AARHUS UNIVERSITY

Coversheet

This is the accepted manuscript (post-print version) of the article.

Contentwise, the post-print version is identical to the final published version, but there may be differences in typography and layout.

How to cite this publication

Please cite the final published version:

Dorf, H., & Jensen, N. R. (2016). A nation at risk?: Danish citizenship policy under austerity. *Citizenship teaching & learning*, 11(3), 333-346. DOI: 10.1386/ctl.11.3.333_1

Publication metadata

Title:	A nation at risk? – Danish citizenship policy under austerity
Author(s):	Hans Christian Dorf & Niels Rosendal Jensen
Journal:	Citizenship teaching & learning
DOI/Link:	https://doi.org/10.1386/ctl.11.3.333_1
Document version:	Accepted manuscript (post-print)

General Rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Hans Christian Dorf & Niels Rosendal Jensen¹ (2016): A nation at risk? – Danish citizenship policy under austerity. *Journal of Citizenship Teaching and Learning*, no. 3.

Introduction

On reflection, the world financial crisis emerging in 2008 did not cause a great deal of social unrest in Denmark. This is not because its influence on the economy did not affect youth unemployment rates or other indicators of recession. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the financial crisis brought a general and acute experience of ‘austerity’ to Denmark. Rather, the ‘Scandinavian welfare model’ may still offer sufficient robustness to enable Denmark to withstand the potential effects of economic recession with relative ease. Thus, Denmark may offer a special case in Europe as far as a direct relationship between austerity and citizenship is concerned.

Yet, in a wider sense two characteristics of the ‘post-liberal political settlement’ (Olssen 2008) in the new millennium can be associated with an experience of austerity in Denmark. One is related to changes in economic governance and welfare distribution while the other is related to perceived threats to Danish culture and safety. As we shall argue drawing on theories of nationalism (Sand 2010), the two characteristics are interlinked, both have implications for citizenship, and both challenge the Danish welfare democracy of the twentieth century.

In the *first part* of this article, we present an outline of the development of the Danish welfare model and its recent transformations in relation to changes in legislation on youth unemployment, youth education and the cash benefits system. This policy area constitutes one dimension of citizenship politics in Denmark.

While the focus on citizenship became apparent at the European level in the early 1990s associating it with employability and competitiveness, inclusion and active participation in a multicultural society (Commission 1998), the term did not come into common political usage in Denmark until after 2005, when for historical and political reasons its focus narrowed to restrictive immigration policies, a strong focus on (mono-)cultural integration, and initiatives against extremism.

In the *second part* of the article we turn to this dimension of citizenship policy in Denmark restricting our attention to the areas of citizenship education, anti-radicalization measures and ‘terror packages’. We argue that these political initiatives, which can only partly be explained as specific austerity measures, are linked to general effects of transnational processes and accompanying changes in Danish welfare policies meeting Danish national identity images with important (educative) citizenship implications.

Part 1: The rise of the tax financed welfare model and its gradual transformation

In 1899, after a lengthy labour conflict, capital and labour agreed on the general terms of regulating the labour market. Two years later, parliamentary democracy was established through a proportionate electoral system – at the same time expressing a plurality of modern political interests and making for a necessary practice of coalition politics. Within a short period before and after the turn of the century, the ‘cooperative rule of the people’ had been set in motion with the ‘universal welfare state’ model as its eventual consequence (Hvidt 1990).

¹ Hans Christian Dorf hado@edu.au.dk and Niels Rosendal Jensen nrj@edu.au.dk are associate professors in educational sociology at DPU, Department of Education, Aarhus University.

To sum up, during the 20th century Denmark developed a redistributive welfare state based on universal, tax-financed social security and citizens' rights to free social services, health care and education. The welfare model emphasized income equalization and a high level of state intervention and support to correct 'market deficiency'. Labour market relations have been defined through tripartite (state, trade unions, employers' associations) cooperation and organized according to the so-called 'flexicurity' model. In general terms, this strategy has had a positive effect on marginalization and polarization in Denmark and may account for the low degree of social unrest that austerity has so far engendered. Welfare benefits were targeted at individuals rather than families; income taxes have been progressive although tax deduction opportunities offset a good part of the redistributive effect. The public sector is large and decentralized in terms of local and regional councils being responsible for a sizeable proportion of public expenditure. Denmark has a strong Keynesian legacy and has generally considered full employment a crucial socio-political goal (Baldwin 1990; Lykketoft 2009; Topp 1987; Thompson 2013; Pedersen 2013).

During the late 1970's and 1980's, the Keynesian-Fordist welfare state faced difficulties in terms of stagflation and deficit public spending; but also in terms of challenges from a neo-liberal ideology of economic policy and political governance emphasising competition and market solutions, mobilization of human capital, self-reliance and voluntary sector activity, and indirect political governance of outcomes. By holding agents at other levels accountable the state could reduce its own democratic accountability for uncertain outcomes, though it re-empowered itself with a number of soft and hard policy instruments, among them targeting, supervision, and economic sanctioning. Institutionally, the new political paradigm asserted itself by privatizations, liberalisation of labour and capital movements, tax reductions and limitations of welfare expenditure. (Thompson 2013; Pedersen 2013; Olssen 2008). Finally, one may argue that the paradigm is educative in terms of its becoming the hegemonic political discourse from the 1990s onwards.

Thus, in the second half of the 1980s, the political discourse increasingly began to emphasize workfare. However, in Denmark workfare was initially detached from its neo-liberal or 'neo-social' (Lessenich 2009) origins and reformulated in accordance with the socio-political legacy. "The most important element in the policies from 1993 onwards was the introduction of a new regionalised, corporatist A(ctivation) L(about) M(arket) P(olicy)" (Andersen 2011: 114). The workfare strategy in Denmark became offensive rather than defensive emphasizing activation rather than benefits and wage reductions; improvement of the skills and work experience rather than simply increasing mobility and work-searching efficiency; training and education rather than work-for-benefits; empowerment rather than control and punishment; inclusive workfare programs rather than programs targeting only the unemployed individual (Torfing 1999; Lykketoft 2009). A large proportion of the activation offers were educational, enhanced by job-training placements including elements of formal education. Activation was seen as improving participants' employment possibilities. Activation became a social right *and* an obligation; the Danish workfare strategy did not emphasize sanctions at the outset, but rather aimed at involving the unemployed in planning, counselling, training, and education activities to empower them and facilitate their re-entry into the normal labour market. However, 'continuity' went alongside with a conversion of the system into a more disciplinary approach (Andersen 2011).

Later versions of the workfare strategy emphasise work before education, the alleged aim being to pave the shortest possible way to a job. After the onset of the economic crisis two elements have been predominant in a neo-liberal workfare strategy across government changes: (1) Reductions in income tax and tax progression (Regeringen 2009b; Skatteministeriet 2012) increasing economic inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) from 19.4 in 1994 to 22.2 in 2001 and 25.6 in 2008 (Økonomi- og indendørsministeriet 2014: 147). (2) Successive tightenings of the regulations of unemployment benefits (AK-samvirke 2010). These developments certainly encroach on important elements of the universal welfare state model. The pressure on the unemployed and especially cash beneficiaries has been increased and this political course threatens to jeopardize the positive effects of the offensive strategy and create a poverty trap (AE-rådet 2013b).

'Youth packages' and the governance of cash beneficiaries – empirical illustration

The Economic Council of the Labour Movement (AE-rådet) in 2012 and 2013 warned that youth unemployment in Denmark had been increasing – from 7.5 % in 2007 to 14.1 % in 2012 – being much higher than the general unemployment level, especially for uneducated youth – though relatively low in European comparison (*cf.* Eurostat 2015). It also warned that Denmark was far from reaching the 2006 target of 95 % of a cohort completing youth education – the proportion of those without post-compulsory education having been around 20 % for years (AE-rådet 2013b). These tendencies were addressed from 2009 when a series of 'youth packages' was launched. AE-rådet also pointed out that youth without any education had a much higher risk of becoming cash beneficiaries (AE-rådet 2012; 2013a). This issue was politically addressed by an agreement on cash benefits in 2013. Both initiatives illustrate the dominant mode of (educational) governance since the onset of the economic crisis.

'Youth package II', *More adolescents into education and jobs* (Undervisningsministeriet 2009), targeting 15-17 year olds in particular, inserted an 'assessment of readiness for education' into the obligatory 'education plans' and strengthened cooperation, contact, and supervision especially with regard to adolescents at risk of dropping out of the educational system. A wider array of different youth education pathways were to be established and vocational practice and opportunities to prepare for education were to be offered. For 18-19 year olds, 'swift'-initiatives were introduced along with a right and obligation to 'intensive activation'. For 18-29 year olds, initiatives included '3R'-courses, job rotation procedures, subsidised jobs, mentoring, and preparation for education. More trainee positions in vocational training were to be secured, either by means of rewards (private sector), quotas of trainee positions (public sector) or expansion of 'school practice'.

With the political agreement on 'Youth package II', jobcentres at the local municipality level were given a more active role with special focus on the 15-19 year olds who are neither under education nor employed. Their activities must be planned in cooperation with schools and the 'youth supervision institution' responsible for drawing up 'education plans' for all adolescents – which these are obliged to follow. All information on adolescents' educational activity – and its governance – was to be filed in a central 'Youth data base' under the authority of the ministries of education and employment. Its alleged purpose was to allow all institutional stakeholders to target their supervision and outreach to adolescents who were neither under education nor employed.

Supervisors have expressed satisfaction with the education plans as a basis for supervision talks, while pupils and teachers are more sceptical about their purpose and usefulness (Espersen *et al.* 2011). How-

ever, the education plans have another function as a contract which can be used to hold adolescents and their families accountable, if they do not stick to it. The so-called 'youth benefit' can be withheld if the education plan is not adhered to, which has been criticized by AE-rådet as affecting exposed families negatively, since the proportion of adolescents with such a background who are neither under education nor employed is particularly high, and thus working against the 95 % target. Similarly, Plant has criticized that supervisors are given a policing role which makes genuine supervision difficult. He concludes that "supervision has increasingly become a tool in the hands of state power".²

Højdal (2011) concludes: "With the government 'Youth package', a political cocktail of coercion, surveillance and sanctions has been mixed [...] Assessment of readiness for education has been presented as a way of making youngsters set realistic targets for themselves, and of assessing which of them will get difficulties completing an education. Thereby assessments become means of early exclusion of those who might eventually become threatened by dropping out, as it is aptly said." Interestingly, the 2014 vocational education reform limits access on the basis of school grades in order to heighten its attraction to youths otherwise attracted to upper secondary education.³

In 2013, a broad political agreement was reached on a reform of the cash benefits system (Beskæftigelsesministeriet 2013). It was emphasised that lack of motivation and support for education or work must be replaced by an array of coordinated and individually tailored incentives. The reform aimed at ensuring 'ownership' through entitlement to supervision, access to communication, and subsidised jobs and practice, but also at affecting public budgets favourably through its combined employment and education effects.

For cash beneficiaries below 30 years, education was to replace passive reception of cash benefits. A distinction was made between being 'ready for education' and 'ready for activity'. Beneficiaries are to partake in 'useful activity' until they commence education. The means to ensure this are 'fast action', 'bridge building', vocational practice, appointment of mentors and study coordinators, and study start networks – besides close supervision, monitoring, follow-up initiatives and 'protection'.

Cash beneficiaries above 30 years must be actively seeking and applying for work, otherwise economic sanctions ensue. The heterogeneous sanctioning practices of local municipalities will be examined. Beneficiaries without any education will have their competences assessed with a view to being offered support for education. They will be entitled to subsidized jobs and vocational practice.

Special supporting initiatives apply to young or single mothers and 'specially exposed' families and groups e.g. psychiatric patients, drug abusers and homeless. Beneficiaries with immigrant backgrounds may be given 'integration injunctions'. Beneficiaries living together as couples must provide for each other.

The situation for immigrants has been special. Reduction of benefits did not become part of the activation policy until 2013 except for immigrants. Thus, an 'immigration package' was agreed upon in 2002 including a much reduced 'introduction benefit' for newly arrived immigrants from non-EU countries (Andersen 2007) followed in 2005 by an 'integration package'. The 'introduction benefit' was abolished

² AE-rådet (2009): *Omlægning af børnecheck vil få social slagside; Vejledning og Ungepakken: Social kontrol*, comment on Vejlederforum.dk, 21.10.2009.

³ *Aftale om bedre og mere attraktive erhvervsuddannelser*, 24.2.2014, Copenhagen: Undervisningsministeriet.

by the centre left government in 2011. However, the 2015 centre right government has decided to reintroduce it, thus probably strengthening one of the factors potentially making for radicalization (Jensen, 2015; *cf.* below).

Summing up, the empirical examples sketched above may be seen as austerity measures but may equally well be interpreted as a more general expression of a gradually changing governance modus of the 'regulatory state' with an earlier onset (Lykketoft 2009; Thompson 2013). In our second empirical area of citizenship policies, the effects of 'austerity' are equally ambiguous.

Part 2: Society under siege? Citizenship, immigration and the 'war against terror'

Though the policy area dealt with above is not labelled citizenship policy in Denmark, it certainly has implications for social integration, thus according with the wider meaning of citizenship employed by EU (Commission 1998; Hoskins *et al.* 2012). In Denmark, however, the citizenship discourse evolving during the centre right government period after 2005 has been concerned with another – though related – policy area, thus showing another face of state concerned with other consequences of the dynamics of globalisation than those addressed by neo-liberalism (Olssen 2008).

The European Council has put it succinctly: "The main crime-related risks and threats facing Europe today, such as terrorism, serious and organised crime, drug trafficking, cyber-crime, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography, economic crime and corruption, trafficking in arms and cross-border crime, adapt extremely quickly to changes in science and technology in their attempt to exploit illegally and undermine the values and prosperity of our open societies" (Council 2010: 2).

Thus, the concept of 'risk' has entered into international and domestic politics and with it, the issues of defining risks (real or perceived); prioritizing risks; and deciding what risks should be analysed and understood (Beck 2008). In Denmark, a particular risk focus in terms of citizenship has been on national identity ('Danish values') set off against extremism, radicalization and terror.

Selecting risks: Citizenship policy in Denmark 2006-15 – empirical illustration

Writing on the making of nations, Sand (2010), with Eric Hobsbawm, links the success of nationalism to the hopes and interests of ordinary people to remain no longer subjects of the authoritarian state but to become autonomous citizens of a democratic state. Thus, national identity is linked with the promises of welfare democracy, which are seen as prerequisites of engendering support and legitimacy in a differentiated modern society. Likewise, Lessenich (2009) points out that recognition in the welfare state is related to employability as well as to national affiliation. However, Sand outlines two conceptions of citizenship: one secular, civil and political based on democratic ideas; the other based on professed kinship and origin i.e. 'ethnicity' and often associated with outside threats. The two conceptions lend themselves to understanding citizenship politics/policy in Denmark. While *the former* presupposes that in a differentiated modern society people primarily share a common set of meta values or an accepted way of dealing with disagreement – and perhaps a set of common challenges, if they agree to (Habermas 1994; Beck 2005) – *the latter* subscribes to an idea of a cultural identity founded in shared history, common language, beliefs, and habits..

The dominant understanding of welfare democracy in Denmark since 1945 has leant on the former conception. Its essence is encapsulated in the official goal of the school reform of 1975 stating that "The school prepares the pupils for commitment and participation in a democratic society and co-

responsibility for carrying out its common tasks. The teaching and everyday life of the school must therefore be based on intellectual freedom and democracy”.

In 2006, citizenship was made a dimension in teacher education. *On one hand*, the civil and political understanding of citizenship was obvious: The bill stated that the introduction of a citizenship element “aims at enabling the future teacher to introduce pupils to the meaning of being a citizen in Danish democracy and the international community.” Specifically teachers must be able to prepare their pupils [for] “democratic citizenship; participation, co-responsibility, rights and duties in a society with freedom and rule of the people; to understand the difference between politics, culture and religion and be aware of different interpretations of citizenship and political participation” [...] “to learn to live together in mutual respect for other people’s values” (L220: 7, 18).

On the other hand, the new citizenship dimension became embedded in an existing, very Danish subject in teacher education: *Christian studies and life enlightenment*. The concept of ‘life enlightenment’ is rooted in the thinking of N.F.S. Grundtvig, a 19th century poet and reformer who became a strong influence on Danish rural and national culture and educational tradition and whose thinking integrated Christian religion with national identity in a particular conception of popular enlightenment (Hall et al. 2015). This influence on the new citizenship dimension is identifiable in the departmental order: “It is the aim that the teacher student acquires competences to assess the influence of Christian religion and other philosophies of life on the values in a European and Danish cultural context” (BEK 219 2007: Bilag 1, 2.2).

The cultural identity citizenship discourse became hegemonic during the 2000s. To understand this, it is necessary not only to refer to historic-cultural national roots, but to take the Danish electoral system and party structure, which make coalition governments necessary, into account.

In 2001, a centre right minority government based on the mandates of the Danish People’s Party (DPP) was formed. This coalition lasted for a decade. DPP had increased its proportion of votes from 7.8 % in 1998 to 12.0 % in 2001, obtaining 13.3 % in 2005, 13.9 % in 2007 and 12.3 % in 2011 (Folketinget 2015). Its political profile combines an authoritarian and restrictive nationalism and monocultural immigration policy with a mostly rhetoric – less consequently practical – focus on social security and ‘traditional’ social democratic welfare. The party’s archetypical voters used to be relatively low income, less educated and older segments of the electorate predominantly from low growth regions and predominantly concerned with domestic affairs.⁴ DPP has been a serious competitor for the votes traditionally cast on the Social Democrats (SD). Thus, as elsewhere in Europe, both the centre right parties and the SD have considered it necessary to adjust their political profile particularly in the area of immigration issues (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2014). Since DPP became an influential voice in the political discourse on immigration and national culture and values well before 2008, the regulations on immigration, legal citizenship etc. have become increasingly restrictive, at times leaning on violating international agreements, while the ‘ethnic’ conception of citizenship has come to prevail. The rhetorical key of the evolving discourse can be appreciated from a quotation from the government working

⁴ This voter profile may be changing with DPP’s jump to 21.1 % of the votes in the 2015 election, cf. Nielsen, S.W. (2015): <http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/skyggekabinetet/ECE2477714/dansk-folkepartis-nye-vaelgere-rigere-klogere-og-yngre/>

program of 2010: “We have done away with the idea that all values are equally good. The Danes wish respect for Danish culture and the principles that Danish society are built on. Gone is the lax and indulgent indifference. Now respect is demanded for the freedom of speech, equality between men and women and separation of religion and politics” (Regeringen 2010a: 6).

The values mentioned, which are not particularly Danish but rather universal, are set off against perceived threats. In 2008, the *Action plan on prevention of extremist attitudes and radicalization among youth* issued a wide array of educational, social, housing, and voluntary association policies.

The main elements of the *Action plan* are: prevention and combat of terror, initiatives against gangs and crime; international cooperation for democracy, initiatives against discrimination and intolerance; education and jobs for all, integration and intercultural dialogue. Initiatives include: early and direct contact to adolescents threatened by radicalization, support of parents’ responsibility, appointment of role models, dialogue on foreign policy and democracy with Muslim countries, citizenship education, citizen centres, internet platforms on democracy, support for voluntary association activity, prisoners’ programs (including gang exit), research, partnerships and cooperation among stakeholders, and special initiatives against ‘parallel societies’ and ghettos (Regeringen 2009a).

In 2010, the centre right government selected particular housing estates for the so-called ghetto list. In *The ghetto back to society*, it claimed that there were places in Denmark, where Danish (!) values such as freedom of heterogeneity, equal opportunities for men and women, responsibility for the common good and respect of the laws and rule of the people were no longer upheld. They were termed ghettos – estates of more than 1.000 people in which the proportion of immigrants/descendants from non-western countries is above 50 %; the proportion of 18-64 year olds not in employment or education above 40 %; and the proportion of persons sentenced by the penal, arms or narcotics law above 2.7 %. Five intervention areas were set out: Making housing areas more attractive to avoid isolation, a balanced composition of residents, special attention to children and adolescents, ‘from social benefits to work’, and curbing social fraud and crime (Regeringen 2010b). In 2013, the centre left government added two additional ghetto criteria: the proportion of 30 – 59 year olds with only compulsory education is above 50 %, and the average gross income of 15 – 64 year olds (exclusive of persons engaged in education) is below 55 % of average income within the region.⁵ Thus, a hitherto underexposed problem – poverty – was highlighted, along with its relationship to the risk of not acquiring any education.

However, the special attention to immigrant minorities has had another focus on risks of a more ostensibly violent nature. Following the attack on the WTC 9/11, the Danish government launched an ‘anti-terror package’ in 2002 and another one in 2006 after the incident of the Mohammed drawings. This background was explicitly referred to when the government presented its new draft program *A strong defence against terror* in February 2015 shortly after the assaults on *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris and at the culture house *Krudttønden* in Copenhagen. One month earlier, political agreement had been reached to strengthen preventive initiatives against extremism and radicalization. An accompanying law enables the police to restrict journeys abroad for Danish citizens in order prevent recruitment for armed conflicts and to restrict residence of foreign citizens, if there is reason to believe that they endanger state security (Regeringen 2015). The new anti-terror program is interesting with regard to the composition of its 12 target areas and its diagnosis of the inherent problem.

⁵ Ministeriet for by, bolig og landdistrikter (2013). *Lov om ændring af lov om almene boliger m.v.*

The target areas are: *Better tools for police and police intelligence efforts to prevent terror in Denmark* (alertness and surveillance, information on aircraft passengers, possibilities of registration of users of prepaid cards, a.o.). *Strengthened task force in case of terror action* (around the clock duty). *Better tools for military intelligence efforts to prevent terror against Denmark* (collection/analysis of information on terror threats from abroad, strengthened effort with regard to Danish extremists abroad). *Extension of Danish contribution to international cooperation to combat terror* (strengthened preventive effort in the Middle East and Africa). *Revision of Danish anti-terror effort. Prevention of radicalization in prisons* (further initiatives). Interestingly, the distribution of costs is heavily biased towards police and military tasks (*Ibid.*).

It is equally interesting that the terror threat is explicitly defined as extraneous with the opening sentence of the draft program stating that: *“We live in a world in which violent forces want to attack our democracy and our freedom. We saw it at the terror assault in Paris in January and at the assault in Copenhagen last weekend.”* The draft program explicitly refers to the crisis of the Mohammed drawings in 2005 as a trigger of an increasing threat along with the (civil) wars in Iraq and Syria, for which radicalized young Danes are recruited as members of ISIL and other factions (*Ibid.*: 1).

Our question is whether there is a connection between the two seemingly diverse citizenship policy areas sketched.

Discussion: Protective modernity, risk and citizenship

In 2014, AE-rådet published an analysis showing that an increasing proportion (24 %) of 25 year olds had *not* completed any youth education – the proportion being much higher for persons with unskilled parents; from 2001 to 2014 it increased from 41 to 46 % with females and descendants of immigrants slightly better off (AE-rådet 2014). The 2006 target that 95 % of a cohort complete youth education was out of reach. An important goal related to active democratic citizenship had not been achieved with the tools of public governance for ‘activation’.

One reason may be sought in increasing income inequalities and reduction of the levels of social benefits. Another reason may be that a ceiling has been imposed on local municipalities’ public expenditure. Local municipalities are not only responsible for ‘activation’ programs but also for compulsory schooling. However, it remains an issue for further examination, to what extent school and youth education contribute to the failure to reduce educational polarisation. Either way, initiatives to improve particular social conditions in the context of local communities or political incentives to stimulate individual ‘responsibility’ seem to have been insufficient to offset the effects of changes in economic and social welfare. In Denmark, the risk of endangering market capitalist dynamics appears to have been a major concern in comparison to the risk of endangering democracy, equality and social cohesion through increasing social polarisation.

In their analysis of far right voting for the European Parliament, Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou (2014) argue that the inability of mainstream politics to address domestic issues has left a space for right wing parties to capitalize on popular discontent and disillusionment and – linking economic crisis with issues of employment, immigration and citizenship – to blame the EU for encroaching on the national social contract (*cf.* Lessenich 2009). However, Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou show that there is no linear relationship between right wing voting success and the degree of austerity, further pointing out that the label of ‘right wing parties’ covers nationally heterogeneous conceptions of the citizenship challenges involved. On the other hand, Armingeon & Guttman (2014) show that satisfaction with democracy

and trust in parliaments are significantly related not only to individual dimensions such as assessment of economic situation, life satisfaction, education and EU-knowledge, but also to macro level factors such as government change, age of democracy and interference from international organizations and market factors. They conclude that the dominant mode of handling the economic crisis has made things worse for democracy.

Applying this perspective to the Danish situation, it is notable, *first*, that the decline in political satisfaction in Denmark shown by Armingeon & Guttman ranges close to the European Union mean and median; *second*, that the Danish People's Party has experienced a massive increase in support in the European Parliament elections from 6.8 % in 2004 to 15.8 % in 2009 and 26.6 % in 2014 (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2014; Indenrigs- og sundhedsministeriet 2004) – a success disproportional to the degree to which Denmark has been affected by austerity. However, it is hardly surprising if DPP voters in particular (see above) fear that the national contract is under siege and – being educated politically by a powerful national identity narrative on that score – interpret this as an cultural threat.

Bauman (1999) has offered the hypothesis that in a situation of economic and social *insecurity* and political or cultural *uncertainty*, it is politically tempting to conflate these risks into a *safety* risk, *i.e.* into external or internal physical threats to life, welfare and identity.

Tully (2008) offers further perspective on the perception of risks and threats. Distinguishing between civil liberties (freedom of speech, thought and faith), political liberties, social and economic citizenship, and minority rights, he argues that these principles have been imposed on the rest of the world as standards of civilization along with western culture and 'free trade' since the beginning of modern nation building. However, this imposition does not mean that the 'promises of modernity' have been fulfilled either in the 'Third world' or within the western nation states themselves. Like liberation movements, 'fundamentalist' or radical right movements can be interpreted as retaliatory reactions either to the aggressive imposition of western dominance with its legacy of destabilisation and conflict or to the unfulfilled promises of modern universalist citizenship (Eisenstadt 2004).

Enlightenment understood freedom of speech as a protection of democratic and minority rights against state violence and majority dominance. Lately, freedom of speech seems to have changed into a protection of middle class majority culture by ridiculing the beliefs of incompletely integrated minorities and hence, by abstracting from the historical and social conditions of integration, making the latter more difficult.

Eisenstadt (2004) emphasises that the cultural program of modernity comes with two visions, a pluralist and a totalizing 'Jacobin' one. For the latter, history has a goal legitimizing political action; this goes for utopian communism as for modern fundamentalism. Now neo-liberal market utopianism and post-9/11 defensive or pre-emptive state action sometimes seem to form the *Janus* head of a new Jacobin political crusade. After 9/11 and *Charlie Hebdo* it became a political virtue not to understand, but to condemn and combat. Neglecting the need to deal with the real interdependence of "continually interacting modern civilizations and movements which cut across any single society or civilization" (*Ibid.*: 64) and the *sources* of polarization, modernity has placed itself under siege.

This is consequential for citizenship. Political discourse has been eminently educative from the beginning of the present millennium whether in terms of the 'invisible' or the hard hand. However, the cho-

sen policies haven't brought solutions to domestic or international social inequality or conflict, hence inclusive citizenship any closer.

Conclusions – the role of austerity and other social determinants of citizenship

A number of tentative conclusions may be extracted from our discussion: Despite a gradual, but many-sided revision of the Danish welfare model, it still appears robust enough to limit the effects of the international economic crisis and its social expressions to a moderate level. Our examples convey a picture of heterogeneous citizenship policies in terms of classical universal welfare state and 'neo-liberal' governance elements. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish specific austerity measures from longer term changes in political intervention modes. A particular distinction in citizenship policies between a workfare dimension and a national identity and safety dimension is identified. Rooted in Danish national history as well as parliamentary conditions, the citizenship discourse has moved from a civil, political towards an ethnic, cultural conception. However, the two policy dimensions are arguably interlinked in terms of mirroring changes in the political contract inherent in the constitution of the welfare state. Both the workfare and the national identity and safety discourse are highly educative, conveying selective images of risks and threats, though none of them have offered persuasive answers to the challenge of growing social polarization. Given the above, Denmark may offer a special case in Europe as far as a direct relationship between austerity and citizenship is concerned.

Bibliography:

- AE-rådet (2012). *Risikoen for kontanthjælp tidobles uden uddannelse*. http://www.ae.dk/sites/www.ae.dk/files/dokumenter/analyse/ae_risikoen-for-kontanthjaelp-tidobles-uden-ungdomsuddannelse.pdf
- AE-rådet (2013a). *3 ud af 4 på kontanthjælp har ingen uddannelse*. http://ae.dk/files/dokumenter/analyse/ae_3-ud-af-4-unge-paa-kontanthjaelp-har-ingen-uddannelse.pdf
- AE-rådet (2013b). *Danmark i en krisetid – Velstand kræver uddannelse. Økonomiske Tendenser 2013*. Copenhagen: AE-rådet. http://www.ae.dk/files/dokumenter/publikation/ae_ot13.pdf
- AE-rådet (2014). *Færre bryder den sociale arv i Danmark*. http://www.ae.dk/sites/www.ae.dk/files/dokumenter/analyse/ae_faerre-bryder-den-sociale-arv-i-danmark.pdf
- AK-samvirke (2010). *Fakta om dagpengereformen*. <http://www.ak-samvirke.dk/artikler/fakta-dagpengereformen> accessed 2.9.2015.
- Andersen, J.G. (2007). Restricted access to social protection for immigrants in the Danish welfare state. *Benefits*, 15 (3).
- Andersen, J.G. (2011). From the Edge of the Abyss to Bonanza - and beyond: Danish Economy and Economic Policies 1980-2011. *Comparative Social Research*, 28.
- Armingeon, K. & Guttmann, K. (2014). Democracy in Crisis? The Declining Support for National Democracy in European Countries 2007-2011. *European Journal of Political Research*, August.
- Baldwin, P. (1990). *The Politics of Social Solidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bauman, Z. (1999). *In Search of Politics*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
- Beck, U. (2005). *Power in the Global Age*. Cambridge: Polity.

- Beck, U. (2008). *World at Risk*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Beskæftigelsesministeriet (2013). *Aftale om en reform af kontanthjælpsystemet – flere i uddannelse og job*. Copenhagen: Ministry of employment.
- Commission of the European Communities (1998). *Learning for active citizenship: A significant challenge in building a Europe of knowledge*, Foreword. http://ec.europa.eu/education/archive/citizen/citiz_en.html
- Council of the European Union (2010). *Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: "Towards a European Security Model"*. Brussels: Council of the European Union.
- BEK 219 (2007). *Bekendtgørelse 219 af 12/3/2007 om uddannelsen til professionsbachelor som lærer i folkeskolen*. Copenhagen: Ministry of Education.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. (2004). The Civilizational dimension of Modernity – Modernity as a distinct civilization. In Arjomand, S.A. & Tiryakian, E.A. (eds.): *Rethinking Civilizational Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.
- Espersen, L.D., Eiberg, M. & Andersen, D. (2011). *Veje til ungdomsuddannelse 2. Kvalitative interview med skoleledere, lærere, elever og UU-vejledere*. Copenhagen: SFI rapport 11:40.
- Eurostat (2015). *Unemployment rate by sex and age groups. Annual average*. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/UNE_RT_A
- Folketinget (2015). *Valg og tendenser*. http://www.ft.dk/folketinget/oplysningen/faq/~/_media/PDF/publikationer/Informationsark/Tal%20og%20fakta/Valg_og_tendenser.ashx; <http://www.ft.dk/aktuelt/nyheder/2015/06/valgidag.aspx>
- Habermas, J. (1994). Three normative models of democracy. *Constellations*, 1 (1).
- Halikiopoulou, D. & Vasilopoulou, S. (2014). Support for the far Right in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective. *The Political Quarterly*, 85 (3).
- Hall, J.A., Korsgaard, O. & Pedersen, O.K. (eds.) (2015). *Building the Nation. N.F.S. Grundtvig and Danish National Identity*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Hoskins, B., Abs, H., Han, C., Kerr, D. & Veugelers, W. (2012). *Contextual analysis report. Participatory citizenship in the European Union*. London: Institute of Education. http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/about-the-europe-for-citizensprogramme/studies/index_en.htm
- Hvidt, K. (1990). *Det folkelige gennembrud og dets mænd 1850-1900*. Gyldendals og Politikens Danmarkshistorie, Bd. 11. København: Gyldendal.
- Højdal, L. (2011). Uddannelsesværnepligt. *Information*, 26.1.2011.
- Indenrigs- og sundhedsministeriet (2004). *Europaparlamentsvalget 13. juni 2004*. Copenhagen: Ministry of the interior and health. <http://oim.dk/media/67945/EPvalg-2004.pdf>
- Jensen, C. (2015). Fattigt og farligt. *Information*, 2.9.2015.
- L220 (2006). *Forslag til lov om uddannelse til professionsbachelor som lærer i folkeskolen*. Copenhagen: Government.
- Lessenich, S. (2009). Aktivierungspolitik und Anerkennungsökonomie. *Sozial Passagen*, 1 (2).
- Lykketoft, M. (2009). *The Danish Model – a European Success Story*. Copenhagen: Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd.
- Olssen, M. (2008). Globalisation, the third way and education post-9/11. In Peters, M., Britton, A. & Blee, H. (eds.): *Global Citizenship Education*. Rotterdam: Sense Publications.

- Pedersen, O.K. (2013). Political globalization and the competition state. In Brincker, B. (ed.): *Introduction to Political Sociology*. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag.
- Regeringen (2009a). *En fælles og tryk fremtid. Handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og radikalisering blandt unge*. Copenhagen: Government.
- Regeringen (2009b). *Forårspakke 2.0 – vækst, klima, lavere skat*. Copenhagen: Government.
- Regeringen (2010a). *Viden, vækst, velstand, velfærd*. Copenhagen: Government.
- Regeringen (2010b). *Ghettoen tilbage til samfundet. Et opgør med parallelsamfund*. Copenhagen: Government.
- Regeringen (2015). *Et stærkt værn mod terror*. Copenhagen: Government.
- Sand, S. (2010). *The Invention of the Jewish People*. London: Verso.
- Skatteministeriet (2012). *Rammeaftale om en skattereform*. Copenhagen: Ministry of taxes.
- Thompson, G.F. (2013). Market and State. In Brincker, B. (ed.): *Introduction to Political Sociology*. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag.
- Topp, N.-H. (1987). *Udviklingen i de finanspolitiske ideer i Danmark 1930-1945*. Copenhagen: DJØF.
- Torring, J. (1999). 'Workfare with Welfare: Recent Reforms of the Danish Welfare State'. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 9 (5).
- Tully, J. (2008). Two meanings of global citizenship. Modern and diverse. In Peters, M., Britton, A. & Blee, H. (eds.): *Global Citizenship Education*. Rotterdam: Sense Publications.
- Undervisningsministeriet (2009). *Flere unge i uddannelse og job*. Copenhagen: Ministry of education.
- Økonomi- og indenrigsministeriet (2014). *Familiernes økonomi. Fordeling, fattigdom og incitamenter*. Copenhagen: Ministry of economy and the interior.