A coup d’état, that is, nationalization or something less radical in favour of the social state, will not only result in horror, that is, capital flight, closures, mass employment etc. It will be of no use. Montesquieu says that the new dematerialized currency imposes limitations on the political latitude of sovereigns. The benefits of barbarism are suddenly diminished. What Montesquieu calls Machiavellism, the great acts of authority, that is, acts unencumbered where the sovereign imposes his will on the surroundings for his own benefit or amusement is now painted as ever more counterproductive. It has no positive effects, only bad consequences. Trade starts and furthers the transition from a barbaric to a civilized rule by limiting the politically prudent. He ends the chapter with this comment on the natural inclination of sovereigns and people in general to do bad: “And happily, men are in a situation such that, though
their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless have an interest in not being so”. It is increasingly only the benign rule (good governance) that brings prosperity and progress. Kant says that:

It is the trading spirit which cannot coexist with war and which will sooner or later possess every people. Of all the subordinate powers of the state it is the power of money that is the most trustworthy and the states see, therefore, themselves compelled (although not from any morality) to further the noble peace. (1966d: 226)

Disregarding, here, that Kant calls money for one of the state’s subordinate powers and that he elsewhere says that the blocking of trade, the prevention of the individual from pursuing his interests, damage the ‘powers of the whole’ [Kräfte des Ganzen] (1966a: 46), the focus is on limitation of the state’s powers, or more precisely on its coercive, irregular powers. Also James Steuart argued that the improvement of trade would restrict the possibility of despotism:

The consequence of this change [the introduction of trade and industry] has been the introduction of a more mild and a more regular plan of administration. When once a state begins to subsist by the consequences of industry, there is less danger to be apprehended from the power of the sovereign. The mechanism of his administration becomes more complex, and … he finds himself so bound up by the laws of his political oeconomy, that every transgression of them runs him into new difficulties. (quoted from Hirschman 1997: 83-4)

Again, the parallels to contemporary ideas of good governance and disciplinary management are quite striking (see for instance IMF 1997). Continuing Montesquieu’s overcoming of barbarism we’ll later (in chapter 6), see what we could call ‘How globalization in Europe penetrated barbarism’, a barbarism that is now that of the nation state. It is highly important that Montesquieu limited the end of barbarism to Europe. This is a claim we’ll encounter many times in the following. The overcoming or penetration of barbarism moves it to the borders of Europe. Adam Smith has a similar historical-sociological story of the banishment of violence in the first part of Wealth of Nations (book 3, chap. 4) called ‘How the Commerce of Towns Contributed to the Improvement of the Country’. It is a story of the societal implications of the invisible hand, of the spontaneous societal creation of capitalism. Before the breakthrough of commerce the landlord rules the countryside through personal control with servants and farmers. They spend their money maintaining relations of dependency and receive loyalty (and work) in return. It was at the same

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56 There are several references to the same in Lectures on Jurisprudence, see 1978: 49-50, 202, 248-9, 261-5, 410, 420.
time a period of great repression and violence and the landlords were in continual strife and even war with one another, with the king and with the people. But this changed through a silent revolution perpetrated by the commerce of the towns; "a revolution of the greatest importance to the public happiness" (Smith 1976: I, 440) emerged as a result of the actions of two groups who had no intention of serving the common good. The town capitalists wanted to make money and the landlords wanted to acquire luxury goods. The expense of the goods prompted the landlords to change their relations with their subordinates from copyholders to tenants and from servants to employees. The relations became purely moneyerized, based on exchange rather than dependency and violence. The landlords exchanged their power for glass pearls according to Smith. The interest in consumption changed the inter-personal relations from ones of inequality and extortion to ones of equality based on the exchange of work/rent/money and reduced thereby the landlord’s ability to suppress the country people (Marx had a different version of the same in his famous chapter in Das Kapital (book 1, part 4, chap. 24) on ‘The so-called original accumulation’). The political implications of the landlord’s craving for the luxury goods of the town merchants were that:

… commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors. (Smith 1976: I, 433)

Trade horizontalizes inter-personal relations and introduces ‘order and good government’ to an extent, that makes it improbable that vertical relations of authority and dependency can be maintained and therefore that organized violence and repression can be exercised.57 In the chapter, Smith refers to Hume as the only one who has noticed the effect of trade upon the nation and he mentions the two essays: ‘Of Commerce’ and ‘Of Luxury’. In the first, Hume writes: "The greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects soever they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with regard to commerce” (1963: 261). The politics of before was ‘unnatural’ and ‘violent’ and it went against ‘the natural inclination of mankind’ to trade with one another. But with the development in production and trade, we witness a shift from a zero sum game between sovereign and citizen to a plus sum game: "Thus the greatness of the sovereign, and the happiness of the state, are in a great measure united with regard to trade and manufactures"

57 The same development is found with regard to the Catholic church, whose qualities Smith, as an echo from Hobbes, describes as "the most formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and security of civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind" (Smith 1976, II: 325). The greed of the church propagated through the gradual improvement of trade and production destroyed its mundane power.
(1963: 268). Political economy, says Smith, has as its objective to further the wealth of both sovereign and citizenry (1976: 449). The commercialization has brought the sovereign in harmony with the natural and peaceful order of things, that develops and prospers when left alone, and it is in the sovereign’s own interest to identify his politics with the natural inclinations of man to better their condition. It takes considerable violence to force the farmer to extract more from the land than is needed for his own livelihood and thereby to secure the grandeur and coffers of the state through repression and forceful extraction. Give the individual, Hume says, the means thereto, and he will do it himself. This will then be far easier to receive a contribution to the state from him and infinitely more profitable. The state can maintain itself by turning into a fortified camp and secure its revenues through nationalist passions but these are difficult to sustain and it will be far easier "to govern men by other passions, and animate them with a spirit of avarice and industry, art and luxury" (Hume 1963: 269), to govern them through non-political and individualistic passions rather than through political and collective ones.

Properly understood, there is no disharmony between on the one side the interests of the state and on the other the interests of the citizens. In and through trade comes a deconflictualization of the relations between sovereign and citizen, provided they both understand their own true interest. The relation is depoliticized, as the subject becomes a citizen, with whom the sovereign does not wage a war of extraction, but with whom he has a relation of rights and duties. It is important for Smith, Hume and the others to establish, that this has not been the predominant policy or idea up to their time. But now the conflictual relation between enemies within the nation can be replaced by benign competition and contractual agreements.

'The Freedom to be Mediocre'

It is of considerable interest that Smith, in the story above, on several occasions refers to the unwillingness of the lower classes to fight for the landlord as evidence of the new, ‘purer’ and looser relationship between the landlord and his former dependents. The softening of authority relations weakens martialism. This is a frequent concern of Smith. Commercialization impairs the military power of the state: "When a country arrives at a certain degree of refinement it becomes less fit for war" (Smith 1978: 411). Commercialization weakens courage and threatens to extinguish the spirit of martiality. What Smith and others sense, is the coming of ‘post-heroic man’, which is the flipside of ‘economic man’.58

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Digression on martialism. This concern is apparent in a number of works, not least in Adam Ferguson’s *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* from 1767 and in Rousseau’s essay ‘Whether the restoration of the Sciences and Arts has contributed to the purification of morals’ from 1750. Ferguson, being an old soldier and an advocate of a Scottish citizen militia (Sher 1989), shows great concern for the decline of martialism. He has a strong sense of the positive effects of “the rivalship of nations and the practice of war”, they have “given rise to many departments of state, and the intellectual talents of men have found their busiest scene in wielding their national forces”; “he who has never struggled with his fellow-creatures, is a stranger to half the sentiments of mankind” (1995: 28). Although he repeats the liberal arguments of the new, humane approach to war, the inter-European peace, the difference between rude and polished nations etc., he is keenly aware of the danger of decline, once obstacles and tribulation are replaced by cooperation and commerce: “The most animating occasions of human life, are calls to danger and hardship, not invitation to safety and ease”; rivalship and war “are the principles of political life, and the school of men” (1995: 47, 63). He fears the decline in moral values, in personal bravery, in the tools and persons of state and in the ‘ardent attachment to their country’ (1995: 189). One of his concerns is to maintain a vigorous public spirit, as the polishing of man ‘privatizes’ everyone:

> We may, with good reason, congratulate our species on their having escaped from a state of barbarous disorder and violence, into a state of domestic peace and regular policy; when they have sheathed the dagger, and disarmed the animosities of civil contention; when the weapons with which they contend are the reasonings of the wise, and the tongue of the eloquent. But we cannot, meantime, help to regret, that they should ever proceed, in search of perfection, to place every branch of administration behind the counter, and come to employ, instead of the statesman and warrior, the mere clerk and accountant. (1995: 214, my italics)

The clerk and accountant being the paradigmatic figures of a depoliticized community. In an essay of unknown date ‘Of Statesman & Warriors’, Ferguson considers schemes for changing or amending the revaluation of values from martialism to commercialism, the problem being that men of talent shies away from military service. He says, therefore: “It were therefore a real Improvent of the Military Establishment in such case if any thing could be done to direct the Genius of the Country more into that department” (1986: 20). This is not achieved by the ‘natural’ processes of commercial society. Kalyvas andKatzenelson (1998: 182-3) may not be right in stating that Ferguson anticipated Schmitt’s distinction between friend and enemy, and proved him wrong in claiming that liberals cannot grasp the difference, but Ferguson was surely one of the most acute observers of the strife and said about mankind: “Friendship and enmity are to them terms of the greatest importance: they mingle not their functions together; they have singled out their enemy, and they have chosen their friend” (1995: 100).

Rousseau is somewhat of a different story. Ferguson may be a rustic member of the Enlightenment but Rousseau’s place in it is a complicated matter. He has been and is still pictured as both a representative of the Enlightenment and the Counter-enlightenment (for the last view, see Lebrun 1972; Garrard 1994, 2003; Melzer 1996). It is probably most true to say that he was of but not in the Enlightenment – most certainly not in its French salon-version. One could say, that Rousseau is making a plea for politics against the anti-politics of commercial society when he says that “The ancient politicians forever spoke of morals and virtue; ours speak only of commerce and of money”; and he continues by saying that, “with money one has everything, except morals and Citizens” (1997c: 18, 19). As a comment on the

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59 See also his rather (also by his own standards and in his own words) confused essay ‘Which Is the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero and Which Are the Heroes Who Lacked This Virtue?’ from 1751 (Rousseau 1994).
liberal dogma of (European) peace, Rousseau states that “National hatreds will die out, but so will the love of Fatherland” (1997c: 8). The love of country evaporates and the flesh of man grows lazy:

How, indeed, can men overwhelmed by the least need and repelled by the least pain be expected to face up to hunger, thirst, fatigues, dangers, and death. With what courage will soldiers bear up under extreme labours to which they are in no way accustomed? With what spirit will they go on forced marches under Officers who have not even the strength to travel on horseback? (1997c: 21)

And, as Graeme Garrard explains in his *Rousseau’s Counter-Enlightenment*:

Rousseau came to detest the salon culture of Paris, not least for its ‘feminine’ quality. “Every woman at Paris”, he complains in his *Letter to d’Alembert*, “gathers in her apartment a harem of men more womanish than she” … In his attack on the decadence of Parisian life in his novel *Julie, or the new Heloise* (1761), he singles out the dominance of les dames, the “trivialous, devious, wily, foolish, fickle” women of the French capital and the hegemony of ‘feminine’ values, as among the principal causes of the city’s moral decay, in contrast to the rough Spartan manliness of Geneva. (2003: 25)

The discussion between manly and womanish, country and town, purity and decadence, the dangers of mixture, all this display a counter-modern streak in Rousseau. *End of digression.*

This mourning of the decline of public virtue or martialism in commercial society is parallel to Tocqueville’s ambivalence about the decline of greatness in democratic society. The modern is, as we saw in chapter 2, connected with a great sense of loss, and it is Tocqueville, who has expressed this feeling most clearly and beautifully in his *Democracy in America* from 1834/1840. It can be read as a painful attempt to write his way through the ambivalence of democracy and equality emerging at the expense, as Tocqueville sees it, of greatness and spirit. This very long quote expresses in an unsurpassed formulation the not quite satisfying about modern life:

What do you ask of society and its government? We must understand each other. Do you want to give a certain loftiness to the human spirit, a generous way of viewing the things of this world? Do you want to inspire in men a sort of contempt for material goods? Do you desire to give birth to or to maintain profound convictions and to prepare for great devotions? Is it a question for you of polishing mores, of elevating manners, of making the arts shine? Do you want poetry, renown, glory? Do you intend to organize a people in such a manner as to act strongly on all others? Do you destine it to attempt great undertakings and, whatever may be the result of its efforts to leave an immense mark on history? If this is, according to you, the principal object that men ought to propose for themselves in society, do not take the government of democracy; it would surely not lead you to the goal.

But if it seems to you useful to *turn the intellectual and moral activity of man to the necessities of material life and to employ it in producing well-being*; if reason appears to you to be more profitable to men than genius; if your object is *not to create heroic virtues but peaceful habits*; if you would rather see vices than crimes, and if you prefer to find
fewer great actions on condition that you will encounter fewer enormities; if instead of acting within a brilliant society it is enough for you to live in the midst of a prosperous society; if, finally, the principal object of a government, according to you, is not to give the most force or the most glory possible to the entire body of the nation, but to procure the most well-being for each of the individuals who compose it and to have each avoid the most misery, then equalize conditions and constitute the government of a democracy. (Tocqueville 2000: 234-5, my italics)

This is the tragic barter of modernity. And he drives the point home in the end of the work: "Almost all extremes become milder and softer; almost all prominent points are worn down to make place for something middling that is at once less high and less low, less brilliant and less obscure than what used to be seen in the world" (2000: 674). Peace and boredom descends, as man becomes preoccupied with 'the necessities of material life', with filling the belly. We have, then, on one side the strength of heroic virtues and the glory of the few and on the other the welfare of the masses. Everything becomes a bit more grey, a bit less grand and a little more flat, the oscillations become rarer and smaller. Everyday life penetrates all life. This is the discomfort of a liberal about liberalism; a discomfort of the levelling effects of commercialism and liberalism.

The early Nazi theoretician, Arthur Muller van den Broeck, once said that liberalism gives everyone 'the freedom to be mediocre’ (quoted from Buruma & Margalit 2004: 71). This was obviously not meant as praise but is nonetheless true, in the sense that we have tried to explore above. Liberal man wishes the freedom to live the gentle life. Hume’s ‘tradesmen and merchants’ belong to “that middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty” (1963: 284). Adam Smith says of him: “In the bottom of his heart he would prefer the undisturbed enjoyment of secure tranquillity, not only to all the vain splendour of successful ambition, but to the real and solid glory of performing the greatest and most magnanimous actions” (1982: 216). Sheldon Wolin is right to argue that whereas liberalism “has always been accused of seeking to dissolve the solidarities of social ties and relationships and to replace them by the unfettered, independent individual, the masterless man. In reality, the charge is almost without foundation and completely misses the liberal addiction towards social conformity” (2004: 281). Liberal man wants a life of what Beccaria called the ‘lasting pleasures of peace and security’ (1996: 30). Personal security becomes a core concept of liberalism, precisely because it wasn’t a given but often the exception rather than the

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60 Hume (1963: 124-135) notices that in civilized monarchies the ones with ambition has to focus upwards to gain the favour (and resources) of the few rich and mighty. One has to make oneself ‘agreeable’ by eloquence, education and wit which stimulate the fine arts. In the republic, however, the ambitious has to focus downwards to gain the attention of the masses. One has to make oneself ‘useful’ by industry, knowledge and skills, which stimulate the practical sciences and trade. It is, then, a general observation at the time, that modern commercial society is less grand and magnificent but more prosperous and utilitarian.
rule. Montesquieu says that, “Political liberty consists in security or, at least, in the opinion one has of one’s security” (book 12, chap. 2). The basic sense of personal security is the precondition for commercialism, as Montesquieu’s story of the Jews testifies to. Hume says: "From law arises security; from security curiosity; and from curiosity knowledge” (1963: 119).

What we see is the shift from publicity of values and virtues to their privatized forms. This also signals a change of characters: From the statesman and warrior to the clerk and accountant. And we can recognize it as depoliticization. Commercial activity is supposed to be non-political in the conflictual sense. It privatizes ambition, greed and instinctual drives such as lust and pride and makes them benign in the form of emulation or competition, where the desire to be recognized as better than others are measured by wealth and not by battle scars. Division of labour, commercial competition, self interest well understood, as Tocqueville names it, creates forms of activity that are middling, peaceful, rational, polished, civilized etc. Tocqueville says: “The doctrine of self-interest well understood does not produce great devotion; but it suggests little sacrifices each day; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous; but it forms a multitude of citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, farsighted, masters of themselves” (2000: 502), and he continues:

If the doctrine of self-interest well understood came to dominate the moral world entirely, extraordinary virtues would without doubt be rarer. But I also think that gross depravity would be less common. The doctrine of self-interest well understood perhaps prevents some men from mounting far above the ordinary level of humanity; but many others who were falling below do attain it and are kept there. Consider some individuals, they are lowered. View the species, it is elevated. (2000: 502)

Liberal man is mediocre man. It is both his merit and curse. Benjamin Constant defines modern freedom as ‘peaceful enjoyment and private independence’ and as ‘the enjoyment of security in private pleasures’ (1988c: 316, 317). Modern freedom is exactly a depoliticized freedom, where one is not forced on to the agora, to the “constant exercise of political rights, the daily discussion of the affairs of the state, disagreements, confabulations, the whole entourage and movement of factions, necessary agitations, the compulsory filling” of public political life (1988c: 314-5). “Commerce supplies their needs, satisfies their desires” (1988c: 315); There is no need for a public or political side to man. This is strongly linked to what Christopher Lasch (1991a: 52-5) has called ‘the moral rehabilitation of desire’ and which we have already spoken about at length. The violent and passionate urge for conquest and domination can be replaced by the benign and peaceful urge for accumulation and consumption. Energies are depoliticized by being re-directed toward individual
satisfaction of desires rather than the fulfilment of public programmes of the good and just. What liberalism does is to decentralize the pursuit of the good life. Self-realization is no longer to take place on the public conflictual arena but in the bosom of private non-political life. Ernst Gellner spells out the new feature of modern liberty:

The price of liberty may once have been eternal vigilance: the splendid thing about Civil Society is that even the absent-minded, or those preoccupied with their private concerns or for any other reason ill-suited to the exercise of eternal and intimidating vigilance, can look forward to enjoying their liberty. Civil Society bestows liberty even on the non-vigilant … Civil Society is an order in which liberty, not to mention female pulchritude, is available even to the timorous, non-vigilant and absent-minded. (1994: 80)

Eternal vigilance is, of course, the ancient freedom mentioned by Constant or the hyper-politicization of revolutionary times. Modern liberty, or civil society, allows private man to go about his business, to stay in the private, without the costs of political corruption or oppression. Premodern societies were scarcity-societies and created therefore misery. Modern societies are, what Anthony Giddens (1990: chap. 5) calls post-scarcity societies and creates dissatisfaction. We can differentiate between two kinds of dissatisfaction, where the first is in no small measure responsible for the second:

1) functional dissatisfaction. The capitalist market presupposes a constant dissatisfaction to sustain itself. This we have already seen in the description of modern man. Capitalism presupposes the constant reproduction of dissatisfaction. When Coca-Cola has as its slogan: ‘this is it’, then that expresses, according to Slavoj Žižek, the exact opposite. It is not ‘it’. It will not satisfy you. It will leave you unsatisfied, thirsting for more. The functional dissatisfaction is in harmony with the reproduction of modern society and is the precondition for capitalism. Functional dissatisfaction is an anti-political machine. It produces post-politics.

2) dysfunctional dissatisfaction: This comes from the longing after depth, meaning, seriousness, fullness, hardness etc. This dissatisfaction is in contradiction with capitalist accumulation. It wants something altogether different. Not more of the same but something else entirely. This is the kind of dissatisfaction which brings the back political – with a vengeance. “They love Pepsi-Cola, but we love death” said a, now probably dead, Taleban fighter at the beginning of the US-Afghanistan war (Buruma & Margalit 2004: 49). Dysfunctional dissatisfaction forces the public and insistent display
of strong, unquestionable values upon the stage; and it fosters the cult of the death sacrifice because that is the ultimate contradiction of liberal freedom as consumerism. Functional dissatisfaction is about feeding the belly, whereas the dysfunctional one feeds the beast; it gives rise to frustrated political expressions – often of a violent, hyper-political kind.

The last part of Fukuyama’s *End of History* called ‘The Last Man’, can serve as the closing of this section. Fukuyama focuses here on the urge for recognition, *thymos*, and distinguishes between two forms: *Isothymia*, that is, the desire to be recognized as the equal of others (1992: 190). This is obtainable through liberal society. It is what liberal society offers and one of its main avenues is through the market. This is the form of the last man, the liberal consumer, the boring, mediocre man, ‘men without chests’ (Fukuyama 1992: chap. 28); the ones who gladly exchanges danger and sacrifice with comfort and security. This is one of *thymos*’s functional variants. This is a generalized form of recognition; the liberal form of recognition for instance in the rule of law and in the concept of citizenship. But man is, as Hobbes knew, also and importantly driven by *megalothymia*, that is, the desire to be recognized as better than others. This has a both functional and dysfunctional side: “This desire is not merely the basis of conquest and imperialism, it is also the precondition for the creation of anything else worth having in life, whether great symphonies, paintings, novels, ethical codes, or political systems” (1992: 304). It is what makes us try and succeed despite great odds, just as it is what makes us slaughter one another.

The functional side is the effort to make a name for oneself and Fukuyama calls them ‘outlets for megalothymia’ (1992: 315ff). This is what we call depoliticizations. These are entrepreneurship (which we have discussed at length), scientific activity, democratic politics, foreign policy and ‘adventures’ in the still historical part of the world, extreme sports and snobbery. All these banal forms of translated *megalothymia* is functional for the reproduction of society. They allow benign expressions of the desire for recognition as better than others within circumscribed spheres – and without direct political implications or meanings. The dysfunctional form comes from the question: “Is recognition that can be universalized worth having in the first place? Is not the quality of recognition far more important than its universality? And does not the goal of universalizing recognition inevitably trivialize and de-value it?” (1992: 301).

With these two forms of megalothymia, the banal and the violent, we also have the two forms of exceeding in modern society; a banal form, which corresponds to the functional dissatisfaction; and a terroristic form, which corresponds to the dysfunctional one. The banal form is the one we all
participate in. Its most common form is consumption for differentiation: The buying of products to signal our difference. It is part of a generalized rebellion, a democratized rebellion against mediocrity, which actually confirms it. It is a rebellion without consequences. It is a daily revolt devoid of danger, sacrifice or risk. We confirm our place in the consumption system by declaring our opposition to it. It is a rebellion that secures our position in the social. This form of exceeding sustains the capitalist system with its built-in expiration date. We cement our basic satisfaction in and through the proclaimed dissatisfaction. In the terroristic exceeding, we find the reformulation of the slave/master relation in the descriptions of the terrorists as full of life in their death dance, they are ‘heroic beasts’, ‘the masters of life and death’, who, through their (self-)destructive acts, confirm their attachment to true life and their dismissal of the comforts of modern hedonistic life and individualistic nihilism. The terroristic form celebrates violence and hardship, just as much as the banal form shies away from it. The terroristic exceeding is a true confrontation with ‘the system’, as its idea and practice negates the very foundations of its opponent. It is, therefore, political. It is often frustrated politics, as the political desire is blocked in its ‘pure’ expression. It degenerates often to mindless violence against foreigners or McDonalds as a way to hit a surrogate enemy, where the enemy is nowhere to be found. This is, as we discuss in chapter 8, the danger of the abstract enemy. Because of the desire to name an invisible enemy, anyone will do.

The banal form is anti-political, because it is a play of differences that makes no difference. It is all play in the Schmittian sense explored in chapter 3. But the terroristic form is the return of the political, because it is a desperate attempt to reinstate a difference that makes all the difference. It is the desire for an enemy, that can be recognized as such, who is not only different but also inferior. So the political returns in the depoliticized machines of society. It returns not only as economic wars, which the 19th century saw plenty of in imperialism and colonialism, but also through the desires not properly satisfied. Liberalism produces, therefore, both anti-politics and politics.
II. Institutionalization of the political

When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to, what is vulgarly called, politics.
(Smith 1976, II: 243-4)

Where-ever Law ends, Tyanny begins.
(Locke 1988: 400)

Winston Churchill is alleged to have once said that, ‘Democracy is, when it knocks on the door early in the morning and you know it is only the postman’. Although said about democracies, it is equally true of the constitutional state. The core of institutionalization or juridification of the political is the critique and dismissal of arbitrary rule. The arbitrary, the unruly, the random is the main opponent of liberal rule and represents all that is dangerous about the political: The sudden, the unexpected, the unpredictable, the decision out of nothing, the emergency. The opposite of the arbitrary is the regulated and rule-bound, the known and predictable. The field of possibility has been limited to a finite number of options and the result can, ideally, be predicted in advance. To be governed by laws rather than men was already evident in the works of Plato and Aristotle but liberalism differs in making it, ultimately, the sole criterion of good rule. The virtue of the ruler becomes secondary as the proper legal framework can sustain a society even of devils. Juridification, or the translation of political decisions into procedures is, according to liberals at all times, the precondition for commercialization and civilization. Statements like this one from Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence is to be found everywhere in liberal texts: “The first and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice” (1978: 5) or as Voltaire said: “Freedom consists in being dependent only on the law” (1994b: 59; 1994c: 216). Rule of law is the foundation for liberal sociability and, importantly: “The great object of justice is to substitute the idea of right for that of violence” (Tocqueville 2000: 131). This section deals with the liberal dichotomization between ‘good rule’ based on constitutionalism, separation of powers, the impersonal seat of power, the rule of law, regulations and procedures and then the ‘bad rule’ based on sovereign decisions, arbitrariness and often the identity between person, power and decision. Depoliticization of rule through juridification becomes the defining characteristic of the good rule. In the end there is only the liberal and the barbaric rule.
Forms of Rule

The state and the political is closely connected in modern Western political thought and, according to Norberto Bobbio, they both refer to the phenomenon of power. It is from the Greek names for strength or power \( \text{krátos} \) and authority \( \text{arké} \) that the antique names of forms of rule is derived: aristocracy, democracy, monarchy, oligarchy (Bobbio 1989: 69). Already in the naming and classification lies a recognition or theory of the political. Voltaire gave in his *Dictionnaire philosophique*, under the heading ‘Tyranny’, a good description of liberalism’s counter-image to the good rule: ”The sovereign who knows no laws but his own whim, who seizes the property of his subjects, and who then enlists them to seize that of his neighbours is called a tyrant. There are no such tyrants in Europe” (1972: 398). With the possible exception of the last sentence, this picture of the tyrant and the despot predominate liberalism’s image of the non-liberal regime: Dangerous within and without, a threat to its inhabitants and neighbours alike. One important point, which needn’t detain us here, is that the liberal rule is thought juridically, not democratically. The primary characteristic of the good rule is what Smith calls ‘regular government’ (1978: 318) not democracy. More important is it that the complex of typologies is reduced to the dichotomy between liberal and non-liberal rule and that non-liberal rule is deemed illegitimate, dangerous, and bellicose.

When Kant in *Zum evigen Frieden* makes a typology, apparently inspired by Aristotle’s classic differentiation in three good and three corrupt forms of rule, the decisive distinction is between *forma regiminis* – the way people are governed – a distinction between republicanism and despotism, which he separates thus: “Republicanism is the principle of state that separates executive power (the government) from the legislative. Despotism is the state’s arbitrary [eigenmächtigen] consummation of the law, that it has itself given, provided they are enforced as the sovereign’s own will” (1966d: 206-7). Within these two main forms, Kant then distinguishes between three forms of rule called *forma imperii* – who rules – autocracy, aristocracy and democracy; with the important exception that there are no republican form of democracy, only a despotic. The republic is now an option for the monarchy provided it governs by laws. Separation of powers is the operative principle in Kant’s classification, because it drives a wedge in between the sovereign’s will and legislation (and sentencing no less), which is the first condition of the constitutional state.

Montesquieu draws a different line of separation in his tripartition: republican, monarchic and despotic (and the republic can be both democratic and aristocratic, book 2, chap. 2). Again the decisive difference, theoretical and moral, is the one between the first two forms and despotism. Whereas in the republic and the monarchy, governing is conducted through rules and laws, “in
despotic government, one alone, without law and without rule, draws everything along by his will and his caprices” (book 2, chap. 1). This explains why fear is the basic principle of the despotic principle of government (book 3, chaps. 9 & 10).

Smith ignores completely the ‘unruly’ forms and restricts his discussion to monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, and, like Montesquieu, he groups the last two under the heading ‘republic’ (1978: 200, 404). Also he makes the decisive dividing line – here a historical line – between the barbaric forms of the past, that were based on the ruins of the Roman empire and who were corrupt, partisan and despicable, and then the subsequent civilized forms (1976, II: 238). The new civilized forms are to a large extent the result of a natural division of labour between the executive and the judiciary, which has emerged because of the growing complexity of commercial society, which makes each function, including and not least, the juridical to a specialized field. A division of powers are, therefore, the natural by-product of societal development (1976, II: 243; 1978: 405-7).

In his essay ‘That politics may be reduced to a science’, Hume puts the question, whether the difference between forms of government depends upon the good or bad character traits of the ruler? That is, on personal rather than institutional features. He dismisses it, when it comes to republican or free governments, whereas it applies to the absolutistic rule, whose rule utterly depends upon its moods and caprices. Republican rule is, on the other hand, dependent upon something much more stabile: Its laws: "So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us” (1963: 14). Hume uses Aristotle’s typology so both the republican and the absolute government can be monarchic, aristocratic or democratic. There are three good and three corrupt forms. The important thing is that the goodness or badness of the government doesn’t depend upon the one or those that govern but on the juridical framework within which they govern:

Legislators, therefore, ought not to trust the future government of a state entirely to chance, but ought to provide a system of laws to regulate the administration of public affairs to the latest posterity … In the smallest court or office, the stated forms and methods by which business must be conducted, are found to be a considerable check on the natural depravity of mankind. Why should not the case be the same in public affairs? (Hume 1963: 22)

He has an interesting historical-sociological observation about the monarchic form of government. All the forms have improved in recent times but ‘civilized monarchy’ – the republican or good form of monarchy – more than anyone. And he says, echoing his ancient role models: "It may now be
affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, *that they are a government of Laws*, not of Men. They are found susceptible to order, method, and constancy to a surprising degree” (1963: 95, see also p. 126); ‘Order, method, and constancy’ – the bureaucrat’s three cardinal virtues. This is the decision-less rule and civilized monarchy is praised for shedding its sovereign decisions, immunities and exceptions.

Finally, Locke who divides up the forms of rule – where the supreme power resides – in three: democracy, oligarchy and monarchy (1988: 354). It is apparently neutral categories which then, like in Kant and Hume, can have their good and bad forms. According to Locke, the main deficiency in the state of nature is that men are judges in their own cases (1988: 350-3): “since ‘tis easily to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an Injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it” (1988: 276). He then makes the ingenious transfer of this point from the inter-personal to the political and asks with regard to ‘Absolute Monarchs’ “what kind of Government that is, and how much better it is than the State of Nature, where one Man commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be Judge in his own Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controle those who execute his Pleasure?” (Ibid.) Locke is highly polemical and rhetorically strong in chapter 7 of *Second Treatise*: ‘Of Political or Civil Society’ in his critique of those who think that, ‘absolute Power purifies Mens Bloods’ which is the same as believing that “to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by *Pole-Cats, or Foxes*, they think “it Safety, to be devoured by *Lions*” (1988: 327, 328). The dangers of passions, partiality and arbitrariness in individual self-judgment are parallel to those of an absolute monarch. They must both be circumscribed: The individual by entering the state of society; the sovereign by “settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties; and by Men having Authority from the Community, for the execution of those Rules” (1988: 324).

How important a role juridification of the political plays in Locke’s theory is shown by his distinction between the king and the tyrant whose only difference is that, “one makes the Laws the Bounds of his Power, and the Good of the Publick, the end of his Government; the other makes all give way to his own Will and Appetite” (1988: 400).

The depersonalization of political rule gets an at first glance quite peculiar expression in the ideal of the judge as an automaton. We find the figure most prominently in the works of Montesquieu and Beccaria and it’s probably not to be seen as an actual ideal but rather as a critique of existing judicial practice. The goal is to leave as little room for personal discretion and decision as possible and to make the laws as clear, precise and exhaustive as possible. The laws, according to
Montesquieu, has to be concise, simple, to awake the same ideas in all men; they should not be subtle and are, wherever possible, to avoid exceptions, limitations and modifications; they shouldn’t be changed without sufficient reason and they must then be argued for with good reasons (book 29, chap. 16). In other words: Stabile, predictable, knowable for everyone to obey and for judges and bureaucrats to rule by; “but if the magistrate should be guided in this vigilance by regulations which are arbitrary and not established by a code endorsed by every citizen, the door is open to that tyranny which is always to be found on the circumference of political freedom” (1996: 94). In the chapter on ‘Secret accusations’, a common occurrence at the time, Beccaria writes: “Without clear and fixed principles to steer by, they toss to and fro, lost and wandering in a vast sea of opinions. Always occupied in saving themselves from monstrous threats, for them one moment is always rendered bitter by the uncertainty of the next” (1996: 29-30); “Nothing is more dangerous than the common axiom that we should ‘consult the spirit of the law’. This is to allow the dyke of law to be breached by the torrent of opinion” (1996: 17). The naturalist imagery exemplifies the danger.

The clarity of the laws would be to no avail, were the judge free to let his prejudices and opinions guide or inform his rulings. The judge is, therefore, to “reach a perfect syllogism. The major premise should be the general law, the minor premise whether the action does or does not conform to the law; the conclusion should be either release or punishment” (1996: 16). One is to ask ‘the constant and fixed voice of the law’ and not the ‘instability of errant interpretation’ (1996: 17). Montesquieu can, therefore, say: “When the judge presumes, judgments become arbitrary; when the law presumes, it gives a fixed rule to the judge” (book 29, chap. 16). This means that “the judges of a nation are … only the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, inanimate beings who can moderate neither its force nor its rigor” (book 11, chap. 6). Any element of human weakness or imperfection is to be eradicated. The personal and decisionistic element is feared and dismissed. Good or proper rule is limited to observance of rules. Interpretation, of course, lurks in the shadows of Beccaria’s minor premise but the point is liberalism’s obsession with the elimination of the political through juridification and proceduralism.

Rule is depersonalized and the most common expression of this is the personalization of non-liberal rule which is presented as Saddam’s Iraq, Hitler’s Germany, Milosevic’s Serbia etc. Person, state and rule are one. Another expression is the assumption that non-liberal regimes are, by nature and necessity, violent internally and externally by nature.
The late liberal embrace of democracy turned a dangerous phenomenon into another machine for the translation of enmity into competition. The internal social or political enemy becomes the parliamentarian opponent. Democracy is effectively reduced to representative democracy and its two components, liberalism and democracy, are thrown together in a deeply ambivalent and tension ridden unity (Beetham 1992; Held 1992: 11; Torfing 1999; Geuss 2001: chap. 3). Parliamentarism is the precondition for the translation of enmity, as it curbs political fervour and channels political energy and activism into institutionalized and ritualized forms of engagement and confrontation, and it displaces the political struggle from the open confrontation to the indirect as competition for mandates and vote-maximization takes the place of political conflictuality. Democracy needed to be made safe in order to perform the function of a depoliticization machine. Democracy was in the early times of liberalism seen as the exact opposite: As the threat of over-politicization. A short look at pre-democratic liberalism shows that they adopted the antique description of democracy as mob rule. It was understood as class rule – but by the wrong class (Struve 1973; Macpherson 1977: 10). Its primary problem was instability and ungovernability. Montesquieu says of the people that it “always acts too much or too little. Sometimes with a hundred thousand arms they upset everything; sometimes with a hundred thousand feet they move only like insects” (book 2, chap. 2). Tocqueville (2000: 235-263) famously named the threat ‘the tyranny of the majority’.

Direct democracy, its early form, is dangerous to liberalism because it tends to politicize everything and to infuse everything with political energy. It recognizes no limitations; it is restless and destructive; it succumbs to despotic manipulation; it is the street brought into the coffee house. Direct democracy is the return to irrational, passionate and militant politics; and this time more dangerous and brutal as it is performed by the masses and not by an aristocratic court elite. The problem with democracy is that it is too much: Too much politics and participation. I have already in an earlier chapter mentioned The Crisis of Democracy from 1975 (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki 1975). What is interesting is that the crisis is exactly one of too much democracy – or rather the exercise of democracy by the wrong people: the young, women, and ethnic minorities – all the under-socialized and over-politicized. The political system cannot absorb that much political energy. It becomes ungovernable. This is the liberal critique of democracy: It threatens liberal freedoms and liberal governability. A recent reformulation of this critique is to be found in Fareed

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62 For more ‘classic’ reactionary anti-democratic arguments see Spitz 1949.
Zakaria’s *The Future of Freedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* whose main (but not very well-founded) argument is that, “Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not” (2003: 17). As the democratic principle is penetrating still more institutions and practices, personal freedoms and not least system functionalities are receding. The liberal model of democracy is concerned with what Richard Bellamy (1994), discussing Hayek, calls the ‘dethroning of politics’.

Representative democracy, and the party system it created, was the solution that satisfied both the need for legitimization (popular participation) and the need for effectiveness (governance capability). Liberals tend to find the balance between the two skewed in favour of participation, whereas republicans, populists and others find it skewed in favour of system needs. The latter regret the lack of political energy in a system, which is alleged to be destructive of civic virtue, ‘undemocratic’ even.\(^{63}\) The liberal argument is, as C. B. Macpherson says, that “Democracy is held to be consistent with, and even require a low level of citizen participation” (1973: 78). In his *Understanding liberal democracy*, Barry Holden (1993: 17) differentiates between conventional and radical theories of democracy: In the conventional model voters has to decide on questions put to them, whereas in the radical model the voters formulates the questions themselves. The conventional model is the liberal one and Holden says: "One of the features of conventional theories of democracy is their idea of the limited nature of popular decision making: the electors are neither expected nor presumed to have the substantial degree of rationality necessary for the kind of detailed decision making postulated in radical theories” (1993: 83). Liberalism has effectively reduced democracy to the conventional or representative model (Pateman 1970; 1985: 5; Held 1993b: 262); and one, if problematized or historicised at all, most often hear it presented as the only viable or desirable form of democracy.\(^{64}\)

The representative system is not overburdened with the same expectation of citizen participation or knowledge nor with any ideas of educational effects. Its most important function is to protect individual freedom through the periodic control of elected power (Torpe 1990: 69; Carleheden 1994: 86; Held 1996: chap. 3). The virtue of representative democracy is that it allows people to retreat to their daily lives and their private pursuits. Constant explains the difference between the ancient, closed and autarchic societies and the modern, great and commercial societies: “we can no longer enjoy the liberty of the ancients, which consisted in an active and constant participation in collective power. Our freedom must consist of peaceful enjoyment and private independence” (1988c: 316); and he continues (1988c: 325):


\(^{64}\) See for instance Sartori 1987a: 14, 30, 71; 1987b: 479; Bobbio 1989: 154-5.
In the latter, the more time and energy man dedicated to the exercise of his political rights, the freer he thought himself; on the other hand, in the kind of liberty of which we are capable, the more the exercise of political rights leaves us the time for our private interests, the more precious will liberty be to us. Hence, Sirs, the need for the representative system.

Through representative democracy the political will and energy of the people is channelled into manageable forms and demands – system-internal demands (Macpherson 1966); the masses, or the proletariat, are transformed from enemies to co-supporters, from opponents to loyal opposition. Charles Maier (1992: 132) identifies two ways in which liberals sought to limit the democratic wave. Firstly, one could restrict the eligibility and the electorate in terms of age, gender, occupation, marital status, social benefits, criminality etc., which was (and in some measure still is) a widely used tool. Secondly, one could introduce structural limitations through representation and constitutionalism. We can add a third feature, the emergence of a party system, which (although initially often despised by the liberals) helped turn the enemy into a loyal opposition by deflecting the struggle from substantial, radical and revolutionary objectives into particular, ‘realistic’ and moderate demands. Political organization and articulation are rearticulated to fit the institutions and practices of the system and serves therefore to ‘civilize’ opposition. Representative democracy is based on the conviction that social pluralism can be made into “a peaceful fact, almost a jigsaw puzzle that fits, if it unfolds under certain proper legal regulations” (Hansen 1999: 356). Political conflictuality is, like in the market, translated into peaceful competition – through the exclusion of radicalism, populism, direct democracy and other demands and energies which are impossible to absorb or institutionalize within the existing system. They exist outside the system of acceptable parliamentarian-political articulation.

The Prerogative

“When a system is fighting for its life, it has no time for the habits of a debating society”, as Harold Laski said (1936: 247). Institutionalization or juridification does not close the political. It is allowed room in the prerogative and in the exception (which is often conflated). It is not entirely accurate, but true enough for our purposes here, to call the state of emergency for the internal side and the prerogative for the external side of the emergency. They demonstrate the existence of the political behind or beneath the non-political, behind the depoliticized normality. The constitutional state cannot create its own preconditions or protect its institutions with institutional means. This is where the exception measures and the prerogative enter and, hence, the political re-enters. The prerogative is the sovereign’s right to go beyond the established and codified laws and regulations to respond to
a situation, either unaccounted for in the regulations, or a crisis so sudden and imminent, that it precludes going by the book. It is important that the prerogative in early liberal thought is mainly meant to apply to the international sphere. This part of power still has all the attributes and competences of ‘pure’ sovereign power. In chapter 14 of Second Treatise, Locke defines the prerogative as the power and right to “act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it” (1988: 375; Neocleous 2003a: 44-5; Gross 2003: 1077; Fatovic 2004). It is mainly the lawless state of the international, which necessitates this right (Pasquino 1998: 202). Ferguson, although taking about rude times, says that the engagement in hostilities “inclines every people, during warlike ages, to monarchical government” (1995: 142):

From a regard to what is necessary in war, nations inclined to popular or aristocratical government, have had recourse to establishments that bordered on monarchy. Even where the highest office of the state was in common times administered by a plurality of persons, the whole power and authority belonging to it was, on particular occasions, committed to one; and upon great alarms, when the political fabric was shaken or endangered, a monarchical power has been applied, like a prop, to secure the state against the rage of the tempest. Thus were the dictators occasionally named at Rome, and the stadtholders in the United Provinces; and thus, in mixed governments, the royal prerogative is occasionally enlarged, by the temporary suspension of laws, and the barriers of liberty appear to be removed, in order to vest a dictatorial power in the hands of the king. (1995: 143)

Tocqueville says that, “External policy requires the use of almost none of the qualities that are proper to democracy, and demands, on the contrary, the development of almost all those it lacks” (2000: 219); and he notes that liberal democracy in one country necessitates a Europe of republics (2000: 214). Kant says, that when it comes to international matters, a despotic regime cannot be expected to change its form of rule, when confronted by unfriendly regimes “which, after all, is the strongest when it comes to external enemies” (1966d: 234). The international is of such a nature that the law and the democratic procedure are not adequate instruments. The question of war and peace, treaties and diplomacy, has always had a status beyond ‘normal politics’ and often outside democratic accountability. Locke calls this power ‘natural’, “because it is that which answers to the Power every man naturally had before he entered into Society”; and it “contains the Power of War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances” (1988: 365). The international is such that, “what is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs

and interests, must be *left* in great part to the *Prudence* of those who have this Power committed to them” (1988: 366). The international resists institutionalization, predictability and stability. It resists depoliticization and the sovereign is hence admitted the political decision. He is admitted discretion, to go beyond legal and moral rules. He is given the *right to name the enemy* and to fight him. The codified liberal order is not trusted to have the means to defend itself. War and peace, enmity and conflictuality are deemed beyond liberalism. The political is preserved in the exceptional situation and in the border line cases. Liberal societies keep the political preserved in illiberal and undemocratic forms within the liberal-democratic order.

The history of political thought in the West in the past 200 years is partly the story of the progressive repression or crowding out of the ‘power state’, both practically and theoretically, and the simultaneous revaluation of the rule of law state to the point, where the power state is all but ‘forgotten’ by the rule of law state and its theoreticians. In his play *L’Engrenage* from 1946, which originally had the title ‘Les Mains sales’ – ‘Dirty hands’, Jean Paul Sartre describes a conversation between two old revolutionary comrades in arms, Lucien and Jean. After the revolutionary siege of power and forced by the necessities of politics, Jean has turned his back on the revolutionary goals and has become a dictator. His old friend and now opponent, Lucien says accusatory: “Your hands are full of blood. – I know, says Jean – do you not think I would have like to remain clean? But if I had done like you the regent would still be sitting on his throne. Purity is a luxury. You could afford it because I was always around to dirty my hands.” This is the problematic between the dirty hands of ‘the power state’ and the purity of the constitutional state. The constitutional state lives in the protected shadow of the power state; it lives in the normality that the power state protects and guarantees. It can claim moral purity and superiority because of an unacknowledged debt to the political which returns as prerogative, roman dictatorship, emergency measures and the like. It can be (or rather, seem) non-political, because the political is being taken care of below the horizon of liberalism.

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66 According to John McCormick (1997: 125f and 1993) the lack of non-authoritarian theorization on the state of emergency is enormous. For the consequences of this lack in Latin-America, see Negretto & Rivera 2000. For an attempt at contemporary thinking about dictatorship inspired by Schmitt, see Arato 2000 and Bobbio 1997. For a classic and competent discussion of the history of the state of emergency, see Rossiter 1948 and a more recent: Agamben 2005. 67 Dirty hands can be defined as “Public officials commit immoral deeds out of greed, the desire for power, or loyalty to family and friends. But the most perplexing kind of immorality in public office displays a more noble countenance. It is that committed, not in the interest of personal goals, but in the service of the public good” (Thompson 1987: 11): Morally and perhaps legally reprehensible acts committed in the pursuit of higher non-personal, public goals. See Burke 1986; Garrett 1996.
III. Summing up: The Encirclement of Barbarians

The barbarian is always the man who stalks the frontiers of States, the man who stumbles into the city walls. Unlike the savage, the barbarian does not emerge from some natural backdrop to which he belongs. He appears only when civilization already exists, and only when he is in conflict with it. (Foucault 2003: 195)

The liberal era is, as anti-liberalism has always claimed, the unheroic era; an era whose implicit consequences is, what Edward N. Luttwak calls ‘post-heroic warfare’ (1995) and as the American military advertises as clinical warfare. War without loss (on one side, invisible on the other) is warfare without war (again, on one of the sides). The consistently liberal war is the war that does not see itself as war, that does not demand the sacrifices of war, and which isn’t carried out with the means of war. This is where such paradoxical concepts as humanitarian war or democratic imperialism originate from and which will be discussed later.

The liberal vision entails the boring society; the society which have shed the public urge for war and the cult of death (Shklar 1989: 32). As the Serbian professor of sociology, Bozidar Jaksic says in a reflection on the wars in ex-Yugoslavia: “But my dream is that we one day will begin to be a boring country. Right now we are interesting like tigers or other exotic animals in the zoo. But I’ll rather look from the other side of the bars. We should live boring lives like you do in Denmark!” (quoted from Eriksen & Stjernfelt 2003: 144-5). The boring, uneventful life is the opposite of the exciting and dangerous life of the civil war, where opinions and allegiances matter, as in the difference between life and death. The liberal vision is a society, where opinions matter less; where there is nothing to kill or be killed for. It is the rich Western part of the world that in the zoo of nations gets thrilled and drawn by the exotic dangerous animals as expressions of a more pure, more real existence; and it is the ones trapped behind the bars who dream of a domesticated life as a fat and lazy cat. So, given the choice, liberalism chooses boredom over heroism. Not because liberal man is boring per se but because heroism is too exciting. The strength and weakness of liberalism is exactly this choice, which both founds and undermines liberal societies.

But the choice should not blind us to the fact that liberal societies are very strong and coercive societies; or to the unacknowledged fact that they produce, from within their internal pacification, a series of barbarians. It creates ‘others’ through the identification of illiberal extremities: Religious fundamentalism, economic protectionism, judicial arbitrariness; actors or systems all deemed inherently dangerous and illegitimate. These are unrecognized and asymmetrical enemies,
castigated as morally inferior. Pushing through the anti-borderland a circle of barbarians emerge, each threatening liberal society, but all of them dis-acknowledged as an equal. The ‘liberal machines’, which have created ‘conflict partners’ out of former enemies, does also produce new enemies below surface. Liberal self-understanding realizes only the international enemy as a political enemy. The next chapter will explore the liberal engagement with the international enemy, their attempts to go beyond, and the re-emergence of new enemies in the very same process that should end the existence of enmity.
Liberal Conceptions of the International

There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack. If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Rome’s allies; and if Rome had no allies, then allies would be invented. When it was utterly impossible to contrive such an interest – why, then it was the national honor that had been insulted. The fight was always invested with an aura of legality. Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbors, always fighting for a breathing space. The whole world was pervaded by a host of enemies, and it was manifestly Rome’s duty to guard against their indubitably aggressive designs. They were enemies only waiting to fall on the Roman people.

(Joseph Schumpeter; quoted from Barash 1994: 31)

Liberalism hasn’t had the same kind of success internationally as nationally. Theoretically it has been under pressure and critique from realism and what is self-legitimizingly referred to as ‘necessity’, geopolitical or otherwise. The international is the limit case of liberalism. This is where its dogmas and conceptions are most strongly challenged. Violence and unfreedom seems here to be rampant and ultimately uncontrollable. Any attempt at pacification seems to have a hard time. As Stanley Hoffmann writes, the international is in many ways the very opposite of liberalism:

Now, it is easy to see why international affairs have been the nemesis of liberalism. The essence of liberalism is self-restraint, moderation, compromise, and peace. The state must be kept within its sphere; government can use its powers only in the ways set by law; groups and individuals must avoid trespassing and curtailing each other’s freedom. Conflicts, the stuff of social life, have to be settled by reason – through negotiated deals or by resort to freely established authorities – not by violence. The essence of international politics is exactly the opposite: troubled peace, at best, or the state of war. (1987: 396)

This chapter investigates liberalism’s response to the challenge of the international. In standard accounts of the history of political ideas, one seldom sees discussions of the early liberal’s views on international affairs (Sabine & Thorson 1973; Liedman 2000; Fink 2003; Malnes & Midtgaard 1993; Heywood 1998). For that, one often has to turn to literature on colonialism and imperialism. In IR literature a few of the early liberals get a mention as fathers of schools, but it is mainly their influence rather than their own views which are at the centre (Wæver 1992; Petersen & Skak 1998; Vitori & Kauppi 1987; Jackson & Sørensen 1999; Burchill & Linklater 1996). Even in a
presentation of ‘the fathers of international thought’ (Thompson 1994) there is hardly a mention of their thoughts on the international and in Peter Gay’s seminal work on the Enlightenment (1967, 1970) this aspect of their thinking is not even mentioned. In an article on the international thought of Rousseau and Kant, Niels Amstrup (1992: 310) observes, I think rightly so, that the history of political thought has been rather negligent of international affairs. This chapter deals with liberal ideas and assumption of the international as first formulated in the Enlightenment. The aim is not an exhaustive description but an exploration of themes, images and conceptions inherent in liberalism from then till now. This chapter, then, is not just about the past. As will be shown liberal internationalism has remained committed to pretty much the same set of principles and thesis for the past three hundred years:

The evolution of liberal international theory in its first three hundred years reveal a set of themes that have proven robust, continually adapting to new circumstances to offer new insights into international relations. Although the relative importance of these themes has shifted over time, their interrelationships have been recognized by each new generation of thinkers. (Zacher & Matthew 1995: 117)

I. Politics is War

… the philosophes turned, indeed, against statesmen and their practices. They contrasted ‘true policy’ or ‘economic policy’ – its emphasis being on free trade and the community of interests between states – with ‘false policy’ or ‘power politics’ which led to frustration and war. (Hinsley 1963: 82)

The early liberal Enlightenment-thinkers weren’t international politics scholars. It was for none of them their primary interest or work (Gilbert 1951/2: 2). Their reflections on the special nature and structure of the international sphere are, therefore, seldom discussed separately from their thoughts on domestic politics, the economy, the judiciary, morals etc. It is, accordingly, not surprising that we rediscover many of their figures and ideas about the national in their thoughts on the international. One often says that they made a ‘domestic analogy’, where those ‘mechanisms of freedom’, that they explored in the domestic field, were expected to have the same effect on the relations between states as they had within states. It is, however, not a complete analogy, where there is no significant difference between the domestic and the foreign – it might be today, as we’ll discuss later. Still, the concept of the domestic analogy captures the move – from the domestic and to the foreign – and the ambition – from national to international pacification. As both a limiting factor and a constant motivation, the international continues to be seen as the sphere of trouble and
danger. It is the sphere of war and violence. The discussions of liberal internationalism have often focused on the domestic analogy. Stanley Hoffman is representative for this view, when he writes: “the international dimension of liberalism was little more than the projection of domestic liberalism on a world scale. Liberalism was and is, in large part, an expression of revulsion against illegitimate violence: that of tyrants at home and of aggressors abroad” (1995: 160-1). Antonio Franceschet writes: ”A more-or-less common denominator of liberal internationalist positions is, therefore, the view that the anarchic system of sovereign states can and ought to be domesticated in a way that resembles, however imperfectly, the liberal vision of political society within the state” (2001: 211; see also Gilbert 1961: 62; Buzan 1984: 600; Buchan 2002: 408). This reduction of liberal internationalist thinking is partly the result of its positioning with regard to realism, which emphasizes the enduring and all-important difference between the national and the international as one between peace and anarchy. But it also describes the main feature of liberal internationalism.

Raymond Aron defines the defining trait of interstate relation as “the fact that the actors regard the use of armed forces as both legitimate and legal. Of all social relations in higher civilizations these are the only ones, where violence seems to be considered normal” (2003: 98). This ‘fact’ is what contemporary liberalism questions and what the early liberalism tried to come to terms with. Early liberalism tended to both portray this ‘fact’ as an historical fact, conditioned upon a number of unfortunate but changeable circumstances, and as a more robust and enduring fact grounded in lasting features of man and the political. Unlike realism, which has a clear understanding of both the national and the international, there is in early liberalism an unclarity in the understanding of the international. On the one side, the international is seen as a space void of law, where each state fends for itself, locked in perpetual war. On the other side, there is a strong sense of common interest among the (European) states, a cooperative modus and a sense of ‘we’ that transcends violent rivalry and which tends to copy the model for intra-state pacification. We can rephrase it: Liberal thought on the international struggles with the disturbing question, whether the international sphere and its violence is a historical or a human condition. More often than not, both ideas are present in one and the same thinker. The following will explore this tension between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘non-liberal’ side of liberal internationalism.
One can say that the international first arises as a problem with the national. They are interdependent. The one presupposes the many. Montesquieu writes, that when people form societies, each society becomes conscious of its strength (and, what he also means but doesn’t write, the strength of the others) which creates a state of war between them (1989, I: 7). This state of war is parallel to Hobbes’s state of nature in that there is no epistemic or moral order other than everyone’s right to self-preservation. Montesquieu makes a common, but quite problematic, parallelization between man and state:

The life of states is like that of men. Men have the right to kill in the case of natural defense; states have the right to wage war for their own preservation. In the case of natural defense, I have the right to kill, because my life is mine, as the life of the one who attacks me is his; likewise a state wages war because its preservation is just, as is any other preservation. (1989, I: 138)

In the chapter on property, Locke writes in Second Treatise that “in the beginning all the World was America” (1988: 301); uncultivated, unowned, unregimented, state of nature. Hobbes too, in chapter 13 of Leviathan which concerns ‘the naturall condition of mankind’, uses America as a picture of the stateless state. The American Indians, civil war and the relations between states are actually existing examples of the state of nature (see also 1999: 80). He writes:

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealouisies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. (1985: 187-8)

At the end of chapter 30, he makes another comparison between the individual and the state. They possess the same natural rights, first and foremost the right to self-defence:

68 The uncultivated land meant for Locke that the European settlers had the right – almost the divine obligation – to take possession of the land. This is one version of the European dismissal of any ordering principle other than its own. Here – as so often – it served more practical purposes as well. Although God had given the world to men in common he is at pains to stress that “he gave it for their benefit, and the greatest Conveniencies of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational (and Labour was to be his Title to it)” (1988: 291). The European mode of production is the only cultivating, rational and property-creating one. This become even more evident later on in the chapter on property when he says that “there are still great Tracts of Ground to be found, which (the Inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of Mankind, in the consent of the Use of their common Money) lie waste” (1988: 299). Brutally put: non-Western lands lies waste and are up for grabs (the same goes for the enclosures of the commons, see Lebovics 1986).
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say anything in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths (1985: 394).

In one sense, there is of course a parallel, as the state of nature of both man and state is without umpire, but Hobbes hints at a significant difference between the two states of nature in the sentence which follows the above quote from chapter 13. Here, he writes on the states: "But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men" (1985: 188). The state of nature between states exists on the basis of peace, or at least some form of order, in the states.

I want briefly to mention three critiques of the equalization of man and state. Firstly, Stanley Hoffmann (1965: 60-1) mentions two reasons why the international state of nature isn’t as miserable as the interpersonal. First of all, states are stronger than men; collectives doesn’t perish as easily, why the fear of ‘death’ (violent death, as Leo Strauss (1992: 17) emphasizes). Secondly, the existence of the state is guarantee of the security of the citizens: no person is safe in the state of nature but interstate rivalry may not directly influence a person’s daily life (see also Walker 1993: 93). Hedley Bull (1977: 47-8; 1995) notes, that there isn’t a direct parallel between Hobbes’s description of the state of nature as being without industry, navigation, arts, sciences, moral and legal distinctions etc. and then the international. In Hobbes’s own time, there was a developed interstate trade and communication. The lack of a world government did not make world trade impossible, the interstate rivalry didn’t exhaust the means and energy of the state rendering the population destitute. The European state system, even at this time, couldn’t either be said to be without any ideas of right and wrong, “no Mine and Thine” (Hobbes 1985: 188). On the contrary, even in the absence of a supreme judge or a sovereign, an elaborate system of diplomacy,

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69 Although ‘Hobbesian’ is an often used term in debates of the international, Hobbes himself had little to say on the subject and it is not altogether obvious that he himself would be a Hobbesian – and most certainly not in the sense that Robert Kagan (see later) uses the concept of a Hobbesian approach to the international where the American neo-conservatives and the Bush administration operates in an international disorder. They are more appropriately termed ‘armed Kantians’ and Hobbes would probably never engage in the kind of uncertain and dangerous endeavours that America is presently pursuing. He advocated caution and non-engagement (see Hobbes 1999: 103-4, 177). For critiques of the connection between realism and Hobbes, see Bull 1981; Navari 1982; Hanson 1984.

70 Although: “in the period 1130-1815 the English state spent the bulk of its revenue (and normally between 75 per cent and 95 per cent of all revenues spent on public functions) on war and preparations for wars” (Mann 1988: 130).
international law and even international morality developed giving rise to elaborated rules of warfare (Best 1980, 1994; Walzer 2000). Lastly, David Runciman (2003) speaks of the difference between man and the state in the state of nature. Life for man is, according to Hobbes, “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (1985: 186). This cannot be said to apply to the life of the state. They are bigger and stronger; they live longer and they are not as exposed to death and destruction as man. As Runciman writes in the shadow of 9/11, it is very hard to jack a knife into the shoulder blades of a state with its back turned. The threat and insecurity for state and man is not alike: States are not solitary, as they come into being in through recognition in a state system. States are not poor, as even the least well-off state usually commands far more resources than its citizens. States may do a lot of harm to mainly their own citizens but generally states are not nasty toward each other. Diplomacy and the rules of war are mostly upheld. States are not brutish. This is the core of Hobbes’s own argument: Through the state we enter the state of society, where even the worst sovereign is better than no sovereign. Finally, the life of states is not short. The concept of ‘failed states’ bear this out. They continue as recognized states long after they have ceased to display any effective state-like features. States are, if not eternal, then at least generally very long-lived.

What we see in Hobbes, and also in liberalism, is a fundamental uncertainty about the nature of the international. On the one hand, it is understood as anarchic, but on the other hand it is also portrayed as saturated with sociability, which dissolves the differentiations of in/out and order/anarchy. Locke demonstrates the same kind of uncertainty as Hobbes, when he in the Second Treatise states that “all Commonwealthe are in the state of Nature one with another” (Locke 1988: 390; see also Cox 1960: chap. 4) and then in the same chapter on conquest shows great appreciation for the moral norms of the state society. The uncertainty of Locke may stem from liberalism’s legalistic concept of social order, where the national creation of order, in the shape of Hobbes’s sovereign or Locke’s state as rule of law, are portrayed as the only model of order, whereby the international falls short. We might call this the state or sovereign element of liberal order thinking. This element is then in contradiction with the rest of liberal theory, which stresses the sub-state creation of order, which tend to fill the international with relations, exchanges and communication. Locke sometimes defines the state of nature as the space where there are no impartial judge to

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71 Hobbes opens this possibility: “It is a proverbial saying, inter arma silent leges. There is little therefore to be said concerning the laws that men are to observe one towards another in time of war, wherein every man’s being and well-being is the rule of his actions. Yet thus much the law of nature commandeth in war: that men satiate not the cruelty of their present passions, whereby in their own conscience they foresee no benefit to come. For that betrayeth not a necessity, but a disposition of the mind to war, which is against the law of nature” (1999: 103-4).
appeal to, no one who with authority can make and enforce a ruling (for instance Locke 1988: 326, where this is extended to the relations between sovereigns; or in the subsequent paragraph ‘the Woods of America’). Adam Smith says the same in Lectures on Jurisprudence (1978: 545):

... with respect to the laws of nations, we can scarce mention any one regulation which is established with the common consent of all nations, and observed as such at all times. This must necessarily be the case, for where there is no supreme legislative power nor judge to settle differences, we may always expect uncertainty and irregularity.

The international cannot meet the model of a ‘supreme legislative power’. In this way, given the near universal dismissal of the world state even among the most cosmopolitan of the liberals, the international is measured with the standards of the national sphere and found wanting. Perhaps we could see this as a variety of the domestic analogy even though it seemingly contradicts it. The international is submitted to the same ‘test’ as the national and is, therefore, despite being portrayed as different, not inherently or necessarily so. The international is defined by a lack, a lack of features common to the national sphere. Its problems emanate exactly from this lack. It is worth noting that Smith ends the quote by saying that we must ‘always expect uncertainty and irregularity’ from the international sphere because it hasn’t the features and institutions of the national. The international has the exact opposite characteristics of the national, which – as we saw in the previous chapter – is exactly characterized as being ‘certain’ and ‘regular’. So, we have two images of the international. The first image is of the international as the open space: America, a state of nature among states. Apparently, this is the immediate picture, the common sense, when early liberals talk of the international. This is, of course, also the image in liberalism of the ancien regime and its foreign policy. The second image of the international is of the peopled space: Europe, the state of (quasi) society among states. The first image is static. The international resists regularization. The only end of the state of nature would be a world government, which by necessity would be despotic. There is a sharp divide between the order and regularity of the national and then the disorder and irregularity of the international. The first image presupposes a plurality of demarcated entities and it is the state-centric or sovereign side of liberalism whereas, the second image is its state-critic and non-sovereign side. States are not essential to this image.

The above discussion has briefly hinted at the first image – the international as America. The rest of the chapter will discuss the international as Europe. Most liberals place themselves somewhere between these two images. It’s important to bear the duality of liberalism in mind as we proceed to the rest of the chapter, especially given the fact that this dissertation and most other discussions of
liberal internationalism sees the second image as its defining characteristic. Liberalism as an ideal type is the second image (The point of calling it ‘European’ will hopefully show itself more clearly in this and the following chapters. It’s sufficient here to note that the ‘new world’ of America becomes the ‘old world’ of Europe. Just as the USA saw and defined itself as a departure from ‘old Europe’ so Europe defines itself in opposition to the image of America presented above. These different images are still highly charged in contemporary transatlantic debates). This also means that the following will be a somewhat purposefully distorted picture of actually written liberalism as it tries to emphasize the, so to speak, liberal side of liberalism. Liberal internationalism operates in this vagueness of double images that both accepts and transcends the interstate as anarchic. As we in coming chapters discuss contemporary liberal globalism we’ll see this split reproduced, as liberalism tries to shed its state-centric side.

**Politics vs. Relations**

As just mentioned, one can operate with two positions. The first position asserts that the international is a state of nature because there is no global sovereign. The second position tries to abandon the language of sovereignty altogether and highlights mainly the sub-state levels of international exchanges. One could say that, strictly speaking, this is the meaning of ‘international’, whereas ‘interstate’ should cover the relations among states. What liberalism is then trying is in various ways to criticize, disregard and ignore the interstate level by focusing on the equivalent to ‘society’ in the domestic setting, namely the ‘international society’.

One way of approaching the liberal attitude to the international is to differentiate between international politics and international relations. The liberal distrust of international politics wasn’t an expression of any kind of protectionism but rather an experience-based lack of confidence in its practitioners: Kings, generals and diplomats. Richard Cobden (1804-1865) pinpointed it with his famous remark: ”As little intercourse as possible betwixt the Governments, as much connection as possible between the nations, of the world.” (quoted from Hammarlund 2001: 53). In his *England, Ireland, and America* from 1835, Cobden further wrote that apparently interference was the guiding principle of British foreign policy and its corrective lay “in the wholesome exercise of the people’s opinion on behalf of their own interests. The middle and industrious classes of England can have no interest apart from the preservation of peace. The honours, fame, the emoluments of war belong not to them; the battle-pain is the harvest-field of the aristocracy, watered with the blood of the people” (quoted from MacMillan 1998: 103).
International politics was filled with everything, the liberals tried to overcome: Secrecy, breach of contract, deceptions, violent passions, coercion and the very real application of the principle that might is right (Burchill 1996). Le Trosne wrote in 1777 that diplomacy was a "obscure art which hides itself in the folds of deceit, which fears to let itself be seen and believes it can succeed only in the darkness of mystery". Diderot wrote a satirical article on 'The political principles of kings', wherein he describes diplomatic activity: "Make alliances only in order to sow hatred … Incite wars among my neighbours and try to keep them going … Have no ambassadors in other countries, but spies … To be neutral means to profit from the difficulties of others in order to improve one’s own situation" (both quoted from Gilbert 1961: 61). Famous is also Kant’s depiction of what he saw as the king’s academic and legal propagandists as ‘sorry comforters’. It probably wasn’t without effect on their deep distrust and rejection that this part of the state’s affairs was closed to the philosophes (Howard 1978: 23; 2000: 26-7). This was true even where they rubbed elbows with the rulers as Voltaire did with Frederick the Great, the philosopher king, who shocked Europe and most of the philosophes, by being a very aggressive militarist. Kant’s critique of the propagandists, who could find an explanation of the legality for just about anything, was not unfounded, not then and not now. In the beginning of the 1740s, Frederick the Great invaded Silesia and left the job of justifying the invasion to his diplomatic corps, a Podewils, who produced a very complicated defence of the king’s actions. Frederick himself wrote on the margin of Podewil’s legal argument: “Bravo. The work of an excellent charlatan” (Cavallar 1999: 34). Adam Smith summarizes very precisely their view of international politics, diplomacy and law:

In war and negotiation, therefore, the laws of justice are very seldom observed. Truth and fair dealing are almost totally disregarded. Treaties are violated; and the violation, if some advantage is gained by it, sheds scarce any dishonour upon the violator. The ambassador who dupes the minister of a foreign nation, is admired and applauded. The just man who disdains either to take or to give any advantage, but who would think it less dishonourable to give than to take one; the man who, in all private transactions, would be the most beloved and the most esteemed; in those public transactions is regarded as a fool and an idiot, who does not understand his business; and he incurs always the contempt, and sometimes even the detestation of his fellow-citizens. In war, not only what are called the laws of nations, are frequently violated, without bringing (among his own fellow-citizens, whose judgments he only regards) any considerable dishonour upon the violator; but those laws themselves are, the greater part of them, laid down with very little regard to the plainest and most obvious rules of justice. (1982: 154-5)
And he continues to say: “From the smallest interest, upon the slightest provocation, we see those rules every day, either evaded or directly violated without shame or remorse” (1982: 228). International politics was, and was seen as, not much more than war and the preparation for war. The liberal *philosophes* couldn’t anything but be dismissive of international politics as such. International relations – sub-state connections and exchanges across state boundaries – were, on the other hand, open. Open as in public and as in open to private persons – including the *philosophes*. What we see, therefore, is the reproduction of ‘national freedoms’ in the international sphere:

… foreign policy and diplomacy were regarded as typical phenomena of the ancien regime; they owed their importance to the fact that the rulers followed false ideals and egoistic passions instead of reason. The logical consequence was that in a reformed world, based on reason, foreign policy and diplomacy would become unnecessary, that the new world would be a world without diplomats. (Gilbert 1951/2: 16)

Politics is war, relations are peace. JS Mill said that international trade was not only ‘the principal guarantee of the peace of the world’ but also “the great permanent security for the uninterrupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race” (1965: 594).

*Trade: The Tacit War*

It is in the argument of the pacifying effects of the pursuit of wealth that we find the greatest similarities in the view of the spontaneous organization and pacification of freedom both within and between states. Voltaire wrote in his *Dictionnaire philosophique* under the heading ‘Tolerance’:

The Parsee, the Hindu, the Jew, the Mohammedan, the Chinese deist, the Brahman, the Greek Christian, the Roman Christian, the protestant Christian, the Quaker Christian trade with each another in the stock exchanges of Amsterdam, London, Surat or Basra: they do not raise their daggers against one another to win souls for their religions (1972: 387)

Likewise, Joseph Addison wrote in 1711, upon his visit to the Royal Exchange in London:

I am infinitely delighted in mixing with these several ministers of Commerce as they are distinguished by their different walks and their languages. Sometimes I am justled among a Body of Americans; sometimes I am lost in a Crowd of Jews, and sometimes in a Group of Dutch-men. I am a Dane, a Swede, or Frenchman at different times, or rather fancy myself like the old Philosopher, who upon being asked what country-man he was, replied that he was a Citizen of the World. (quoted from Schlereth 1977: 101)
As Adam Smith said, the economic occupation does not appeal to people’s goodness but to their interest. Religion, place of birth and other such non-economic markers are irrelevant in the process of exchange. Strictly speaking, it isn’t, as Voltaire hints at, tolerance but indifference; which is of course preferable to combat and war. The economic agents view each other as nothing but economic agents. They are, as Marx put in the foreword to the first edition of *Das Kapital*, ‘personifications of economic categories’ (1988: 16). It is capital as money, not as home town, which dictates the interchange. The indifference in regard to what we normally find important in our relations with others – who are they? Where are they from? Are they good people? etc. – is disregarded. It’s a pure relationship. This indifference toward the other person’s salvation and origin is the precondition of exchange. The pursuit of gain creates therefore an ‘economic tolerance’ or ‘economic pacifism’. That, which otherwise creates discord, is here immaterial and even a hindrance for the wealth of nations and individuals. The early liberals knew all about the existence of free-floating and dematerialized capital and its limitations of politics. There are here a number of arguments, strikingly similar to those contemporary arguments about globalization, and which postulates the inefficiency, if not counter-productivity, of national politics in an era of digitalized capital. Montesquieu said in 1757:

Commerce, sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes hampered by monarchs, wanders across the earth, flees from where it is oppressed, and remains where it is left to breathe: it reigns today where one used to see only deserted places, seas, and rocks; there where it used to reign are now deserted places. (1989, book 21, chapter 5)

And Adam Smith said in 1776 of the capitalist:

A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and together with it all the industry which it supports, from one country to another. (1976, I: 444-5)

A clear contradiction between a jealous and suspicious foreign policy on the one side and an open and unprejudiced trade on the other is created; between a politics, which is massive, stationary and hindering, and then an economy, which is light, mobile and creating. Tocqueville expressed the optimism of his age, when he wrote: "There is no sovereign will nor national prejudices that can struggle for long against low cost" (2000: 390). That is why both Adam Smith and David Hume appeals to look beyond those national prejudices that hinder trade – for them and at this time this
meant primarily Britain and France. Hume goes so far in the article ‘Of the jealousy of trade’ as to say, that he not only as a man, but as a British subject, will pray for a flowering trade in Britain’s old foes: Spain, Italy, even France (1963: 338). Adam Smith says, that if Britain and France were able to look beyond mercantile jalousie and national hatred and realize their true interest, then they would see that their individual wealth and prosperity depended upon that of the other country (1976, I: 521; Macmillan 1998: chap. 3); and in his lectures he said: ”All these national jealousies which prompt them to spite and ill-will each other, and refuse to be supplied by them in any convenience of life, must lessen the exchange of commodities, hurt the division of labour, and diminish the opulence of both” (1978: 391-2). And in Theory of Moral Sentiments (1982: 229):

France and England may each of them have some reason to dread the increase of the naval and military power; but for either of them to envy the internal happiness and prosperity of the other, the cultivation of its lands, the advancement of its manufactures, the increase of its commerce, the security and number of its ports and harbours, its proficiency in all the liberal arts and sciences, is surely beneath the dignity of two such great nations. These are all real improvements of the world we live in. Mankind are benefited, human nature is enobled by them. In such improvements each nation ought, not only to endeavour itself to excel, but from the love of mankind, to promote, instead of obstructing the excellence of its neighbours. These are all proper objects of national emulation, not of national prejudice or envy.

Hume too criticizes a policy of relative advantage that sees a point in the poverty of the neighbour:

Nothing is more usual, among states which have made some advances in commerce, than to look on the progress of their neighbours with a suspicious eye, to consider all trading states as their rivals, and to suppose that it is impossible for any of them to flourish, but at their expense. In opposition to this narrow and malignant opinion, I will venture to assert, that the increase of riches and commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a state can scarcely carry its trade and industry very far, where all the surrounding states are buried in ignorance, sloth, and barbarism. (1963: 334)

Smith has an almost verbatim critique in Wealth of Nations against the doctrine also known as ‘beggar thy neighbour’ (1976, I: 519). What they argue against is foreign policy (and commerce) as a preparation for war; and what they argue for is a commercial cosmopolitanism (Schlereth 1977: chap. 5; Forman-Barzilai 2000). In his Principles of Political Economy from 1871, J.S. Mill writes in the manner of Montesquieu and Smith that:

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72 Smith was not, however, strictly speaking a cosmopolitan. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments he says: “That we should be but little interested, therefore, in the fortune of those whom we can neither serve nor hurt, and who are in every respect so very remote from us, seems wisely ordered by Nature; and if it were possible to alter in this respect the
... capital is becoming more and more cosmopolitan; there is so much greater similarity of manners and institutions than formerly, and so much less alienation of feeling, among the civilized countries, that both population and capital now move from one of those countries to another on much less temptation than heretofore. (1965: 588, my italics)

Neighbouring (civilized) nations are not political enemies but economic competitors, emulation rather than hatred, trade rather than war. And that makes all the difference in the world, as it presupposes a certain equality in conditions and a certain parallel in developments to succeed. Trading nations in a way shares each others fate. David Ricardo wrote in 1821, in his famous chapter on foreign trade, that a system of perfectly free commerce would create the most extended division of labour between countries “while by increasing the general mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilised world” (1965: 81). We’ll leave aside (for now) that the universal society of nations is reduced to the civilized world, i.e. the Western part of the world. The important thing here is that the nations are united by common ties of interest and intercourse – what E.H. Carr called the thesis on ‘the harmony of interests’ (1964: chap. 4). Benjamin Constant expresses the same belief: “Commerce has brought nations closer, it has given them customs and habits which are almost identical; the heads of states may be enemies: the peoples are compatriots” (1988c: 325). Again, we see the differentiation between politics and relations, the portrait of politics as enmities and non-politics as peace. Trade are not just fleeting encounters between self-interested economic actors but just as much the cultivation of a moral community that goes beyond self-interest and creates a ‘we’. Hume emphasizes – as discussed in the previous chapter – the emulation or peaceful competition among nations, and he sees this as not only a source of prosperity and progress but as the source of ‘the rise of politeness and learning’ (Hume 1963: 120). Trade silences the loud noise of weapons and creates what Beccaria (1996: 8) called ‘the tacit war of industry’. The space of interaction between civil societies increases as the space of state positioning decreases.

original constitution of our frame, we could yet gain nothing by the change” (1982: 140). And he criticizes the stoic idea of being a citizen of the world as well as the idea that love of one’s own country is a derivative of the love of mankind and he says of world order proposals: “The most extensive public benevolence which can commonly be exerted with any considerable effect, is that of the statesmen, who project and form alliances among neighbouring or not very distant nations, for the preservation either of, what is called, the balance of power, or of the general peace and tranquillity of the states within the circle of their negotiations. The statesmen, however, who plan and execute such treaties, have seldom any thing in view, but the interest of their respective countries” (1982: 230). Smith is, despite his critiques of national prejudice, a nationalist in the sense that he conceives order, internal and external as predicated upon a national ordering principle.
Modernity is Peace. From Warlike to Peaceful

A “dangerous prejudice, a carry-over from barbarism, a remnant of the former chaos”. So spoke D’Argenson in 1764 on military virtues (quoted from Gilbert 1961: 59). Modernity is peaceful. This is the defining narrative and legitimization of modernity. The idea is almost, despite the horrors of the twentieth century, impossible to shake off. It’s an inherent and necessary part of modernity’s self-description and it has for instance been one of the ‘tasks’ of modernity’s premier social science, sociology, to ‘prove’ this. In this and the following section, we’ll explore aspects of this alleged connection between modernity and peace. This section deals with the peaceful nature (even in war) of the modern states, whereas the next takes on the warring features of the non-modern. In this section, we’ll see an outspoken parallel between domestic and foreign, or rather: The internal pacification guarantees and structures the external. The same developments, which pacified the internal space, now also pacify its outward motions. William Connolly summarizes the liberal understanding of the difference between past and present (and those who still live in the past):

Even if modernity is not unique (it is too early to tell), it is at least distinctive. In its optimistic moments it defines itself by contrast to earlier periods which are darker, more superstitious, less free, less rational, less productive, less civilized, less comfortable, less democratic, less tolerant, less respectful of the individual, less scientific and less developed technically than it is at its best. (1993: 1)

This difference between modernity and various modes of non-modernity, and all its subsequent differentiations between the benign and the dangerous, peace and conflict, prosperity and poverty etc., is all-important to understand liberal conceptions of the international. Benjamin Constant differentiates between two ages: The age of war and the age of commerce. The organizing principles of the two ages share a common goal: To acquire the object of one’s desire; but they depart in their practical means to reach this end. Commerce is, as Constant says, a way to acquire by way of mutual understanding that which one can no longer hope to conquer by means of violence. It is through the experience-based insight that war is an unsure way of acquisition that individuals – even the strongest among them – realize that commerce is a much milder and surer way of getting what you want; “War then comes before commerce. The former is all savage impulse, the latter civilized calculation. It is clear that the more the commercial tendency prevails, the weaker must the tendency to war become” (1988a: 53). ‘Savage impulse’ confronts ‘civilized calculation’ as two distinct forms of social organization: “The infinite and complex ramifications of commerce have placed the interest of societies beyond the frontiers of their own territory; the spirit
of the age triumphs over the narrow and hostile spirit that men seek to dignify with the name of patriotism" (1988a: 54). This is not just a repetition of the former section on the pacifying effects of commerce. The age of commerce is just another name for a much more ambitious age: The pacific age, of which commerce is one element. It is Constant who most explicitly and forcefully discusses an often since repeated argument against war: They do no longer pay. This argument is part of a grander claim, which says, that violence and war is in contradiction with the now prevailing societal order. The principles of modern society are progress, prosperity, harmony, balance, tranquillity and not least comfort; all of which gets disturbed if not destroyed by war:

The sole aim of modern nations is repose, and with repose comfort, and, as source of comfort, industry. War becomes every day a more ineffective means of attaining this aim. Its hazards no longer offer either to individuals or to nations benefits that match the results of peaceful work and regular exchange. Among the ancients, a successful war increased both private and public wealth in the form of slaves, tributes and lands shared out. For the moderns, even a successful war always costs more than it brings in. (Constant 1988a: 54; see also 1988c: 314)

The aim of modern societies is stability, harmony, tranquillity; all which are disrupted if not destroyed by war. Just as importantly: two developments have rendered war useless if not counterproductive. The first have already been mentioned: It is commerce and the peaceful exchange, which makes it possible to satisfy our desires without violence. The other development is in weapons technology, which have taken the glory out of war: "War hast lost its charm as well as its utility. Man is no longer driven to it either by interest or by passion" (1988a: 55). The two martial or aristocratic arguments for war are no longer valid: War is neither profitable nor honourable. Constant has with remarkable precision listed the liberal arguments against war:

The commercial nations of modern Europe, industrious, civilized, placed on a territory large enough for their needs, linked to other peoples by relations the interruption of which would be a disaster, have nothing to hope for from conquest. A useless war is the greatest offence that a government today can commit. It destroys every social guarantee without compensation; it jeopardizes every form of liberty; it injures every interest; it upsets every security; it weighs upon every fortune. It combines and legitimizes every kind of internal and external tyranny. It introduces into judicial forms a hastiness destructive both of their sanctity and of their purpose. It tends to represent all the men whom the agents of authority view with hostility as accomplishes of the foreign enemy. It corrupts the rising generations; it divides the people into two parts, one of which despises the other and passes readily from contempt to injustice. It prepares future destructions by means of the past ones and purchases with the evils of the present the evils that are to come. (1988a: 81)
Hardly anything significant in the liberal arsenal against war (with the exception of mankind’s total annihilation in a nuclear war) has been added to this, which Constant wrote in 1814. On the contrary: It has at several different times (one of them being now) been presented as the truth, not for then-and-there but for here-and-now. Another part of the argument is the change in man’s dispositions as we move from the aristocratic to the commercial society. We covered that in the previous chapter. It creates a person who transcends national prejudice, who feels a European unity, and who opposes war. I’ll present another long quote, this time from Tocqueville, because it captures my point about the argument on the futility and difficulty of war:

> When the principle of equality develops not only in one nation, but in several neighboring peoples at the same time, as seen in our day in Europe, the men who inhabit these diverse countries, despite the disparity of tongues, usages, and laws, still resemble each other inasmuch as they equally dread war and conceive the same love of peace. In vain does ambition or anger arm princes; a sort of apathy and universal benevolence pacifies them despite themselves and makes their swords fall from their hands: wars become rarer. In proportion as equality, developing at the same time in several countries, simultaneously pushes the men who inhabit them toward industry and commerce, not only do their tastes resemble each other’s, but their interests mix and become entangled so that no nation can inflict ills on others that do not come back to it, and so that in the end all consider war as a calamity almost as great for the winner as for the defeated. (Tocqueville 2000: 631, my italics)

Again we see a differentiation between a pacific people and princes, who are armed in ‘ambition or anger’ and an emphasis on European commonality created through commerce. But Tocqueville is a very minute and precise observer, and the quote continues by making a connection between not only democracies and peace but also the dangers of war in democratic times, the escalation and totality of democratic or modern wars:

> Thus, in democratic centuries it is very difficult, on the one hand, to bring peoples to combat each other, but on the other hand, it is almost impossible for two among them to make war in isolation. The interests of all are so intertwined, their opinions and their needs so similar, that none can keep itself at rest when the others are agitated. Wars therefore become rarer, but when they arise, they have a vaster field.

Constant mirrors Tocqueville in the notion of a new trans-European community. Formerly, every nation was a family unto itself and it was naturally the enemy of all other. Now, a great part of humanity (Europe) lives as one family: “Even the division of Europe into several states is, thanks to the progress of enlightenment, more apparent than real” (1988c: 313). The warring disposition was
a product of circumstances. When the circumstances changes, so does man: “At certain stages in the history of mankind, war is simply in man’s nature” (1988a: 51). And he continues: “The warlike tradition, a heritage from distant ages, and above all the errors of governments slow down the effects of this tendency, but every day it makes further progress” (1988a: 53). It hardly needs mentioning that we again see governments as the impediment to what is now (European) man’s natural peaceful disposition. Formerly, Constant says, war was so much a part of man’s nature, that “Attila pointed out to his Huns the part of the world upon which they were to descend, and they fell upon it, because Attila was simply the instrument and the representative of their own impulse” (1988a: 64). But now, in the age of commerce, war is contrary to man’s nature, so governments have to use ‘sophism and imposture’ to lure the people into combat (1988a: 64-5):

Instead it would talk of national independence, of national honour, of the rounding off of frontiers, of commercial interests, of precautions dictated by foresight, and what next? The vocabulary of hypocrisy and injustice is inexhaustible … Any authority that wished today to undertake extensive conquests would be condemned to this series of vain pretexts and scandalous lies … Authority would have to work upon the intellectual faculties of the mass of its subjects.

Constant, like Kant (but sensed by Tocqueville), did not see the nationalist crowd, singing all the way to the front, as the ‘generation of 1914’ did. Kant wrote in Zum evigen Frieden that a republican constitution will ensure peace, because when “the assent of every citizen is necessary to decide the question ‘Whether war shall be declared or not’ … they will certainly beware of plunging into an enterprise so hazardous” (1966d: 205); and Constant said that “The only possible guarantee against useless or unjust wars is the energy of representative assemblies. They grant the conscription of men, they consent to taxes” (1988b: 256). But, as Michael Howard says in a critique of the liberal belief in the pacific nature of public opinion: “one can never be sure that public opinion in democracies will be civilized” (2000: 65).73 They could not imagine that it would or could be society pressing war upon the government.

73 “It is clear that Kant’s reasons for maintaining that republics are more reluctant to go to war are twofold: citizens had to fight themselves and they had to bear the burden of public debt. Neither of these two reasons fits today’s ‘democracies’, which have large professional armies and the capacity to issue debt to foreigners” (Cui 2004: 247). Michael Mann coins the term ‘civil society militarism’ and says that “the association of liberalism, constitutionalism or democracy with pacifism is a complete and utter fabrication”. He refers this statement and the concept to “‘civil society militarism’, state-supported but not state-led, directed against peoples who were often stateless … At this kind of militarism the citizens of liberal regimes were the undisputed world leaders for two centuries” (1996: 235).
Another typical element in the claim of the liberal state’s pacifism is its humanity in war. Montesquieu writes in *De l’ Esprit des Lois*, in the chapter ‘On the rights of conquest’, about the differences in the Roman rights of nations and those of his own time, when it comes to the treatment of conquered peoples. Roman law gave, according to Montesquieu, the conqueror the right to exterminate the conquered people, whereas the ruling principle of his time is that the victor only takes control of political government and lets the defeated people live by their own laws. Out of the difference, he wants to “leave [it to] others to judge how much better we have become. Here homage must be paid to our modern times, to contemporary reasoning, to the religion of the present day, to our philosophy, and to our mores” (book 10, chapter 3). In his *Lettres Persanes*, Montesquieu lets, furthermore, one of his characters calm the distress of one of the Persian visitors “that ultimately someone will succeed in discovering some secret which will furnish an even more efficient way to kill men, by destroying whole peoples and entire nations”, whereto Montesquieu’s character responds: “You claim to fear that someone may invent a method of destruction more cruel than those in use. No, if such a fatal invention were discovered, it would soon be prohibited by the laws of nations and suppressed by unanimous consent” (quoted from Chapin 1966: 286; see also Best 1980: chap. 1). Hume says that the ancient republics were ‘almost in perpetual war’ not least because “the whole state is frontier, and is exposed to the inroads of the enemy” (1963: 403, my italics), whereas the modern republics are more peaceful and much less destructive in war:

In ancient history we may always observe, where one party prevailed, whether the nobles or people (for I can observe no difference in this respect), that they immediately butchered all of the opposite party who fell into their hands, and banished such as had been so fortunate as to escape their fury. No form of process, no law, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near half of the city was slaughtered, or expelled, every revolution; and the exiles always joined foreign enemies, and did all the mischief possible to their fellow-citizens, till fortune put it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolution. And as these were frequent in such violent governments, the disorder, diffidence, jealousy, enmity, which must prevail, are not easy for us to imagine in this age of the world. (1963: 405-6)

Smith also talks about ‘our refinement in humanity’ when it comes to treatment of prisoners of war:

The practice of ancient and modern nations differs widely with regard to the length to which the outrages of war may be carried. Barbarians, if they do not kill those taken in war, may dispose of them as they please … modern manners have come to a greater degree of refinement, both with respect to persons and effects. Captives in war are now by no means made slaves or liable to oppression. (1978: 548; see also 1982: 204-6)
As we saw in the last chapter, Ferguson (and Tocqueville) in particular, notices the fall in virtue and grandeur going from aristocratic to commercial society. He valued the warrior virtues highly and lamented their decline. But where he most explicitly acknowledges the value of the new society is in the difference to the warring of the rude peoples: "The amiable plea of humanity was little regarded by them in the operations of war. Cities were razed, or inslaved; the captive sold, mutilated, or condemned to die” (1995: 189). He even makes the difference in combat behaviour the defining criterion of differentiation between rude and polished nations:

In the modern nations of Europe, where extent of territory admits of a distinction between the state and its subjects, we are accustomed to think of the individual with compassion, seldom of the public with zeal. We have improved on the laws of war, and on the lenitives which have been devised to soften its rigours; we have mingled politeness with the use of the sword; we have learned to make war under the stipulations of treaties and cartels, and trust to the faith of an enemy whose ruin we mediate. Glory is more successfully obtained by saving and protecting, than by destroying the vanquished: and the most amiable of all objects is, in appearance, attained; the employing of force, only for the obtaining of justice, and for the protection of national rights. This is perhaps, the principal characteristic, on which, among modern nations, we bestow the epithets of civilized or of polished. (1995: 190)

This is of course filled with contemporary implications and reproductions as well. One can hardly help hearing Western leaders describe the difference between their terrorism and our anti-terrorism.

*The Continued Threat from the Barbarians: John Stuart Mill*

Even if Constant writes, that the European peoples are now strong enough not to fear anything from the hordes that are still barbaric (1988a: 53; 1988c: 313), it is clear that it is from them, the liberals expected the threat of war. J.S. Mill says, that “Wars, and the destruction they cause, are now usually confined, in almost every country, to those distant and outlying possessions at which it comes into contact with savages” (1965: 707). There were, of course, pre-liberal residuals in the European political system and among the yet unenlightened, but this was a problem that would pretty much solve itself. In reality, only the threat from the non-liberal or non-modern remained. Despite the fact that the old barbaric times, they referred to as counter-images of their own time, were located historically in the (European) past, this did not hinder its use in a critique of the ‘barbarians’ of their own time. As Ferguson says: "in every rude state, the great business is war; and that in barbarous times, mankind, being generally divided into small parties, are engaged in almost perpetual hostilities” (1995: 142). This is why these states remain a continuing threat. They are like a constant reminder of the past and a source of great concern because of the lingering fear of the
defence capability of liberal, commercial societies confronted with death-willing beasts of destruction (also echoed in contemporary terror/anti-terror discourse). Smith has in *Lectures on Jurisprudence* a great description of how the development toward a liberal society shifts the threat of violence from the interior to the exterior:

When the power of government becomes so great as to defend the produce of industry, another obstacle arises from a different quarter. Among neighbouring nations in a barbarous state there are perpetual wars, one continually invading and plundering the other, and tho’ private property be secured from the violence of neighbours, it is in danger from hostile invasions … It is observable that among savage nations there are always more violent convulsions than among those farther advanced in refinement. (1978: 522)

And he says in *Theory of Moral Sentiments*:

A polished people being accustomed to give way, in some measure, to the movements of nature, become frank, open, and sincere. Barbarians, on the contrary, being obliged to smother and conceal the appearance of every passion, necessarily acquire the habits of falsehood and dissimulation. (1982: 208)

The threat is now coming from the outside; from the yet barbaric nations. The implicit claim is that the ‘trading nation’ doesn’t wage war (at least not offensive war) and does not get perceived as a threat by its neighbours. Barbarity is unknown in and from a liberal state as anything other than a threat coming from the outside. The border of the well-governed state (and the well-governed Europe) is also the limiting extent of peace. Beyond the border lies perpetual strife.

An interesting case is a small text from John Stuart Mill, ‘A Few Words On Non-Intervention’, published in *Fraser’s Magazine* in December 1859. It starts of very patriotic, proclaiming that “There is a country in Europe, equal to the greatest in extent of dominion, far exceeding any other in wealth, and in the power that wealth bestows, the declared principle of whose foreign policy is, to let other nations alone” (1875: 153). Britain, which is the country he’s referring to, is “incomparably the most conscientious of all nations in our national acts” (1875: 161); “If the aggressions of barbarians force it to a successful war, and its victorious arms put it in a position to command liberty of trade, whatever it demands for itself it demands for all mankind” (1875: 153-4). Yet Britain is not regarded as such by other countries. There is apparently a discrepancy between the liberal and humanist self-image and foreigner’s view of Britain as ruled solely by reasons of state. Mill speaks of “the dishonest pretence of enemies, or of those who have their own purposes to serve by exciting odium against us, a class including all the Protectionist writers, and the
mouthpieces of all the despots and of the Papacy” (1875: 154). But this is not merely dishonest pretence of enemies. Part of the reason is the ‘sins of speech or of action of our statesmen’ (1875: 158). Mill talks of “all the habitual expressions by which we represent ourselves as worse than we are; expressions often heard from English statesmen” (1875: 157). Justin Rosenberg writes: “he detects within liberalism itself no basic contradiction or difficulty, opaque to its practitioners but manifest in its effects on others, which would explain the systematic disjunctures between England’s internal self-image and its external reputation” (1999: 5). This is a variant of the distinction between (liberal) society and the political system. This is not, what really what interests us here (although it has some interesting parallels to present American self-description). What I want to draw attention to is Mill’s discussion of intervention and non-intervention, which has some striking parallels to present discussions. Much like in our times, Mill states the two opposing principles for and against intervention:

There is much to be said for the doctrine that a nation should be willing to assist its neighbours in throwing off oppression and gaining free institutions. Much also may be said by those who maintain that one nation is incompetent to judge and act for another, and that each should be left to help itself, and seek advantage or submit to disadvantage as it can and will. (1875: 158)

Mill then makes an important distinction between civilized and barbarian nations and says that there is a great difference “between the case in which the nations concerned are of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilization, and that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and the other of a very low, grade of social improvement”. The main reason is that barbarian nations “cannot be depended on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives” (1875: 167). The law of nations do not apply to the relations with barbarian nations. This is why Mill, who worked with colonial matters most of his adult life (Harris 1964; Sullivan 1983), could start the article by saying that the principle of British foreign policy is ‘to let other nations alone’, other civilized nations that is. Actions on a barbarian nation, Mill notes, can be a violation of great principles of morality but it is the universal rules of morality between man and man not those between nations because “barbarians have no rights as a nation”, and then he adds: “except a right to such treatment as may at the earliest possible period fit them for becoming one” (1875: 168). And Mill even says, that a

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75 Mill most likely agrees with those critics who “think they make a great concession in admitting that the fault may possibly be less with the English people, than with the English Government and aristocracy” (1875: 155).
civilized nation, seeing that it can’t help having barbarous neighbours, has at some point to either “conquer them, or to assert so much authority over them, and so break their spirit, that they gradually sink into a state of dependence upon itself” (1875: 168-9). Mill makes the rather remarkable claim that this applies to the British relations with the native states of India (which could hardly be described as Britain’s neighbours; perhaps we should see this as a precursor of the notion of the global neighbourhood?) which are to be understood as ‘a despotic government’ which he in On Liberty called “a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians” (1977a: 224) and an instrument of nation-building, a tool to turn barbarian nations into civilised ones. In the final chapter of Considerations on Representative Government called ‘Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State’, Mill makes a differentiation among the dependencies between those colonies who are “composed of people of similar civilization”, the same ‘blood and language’, ‘colonies of European race’ (1977b: 562, 563) who are fit for representative government and other non-European colonies, like India, who are at a great distance from the level of civilization required for self-rule. On them is imposed despotic rule. Mill notes that “it is already a common, and is rapidly tending to become the universal condition of the more backward populations, to be either held in direct subjection by the more advanced, or to be under their complete political ascendancy” (1977b: 568). They are found wanting on the European scale of modernity and civilization and are therefore held to be without rights to or capability of independence:

But among civilized peoples, members of an equal community of nations, like Christian Europe, the question assumes another aspect, and must be decided on totally different principles. It would be an affront to the reader to discuss the immorality of wars of conquest, or of conquest even as the consequence of lawful war; the annexation of any civilized people to the dominion of another, unless by their own spontaneous election. Up to this point, there is no difference of opinion among honest people; nor on the wickedness of commencing an aggressive war for any interest of our own, except when necessary to avert from ourselves an obviously impending wrong. (1875: 171)

Among civilized nations there is a common understanding of the immorality of war of conquest. There remains, however, one question of dispute about the relations among civilized nations: Whether a civilized nation is justified to take part on either side in a civil war, may impose another government or institution for the sake of the country itself or its neighbours; “and chiefly, whether it may justifiably aid the people of another country in struggling for liberty” (1875: 171). He then quickly alleges that all other cases than that of a people in arms for liberty is easily resolved and without moral complications. Intervening to help a government keeping its people down is clearly
wrong, although “unhappily by far the most frequent case of foreign intervention” (1875: 172). He then considers the case of “a protracted civil war, in which the contending parties are so equally balanced that there is no probability of a speedy issue; or if there is, the victorious side cannot hope to keep down the vanquished but by severities repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent welfare of the country” (1875: 172). In this case, which has some similarity to the interventions in ex-Yugoslavia, he acknowledges a right to intervention; it has, according to Mill, ‘been repeatedly practiced’, it has ‘general approval’ and “its legitimacy may be considered to have passed into a maxim of what is called international law” (1875: 172).

This leaves the case, which is the real purpose of the article, intervention to aid the struggle for liberty. Mill divides the issue into two different cases dependent upon whether the yoke, the people is struggling against, is a native or a foreign government. When the struggle is against native rulers, Mill says to the question of intervention: “as a general rule, No. The reason is, that there can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that intervention, even if successful, would be for the good of the people themselves” (1875: 173). The people’s own struggle and sacrifices is the only proper test that they are ready for free and popular institutions. Mill is aware of the objections against this, namely that “the virtues of freemen cannot be learnt in the school of slavery” (1875: 174) and that it may put the oppressed people on an impossible task. But still, he maintains that in this case of native oppression, a free government can only lend ‘the moral support of its opinions’. Self-determination requires independent struggle. The final case, intervention on behalf of an occupied people, is righteous because it’s actually a case of upholding the principle of non-intervention: “Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always prudent” (1875: 176). One could say that this is the argument (minus the last bit) of the first Iraq war.

What Mill does, and which is one of the reasons for discussing him so extensively, is to divide the world into three spheres. The liberal, civilized nations among whom peace reigns; the despotic but civilized nations who are not to be intervened into either because they will develop into liberal nations by themselves or because the intervention probably will not further the goal; and finally, the barbarous nations who have no rights as nations and who are free game for intervention. In his Principles of Political Economy, he makes a by now well-known distinction between the overcrowded Europe and the “unoccupied continents under its command” (1965: 967). Here it is basically a demographic and economic argument for colonialization (although he does mention ‘the future and permanent interests of civilization itself’ right next to ‘the collective economical interests of the human race’, 1965: 963). What’s important here is the designation of large part of the world
as ‘unoccupied’ which only makes sense in the form we saw in Locke: The lands are not occupied in the Western way and are therefore free for use.

In present usage the distinction between the three forms of political organization are the postmodern, modern and premodern states. In postmodern states intervention is not needed, in modern states it is not justified (or rather, it is not possible, given their strength, so we better try critical diplomacy), but in premodern states it is justified and for some commentators even mandatory. What is happening now is that the middle category is coming under pressure. The liberal globalist story, we’ll pursue in the coming chapters, claims that the non-liberal, civilized but despotic nations, are now both obsolete and dangerous. The world is being split between the good and the awful, leaving no ground for the just bad, the modern nation state. Europe is the model and enforcer of the pacific option. Kant wrote, that if one observes the plan of nature, ”then you’ll see a regular improvement of the state constitution in our part of the world (which most likely one day will legislate for everyone else)” (1966a: 48). Europe will expand its idea and stimulate lower societies to ‘progress’ beyond their ‘different kinds of historical faiths’ (quoted from Tully 2002: 341), which were appropriate only to their lower kind of civilization and development. In his *Metaphysik der Sitten*, he even makes the case for colonialism saying that there are enough plausible arguments in favour of “the use of violence on the grounds that it is in the best interests of the world as a whole. For … it may bring culture to uncivilised peoples” (quoted from Buchan 2002: 418); the other argument for colonialism being the export of European surplus population. Kant demonstrates here, the European ‘liberal anti-pluralism’ (Simpson 2001, 2004), which we’ll see more of in the coming chapters. There are really no legitimate moral or religious pluralism. There is only stepping stones on the way to European modernity. And it shows the liberal argument for violence, described as anything but violence. Bruce Buchan says: “liberal states cannot be inherently peaceful if that peacefulness is restricted only to relations with other liberal states” (2002: 408). But the self-image is one of peace and non-violence.
II. Eternal Peace – Among the Living

If a citizen of the world had to prepare an universal international code, what would he propose to himself as his object? It would be the common and equal utility of all nations. (Bentham 1789a: 1)

The lack of strong institutional responses to the problem of war probably stems from deep distrust of the state’s hitherto interaction. Treaties, conferences, concerts, alliances, diplomatic relations, peace treaties – open and secret – were the instruments of the old regime. It was the political answer to the problem of war. The liberals sported a non- or sub-political answer: Societal development. Institutionalization, planned peace, would only be another arena for state power. This section will discuss a proposal or evaluation of peace. The now well-known work of Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden from 1795, is of course the most obvious or common choice, but we’ll concentrate on the less known work of Jeremy Bentham, A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace from 1789. Whereas several schools of international thought proclaim to be the heirs of Kant, none seem to recognize, and even fewer to know, the little work of Bentham. I’ll concentrate, therefore, on Bentham, giving his argument space and attention, even though Kant’s is arguably the most important essay on international politics from this period. Both works are clearly within the liberal tradition, and they reproduce a number of themes already discussed.

One of the possible reasons behind the different history of reception of the two essays is suggested by David Baumgardt’s preference for Bentham, saying that in comparison with Kant, Bentham’s essay is “more consistent in its argument and more the work of a practical political mind” (1952: 158; see also Gallie 1978: 35). Kant’s success, paradoxically, is due to its inconsistencies. Zum Ewigen Frieden reproduces all the inconsistencies of the liberal approach to the international; it replays all its themes and balances and lends itself to a number of very different readings, whereas Bentham’s is more straightforward. The claim here is that the renaissance, which Kant’s essay is experiencing (Lettievall 2001), is exactly due to this merger between two principles of the international, which is not solved in Kant’s own text and which is at the root of present discussions: Cosmopolitanism and state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{76} Kant is also marshalled in the service of what many take to be the most robust fact of the social sciences: The thesis of democratic peace, that is, that democracies do not fight each other. This ‘Kantian’ thesis was (re)launched by Michael Doyle...

\textsuperscript{76} The commentary on Kant’s international theory is enormous and rapidly growing. The following is a small part of the literature and has informed my view of Kant: Waltz 1962; Hinsley 1963: chap. 4; Gallie 1978: chap. 2; Nichols 1986; Hurrell 1990; Amstrup 1992; Williams 1992; Bartelson 1995; Franke 1995; Bohman & Lutz-Bachman 1997; Habermas 1997a; Cavallar 1999; Tuck 1999: chap. 7; Muthu 2000; Rasmussen 2000; Franceschet 2000, 2001; Lettevall 2001; Buchan 2002; Tully 2002; Kleingeld 2003; Williams 2003; Bottici 2003.
(1983a, b, 1986, 1995) and has since grown to an academic (and political) industry all its own. That
debate is too comprehensive to survey or debate here but it is obviously part of the late-twentieth
century liberal internationalist regaining of confidence. It has become an important element in the
liberal globalist self-description and is a variant of the domestic analogy thesis, claiming that liberal
norms and values internally have determining influence on behaviour externally.\footnote{For a small, unrepresentative segment of the debate see Lake 1992; Forsythe 1992; Schweller 1992; Ember, Ember & Russet 1992; Owen 1994; Cohen 1994; Macmillan 1996; Oneal & Russet 1997; Sorensen 1997; Barkawi & Laffey 1999; Cavallar 2001; Cederman 2001; Jervis 2002; Peceny, Beer & Sanches-Terry 2002.} Instead, I want to
focus on Bentham’s peace plan which is, I argue, an exemplary liberal understanding of the
international and of the way to peace. It also has the merit, as Kant’s, of being a cosmopolitan tract
which ought to give it a better press among the cosmopolitans than it has at present.

Jeremy Bentham’s Cosmopolitan Peace

The absence of Bentham in discussions of international theory is remarkable considering the high
prognostic content and value of his small essay and the fact that he was the first to coin and use the
concept of ‘international law’ to replace ‘law of nations’. Part of the explanation is no doubt its late
publication in the 1834-publication, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, and then even in an edition by
John Bowring, which has since been heavily criticized. Gunhild Hoogensten (2001) even questions
the very existence of the work as an independent piece of Bentham’s. She alleges that Bowring, the
first posthumous editor of Bentham’s works, has pieced it together from various smaller works and
added his own commentaries. In the rest of the scanty secondary literature, however, the essay is
recognized as a genuine work of Bentham, and so it is here. A Plan is the fourth and last in a
collection of smaller essays written between 1786 and 1789 and later collected under the heading
The Principles of International Law. It consists of Objects of International Law (1789a); Of
Subjects, or of the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Laws (1789b); Of War, Considered in
Respect of its Causes and Consequences (1789c); and finally A Plan for an Universal and
Perpetual Peace (1789d). The reception of Bentham has generally ignored, downplayed or ridiculed
his peace treaty.\footnote{Even in discussions of perpetual peace projects, Bentham gets scant attention. See for instance Schlereth 1977: 114
and Archibugi 1992: 307-8. Three notable exceptions are Schwarzenberger 1948; Hinsley 1963: chap. 5; and Conway 1993. For more technical discussions of his concept of ‘international law’ see Jacobini 1993 and Janis 1993.} Derek Heater says, that it is “in truth, not one of his best works, and it need detain
us but briefly“ (1996: 81-82). Michael Howard writes: “Like so much that Bentham wrote, the work
was smug, parochial and simplistic, making sweeping generalisations on the basis of minimal
knowledge” (1978: 33). This characterization is remarkable given the fact that Howard a few lines
later down acknowledges the essay’s close descriptive parallels with the actual events and he says: “Bentham thus applied the general prescription of the philosophes to the particular case of his own country, and devised a programme which was to become the foundation of British liberal foreign policy until the eve of the First World War” (1978: 33). Not only did Bentham apparently state the principles of Britain’s foreign policy for the next almost 150 years, it is also an attempt at practical implementation of Enlightenment-liberalism on a practical case. The reasons for taking it up here hardly need further justification.

Bentham is no pacifist (Conway 1993: 966-9). He recognizes war as the state’s legitimate right; as the only method a state can use: “When a state has sustained what it looks upon as an injury, in respect of property, from another state – there being no common superior ready chosen for them – it must either submit to the injury, as get the other state to join in the appointment of a common judge, or go to war” (1789c: 1). As Locke did, so says also Bentham, that where private persons can appeal to the state, whereby they lose the right to personal enforcement of justice, there states have no similar mechanism. The lack of a global sovereign makes war legitimate. But he is at the same time very morally condemning of war: “war is an evil – it is even the complication of all other evils” (1789a: 2), it is ‘a mischief upon the largest scale’ (1789c: 1), and he speaks of ‘the extreme folly, the madness of war’ (1789d: 8). He even goes as far as to say that it is in certain cases the responsibility of the sovereign to sacrifice the interests of its subjects in favour of those of strangers. The sovereign’s ultimate responsibility is ‘the most extended welfare of all the nations on the earth’ (1789a: 2). This is rather radical and places Bentham squarely in the cosmopolitan camp. Without exaggerating its importance, one could say that the difference in the titles of Bentham’s and Kant’s essays very precisely indicates the difference in content and possibly even intent. The title of Bentham’s essays talks of a plan, and that not only for a perpetual peace, like Kant also does, but also a universal peace. It’s the practical and universal intent, which most clearly separates the two. War, for Bentham, was pretty much a phenomenon of the past – at least among the most developed nations. The actual wars were a remnant of what he in 1785 called ‘la barbarie féodale’ (Conway 1993: 970). Bentham identifies four reasons of war: The feudal system, religious antipathy, the rage of conquest and the uncertainties of succession: ”Of these four causes, the first is happily extinct everywhere – the second and third almost everywhere, and at any rate in France and England – the last might, if not already extinguished, be so with great ease” (1789d: 9). Peace is, accordingly,
more likely than war. The relations between the European nations are dominated by common interests: "Between the interests of nations, there is nowhere any real conflict" (1789d: 18).

The inter-European conquests are now a closed chapter in European history; “such madness does not belong to our age” (1789d: 8). Likewise with plunder and destruction; it is “totally repugnant, not only to the spirit of the nation, but to the spirit of the times” (1789d: 8). Not only is plunder repugnant and in contradiction with the times; it is also, as also Constant and Montesquieu said, increasingly counterproductive, mainly because of the characteristics of the commercial society:

… long before an army could arrive anywhere, everything capable of being plundered would be carried off. Whatever is portable, could be much sooner carried off by the owners, than by any plundering army. No expedition of plunder could ever pay itself … Mark well the contrast. All trade is in its essence advantageous – even to that party to whom it is least so. All war is in its essence ruinous; and yet the greatest employments of government are to treasure up occasions of war, and to put fetters upon trade. (1789d: 8)

He is, therefore, not all that interested in international institutions as instruments of peace. He leaves it to the natural course of things: To the spontaneous self-organization of the new freedoms. It has no doubt also played a significant role that the existing treaties and institutions were dictated by reasons of state, honoured until considered prudent to break them and that many of the proposals for an institutionalized European peace were highly naïve and unrealizable. International institutions were not the obvious solution for liberals. It looked too much like the politics of the old regime and there were at the same time a strong expectation that the liberalization of the new freedoms would create the conditions for peace behind the back of the scheming politicians. That is why it is not Bentham’s first priority to persuade the statesmen of the merits of his peace proposal. Public opinion will do what princes used to. The press is, he says, ‘the engine, and the only engine’ (1789d: 1) to further and realize his proposal. Again, we see a clear devaluation of the political sphere in favour of the societal. The political is the obstacle; society is the way and means. Bentham was among the first to appeal so directly to public opinion on issues of international affairs; to rely on public opinion to force states to honour their commitments and punish those who didn’t (Hinsley 1963: 86). Despite the fact that his peace proposal allegedly includes all of Europe, he concentrates on the relationship between Britain and France. Their unity removes the primary obstacle for a general and permanent pacification of Europe (1789d: 2). Bentham, therefore, lists a number of proposals or maxims, that most directly concerns Britain and France, but which are also meant to apply to the European states at large, which is why I have generalized his nine maxims:
1. It is not the interest of the European states to have any foreign dependencies. Colonies are a source of war, not least because of the distance between those who decide the war, those who shall execute it and those who shall endure it (1789d: note 3); and they are seldom, if ever, a source of profit for the colonial power. They are, on the contrary, a great expense. The possession of colonies is furthermore a source of corruption and mismanagement. To give up the colonies would, therefore, simplify government to the benefit of the administration and the people.\(^{80}\) He also remarks, in a very prophetic statement, that national intelligence declines as a result of the false perceptions that are needed to hide the realities of colonial rule and to hinder the demand for their dissolution. He was no doubt thinking of the national glorification of an ‘imperial mission’ – most famous in the phrase of Kipling, ‘the white man’s burden’, which was also present in some liberals, for instance in Locke’s writings on conquest (1988: chap. 26) and in some of Tocqueville’s writings on Algiers.\(^{81}\) Bentham’s solution is: b) give up all colonies; b) found no new colonies. It is, in the words of Bentham, the ‘most visionary part’ of his peace proposal (1789d: 9).

2. It is not the interest of the European states to have any treaty of alliance, offensive or defensive, with any other power. It furthers the risk of war. The liberals had watched how alliances were part of an inter-European game of positioning in order to strengthen oneself before the next war. For Bentham it is, of course, mainly a critique of the British practice of balancing the continental powers but it’s also a more general critique of the foreign policy practice of always operating with the next war in mind, thereby actually heightening the risk of war.

3. It is not the interest of any European state to have any treaty with any other power for the purpose of possessing any advantages in point of trade, to the exclusion of any other nation. Bentham talks of “the perfect inutility and mischievousness of all law and public measures of government whatsoever, for the pretended encouragement of trade” (1789d: 5). His solution is that states should not enter into preferential trade agreements, go to war to impose them, enter into alliances to achieve them or give special advantages to any particular industries. This is a clear cut example of free trade cosmopolitanism and a critique of the ruling practice of using trade as an

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\(^{80}\) Bentham also notes that it is in the interest of the colonies to be de-colonialized as it reduces the risk of bad governance stemming from the conflicting demands between colonies and colonial power. Bentham writes that “It is for the purpose of governing it badly, and for no other, that you wish to get or to keep a colony. Govern it well, it of no use to you” (1789d: 4). In 1789d: note 2, he says of India that the successful greed, that the colonial power displays, is spoiling the moral of the native Indians.

\(^{81}\) There is a rapidly growing literature on racism and colonialism in the Enlightenment and in liberalism, which is essential and important for the evaluation of both. There is no room here for discussing these issues, which are of course highly relevant for the present discussion. Not least the re-discovery of Kant’s anthropological work has sparked the debate which is gaining a welcome momentum. See for instance Neugebauer 1990; Judy 1991; Eze 1997; Skorgen 2003; Jacobs & Kain 2003; Bernasconi 2003. For Tocqueville and colonialism see Richter 1963; Pitts 2000; Helliwell & Hindess 2002; For Locke and slavery see Farr 1986; Glauser 1990; Arneil 1994.
instrument of war or preparation for war. As he says in another maxim: “Mark well the contrast. All trade is in its essence advantageous – even to that party to whom it is least so. All war is in its essence ruinous; and yet the greatest employments of government are to treasure up occasions of war, and to put fetters upon trade” (1789d: 7).

4. It is not the interest of any European state to keep up any naval force beyond what may be sufficient to defend its commerce against pirates. It was a common thought among the liberals, that – as Robert Kagan says today – when you have a hammer, everything looks like nails. Keeping a large navy is tantamount to asking for war. This also explains maxim five.

5. It is not the interest of any European state to keep on foot any regulations whatsoever of distant preparation for the augmentation or maintenance of its naval force.

6. Supposing Great Britain and France thoroughly agreed, the principal difficulties would be removed to the establishment of a plan of general and permanent pacification for all Europe. This article is very telling for its idea of a ‘core Europe’ which has had a long history in European liberalism and whose premier spokesman today is Habermas (more on that in later chapters).

7. For the maintenance of such pacification, general and perpetual treaties might be formed, that reduces the amount of troops. It is worth noticing that Bentham here, for the first time, uses the expression ‘might be formed’. It seems the distrust of treaties is so deep that even an agreement on general disarmament is suspicious; or perhaps it’s just sign of his realistic assessment of its unlikelihood at the time of writing. Instead, he argues for the power of the example: That one state takes the lead and, ‘in the most public manner’, declare a unilateral disarmament (and decolonialization). For this, it would gain ‘everlasting honour’ (1789d: 7). This state will, according to Bentham, win everything and risk nothing. The public announcement of disarmament will ensure the trust of the other states and will make it impossible for the disarming state to neglect or break its promise. National and international opinion will enforce the keeping of the promise. So, we see both another example of the alleged power of public opinion and that what first seemed like a regular treaty or regime turned out to be, at least at first, something quite different.

8. The maintenance of such a pacification might be considerably facilitated, by the establishment of a common court of judicature, for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such court were not to be armed with any coercive powers. In the absence of such a court, Bentham is ready to concede that states have the right and duty to pursue their own interests with all possible means. Disputes are then, ultimately, settled by force. But with a court, states would be able to compromise and settle disputes without losing face which would render wars caused by differences
of opinion or interests meaningless and unnecessary. We’re not told much about the institutional framework of this court. It seems to be thought as the institutionalization of the already existing ‘European fraternity’ (1789d: 10). His comments are limited to stating that the court – now referred to as ‘a Congress or Diet’ (1789d: 11) should consist of two delegates from each nation; its decisions should be made public; and its power would consist in a) publishing its opinions, b) ensuring that they are distributed in the member countries, and c) excluding recalcitrant states. Once again we see the force and influence that Bentham entrusts both public opinion and the state’s eagerness to be part of the civilized nations. Freedom of the press is the most vital enforcer.

9. Secrecy in the operations of the foreign departments ought not to be endured, being altogether useless, and equally repugnant to the interests of liberty and peace. Secret diplomacy is ‘equally mischievous and unnecessary’ (1789d: 12). This is by far the most elaborated of the maxims and the one where he argues most emotionally. The doctrine of state secrets is ‘favourable to the projects of sceptred thieves and robbers’ (1789d: 15). It is “a mere cloak for wickedness and folly – a dispensation to ministers to save them from the trouble of thinking – a warrant for playing all manner of mad and silly pranks, unseen and uncontrouled” (1789d: 16-17). War is a far greater evil than deceit but the control mechanisms are inversely proportional to the consequences of the actions: "This is the department of all others in which the strongest checks are needful; at the same time, thanks to the rules of secrecy of all departments, this is the only one in which there are no checks at all." (1789d: 14).

This ninth maxim, occupying a third of the entire text, shows the distrust of the political system and its practitioners. The argument for the de-colonialization dominates the first third. These two – state secrecy and colonialism – are for Bentham the primary existing causes of war, not least because they concentrate power in the political apparatus. Colonial administration, at home and abroad, and the foreign department are his primary institutional targets and were of course the principal expressions of state power and prestige at the time. Bentham’s peace essay is a representative text for the liberal view of war and peace, its causes and possibilities. It displays the points of critique, the sources of hope and ultimately also the failure to fully grasp the nature of the international.
In her discussion on civil society, Mary Kaldor remarks upon a very significant differentiation. She says: “if civil society was national within Europe, it was conceived as European outside Europe” (2003c: 38). But, seen from within Europe it was thought as universal. As we move to next chapter, some of the concepts change. We’re going from internationalism to globalism. The move is premised upon the sovereigntist precondition of early liberalism, which didn’t question the state system as such. They presupposed an international system of states, that is, they didn’t seriously question the sovereign order:

Curiously, these self-acclaimed ‘citizens of the world’ did not translate their world view into a radical political cosmopolitanism that might have abolished all nation states as viable political entities. Instead, the philosophes tended to agree with John Locke’s acknowledgment of separate and independent states as being conditioned by man’s evil nature. (Schlereth 1977: 105)

The relations under and across state boundaries were supposed to take place beside the sovereigntist level. What the sub-state relations did was to question or undermine national politics but not the state system and, therefore, ultimately not the political either. The continued existence of nation states was not in doubt, nor was the idea of the sovereign decision centre. This is changing. The new liberal globalism is oriented towards a much more ambitious challenge to the state system. Relations are not merely diminishing national politics but also both the national and the political. The new narrative of liberalism aims to undo the sovereigntist legacy. It is, therefore, not a automatic reproduction of old themes but a radicalization of tendencies within liberal internationalism that were stunted by the development of the nation state and the international system. The end of the political is the unfinished project of liberalism. A project globalization promises to complete. Scott Burchill is right to say, that globalization ”is the most significant legacy of eighteenth-century liberal internationalism” (1996: 54). We turn, therefore, to the contemporary debate on globalization to pursue the re-enactment of the themes and assumptions of liberal internationalism in what I propose to call liberal globalism.
Part 3:

Living the Dream
Globalization Is What You Make of It

We are globalization-struck. Apparently, there is not the event or process, which isn’t either the result of, or decisively influenced by, globalization. And there is no political initiative or denial thereof, no business decision or demand of restructuring and flexibilization, which cannot be justified with reference to globalization. ‘Globalization demands …’ has become the way to get your agenda through unopposed. Globalization seems to have become the meta-narrative of our age. That alone should make us suspicious of such an inflationary and manipulable concept. Maybe more than reality, the political debate has been struck by globalization to such an extent that reference to globalization has become an incontestable and widely accepted argument in itself. Globalization has become the main depoliticization manoeuvre of our day. One can detect a certain difference between the social science debate on globalization, where there is a debate on its existence, origin, limit, conditions and effects, and then the political (and journalistic) debate, which is most often characterized by what Martin Marcussen (2000: 7; 2002: 151-3) calls ‘structural determinism’, where globalization is a new and overwhelming phenomenon that have robbed the national polity of most of its instruments, and where the politics, the economy and the society has no choice but to adapt to external forces. This debate is characterized by what the Danish sociologist, Lars Bo Kaspersen, calls ‘globaloney’ [globalskab]: “Politicians caught in this perception of globalization make themselves almost powerless and the solutions, there are, are the necessary solutions, as globalization is seen as an inescapable process that pushes and forces the politicians” (2001a: 85). This is easily detectable as depoliticization and is found massively among those in the debate described later as ‘hyperglobalists’.

The thesis of this chapter is, with a paraphrase of the title of Alexander Wendt’s famous constructivist article (1992), that: Globalization is what you make of it. And, what it increasingly seems to be made into is the latest elements in the liberal internationalist arsenal transforming it into liberal globalism, its hitherto most powerful form, which seems to bring the promise of the end of politics. I want to suggest, that it is the view of the state that determines the view of globalization,

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not the other way around. The future of the state, outlined in various globalization discourses, stems from a, so to speak, pre-globalization evaluation of the nation state. Globalization is ‘used’ as the occasion and possibility for going beyond the political in its historical form: The nation state. The blocked promise of the Enlightenment’s liberal internationalism has found new life in their version of the globalization narrative.

In a recent article, ‘Ideologies of Globalization’, Manfred B. Steger quotes Michael Freeden: “An ideology attempts to end the inevitable contention over concepts by decontesting them, by removing their meanings from contest” (Steger 2005: 15), which is part of what we understood by depoliticization earlier. Steger then proceeds to list “six core claims of globalism, that is, six particular ways in which globalists decontest their master concept ‘globalization’” (2005: 16). The globalist claims are, according to Steger: 1) globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets; 2) globalization is inevitable and irreversible; 3) nobody is in charge of globalization; 4) globalization benefits everyone … in the long run; 5) globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world; 6) globalization requires a global war on terror. With the exception of the last, that I’ll disregard, this work finds itself in partial agreement with Steger despite his weak and progressively weaker demonstration of the evidence as we move down the claims. The first three claims could be termed ‘historical progressivism’ and the next two ‘outcome progressivism’, in that the first three designates an evolution of history, whereas the last tells, what the evolution will bring. In the first three we find arguments about ‘necessity’, ‘inevitability’, ‘irreversible’, ‘it’s the future, like or not’, ‘no alternative’ (but ethnic cleansing, as Habermas puts it below). The development is essentially above and beyond politics, there is no turning back, the unleashed global forces has reached an unstoppable momentum of their own. Globalization is basically an autonomous force leaving politicians and others with few degrees of freedom. Although Steger’s critique of the globalists is aimed at some of those, we’ll call hyperglobalists in the next section, it really covers also significant numbers of the second (and by far the largest) camp: The transformationalists. Theirs is a lighter, or more qualified, precautious version, but a version in line with the hyperglobalist understanding of globalization nevertheless; at least as the first three claims go. The next two arguments (4 & 5) provide more of an affirmative answer: ‘Globalization is good’. Its short or even medium consequences may be bad but not only are there no choice or alternative, as just mentioned, there is also considerable advantages all round. This is not shared among a significant part of those I place among the hyperglobalists (the alarmed), or for that matter the transformationalists (especially the cosmopolitans) although it also appears in their
The globalization debate is massive and it is hardly possible to keep up with the books and articles on the subject. From a rather narrow economic discussion, it has spread out to all fields of the social and humanist sciences. In this process, a certain obviousness has emerged: Globalization is real, unprecedented, and massive in volume and effect. There are critics, as for instance the ill-named anti-globalization movement, and there are sceptics. The first are, as Tony Blair once said, more seen as a police enforcement problem than a voice in the debate and the second, the sceptics, are either seen as wackos or as correctives to the most hysterical globalists. In the following, I’ll try, firstly, to broaden the understanding of the debate with the help of a fairly simple table of positions, secondly, to redirect attention to the sceptics as a politicizing voice in a globalization debate otherwise dominated by the promise of post-politics. To do so, I’ve constructed a typology of
positions in the globalization debate. The table is of course reductionistic and unfair to the complexity of the arguments of the mentioned thinkers and writers, who may not even recognize themselves in the categorization. I do, however, think it catches some, if not most, of the positions in the debate and highlight both their similarities and disagreements.

It is divided according to two principles: a theoretical and a political. The theoretical differentiation principle relates to the connected theme of the limits of both globalization and politics. One outer position highlights the expansion of globalization and the increasingly narrow field of politics; the other outer position the limited reality of globalization and the still existing force of politics. These categories have been adopted from Global Transformations (Held et. al., 1999: 2-10) and they identify three positions: the hyperglobalist, the transformationalist and the sceptic. The hyperglobalists consider globalization to be a new and all-powerful force that recreates all processes, localities, actors and practices according to the same (economistic) logic, which everyone must adapt to uniformly in order to succeed or merely survive. The transformationalists consider globalization to be a new, partial, contested and dialectical force, that in conjunction with historical, institutional and political realities, redefines all processes, localities, actors and practices, but unevenly and unsynchronized. The sceptics largely consider globalization to be a myth, as they insist that we are witnessing a historically long and fluctuating internationalization, which gives all processes, localities, actors and practices considerable room to manoeuvre and time to adjust.

1. Theoretical differentiation

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The political differentiation principle is the classical left/centre/right-divide. It relates to the view on international redistribution and political regulation of the economy and thereby also to accept of (largely unfettered) world capitalism as it exists and functions today. The right is obviously positive about existing capitalism and critical towards redistribution and regulation; the left is critical towards capitalism as such and positive towards redistribution and regulation; the middle is positive towards both capitalism and redistribution and regulation. The right emphasizes the state’s

83 See also Held & McGrew 2002; Busch 2000: 30-33; Giddens 2000b; Hay & Marsh 2000; Beck 2002a: 394 and not least Guillén 2001 who impressively sums up the globalization debate.
competitive function: economic competitiveness in its liberalistic form, existentialist in its nationalist. The left emphasizes the state’s protective welfare functions. The middle also often expresses a belief in the obsolescence of the right/left divide, as when Giddens (1994a) announces a position ‘beyond right and left’; an ‘exhaustion of received political ideologies’ (1994b: 27).

2. Political differentiation

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Compared with the tri-category differentiation offered by Held et.al, and often reproduced in other texts, this hopefully ease the explanation of the otherwise curious gathering of die hard laissez faire neoliberals and some (often Marxist) sections of the globalization-critical movements and at the other end of left-wing radicals and nationalists. The last ‘company’ has for instance in the Danish EU-debate given rise to a number of confusing claims as to the character of the left wing opposition to the EU-project that this table might help to clarify. There is obviously a considerable overlap between positions; the hyperglobalists and the transformationalists for instance agree that globalization is a new and decisive phenomenon while the transformationalists and the sceptics can agree that the state will remain an important actor; right and middle can agree on the basically positive nature of economic globalization, whereas middle and left can agree on being worried about the exclusion of people, countries and regions.

3. Positions in the globalization debate

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The hyperglobalists is a remarkable gathering of neoliberals and anticapitalists, economists busy forcing through structural adjustment programs in third world countries and anticapitalists demonstrating in the streets. Globalization is here viewed as a new epoch in human history which radically reshuffles and rearranges the whole social field. Most important here is economic
globalization that forces its singular capitalist logic on the world. We’re witnessing a ‘McDonaldization’ of the world (Ritzer 1996) and the coming of a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae 1990) of global capital, that overwhelms and replaces the nation state as the primary economic unit. For the hyperglobalists, it is already ‘One World, Ready or Not’ (Greider 1997). This means that state and politicians are losing ground to capital (Strange 1995). The state is reduced to, at best, the local service organs of the global capital, to ‘local law enforcement’ as Bauman says (2000). Despite ideological conviction, that divides them, the hyperglobalists share a view of the future where transnational companies are the new powers, where the state is the institutional looser, and where welfare and democracy will be heavily reduced. The hyperglobalists (in its neoliberal form) was the first globalization paradigm, the ‘first wave’ in the debate (Hay & Marsh 2000: 4), why it has structured and determined large parts of the subsequent debate as either positive or negative reference. Its distinguishing feature is a view of globalization as almost a natural force, an economic tsunami that tears up everything in its way through the social, economic and political fields. The difference within the hyperglobalist camp is in the evaluation of this.

The *neoliberals* has a positive, if not rejoicing, view of the changes, as they claim that the state and its politicians are forced to scale down their interventions in the economy giving room for the free unfolding of capitalist logic. No tears are shed for ‘the end of the nation state’ (Ohmae 1996) as it is the coming true of the top priority of economic liberalism – the kind of liberalism that James Richardson has called ‘privilege liberalism’ because it “endorses the prevailing patterns of political and economic organization, including the massive privileges which they confer on the advantaged” (1997: 7) or the kind that Will Hutton (2002) strangely calls ‘American conservatism’ (strange because there is nothing inherently American about it, as we shall discuss later). In the neoliberal camp we find the management gurus, who make a lot of money predicting the fall of hierarchy and by offering a steady stream of the new words for ‘readjustment’ (Kunde 1997; see also the booklists of any financial newspaper).

The *politicians* or, as previously named, ‘the structural determinists’ recognize the neoliberal argument but are by profession worried about the effects of globalization upon the nation, its citizens and not least on the place and position of the national economy in the global division of labour. Focus are on competitive strategies for the prosperity of the nation in an economic field of denationalized capital, where everyone is not in the same boat, and where the companies are no longer nationally anchored and loyal but where they scan the globe for the best and cheapest conditions of operation (Reich 1991). This is where we find the governmental and ministerial
reports, the national action programs for the ‘information society’, ‘the knowledge economy’, the
‘learning society’ etc., which never fail to find a disadvantageous area ‘compared with the countries
we usually compare us with’ and which seldom fail to advice drastic changes in the labour market,
the educational sector and in the welfare programmes in order not to fall behind. This is also where
we find most journalists and ‘quick thinkers’.

The alarmed focuses on the democratic and social consequences of the hyperglobalization. No one
is in control (Bauman 2000; Schjødt 2000); there is an ever increasing race to the bottom in an
intra-state race to offer companies the cheapest working conditions (Martin & Schumann 1997;
Robinson 1996; Olesen 1997; Forrester 1999); the global companies are strangling democracy in a
‘silent takeover’ (Hertz 2001). The citizens of ‘McWorld’ are left with the choice of toppings on
their potatoes (Barber 1996: 68). Here we find sections of the globalization-critical movement that
acknowledges the existence of a hyperglobalization and the emergence of MNC’s as the world’s
new powers. They just don’t like it. In this category, we also find Hardt and Negri’s redescription of
globalization as Empire (2000). Chantal Mouffe calls their book “no more than an ultra-left version
of the cosmopolitan perspective” (2005a: 107). It’s probably more correct to see it as an ultra-left
version of hyperglobalism, which translates alarm into anticipation of the coming society generated
through the contradictions accumulating from a fully unfolded empire. The new comes about “by
pushing the processes that it [empire] offers past their present limitations” (Hardt & Negri 2000:
206). The analysis is the same but the nostalgia for nation state democracy and welfare is discarded.

The transformationalists view globalization as a historically unprecedented and decisive force
behind a large-scale and rapid change of all sectors of society (Harvey 1990). Globalization is
‘uneven’ (Holm & Sørensen 1995; Ougaard 1998, 2001); it is a contested and contradictory process,
that simultaneously integrates and fragments, that transforms societies, states and the world order
and which demands action and adjustment but in locally contingent ways, in different tempi and
with different results. There are different degrees of globality and globalization. Focus is not just on
the economic side but also on distinct globalizations of culture, the self, politics, military, law etc.;
and on the emergence of a plurality of ambitious, expansive and non-state, non-business actors on
the global, national and local scene (Mathews 1997; Kaldor 1999). The functions and conditions of
politics and state are not necessarily reduced but they are reconstructed in a world, where
sovereignty are no longer primarily an attribute of statehood but a bargaining chip in the expanding
range of transnational networks that states participate in. Globalization is ‘impure’, as Michael
Mann says; it consists of “a combination of both the transnational and the inter-national. The potential universalism of the former is undercut by the particularisms of nation states – and indeed also by the particularisms of human social practices at large” (Mann 1997: 489; see also 1993, 2001). Whereas both the hyperglobalists and the sceptics to a high degree can keep the scientific and political categories, the transformationalists are criticizing, what Ulrich Beck calls ‘zombie categories’, that is, obsolete categories that still haunt our perception and action, and they are on the lookout for new categories beyond the ‘nation state container’ (Beck 1999a, 2000, 2003; Brenner 1999; Castells 2000c, d). The same need for categorical innovation contains also often an impatience with, a critique of, or even disregard of, classical concepts such as ‘class’, ‘capitalist’, ‘exploitation’ etc. Transformationalists observe new logics of marginalization and inequality and the dialectical character of globalization that creates and furthers the conditions for its own oppositions, as when Beck (2001b) talks of ‘cosmopolitanism and its enemies’ or Castells (1997) analyzes ‘resistance identities’. It is a characterizing feature of transformationalists that they try to create a room between neoliberalism and neotribalism. The transformationalists see a state in need of change. Its power needn’t disappear or even weaken but it does have to find new ways of getting the job done (Ruggie 1993, 1994). The consequences of globalization for the state depends upon its position in the state system, its size, wealth, military, political and economic system etc. But perhaps more importantly, it depends on its (and its society’s) strategies for adapting, resisting, shielding, controlling, profiting and using the new globalizing imperatives. The state may disappear but it may also reappear in a new form with various names: Network state, world open state, cosmopolitan state, postnational state etc. to which we will return in the following chapters. The state is at present overwhelmed by the global flows and is only just beginning to adjust from being a unitary, demarcated, enclosed decision centre to becoming a decentralized, fluid point of coordination, where ‘power’ is shared with a plurality of sub-state and supra-state actors and where the appropriate decision community is no longer necessarily congruent with the national community (Beck 2001c; Castells 1997: 243-308; Giddens 2002; Held et.al. 1999: 32-86).

The liberal reformers are often social scientists or people working with the political and legal aspects of globalization in international organizations (as neoliberals work with the economic aspects). Their main concern is to engineer governance tools for a ‘partially globalized world’ (Keohane 2001; Keohane & Nye 2000). Focus is on making globalization workable through international and global regulation and institutionalization without limiting or questioning global capitalism. It is a somewhat modest reform programme that doesn’t challenge the powers that be.
The *third way* is the name of Giddens’s theoretical and political reformulation of the societal and political field (Giddens 1998, 2000, 2001), but it is also the name of a loose band of fellow travellers, who recognize and welcome the existence of globalization, who celebrate its liberation potential, but who at the same time express a concern over the losers in this new game. The solution becomes a mix of ‘regulated globalization’ along social democratic lines combined with a competitive adjustment programme at home along neoliberalist lines.

The *cosmopolitans* are theoretically closely related to the third way-view of globalization but they differ on the amount and nature of political regulation needed (Beck 1998a; Held 1993a: 265-71, 2001: 434-40; Held & Goldblatt 1997). There is a greater focus on illegitimate power and wealth asymmetries and on the need for political institutions to match the shift of power outwards. In this position, we also find the most elaborated attempts to rethink categories such as ‘governance’, ‘democracy’, ‘citizen’ etc. to the new globalized constellation.

The *sceptics* maintain that the present levels of economic interdependence are not higher (and maybe even lower) than in earlier periods; the truly transnational companies are few in numbers and in actual transnationalization; the state is not victim but initiator and guarantee for the present internationalization. From the same economistic starting point as the hyperglobalists, the sceptics criticize the hyperglobalists for their ahistorical and singular logic of development. What we are witnessing instead, the sceptics claim, is an increased internationalization between largely national based economies. Rather than out of control, the international economy is conditioned, protected and maintained by the nation state; a state that remains the central and dominating economic and political force.\(^\text{84}\) Capital, work and company have not flexibilized itself out of the reach of the state. The state is still in control (Pollert 1988). Even though the critique of hyperglobalism is still rather economistic, the result of the critique is a greater focus on politics. Internationalization does not result in a stateless or unpolitical order. The race to the bottom is not inherent in any anonymous logic. It is a choice. Globalization is an ‘ideology’ (Cox 1996: 23), it is ‘newliberalspeak’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 2001), that serves to legitimize unpopular policies, “a myth that exaggerates the degree of our helplessness in the face of contemporary economic forces” (Hirst & Thompson 1999: 6). The sceptics find nothing decisively new in the relentless pursuit of capitalism to accumulate and they maintain that the alleged evidence for a substantial change in the operational modus of capitalism or state is either weak or wrong. The state is consequently not defenceless or in serious danger. The

sceptics focuses instead on either the continued role of the state in capitalist accumulation (Hirsch 2001) or they emphasize the political irrelevance of globalized capital as the existence of the state is dependent upon something else entirely than capital. Differences aside, the sceptics warn against the belief in and the project of going beyond the nation state. Their position is that despite an internationally overlapping order of authorities, there is “a distinct, significant and continuing place for the nation-state” (Hirst & Thompson 1999: 269). The sceptics generally see an all-important value in the continued existence of the state which, of course, colour their reading of globalization. In short, and somewhat unfair, we can say that for the right the state is about peace (borders make good neighbours) and meaning (the national ‘we’) whereas it for the left is about welfare and democracy. These are challenged by the other globalization discourses.

The sovereignists view globalization as an at most marginal phenomenon, which doesn’t seriously challenge state sovereignty and national unity, nor is it creating a new intrastate or even supra-state order (Mearsheimer 1990, 1994/5; Waltz 1993, 2000; Krarup 2000). Nation state sovereignty is not in danger from any globalization or development. If in danger, it is from politicians. Sovereignists often claim that it is the political and economic elites who have chosen to surrender state sovereignty to supra-state institutions to further their own political agendas, whether this is European integration, multiculturalism, human rights, finance capitalism or do-goodism. Two varieties of sovereigntism is first ‘conflictualism’, which denies that economic and political globalization has created a more integrated world, if anything a more fragmented one (transformationalists also see signs of increasing fragmentation but coupled with equally strong signs of increasing integration). The conflictualists see the likely future as one of a divide between the West and the rest (Huntington 1996). Secondly there are the ‘isolationists’ (Buchanan 1990) who feel that the rest of the world can go f… itself. Nationalists are usually divided between these two camps or promote an uneasy blend of the two. The political program of the sovereignists is the reassertion of the national border in political and culturalist terms. The nature of international politics is permanently conflictual and the nation state system with its demarcated borders is the only guarantee of local peace, order and meaning.

As opposed to the sovereignists, the internationalists have neither particular love for the nation state nor any desire to strengthen its borders outwards and its power inwards. Their critique of the hyperglobalists focuses on their undynamic and monolithic understanding of the state. For the internationalists, the state is a pluralistic, adaptable entity and its continued strength is the condition for the workings of the economy, including the international economy (Hirst & Thompson 1999:
chap. 9; Kaspersen 2001b; Weiss 1997, 1999). In this camp is also formulated a critique of ‘economic necessity’ and the proclaimed consequences of globalization for the future of welfare, redistribution, macroeconomic governance and so on.

The radicals are the ones most eagerly trying to reveal the globalization discourse as a cover for neoliberal politics and as a continuation of capitalist exploitation and power (Gowan 1999a; Petras 2001). Its position is most elegantly formulated as the critique of ‘market populism’ in Thomas Frank’s excellent book One Market under God (2001). Among the radicals, we also see the most persistent attempts to maintain the relevance of ‘old’ issues concerning inequality, class, political mobilization etc. All is not reduced to lifestyle or identity politics; the question of (re)distribution remains the most important. The rest is façade or diversion, playthings for the young, the rich and their theoreticians or it is ‘postmodern capitalism’ developing new markets and legitimization strategies. Bourdieu, for instance, focuses on the inherent power asymmetries of the so called free market (2001a, 2002). Globalization is political and not the expression or reflection of any economic rationality or necessity. It is on the contrary a neoliberal crusade to dismantle the social state, as Bourdieu (2001b) calls it: “The ‘global market’ is a political construction … and the product of a more or less deliberately executed politics” (Bourdieu 2001a: 106). Globalization is, according to Bourdieu, the universalization of a particular society – the American – which by the servants of power is portrayed as the destiny of the world (2001a: 29-36; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1999). It is also among the radicals one finds the call for mobilization against the ruling globalization. This is also why one of the poles of the globalization-critical movement is located here (Clinell 2001; Starr 2000), the other pole being located among the alarmed.

The trend has been to view the sceptics as a welcome correction to the hyperglobalists (leaving the comfortable middle, ‘neutral’ position to the transformationalists, another classic depoliticization move) and yet to put more faith in the hyperglobalist position than in the sceptic (Callinicos 2001: 19). I want to challenge that and see the sceptic position not as a corrective to the hyperglobalists but as a critique of both the hyperglobalist and the transformationalist camp. I want to argue, that what the sceptics are actually attempting is a repoliticization of the globalization debate. Globalization critique has become part of if not the new liberalism critique. The sceptics highlight political choice and they reframe the debate in politicized terms and by contesting the obviousness of endisms, especially the end of the political. I take, therefore, from the sceptic camp a repoliticized vocabulary that can be applied on transformationalist discourses.
II. Politicizing the Nation State and Depoliticizing Globalization

... leads the globalisation theorists to endorse as their own model of the past the traditional realist idea of the Westphalian System. That model indeed portrays a world of sovereign political units, asserting absolute, inviolable jurisdiction over bordered territorial spaces. Compared with that model, the transborder flows identified by globalisation theory do indeed look revolutionary. (Rosenberg 2000: 19)

The first thing to notice about contemporary globalization discourse is its highly ‘constructivist’ re-description of the nation state. A solid, demarcated, coercive, and undivided view of sovereignty, nation state and politics is projected back onto state history to emphasize the difference with the now fashionable multilayered, pooled, loose, and fragmented view of sovereignty, entities and politics. The postmodern or cosmopolitan state only exists as the opposite of the nation state. The nation state is being politicized as European liberals start to embrace the realist view of international politics for the understanding of the past:

As we consider the ‘disempowerment’ of the nation-state, we think in the first instance of the long-established transformations of the modern state that first emerged with the Peace of Westphalia. The features of this system are reflected in the requirements of classical international law just as much as in the descriptions of realist political scientists … This conventional model is less and appropriate to the current situation. (Habermas 2001a: 69)

Forgotten is the long-standing liberal or idealist version of international theory. As Robert Cooper, and with him a stream of liberal thinkers, says: “In international relations, this is the world of the calculus of interests and forces described by Machiavelli and Clausewitz” (2003: 22). The motive for accepting the realist theory as the adequate model for the nation state is, of course, to emphasize that much stronger the difference to today’s postnational state. The past is hyper-politicized for the present to be depoliticized. By accepting the realist description of the nation state and the international for the period 1648 to 1945, liberalism is not really accepting defeat in the interpretation of past world events but is actually proclaiming its contemporary and future victory. By giving realism the right to interpret the (past) era of the modern nation state, liberalism is claiming the right to interpret future events. By taking over the realist view of the nation state liberalism is able to construct a stark opposing picture of the post national state. By ignoring its own tradition of a liberal theory of international politics, a formidable enemy to oppose is given to liberalism. Robert Fine, when discussing cosmopolitanism, as we do in the next chapter, stresses their skewed reading of the history of the nation state:
The strength of the new cosmopolitanism is to challenge the ‘methodological nationalism’ of the social sciences and to address the historical contingency of the nation state as an organizing principle of political community. However, the limits of this challenge are revealed in its adoption of the terms of reference of what it criticizes. To be sure, it denies that the nation-state is a natural form of socio-political organization, but it accepts that it is (or was) the natural form of socio-political organization in the modern age – i.e. that it is the organizing principle of political modernity. This strangely re-natured view of the nation-state downplays the co-presence of other modern forms of political organization (empires, colonies and totalitarian regimes); it takes a relatively brief period of modern political life when the idea of the nation state was most prevalent (the post-war period from 1953 to 1989) as the exemplary period of political modernity and even then imposes a retrospective image of the solidity of the nation state that was arguably not shared at the time; and it often presumes a stylized history of an Enlightenment ideal of nationhood followed by its ethnic degeneration. The diagnosis of the present epoch in terms of the decline of the nation state is advanced against the naturalistic backdrop of the solidity of the nation state as the form of political modernity, but it is precisely this image of solidity that should be in question. (2003: 460; see also Görg & Hirsch 1998: 590)

In politicizing the nation state it is being portrayed as the opposite of liberalism. It is the new barbarian, which reproduces the classical liberal distinction between the civilized and the barbaric state or, as Kant said, between the republican and the despotic. In the ‘new’ modern nation state everything is subordinated the political. The description has certain affinities to the totalitarianism-debates, where the totalitarian state was portrayed as overly political, as everything else was subsumed under the political imperatives. And there is another similarity: The nation state is now being portrayed or equalled almost to a totalitarian, or at least authoritarian, state. Giddens says: “States have been far more dangerous and disturbing to their populations than businesses or markets ever have. Better to be ‘at risk’ to capitalism than at risk to communism or military government, surely” (in Giddens & Hutton 2000a: 25). The state is suddenly reduced to its communist and militarist versions. This is less a slip of the tongue than one might think. It is part of a larger re-description of the nation state from being the precondition for internal peace, democracy and welfare to being a threat to people in and outside the state.

The globalization discourse in general and the liberal discourse in particular is riddled with an insufficient understanding of the modern state, its history, power and nature. One can highlight at least four simplifications, which help give the liberal globalization discourse its force and revolutionary appearance. Firstly, an exaggeration of the power of the modern state historically, where the theoretical definition as the legitimate and effective monopoly of violence is taken to be an accurate description of its practice. The question is how exclusive, legitimate and effective the control and power of the state over its territory actually was (Krasner 1995/6). This leads directly to
the second simplification, which reduces the modern state to its Western form: The nation state (and this too is a reduction since it downplays a rich variety of how to be a nation state). This form with its alleged unity between people, territory and politics isn’t as obvious or natural as one is led to believe by the story of its dissolution. The story of the modern state is often told as the competition between a plurality of systems which the modern state won, effectively discarding all alternatives and universalizing one model. This is disproved with a look at the diversity of state forms but it’s a part of the equalization of the West and modernity, effectively devaluing both the Western and non-Western experience. Thirdly, an underestimation of the present state’s actual and potential power. The state still controls a large (and not diminishing) part of the GNP, it employs many people, provide multiple essential services from defence to health care, controls education, immigration and its own population, is party to an increasing number of international treaties, which each time effectually confirms its status etc. The state is a very lively dead, and there are few compelling signs that the successful states are actually losing a power they once possessed. The state never ruled absolute, even in its totalitarian form, but that is the presumption of the rhetoric behind the theories of state decline. This is explained by the fourth simplification, which employs a static and ahistorical understanding of the state, where every change is interpreted as a decline. As Linda Weiss says, in this globalization discourse “Any diminution in the importance of a particular policy tool is taken as evidence of a loss of state power” (1997: 18).

These simplifications serve to dramatize the consequences of globalization, not least for the state. They are arguments for a break with the state paradigm. They are re-descriptions of the nation state, causing the appearance of a greater shift than otherwise to be expected. They are tools of depoliticization. They are not lies or deceits but more like paths one is led onto by the liberal approach. They present themselves as ways to further the liberal description. Depoliticization works by closing the field of options. In liberal globalization discourse this is done by stating quite categorically that there is only one (legitimate) answer to globalization; the rest is barbarism. As Benoist very precisely says: “Moralizing idealism overcomes the last resistance of a realism, described as cynical or perverse” (2002: 18). The choice is depoliticized and so are the opponents since their different choice is not accepted as a choice at all, let alone a legitimate one. But, because things are not given by and in itself, there is never only just one answer. It is the ultimate act of depoliticization to present it as such. The hyperglobalists and the transformationalists both depoliticize globalization by placing it beyond the realm of political choice. Admittedly, the transformationalists allow for a degree of freedom in the adaptation to the globalist paradigm but
not in the basic tenets of globalization. It is part of my argument that there may be less of a distance between the hyperglobalists and the transformationalists than they both like to imagine. They basically share a post-nation state perspective and a dismissal of the political.

Liberalism in Cyberspace: Manuel Castells

This section will deal with one aspect of Castells’s trilogy, The Information Age (1997, 2000a, b): The case of power. Or even more narrowly: The conditions of state power in the global network society. The claim is the already well-known, that the modern nation state is an obsolete organizational form, that somehow still exists despite the new realities and which is being replaced by a new more superior form: The network state. Castells’s globalization analysis differs from most others by its focus on technological development as one of the main, if not the main, driving force. With the exception of the economy, which also plays a large part in Castells’ analysis, there is a marked neglect of developments often included in globalization analyses, such as the judicial and foreign policy developments and the emergence of global regimes of various kinds. This has consequences for his analysis. The without doubt weakest link in his diagnosis is the analysis of the transformation of the state to a network state, that is, the state’s internal reorganization and its changed relations with the rest of the world. This, however, does not make his analysis any less interesting as an example of the liberal globalization discourse. The analysis may be different in specific subject matter and terminology but the conclusions about state and power are the same. Castells’ analysis is an electro-vision for liberalism in cyberspace.

The net is pure liberalism. It’s spontaneously self-organizing. Once politically initiated, it is autonomous and beyond control. All that is left is to ride the tiger. It can neither be killed, caught nor tamed. Personal, centralized power disappears in favour of pure systemic power, against which there is no successful resistance: "Once such a network is constituted, any node that disconnects itself is simply bypassed, and resources … continue to flow in the rest of the network” (2000a: 147; see also Grewal 2003). The net regroups and bypasses any and every obstacle; it connects any valuable resource and disconnects valueless or disruptive nodes. The net is the new acentric and subjectless power. Castells’s analytical point about the connection between net, technology and

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85 Part of his analysis is based on a depoliticizing reading of the global economy, where Castells repeats the neoliberal argument. In terms of the above typology he sits somewhere between the neoliberals and the third way: Neoliberal in his analysis, third way in his politics. As in an echo from Giddens he says: "I am a social democrat, but I am obsolete … People who think about our societies have to reinvent politics. The inspiring thing is in what Greenpeace does, or Oxfam. For the moment, the left is as obsolete as the right” (1998b: 13). Interestingly, politics is not about what the state does; and the reason for the obsolescence of the left is precisely their state centrism.
power can be summarized as such: "new information technology unleashed the power of networking and decentralization, actually undermining the centralizing logic of one-way instructions and vertical, bureaucratic surveillance" (1997: 300). The conclusion is, that “the power of flows takes precedence over the flows of power” (2000a: 500).

Many of his critics has remarked upon the disappearance of the actor – especially the capitalist actor (Webster 1997b: 78; Dijk 1998; Webster & Halclo 2000: 7). Johan Lönnroth (2001: 16) says very accurately, that it seems as if “Castells’ network partly plays the same role as Adam Smiths invisible hand. It anonymizes power”. This observation can be generalized to the disappearance of power as such in his analysis. Instead of ‘stable power elites’, we get a ‘collective capitalist’ (Castells 2000b: 374). This is the general destiny for power in Castells’ analysis. The net is ‘in control’. Chris Freeman (1998: 464) writes: "the fact that networks are everywhere forming, flourishing and sometimes disappearing and that many of them are now computer networks does not dispose of the question of power within networks. Castells has surprisingly little to say about this”. In a reply Castells (1998a: 474) says:

So there is systemic power in the global financial network, of the big investors and their information systems over the small investor. But their power is delegated from a higher power, the power of a non-human (but human-made) global artefact: the global financial network … The most important power of the network is to exclude a node from the network, and this is not an individualised power, but a structural power, enacted, without control, by the network itself.

In the industrial era there were three state forms: the capitalist, the statist and the developmental. The ‘IT-turn’ destroyed in different ways the living conditions of the last two (2000b: chap. 1 & 4) and changed the organizational matrix for the first.\footnote{Castells uses Poulantzas’s class state theory (Castells & Carnoy 2001) and Giddens’s Weber-inspired definition of the modern nation state (Castells, 1997a: 244). Castells’s own analysis starts, where the nation state looses its monopoly in Giddens’s terms and its relative autonomy in Poulantzas’s.} In the information age there is in the long run only two state forms (in so far as you can talk of states here): the connected – the network states – and the disconnected – the failed states. In the short or medium term there is a third, middle form which is desperately trying to sustain itself: The modern nation state. This differentiation in two or three will reappear several times in the following chapters and have already been spelled out in earlier chapters as essentially a differentiation between the benign and the malignant. And as we will see, the main difference in relation to the Enlightenment is that the nation state has been relabelled as barbarism. The failed states has either not managed to build state capacity and a monopoly on organized violence or have had it wrecked by rival power centres that have effectively
challenged the state’s legitimacy and monopoly on violence. The result is chaos and destruction, as Castells makes so painfully clear in his descriptions of the predator state (2000b: chap. 2 & 3). The modern nation state can now only be upheld as a communitarian resistance in opposition to the values and principles of liberal democracy and the global network (1997: 306, 343): “nation-states survive beyond historical inertia because of the defensive communalism of nations and people in their territories, hanging onto their last refuge not to be pulled away by the whirlwind of global flows” (1997: 308, my italics). They survive – for a while – by entrenching themselves in the defence of particularistic identities, or ‘resistance identities’ as Castells calls them (1997: chap 1 & 2). The attempt to maintain the nation state is refuted as a doomed attempt to block the forces of the global flows and, as it were, of history.\footnote{“clawing back from history to the principle of power for the sake of power, sometimes wrapping it in nationalist rhetoric”; “the fundamentalist state, while unleashing the last wave of state’s absolutist power, does so, in fact by negating the legitimacy and durability of the nation-state” (1997: 355 & 276).} What used to be the precondition of democracy has now become its deathblow. The particular is now in contradiction to the liberal democracy, which supposedly then is thought global, although the implications of this are never mentioned or hinted at. The argument serves only as critique of re-description of the nation state.

The premise is that all entities and principles – state, family, enterprise, media, church etc., which have hitherto been thought within a nation state context and in an enclosed, unitary form – now stand in opposition hereto. There is a presumption of modernity’s institutions as inherently hierarchic, uni-directional and coercive. Any insistence on their primary conditions is now considered reactionary, undemocratic and in contradiction with the reproductive conditions of the new age. Besides the state, Castells makes a similar analysis of two other power centres of the industrial era: The enterprise and the patriarchal family, whose new characteristics, I’ll mention briefly as they both echo the state analysis and the endisms mentioned by Gamble earlier.

The enterprise first: With globalization and flexibilization of the economy, the old industrial organizational logic with its rational bureaucracy, hierarchical leadership, standardized production and oligopolistic control of the market came under increasing pressure. Forced by an ever stronger competition, the enterprise recreates its internal organization and external relations. The enterprise redefines its internal organizational logic from verticality to horizontality, the operational unit becomes the project rather than the enterprise itself, and its goal is reached through multiple exchanges and relations in networks that consist of ever fluctuating partners in alliance today and in competition tomorrow. Out of this comes the network enterprise. The company goes from being the centre of capital, planning and work to becoming a node in a plurality of larger networks of flows of
finance, information and products (Castells 2000a: 164-188). For the first time in history, Castells says, the basic economic unit is not an individual or collective subject but a network. The same development can be found in the family, which goes from being a patriarchally dominated nuclear family with established gender, age and authority relations to a network family with ever shifting relations and constant renegotiation among equals (Castells 1997: chap. 4). Out of the global, informational economy, technological changes in the human reproduction and feminism (which Castells sees as a product of the first two changes), the family hierarchy comes under pressure. The reality today is more economically and emotionally independent women and children, a heavily contested and problematic male identity, a plurality of family arrangements, an ‘intimate democracy’ inside the family, a new culture of sexuality, an end to heterosexual monopoly in favour of ‘pure relationships’ in the words of Giddens (1997), technologically and socially manipulated reproduction etc. The result is that the centralized, personalized, authoritarian and hierarchical family structure can no longer maintain itself.

What unites these two analyses with the analysis of the state is that they all indicate an end to centralized power upheld through commands, sanctions and, in the final instance, violence. Within all three organizational units, violence and power become ever less productive, even counter-productive. The vertical command can increasingly be denied or ignored without the threat of sanctions. Traditional power remains place- and time-bound, whereas the former subjects of power escape in and through the global flows. Today, exercise of traditional power is like standing on the edge of the water commanding the sea to withdraw. A futile attempt, unless you pick the right time of the day (where you can then have the appearance of power). The flow of power cannot control the power of flows. In short, power in its traditional form disappears in the information or network society. It seems to be a general feature in network analyses (Andersen 2004: 80).

The single most important element in the transition from the modern nation state to the network state is the loss of power: Economic power, communicative power and security power. A central claim of Castells is that the network state loses power but maintains influence (1997: 243, 307). A liberal dream scenario: Power and hereby violence vanishes from the state but it maintains its organizing and mediating role. The main characteristic of power is conflict, whereas it for influence is agreement. The means of power are force, coercion and sanction, while they for influence are incentives, encouragements and rewards (Thomsen 2000: 12). Castells himself writes: "What is power? In my view, it is the ability of a social actor to impose its will on others, regardless of

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Influence is the process by which a social actor frames others’ choices in the sense of its interests, while not being able to impose these interests by sheer force” (1998a: 473; see also 2000a: 15). This form of power disappears, as the net offers plenty of opportunities to escape. The new societal structure offers an environment, where the command can be overheard and the sanction ignored. They simply do not get transmitted through the system because the single network and certainly the network of networks do not operate on the basis of force and coercion but rather on mutual interest. Power can not be maintained in a point wherefrom commands can be issued:

Power … is no longer concentrated in institutions (the state), organizations (capitalist firms), or symbolic controllers (corporate media, churches). It is diffused in global networks of wealth, power, information, and images, which circulate and transmute in a system of variable geometry and dematerialised geography. Yet it does not disappear. Power still rules society; it still shapes, and dominates us … But in its current form of existence, it is fading away: the exercise of this kind of power is increasingly ineffective for the interests that it is supposed to serve. States can shoot, but because the profile of their enemies, and the whereabouts of their challenges, are increasingly unclear, they tend to shoot randomly, with the probability that they may shoot themselves in the process. (1997: 359)

Power no longer resides in the subjugation of the body but in the influence on the mind. Symbol power not weapons power is the name of the game in the information age (1997: 359-60). The network state is a state form that have surrendered its command power, its demarcated border, centralism, national-ethnic criteria of exclusion, coupling of personality and sovereignty etc. Castells’s new state shares an important characteristic with Beck’s or Habermas’s cosmopolitan state. They are first and foremost defined by what they’re not, by their (alleged) past. The network state is defined negatively as the opposite of its own future as a nation state. The network state is basically a state that cannot meaningfully define a border or exercise an exclusion. Ulrich Beck expresses the same with his concept of cosmopolitan states, when he writes that it will:

… have to be founded on the principle of national indifference. Just as the Peace of Westphalia ended the religious civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by separating state and religion, so the national world wars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries could be answered by a separation of state and nation. (2001c: 87)

The new state has no concept of particularity or preference and therefore no criteria for exclusion. All-important is that the hitherto criteria – nationality – is ruled out. The network state is defined as the opposite of a highly demarcated, territorial, centralized state that has more polemical value than actual or past presence. The network state lives as a counter-image or a critical concept, which
serves more to criticize the present than to describe the future. It is merely the opposite of what is
described or constructed as the modern European nation state. Thus, it is not surprising that we find
that Castells reduces this new state to a European phenomenon. It is really part of an internal
European discussion of statehood. The new state form is the EU as the ‘most advanced expression’
of globalization; it is the state form ‘probably characteristic of the Information Age’ (Castells
2000b: 348, 364; see also 2000b: chap. 5 & 2000e). The discussion of other possible, legitimate and
working organizational expressions in the information age is completely lacking. Europe is – again –
portrayed as the world’s future.

It is, accordingly, a shame that Castells fails to discuss the USA in the same way as the EU. It is not
entirely clear, whether he shares, what we’ll refer to later as the European liberal consensus on the
difference between a ‘postmodern’ Europe and a stubbornly ‘modern’ US. The United States
should, if any, be on their way towards a network organizational modus, as America is portrayed as
the future of things to come in Castells’s analysis of the technological, economic, and sociocultural
changes. The US have in Castells’s analysis the same role that Britain had in Marx’s, namely as the
most advanced expression of current, worldwide trends. But once Castells has to exemplify the
future as regards statehood, he only names and discusses the EU, which, in other parts of the
analysis, is portrayed as more resistant to the transformations of the information age. There is here a
dis-synchronicity between techno-economic and political development, which doesn’t fit in well
with the overall frame of the analysis. Castells pins his hopes for change on the immanent logic of
globalization and information technologies. It is not social and politics actors, but the unfolding of
autonomous processes, the disembedding power of globalization and technology, that will bring
about change. Eager to get rid of traditional politics, the struggle for power, Castells does what
“overburdens the emancipatory promise of communication and information technologies”.

In sum, one of the problems with analyses such as Castells’s is the implicit precondition that power
used to be sovereign, that is, unified, identifiable, centrally residing, wherefrom commands and
sanctions were issued – whether this is in a state over its subjects, a firm over its employees or a
patriarch over his family. Power is seen as concentrated command power. In short, power was a
winter palace that could be stormed or a king that could be beheaded. A bit polemically: According
to Castells’s analysis, the information age promises a transformation of power from a Bodinian to a
Foucauldian form. The analysis of power in the industrial age is too one-sidedly thought in
soverignty-terms, whereas it in the information age is dissolved into subjectless power, non-
executed power, systemic power, non-dangerous power (the ultimate liberal prize). There is no actor, no decision or command centre, nor any differentiation between inside/outside, state/non-state. In this definition, the network state ‘exists’ in the perpetual denial of its own existence, its ‘existence’ necessitates constant denial of any lasting or durable form. It is a random gathering of contingent flows, directed or controlled by no one. Its characteristic is to be de-sovereignized and de-personalized, de-centralized and ultimately de-materialized. Ultimately it cannot ‘do’ anything.

World Domestic ‘Politics’: Jürgen Habermas

Habermas once stated in an interview with a Danish newspaper that: “The Germans should never again be allowed to carry out an independent foreign policy” (Stjernfelt 1997). In actual fact, he meant that no state should be allowed. Habermas’s enduring battle against Germany as a ‘normal state’ is the premier example of a consistent liberal encounter with the barbaric state. The argument in the following will be that Habermas’s globalization theory should, in part at least, be read against the background of his long struggle to tame the German state but also the nation state as such. As his writings on the EU demonstrate, the German experience with the state is also a European experience. The question, to which we shall return, is whether it is also a global experience. There is a direct line – mediated through the globalization discourse – from Habermas’s concept of constitutional patriotism in the mid-1980s to his concept of the postnational constellation from the mid-1990s. Constitutional patriotism is the first step in the depoliticization of the nationally determined state community that globalization and the postnational constellation promise to fulfil. Constitutional patriotism is of course a significant element in the German discussion of its status or non-status as a normal state (Müller 2000: chap. 3), and Habermas takes it up as a defence of the apolitical nation, as an antidote to the nationally self-assertive and eventually aggressive state:

For Habermas constitutional patriotism is an abstract patriotism, which – with a somewhat Enlightenment optimistic formulation – no longer orients itself toward the concrete unity of the (German) nation but towards abstract processes and principles … Instead of the particularistic and concrete nation are put the universal and abstract idea of the universalization of democracy and human rights. (Staun 2001: 389)

What we see, is the differentiation between a constitutional identity based on a political identity as a citizen in *demos* or on an ethnic-cultural understanding of nationhood rooted in *ethnos*.\(^{90}\) It is hardly controversial to point out that his constitutional patriotism is in direct continuation to or are dependent upon a stronger force than the experience of Germany’s bloody history, namely the liberal fear of passions. It is a stronger force because it is that fear and understanding of passions, which shapes his reading of Germany’s past; it structures his experience with the nation state. The *Historiker Streit* demonstrated that this experience isn’t given by the events themselves. History doesn’t come with meaning attached. Factors outside history determine or shape its readings. Throughout his writings, one repeatedly finds the claim that nationalism equals war, oppression and ultimately extermination.\(^{91}\) It is not a question if, but only of when. On a seemingly innocent question of whether – in view of the heroic and tragic effort of the New York firemen in the burning and collapsing Twin Towers – heroism was good for anything, he replied: "It seems to me, that whenever ‘heroes’ are being honoured, the question of who needs it – and why – needs to be put. Also in this more harmless case, one can understand Brecht’s warning: ‘Woe the country that needs heroes’” (2002b: 178). Given what we have already discussed in earlier chapters on the heroic and non-heroic man, this is an excellent example of the depth of Habermas’s liberalism.

In the opposition to the absolutist state, nationalism and the nation state were adequate answers: An ambivalent and dangerous answer but nonetheless functional and necessary. Today, it is different: “the triumphal procession of the nation-state also has an ironical obverse side. The nation-state at one time represented a cogent response to the historical challenge of finding a functional equivalent for the early modern form of social integration that was in the process of disintegrating. Today we are confronting an analogous challenge” (1998e: 398). Habermas has described the present challenge with the concept of constitutional patriotism and later with the concept of the postnational constellation. The claim in the following is that constitutional patriotism plays the same role in the national constellation as globalization (and European integration and multiculturalism) plays in the postnational constellation. There used to be a clear nation state bias in his work. It was simply the modern frame for the political community (Carleheden 2001: 406). In his own words, the limitation of his earlier work was “the implicit assumption that national societies, societies framed by a nation-state, provide the modern for societies in general” (in Arnason 2000: 6). Constitutional patriotism is the answer to the post-traditional but still nation state condition. De-nationalization of

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90 Important contributions to the part of his theory which concerns the problematic and unnecessary connection between nation and state are to be found in Habermas 1992, 1998b, 1998c.
statehood is the answer to the postnational condition. One can understand the first discussion (constitutional patriotism) as a depoliticization of the national and the second discussion (globalization) as a depoliticization of statism.

The mention above of the connection between constitutional patriotism and the fear of national passions and self-assertion serves as illustration of Habermas’s purpose with the discourses on globalization and multiculturalism. He finds here, what he takes to be compelling arguments for depoliticization. It is no longer (or progressively less) a choice – as it still was in the debate on constitutional patriotism – but a necessity dictated by globalizing transformations. The postnational constellation is a non-political circumstance. We can single out two claims in Habermas’s globalization theory. The first lies in direct continuation of constitutional patriotism, both in terms of value and argument. That is the part of his theory that highlights the de-homogenization of the national community through Europeanization and multiculturalism. Habermas finds here empirical markers for what used to be a normative claim: The necessity of the depoliticization of the national. The other claim is more directly dependent upon the arguments of liberal internationalism and portrays interstate (and some state) politics as counterproductive – this time due to globalization. Here we clearly see the already mentioned depoliticization of the state. Both are arguments about the constraining effects on politics as a result of societal changes:

But today we live in pluralistic societies that are moving further and further away from the model of a nation-state based on a culturally homogenous population. The diversity of cultural forms of life, ethnic groups, religions, and worldviews is constantly growing. There is no alternative to this development, except at the normatively intolerable cost of ethnic cleansings. (1998e: 408)

Notice the one-dimensional possibility of interpretation and action given: De-nationalization or ethnic cleansings. This is the kind of moralistic depoliticization that liberals master more than most. In the following, we’ll concentrate on the second argument about globalization. Habermas has a fairly simple definition of globalization: "the increasing scope and intensity of commercial, communicative, and exchange relations beyond national border” (2001e: 66) and in his Die postnationale Konstellation, he identifies four main aspects of globalization that directly relates to the question of the continued existence and form of the nation state: a) the increased mobility of capital, b) growing global interdependence, c) multiculturalism and d) the monetarization of society (2001e: 66-80). We’ll concentrate on the second aspect, the growing interdependence and the resulting liberation of politics from its national basis. But before that a brief word on the other
aspects and their relation to politics. The lightness of capital meets the weight of politics, which seriously diminishes the available space for economic policies and the welfare state. As Castells, Habermas accepts the neoliberal argument about the overly expensive welfare state (2001d: 49-52; 2001e: 60, 79-80). Multiculturalism necessitates a decoupling between majority culture and political culture: ”Globalization forces the nation-state to open itself up internally to the multiplicity of foreign, or new, forms of cultural life” (2001e: 84). The monetarization of society obviously relates to the neoliberal deregulation and privatization programme and to Habermas’s earlier thesis on colonization of the life sphere. His claim and worry is that ”money replaces power … Power can be democratized; money cannot” (2001e: 78).

As regards the second aspect, the growing global interdependence and its challenge to traditional nation state based politics, we find in Habermas an acceptance of the realist theory on international politics as the correct one with one major qualification. It is only true for yesterday: Realism was the adequate frame of understanding and action in the national era of yesterday, liberalism is the only acceptable frame in the postnational era. Realism is accepted but on the premise that its claim of the static and statist nature of the international anarchy was a historical claim that now no longer claim validity or priority. Inspired by Robert Cooper (see next chapter), Habermas has divided the world into three parts, where the ‘third world’ is the stateless or state-failed world. Those are the countries that haven’t managed to bring themselves into modernity. They are the ones stumbling back into the (European) past:

The ‘Second World’ is shaped by the heritage of power politics that individual nation states that have emerged from decolonization have taken over from Europe. Internally these states balance their unstable relations through authoritarian constitutions and obstinately insist on sovereignty and non-intervention from the outside (as in the Persian Gulf region). They emphasize military violence and exclusively obey the logic of the balance of power. Only the states of the ’First World’ can to a certain degree succeed in bringing their national interests into harmony with the normative claims established by the United Nations, an organization that has come at least part of the way toward achieving the cosmopolitan level. (1997a: 132)

The ‘second world’, bearing the characteristics of the past of the ‘first world’, is now portrayed as having ‘authoritarian constitutions’, an ‘obstinate insistence on sovereignty’ etc. It is of great importance that the decisive differentiation between barbaric and non-barbaric states now lies between the second and first world. The third and second world shares the state ambition, whether achieved or not, and are thereby morally repugnant. Only the first world has wrestled free from the urge of nation statehood. The first world represents those that have brought, or are bringing, their
political organization on level with the demands of the global reality. It is ‘the temporal meridian of the present’ (1997a: 132; see also 2003b). Elsewhere he writes (1994: 75), that an autodidact Europe may help other states and nations liberate themselves from their nineteenth century. Another European writing of the global condition.

The politics of today must in no way resemble the politics of yesterday. In anticipation of later discussions, David Held’s book *Democracy and the Global Order* (1995) has the very saying subtitle: ‘From Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance’ (my italics) which very clearly demonstrates the goal: From state rule to (non-state, extra-state) governance achieved through the globalization discourse (see also Falk 1999b: 420-1):

Today we see a very doubtful defence of ‘governance’ as the new term for a governing allegedly able to do everything, to step in instead of politics conducted through widespread administration procedures and able to leave the stage to one actor who itself is diffuse, namely the international civil society and at one and the same time unite the spokesmen for the free market and for international law under one banner. (Rosanvallon 2003: 15)

Habermas’s defence of governance as the replacement of politics rests on a reading of the transformation of the international from a time, where violence and power might have been morally wrong but politically effective to a time, where they are both wrong and ineffective. Habermas’s version of global governance is the counterfactual concept of ‘world domestic policy’.92 Put very shortly, *world domestic policy is domesticated foreign policy*. Actually, it is the abolition of all classical foreign policy, of all pursuits of national interests, the denial of the doctrine of legitimate self-assertion in a conflictual international environment. World domestic policy subscribes to the idea that domestic policy is more peaceful than foreign policy (a common but not necessarily true assertion) and to the notion of the ‘domestic analogy’ discussed in a former chapter. The internal domestication serves as model for the de-conflictualization of the international. This means that there are no longer any meaningful differences between internal and external, national and international, domestic and foreign policy, and, therefore, also no difference between what we can expect from the ‘two’ spheres. World domestic policy is the pacified externality; the rejection of the inherent conflictual nature of the ‘international’. Ultimately, it is the denial of the international as any meaningful category and by extension, therefore, also of the national. As always, its positive content is limited to the EU and a few remarks on the UN, once again demonstrating its purpose not as an analytical but as a political tool for the depoliticization of classical foreign policy.

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What Habermas sees as repoliticization of the lost political latitude, I interpret as depoliticization, when he says: “Instead of a globalization that consists of a market without boundaries, many of us hope for a return of the political in another form. Not in the original form of a global security state, tied to the spheres of the police, intelligence services and now even the military, but instead as a world-wide, civilizing power of formation” (2001a). He wants to meet the depoliticizations of the global market with a civilizational depoliticization (and notice the differentiation between the political in its ‘original form’ and now in ‘another form’). In the concepts of this project a ‘worldwide, civilizational force’ is the uppermost expression of depoliticization. The precondition of world domestic policy and the postnational state are the problems the global transformations create for the political instruments of the modern nation state. They are, according to Habermas, becoming increasingly clumsy and ineffective in a rapidly more complex and differentiated globe. All classical policies and distinctions are losing value and meaning: friend/enemy, in/out, war/peace, state/non-state etc. Habermas has, in an article on Kant’s *Zum ewigen Frieden*, a programmatic section, which summarizes his views on the transformation of the international:

… there is a blurring of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy that are constitutive of state sovereignty. The classical image of power politics is being changed not only by additional normative features such as a politics of democratisation or of human rights, but also through a peculiar diffusion of power itself. With the growing pressure for cooperation, more or less indirect influence is becoming more important than direct implementation of one’s own goals through the exercise of administrative power or threats of violence. Instead, power is now exerted indirectly in the structuring of perceived situations, in the creation of contacts, in the interruption of flows of communication, or in the definition of agendas and problems; in short, it is exercised on the boundary conditions within which actors make their decisions. ‘Soft power’ forces ‘hard power’ aside and robs the subjects Kant had counted on in his association of free states of the very basis for their independence. (1997a: 122-123)

In the article, he evaluates the empirical and prognostic value of Kant’s three main arguments for the possibility of peace: republican rule, interdependence and a global public. According to Habermas, Kant was only partly right in his own time because he didn’t see the rise of an unruly nationalism (see also the critique of Kant in 2004c: 144-5) and because the instruments of peace weren’t really there as more than hopes. The present, however, renders Kant right posthumously. In the global flows, state power becomes ever more irrelevant because it becomes powerless. “The power of flows overwhelms the flow of power”, as Castells wrote. Hard power gets replaced by Joseph S. Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ (1990), that is, weapons, war and confrontation, but also commands, sanctions and coercions are replaced or outperformed by trade, knowledge, negotiation
and persuasion as the decisive and effective instruments of politics. Traditional power politics simply do not work. The differences and differentiations of nation state politics describe ever less. The postnational constellation contains exactly a state form that behaves anything like a traditional state. Those, who still do, are increasingly embarrassing and worrying actors. In another very central passage, he writes (2003a: 706):

*Empirical* objections to the possibility of realizing the American vision converge in the thesis that global society has become far too complex; the world is no longer accessible to a centralized control, through politics backed up by military power … Politics loses its primacy over the horizontally networked media of both markets and of communication once it attempts to regress to the original, Hobbesian form of a hierarchical security system.

The world is becoming too complex for traditional politics (2002b: 167). America has not learnt this lesson and are, therefore, increasingly portrayed as the opposite of Europe, as Europe’s sorry past, a Europe which now strives to become a world domestic power; a power that “also externally remains able to act and which proves that it is not only the number of military units that count in a complex world society but also the soft power of negotiation agendas, political connections and economic advantages” (Habermas & Derrida 2003: 9, my italics). The new global complexity reduces the utility of hard power to the point where, as in Montesquieu and others, it becomes counterproductive. Habermas offers a number of explanations for the emergence of the new constellation, which seriously challenges its proclaimed global character (and the prescribed alternative to the nation state, see Fine & Smith 2003). The first explanation is globalization, where we may question the global character of the transformation. But it is primarily in the second explanation – the rejection of Europe’s past – that the postnational becomes purely European. This is Habermas’s basic story or original driving force, but it is also one that makes Europe the exception and therefore not the model of the world. The defining modern experience of many parts of the world is colonialism and they are not about to copy Europe again, even if this time it is supposedly to be done voluntarily. One could have wished, as in most that use this European experience of self, for a reflection on the geographical and mental limits of this experience.

The postnational constellation seems, therefore, to fulfil Habermas’s wishes for a state unable to pursue independent foreign policy – not least by changing, to the point of disappearance, the concept of foreign policy itself. It reformulates politics in a way that takes from it all those characteristics, I early described under the heading ‘politics as conflict’. Instead we get one of the more pure and consistent versions of ‘politics as technique’.
III. Summing up: Beheading the King

... to respect sovereignty is to be complicitous in human rights violations (Linklater 2000)

... the recognition of effective power as legitimate power has a highly problematic history, and has led to many brutal regimes being wrongly regarded as equally legitimate members of the international community. (Held 2005a: 155)

With Foucault (2003: 35-7) we might say that the first battle against sovereignty waged by the Enlightenment was fought in and with sovereigntist terms: It was about defining the borders and limitations of sovereignty and, therefore, in a profound sense, served to confirm and strengthen it. Now, the battle against sovereignty is being fought by criticizing, downplaying, or even ignoring the very language of sovereignty itself. The language of sovereignty, ‘the disease of Bodin’, is the object of attack. ‘No one is in control’ is the same as beheading the sovereign. Power is no longer talked about in sovereigntist terms. The sovereign commanded the flow of power. Now, as Castells says, it’s all about the power of flows. When words like ‘old-fashioned’, ‘their nineteenth century’, ‘living in the past’ etc. are used in European liberal discourse, then these are more than mere words. They are directly conditional upon, and signs of, a progressivist and Eurocentric philosophy of history that, despite the transformationalist qualifications, has only one direction: “Globalisation is here to stay, and while there will be inevitable hiccups and setbacks, there is no going back for anyone” (Giddens & Hutton 2000b: 215). Another element inherent in this progressivist philosophy is, as I’ve shown in the previous chapter, a naming and excluding of the ‘backward’ and the ‘barbaric’. What we see is that barbarism has become modern; not because it is popular in usage but because what we used to term modern, first and foremost the nation state, has now become part of the old and barbaric. Really, what is being said is that (Western) Europe is moving beyond politics in its traditional, modern sense and that most of the rest of the world is stuck there still. Because the modern is now longer the present, then they are actually now living in the past. Liberal Europe once again assumes the role of moralist educator and legislator of the world. A Europe and a liberalism which, in the words of Kant quoted in the previous chapter, want to ‘legislate for everyone else’.

Intimately related to this is a construction of the modern nation state as highly demarcated, uniform, territorial, ‘heavy’ and centralized, which seems only to have the purpose of differentiating it from the newer, ‘lighter’, de-territorialized versions. Complement to this is an affirmation by liberals of the realist understanding of international politics. Again, this is less a description of the past than an attempt to distance the present, or rather future, state from its predecessor. Further still, there is
allegedly only two ‘state’ forms left (to the extent that they are states): The globalized state and the failed state. The modern nation state is a zombie, still wrecking havoc but doomed to perish. Yet another element could be summarized by asking, whether globalization is a global phenomenon or merely a European one? I want to ask, whether what we see, is not more like a globalization of Europe than of the world; and whether elements of what is placed under the label ‘globalization’ or in conjunction with it are not so much part of a unique (Western) European experience, that one cannot deduce any global consequences from it, or at least that one should be careful when drawing universal conclusions on the basis of local globalization.

Liberal globalism is the dominant European liberal paradigm today. Its defining feature is a distinct post-national reading of globalization and a strong tendency to declare the nation state paradigm obsolete. Any alternative to liberal globalization is dismissed as either impossible or illegitimate. The first point is often framed so that opposition to letting one’s country globalize is to become North Korea or the Taliban. The second point is often brought home by labelling any opposition to globalization as nationalism and then say as Polly Toynbee: “The ‘kultur’ of the Third Reich or Greater Serbia lurks only just beneath the surface of most nationalist emotions” (2000: 198); or when Martha Nussbaum (1996: 14) nsays: “patriotism is very close to jingoism”. Either globaliztion or the choice between dictatorship and genocide. Take your pick. A powerful depoliticization strategy is of course to present one’s own position as the only legitimate one, and this is massively present in the globalization discourse where, as already mentioned, the nation state is being re-described, now not only as tightly demarcated and realist but also as inherently violent and ultimately genocidal. That is very much the theme of the next chapter.
Liberal globalism

What makes today’s liberal imperialism an imperial doctrine is the belief in the political inequality of countries. This inequality is not restricted to differences in military and economic power, but includes, critically, differences in competence for self-governance … The normative consequence of political inequality among countries is that some may legitimately make and implement important decisions for the governance of others. (Purdy 2003: 35)

Liberal globalism is the latest incarnation of liberal internationalism. On the basis of a distinct interpretation of globalization, it draws a number of strong conclusions about the changes of the national and the international. Some of them have we already seen, but now we’ll concentrate more on the political conclusions. In the following, we’ll examine the ‘Europe vs. America’-debate and the most ambitious expression of liberal globalism, cosmopolitanism; both cases which testify to a new confidence within European liberalism. Given that liberal globalism does not speak the language of sovereignty or the political, we’ll ask if, where and how, we might see its returns. The thesis is an old Freudian one: The repressed returns in new incarnations. Not naming liberal or humanitarian wars as such results in ‘perverse’ eruptions of war.

The first section starts with two ‘scandals’, that is, two texts by Robert Kagan and Robert Cooper, which caused quite a stir. Kagan’s errand is explicitly the Europe-America-debate and he sees it from the American side. Cooper is not addressing the debate, but I attempt to show that he, although he clearly understands himself as an Atlanticist, is deeply embedded in the European liberal paradigm and he demonstrates the contemporary liberal globalist reading of the evolving state system. The section then proceeds to two declared European liberals, Will Hutton and Jürgen Habermas, who exemplify a new confident liberalism, which understands itself in opposition to America and to its own past. The second part of the chapter takes on cosmopolitanism and asks if humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism have become the new sovereigntist language?
I. The New Barbarism – European Liberals Look at the USA

Underlying the current dispute is a much more fundamental difference in principle between the United States and many European countries over the source of democratic legitimacy on an international level. (Fukuyama 2005: 148)

The new barbarism in European liberalism is unilateralism. In the following, I will argue that the massive critique of the US coming from European liberal intellectuals is not, as often claimed, primarily a result of anti-Americanism. It is, on the contrary, first and foremost a result of a development in European liberalism that interprets globalization and European integration as signs of a new globalist order of post-nation state sovereignty. I make no judgments of the good or bad nature of American politics, nor do I locate the present strife in the Bush presidency. I tend to agree with the quote from Fukuyama at the top of the section, which states that the strife concerns different readings of 'democratic legitimacy on an international level'. This does not mean that one can dismiss a fictive ‘America’ in the minds of the Europeans or a fictive ‘Europe’ in the minds of the Americans (Fuglede & Bjerre-Poulsen 2004); it only means that they are not the decisive factors. I’m reproducing here a false distinction between a monolithic US and Europe that of course do not correspond with reality. It is used simply for purposes of clarity and should not be taken as an acceptance of the view that they represent totally opposing camps or name some clearly enclosed entities. The present strife between America and Europe has given rise to a lot of articles and books, only a fraction of which I can possibly discuss. Just like every self- (and profit) respecting European liberal had to have a book out on first globalization and then terror, so now it seems to be Europe and/or America (i.e. Mann 2003; Balibar 2003a; Bauman 2004a).

Unilateralism is in the eyes of European liberals becoming the strategy of stubborn nation states desperately clinging to an obsolete paradigm for international behaviour, that may have been valid in the era of state sovereignty being located from 1648 to 1945, but which is now becoming ever more counterproductive and dangerous in the era of post-state sovereignty. What we find here is a faulty reflection on the European nature of the portrayed globalization; or rather the extent to which, what is being labelled globalization, is actually an internal European (and in many ways only a

93 See for instance Fabbrini 2002; Weitkunat 2002; Naim 2002; Harris 2002/3; Ajami 2003; Ceaser 2003; Johnson 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2003; Grünbaum 2003; Markovits 2005, all of whom are characterized by a very one-sided reading of European sources and a missing or insufficient definition of ‘anti-Americanism’.

94 Liberal Americans share the ‘European’ critique, for instance Benjamin Barber: “The United States, destiny’s longtime darling, is on a collision course with history … America is failing to read the message of mandatory interdependence that defines the new twenty-first-century world” (2004: 33). And one can find ‘conservative’ Europeans supporting the ‘American’ line.
West European) experience and phenomenon, that may have little or no bearing on other countries and regions. If the described globalization is only or primarily a European phenomenon, there may be less reason for the European critique of the US. They operate then legitimately and effectively, according to modern and still valid conceptions of state sovereignty and national interests. This debate between Europe and America, or rather the European debate on us and America is a valuable prism for understanding liberal globalism, because here are expressed ideas about what Europe is and isn’t. My thesis is that the European liberal critique of American foreign policy has less to do with American practice than with liberal ideas about the nature of the international first formulated in the Enlightenment and now reproduced in Europe. The aim below is to understand European liberal internationalism or globalism through its exclusion of the ‘barbaric other’ from the monarchic state to the US. In a strange twist of positions, America is now becoming the ‘other’ of the emerging Europe, just as Europe itself once served as the negative inspiration of the emerging US (there are of course also other ‘others’, see Diez 2004).

America is the new barbarian in European liberal discourse. The defining characteristic of this demarcation is the difference between arbitrariness and predictability. The barbaric state is decisionistic or discretionary, whereas the civilized state is rule-bounded. Arbitrariness is unpredictable, motivated by passions and hidden desires; it is secretive, sudden and violent. This is where the supreme political decisions are made since nothing is given. The opposite of arbitrariness is the regulated and benign. The field of possibility is narrowed beforehand and the result can in principle be predicted. This is government by laws rather than people, by rules rather than decisions. The political is submitted to juridification and administration, until it ideally overcomes the political decision altogether. Civilized rule becomes now the counter image to American foreign (and domestic) politics. When the American foreign secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, divided Europe up into the ‘old’ anti-American and the ‘new’ pro-American Europe (Pertti 2004), major parts of the European liberal intelligentsia responded by saying, that is was the US, with its power-politics, that was old-fashioned; and that it was Europe, as EU and ‘governance beyond the nation-state’, that usher in a new epoch. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (January 24, 2003) collected a number of responses from French and German intellectuals. Peter Sloterdijk wrote under the heading ‘Postheroische Politik’, that it is “the advanced fraction of the West which, taught by the lessons of the twentieth century, has turned to a post-heroic cultural modus – and a corresponding politics; this is contrary to the US who remain stuck in the conventions of heroism”. The great self-stylized provocateur, who in a number of questions sees himself in opposition to his German or even
modern age, is here in perfect harmony with his adversary from the ‘Menschenpark’-debate, Jürgen Habermas, who under the heading ‘Neue Welt Europa’ wrote, that in Germany/Europe:

… a normative way of thinking has replaced old mentalities. It’s a way of thinking opposed to the realpolitical cynicism of the hard-boiled, the conservative culture critique of the shrewd and the anthropological pessimism which relies on power and power-holding institutions. It’s a strange turn of fronts when Rumsfeld names this new Europe as ‘the old’.

Luc Bondy, head of the Wiener-festspiele, summarizes under the heading ‘Vive l’Europe’ the idea that forms the background for the angry European responses: ”When mister Rumsfeld now contemptedly says that the peace-seeking is ‘the old Europe’, then he is actually honouring us. When the old Europe, who knew war, now has the reason and good sense, to no longer want war, then I’m all for this old Europe, which is the new Europe”. The attack on ’old Europe’ gets inverted to a defence for ’New Europe’, as we, for instance, see Derrida attempt: “My reaction can be stated short: I find such expressions shocking, scandalous and telling. It’s telling for the ignorance of what Europe was, what it is and what it will become. Unwillingly, the words of the American defence minister make it clear just how urgent the European unification is.” Today, one also see attempts to ’sell’ the European project as a counter-force to American hegemony. This is evident in a controversial speech by the former Danish foreign secretary, the social democrat Mogens Lykketoft, who in august 2001 spoke about ‘The Future of Europe’ and about the important and lasting ties between Europe and the US, only to accentuate their different approaches to politics and power as an argument for European unity: ”The disorder of the world is marked by a lack of sufficiently strong global organisations and agreements – and by the existence of only one super power, which currently is being governed by a very strong belief in the market forces and the national interests”. Europe is to counter the new American isolationism and its “rejection of agreements, which go against narrow national economic interests” (Lykketoft 2001).

The US is the new barbaric state – in a recent interview David Held called America ‘the greatest rogue state in the world’ (Thorup & Sørensen 2004). This imagery is also present in other descriptions of American politics and the American president in European debates: It is Wild West, shoot-first, the Texan mad man, the hillbilly-approach to foreign policy. These are images of an irrational, dangerous behaviour from a bygone age. But it is not anti-Americanism. It is a European liberal dichotomy between barbaric, unpredictable and violent states on the one side and civilized, peaceful and predictable states on the other.
The American conservative Robert Kagan is right, when he in his much discussed article ‘Weakness and Power’ (2002), later book *Paradise and Power* (2003a) and electronically published afterword (2003b)writes, that this division between Europe and the US is not a temporary phenomenon caused by the election of a very un-European American president, George W. Bush right after a supposedly European-like American president, Bill Clinton; and I think, he is right to say that this transatlantic rift will not heal any time soon.

Kagan puts forward three theses, one general and two historical, to explain the growing divide. First the general and most important thesis: power shapes one’s view of the world. There is a world of difference in how one sees the world, its problems and solutions, depending on how much power one command. There is, in the words of Kagan, a psychology for the weak and another for the strong. If you walk around in the woods armed only with a knife, then an encounter with a bear will probably not result in you attacking it. You choose to see its lurking around in the woods as an acceptable risk. If, on the other hand, you’re armed with a gun then you will probably not risk a later attack, so you kill the bear. This is also Kagan’s explanation of the different approaches to Iraq. Europe – armed with less than a knife – chose to see Saddam Hussein’s regime and his possible possession of weapons of mass destruction as an acceptable risk, since the Europeans had no (military) way of dealing with Iraq. The US, on the other hand, had the means and, therefore, also the will. Kagan’s claim is that, when there are nails, and you have a hammer, the temptation to hit them is just too great to resist. But without a hammer, they are just nails. This general thesis is combined with a second thesis of a power shift between Europe and the US. When the European powers were globally dominant, they spoke openly about reason of state and power politics; they had no intention of being limited by international law. It was the weaker part, the US, which appealed to the law. Today, Europe is the weak power and is therefore spokesman for multilateralism, international law, governance rather than governing, and global binding agreements and institutions. Those are the instruments of the weak. Kagan’s third thesis is that the European dismissal of power politics – which is a result of the global power shift – has been reinforced by the post-WW2 American protection of the Europeans from the realities of anarchy. American power

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95 The arguments were already presented years before, see Kagan 1998. See also Kagan 2003c on American legitimacy. For the debate on Kagan in Europe see for instance Seidenfaden 2003; Runciman 2003; Bertram 2003; Balibar 2003b; Lukes 2003; Zaretsky 2003.

96 In the electronically published afterword (which seems to be written for his neoconservative friend), he mentions several places that the European critique is caused by the painful discovery that it is no longer a superpower or have any noticeable influence upon the remaining superpower (2003b: 117-120, 147-9).
has misled the Europeans to think that they can do without power. According to Kagan, Europeans are unwilling to admit that their Kantian peace is dependent upon US Hobbesian power logic. Despite his references to the Enlightenment as the background for the dismissal of power politics, Kagan still claims, that it is not these values and ideas but the relative strength that determines the view and use of (military) power as an instrument of politics. He claims it is no rooted or traditional conception in European history but the result of recent history. It is the claim of this dissertation that a too one-sided focus on changes in the relative strength doesn’t explain the nature and content of the European-liberal view of international politics in the post-war era. Kagan undoubtedly has a valid point in his insistence, that it is the American nuclear umbrella, which has allowed European liberalism to dismiss force and war as legitimate means of politics, but it doesn’t explain the ways and explanations of contemporary European liberalism which, on the contrary, is a reproduction of the Enlightenment’s hopes, concepts and images. It is the re-continuation of a legacy and a project, which was broken off or derailed by nationalism, imperialism and the nation-state. Kagan tells part of the story, but he doesn’t seem to fully understand the origin or depth of the liberal European mistrust of arbitrary power. Kagan’s perspective cannot explain, why contemporary European liberalism has taken the form it has; why it insists on post-nation state sovereignty. For European liberals, unilateralism is the dangerous approach to foreign politics and the US is the dangerous power in global politics, precisely because they stick to a state-centric self-understanding and because they refer to reason of state and national interest as legitimization of their foreign policy.

*Postmodern Europe: Robert Cooper*

This discussion has been taken up by the thinker, Kagan (2003a: 74-5) believes, is the primary source of Tony Blair’s loyalty towards the US: Robert Cooper. 97 Cooper has been leading foreign policy adviser to Blair, including special advisor on Afghanistan, and is now general director of foreign policy in the EU’s Council of Ministers, and he is the author of a controversial article on liberal imperialism from 2002, which is based on material from an earlier article from 1993 and from a book, *The Post-Modern State and the World*, written in 1996 and revised four years later and which was expanded into another book, *The Breaking of Nations* in 2003. 98 Neither books nor

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97 Cooper returns the favour: “So the soft power of the European Union is a remarkable success; but ultimately this order was based on hard power” (2004: 176). He does however also, directly and indirectly, criticize Kagan, see especially Copper 2003: part 3.

98 In a panel debate he denied being an advocate of liberal imperialism: “I don’t think you can be a liberal and run an empire at the same time. Empire requires control.” He also has an interesting differentiation between hegemony and imperialism: “Nor do I think America’s aim is to be an empire. America’s aim is to be a hegemon. A hegemon aims to
articles are about the US, but one recognizes the way of thinking in dichotomies between peaceful and barbaric states, which we have seen earlier. Discussion of his work will shed light on that change in European liberalism, which has been one of the driving forces in the transatlantic divide. Cooper distinguishes between postmodern, modern, and premodern states. Where liberalism earlier put the demarcation line between civilized and barbaric at the difference between modern and premodern, it has now been shifted to the boundary between the postmodern state and the other two forms of statehood. As indicated by its name, the postmodern state is the state that has left its modern form, which, according to Cooper, was characterized by the principle of balance of power in its relationship to other European nation states and by an imperialistic urge towards non-European states. He opens his article by writing in continuation of Fukuyama:

In 1989 the political systems of three centuries came to an end in Europe: the balance of power and the imperial urge. That year marked not just the end of the Cold War, but also, and more significantly, the end of a state system in Europe which dated from the Thirty Years War. (2002a: 11; see also 2000: 7, 15; 2003: 3)

This is a European development. The rest of the world is – as also Fukuyama believes – still caught up in a modern world of territorial jealous nation states or in the premodern world of failed states. The modern states, he writes, behaves like states have always done and operates by Machiavellian principles of reason of state. The premodern states are only states by name (and international recognition). Here rages a Hobbesian war of all against all. With the end of the imperialistic urge, the unfit post-colonial states fall into the premodern world, as there is no longer anyone to ‘rescue’ them from themselves. The postmodern state, on the other hand, is secure in its statehood but does not think of security and sovereignty in national terms; it has dissolved the distinctions between in/out and domestic/foreign; and it rejects the use of force as a policy-instrument. The postmodern state does not pursue national self-interest; it does not view the world through geopolitical lenses; on the contrary, it seeks to further global common interests formulated through apolitical normative imperatives (1993: 510-13; 2000: 15-23, 43; 2003: 26-36). The postmodern state is a state that in its foreign policy does not act like a traditional state but rather like an armed Oxfam. The postmodern state is not a state in the classical sense. Therefore, its external actions cannot be understood as driven by reasons of state. Cooper is here, as in much of his argument, in close agreement with control the foreign policy of other countries; an empire aims to control the domestic policy. A hegemon operates on the basis that ‘he may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch’, an empire aims to change the laws, the systems, the government, democracy, and all that kind of thing. Basically I think America is a hegemon rather than an imperial power or would like to be” (both in Portillo 2003).
Enlightenment-liberalism, who also thought that their age had moved beyond narrow interests and war. They are pacific, enlightened and motivated by universal standards of morality rather than self-interest. ‘Postmodern imperialism’, which is the closest Cooper comes to acknowledging the postmodern state’s use of violence, is, therefore, void of national interest. Its motives are purely humanitarian. There is neither desire for control and conquest nor passion for war and enmity. Cooper does not draw the conclusion himself (although all his material points in that direction): Europe constitutes the postmodern, US and a number of industrialized (and maybe) semi-despotic regimes such as India, Pakistan, Brasil, and China constitute the modern and the number of failed states such as Afghanistan and Somalia constitute the premodern. The interesting thing for this article is, of course, the position of the US – ‘the more doubtful case’. All the material in Cooper’s argument points toward the US as an essentially modern state, which is one of the reasons for my interest in Cooper. In continuation of Cooper’s argument, but apparently without his consent, we can say that the US is barbaric because of its outdated modernity.

The thing to notice is, that the admission criteria for being considered civilized has been raised; Cooper says straight out: ”both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats” (2002a: 15). They pose threats, because they’re still stuck in the moral and political quagmire of nation statehood. He also gives a much sharper formulation of his argument. He says: ”there is a zone of safety in Europe, and outside it a zone of danger and a zone of chaos” (2000: 34; 2003: 55). The modern nation state is a danger. It is basically still (or rather: now) barbaric, because it is either a sovereign nation state or striving to become so. It is accordingly dangerous, as Hobbes (1985: 187) said, “because of their Independency … [they stand] in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another”. In the 2003 book, he notices something about the modern state:

Any of these [modern] countries could, if things went badly wrong for them, revert to a pre-modern state. But it could be equally alarming if things went right for them. The establishment of internal cohesion has often been the prelude to external expansion … In the modern world, it is the successful states that are potentially dangerous. (2003: 24)

So, the modern state is now dangerous whether weak or strong. Whereas the modern state is ‘very old-fashioned’ (2003: 22) and potentially dangerous, it is obvious, that Cooper primarily fears the premodern world. It is no coincidence that his 2003 book has the subtitle Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century – postmodern order and premodern chaos. Not much room or attention for the

99 For a similar division of the world (with reference to Cooper) that includes America in the pacific camp, Nye 2004.
modern nation state. As a distant echo from Constant and Bentham, he localizes the emergence of both the premodern and the postmodern state in the fact that: "A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer" (2002a: 14); and exactly like Bentham, he reduces this ‘basic fact’ to the West European countries (he does, however, mention Canada and Japan as postmodern states, 2000: 29-30; 2002a: 15):

The US is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity and desirability of interdependence or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference to the same extent as most European governments now do. (2000: 29; see also 1993: 512-3; 2002a: 15; 2003: 44-50)

There are a number of problems with Cooper’s reading of the state history. First and foremost: Which are the transformative forces? In other word, what is it that unites (Western) Europe with Japan and Canada? It can hardly be 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, since Canada has almost always behaved ‘postmodern’ and Japan certainly has since 1945. Cooper has the same problem, as for instance Habermas and other ‘cosmopolitan Europeans’: How can a European experience of a 20. century ‘thirty years war’ 1914-45 (2000: 7-8) be or become a universal transformative experience?

Cooper offers three explanations, which do not seem to be entirely compatible. The first is as already mentioned 1989. The second lies about 40 years before in the signing of two treaties: The treaty of Rome and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which starts off postmodern Europe. What these treaties signal, according to Cooper, who writes in perfect extension of the Enlightenment liberalism is, ”that ‘the world’s grown honest’. A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or to conquer … It is not the Coal and Steel authority … that has kept the countries of Europe from fighting each other, but the fact that they did not want to do so” (2000: 24 & 25-6). Notice that, again, the ‘honest world’ is European. Cooper says, as do Habermas, that the treaties embed a European dismissal of power politics and war as a result of the horrors of WW2. The problem is why modern politics were dismissed and why the dismissal took the form it did. Cooper’s explanation of this question is hardly present and certainly not convincing. There is a further problem with this second explanation, which becomes apparent, when he starts elaborating it. The Rome and CFE treaties are only part of a larger group of postmodern institutions, which are not limited to Europe or the West. How and why modern or even premodern states have taken active part in these institutions is not explained. Equally dissatisfying is his third explanation, which repeats a classical figure that can be found from Smith and Marx to
Manuel Castells: Changes in the economic system effect changes in the political system. Cooper asks: "Is it fanciful to identify (loosely) the three stages of states development with three types of economy: agricultural in the pre-modern, industrial mass production in the modern, and the post-industrial service and information economy with the post-modern state?" (2000: 31; 2003: 51).

Michael A. Peters (2002; 2003) writes in a lucid critique of Cooper, that what we see here is a strange and twisted synchronicity between economics and politics. If the relationship between economics and politics is right, then the US with its highly developed IT-industry ought to be the exemplary picture of the postmodern state; Europe (and especially after the enlargement with 10 agricultural and heavy industry countries) ought to remain modern; and most of the modern states such as India (and perhaps China) ought to be premodern. In the final instance, one must conclude that Cooper’s story rests more on a classical liberal idea of the international and Europe than on an analysis of the same; more on an idea of economic pacifism and the European overcoming of national prejudice and interest, more on a dichotomy between Europe and the rest of the world, than on an analysis of structural and political transformations.

For Western Europe the actual postmodern era began in 1989. The time of the Cold War was, according to Cooper, characterized by an internal postmodernity in the West European space, whereas it externally was dominated by realist, modern security concerns. Postmodern internally, modern externally. 1989 signals the end to this division and the complete postmodernization: “We are post-modern states living in a post-modern continent” (2000: 33). But if all that has changed is that the postmodern zone has been moved eastwards and that one enemy is gone, is that really then sufficient to qualify as the making of an entirely new state form? The thing is namely, that the world outside Europe is still modern or premodern, as his 2003-book is all about. This is exactly why he caused a minor scandal: He advocated for a postmodern approach internally but a basically modern one externally. The dichotomy persists. Its field of operation has only moved. Cooper is refreshing in his honesty and chilling in its consequences, when he writes:

Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with the more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the 19th century world of ‘every state for itself’. Among ourselves we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. (2002a: 16, see also 2002b)
But all he really does is to reproduce the ‘classical’ or modern European distinction between the civilized Europe and the barbaric outside. And he reproduces the bloody doctrine of two different sets of policy and military practice that made almost the entire non-European part of the world, the borderland, to a legal and political wasteland, which could be conquered, used and abused at the discretion of the first European, who sat foot on ‘uninhabited land’, precisely because the rest of the world weren’t modern (state-ordered) in the European way (Koskenniemi 2001; Salter 2002; Constantinou 2004: chap. 2). Cooper is not a fringe liberal; perhaps just a more honest or outspoken one. We’ll see more examples of the same dualism between the West and the Rest in later parts of this chapter, and we also saw it previously in Castells and Habermas. As Brett Bowden says:

It is difficult to deny that there are parallels between the present and the past in terms of a division of the world into civilized and uncivilized spheres. For it is apparent that many contemporary Western theorists, commentators, and political practitioners continue to hold to a division of the world into different shades of civilization. As with the classical standard, the current measure of civilization revolves around the capacity of non-Western states to govern themselves in such a manner that they can engage with the West on terms of its making. (2004: 62)

Cooper is naming the premodern world a borderland beyond the line, where civilized rules and norms do no apply. The dissolved distinctions between in/out, foreign/domestic, which allegedly characterize a postmodern state, only applies to its relations with other postmodern states. The distinctions are, actually, reaffirmed in relations with modern and premodern states.

**America is Old Europe: Will Hutton and Habermas**

We now direct the discussion to two prominent European liberals and their construction of America as ‘the other’ of Europe: Will Hutton and Habermas. Hutton is commentator in the Observer and author of the acclaimed *The State We’re In*. I’ll concentrate on *The World We’re In* (2002), which has the opposition between the US and the EU as its point of focus. The not so hidden purpose of the book is to convince the EU-sceptic British electorate of the necessity of a deeper integration with the EU. This he does through a division of the political spectrum into two opposing camps: The conservatives and the liberals. The conservative position is economically neoliberal but politically nationalist. The liberal position is economically social democratic and politically (for lack of a better word) world open. The American conservatism has only a faint resemblance with the European civilization’s core values, whereas the American liberalism is ”the creed that advocates a rational, universal infrastructure of justice built on complex trade-offs between liberty,
solidarity and equality – and this is sufficiently near European conceptions of liberalism for the term to work in both contexts” (2002: 4). So, a liberalism rooted in the Enlightenment is common ground for Europe and the US, whereas conservatism is an American invention, which basically is (and should remain) foreign for European political practice and theory. Chapter seven of his book states that the politics of Great Britain suffers under an American ‘bear-hug’ that makes domestic politics neoliberal and foreign politics militaristic. These are obviously foreign influences unknown to native European soil. Europe is – as also Habermas does – portrayed as inherently liberal in a social democratic kind of way. ‘Conservatism’ – neoliberalism and militarism – is foreign import. The problem is that the conservatives in America are giving the wrong answers to the challenges of globalization. They rely on superior military power to further their narrow national interests. They refuse to be part of international agreements and institutions but demand it of others; they protect their national markets but demand unhindered market access to other countries; and they refuse to pool their sovereignty in multilateral institutions and processes: "What has changed since the collapse of communism and the triumph of conservatism is that the US increasingly believes that there is one set of rules for it and its nationals, and another for the rest of the world” (2002: 184-5). Hutton comes very close to describing American foreign policy as barbaric or animal like. They have today an ‘instinctive unilateralism’ (2002: 10, 179, 183); they rely on ‘brutish power’ (2002: 352); the conservative America constitutes a ‘threat’ (2002: 353); its foreign policy is ‘an eccentric, idiosyncratic creed’ which is ultimately ‘dangerous’ (2002: 352, 353, 48). Contemporary American foreign policy is consequently pre-rational and based on only passions and force. It is the politics of the old world. Unilateralism is suspicious, if not outright dangerous, in its rebellion against the actual order of the world. The American approach to foreign policy is ‘inherently pregnant with tension and ultimately unsustainable’ (2002: 352). Europe on the other hand has ‘a more enlightened view of the global interest’; It can and will offer the world ‘genuine multilateral leadership in the search for securing global public goods’; “The EU is demonstrating how interdependence can be managed and nurtured” (2002: 324, 2, 353). He awaits impatiently the day, America reaffirms its right policy, the liberal: ”Until then, Europe stands alone” (2002: 370).

The same idea of America and EU can be found in Habermas, who in the last couple of years has grown increasingly fond of the EU and increasingly sceptical of America. The immediate occasion may have been the Bush-administration but the cause is of a much more fundamental character. The

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100 It may be a bit unfair, but I can’t help quote Hutton himself in his debate with Giddens about globalization where he states: “civilizations like the US or Europe are much too complex to fall into simple Manichean categories in which one largely ‘good’ and the other largely ‘bad’” (Giddens & Hutton 2000: 16).
most important document is ‘Unsere Erneuerung. Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas’ (co-signed by Jacques Derrida but obviously written by Habermas) printed in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Libération on May 31, 2003.\textsuperscript{101} It is not important because of its content (which was disappointingly well-known from Habermas’s other writings) but because of the fanfare by which, it was introduced, and because of the time of its publication right in the European discussion of the Iraq-war. Habermas had previously written: “With a view to the future of a highly stratified world society, we Europeans have a legitimate interest in getting our voice heard in an international concert, that is at present dominated by a vision quite different from ours” (2001c: 12). The views in the FAZ-article were occasioned but not shaped by the specific context of the Iraq-war. The important point of strife is, what vision that shall shape the world: International law or “the unilateral, world-ordering politics of a self-appointed hegemon” (2003a: 706).

The world has become too complex for the kind of traditional politics power politics, that America still insists upon. America has not learned the (European lesson) and represents, therefore, a dangerous ‘hegemonic unilateralism’; it is in opposition, not to what Europe is, but to what it shall become: A global domestic power. This is a ‘power’ “that also in its foreign policy remains assertive and proves that it is not only the number of military forces that counts in a complex world society but also the soft power of negotiations, political relations and economic advantages” (Habermas & Derrida 2003). The new global complexity reduces the utility of hard power and upgrades the importance of soft power, as we saw in the previous chapter.

In commentaries on the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, Habermas notes a difference between America and Britain on one side, who reaches back to ‘maxims of traditional power politics’, and a continental Europe that looks to a ‘cosmopolitan order’ (2001c: 7; 2002a; 2002b: 176; 2003a: 703-4). It is this dichotomy, which makes him write Britain out of (core) Europe. Péter Esterházy (2005) has in a comment on the ‘Unsere Erneuerung’-piece named: ‘How big is the European dwarf?’ with great humour and insight pierced through the idea of the special historical circumstances that creates a ‘core Europe’ in which for instance the Central- and Eastern European countries are excluded. Jan-Werner Müller (2000: 109) notes very perceptively that:

\begin{quote}
Habermas showed a marked lack of interest in the East German revolution. He somewhat dismissively called the East German and the East European revolutions nachholend, i.e. revolutions to catch up with the West and the ideas of 1789. Habermas emphasized that ‘the catching up revolution does not throw any new light on our old problems’.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{101} The headline comes from the editors of FAZ. The original title was ‘Der 15. Februar oder: was die Europäer verbindet – Plädoyer für eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik – zunächst in Kerneuropa’ (Habermas 2004a: 29-30).
This makes it interesting, that Habermas says: “The Europe of today grew out of the experiences of the totalitarian regime of the twentieth century and from Holocaust” (Habermas & Derrida 2003); that is from the experience of one totalitarian regime – the Nazi-regime – and not also the other – the communist. Europe effectively becomes Western Europe – even reduced to Germany, France and the Benelux-countries (Lucke 2004: 54). The same can be said about his description of what is common European (2001c: 19-21; Habermas & Derrida 2003). Here Europe is basically reduced to the social democratic welfare states of Northern Europe (Kaube 2005: 56).

In connection with the Kosovo-conflict, Habermas demonstrated an appreciation for the American efforts to further human rights as part of their idealistic agenda (1999b). In 2003, the argument changes a bit, but a significant bit. He seems to be very clearly sensing the hijacking of this idealism by the neoconservatives who take the idea and run – or rather fly with supersonic speed to some third world country for the forceful implementation of Wilsonian-Kantian ideals. The neoconservatives have a revolutionary agenda for spreading liberal values by force and the breaking of international law if necessary. The result of this is that “the normative authority of the United States of America lies in ruins” (2003a: 703). The danger from the new American idealistic agenda is its moralization of foreign policy rather than its juridification. These are, according to a recent speech by Habermas (2004b), the two opposing views about global order today. To finish of, we may want to ‘rescue’ Habermas’s and Derrida’s text by interpreting it as a meta-text on the dangers of the political, i.e. enemy construction. For what we see is a rather crude differentiation between the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon powers, which lays all blame on one side and all right (and future) on the other (Habermas 2004d). This construction of friend and enemy is so ‘Schmittian’, that we perhaps should view the text as an ironic comment on the kind of enmity construction, which Habermas has done so much to criticize and debunk in its nation state form, and as a warning on how enmity (and thereby the political in a Schmittian sense) may pop up when we least expect it, even in the postnational constellation?

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102 “… in order to characterize the demise of the Socialist regimes in 1990, Habermas coined the term ‘catch-up revolution’: the West (Western liberal democracy) has nothing to learn from the Eastern European Communist experience, since in 1990, these countries simply caught up with the social development of the Western liberal-democratic regimes. Habermas thereby writes off this experience as simply accidental, denying any fundamental structural relationship between Western democracy and the rise of ‘totalitarianism’ – any notion that ‘totalitarianism’ is a symptom of the inner tensions of the democratic project itself” (Žižek 2002c: 299).

103 The same can be said of a number of other liberals, for instance Castells 2000b: chap. 5; 2000e; 2004.
The critique of America in European liberal globalization discourse testifies to a new confidence in European liberalism, which tends toward a claim of moral superiority and the dis-legitimization of every political form other than the liberal-democratic, and now also postmodern, one. Europe is the post-political, post-historical and post-belligerent island in a roaring sea of politics, war and disorder. Before turning to the liberal globalist approach to war and disorder in chapter 8, we’ll concentrate on the internal figuration of the postmodern state, cosmopolitanism and its construction of the nationalist other (and the anti-cosmopolitan construction of the cosmopolitan other).

II. New Cosmopolitanism and its Critics

If patriotism, Samuel Johnson remarked, is the last refuge of a scoundrel, so post-nationalism and its accompanying disdain for the nationalist emotions of others, may be the last refuge of the cosmopolitan. (Ignatieff 1994: 11)

It’s not uncommon to divide political philosophies into those with ‘roots’ and those with ‘wings’. Those with roots emphasize the concrete, the place, the particular and singular, the national, the always already situated. They criticize those with wings for denying the rootedness of human existence. Those with wings, on the other hand, criticize those with roots for being narrow-minded, limited in outlook and imagination, prejudiced and stubbornly stationary. They emphasize freedom and the universal, the stepping over borders and limitations, the universal and the choice; movement and changeability are their defining characteristics of man. The cosmopolite has always been accused of having all wings and no roots. It is, allegedly, the flight of the elite away from the committing burdens and limitations of community. It is the rejection of the rich of their (tax and solidarity) obligations. It is the rhetorically elegant contempt of the common people. It is the possibilities for the few at the expense of the many. It is the good life for a minority and the nightmare for the majority. The claim is, that they exchange their national belonging, with what Craig Calhoun (2002) wonderfully calls ‘the class consciousness of frequent travellers’. The globalization debate has rekindled both the cosmopolite and the anti-cosmopolite.

I want to argue that the problem with the new cosmopolitanism is not any betrayal of nation and democracy but its connection with discourses of the ‘new state’, the ‘new economy’ and the ‘new wars’ in ways, that tend to make it into the legitimating creed of state and power transformation, rather than their critique. Cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolite are old terms and is one of the great traditions of European political and moral thought. This story, or the story of anti-cosmopolitanism,
will not be retold here.\textsuperscript{104} Just a few quotes to illustrate how cosmopolitanism is often viewed – even by those whom one should assume were its friends. Bhiku Parekh writes that:

Cosmopolitanism ignores special ties and attachments to one’s community, is too abstract to generate the emotional and moral energy needed to live up to its austere imperatives, and can also easily become an excuse for ignoring the well-being of the community one knows and can directly influence in the name of an unrealistic pursuit of the abstract ideal of universal well-being. This is bad in itself but also has the further consequence of provoking a defensive reaction in the form of narrow nationalism. (2003: 12)

Anthony Pagden calls it “a luxury that only aristocracies of one kind or another can really afford” (2002: 173). Still earlier, the dictionary of the French Académie defined a cosmopolitan as: “He who does not adopt a country. A cosmopolitan is not a good citizen” (quoted from Kleingeld 2003: 299-300). Even Kant wrote of his fellow Germans, that they “have no national pride, and are too cosmopolitanism to be deeply attached to their homeland” (quoted from Malcolmson 1998: 238). Rousseau thought that cosmopolitanism was just an excuse for not caring about one’s country men. In the Geneva-edition of the \textit{Du Contrat social}, he writes: “Certain it is that the word \textit{mankind} offers the mind only a purely collective idea which does not assume any real unity among the individuals who constitute it” (1997b: 155). Reinhart Koselleck (1988: 135) quotes a Ernst August Anton von Göchhausen who in 1786 wrote: “World citizenship. What does it mean? You are either a citizen or you are a rebel. There is no third choice”. This is the suspicion or allegation that cosmopolitanism has always had to live with and defend against. Now is no different. Christopher Lasch, combining images of cosmopolitan capital and elites, wrote that:

In the borderless global economy, money has lost its links to nationality … The privileged classes in Los Angeles feel more kinship with their counterparts in Japan, Singapore, and Korea than with most of their countrymen. This detachment from the state means they regard themselves as ‘world citizens’ without any of the normal obligations of national citizenship. They no longer pay their share of taxes or contribute to democratic life. (quoted from Vertovec & Cohen 2002: 6)

\textsuperscript{104} Aspects of the story are told in Harris 1927; Schlereth 1977; Heater 1996; Murphy 1999; O’Brien 1997; Kleingeld 1999; Scheffler 1999; Pagden 2000; Kleingeld & Brown 2002; Kaufmann 2003. A problem confronting cosmopolitanism is the elusiveness or plurality of its meaning and of what it means and takes to be a cosmopolitan (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge & Chakrabarty 2000; Vertovec & Cohen 2002; Skrbis, Kendall & Woodward 2004). A small example of the confusion is from an article on preventive war by Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, who first calls their position cosmopolitan because “it takes the human rights of all persons seriously” (2004: 4), but a little later they qualify it as a “a liberal form of cosmopolitanism, since it emphasizes the basic human rights of all persons” (2004: 4, note 7). Basic human rights is then both the qualifier for liberalism and cosmopolitanism.
These are all images of rootlessness. Cosmopolitanism is the philosophy and practice of going beyond the border. This section explores another ‘assault’ on the political, this time in modern cosmopolitanism, which is one of the most radical forms of liberal globalism, being both liberal and post-liberal; liberal in its values and assumptions – not least in its anti-political assumptions, but also post-liberal in its critique of both liberal internationalism, which is to be superseded by a cosmopolitan re-organization and of free-market capitalism, said to endanger social-liberal or social democratic achievements. The discussion will focus on modern cosmopolitanism and its critics, but attempt no exhaustive or systematic elaboration of cosmopolitan ideas and ideals. The object is cosmopolitanism’s critique of nation state modernity and its distinctions.

Chaosopholis or the World as a City

The core of cosmopolitanism is a suspicion of the particular – the city-state, the nation, the race, the class etc. From its inception and till today, its driving force has been a critique of enclosure, of limited horizons and possibilities, of limits to knowledge and movement, of the naming of the enemy and the obviousness of home and belonging (Schlereth 1977: xiii; Heater 1996: 72-3; Anderson 1998: 267). The claim of one humanity is to be understood as a critical comment on all the attempts to divide up mankind into warring factions. Cosmopolitanism attacks the familiarity and unquestioned obviousness of borders, the alleged naturalness of demarcations and divisions. The cosmopolite, as an ideal type, fears discourses of firmness, demarcations and purity; is always curious and delighted to find people living differently than herself; always eager to know what lies behind the next mountain pass, anxious to meet them and that, which at present lies beyond the horizon. The deep source of the cosmopolite’s longing and discontent is her refusal to be limited by contingency. The ‘coincidental’ place of birth and upbringing is not allowed to dictate the cosmopolite’s being. One is always already that much more. The cosmopolite is therefore to be understood as an explorer of the diversity of the world, living on and off the plurality (this is why Roger Scruton can write that “the cosmopolitan is often seen as a kind of parasite, who depends upon the quotidian lives of others to create various local flavours and identities in which he dabbles”, quoted from Waldron 2000: 227). Cosmopolitanism is constantly stepping over the boundaries, which people find obvious, natural and comforting; constantly trying to make the world – of each person and in its entirety – larger than many people find pleasant, possible and secure.

The concept of cosmopolis hints at ‘world city’ or ‘the world as a city’; and that expresses pretty accurate the picture of cosmopolis in both its adherents and critics. The world as a city evokes
images and hopes of an exciting world of endless opportunities in some and of sin and degradation in others. The cosmopolite – being urban and metropolitan – wants the world as a city filled with opportunities and change, the labyrinthic swarm of the bazaar and the plurality of human existence. Here, everybody is free to express and change their individuality, to ‘shop’ in the warehouse of human expressions. Everything is in flux; everything is for offer. The world as a city is the opposite of the slowness and limitations of the countryside, of the world as village or city-state. The anti-cosmopolite, on the other hand, despises the world as a city. It is the ‘home’ of the impersonal, the abstract and the debased. Here, everything, even humans, is for sale. Life is depraved, unsubstantial and unserious. It is the place of both the market and the brothel. This opposition to the world as a city is part of a grander critique of modernity – modernity as expressing the ‘urbanization’ of life. It is a critique, which questions the levelling, banalization and vulgarization of modern life and which rebels against the abandonment of all differentiations and hierarchies. The city as the embodiment of decadence is an old one (i.e. Popper’s description of Plato) and it has been steadily reinforced with various Blut und Boden-manifestations from the Cambodian Khmer Rouge or the Chinese Cultural Revolution to the Nazi peasant romanticism or Al-Qaeda’s attack on ‘the greatest city in the world’, New York: “The image of the metropolis as a whore is not just a reflection of female sexuality, so feared and loathed by puritans such as Mohammed Atta, but also a comment on a society that revolves around trade. In the city, conceived as a giant marketplace, everything and everyone is for sale” (Buruma & Margalit 2004: 18; remember Rousseau’s description of the feminized Parisians in chapter 4). Salman Rushdie has, in a reflection on the terrorist attacks on 9/11, expressed the antipathy to the West, to the city, to modernity, here personified in New York:

New York is the beating heart of the visible world, tough-talking, spirit-dazzling, Walt Whitman’s ‘city of orgies, walks and joys’, his ‘proud and passionate city – mottlesome, mad, extravagant city!’ … Such people are against, to offer just a brief list, freedom of speech, a multi-party political system, universal adult suffrage, accountable government, Jews, homosexuals, women’s rights, pluralism, secularism, short skirts, dancing, beardlessness, evolution theory, sex. (2001)

It is no coincidence that fundamentalist Christian groups in America could agree with fundamentalist Muslims in calling it ‘Jew York’; a classic anti-Semitism, which combines the un-rooted capital, the money- and power-grabbing Jew with images of the depraved metropol (or that they can agree upon a counter-mobilization against the new global social agendas such as family-planning, see Isaac 1999; Antonio 2000; Herman 2001). One shouldn’t forget that both the Nazi and Soviet regimes branded the Jews ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ (Fine & Cohen 2002:146). As quoted in a
previous chapter, modernity installs what Taguieff names ‘the in-between and the ’neither this nor that,’ the neutral and the mixed, the at-home-nowhere and the at-home-everywhere, the nomad and the cosmopolitan as normative types” (1997: 162). It is against this equalization of sexes, ages, races, nations, states, ranks, classes etc., that anti-cosmopolitanism finds it motivation as part of a larger counter-modern critique. This is also why there is a strong inner connection between, on the one hand, cosmopolitanism and human rights, and, on the other, anti-cosmopolitanism and the opposition to human rights. As already quoted, Joseph de Maistre said:

The Constitution of 1795, like its predecessors, was made for man. But there is no such thing as man in the world. In my lifetime I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc.; thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never in my life met him; if he exists, he is unknown to me. (1974: 97)

Edmund Burke alleged something similar and also today we find a similarity between anti-cosmopolitanism and opposition to human rights in parts of what is called ‘the new right’ (i.e. Krarup 2000). It is informed by an opposition to the borderless, in whatever form the borders may take, not least as national sovereignty. This also means that the critique has historically specific expressions: misogyny, racism, fear and hatred of the ‘dangerous classes’, mass critique, anti-Semitism, nationalism, cultural criticism etc. Parts of these critiques are reproduced in the history of anti-cosmopolitanism but the critiques are, of course, not reducible to anti-cosmopolitanism. One thing, however, is permanent: Borders versus their crossing. The cosmopolite insists on transcending the limitations of borders; its critics insist on the necessity and continuity of the border. The anti-cosmopolite insists that the borderless existence – as cosmopolitanism, gender-equality, race equality, mass democracy or whatever – will produce ‘perverse’ effects, as they overstep the boundaries of ‘true’ human existence; these perverse effects could be broken families, unruly classes (in society and school), ungovernable democracies, moral decline, lack of public virtue, the terror regime, Auschwitz etc.

Verena A. Conley (2002) has created a great concept for the world as a city: ‘Chaosmopolis’, where every form or shape is only temporary; where everything and everybody is floating; where nothing is fixed and everything could be different; where everything will be different. It is a world of constant renegotiations, endless reinventions of the self, and of ever fluctuating points of (dis)orientation. That also suggests one of the problems of cosmopolitanism: Its need for surplus – mentally and economically. The world as a city or chaosmopolis is confused, messy and demanding, and not everyone will feel safe or ‘at home’ in no-where-land. One cannot simply
dismiss the critique of cosmopolitanism, which describes it as elitist and even parasitical. Michael Ignatieff, a cosmopolitan himself, says at the beginning of his journey into the new nationalisms that, “Globalism in a post-imperial age only permits a post-nationalist consciousness for those cosmopolitans who are lucky enough to live in the wealthy West” (1994: 9). So, when Richard Rorty, another cosmopolite, in a critique of left intellectuals writes that, “this newly-acquired cultural cosmopolitanism is limited to the richest twenty-five percent of Americans” (1998: 85), then it needs to be taken serious as a manifest limitation of cosmopolitanism, as demarcating the borders of cosmopolis. This is also what one of its most outspoken proponents is saying, when he remarks: “Yet not even in today’s mass society – not even within the narrow confines of the western world – can the epithet ‘cosmopolitan’ be applied to the demos, the majority. In the era of the computer, a third of the inhabitants of out planet have never even used a telephone; cosmopolitanism remains the prerogative of an elite” (Archibugi 2002: 26). This is no small frontier and it puts the idea of a cosmopolitan society, future, man, globe … in question.
An updated version of the critique of elitist cosmopolitanism sees a global political and economic elite abandoning the local and limited, the all too known and ever more boring, the repetitive smallness of general living in favour of the global, exciting and profitable life in the fast lane. It is a well-known and widespread concern for the future of democracy, culture and welfare in a globalized age; and it’s a critique not only of regressive nationalists or ‘old labour’ but a more general worry of a widening gap between elite and people because the elite has been given the economic, political and technological opportunities to ‘cosmopoliticize’ themselves (i.e. Lasch 1995; Etzioni-Halevy 1999; Crouch 2000). This is definitely not how the new cosmopolitans view themselves and their project, but, as we discuss later, it may be contributing to just that.

Rooted Cosmopolitanism?
The negative side of cosmopolitanism is a philosophy of suspicion and with that almost always comes the danger of feeling morally superior. A trait that cosmopolites have often displayed: “The moralistic cosmopolitan … is not one who everywhere feels comfortable but who everywhere feels superior” (McConnell 1996: 82). Where former cosmopolitanisms were expressions of superiority and elitism, the new cosmopolitanism tries to take account of the critique of them as free-floating nomads in countries of settlers and as displaying selfish irresponsibility as a higher morality. Earlier forms of cosmopolitanism remained, first and foremost, an attitude to the world. Thomas Schlereth writes: “much of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism was more symbolic and theoretical than actual
and practical. Often it was only a highly subjective state of mind that sought to grasp the unity of mankind without, however, attempting to solve the relations of the part to the whole” (1977: xii). David Hollinger draws our attention to the point that the new cosmopolitanism is neither universalistic nor pluralistic:

For cosmopolitans, the diversity of humankind is a fact; for universalists it is a problem. Cosmopolitanism shares with universalism a suspicion of enclosures, but the cosmopolitan understands the necessity of enclosures in their capacity as contingent and provisionally bounded domains in which people can form intimate and sustaining relationships, and can indeed create diversity … Cosmopolitanism urges each individual and collective unit to absorb as much varied experience as it can, while retaining its capacity to achieve self-definition and to advance its own aims effectively. In this view, cosmopolitanism and universalism, while often united against common enemies, are now best distinguished. (2001: 239; see also Fine 2003 and the contributions in Cheah & Robbins 1998)

Another problem with universalism is its political usability as cover for various imperialistic projects of Christian, liberal or Marxist persuasion (Mehta 2000: 622). Or, as Robert J. Holton notes: “The key conceptual move underlying the ‘new’ cosmopolitanism is the paradoxical observation that claims to universalism are always rooted in time and space” (2002: 157). Alleged universalism is often a cover for particularistic political or religious movements trying to portray one’s own nation, race, class, religion or politics as the universally true (Fine 2003: 460-1):

It rejects the old shibboleths of the universal class (be it, the state bureaucracy or the proletariat) and the universal nation (be it, France after 1789 or Russia after 1917 or the USA after 1989) on the grounds that they falsely identify the interests of a particular class or a particular nation with the general interests of humanity as a whole … Against these competing forms of particularism and the spurious universals they generate, the new cosmopolitanism presents itself as a genuinely universalistic outlook that recognizes the point of view of humanity as a whole as well as the diversity of the human species. It presents itself as reconstructing our categories of understanding in such a way as to overcome the narrow particularism and abstract universalism constitutive of these modern forms of political imagination.

Still, the new cosmopolitanism emerges from the universalist insight that national or particular solidarities threaten greater communities; that they endanger or render impossible any politics that takes it cue from humanity, or from what Ulrich Beck calls ‘world risk society’ (1996); and that nationalism and other particularisms has often ended in bloodshed on ‘the other’ both inside and outside the given society. Meanwhile, the new cosmopolitanism also rejects ‘classical’ cosmopolitanism or the universalism that proscribes mankind as the only valid political or emotional unit. It is acknowledged that people are in need, politically and emotionally, for primary
or local identities that than mankind but large enough to act politically. The problem with nationalist pluralism is its collectivism; its mandatory membership of contingent belonging; its ultimate priority of the nation over the individual. The new cosmopolitanism reverses the order of priority and affirms in each person difference as a person and equality as a human being.

Between the two insights from universalism and pluralism, the new cosmopolitanism subscribes to an unstable plurality of identities within each person, layers of attachments and markers of belonging. These are identities that remain open, in constant change, and the order of priority is not given. Pluralists or nationalists only acknowledge one identity, defined by a single marker, among a plurality of others, each demarcated and closed, territorially and emotionally. Universalism acknowledges no entity smaller than mankind. It is homogenization, small or large. The new cosmopolitanism is, therefore, suspicious toward what we can call the universalist left (internationalism) and the pluralist right (nationalism). Rather than pure rejection or assimilation, it is an attitude of openness and curiosity. Ulf Hannerz says in an article on cosmopolitans and locals that a genuine cosmopolitanism is “first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrast rather than uniformity” (1990: 239).

There exist now a number of cosmopolitanisms, green, ecumenical, capitalist, technological etc. Behind all of them lies a moral cosmopolitanism, a view of humanity, which states that all human beings are members of a single moral community, that they are human first and particulars next, and that there are some, small or large, moral obligations to others regardless of nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, gender etc. This moral cosmopolitanism may be thin or thick but it is essential.

Digression: Cultural cosmopolitanism – academy, exile and consumption. A way to differentiate between cultural and political cosmopolitanism could be that cultural cosmopolitanism is about man in the world, whereas political cosmopolitanism is about the citizen in the world. Cultural cosmopolitans, then, can be divided into three: The voluntary, the forced and the banal. The voluntary are often Western or Westernized intellectuals; they choose cosmopolitanism as their way of life, politics and morality. This is opposed to the forced cosmopolitans who are the wanderers of the Third World. They are forced both to flee and to risk a life on the edge of their new country, forcing them to ‘cosmopoliticide’ in order to survive, that is, combine traditions and practices from several countries. This is the cosmopolitanism of either academia or exile (we’ll return shortly to the consumptive cosmopolitant). Bauman (2001b) calls the forced cosmopolitans for ‘vagabonds’ at the same time as he reproduces the old picture of the cosmopolite in the vagabond’s opposite, the ‘tourist’, the global traveller (as opposed to wanderer), a fate he describes as both joy- and experience-free, a vacuum-packed life in airport-lounges and chain hotels. To separate this figure from the cosmopolite, I want to use Castells’s concept of the ‘globapolit’, half man, half flow (1997: 67) to describe the tourist. The globapolit
experiences nothing of the diversity of the world; if he or she did it would only disturb the conduction of business. The voluntary cosmopolite, whom the tourist resembles, wants to tap in to the plurality of being but often finds him- or herself caught in the same airports and hotels as the globapolit. I concur with Rüdiger Safranski’s critique:

The hysteria among mobility-athletes and global players is not to be mistaken for worldliness. One who conducts his worldwide business with blinkers on, or who travels around as tourist, is not worldly. For that is required a willingness to let oneself be entangled in the unknown. Worldly is only the one who is transformed through the riches of world-experience. (2003: 24-5)

Contrary to that, the cultural cosmopolitan is one who either voluntarily or forced takes in the strange and unknown. The voluntary cosmopolitan is, as already said, often someone, who from a safe place, economically and physically – it could be the academia, an NGO or UN agency – has a concept of justice that doesn’t stop at the national border. One of the foremost representatives of this position is Martha C. Nussbaum, who advocates both a global obligation to counter need and a cosmopolitan curriculum in her home country, the USA. In an appeal for a change in the American educational program, she writes (1996: 9):

In educational terms, this means that students in the United States, for example, may continue to regard themselves as defined partly by their particular loves – their families, their religious, ethnic or racial communities, or even their country. But they must also, and centrally, learn to recognize humanity wherever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange to them, and be eager to understand humanity in all its strange guises. They must learn enough about the different to recognize common aims, aspirations and values, and enough about these common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their histories.

The forced cosmopolitan is the immigrant, the refugee, the exiled, the diaspora resident, who out of bitter necessity must learn to balance different loyalties, practices, values etc. (Derrida 1997; Diouf 2000; Nairn 2003: 129). In some discourses, not necessarily cosmopolitan, the refugee is even given the role that the proletariat used to have in Marxist discourses: The harbinger of the future (Agamben 2000: chap. 2; Hardt & Negri 2000: 212-4, 361-4, 396-400; 2004: 133; Bauman 2003: 148). Their hybridism makes them adaptable to a world that rewards capability for change and mobility, while national and occupational rigidity is punished. The diaspora communities and the Third World countries, which haven’t experienced a Westphalian sovereignty, are now signs of the post-sovereign future (Beck 2000: 89). In between these two groups are a number of non-Western residents of the West, writers like Edward Said, Salman Rushdie and V.S. Naipul who, for a Western audience, criticize non-Western narrow-mindedness in favour of a broader and softer understanding of identity and loyalty (Brennan 1989; Cocks 2000). Salman Rushdie is perhaps the best example. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen says, Rushdie is in favour of a bastardized, creolized and moving world, not least because it defines who he is. His main opponent is the puritan’s demands of purity and borders (Eriksen 1999: 17; Eriksen 2003). In such a world, there is no room for Rushdie and people like him.

Hylland Eriksen himself has in a small, interesting book, Kulturterrorismen (The Terrorism of Culture), with the saying subtitle Et oppgjør med tanken om kulturell renhet (a critique of the idea of cultural purity) made a defence for

impurity; an ‘anarchistic moral philosophy for a cultural pluralist society’, where he criticizes how “culture is being shaped to a political resource”, and where he “defends the individual against the fetishization of ‘culture’ as something firm, permanent and authoritative” (1999: 9, 23, 11). The terrorism of culture is the cosmopolitan’s concept for the dangers of culturalization, whether we culturalize ourselves in nationalism or others in multiculturalism. The result is that identities are locked in autarchic and permanent entities. Eriksen and some parts of cosmopolitanism insist on the in-between, the anomalies, the grey zones, the cross-over, that which will never fit, that which sticks out, that which keeps disturbing, keeps resisting. The opponent is the longing for purity, unity, permanency, borders etc.

The third form of cultural cosmopolitanism is the one, who is neither voluntary nor forced, but lived. It is the form, we can call ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ or ‘banal globalization’ and it concerns the consumption of globalization, that is, the enmeshing of cultures and cultural expressions in ever greater transnational links and networks (Held et.al. 1999: chap. 7; Caglar 2002; Szerszynski & Urry 2002; Urry 2000; Søelund 2002; Held & McGrew 2003: part 3). Beck even says: “Consumer society is the actually existing world society” (2004: 150). It is not least through the globalized media-system that symbols, ideas, expressions, practices etc. travel across borders and mix up with other ‘original’ or ‘indigenous’ cultures. The banal cosmopolitanism is consumed through food, music, fashion, sport events, films but also through the spread of ideas, ideologies, sciences, symbols and so on. We see more and more work on ‘everyday cosmopolitanism’, past and present, that seems to belie the notion of cosmopolitanism as solely an elite-project (Nava 2002; Hiebert 2002; Lamont & Aksartova 2002). This is, of course, also the case with the studies of ‘migrant cosmopolitanism’ mentioned earlier, a true cosmopolitanism from (way down) below, if ever there was one. The banal form of cultural cosmopolitanism is perhaps the clearest sign of what Bruce Robbins (1998) calls ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ and recent studies has tried to broaden cosmopolitanism beyond both its Eurocentric origins and prejudices and the common, narrow genealogy of ‘philosophical cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah 1998; Werbner 1999; Kwok-Bun 2002; Zubaida 2002; Holton 2002).

The fear of this kind of globalization of culture is often expressed as the ‘McDonaldization of culture’ (Ritzer 1996), that is, a global mono-culture of non-nutritious plastic culture. But that doesn’t seem to be the future (Smith 1990; Toynbee 2001). It’s more like a globalizing of the cultures; an interruption of or disturbance in their autonomous reproduction. But the idea of a McDonaldization very precisely describes the fear of levelling, banalization, unreality, lack of depth and seriousness, life as pure play and easy consumption that has sparked and animated critiques of liberalism, capitalism, emancipations of various sorts, and cosmopolitanism. The main accusation against cultural cosmopolitanism is its alleged betrayal of the nation and its far too thin and elusive concept of sociability. These are not new accusations. The communitarian critique of cosmopolitanism questions the value and durability of cosmopolitan politics. They emphasize nation, language, tradition, history as necessary elements in the foundation of democracy, welfare and identity. Communitarians criticize cosmopolitanism for exaggerating the impact of globalization on the national community of fate and for mocking the national and local in favour of an empty celebration of the global (Cohen 1996; Appiah 1998; Nielsen 2004: 123-133). Cosmopolitanism is criticized for being yet another particularism; It’s an elite-project that disregards and mocks ordinary people’s lives, forcing them to adapt to an unwanted lifestyle:

The rational cosmopolitan, believing firmly that he and his fellow rational cosmopolitans possess reason such that no reasonable person would disagree with them, and insisting that their own values are the truly universal ones, is thereby armed to do battle against the obscurantism of those who are not equally enlightened – and this means, in actual practice, against the values of those ordinary
people who wish to pass those values on to their own children. Almost invariably, such values are one and all particularistic, local, traditional, parochial, arbitrary. What right do parents have to pass on such blindly acquired values to their own children? The answer the rational cosmopolitan gives is emphatic and clear: none whatsoever. (Harris 2003: 57)

The cosmopolitan is confronted with the same accusations as liberals more generally: They’re pushing a particular worldview as universal, masking their power drive behind moralism and humanism and subjecting people to an ‘unreal’ way of life. Robert Pinsky says that the cosmopolitans (he is referring specifically to Nussbaum) “falls into the formulation of one peculiar province, the village of the liberal managerial class” (1996: 87) and Brett Bowden (2003: 355) says that cosmopolites are “citizens of the cosmopolitan, globalised, liberal-democratic Western world that constitutes ‘the center’” of the concentric circles of loyalty (see also Žižek 1999d: 218-9). And the list of these remarks goes on (especially when it comes to the question of colonialism/imperialism and liberalism/cosmopolitanism, i.e. Pagden 2000; Veer 2002). This is the stuff of political critique: The disclosure of one’s opponent as particularistic. This is a game that cosmopolitans also engage in and one in which they get their share of dismissal. End of digression.

The new cosmopolitan has, as already said, tried to meet this critique, presenting itself as ‘rooted’, ‘embedded’, ‘native’, ‘situated’, ‘grounded’ even ‘patriotic’ and ‘national’ (Cohen 1992) in order to establish the difference to its own universalistic past, to the ideas of one world and to the neoliberal globalization theory, which sees the world, ideally, as consisting of one undifferentiated and state-less market. The new cosmopolitanism, despite its rootedness, is in invariably committed to a distrust of the national and the statist. Without it, there is no cosmopolitanism. When a neo-nazi confronted Günter Grass (1990) with the accusation of being a traitor, he chose rootless cosmopolitanism over aggressive nationalism. This is the enduring core of cosmopolitanism: Forced (by its opponents), the cosmopolitan will always choose the universal rather than the particular.

Political Cosmopolitanism

Political cosmopolitanism is the perhaps most innovative and ambitious attempt to grasp and change the international/global system. It is rapidly becoming a unifying concept for a philosophical universalization of the concept of justice, a theoretical exploration of the relationship between the national, the international and the global and, finally, a political program of concrete proposal for the democratization of global politics. Some of the most important proponents are Richard Falk, Mary Kaldor, Daniele Archibugi, Anthony McGrew and not least David

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Political cosmopolitanism has grown out of a frustration with the faults and limitations of the liberal internationalist regime (McGrew 2001; Held & McGrew 2002) and not least its prime agent: the nation state. The international regime has achieved remarkable results since the end of WW2 – the United Nations, the entrenchment of human rights, institutionalized cooperation on many issues and levels, and lately the mobilization of civil society on global issues – but it pretty much remains international, that is to say, locked in the geopolitical ‘deal’ after 1945, controlled and limited by nation states, and grounded in a narrow capitalist understanding, which altogether blocks for a democratization of global issues, for a circumscription of global economic forces and for a ‘humanization’ of the world. The international world is still a world of borders and hierarchies; ultimately of might as right, of passports and controls, and of, despite the internationalization, a still strict separation between foreign and domestic politics, where foreign policy still plays by other, less democratic, less participatory, less open, but more manipulable and discretionary rules.

The cosmopolitan strategy is to radicalize certain elements in the liberal internationalist regime – exactly those elements which questions the foundations of the nation state. Ole Wæver has stated it very precisely, when he writes that, “the realization of a cosmopolitan order demands the relativization of state sovereignty and, in practice, also that action is taken with direct reference to human rights which goes against the rules that states have formulated in the existing international law” (2003: 67). Political cosmopolitanism is, therefore, a direct challenge to the nation state. Cornelius Murphy talk about being ‘imprisoned within states’ (1999: 119); Daniele Archibugi about

111 See the list of his publications in Held 2006; and the critique in Goldblatt 1997; Kymlicka 1999; Wendt 1999; Saward 2000; Laffey 2001; Scheuerman 2002a; Cochran 2002; Smith 2003 and the contributions in Held 2005a.
113 See Linklater 1999a, b, 2002; and the critique in Hopgood 2000; Kveinen 2002.
115 See Monbiot 2003.
119 One could probably also add Ulrich Beck to the cosmopolites, but the question is whether his current usage of cosmopolitical concepts reflect a commitment to cosmopolitanism or his usual rapid use and discarding of concepts, which seems merely to serve as stepping stones toward a consistent theory which keeps escaping him.
the ‘now baroque category of sovereignty’ (2002: 34) and Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss about the ‘ossified, state-centred system’ (2001: 220). Despite qualifications from transformationalists, that the state is here to stay, it is a direct assault on ‘nation state modernity’. The state, which is supposed to survive, is subject to massive internal and external re-configuration, which renders it unlike any of its predecessors. It’s a state, which, like we saw in the discussion of Castells and Habermas, isn’t a state in classical terms and, therefore, also without its distinctions.

Here we also find ‘scientific cosmopolitanism’, which alleges that all concepts from ‘classical’, ‘first’, ‘simple’, that is, ‘nation state’ modernity are obsolete; they are ‘zombie-categories’ (Beck 1998a; 2004) haunting our sciences and policies with their stubborn demarcations, their naturalization of contingencies, their perpetuation of the transitory and their simplistic (and increasingly dysfunctional) division of the world into dualities: state/non-state, foreign/domestic, foreigner/citizen etc. Political cosmopolitanism emerges from an analysis of globalization that stresses the ever-increasing interdependence of societies; ‘overlapping communities of fate’ as David Held calls it; ‘global risk society’ as Ulrich Beck calls it, are concepts to describe how policy issues, risks, problems but also opportunities, cultures and individual lives are transcending their hitherto boundaries making previous policies, institutions and concepts obstacles rather than solutions. Globalization has placed all actors and processes ‘inside’. The idea of an ‘outside’, whether it’s other nations, the world as a whole in the form of autarchy or isolationism, or other people(s), that we can ignore or hold at bay and away, becomes increasingly less fitting for reality as well as practice. Inside/outside, so the cosmopolitans claim, is increasingly only something we employ to keep the realities of things away. The blurring of inside/outside also goes to questions of national identity and ethnicity; and multiculturalism, as a descriptive fact not a normative claim, is part of the larger argument, highlighting the blurring of distinctions, that we used to take for granted. The multicultural as reality is pushing for a further dissolving of nation state modernity and brings questions about national history, prior dealings and repressions of minorities, colonialism and imperialism, nationalization, imagined or otherwise, to the fore (Gilroy 2004).

It also makes the issue of world citizenship present in a way it wasn’t, when the claim, that we’re all citizens of the world, merely served as a strategy of critique or as a way to distinguish oneself from one’s narrow-minded countrymen. The question of global responsibilities and obligations are

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120 Terrorism may be a good example (writing this the day after the bombs in London on the 7th of July 2005, sitting just a few blocks from one of the bomb sites), because it is obviously the work of people, who are both outside the attacked society, because they hate it, and inside, as they are probably ‘home-grown’ or trained here and because their ideas and methods, as John Gray (2005b) has stressed in a comment on the London bombings, is part of the European legacy too.
suddenly no longer a purely theoretical issue, but has become one of the most contested and debated issue in political theory – and a lot less, but still, in political practice. In a similar move, questions of world/global/post-sovereign/post-national/cosmopolitan citizenship have also become hot topics of debate and practice,\textsuperscript{121} and that is further sign of a ‘de-dualization’ of political concepts. Dual conceptualizations are losing clarity, obviousness and stability; their edges are becoming fuzzy and their lines pierced. The world in a four-square table, as all political science aims at, look increasingly like the fill in-drawing of a two-year old with lines and colours drawn at random without any regard for the pre-established patterns. This has also made it imperative to discuss the connection between nationalism/patriotism and cosmopolitanism, where the new cosmopolitanism is, apparently, seeking a modus vivendi of sorts with a benign ‘patriotism’ (Beitz 1983; McCarthy 1999; Canovan 2001; Turner 2002b; Kleingeld 2003). As with the question of multicultures or plural identities, the new cosmopolitanism is ducking the issue of the ‘radical other’; the non- or anti-cosmopolitan other. It tends to founder on the approach or hope expressed by Ken Booth:

I am very confident that enough people across the world have the potential moral muscle for this cosmopolitan project. That they have some moral muscle is evident in peoples’ key relationships with their nearest and dearest, and their discharge of immediate social obligations. The problem is that this moral muscle is not sufficiently exercised; it is not yet well developed when it comes to distant events. But there is no logical or physiological reason to suppose moral muscle has a ‘natural’ limit, at the state boundary. It only has the limit it has, which is the product of history. A few generations of cosmopolitan aerobics, to break through the traditionalist moral boundaries set down over centuries, could change matters dramatically. (1995: 119)

The ‘other’ is a neglected figure in cosmopolitan theory. He or she is presented as compatible with a cosmopolitan order, because it supposedly does not infringe on ‘basic’ identities, they merely add another more inclusive layer; or the ‘other’ is presented as illegitimate and as perpetrator, actual or potential. In both cases we notice a depoliticization. The first figure, the other as compatible with cosmopolitanism, is reduced to a cultural type, whereas the second figure, the other as incompatible with cosmopolitanism, is reduced to a sociological or psychological type. This last type is deemed outside politics because politics has become cosmopolitan. We’ll return to this in the next section. One of the great achievements (and now, supposedly, faults) of the nation state was to demarcate and limit the area of interest which made a deeper and institutionalized solidarity possible. Now, the notion of (geographically, nationally or ethnically) limited responsibility is questioned. Once nation

state limitations of protection, solidarity and obligation get blurred, the question of who gets what, when and how (and why) moves centre stage, as does the topic of global ethics, in what Andrew
Linklater calls a ‘small revolution’, where “Considerations of global justice have to start from the assumption that the moral relevance of the distinction between insiders and outsiders has to be demonstrated rather than presupposed” (1999b: 477). This is indeed a challenge to nationalist and statist ideas of the limits of justice and has sparked a lot of debate on concentric circles of obligations, dual loyalties, mediation between needs and needy etc. It seems to be increasingly less true what Max Boehm could, probably justifiably, write in 1953:

But on the whole the actual obligations which cosmopolitanism lays upon its adherents are comparatively negligible – the more so because in practise it seldom goes beyond demonstration, sentimentality, propaganda and sectarian fanaticism. Hence it often exists among persons whom fortune has relieved from the immediate struggle for existence and from pressing social responsibility and who can afford to indulge their fads and enthusiasms. (1953: 458)

As Daniele Archibugi writes, there has been a shift from the preoccupation with the personal psychological benefits of being a cosmopolite to the practical and political consequences and obligations of the same. He writes, somewhat JFK-like: “To be cosmopolitan now is no longer simply to feel oneself a citizen of the world but also, and above all, a citizen for the world” (2002: 32). A very significant element in the change from classical to new cosmopolitanism is the move from pure critique to attempts at solutions. One of the main critiques of cosmopolitanism has always been its aloofness from reality and the enormity of its proposals. But in recent years, there has been a turn to concrete, both incremental and radical proposals. The new cosmopolitanism is more affirmative and constructive than its earlier versions.122

The most common critique of political cosmopolitanism is its naivety and impossibility. The argument is that democracy does in fact stop at the border and that any attempt to extend it will lead nowhere. Global democracy is a fantasy; at most we can hope and work for international

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122 The growing number of (increasingly detailed) proposals for cosmopolitical reform across the global policy issues, include debates on global civil society and public opinion (Falk 2000; Bohman 1999a); global parliament (Falk & Strauss 2001); reform of the global economy (Held 1994, 2000, 2002b, 200c, 2003b, 2005b); preventive use of force (Buchanan & Keohane 2004); humanitarian interventions (Archibugi 2004); reform of the UN (Falk 1998; Archibugi 1993; Archibugi, Balduini & Donati 2000); global governance (Held 2003a, 2003c, 2004a, 2004b; Held & McGrew 2002b); anti-terrorism (Archibugi 2001; Archibugi & Young 2002; Kaldor 2003; Held 2002d, 2003d; Falk 2003); national self-determination (Archibugi 2003) and war (Kaldor 1999; 2002a, b). The most ambitious proposals is summarized under the idea of 'cosmopolitan democracy' coined by David Held (1991a, 1992, 1995, 1996; part 3, 2004a) and taken up by others in the field (Archibugi 1998; Bohman 1999; McGrew 2000; 2001) which has sparked quite a lot of, often critical, debate (Görg & Hirsch 1998; Wolf 1999; Dahl 1999; Hutchings 1999: 159-162; Franceschet 2000; Hojholm 2002; Scheuerman 2002a; Søndergaard 2003: 149-157; Urbinati 2003; Guneriussen 2004).
accountability through the nation states (Hirst 2001a: chap. 4); a further argument is, as Nadia Urbinati says, “Issues, not citizens, are or can become global” (2003: 80). One finds both a communitarian and a realist variety of the critique that say, that democracy (and programs for equality, redistribution and justice) cannot be extended beyond the nation state. We’ve already covered the communitarian critique, which centres on the claim, that people’s identity and loyalty is conditioned upon a territorially limited entity. The realist critique questions both the possibility and the use of transnational democratization and juridification (Bull 1977: 84-8, 302-5; McGrew 1998; Kissinger 2001; Held & Hirst 2002; Zolo 1999, 2000). The international is anarchic; states ultimately rely on themselves; international relations, regimes and norms are weak; the idea of an international community or society is mostly a cover for great power interests; and there is often a pronounced critique of any strong globalization thesis (Hirst & Thompson 1999, 2002); and, finally, people show no interest in international affairs, why it will remain a concern for state elites. Conflict and the use of force are and remain the characteristics of the international. The argument ultimately boils down to the static nature of the international. It is not subject to profound historical change and the division between national and international, domestic and foreign, remains a qualitative and decisive difference. Borders, hierarchies and demarcations persist.

Whereas the communitarian and realist critique blame cosmopolitanism for being in opposition to human nature or the realities of power, there is also a radical critique, which sees cosmopolitanism as very much in tune with the powers that be. It borrows at times from both the communitarian and realist critique, and blames cosmopolitanism for, willingly or unwillingly, serving the interests of strong geopolitical and geoeconomic powers. This critique names cosmopolitanism as just another version of euro-centrism or imperialism. In a quote from an older Marxist philosophical dictionary, we find a critique of cosmopolitanism, which sees it as a betrayal of the working class:

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123 Let me just mention one extreme right-wing expression of the argument that we do not have any obligations beyond our own borders, because it expresses, albeit in an extreme way, an often heard idea about the alleged motivation behind global justice: “Global responsibility is a sick idea thought up in the heads of people who see the planet as a doll house to play with” (Jensen 1999). If ever one needed an argument for cosmopolitanism, there it is.


125 The debate on empire and imperialism has grown strong in the last years, and it seems to have four strings, whose connections are, as yet, not entirely clear. There is firstly the debate generated by Hardt & Negri’s Empire (2000), see Balakrishnan 2003a; there is the debate on liberal empire, as discussed earlier in regard to Cooper (see also Rieff 1999; Purdy 2003; Ignatieff 2001b; 2003b); there is the debate on America as empire, see Mallaby 2002; Ikenberry 2002; Maier 2002; Kurtz 2003; Mann 2003; Pieterse 2004; Barber 2004; and the section on ‘the revival of empire’ in Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, 2003; and there is, finally, the revisionist history writing on the British empire.
Cosmopolitanism: the ideological expression of the class interest of the up-and-coming bourgeoisie … The present cosmopolitanism of the imperialistic bourgeoisie is reactionary and serves as an excuse for the national betrayal and as an excuse and legitimization of the union of monopolistic capitalism. Cosmopolitanism is the shadow side of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism. It is the reactionary counterpart to the socialist internationalism. (Philosophisches Wörterbuch 1971: 667)

The new radical critique sees the cosmopolitan critique of national sovereignty as a cover for the implementation of a global liberal-capitalist trade and intervention regime controlled by Western economic and political interests. Cosmopolitanism weakens nation state democracy and welfare, and gives at the same time the legitimization for so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’ against states that will not succumb to the liberal dictate. Claims of ‘global justice’, ‘global community’, ‘human rights’ serve the interests of the most powerful, as they are the only ones with power to interpret and selectively enforce them. Cosmopolitanism becomes the tool of ‘liberal imperialism’:

While the conservative critique of cosmopolitanism focuses on its revolutionary propensities that threaten to subvert established modes and orders, radicals view cosmopolitanism as an ethical doctrine that too easily plays into the hands of the powerful, be they states, cultures or multinational corporations, providing an ideological basis for the maintenance or enhancement of their dominance. (Lu 2000: 252)

I want to argue that both claims are true. Cosmopolitanism and liberal globalism more generally subvert the nation state’s established modes and orders but is not necessarily a benign move. They may actually, unknowingly and unwillingly, be helping the powers that be to transform their mode of operation and their instruments of global dominance.

A New Statist Language?

The main enemy of cosmopolitan globalization discourse is the nation state and its practitioners. This gives rise to distinct readings of both history and current affairs, and I argue that it may give rise to an unwelcomed conglomeration of cosmopolitans and the state, where the cosmopolitan discourse isn’t really in opposition to the state, as much as it helps its transformation – and most likely not to “the post-nation, plural-nation, nation-indifferent, and nation-tolerant state” (Beck 2001c: 87), that they hope. Cosmopolitanism may, paradoxically, be giving us a new language of state sovereignty, which reinstallsthe in/out, friend/enemy distinctions under different names. The

126 For internationalist critique of cosmopolitanism see Colás 1994 & Anderson 2002a.
‘cosmopolitan thought’ is an attack on any notions of classical differentiations, both descriptively in the globalization discourse and normatively. The particulars of the nation state age, in/out, friend/enemy, foreign/domestic, local/national/international and also distinctions such as war/peace, economics/politics, police/military are transcended or discarded as obsolete. This may sound as a strong critique of statist power but in actual fact it is complementary to the Western state’s own discourse, which is progressively changing its ways of international/global control into a deterritorialized form of dominance, which project force from above and afar. The ones losing are the states trying to secure a statehood in the first place. Once modernity’s distinctions are dissolved, one has to ask: Who profits from fluidity and indistinction? Who defines the new distinctions?

I want to argue in this final section, that cosmopolitanism serves the re-configuration of power by hyper-politicizing the nation state and, consequently, depoliticizing its usurper. Cosmopolitans help frame the new post-sovereign language of dominance and intervention by not being attentive enough to the ‘new alliance of humanitarian and military interest’ (Kennedy 2004: xii). The modern nation state was born in and through war; so is the postnational. The ‘new wars’ are borderland wars and they are instrumental in reinstating order by drawing new distinctions between the West and the Rest, between order and chaos, the civilized and the barbaric, between friends and enemies. As Mark Duffield says in his remarkable book *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*: “The aim of liberal peace is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities” (2001: 11). This is, of course, an often worthy and needed enterprise but it is also part of the new repression of the global borderland and the making of a new global order – and it isn’t obvious that the humanitarian or cosmopolitan language is always the most effective or appropriate vocabulary. The new wars outline the new cartography and the new enmities of globalized power. This is what we’ll concentrate on in the following and in the next chapter.

Cosmopolitanism is complicit in the new ‘taming’ of the borderland. The post-sovereignty discourse is no risk to Western states, who are secure in their statehood – and in their sovereignty in a post-sovereign order. In this way too, one can agree with Michael Ignatieff that, “cosmopolitanism is the privilege of those who can take a secure nation state for granted” (1994: 9). It may not be meant as such, but the unequal distribution of power in the international system makes the new post-sovereign language a political tool of the powerful. The new global borderland is defined as post-political. The political is obsolete. It belongs exclusively to the nation state era. But this kind of language is systematically hiding the return of the political in new in/out, friend/enemy
categories; the most prominent being the ones between cosmopolitan or postmodern states on one side and a combination of modern nationalist barbarism and premodern warlord chaos on the other.

The post-sovereign discourse is a moral discourse denying (certain) sovereign states their legitimacy. It becomes, therefore, a means of de-legitimization and intervention. The new moral discourse may be directed against state abuse but in a significant way it gives new life to the state in its most statist register: War. Margaret Canovan (1998) asks: “Crusaders want to see human rights recognized and protected across the world, and questions of political agency inevitable follow. Seeking to make the Marxist political project effective, Lenin hit on the notion of the powerful Party: what collective actor can (by analogy) bear the project of human rights?” It is and remains the state or more precisely, a conglomerate of Western states, we’ll later call the ‘humanitarian sovereign’. The collective actor of the world community is the West. One cannot imagine China or Iran proclaiming to be the defender of the international community or humanity and then be recognized as such. This humanist and globalist prerogative is exclusively Western.

Another way cosmopolitanism is embedded in the new state discourse is their Eurocentric view of the world. As already mentioned in this and previous chapters, the interpretation of globalization presented by both liberal globalism and cosmopolitanism projects a European experience into a global one. Mark Laffey says: “The historical geography of the modern state and its trials justifying liberal cosmopolitanism offers a deeply Eurocentric view of world politics … Europe is the active subject, both in and of world history” (2001: 77). This becomes apparent, once cosmopolitans begin outlining their political programme. Most often it is restricted to a celebration of the EU as the model for the world (if perhaps not exactly like the original). European post-sovereignty is the only adequate answer for the world as a whole. Europe will not be confined to Europe. The new post-national anti-borderland must be expanded.

A common critique of cosmopolitanism is that they confer too much power to the judiciary, actually setting up a juridical sovereignty of deterritorialized and non-democratically accountable judges (Thompson 1999: 155-6; Scheuerman 2002a; Søndergaard 2003: 153; Urbinati 2003: 82) and generally tend to disregard national democratic institutions and processes (Thaa 2001; Cochran 2002; Chandler 2003a: 340; Mephan 2005: 60). As to the latter one can detect a distinct move away from considerations of national democratization in the work of David Held, whose concept of a ‘double democratization’ has been transformed from a national democratization of state and civil society (1989: 167, 182; 1991b: 24; 1996: 316-23) to an entirely international or cosmopolitan
democratization, which is almost altogether silent on national democratization. This is no longer the liberal way to transform the state. Now, it goes through global transformation and democratization. I want to highlight another dimension the cosmopolitan de-nationalization: The tendency to re-name the national as problematic and to deprive it of legitimacy (which is, in a sense, also a de-democratization, as the verdict on the legitimacy of a people’s decisions is placed outside themselves). In Held’s work we see the slide from a ‘universal’ justice to what will in fact be a Western one. He talks about setting up ‘an authoritative assembly of all democratic states and agencies’, ‘an independent assembly of democratic peoples’ (1995: 273, see also p. 226-31) to either supplement or replace the present UN General Assembly. This new assembly composed of only (liberal-capitalist?) democratic actors “could become an authoritative international centre for the examination of those pressing global problems which are at the heart of the very possibility of the implementation of cosmopolitan democratic law” (1995: 274) from health, debt, global warming and financial stability to police and military enforcement; “Its task would be to set down the rules, standards and institutions required to embed cosmopolitan values and priorities” (2004c: 191). This assembly would become a global sovereign with the power and monopoly to define and enforce threats to the global ‘community’; and it would restrict the membership (to what will become the de facto international community) to not only democratic states but to only those states and civil societies that are globalizing themselves: “In the first instance, cosmopolitan democratic law could be promulgated and defended by those democratic states and civil societies that are able to muster the necessary political judgement and to learn how political practices and institutions must change and adapt in the new regional and global circumstances” (1995: 232). As Chantal Mouffe says: “Who will decide which states are democratic, and on what criteria? No doubt it is the Western conception of democracy that will be used. It is rather telling that Held does not see that as a problem” (2005a: 102). Held is changing the principle of access as a legitimate voice and entity from the sovereignty principle to a moral principle (Held 2004a: 137):

Sovereignty can no longer be understood in terms of the categories of untrammelled effective power. Rather, a legitimate state must increasingly be understood through the language of democracy and human rights. Legitimate authority has become linked, in moral and legal terms, with the maintenance of human rights values and democratic standards. The latter set a limit on the range of acceptable diversity among the political constitutions of states.
The nation state logic is now ‘singularly inadequate and inappropriately’ (Held 1996: 261, my italics). This willingness to restrict access and legitimacy to speak in and for the global community, to use moral language, is also evident in Mary Kaldor’s work on the global civil society. In order to get included within the circle of friends one have to pass a political-moral test, prove one’s democratic and globalist credentials. Kaldor says:

Civil society thus consists of groups, individuals and institutions which are independent of the state and state boundaries, but which are, at the same time, preoccupied with public affairs. They are, in effect, the guarantors of civil behaviour both by official institutions (states and international institutions) and in the world at large. Defined in this way, civil society does not encompass all groups or associations independent of the state. It does not include groups which advocate violence. It does not include self-organised groups and associations which campaign for exclusivist communitarian concepts. Nor does it include self-interested private associations. (quoted from Chandler 2002: 118)

A democratic nation state insisting on its sovereignty, a civil society defending its particularistic culture and autonomy, or even a private association working for its own interests, will not qualify as a legitimate partner. Cosmopolitanism adds to the liberal anti-pluralism a globalization and post-nationalism requisite which, as we have seen, ‘asks’ states and civil societies to copy and accept a European experience as the global and only condition. Held says, that the sovereignty principle “has a highly problematic history, and has led to many brutal regimes being wrongly regarded as equally legitimate members of the international community” (2005a: 155). The sovereignty-critical discourse fails to ask in an adequate way, what the sovereignty-system created besides oppression and what might be the consequences of its dissolution. The new post-sovereign, post-national discourse narrows who are accepted as legitimate representatives for their community and for themselves and, consequently, it broadens the field of moral and military intervention.

Cosmopolitans tend to equate ‘power logic’ with the realist nation state (Held 2003a: 163), which causes them to misrepresent the continuance of power logic and even reasons of state within the new globalized state. When confronted with the endurance of inequality and power within the global system, the answer tends to focus on residual nation state elements – not least the US – which stand in the way of a fully cosmopolitan and post-political order. This has reminiscences to the Enlightenment’s view of international affairs. When Held says about the Iraq war that it is “in danger of dragging us back to a pre-legal order and a deeply uncivil international society” (2003e), one gets the impression that we’re, with the exception of a few obstacles, living in a legal and civilized global order. Notice also the historical teleology and not least the description of the
‘uncivil international society’ as ‘pre-legal’. This is further evidence of a re-description of the nation state era. We find a similar tendency to conflate the nation state with war in the common argument that the European states have moved beyond their bellicose past. War is being defined solely as inter-state war and the European experience is, again, being projected as a universal truth. ‘War no longer pays’ we hear (Held & Kaldor 2001; Held & McGrew 2002a: 68). But this may only be true for the European post-borderland. It may not be true for the rest of the world or for the European projection of humanitarian armed force. Kaldor says in a very typical remark that:

In the aftermath of the Cold War, war on the inter-state model seems to have become an anachronism. Another war on the scale of the two world wars, let alone a nuclear war, seems unimaginable. Military technology has become so destructive that the capacity to capture territory militarily, even for the most advanced military powers, is severely circumscribed. (2000: 57-8)

A common observation is that present trends “imply a move away from absolute control of territory and from geopolitics, that is to say, the control of foreign territory in the national interest” (Kaldor 2003b: 5); and she also says: “The end of the Cold War probably meant the end of wars of the modern type – wars between states and groups of states” (2003c: 119). What both quotes indicate is the presumption that the modern state is obsolete and that the world is becoming bifurcated into what Robert Cooper called postmodern and premodern states. The picture becomes a bit messier, once she identifies the three new forms of warfare. Firstly, we have network warfare or new wars (2003c: 119-113; 1999, 2003a), which is armed conflicts between networks of non-state and state actors. One is tempted to call these wars the return of borderland wars. Kaldor says that, “they tend to be concentrated in areas where the modern state is unravelling and where the distinctions between internal and external, public and private, no longer have the same meaning” (2003c: 120). These are the wars of premodernity. Secondly, we have spectacle warfare, which is primarily undertaken by the USA and involves high-tech warfare at long distance (2003c: 123-6; 2003b). This is an anomaly perpetuated by what she calls ‘the last nation-state’ (2003c: 125). The exception that proves the rule that all the world is either post-modernizing or unravelling. The American reaction to 9/11 was a spectacle response, “a reversion to the reflexes of the centralized war-making state” and it gave the Bush administration the opportunity to repeat the supposed state prerogative/monopoly: “to redraw the boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, to identify a new ‘other’” (2003c: 150, 151). Thirdly and finally, we have neo-modern warfare, which refers to ‘large transition states’ on their way to postmodernity (2003c: 126-8). They conduct “either limited inter-
state warfare or counter-insurgency” but are stubbornly “still under the illusion that they can win militarily” (2003c: 127). This type of warfare – misnamed ‘neo’, which diverts attention away from the fact that it is modern – doesn’t really interest Kaldor. This is not the kind of war, she expects in the future – in the end, future wars are reduced to network war and spectacle war which “feed off each other and sustain themselves through fear and insecurity”; and the “Bush Administration, with the help of al-Qaeda, has tried to reinvent the ‘other’ and to revive the ‘outside’” (2003c: 155, 159). The latter two are, so to speak, unsustainable forms of war. They are waged by “states that continue to pursue unilateralist policies” (2003c: 147) in a multilateral world. What, we are left with, is wars coming out of chaos, because it is “no longer possible to insulate territory from anarchy and disorder” (2003c: 6) and its (Western response). One would expect a fourth form, humanitarian warfare, but instead we get: ‘The humanitarian alternative’, which presents humanitarian interventions as ‘international law enforcement’ (2003c: 134). The moral discourse and the re-description of contemporary military interventions as police operations is another potent example of the blurring of distinctions, which tend to hide problematic features of the new globalist intervention-regime. Mary Kaldor says that there isn’t “any longer a clear distinction between the soldier and the policeman”. The conclusion is that “Humanitarian intervention is not the same as warfighting” (2000: 58, 61); and Daniele Archibugi says, more militarist (humanitarian) than the generals, about the intervention in Kosovo that he “would have risked sending in huge numbers of ‘blue helmets’ on the ground, accompanied by numerous representatives of civil society and peace workers” (2000: 150). The difference between humanism and militarism, war and aid is blurred. But this is not pure indistinction. One can observe, firstly, that the militarist side is colonizing the civil/humanitarian side (just like ordinary policing is becoming increasingly militarized); the shift from peace-keeping to peace-making is not only reflecting a need but also a more coercive and militarized humanitarian warfare. Secondly, humanitarian warfare is not like domestic policing because there is no established ‘global police force’. It is more like posse comitatus justice of the American frontier, coalitions of the willing setting after (what they take to be) the culprits. ‘Cosmopolitan law enforcement’ is another name for a new fact, the post-1989 re-establishment of the military’s task of creating not only a purpose for itself but a new state. War is still, even when coined ‘humanitarian’, the maker of states; and states are still founded on the repression of the borderland, on making in/out-distinctions. This time with the help of cosmopolitans making the distinction between the friends (the cosmopolitans) and the enemies (the particularists), where only
the first are considered legitimate. Cosmopolitans fail to acknowledge the role of the new humanitarian warfare in creating both a new Western state and a new constellation of global power. Mark Duffield writes very perceptively about the liberal peace (by military means):

The current concern of global governance is to establish a liberal peace on its troubled borders: to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies as a way to avoid future wars. The ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability. In achieving this aim, liberal peace is different from imperial peace. The latter was based on, or at least aspired to, direct territorial control where populations were ruled through juridical and bureaucratic means of authority. The imperial power dealt with opposition using physical and juridical forms of pacification, sometimes in an extreme and violent manner. Liberal peace is different; it is a non-territorial, mutable and networked relation of governance. The aim of the strategic state-non-state complexes that embody global governance is not the direct control of territory. Ideally, liberal power is based on the management and regulation of economic, political and social processes. It is power through the control and management of non-territorial systems and networks. (2001: 34)

This goes to show that the new lacking urge for territorial domination, that Kaldor, Cooper and others talk about, may actually serve the forces of domination rather than hinder it. Bauman says that one used to be able to tell the victor by the fact that he was the only one standing on the battlefield after the battle. Nowadays, the one standing is the conquered one, left behind to live in the ruins, whereas the victor is long gone. Dominance is no longer territorial, but that doesn’t make it any less oppressive. Michael Ignatieff (2003b) talks of humanitarian warfare as an ‘empire lite’, that is, an imperialism that doesn’t dare speak its name and which doesn’t touch ground. It refuses the obligations of empire. He (and Cooper) sees it as problematic, but it is actually a new and improved (from the point of view of the ‘imperialists’) form of domination, which rules through absence, through the global flows of capital and law, through decisions on legitimacy and illegitimacy. Bauman talks of ”the liquid-modern conditions that radically alter the pragmatics of domination” manifested in a”resentment against bearing the consequences of victory in the form of responsibility for the day in, day out administration of the conquered lands” (2002b: 100).

Another, very common, example can be found in Mary Kaldor’s discussion of nationalism, which reinstates an in/out, friend/enemy-categorization helpful for imperial interventionism. Kaldor (2004) differentiates between ‘spectacle nationalism’ and ‘new nationalism’ – the latter very much like what she formerly called ‘identity politics’. 127 This is somewhat like Castells’s differentiation

127 ”I use the term ‘identity politics’ to mean movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power”; it “tends to be fragmentative, backward-looking and exclusive” (Kaldor 1999: 76, 78; see also 2003a & 2003c: 97-101). Like Castells, Kaldor contrasts identity politics to a ‘forward-looking project’ namely the ‘politics of ideas’ (1999: 77). Identity politics is both about politics based on non-negotiable markers (and
between project identity and resistance identity, although Kaldor invests her ‘benign’ form with a lot less rationality and deliberation (the match is not perfect, Kaldor’s ‘spectacle nationalism’ serves the same purpose as Castells’s ‘legitimating identity’, that is, to “legitimise existing states”, Kaldor 2004: 168). Still, they both centre on the opposition between a benign form of politics, which is progressive (Castells) or harmless (Kaldor) and then a dangerous one, closed off from argument, compromise and deliberation. It is a differentiation between liberal and illiberal politics, and serves ultimately to discredit nationalism as a legitimate position. Identity politics is the deformed or illegitimate answer to globalization. Not only is its first source a non-sustainable answer to globalization but its second source is criminality (1999: 79-84). Unless reduced to a ‘banal nationalism’, that is, “passive participation, watching television or joining a crowd” (Kaldor 2004: 168), nationalism is renamed ‘new nationalism’ which:

... is to be found in places like Nagorno Karabakh or Bosnia-Herzegovina and is bred in conditions of insecurity and violence. The new nationalism is exclusive, that is to say, it excludes others of a different nationality, and has much in common with religious fundamentalism, the insistence that religious doctrines be followed rigidly and imposed on others. (Kaldor 2004: 168)

In an earlier article on the ‘new nationalism’, she stated that the divide is now “between those who favour a new diversity of transnational, national, and local forms of sovereignty and those who want to build fractional territorial fiefdoms” (1996: 56). New nationalism is being effectively de-legitimized. It is a ‘counter-productive project’ and “a recipe for new closed-in chaotic statelets with permanently contested borders dependent on continuing violence for survival” (1996: 53-4). New nationalism breeds ‘new wars’, which are effectively depoliticized, as Kaldor describes their origin as “fear and hatred, a criminalized economy that profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, or the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups” (2005: 179). The new wars have no political content; they are pure ‘chaos’, they have ‘no clear beginnings or ends’ (Ibid.), no political goals or motivations. They are pure borderland. Duffield says about the consequences of this non-political description that labels the economic and political dimensions of conflict as criminal:

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with the purpose of seizing state power) whereas the ‘politics of ideas’ is a liberal-democratic version of politics. The politics of ideas is a political confrontation among good friends, whereas identity politics is a political confrontation initiated by the enemy.
The idea is implanted that such activity is mainly the prerogative of a corrupt few. That is, it does not relate to wider societal changes and globalised practices. On the contrary, rather like current approaches to the (expanding) drugs trade, it is an illicit aberration that can be circumscribed and policed. This not only reinforces the need for global governance to intervene and separate the deserving poor from their undeserving leaders; perhaps more significantly, the idea that criminality is circumscribed and specific is vital if the possibility of development itself is to be maintained. Once violent, corrupt and criminal leaders are neutralised or removed, liberal peace, in alliance with the poor, can once again resume normal development. The idea that the new wars may be symptomatic of much wider societal and international transformations is not seriously considered. They remain a temporary aberration on the inevitable road to development and security. (2001: 131-2)

Kaldor subscribes to the in/out-distinction between an anti-borderland process emanating (mainly) from the West and from cosmopolitanism and then a nationalist borderland. New nationalism is a ‘form of particularistic politicization’ (1996: 47), which is foreign to cosmopolitanism. The latter is non-political in our sense of the political, as Kaldor restricts the friend/enemy-distinction to nationalism: “All nationalisms are based on a ‘we-them’ distinction in which the ‘them’ are enemies who generally pose potential military threats and have to be excluded from the claimed territory” (1996: 48). Ulrich Beck says in a similar vein that “in the mid-seventeenth century, a secular state was inconceivable, even synonymous with the end of the world, and today a non-national state is almost equally unthinkable; it breaks with the most basic political idea: the antagonism of friend and foe” (2001c: 87). The friend/enemy-distinction is reserved for the nation state. What it, in fact, shows is that cosmopolitanism is every bit as capable (and willing) to construct enemy-images, only not out of ethnic markers but out of the liberal fear of passions. When Held says, that “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction makes all states insecure and problematizes the very notion of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’” (1997: 260, my italics), then it reserves the friend/enemy distinction to the nation state era and it becomes difficult to see its endurance in the globalist era. The same goes when he and Anthony McGrew says: “The idea of ‘global politics’ challenges the traditional distinctions between the domestic/international, inside/outside, territorial/non-territorial politics, as embedded in conventional conceptions of ‘the political’” (1998: 232; 2002b: 6).

Pauline Ochoa says of cosmopolitanism that “it cannot account for the possibility of fundamental differences and, therefore, of conflict between them” (2001: 106). It’s probably more correct to say that cosmopolitanism cannot account for political conflictuality because it describes it as barbarian and old-fashioned and is, therefore, ‘forced’ to comprehend conflict as one between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, which ever way those two terms are named in the actual case. Just as liberals in general tend to confine the political to the state, cosmopolitans and likeminded tend to restrict the friend/enemy-
naming to the state or to belligerent movements, who, in the words of Kaldor, are ‘claiming state power’. This limited understanding of the political obscures the persistence of the political:

Bounded civil society depended on the existence of an ‘other’ even if there were different categories of ‘other’ – ‘civilized’ Europeans and ‘less civilized’ outsiders. The end of war as a unilateral option for state politics presupposes an acceptance of human equality; it eliminates the justification for the preservation of statist politics and the distinction between the inside and outside. (Kaldor 2003c: 115-6)

Kaldor is proposing a post-political scenario, but only because the political – as the naming of the ‘other’ and the ‘outside’ – is confined to the nation state era. But, what she and other cosmopolitans do is to turn what she calls the ‘multilateral state’ into the inside and the ‘unilateral state’ (modern state) and the ‘failed state’ into the outside (2003c: 136-141); and, again, she confines ‘ideologies of the other’ (2003c: 140) to the modern or unilateral state. There is nothing progressive or anti-statist in proclaiming an end to inside/outside or friend/enemy, as especially ones like Mary Kaldor and Ulrich Beck seem to think. It serves the interests of the powers that be who re-describe inside/outside, friend/enemy in supposedly non-statist terms. When giving the state the monopoly on this exclusion process and then proclaim the decline or end of the state, then one is blinded to the new manifestations of the very same processes proclaimed over. In this text we’re concentrating on the globalist returns of all those distinctions.

Most cosmopolitans fail to question the systematic imbalance inherent in the new post-sovereignty discourse (to be fair, it is at times remarked upon, Archibugi 2004: 16; Beck 2005: 7). The post-sovereign or cosmopolitan language cannot be activated by everyone. The new post-sovereignty discourse opens up for what I in the next chapter will call ‘sovereign inequality’. David Chandler says very correctly: “In practice, the prosecution of international justice turns out to be the prerogative of the West” and that “the practical consequences of demolishing the existing – if only juridical – equality between the states can only be to deepen their political inequality” (2000: 61, 63). The Western states can safely appropriate the post-sovereign re-description of international/global relations, as they are the ones interpreting and enforcing the new conditions of legitimate statehood. The new discourse gives the Western powers a formidable new system of legitimacy, defaming and intervention. It allows them to re-describe imperial control as protection of human rights and humanism. The new moral discourse depoliticizes the inherent inequalities of the system and hides the fact that not all states can authorize the discourse of humanity.
III. Summing up: Rulership Denied

Too often, we have become rulers in flight from rulership. (Kennedy 2004: xxiv)

In a critique of David Held and especially his concept of ‘overlapping communities of fate’, Will Kymlicka says very precisely:

… what determines the boundaries of a ‘community of fate’ is not the forces people are subjected to, but rather how they respond to those forces, and, in particular, what sorts of collectivities they identify with when responding to those forces. People belong to the same community of fate if they care about each other’s fate, and want to share each other’s fate – that is, want to meet certain challenges together, so as to share each other’s blessings and burdens. (1999: 115)

Held, like many other globalists, tends to depoliticize globalization by assuming a too simple fit between the issue and its (globalist) interpretation; and that as the only appropriate and even legitimate interpretation. Globalization and its challenges do not come with any predetermined meaning or relevant community. The critique of sovereignty and nationality as ‘obsolete’ or ‘dangerous’ is a political critique naming friends and enemies. Kymlicka has another important point. He acknowledges that “many citizens in Western democracies feel dissatisfied with their political participation” (1999: 116), but he denies that it is caused by globalization. Held gives an example of the political instrumentalization of globalization, when he makes public dissatisfaction with politics one of the causes of the present disjuncture between globalization and national politics. This dissatisfaction was noted by Held long before the globalization discourse (Held & Leftwich 1984: 139; Held 1986: 1), that is, before it became an argument for a cosmopolitanization of the state to re-connect democracy with the centres of power (Held 1994; 1995: part 3; 1996: 9). This is not to say that Held isn’t right about both the former and the present dissatisfaction but only that globalization may not have the status it is endowed with in the globalist discourse.

128 One could probably say the same about the thesis of the state as only one among ‘a complex web of interdependencies’ (Held 1984: 361). When, in the global era, this became true of the nation state a new more hardened perception of the modern nation state tends to be projected back. Held is of course aware of the complex nature of the state – he started working with (first critical theory then) state history and sociology (Held 1982, 1983, 1987, 1989; Held & Giddens 1982; Held & Krieger 1983) and his work on globalization has shown an uncommon and commendable attention to the complex nature of the state and “the enduring capacity of the state apparatus to shape the direction of domestic and international politics” (Held 1991a: 149; see also Held, Goldblatt, McGrew & Perraton 1997: 272 and their monumental Global Transformations, 1999: chap. 1). Still one can’t help seeing the continuities in the critique of the hierarchical state apparatus as a sign that globalization is less the cause of the claim that “hierarchical forms of managing global affairs are losing their efficacy and legitimacy” (Held & McGrew 2002b: 11), than the occasion for stating the position with added weight.
What I’ve been trying to show in this chapter is the exclusionary effects of the globalist and cosmopolitan discourse. The blurring of boundaries and distinctions serve the ones able to enforce his or her interpretation. Schmitt said: “For every crucial political concept, it is imperative who interpret, define and use it; who makes the actual decision as to what peace or disarmament is, what intervention, public order and security is” (1994f: 202). Once the consensus on political concepts, which international law can be said to constitute, is broken, we enter a borderland of interpretation. This is a highly political situation. Cosmopolitanism, as most other liberalisms (I disregard here non-liberal cosmopolitanisms) doesn’t reflect enough on questions of power and the political. One could fear that others will step in and use the vocabulary of liberal globalism and cosmopolitanism for non-liberal and non-cosmopolitan goals. Schmitt ends his Politische Romantik with a remark which could be used to (and was meant to) describe liberalism: “Everything that is romantic is at the disposal of other energies that are unromantic, and the sublime elevation above definition and decision is transformed into a subservient attendance upon alien power and alien decision” (1982: 228). This is a critique of, for instance, cosmopolitanism, who in their fight against methodological, political and psychological nationalism may inadvertently pave the way for stronger and much less benign forces who usurp their language in pursuance of non-cosmopolitan goals (Harvey, 2000; Laffey, 2001; Gowan, 2001; Canovan, 2001). Cosmopolitans need to understand depoliticization and repoliticization better in order not to become the fig leaf for a new global re-ordering of power and a new Western interventionism. David Kennedy says in his self-critical The Dark Sides of Virtue. Reassessing International Humanitarianism:

The human rights movement consistently underestimates the usefulness of the human rights vocabulary and machinery for people whose hearts are hard and whose political projects are repressive. The United States, The United Kingdom, Russia – but also Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians – have taken military action, intervened politically, and justified their governmental policies on the grounds of protecting human rights. Far from being a defense of the individual against the state, human rights has become a standard part of the justification for the external use of force by the state against other states and individuals. (2004: 25)

He goes on to say that “humanitarian rulership is so often rulership denied” (2004: 329), and just as the blurring of the boundaries between policing and warfare, or humanitarianism and militarism first and foremost makes policing and humanitarianism part of the military arsenal, Kennedy says, that the present humanitarian language spoken by power is less making human rights a part of governance “as it makes humanitarianism the voice of sovereignty” (2004: 344).
When Ulrich Beck says that, “Globalization is not a choice. It’s nobody’s rule. No one is in charge, no one started it, no one can stop it” (2001c: 84), it’s a truth, which hides an even bigger one. It hides, firstly, the fact that globalization is managed from somewhere, which can be localized to the metropoles of the West. Power isn’t that deterritorialized. Secondly, it hides the fact that globalization, its processes and consequences, doesn’t just happen. They have to be defined and interpreted. Globalization is, like the international community, what Margaret Canovan said about humanity. It is the “grandest but flimsiest of contemporary imagined communities” (2001: 212).

Cosmopolitanism, like liberal globalism in general, does not sufficiently acknowledge the dangers inherent in the process of indistinction. The critique of America tends to hide the dangers of political globalization by confining the problematic features of the international system in a supposedly old-fashioned politics. A ‘sin’ not less David Held exemplifies (Mephan 2005: 62); for instance when he says: “It is political and economic might which ultimately determines the effective deployment of rules and resources within and beyond borders in the Westphalian world” (1992: 27).

By making it a characteristic distinct and peculiar for the Westphalian nation state its endurance in a post-Westphalian world is obscured. Liberal globalists present problematic state practice as ‘relics’ from the realist nation state, thereby neglecting the ‘new state’, the new consolidation of power and dominance in the global system and its confirmation through war. To pierce through the fog of humanitarian war is our theme in the next and final chapter.
The Returns of Enmity

It is both curious and disquieting that democratic governments do not consider themselves capable of putting forth political arguments when faced with what is still the political object par excellence: namely war.
(Brauman 2004: 398)

On October 2, 2001 the British Prime Minister Tony Blair addressed a Labour party conference:

Today the threat is chaos, because for people with work to do, family life to balance, mortgages to pay, careers to further, pensions to provide, the yearning is for order and stability and if it doesn’t exist elsewhere it is unlikely to exist here. I have long believed this interdependence defines the new world we live in. (quoted from Johnson 2002: 213)

To Blair the threat is external; it comes from the outside. He draws a clear distinction between an inside which is peaceful, stable, mediocre in the sense discussed previously, post-political; and then an outside, which is chaotic, unorderly and unstable. The interdependence, Blair says defines our world, turns out to be highly unequal. We in the West, personified by the middle class, is peaceful and we project order out into the world (in the same speech Blair made ‘the starving, the wretched, the disposed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor, from the deserts of northern Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan’ to ‘our cause’, quoted from Johnson 2002: 220; see also Duffield 2001: chap. 2; Abrahamsen 2005). From the non-West comes disorder and terror. A frontier is made between the inside, where people live quiet and productive lives and an outside, from where the barbarians come. The zone of post-political and post-historical peace is threatened by its outside – just like we saw in chapter 5 about the continued threat from the barbarians. Liberalism arranges an opposition between itself and barbarism, peace and war, security and insecurity, comfort and fear, freedom and oppression, prosperity and poverty, which hardly leaves a choice. The liberal globalization discourse claims, explicitly or implicitly, that there is no defensible position outside the post-national constellation. That is classical depoliticization, where the political choice is masked by a supposedly given order of things, which only the deranged or criminal can be against: There is certainly no legitimate political position outside the liberal.

Schmitt was arguably one of the first and most perceptive critics of this humanitarian interventionism in his emphasis on the potentially “totalitarian implications of the liberal appeal to universal humanity. The struggle to achieve the universal order involves political activity and thus the designation of the enemy” (Auberbach 1993/4: 209); and this is exactly what liberal globalization
denies doing in the very same move in which the enemy of humanity is named, shamed and punished. In a critical discussion of Schmitt, William E. Scheuerman (1999: 146) agrees with Schmitt in his main criticism of liberal internationalism which:

… rests on an exclusionary logic by which those opposed to practices committed under its auspices are described as acting against ‘humanity’. Those challenging Allied injustice quickly become ‘criminal’ opponents of international law, whereas even a violent exercise of power under the auspices of international law represents a ‘legal’ contribution to the humanitarian-ethical pursuit of universal peace, a mere ‘police’ action in which international law is simply ‘executed’.

This chapter deals with the question of the political, violence and enmity in humanitarian discourse and warfare. The purpose is to highlight various – unfortunate – returns of the political in the post-political universe of human rights and global capitalism. The depoliticization of Europe has profound consequences for the question of violence. The translation of some violence into criminality and other into humanitarianism depoliticizes the deployment of force by denying the ‘criminals’ political status and by hiding the political nature of the humanitarian intervention:

The existence of violence may be invariant in human conduct but its manifestation and its meaning certainly are not. Political violence is not universal in the sense that what is taken to be both violent and political differs from time to time and from place to place. Just as political regimes not only specify what violence is legitimate and what is not but, together with other apparatuses of global representation, also specify what is actionable violence, relations of power simultaneously always politicise some violence while de-politicising others. (Dillon 1998: 546)

One prime example is when Western powers turn against one of its former allies who suddenly go from being a political partner and equal to a criminal – Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Noriega etc. (Derrida 2005: 97). By re-describing them in depoliticized terms, the conditions of engagement are also changed; “criminalisation translates the deeply contested history and politics of it into the reified nature of criminality and of the criminal. That, in turn, is translated by juridification into the ordering and administration of their indictment, trial, sentencing, and punishment” (Dillon 1998: 560). The different register entails different methods, which is the exact point where liberal or humanitarian war emerges. It is a so called non-war against a non-political adversary. Violence is labelled as either law enforcement or as crime: Enforcement on one side, crime on the other (example: The decision of the Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia not to investigate NATO’s actions as they are presumed legal and legitimate at the outset). The humanitarian violence shapes the new global order while at the same time closing off other options. ‘Policing’ the borders of the global is war but
one can list numerous statements from state leaders in the last ten years each proclaiming the non-warlike nature, motives and methods of their warfare. Vaclav Havel said in April 1999: “But there is one thing no reasonable person can deny: this is probably the first war that has not been waged in the name of ‘national interests’, but rather in the name of principles and values. If one can say of any war that it is ethical, or that it is being waged for ethical reasons, then it is true of this war” (quoted from Falk 1999a: 848). Leaving aside the part of the ‘reasonable person’ (and the fact that the history of warfare is filled with supposedly ‘ethical wars’), one is compelled to ask Havel: Why is a war fought for values and principles inherently and necessarily better than one fought for territory or oil? Nothing suggests there will be fewer wars or that they will be qualitatively different fought. The point, we’ll pursue in the following, is the exact opposite of Havel’s implicit claim that ‘ethical war’ is a good one, namely that there is nothing benign about ethical wars.

The hype now seems to be: ‘You got to have values. Which ones? Never mind, any will do’. As when Tony Blair said about the intervention in ex-Yugoslavia: “This is a just war, based not on territorial ambitions but on values” (quoted from Sané 2000: 42);129 the secretary-general of NATO said that Kosovo was “not about oil, or money, or new trade routes but values” (quoted from Hawthorn 1999: 152); and the then British foreign secretary, Robin Cook, declared during the Kosovo war that NATO was a ‘humanitarian alliance’ (quoted from Douzinas 2003: 167). It is just assumed that a war of values and principles are better, cleaner and more legitimate than wars of ‘national interest’ but the history of war, and not least the European religious wars, seem to suggest that wars waged in the name of ‘principles and values’ have no greater claim to morality or constraint than what is being labelled ‘traditional wars’, ‘modern wars’, ‘national interest wars’ etc. But this differentiation is massively present in liberal globalist discourse; and it probably has some connection to the inflation of ‘values and principles’ in management, marketing and politics.

Values and principles depoliticize the issue of war by referring it to a moral(istic) vocabulary, where war is placed outside the messy realities of politics, asking about motives is like demonstrating your amorality, and non-compliance is like siding with the forces of evil. In the run-up to the Kosovo war, then British minister for development, Clare Short, said that any wavering support for the intervention expressed a disposition to appeasement of fascism (Rosenberg 1999). The room for legitimate critique is becoming increasingly smaller, as Short learned, when she placed herself on the ‘wrong’ side of the war party in the run-up to the Iraq-war. The critique is placed in what Žižek calls the double blackmail: “if you are against NATO strikes you are for

129 He said almost exactly the same about the intervention in Afghanistan: “This is a new type of war, not for territory but for universal values” (quoted from Virilio 2002: 43).
Milosevic’s proto-fascist regime of ethnic cleansing, and if you are against Milosevic, you support the global capitalist New World Order” (1999: 79). War is now being depoliticized through two registers: Aar is either a humanitarian intervention carried out of moral considerations or it is a human rights violation carried out by someone ‘evil’; and evil cannot be dealt with politically. One must be delivered from evil. The evil himself is saved through his extinction (Günther 1994: 153). War is, therefore, placed in either moral or psychological categories. This has consequences for the nature of war and the role of the belligerents. They are either described as irrational – war for wars sake\(^{130}\) – or as rational and benign – war for someone else’s sake. But from the side of humanitarian warfare, it merely shifts the enemy from an open political opponent to another category seemingly less political but in actuality every bit as political and just as ready to seek out the enemy.

I. Contemporary Enmities

If we choose to be morality’s avenging angel in places like Kosovo, we may at first be pleased to see ourselves, like Kurtz in *Heart of Darkness*, as an ‘emissary of pity and progress’. But as warriors for right, faced with those we have demonized we may well succumb to Kurtz’s conclusions as well: ‘Exterminate the brutes’. (Benjamin Schwarz, quoted from Chandler 2002: 191)

Schmitt saw political enmity as limited and feared the consequences of its degeneration, once transferred to other registers. The argument is that enmity does not disappear, when we leave the political vocabulary. It re-emerges in new and possible worse versions. In this section, we’ll examine four different categories of enmity to illustrate, what is here interpreted as the return of the political – this time in distorted forms.\(^{131}\) The four categories are moral, abstract, biopolitical and individual enmity. What characterizes *political* or *conventional enmity* is that the enemy is considered an equal; it’s a symmetrical relation of enmity. There is a sense of equality, which is the precondition for rules of war (Walzer 2000: 128). The goal is to defeat, not annihilate the enemy. Once the conflict is over, one can sign a peace treaty, reassert diplomatic and commercial relations etc. The interaction, even in war, is codified and hence limited. In the interstate war, no one can claim a ‘just cause’, and none is needed, because states have the right to engage in war. No

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\(^{130}\) This was particularly evident during the Balkan wars. The Balkans was portrayed as instinctively bellicose, ‘It has always been like that on the Balkans’; ‘They have always fought each other’; ‘It’s in their blood’. And one sees it in many reports on wars in Africa. What it does – besides repeating what are essentially racist stereotypes – is to depoliticize and decontextualize the wars.

\(^{131}\) Parts of this section have been developed together with Carsten Bagge Laustsen.
one can ideally claim moral superiority. The political enmity is therefore ‘clean’, contained and limited. The enemy is ‘the other’, but recognizable and familiar even in war and enmity. The important characteristic of the political enmity is the horizontal relationship between enemies. This is seriously challenged in its other forms. One example could be the shift from Reagan’s ‘empire of evil’ to Bush Jr.’s ‘axis of evil’. The first denotes a loathed but still recognizable political form (and Reagan did negotiate with this ‘evilness’), whereas the second looses all political content and form. It’s pure evil. Evil comes in many shapes, some of them we can live with because they are, at bottom, recognized as an opponent and not as evil as such (Dean 2005).

I want to briefly mention the moral enmity before moving on to other three categories, only to later return to the moral register. The most important expression of the moral enmity is the idea of ‘just war’, which gives one the moral superiority. The enemy is degraded, deemed inferior and criminalized. In the moral vocabulary, the equal relationship between enemies is being altered to an unequal relationship between the good and the bad. Enmity goes from a non-discriminatory to a discriminatory modus operandi: “Today the enemy, just like the war itself, comes to be at once banalized (reduced to an object of routine police repression) and absolutized (as the Enemy, an absolute threat to the ethical order)” (Hardt & Negri 2000: 13). Actually there are a number of similarities between the political and the moral enmity. Both operate under the assumption that the enemy is external, visible and identifiable. The relation between friend and enemy is thought as a relation between well-defined and demarcated entities. This changes, as we move to the other categories of enmity, where the obvious in/out, friend/enemy differentiation dissolve and new attempts at their reinstatement emerge. This chapter continues the exploration of the forms of enmity started in chapter 3 on Schmitt’s concepts of the enemy: Conventional, real, absolute, unconventional, internal and depoliticized. It attempts to update Schmitt’s list and zoom in on contemporary expressions of enmity emerging from liberal post-politic societies.

Abstract Enmity

In the abstract enmity, as we find it for instance in ‘the war on drugs’, ‘the war on poverty’ and most prominently ‘the war on terror’ (which lies somewhere between the abstract and the moral enmity), we see a blurring of front lines and the disappearance of the enemy. It is highly symbolic that Osama Bin Laden has not been caught and that both his whereabouts and physical condition (dead or alive?) is unknown. This illustrates nicely the invisibility of the abstract enemy. When the first George Bush was president, he said after an US-Soviet summit in 1990 that the enemy was no
longer the USSR but rather ‘instability and unpredictability’ (Barash 1994: 44). This enemy is a total abstraction and it quickly gave way to various representations of ‘instability and unpredictability’, such as warlords (Somalia), old-fashioned dictators (Iraq war 1), terrorism (first attack on WTC), international crime (Russia) etc. This total abstraction cannot last and desperate attempts at re-enmifications was made by what James Der Derian (2001) calls the MIME-NET, that is, the military-industrial-media-entertainment network and by segments of academia (e.g. Samuel Huntington). Putting names and faces on ‘instability and unpredictability’ is, of course, also one way to avoid questions of a system that produces such features but mostly it serves to re-direct energies and anxieties but also funding, policies and wars.

One is, of course, always tempted to put a face on this invisible enemy: The inner city crackhead in the war on drugs, single-parent, teenage-mothers in the war on poverty, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Zarkawi in the war on terror. But these are just symbols; their ‘elimination’ will not win the fight. In actuality, one of the characteristics of the abstract enmity is that the war cannot be won. War becomes unending and metaphorical. When America named its war on Al-Qaeda ‘Infinite Justice’ (they quickly abandoned the name) it is not only justice that’s infinite. It’s the war itself.132 We see the blurring of war/peace as the war on poverty and drugs become part of daily administration or as the terror alerts become routine. When the ‘war’ is daily life and the emergency measures become law – as in the Patriot act – we see a blurring of classical differences. When the Department for Homeland Security tells you to be alert at all times, then there are no difference between peace and war. The same goes for the differentiation between friend and enemy; now, the enemy is potentially everyone. Drug tests in schools or the labelling of all Arab Muslims (and Western converts) as possible terrorists makes the distinction between friend and enemy impossible. As Michael Howard says, the declaration of war makes action necessary: “To declare that one is at war is immediately to create a war psychosis that may be totally counter-productive for the objective being sought. It arouses an immediate expectation, and demand, for spectacular military action against some easily identifiable adversary, preferably a hostile state – action leading to decisive results” (2002: 9). But, here is no decisive battle, no front line or any destructable enemy in the abstract war. This doesn’t make the abstract war any less destructive. Actually quite the opposite. Because victory keeps eluding, there is a certain eliminist tendency in the abstract enmity. In the war on poverty it can be

132 Jacques Rancière says: “I think that it was fairly appropriate. An infinite justice is not only a justice that dismisses the principles of International Law, prohibiting interference in the ‘internal affairs’ of another state; it is a justice which erases all the distinctions that used to define the field of justice in general: the distinctions between law and fact, legal punishment and private retaliation, justice, police and war. All those distinctions are boiled down to a sheer ethical conflict between Good and Evil” (2004: 309).
harsh welfare cuts, disciplinary regimes and even racist ‘science’ (The Bell Curve); in the war on
drugs it can be militant police measures and actual wars in Third World countries (Columbia,
Panama), and in the war on terror it is shadow warriors, executions without trial, rendition of
suspects to countries who routinely torture prisoners or to CIA-controlled ‘black holes’ etc.
American Defence Minister Rumsfeld allegedly complained that there were no good targets in
Afghanistan, why he pressed for a war in Iraq; and the vice president Dick Cheney said that “to the
extent we define our task broadly, including those who support terrorism, then we get at states. And
it’s easier to find them than it is to find bin Laden” (quoted from Barber 2004: 126). This shows the
problems of fighting an abstract enemy. The abstract enemy is of course often given a face, Osama
Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic to name just the most recent. But what that
shows, is that they are no real-life substitute for the abstract enemy. The capture of the latter two
(and when Bin Laden gets captured or killed) has had no detectable effect on the problems they
were supposed to represent. The naming of these as substitutes for the abstract enemy shows the
pedagogical or propagandistic problems of these new wars. We tend to frame them in the language
of classic warfare with identifiable enemies, battles and fronts, victories and defeats. It’s important
to stress that the apparent indistinction is systematically abandoned or repressed, as enemies are
named and pursued. The indistinction between war and peace doesn’t dissolve everything; it makes
peace look, feel and be like war, not the other way round.
Hardt and Negri rightly say, that “one cannot win such a war, or, rather, it has to be won again
every day. War has thus become virtually indistinguishable from police activity” (2004: 14). The
separation between military and police gets blurred, as the police is militarized and the military
takes on policing missions. Hardt and Negri notice one other very important shift: “Whereas
‘defense’ involves a protective barrier against external threats, ‘security’ justifies a constant martial
activity equally in the homeland and abroad” (2004: 21). The shift from defense to security is
inherent in the new paradigm, in the blurring of police and military. It furthers the expansion and
perpetuation of humanitarian wars, as ‘the threat’ pluralizes both internally and externally. The
‘wars for security’ tend to become permanent. Slavoj Žižek talks of “a strange war in which the
enemy is criminalised if he defends himself and returns fire with fire” (2002b). As opposed to the
political enmity, where a deal can be struck with ‘the other’, in the other forms of enmity, there are
no recognized other to deal with. Every move from the moral or criminalized enemy is taken as
proof of his status. Defence or freedom fight becomes terrorism, dislike of foreign occupation or
bombardment becomes proof (in Serbia as well as Iraq) of rampant nationalism or Islamist
fundamentalism. Now, the goal is not the defeat but the elimination of the enemy. Donald Rumsfeld said to a journalist, that the aim of the bombardment in Afghanistan was “to kill as many Taliban soldiers and al-Qaeda members as possible” (quoted from Žižek 2002a: 91). And his predecessor, Lawrence Eagleburger stated: “There is only one way to begin to deal with people like this, and that is … to kill some of them even if they are not immediately directly involved in this thing” (quoted from Ismael & Ismael 2002: 161). Those statements reveal a completely other goal of warfare than ‘pure’ political objectives. The abstract enemy needs a shape and a face to serve as focus of attention, legislation and smart bombs, even if he is only the image of an abstract enemy. This has dealt with terrorism as the abstract enemy. Next we’ll add its features as a moral enemy by elaborating on the concepts of real and absolute enmity, already discussed in chapter 3, and taking it to the contemporary partisan scene, terrorism.

Partisans and Terrorists

In 1963 Schmitt wrote a book on the partisan. Partisan warfare is different from interstate warfare, where both the enmity and the war were contained. In partisan warfare both enmity and the conduct of war becomes radicalized: “The modern partisan expects neither justice nor mercy from his enemy. He has turned away from the conventional enmity of the domesticated [gezähmten] and contained [gehegten] war and has set out into another sphere, the sphere of real enmity, which accelerates through terror and counter-terror into annihilation” (Schmitt 2002: 17, my italics). The partisan has four characteristics: 1) he is irregular; 2) has enhanced mobility; 3) he is political; and 4) he is telluric. The irregularity is perhaps the most obvious and need no further comment. The mobility aspect concerns primarily the way of warfare: The partisan resorts to hit and run operations, ambushes, and he always tries to avoid the open battle. New technology makes this possible and renders him more mobile. The partisan is also political; he is, according to Schmitt, one of the few genuine political actors left in a world characterized by play and post-politics. The partisan knows the difference between friend and enemy and he risks his life in the struggle. The name ‘partisan’ comes according to Schmitt from ‘party’: “The partisan is the one who has one hundred percent taken side [Partei]” (Schmitt & Schickel 1995: 631). The partisan is the new total

133 “When we’re through with [the Taliban and al-Qaeda], they will have flies walking across their eyeballs”; “We’re going to kill them. We’re going to put their heads on sticks. We’re going to rock their world” (Cofer Black, CIA’s counterterrorism deputy, quoted from Barber 2004: 106, 107).

134 The commentary on the book has been limited prior to 9/11, see Tommissen 1968; Aron 1983: 363-371; Freund 1988; Vad 1996. But post-9/11 it has received increasing attention, see Müller 2003a: 144-155; Bulloch 2004; Goodson 2004a, b; Gasché 2004; Anidjar 2004; Horn 2004; Grange 2004; Laclau 2005; Slomp 2005 and even two translations into English, see Telos, no. 127, 2004, pp. 11-78 and www.msupress.msu.edu/journals/cr/schmitt.pdf.
party. The fourth characteristic is the telluric aspect, his earthly groundedness, his basically defensive position. The partisan defends his native soil from invaders.

Schmitt notes two interesting aspects. Firstly, the technologically enhanced mobility risks changing the nature of the partisan. He might be ungrounded [entortet] (2002: 27), that is, losing his telluric and defensive aspect. Secondly, Schmitt introduces a differentiation between two types of partisan: The telluric, reactive and defensive and then the ‘world-aggressive revolutionary activist’ (2002: 35), by which he is, of course, referring to the communist partisans, where the defensive starting point has been hijacked by a universalistic ideology. The partisan needs the help of outside forces both for supplies and weapons and for political recognition and legitimacy. This enhances the danger of the outsider hijacking the partisan struggle for his own purposes: “He becomes the manipulated tool of a world-revolutionary aggression. He is simply sacrificed and forced to betray all he took up arms for and all that the telluric character, the legitimacy of his partisan irregularity, was rooted in” (2002: 77). The enmity of the genuine partisan is what Schmitt calls the ‘real enemy’, whereas the world-revolutionary has an ‘absolute enemy’ (1996d: 18). In the real enmity, there is an identifiable enemy standing on your ground. The war is about kicking him out. The enmity is, therefore, limited in time, geography and purpose: “He defends a piece of land which he has an autochthon relation with. He basic position remains defensive” (2002: 93). The world-revolutionary, on the other hand, has a universal mission. His immediate battle is only a local fight in the global struggle but his enemy is a representative for the global, absolute enemy and then the war becomes “an absolute war and the partisan turns into carrier of absolute enmity against an absolute enemy” (2002: 91). This transition from real to absolute enmity was first conceived by Lenin, who radicalized Marx and Engels’s concept of class warfare that were still too much dependent on liberal ideas about the automatic progression of history:

What Lenin could and thoroughly did learn from Clausewitz is not only the famous formula of war as the continuation of politics. It is the additional insight that in the era of revolution the differentiation between friend and enemy is the primary and is what determines both the war and the politics. For Lenin only the revolutionary war is a true war because only that springs out of the absolute enmity. All others are conventional play. (2002: 55-6, my italics)

Looking at both contemporary terrorism and counter-terrorism, we see some interesting parallels that are not without bearing on our immediate subject of enmity. Asymmetric warfare is just another word for irregularity and the technologically induced mobility – to the point where the terrorists become almost virtual – is visible in their use of airplanes as weapons and in the use of the internet
and mobile phones to document their atrocities almost live. Their political character in a Schmittian sense has been claimed by for instance Žižek and Baudrillard as ‘the beasts of death’, who demonstrate their superiority in sacrificing themselves, whereas we fat and tired Westerners cannot even realize the war taking place, let alone make the necessary sacrifices (Berman 2003). Insistence on their political nature helps avoid the problems of self-serving reductionism, displayed by Michael Ignatieff in chapter 1. There are good reasons, as evident later, for taking them serious as political forces, instead of nihilist evil-doers. As to the telluric and the world-aggressive, the defensive contra the offensive, Herfried Münkler writes in his book on ‘new wars’:

Whereas guerrilla warfare is basically a defensive form of asymmetrization, designed for use against a military superior occupying power, terrorism is the offensive form of the strategic asymmetrization of force … Terrorism and guerrilla warfare differ from each other … also because the latter generate asymmetries through the slowing down of war and the former through its speeding up. (2005: 28-9)

Derrida says in his book on rogue states, that Schmitt’s concept of the partisan is still thought in a nation state perspective. It is the nation state, which is to be rescued, conquered or created (2005: 123, 156; see also Borradori 2003: 100-102). But this is only true for the telluric partisan, not the world-aggressive where the enemy and the enmity transcend locality and concreteness. The enemy is a social group, an economic system, a religion or whatever that is not limited to a nation state. It is worth reflecting on Al-Qaeda as an expression of the transition from a telluric to a world-aggressive partisan (see also Behnke 2004: 300-311). They started as a telluric and defensive force, fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, aided by America who enhanced their mobility with for instance the Stinger-missile and who used them for another purpose than the occupation, namely to let the Soviet Union bleed from its weak underbelly. Through this they changed into a world-aggressive force who had no trouble changing enemy from the Soviets to the Americans as they had become expressions of the same secular threat to Islam. Their aim is not limited to the liberation of a particular territory. That is only steps on the way to the ultimate goal, which is global in scope and ambition (Goldstone 2002: 149). Michael Mann, in his book on American foreign policy, Incoherent Empire, also draws attention to the importance of the difference between national and international terrorists (2003: 159-60). As he argues, one of the problems with a global war on terror, a war to end terrorism, not a specific terrorist organization but terrorism as such, is that it will globalize nationally limited terrorists or liberation groups by inscribing their hitherto national campaign into a global conflict between terrorism and anti-terrorism. This changes the
conflict from a contained to a global one and the enmity changes from the concrete to the absolute; and as stated in the first quote, the war then “accelerates through terror and counter-terror into annihilation”. In his address to Congress nine days after 9/11, Bush said, that “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (quoted from Roberts 2005: 113). But terrorists of global ambition if not reach is exactly what the war on terror is producing. It seems that the most potent anti-terrorism strategy is not to globalize the war on terror but to de-globalize terrorism.

The cycle of terror and anti-terror (or partisans and counter-partisans, see Farred 2004) is well illustrated by a comment by an American advisor to the civilian authority in Baghdad who said: “The only way we can win is to go unconventional. We’re going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. We’ve got to scare the Iraqis into submission” (quoted by Moreiras 2005: 10, who speaks of the American practice of ‘preemptive manhunt’ as a counter-partisan tactic mirroring partisan methodology). The irregular network terrorism is being met with an armed network response (Dillon 2002; Duffield 2002). Terrorism and the Revolution in Military Affairs are powering each other, pushing war and enmity beyond its conventional delimitations. In this kind of war, there is no equality or horizontality. The war can, therefore, not end with a peace treaty or a negotiation because there’s no one on the other side. This, at least, was one of the pacifying effects of the interstate system: The war could be won before total victory. You needn’t be the only one standing on the battlefield.

David Meltzer (2002) has in a very interesting article argued for the reclassification of Al-Qaeda from terrorists to irregular forces, thereby making it possible to initiate negotiations, conduct prison exchanges, make local peace agreements and ultimately declare the war ended.135 Neither of this is possible in the abstract enmity. There doesn’t even seem to be the possibility, as there was with America and the Taleban regime prior to 9/11, of what G.R. Berridge (1994) calls ‘unconventional diplomacy’, that is communication between actors, enemies even, without mutual recognition and diplomatic relations. What Meltzer is actually proposing is moving the enmity from the absolute to the political, as the only possibility of stopping the total destruction, which is the current goal of both camps. George Bush has received a lot of heat for saying that ‘You’re either with us or against us’ (and Osama Bin Laden considerable less critique for the exact same) but this is inherent in the

135 Douglas R. Burgess has in another very interesting article (2005) argued for the reclassification of terrorists as pirates. There are many interesting parallels between the emergence, methods, nature but also illegalization and combating of pirates and terrorists. One can also mention that Osama Bin Ladin actually offered Europe a separate or local peace if they pulled out of Iraq. He, a non-state actor, tried to engage in classic diplomatic manoeuvring.
moral and at times the abstract enmity: “When war is fought to enforce the law, to assist the establishment of justice, neutrality becomes morally disreputable” (Münkler 2005: 64). This is the logical result of a discriminatory concept of enmity. There is only one legitimate position.

**War is Peace, Peace is War**

Another register in which the lines are blurred or rather non-existent is in the *biopolitical enmity* as theorized by Michel Foucault (2003; Kelly 2004) and Giorgio Agamben (1998). Here, we most clearly see the blurring of lines. In the biopolitical enmity, the enemy is named in biological and psychological terms and the enemy is found within the social body. The line between an inside, the friends, and an outside, the enemies, is no longer meaningful. The enemy lives among us and the biopolitical state takes it upon itself to single out those, who threaten the health of the community. This concept of enmity is also highly discriminatory. It establishes a hierarchy of worthy life and starts to talk about ‘life unworthy of being lived’ and its annihilation (Agamben 1998: 136), most dramatically and tragically executed in the Nazi concentration and euthanasia program but for both Foucault and Agamben a constitutive element in modernity. The goal of a biopolitical war is not to reach a modus vivendi with the enemy but to eliminate him. This is a total war:

... the enemies who have to be done away with are *not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats*, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results *not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat* to and the improvement of the species or race. (Foucault 2003: 256, my italics)

What the biopolitical enmity makes clear is the normalization of the exceptional, as the biopolitical state declares war on parts of its own population, not only in form of extermination but also quarantining of the sick, surveillance, exclusions, imprisonments, institutionalization of the abnormal etc. The heroic battles are replaced by micro-technologies that maximize the mortality of some groups and minimize it for others. Instead of individual killings, we get what Ernst Fraenkel with a very precise expression called ‘civil death’ (1969: 95) or what Foucault called ‘statistical death’. The sovereign does not manifest himself in splendid displays of power, public executions, but in the actions of the secret police, disappearances and extermination camps (Foucault 2003: chap. 11). The biopolitical state emerges, where racism and statism meets.
It is no longer: ‘We have to defend ourselves against society’, but ‘We have to defend society against all the biological threats posed by the other, the subrace, the counterrace that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence’ … we see the appearance of a State racism: a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification (Foucault 2003: 61-2)

The generalization of biopolitical technologies marks the breaking point of the difference between norm and exception. In the state of exception, the state can stand in relation of war with its own citizens, the difference between inside (order) and outside (chaos), which informs the norm/exception, law/lawless, friend/enemy of the national/international divide is doubled within the nation state itself. The borderland is reinstated as the exception. Then, the state becomes, in the words of Agamben, ‘a killing machine’ (2005: 86; see also Agamben 2000: chap. 4; 2002; 2004). The breakdown of the differentiations is where the state of exception and biopolitics meet. Biopolitics is a kind of universalized state of exception and it also opens up for the final form of enmity discussed next, the individualized enmity, by highlighting the invisibility of the enemy. In the biopolitical enmity, we can see how arbitrary the dividing line between friend and enemy is. The enemy is not given as enemy, as the many discussions in Nazi circles about who was and who wasn’t a Jew testifies to. Biopolitical enmity is another sign of the state’s difficulties with limiting or containing the enemy category. The biopolitical enemy can be everyone – one’s blood, heritage, disease or whatever is not necessarily identifiable. Enmity is generalized. The biopolitical enmity is the perhaps clearest example of the blurring of differentiations, and it’s also where the exception becomes permanent; the, as Oren Gross calls them, ‘assumptions of separation’ (2003: 1069-1096)136 looses all practical and symbolic value, and the process of naming the enemy ultimately includes everyone. Hardt and Negri (2004: chap. 1.2) also discovers a close link between the revolution in military affairs and biopower, as the new counter-insurgency warfare aims at ‘full spectrum dominance’ that combines military force with social, economic, political, psychological and ideological control. The separation between civil and military is effectively abolished. Counter-insurgency now operates on the full range of the social. As they say: “Counter-insurgency is a full-time job” (2004: 54; see also Dillon & Reid 2001); no separation between civilian and combatant, peace and war, information and propaganda. It’s all part of an effort, which in actuality makes every home a battlefield and no one a neutral or civilian.137 The enemy is in some way always invisible.

136 Gross, Ignatieff (2005: chap. 2) and Scheuerman (1999, 2000b) draw attention to the long trend of blurring normality and exception and of giving the executive greatly expanded prerogatives outside democratic control.
137 A former Marine Corps officer linked to the American neoconservatives, Adam Mersereau, wrote in the lead-up to the Iraq-war: "By definition, limited war can achieve only limited results. If we are going to win a total victory in the
No one is the enemy in himself. The enemy needs to be singled out and named as such. It is an almost therapeutic act of the state, when it names the enemy. It soothes our angst of the unknown and replaces it with a fear of the known. When this move is not performed, the result is paranoia.

The last register of enmity, to be discussed here, is the *individualized or privatized enmity* or what we could call the sub-politics of enmity. Schmitt strenuously maintained that the enmity, he was dealing with, was the public enemy, *hostis*, and not the private enemy, *inimicus*. Common to all the above forms of enmity is that the state has pointed out the enemy and named him or her a ‘public enemy’, however diffuse the exact enemy was. This final form of enmity is an element in a broader category, we could call the ‘sub-state returns of the enemy, which also includes *ethnic enmity* in ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2005) and *religious enmity* in orthodox (and oftentimes violent) Islamist, Jewish and Christian groups mobilizing against secular state and society. All three expressions are characterized by the withdrawal of the state in the construction of identity (and enmity) and, as Manuel Castells says: “When the world becomes too large to be controlled, social actors aim at shrinking it back to their size and reach … God, nation, family and community will provide unbreakable, eternal codes, around which a counter-offensive will be mounted against the culture of real virtuality” (1997: 66). In the following, we’ll briefly concentrate on only the individualized enmity.

A limit example is the designation of the ‘public enemy’ within, the criminals on the ‘most wanted’ list of the FBI (see www.fbi.gov/mostwant.htm), which was started by J. Edgar Hoover. They are named as enemies to the public and at the same time the public is asked to help in their capture. Their danger to the public is obviously not meant as a danger to the existence of society; “Surely they were less of a threat to the overall populace than any number of other threats arising from the social and economic conditions of the time. But unlike poverty, say, or disease, this particular threat could be particularized and individualized” (Rieber & Kelly 1991: 19). The public enemy is the state’s naming of an enemy, which isn’t really an enemy in any existential sense. Rieber and Kelly continue: “This, then, is the logic of declaring public enemies. By particularizing certain individuals...”
as a threat to the established social order, ultimately to civilization, a society gains licence to perpetuate that order without further reflection on it” (Ibid.). This perpetuation breaks down, as we enter the individualized enmity.

Now, we’re experiencing signs of what Ulrich Beck has called ‘the state without enemies’: “This is not a state without enemy stereotypes, but rather a state in search of the lost enemy” (1998b: 141). A state without enemies is a state that hasn’t (yet) named the enemy – one of its primary tasks – and who has, therefore, left the naming to the citizens as individuals. As Beck further says: “The pogroms against foreigners are also a reaction to this lack of enemies” (1998b: 142). With the individualized enmity, the final barrier between the public and the private enemy breaks down, leaving us with no points of differentiation. Here, there are enemies everywhere. This is the paranoid form of enmity, its pogrom form. No one authoritatively makes the distinction between friend and enemy. An example is the already mentioned Department for Homeland Security who on their website: www.ready.gov tells people: ‘Don’t be afraid. Be ready’, and they accompany this with a lot of information on how to deal with various catastrophes and terrorist attacks. The British government have a similar site: www.londonprepared.gov.uk.

The flip side to this preparedness is, of course, the feeling that disaster is imminent. The state is actually saying: ‘We can’t protect you. We can’t find and eliminate the enemy. You’re on your own’. Increasingly, in the war on terror the state gives up its Hobbesian (safety) and its Lockean task (rule of law). Safety has become a personal responsibility. The political is shifted from the state to the individual. The individual is left to set the difference between friend and enemy. This is a privatization or individualization of the political in a Schmittian sense. The violent attacks following 9/11 expressed a frustration concerning the identity of the enemy. Innocent, but foreign looking, people became targets of hate crimes because they stood out and that became markers of their enemy status. This was a way to differentiate, a way to individually transform angst to fear, and fear to action. The assaults were a sign of the decay of the political, the retreat of the state (the visits of state leaders in mosques was a way of saying, ‘the Muslims are not the enemy’ to the public, a statement often lost on people and often forgotten by the state leaders themselves).

The political enmity has a concrete and visible enemy, external to the political entity, against whom a contained and limited war in both time and means is waged. The enemy is one’s equal, respected as such, and there are no possibilities for claims of moral superiority. The relationship is horizontal. Already the moral enmity starts to blur this enmity by allowing moral differentiation and thereby a vertical relationship among unequals. Where the political enemy is a concrete enemy, it tends to
become a total enemy in the other registers which allows for a whole other set of instruments. The war becomes harder to contain. It tends to become permanent, to infiltrate the civil life as well, to make the distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, foreign and domestic politics, and war and peace increasingly meaningless (Hardt & Negri 2004: part 1). A precedent for permanent war and the blurring of differences is the sanction and bombing regime inflicted upon Iraq after the first Gulf war. This low-intensity warfare (a cruel concept) became routine, daily bombardments and slow starvation as non-war and non-peace (Gregory 2004: chap. 7), but, again, a lot more like war than like peace.

This is potentially very dangerous, for what it most often means is that the combatant category becomes universalized, that foreign policy imperatives of existential danger and extreme measures comes to supersede domestic policies, and that war becomes the normal state of affairs. The exceptional becomes the norm. This is actually the exact reverse of what liberal globalism hopes and proclaims. Enmity is not replaced by friendship; the domestic order is not copied onto the foreign sphere; peace is not becoming perpetual. What this discussion reveals is: “Although we are now able to fight wars only on the condition that they are not described as such, these wars do not thereby ‘escape the logic of the political’” (Meister 2002: 101).

**Enemy of Humanity: The Hierarchization of Lives**

We can now return to the *moral enmity* and its appearance in humanitarian wars. Schmitt argues that one of the main contributions of the interstate law was the exclusion of the just war with its discriminatory concept of enmity. What we might be witnessing is its return in what Costas Douzinas calls ‘the postmodern just cause, human rights’ (2002: 25; see also Pittock 2003). The dangers of just war were already visible in their religious expression: “A one-sided and exaggerated emphasis on just cause may generate a moral triumphalism and a moral enthusiasm for war that transform a ‘just’ war into a ‘holy’ or a crusading war” (Coates 1997: 146). That is the point of the critique of contemporary liberal interventionism as a ‘secular holy war’ (Virilio 2000: 9):

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138 One should of course not insinuate that most liberal interventionist are aware of the danger. Michael Ignatieff writes about “the immense moral prestige which has accrued to human rights makes it a seductive, even unanswerable justification for the use of force. The language of human rights easily lends itself to the invention of a virtual moral world peopled by demonized enemies and rogue states, facing virtuous allies and noble armies” (2001b: 213-4). And in the same book on Kosovo, he makes a number of interesting observations on the present virtualization of war and its consequences for morality and politics.
Whoever claims to be waging a just war already believes that the legal entitlements of the two adversaries are asymmetrical: one has all the right on its side, the other all the wrong. The model is that of the criminal who must be rendered harmless by police action and, once arrested, brought before the courts. Or else, in a kind of ratcheting up of penal conceptions, the adversary becomes an incarnation of evil who must be wiped off the face of the earth. Such notions are especially present where religious fundamentalism has made its way into politics. Just war and holy war stand opposed to each other as mirror images. They constitute a symmetry of asymmetries … (Münkler 2005: 30)

As already indicated, the important thing here about humanitarian wars are the changes in the concept of enmity. The enemy is de-legitimized; he or she is not ‘the other’, with whom one can stand in a normal, if tense, relationship, but ‘the barbarian’, ‘the war criminal’, ‘the evil’, with whom there can be no compromise and no peace:

When you claim to prosecute a war in the name of ‘human rights’ – a humanitarian war – you deprive yourself of the possibility of negotiating a cessation of hostilities with your enemy. If the enemy is a torturer, the enemy of the human race, there is no alternative but the extremes of total war and unconditional surrender. (Virilio 2000: 8-9)

What is feared in this kind of critique, is the discriminatory concept of enmity, the hierarchization of life, as demonstrated by the surgical warfare of the Western powers, which is characterized by a “strange inversion in the nature of the victims … in which most of the casualties are civilians and the military personnel appear to be a protected species” (Virilio 2000: 14). It is often remarked upon, that the main victims of humanitarian warfare seem to be the ones the war is being fought to protect, and their deaths are being excused as ‘accidents’, for whom no one is responsible (Owens 2003). A remarkably candid expression of this, which was heard often at the time of the Afghan war, and which was also used in Kosovo, appeared in an Observer lead column in 2001:

UNICEF reported last week that 100,000 more children will die during this winter … if bombing of the country continues … One hundred thousand more deaths if bombing goes on. A greater good squandered if it ceases … The only truly humanitarian outcome for Afghanistan’s starving now requires the downfall of the Taliban government. (quoted from Chandler 2002: 51)

This was not a question for or against the war, but a temporal cessation of bombings so that food supplies could get through. But, once victimized, you’re really in trouble. Not only are your agency taken from you – people act on your behalf, with or most often without your consent – but you are also not counted as an individual but as an anonymous victim. Their status as political subjects is
taken away from them, which opens up for others acting, speaking and bombing on their behalf.\footnote{Something similar happens to those placed in a limbo between victim and perpetrator, as the Serbian people, obviously and objectively suffering under Milosevic’s regime but culpable for electing him. This made Daniel Goldhagen claim not only a direct similarity between Serbia and Nazi-Germany but also: “The majority of the Serbian people, by supporting or condoning Milosevic’s eliminationist politics, have rendered themselves both legally and morally incompetent to conduct their own affairs and a presumptive ongoing danger to other” (quoted from Chandler 2002: 195). There are a number of interesting things about this quote. Firstly, what does he mean by ‘legally incompetent’? Secondly ‘morally incompetent’ is exactly, what we’re discussing, and this is an excellent example of the depoliticization of Serbian politics, redrawing it along moralistic lines. The Serbian people are no longer competent to conduct their own affairs, which basically makes them a pre-political multitude in need of ‘liberal imperialism’. Finally, if the (majority of the) Serbian people are guilty of Milosevic’s eliminationist politics, because they either supported or condoned him, which must mean voted for and didn’t rebel against him, are the majority of the peoples of America, UK, Denmark and other members of the coalition forces in the war on Iraq equally guilty of that war’s illegality and possible war crimes? We’re probably right to conclude that Goldhagen hasn’t made that connection.} The other side of this is, of course, that the humanitarian warriors are kept out of harm’s way. Surgical warfare is only clean and bloodless in one end of the knife, and the West has the biggest knife in town. This throws some doubt on the moral stature of the engagement, especially when operations are planned and executed, so that coalition soldiers will not be harmed even if this, as in high altitude bombings, will result in a lot more civilian casualties: “the celebration of the new humane and victimless wars conceals the strict hierarchisation of the value of life … But a war in which a soldier’s life is more valuable than those of many civilians cannot be moral or humanitarian” (Douzinas 2002: 26). The shift from a political to a moral vocabulary, from the opponent to the victim and the criminal, has potentially dangerous consequences (which is, of course, not to say that interstate wars were nice and cosy, it was just different dangers). The fear is, then, that when all the casualties are on one side, and they are regrettably necessary for the greater good, and the initiators of war are protected from its effects, soldiers are not killed and societies are not affected, except as spectators, there is not much restraint hindering the next war and the next. This is what we’ll discuss in the next and final section.
II. Humanitarian Warfare

The articulation of concrete good and evil in abstract terms is limiting not only for victims. The human rights vocabulary makes us think of evil as a social machine, a theatre of roles, in which people are ‘victims’, ‘violators’, and ‘bystanders’. At its most effective, human rights portrays victims as passive and innocent, violators as abnormal, and human rights professionals as heroic. Only the bystanders are figured in ambivalent or uncertain terms. (Kennedy 2004: 14)

The returns of enmity shows the persistence of the political; and it also shows the ease by which the enemy becomes a total enemy not to be defeated, but destroyed. In principle, the political enemy was safe as a state or regime. Defeat would entail costs but not elimination. Wars were fought for a better position at the negotiation table. Now, humanitarian wars are fought for unconditional surrender. Moral discourse and the critique of state sovereignty becomes the language of war. It describes some actions as violence and similar actions as non-violence; some transgressors of international law as criminals and others as law enforcers. This shows itself in the use of words. The general strategy in contemporary European liberalism is to express European use of force as ‘police operations’ – or as David Held calls it, ‘a robust form of international law enforcement’ (2004a: 145). Mary Kaldor writes that “the main task of defence forces is not defence of borders but humanitarian intervention … The task is more like policing than classic soldiering” (2000: 61 see also 2003a: 196, 2003b). This use of words is a version of the domestic analogy, where the police of the domestic sphere shall replace the military of the international sphere. So, we get force without violence, and war without warriors. Humanitarian ‘violence’ is like getting a visit from the police, after you’ve been robbed (of course, this presupposes a Western image of a kind and honest police force). And it presupposes that you’re the one being robbed, and not the robber, for it to be a nice picture. The problems with the shift from politics to policing are at least twofold. For one, it depoliticizes the politics behind the policing. Secondly, it creates a distorted picture of ‘international law-enforcement’, which is being increasingly militarized and coercive. It does not, nor is it likely, to resemble the policing of a quiet, obese welfare state. In the following, we’ll pursue the practice and legitimization of humanitarian warfare, as well as its potential and unintended consequences and shadow sides, as the enemy of humanity is named and bombed.
**Perpetual Interventionism**

In the dis-recognition of the humanitarian enemy is a disregard or even contempt for sovereignty and autonomy. These are now being re-described as highly problematic, dangerous even. Ken Booth says that Westphalian sovereignty is ‘a tyrant’s charter’. He talks of ‘the destructive and dismal rationality of Westphalia, Machiavelli and Clausewitz’ (1995: 116, 119). Now, it seems that appeals to the state legitimation principle are what get you in trouble in the global playground: “Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty” (Rasch 2003: 141). The new barbarism, that invites the conquerors, is, as noted above, nation state sovereignty. You must lay our country bare for the flows or be pierced open by force. Those are the options in the postnational constellation. Humanitarian warfare is not limited to the defeat of an enemy, otherwise left alone. Now, “he is an enemy who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only” (Schmitt, 1996a: 37); an enemy forcibly changed, educated, normalized.

This is what Schmitt saw in his critique of the liberal attempt to banish war; it becomes instead a new reason for more wars (1996a: 57). He remarks upon the “summary and the even panic idea of totality which is used for propaganda purposes to paint the allegedly totalitarian states as a misanthropic and murderous Leviathan” (1988: 325). This image completely alters the rationale and legitimization for war. Action is forced upon benign forces, whose deployment of force is beyond questioning. They are – in opposition to the ‘totalitarian state’, ‘the new Hitler’, ‘the slaughter of the Balkans’ – all good. Liberal interventionism has, what Danilo Zolo with a great expression calls, the ‘presumption of humanitarian innocence’ (2002: 109-114), or it is what Derrida in his book on rogue states calls ‘the autoimmune humanitarian’ (2005: 35). The new humanitarian lingo gives the ‘humanitarians’ a great deal of legitimacy, which can be cashed in as interventions and changes in both the inner workings of states and in the international system. Schmitt also said it pointedly: “Whoever works within the law is no disturber, no aggressor, no saboteur. Legality proves to be an ineluctable method of revolutionary change” (2005a: 927). Liberal interventionism describes itself as being within the law – even when, as in Kosovo, they transgressed existing international law!

The presumption of humanitarian innocence, legality and legitimacy is a powerful instrument for radically re-ordering the world: “the entire structure of the existing international institutions which are devoted to the maintaining of peace lends itself in reality to a very different end: the diplomatic preparation for, and formal legalization and legitimization of, war” (Zolo 1997: 43). The British foreign minister, Robin Cook said about the war in Kosovo:
There are now two Europes competing for the soul of our continent. One still follows the race ideology that blighted our continent under the fascists. The other emerged fifty years ago out from behind the shadow of the Second World War. The conflict between the international community and Yugoslavia is the struggle between these two Europes. (quoted from Rasmussen 2000: 11)

Notice how, once more, Europe silently translates into the international community, just as an European experience becomes a global dichotomic one: Western Europe equals the international community and make your choice: Europe or ‘race ideology’. The war in Kosovo is nothing less than a fight to end history. Milosevic still lives in history. To him, war is still a means to achieve political ends. We can say that Milosevic (and America although in a completely different way) questions the end of history in Europe. He must, therefore, be stopped and America criticized. The war in Kosovo gained an enormous importance as the proof of European peace. This was the last remnant of a dying age, Europe’s past, being sorted out by the powers of good, Europe’s present and future. In the mind of European liberals, war no longer serves the progression of history, but the defence of its end. This investment in a post-political state of affairs makes every threat a life-defining threat. Every threat contains the possibility of the return of history and the return of the political. So, as Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2000: 12) says, humanitarian intervention becomes the continuation of the democratic peace with other means; and Julian Reid (2004: 66) concurs: “Liberal wars are vindicated in the name of liberal peace”.

The liberal wars, then, may not be fought for the sake of the victims but for the sake of liberalism. There is still strong support for the Kosovo war among European liberals, despite the fact that the evidence seems to suggest that the intervention intensified and accelerated what it was meant to prevent; despite the fact that the intervention confirmed the old saying that yesterday’s oppressed becomes tomorrow’s oppressors, as the Kosovar Serbs not experience; and despite the fact that Kosovo is still a comatose patient, only breathing through organized crime, warlordism and foreign aid. That seems to suggest that the Kosovars weren’t the real object of interest for the intervention. It was a ‘Europe’, which couldn’t allow it to happen here again and it was because, as Beck says: “International law loosens the nation state borders of the world. This development has been under way at least since the end of WW2 and reached a temporary high point during the Kosovo war” (1999b: 984, my italics). Kosovo became the proof and tool of post-nationalism. Inherent in the new liberal humanitarianism may be a constant and pressing drive for ever more interventions with few

\[1^{40}\] In Denmark, as probably in other countries, the prime minister refused to call it a war, since it wasn’t fought on behalf of national interests. This is a precondition for denying the opponent political status.
moral quarrels to dampen the fever of initiative. The contemporary critique very much repeats
Schmitt’s worries that humanitarian wars are like *eating the last cannibal*: An unending task, where
the cannibals being eaten have first been deemed immoral (probably because of their cannibalism,
i.e. militarism), cooked through international condemnation and eaten through a humanitarian
intervention, which knows no end.

*Humanitarian Sovereign*

In the interstate system, there was a high degree of inequality amidst the principle of sovereign
equality. But at least there was a principle of equality that states could be held accountable for.
Now, it seems we’re in the process of institutionalising sovereign inequality, where the sovereignty
of some is said to be ‘shared’, ‘pooled’, ‘transcended’ or whatever but may in actuality be
strengthened, whereas the sovereignty of others is ignored, vilified and tramped upon. What the talk
of an alleged end of state sovereignty hides or downplays is the subsequent end of sovereign
equality. There is no parity between who wins and who loses here. The shift from international
politics to international morality signals a redistribution of sovereign power or what David Chandler
calls ‘institutionalising legal inequality’ (2002: 139-151) and he says: “Removing the rights of non-
Western states to formal equality in international law has not led to a redistribution of power away
from the powerful to the weak, but reinforced existing social and economic inequalities,
institutionalising them in law and politics” (2002: 155). The new system lends itself to the politics
of the powerful, giving them a new legitimacy by framing and describing humanitarian power as
anything but power and force. The new moral discourse depoliticizes the inequalities in the system
and hides the fact that not anyone can authorize the discourse of morality and humanitarianism. The
weak states are left to play the role of the ‘immoral’ and ‘old-fashioned’. Admittedly not
representative for European liberalism, the American conservative Max Boot has nonetheless stated
something very common in the humanitarian discourse:

Most of the world’s nations do not have Westphalian legitimacy in the first place. They are highly artificial entities,
most created by Western officials in the twentieth century … There is no compelling reason, other than an unthinking
respect for the status quo, that the West should feel bound to the boundaries it created in the past. There is even less
reason why the West should recognise the right of those who seize power within those borders to do whatever they
want. (2000: 146)
This quote very nicely demonstrates, whose sovereignty is being questioned in this new supposedly post-sovereign regime. Only some states are ‘allowed’ to transgress international law, because they are presumed humanitarian innocent. For some states, sovereignty is being limited or taken away, whereas others are increasingly free to disregard international law through the humanitarian or moral argument. The value placed on the Kosovo intervention is exactly its role as the birth place of a new globalistic order. The main way, this re-ordering is takes place, is through war. Bauman writes: “The ‘international community’ has little reality apart from the occasional military operations undertaken in its name” (2001a: 15). The sovereign and the nation state were born through war. The humanitarian sovereign and the postnational state may emerge through the fog of humanitarian wars. Habermas has called Kosovo an ‘anticipation of an effective cosmopolitan law’ (in Mendieta 2004: 86). Ironically, Kosovo Polje is now the cradle of Serbian nationalism and of liberal globalism. It is telling that this birth was made possible through the breaking of international law. This is exactly the placing of morality over law that Habermas, as we saw earlier, warns against in the actions of America. But here, in the name of global justice, as interpreted from Europe, another principle applies. In an interview, Habermas scorns America for breaking international law in the Iraq-war but then continues about the war in Kosovo:

Still there were to legitimizing reasons, one formal and one informal and this is so even if they couldn’t replace the consent by the Security Council required by the UN charter. Firstly, one could refer to the \textit{erga omnes} – which applies to all states – and calls for help in the face of an imminent genocide. This has always been a part of international customary law. Secondly, the fact that NATO is a union of liberal states, that it in its inner workings takes the UN declaration of human rights seriously, can also be thrown on the scale [in favour of intervention]. Compare that with the ‘coalition of the willing’ that has split the West and which included such despicable regimes as Usbekistan and Taylor’s Liberia. (Mendieta 2004: 86)

The first reason has turned out to be at least questionable. The second reason is really interesting. One has to interpret Habermas as saying that if the European NATO-countries had joined the Iraq-war then the disregard for UN-law had been justified. The West is effectively the international community – the problem is the ‘splitting of the West’ as his latest book is called. One might wonder, if Germany and France wouldn’t have claimed that the ‘international community’ was waging a war against Iraq, if they had been part of the coalition? Liberals speaking on behalf of the international community or humanity is a lot like Nixon speaking on behalf of the silent majority. It gives an authority without accountability. It’s an unsubstantiated claim of representation. But, of
course, not everyone can speak in the name of something/someone universal and be taken seriously. The interstate system at least guaranteed that sovereigns were considered legitimate voices of their communities, giving the system an aura of accountability and equality. This is what the discussion of Schmitt taught us: The imperialism of voice, or the dominance of interpretation. The core of the matter is, that the West once again and with remarkably similar arguments (minus the racism (sort of) but certainly still with ‘the white man’s burden’) is proclaiming a ‘historic responsibility’, ‘duty of global leadership’ etc. to remake societies and the structure of relations among societies. This inevitably gives rise to a new imperialism, humanitarian or liberal, as the quest is out for once again remaking the world in Western colours. Postmodernity is now to be everyone’s modernity.

Colonialism and decolonialization was in large part the West imposing a nation state modernity on the world. Now, it seems, we’re at it again, this time imposing a postnational modernity on peoples and societies desperately trying to gain a workable statehood. No need to think for too long about who’s going to gain from this. But, we have to ask, who defines and authorizes the discourse of the universal? The new humanitarian wars are what Bauman calls ‘globalizing wars’ that is, wars “conducted in the name of the not yet existent but postulated ‘international community’, represented in practice by ad hoc, mostly regional, coalitions of interested partners” (2001a: 14). Repoliticization entails asking, who authorizes speech and action on behalf of the international community; and it is about insisting on humanitarian interventions as also violence and warfare. Actually, globalizing wars are probably the only way the Western powers will conduct and legitimate wars in the foreseeable future, in ‘the pre-modern zone’ (Cooper 2003) or against ‘the new wars’ (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2005). And this change in war-making, where, probably, no Western state have ever been engaged in so many military campaigns at once, is being heralded as proof of the pacific nature of postmodern states. War is war is peace.

Repoliticization of liberal interventionism or imperialism aims at questioning the proclaimed distinction between violence and non-violence, criminality and non-criminality, as well as, in the last instance, between good and evil, civilized and barbarian. Granting or withholding political status makes all the difference; and it is a setting of difference that is restricted to a very few. The differential and hierarchical power structure determines the possible depoliticization options and it structures who’s on either side. There is a systematic inequality, deepened by the new post-sovereign discourse and the institutionalization of liberal globalism, that favours or disfavours actors. Western powers may easily rely on the international community because they are the ones having what we could call the humanitarian sovereignty, that is, the very real power to name the
transgressor and define the enemy of humanity; \textit{humanitarian sovereign is he who defines the global exception and thereby the global enemy of humanity}. We may ask, is humanism the new sovereign vocabulary? Is it the paradoxical return of the sovereign and the political?

\textit{\ldots Trying to Cheat?}

One of the main problems with a Schmittian approach to humanitarian or liberal interventionism is its presumption of foul play. A particularistic and sinister interest is always presumed lurking behind any claim to universalism. A conspiracy of power and concepts is at work. One of Danilo Zolo’s books is titled \textit{Invoking Humanity} (2002), which is half a quote from Proudhon, used often by Schmitt: ‘Whoever invokes humanity is trying to cheat’. The quote opens the book, and the second chapter of the book could be described as the application of the quote on the Kosovo war (the chapter also contains a section named after the quote). In the chapter, he lists a number of possible reasons for the war; a war against Europe, a war for the control of ‘corridors’, hegemonic federalism’, an Atlantic alliance for Eurasian hegemony, a war for global ‘hegemonic stability’, without landing on any of them. What they have in common as explanations is what we (with a twist of Zolo’s own concept cited earlier) could call ‘the presumption of humanitarian particularism’. David Chandler has summarized this position:

\begin{quote}
For many Left critics of ethical condemnations, ethical foreign policy is not in opposition to \textit{realpolitik} but a way of acting on it. They agree with the human rights advocates that the reluctance to impose coercive policies on many states is due to real interests of economic and political stability. However, they imagine that where states are scapegoated as human rights pariahs this is because they are either resisting the world market, or have economic resources that have to be directly exploited or are in geo-strategic positions that Western powers seek to have direct control over. Instead of revealing the counter-productive and irrational impact of human rights coercion, the Left often rationalise these policies as if they were long-term strategies consciously followed and meticulously planned. (2002: 86-7; see also Žižek 1999c)
\end{quote}

I want to move away from the discourse of suspicion and the core of my argument is that there are no hidden agendas. Liberal globalism and its most prominent expression, liberal interventionism, is the unfolding of liberalism and liberal internationalism. One caveat: I’ve been focusing mainly on non-state actors in the liberal globalist discourse. Of course, once you add states, it’s a whole other game but in the main the liberal globalist position is genuine. It is not my claim that liberal globalism is just a cover for particularist power politics. But it is my point that European liberalism does not see the limits and uses of its own vision. Instead of the approach taken by Zolo, I agree
with Agamben in his comment made about the first Iraq-US war: “The most spectacular characteristic of this war, perhaps, was that the reasons presented to justify it cannot be put aside as ideological superstructures used to conceal a hidden plan” (2000: 102). Instead of conspiracy theorizing (and in international politics there is a lot of conspiracies), the purpose here is to question the value of depoliticization. It is to highlight the possible dangers of depoliticization and to stop short of the ‘ultra-politics’ that Žižek claims is the response of those being forcefully depoliticized:

… the reference to Schmitt is crucial in detecting the deadlocks of post-political liberal tolerance: Schmittian ultra-politics – the radicalization of politics into the open warfare of Us against Them discernible in different ‘fundamentalisms’ – is the form in which the foreclosed political returns in the post-political universe of pluralist negotiation and consensual regulation. For that reason, the way to counteract this re-emerging ultra-politics is not more tolerance, more compassion and multicultural understanding, but the return of the political proper, that is, the reassertion of the dimension of antagonism which, far from denying universality, is cosubstantial with it. That is the key component of the proper leftist stance as opposed to the rightist assertion of one’s particular identity: in the equation of Universalism with the militant, divisive position of one engaged in a struggle – true universalists are not those who preach global tolerance of differences and all-encompassing unity, but those who engage in a passionate struggle for the assertion of the Truth which compels them. (1999a: 35)

The depoliticized discourse denies certain actors legitimate status. They are being re-described as sick, criminal, beyond the reach of reason etc. Repoliticization is also the struggle of social actors to be recognized as political voices: IRA prisoners in British prisons being treated as the general prison population and fighting for POW status, people voting for populist parties to get ‘the common man’ recognized and heard in parliamentary politics, ‘fundamentalist’ violence etc. are all expressions of repoliticization attempts in the post-political universe. Žižek says, that “the political struggle proper is therefore not a rational debate between multiple interests, but, simultaneously, the struggle for one’s voice to be heard and recognized as the voice of a legitimate partner” (1998, my italics). When proper political action and status is denied in the post-political universe, then its return risks taking on ugly faces. And this goes for them doing the depoliticization as well. So this is about asking questions. As Wendy Brown says in a critique of Michael Ignatieff’s anti-political framing of human rights: “But if human rights are tendered as an anti-political and expressly moral

141 In 1976 the IRA prisoners lost their ‘special category status’ in the British prison system as they were moved to ‘H-blocks’ and the British government started a policy of criminalization. The prisoners initiated a hunger strike in which 10 people died. The prisoners had five specific demands: 1) the right not to wear a prison uniform; 2) the right not to do prison work; 3) the right of free association with other prisoners; 4) the right to organize their own educational and recreational facilities; 5) the right to one visit, one letter and one parcel per week. The demands were part of a de-criminalization campaign to regain political status.
antidote to abusive political power, a defense against power and a protection against pain, deprivation, or suffering, we may still ask what kind of politicization they set in motion against the powers they oppose”. And she goes on to say: “Yes, the abuse must be stopped but by whom, with what techniques, with what unintended effects, and above all, unfolding what possible futures? The pragmatist, moral, and antipolitical mantle of human rights discourse tends to eschew, even repel, rather than invite or address these questions” (Brown 2004: 454, 460).

III. Summing up: Liberal Globalism or the Eternal Return of Liberal Illusions?

Is a world that outlaws war, Schmitt asks us today, also a world that outlaws opposition in general, consigning the political to the illegal realm of the terrorist? If so, can we afford the pacification that we have been promised? (Rasch 2000: 1682-3)

The refusal to think adequately about enmity and war has the paradoxical effect of ‘producing’ more enemies and more wars. The reason for the refusal is a rigid concept of (Western) modernity, which systematically places some on the side of morality and others outside of it. Liberal antipluralism, or the monism of liberal-democratic humanism, constantly creates barbaric others, not merely in the imagination of Western liberals but also in a process of meeting our worst expectations when the persecuted and vilified returns the abuse by confirming our name-calling, turning fundamentalist, anti-Western, anti-liberal or whatever:

… the human rights movement contributes to the framing of political choices in the third world as oppositions between ‘local/traditional’ and international/modern’ forms of government and modes of life. This effect is strengthened by the presentation of human rights as part of belonging to the modern world, but coming from some place outside political choice, from the universal, the rational, the civilized. By strengthening the articulation of third world politics as a choice between tradition and modernity, the human rights movement impoverishes local political discourse, often strengthening the hand of self-styled ‘traditionalists’ who are offered a commonsense and powerful alternative to modernization for whatever politics they may espouse. (Kennedy 2004: 21)

Contemporary European liberal understandings of the rest of the world get inspiration, strength and images from the Enlightenment’s characterization of the European preliberal warrior state and the non-European, barbaric non-state. These are images of unpredictability, irrationality, violence and danger; and they are now being applied to the modern nation state; the same political entity that in classical liberal theory (to the extent, they were able to foresee it) was considered a stabilizing and pacifying force. Today, the nation state has overtaken the characteristics of the aristocratic warrior
state and the ‘failed states’ are still lingering on in the non-Western space. The contemporary liberal arguments presented here are consistent with the view of the early liberalism that Europe had overcome war; that the economic and moral imperatives were too comprehensive for serious conflicts to occur; that the consequences of war were too brutal and counterproductive; and that the spirit of the age was too enlightened to sustain the traditional politics of the time, secret diplomacy, colonialism and war. So, when Robert Cooper says: “The individual has won and foreign policy is the continuation of domestic concerns beyond national borders and not vice versa. Individual consumption replaces collective glory as the dominant theme of national life. War is to be avoided: acquisition of territory by force is of no interest” (2003: 53), then it is important to remember that we have heard the argument of the end of war before.

History, unfortunately, did not meet the expectation. The worry of this text has been that the new liberal globalist hope will meet the same fate. There is another, connected, worry: That liberalism will once again ‘allow’ itself to be used contrary to its stated purposes, as it happened with the emergence and solidification of the nation state, where liberalism was instrumentalized as a state doctrine. A liberal globalism committed to depoliticization may soon see its discourse being used by other, more openly political, forces. Paradoxically, it seems that liberal globalism could be in danger of being hijacked by a throne pretender: The post-nation state.142 The post-sovereign human rights discourse is namely also an opportunity for the state and its institutions to win legitimacy and functions. Just two examples: The new humanitarian wars are being used quite consistently by the militaries of the West to recruit and legitimize themselves. Recruitment ads for the military increasingly portray the blurring of the line between humanitarian aid and warfare, between war and policing (Dillon & Reid 2000); there has also been a similar merging of security and development, which has brought humanitarians and soldiers together in joint operations (Duffield 2001: chap. 2). The liberal globalist discourse strengthens this re-legitimization of war and the military. Perhaps another sign of the eternal return of the political.

142 Edward Hermann notes another, perhaps more alarming tendency, of the liberal interventionist community: a selective moral outrage, which seems to fit into the agenda of major Western states. He writes: “As part of a larger study, David Peterson and I checked the mentions of Kosovo and East Timor in the bylined articles of eight prominent humanitarian interventionists – Timothy Garton Ash, Michael Ignatieff, David Rieff, William Shawcross, Geoffrey Robertson, Mary Kaldor, Bernard Kouchner and Richard Falk – which appeared in 1999 and 2000 in ten leading US and British print media … Of the resultant total of 113 bylined articles, only seven mentioned East Timor, whereas 65 mentioned Kosovo. Equally interesting, ‘war crimes’, ‘crimes against humanity’, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘genocide’ were terms ascribed to the behaviour of Serb forces against Kosovo Albanians 26 times, but against Indonesian-sponsored forced, only once” (2002: xv, note 14).
Conclusion: In Defence of Political Enmity

All wars are fought to shape an inside in the process of contesting the outside. Most problematic and disturbing of all, then, will be the politically enduring issue of the friend/enemy distinction. Who is the enemy? What is the enemy? Where is the enemy? (Dillon 2002: 74)

When, upon the arrival of a group of German guests, John Cleese as Basil in Fawlty Towers instructs his staff: ‘Don’t mention the war’, we all know that that is exactly what he is going to do – and in the most bizarre ways. It has been the claim of this text that a similar logic pertains to the political. ‘Don’t mention the war’, that is, the denial of liberal or humanitarian warfare as war is exactly what helps bring it about, just as the denial of both the enemy and the political facilitates their return in distorted forms. The contemporary literature, of which this dissertation is inspired, tends to focus on the return of the political. I’ve been more interested in the returns of the enemy but it is part of the same critical project of informing liberalism of its shadow sides. The critique unfolded above has been more one of exploring possible danger than of asserting facts on the ground. The chapters above have also been inspired by the disobedience of another Fawltyan ban: ‘Don’t mention Carl Schmitt’, which is being systematically ignored these days. This dissertation has followed the direction of present Schmitt-scholarship into international politics. The work on or inspired by Schmitt used to concentrate on domestic issues of parliamentarism, rule of law, the essence of the political etc. Now, the trend is to discuss international affairs using his concepts and critiques, and that, not least, in what could call the third use of Fawlty: The proper way to actually mention the war as war. An aim of this text has been to highlight the dangers of mis-naming exclusions and uses of force. To insist on the political nature of depoliticization is less to call ‘foul play’ than to reinsert the depoliticized in a political register, where dissent, options and decisions are again relevant. Names matter.

This has not really been a defence of enmity; at least not of enmity as such. Rather, it has been, firstly, an insistence on enmity as an important category of scientific investigation and, secondly, of the political enmity as a critical corrective to the other forms discussed above. Only it that sense has it been a defence. Enmity is a neglected category of investigation, unless one includes the many moralist denunciations. It seems fair to presume that enmity is here to stay. If this is so, then we have to find ways to live with it. One very significant way is the liberal translation of enemies into conflict partners. This is a true humanist achievement. Yet it comes fraught with dangers or shadow sides. One of those is the uneventful life, mediocrity, the debased beings of liberal sociability;
another is the ossifying of political life. I’ve been concentrating on some of the exclusionary effects of this translation of enmity and not least on the claim of a complete end of enmity proclaimed by liberal internationalism and then again by liberal globalism. In this way, the insistence on the persistence or returns of enmity, and not least on the political enmity as a contained and manageable one becomes a critical tool of informing liberalism of how, paradoxically, the embedding of its project keeps undermining its proclaimed goals: Liberal globalism becomes anti-pluralist; democratic peace becomes an instrument and argument of war; freedom becomes an excuse for bombardment; critique of nationalism helps force the vilified into more hardened, intransigent forms; critique of sovereignty becomes a new sovereigntist language; self-determination becomes the recipe for neo-colonial protectorates; the war on terror produces ever more terror; legitimacy becomes an instrument of dis-recognition; establishment of a new international law institutionalizes sovereign inequality; the move from politics to morality reintroduces the just war; finally, the end of enmity produces new enemies, also, and not least, the moral enmity of good and evil, competent and incompetent, self-determining and other-determining.

This is what we’ve been trying to show, using enmity as a central category, and taking political enmity as our point of departure. Not because political enmity is inherently benign, far from it. It comes with problems of its own, which liberal globalism is set on this earth to emphasize and criticize. The use of political enmity here is, so to speak, not political but scientific. Political enmity is a theoretical, not a real-historical, concept. It is implied in the logic of diplomacy, classical international law and regularized warfare and it has some relevance in actual events on the battleground, at least before industrialized warfare. But, this has been no exercise in nostalgia for a lost warrior ethics. Theoretically, we have to presuppose the political enmity, no matter how much it in actual practice has been contaminated by the other forms of enmity.

Politically, it serves as a critical corrective and, perhaps, as a minimal utopia (as one of my fellow PhD-students called it); the best to hope for. Instead of the current liberal monopolization of legitimacy, we should perhaps learn to recognize “legitimate non-democratic regimes that have the authority to contain tensions but can also respect a minimum of social and political rights” (Hirst 2002: 8). Postmodern state or chaos and war are not the exclusive options of a global era. Most non-liberal regimes do not engage in continuous war-making; they do not sponsor terrorism or engage in constant repression. Most people, even in non-liberal regimes, do live good lives. In an interview conducted by myself and Frank Beck Lassen, John Gray said: “People can live peaceful, productive, creative lives without a global liberal society” (Thorup & Lassen 2005: 12). This is the
truth, which liberalism refuses to see. Paul Hirst (2002: 8) insists: “It is what regimes do that matters” and in this, liberal democracies may have less reason to claim moral superiority. Just as there is no necessary connection between liberalism and democracy, there is none between liberalism and pacifism. This is the illusion of liberalism, radicalized by liberal globalism. And it’s the illusion we’re attempting to undermine by insisting on the political nature of post-political liberalism. Politics as conflict is not inherently despotic or violent. That is just the liberal way of understanding and presenting it (like politics as technique is understood and described as inauthentic in much liberalism critique). Here, politics as conflict has served us as a counter-narrative to a hegemonic politics as technique and as a way to see the workings within politics as technique of the exact same dangers, that is being delegated to politics as conflict, that is, repression, exclusion, creation of ‘others’, war internally and externally.

The liberal-humanitarian discourse becomes the language of intervention; and “thinking their interventions benign or neutral, they intervene more often than they otherwise might” (Kennedy 2004: 23); and often in areas and ways, which doesn’t help the ‘victims’ intended. This is not to deny the need, often, of intervention of various kinds, and it is certainly no questioning of the humanitarian motive. The ideology critique of this text is not to seek the real, hard reason behind the soft spoken words but to take the humanitarian language and motivation serious and then to look critically at the implications of good intentions. It’s my thesis that a not insignificant part of the problem lies in an insufficient understanding of power. David Kennedy says that the humanitarian blindness “often begins at the moment the humanitarian averts his eyes from his own power” (2004: 329, my italics). Humanitarians and liberal opinion-makers wield enormous power, also military power, but this goes unnoticed in and through the liberal-humanist discourse, which consistently cast off any appearance of own power and names power as evil and as the problem to be overcome. This is the understanding of self and power constitutive of liberalism, that I’ve told.

Liberal globalism dramatizes a distinction between the good and the evil, which is not liberal in origin or structure, but which has been incorporated into liberal thinking, not least on international issues. What we’re witnessing is a hardening of liberal anti-pluralism, that is, a dichotomization into legitimate and illegitimate regimes based on liberal-democratic principles of legitimacy. This is a break with classical international law, where sovereign legitimacy was based on effective control. Much can be said for the shift, but one has to be aware of the dangers in this transformation, not least the licence liberal societies bestow upon themselves to serve as the global judge, jury and executioner. The dichotomization is also reproduced in the distinction between liberalism on one
side and on the other fundamentalism and bellicose nationalism; or as Habermas says: “There is no alternative to this [post-national] development, except at the normatively intolerable cost of ethnic cleansings” (1998e: 408). This way of framing the issue depoliticizes a field of options, which cannot be reduced to either the post-national constellation or ‘new wars’; and it serves as a legitimization of both the liberal globalist restructuring of the state and for the new global sanction- and intervention-regime. Liberal anti-pluralism is a denial of political enmity, in that it dis-recognizes all opposition and every alternative as inferior. But in practice, it creates a seemingly unending progression of asymmetrical enemies on which to intervene.

The unconventional enmity beyond the line is evident in the war on terror. On the one hand is a replay of colonial figures, evident in the comment of an American battalion commander in Iraq: “With a heavy dose of fear and violence and a lot of money for projects, I think we can convince these people that we are here to help them” (quoted from Gregory 2004: 243). This is the modern equivalent of the conquistador who stated that the Indians had to be killed to be saved. On the other hand, we see a doubling of the line within Western societies as anti-Muslim fears and hatreds merge with anti-terrorism, progressively placing Muslim citizens further and further beyond the line of judicial and political equality and protection. The second global repression of the borderland is about remaking the world in the new image of Europe. The borderland, that is, the areas of inadequate distinctions, was pushed back in the first global move, which pretty much universalized the nation state model. Now, this model is increasingly seen as borderland to be feared and repressed. In the terminology of James Ron (in chapter 3), we see a movement from the frontier to the ghetto, the repressive turning of unmanageable borderland into controllable protectorates. The postmodern, supposedly pacifist and un-colonial, states have never been engaged in more wars at once, than they are at present. This ought to give pause for thought. When liberal globalism speaks of post-politics and an end of war, they only meant inside the West. The construction is dependent upon the space beyond the line serving as ‘the other’; and possibly also dependent upon some notion of the rest of the world as ‘free land’, borderland.

What cosmopolitanism and liberal globalism generally may be doing is loosening those distinctions, which held state power within some boundaries. They could be the state philosophy for a boundless world, albeit one a lot less benign than imagined. Reading the counter-enlightenment critique may alert us to the always-already strategic rhetoric of goodness and humanism, but also the possibility that distinctions presuppose each other. Their exaggerated fear of decadence and dissolution, their belief in the common fate of throne and altar, may contain the secular truth that concepts are
mutually dependent, so that, for instance, the distinction combatant/civilian is somehow interconnected with the distinction foreign/domestic. Is that not what Burke and others are saying with the phrase, ‘revolution eats its own children’? That is, the rebellion against one sphere tears them all down. The revolution, which may be eating its children now, is the liberal globalist one. The celebration of endisms may also signal the end of some distinctions, we would like to uphold: Normality/emergency, attack/defence, military/civilian and so on. Perhaps the only ‘classic’ distinction, which is being upheld, is that of politics RELIGION, which is exactly why critics of liberal globalism revels in naming it ‘postmodern just cause’, liberal crusaders’ and talk of it as a ‘universalist and expansionist religion’ (Rasch 2004: 121). This is a return of an indistinction, which contemporary liberalism would like to uphold.

I’ve been arguing that we’re not witnessing a process or state of indistinction, but one of re-distinction. In the introduction, we spoke of a modern ‘horror of indetermination’ (Bauman) and then, in the chapter on the Counter-enlightenment, of an ‘obsessive fear of mixture’ (Taguieff). These seemingly similar worries need to be separated. Just as liberal freedom is not, as Burke and Maistre thought, the freedom to do whatever one likes, liberalism is not the unqualified mixture of everything, and is, therefore, not meeting the worst of counter-enlightenment fears. The reactionary liberalism-critique fears a liberal indistinction. But, what liberalism does is to dissolve some distinctions and to establish others, erecting new walls of separation. Liberalism is less universal, less egalitarian, less tearing down the hierarchies, than both its counter-enlightenment critics and they themselves think. The liberal horror of indetermination is of another kind than the counter-enlightenment fear of mixture (although they have points of contact, which help explain reactionary or conservative elements within liberalism, like the fear of democracy).

Just as the Counter-Enlightenment dramatized features of the Enlightenment, it couldn’t or wouldn’t see itself, so has this dissertation tried to be ‘hysterical’ and one-sided in order to draw attention to possible dangers in liberal globalism. And it has tried to take the notions of limitations serious, not in order to redraw to a closed past, which never was, but in order to ask for the borders of cosmopolis. Inspired by this, we could ask: Is a critical philosophy of the 21st century one of borders and limitations? Is the response to liberal globalism doomed to be one of conscious particularism? Does the ‘return of the political’ and ‘post-liberalism’ signal a new philosophy of limits? Doesn’t a genuine pluralism have to know and recognize limitation?
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