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Introduction

How does narratology relate to, or not relate to, narrative strangeness, that is to defamiliarization, non-naturalizable aspects, non- and anti-mimetic textual strategies, and narrational ambiguity?³

To Russian Formalism and Czech Structuralism aspects like these were among the main concerns insofar as attention was paid to the differential formal qualities of literature, its ‘literariness’, and this with a special focus on narrative literature. By investigations of the strangely deviating formal aspects of narratives as compared to everyday reporting, these two ‘pre-narratological’ schools of criticism concentrated on the strangeness, or estrangement, both linguistic and cognitive, of artistic prose.

When narratology became a distinct sub-discipline in the early 1970s, it inherited the formalistic stance, even if interest in estrangement and literariness perhaps lost some of its edge. Moreover, narratology from its very beginnings incorporated a model that would seem to be utterly foreign to formalism: a communicative model of literary narrative. Literary narratives were thus considered as simulations of natural, oral acts of communication. An internal global narrator or voice was supposed to be a constituent of all narrative, and readers were assumed to process artful fictional narratives in the same way and according to rules employed in processing everyday reports. This approach, however, has had some problems with accounting for the strangeness and anomalies of Modern and Post Modern writing, and as many sceptics have shown, not even classical realism would seem to conform to the standards set by oral or ‘natural’ storytelling. Thus, a certain urge to confront narratology with the difficult task of reconsidering a most basic premise in its theoretical and analytical endeavors has for some time been undeniable.

In the last ten years or so, Scandinavian, or rather Nordic (including Finnish and Estonian), narratologists have been among the most active and insistent critics of the communicative model. They share a marked

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¹ The editors would like to express their gratitude to one of the anonymous readers of the book manuscript. The reader’s report contained a sharp and elaborate contextualization of the common grounds for the contributions to this volume. We have drawn heavily on the report in the first paragraphs of this introduction.
scepticism towards the idea of using “natural” narratives as some kind of
generic model for understanding and interpreting all kinds of narratives,
and for all of them the distinction of fiction is important. In this antholo-
gy, for the most part written by Nordic scholars, we present a collection
of articles that deal with strange narratives, narratives of the strange, or
more generally with the strangeness of fiction, and even with some strange
aspects of narratology. Moreover, they all deal with some aspects of
strange voices. This attempted focus on ‘voice’ may perhaps need an expla-
nation.

Prior to the publication of Gérard Genette’s *Discours du récit* in 1972,
the word “voice” in literary criticism served mainly as an unsystematic, but
handy, umbrella term for observations on an author’s style or rhetoric.
Since Genette’s proposal to distinguish between mood and voice, voice has
also acquired a more focused meaning in narrative theory in terms of an-
swers to the question “who speaks?” In Genette’s theory, the voice of a
narrative will always have to be the voice of a (fictional) narrator, and this
voice is both “the generating instance of narrative discourse” (*Narrative
Discourse*, 213) and “the final instant governing [it]” (157). Whenever a
voice is narrating, a narrative exists, and vice versa: there is always a voice
narrating the narrative, and that voice is the voice of the narrator. The
term voice thus would seem to combine the stabilizing function of an al-
ways-necessary narrator with the seductive mimetic intuitivity of someone
talking (to us). Certainly, for Genette, a voice like Proust’s, for instance,
may mock any conventional vocal rules; the idea of really strange voices,
however, is still foreign to his theory.

Although being a rather simplified version of Émile Benveniste’s the-
ory of enunciation, Genette’s voice concept is usually located within the
framework of French structuralism. Hence, several general criticisms of
theoretical and methodological assumptions of—or about—structuralism
have reappeared on specific levels in a very lively debate concerning narra-
tive voice. Nevertheless, the idea that the fundamental narrative voice is a
narrator’s voice is shared by a wide range of scholars from Franz K. Stanzel
to Gerald Prince to James Phelan; it rests upon the conception that
narratives can and should be analyzed as acts of communication. Marie-
Laure Ryan’s 1993 definition of the term narrator in *The Encyclopedia of
Contemporary Literary Theory* might still be representative in 2010: “[i]n a
narrative text, the narrator is the speaking ‘voice’ which takes responsibil-
ity for the act of narration”. What Lars-Åke Skalin aptly calls the “stand-

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2 Cf. Henrik Slov Nielsen 2004; Per Krogh Hansen and Marianne Wolff Lundbohm 2005; Lars-
Åke Skalin 2005, Pekka Tammi and Hanna Tommola 2006, Marina Grishakova 2006, Mar-
Introduction

ard theory” of narrative transmission has as one of its key elements the belief that in a narrative somebody—the narrator—is speaking to someone—the narratee.

Critiques of the “standard theory”, for the most part emanating from “strange” linguistic or philosophical positions, have had a hard time being heard. Ann Banfield, alluding in 1982 to both Käte Hamburger and Benveniste, famously stated that in a fictional narrative “No one speaks […], nor addresses anyone”—narrative fictions are not communicative texts. (Banfield 1982: 97.) Genette’s crushing response to Banfield in Narrative Discourse Revisited is well known, and mainstream narratology has followed in Genette’s steps—mostly by its silence. Andrew Gibson arrived at a similar conclusion, albeit from another direction, in that he questions the validity of the concept of voice by drawing upon tenets from deconstruction and post-structuralism. Stressing the purely metaphorical character of the term voice—“there are in fact no narrative voices and no voices in narrative” (Gibson 2001: 640)—he attempts to debunk the ideas of coherence, identity over time and stable hierarchies that he takes to be manifest in the concept of voice as envisioned by Genette. Gibson did not fare better than Banfield among mainstream narratologists.

Pragmatic and/or cognitive approaches have been slightly more successful. Injecting doses of constructivism in their reconceptualizations of voice, they emphasize the role played by the reader in locating and figuring the voices of a text. Monika Fludernik, who ridicules the generalized postulates of the standard theory, talks about “the linguistically generated illusion of a voice factor”—the reader, rather than the narrator in the text, is the creator of voice effects. (Fludernik 1996: 344, italics added.) While she might in principle agree with Gibson that the concept of voice is metaphorical and risks blocking insights into more peculiar qualities of textual phenomena, she would seem to argue in favour of using the term even though the constructivist and pragmatic approach “may not quite meet the standards of rigorous philosophical enquiry [… it works!” (Fludernik 2001: 710.)

As a working term in narratology, voice continues to attract attention and stimulate discussion. This is so even though the term poses rather substantial challenges to anyone who wants to use it in a rigorous fashion. See for example two recent and rather different responses to this challenge: Liesbeth Korthals Altes’s “Voice, Irony and Ethos” (2006), and Richard Walsh’s chapter on voice in The Rhetoric of Fictionality (2007), and, in this anthology, Sylvie Patron’s “Reflections on Voice” and Rolf Reitan’s “Second Person Narrative: A Backwater Project?”

Altes’ article was published in Stimmen(n) im Text: Narratologische Positionierungen (Narratologia 10 (2006)), a rich anthology presenting several
highly interesting papers on the challenges raised by the notion of voice in literary fiction. Faced with the polyvalent nature of the term and the need to account for some strange effects of vocal ironies, Altes argues in favour of a synthetic solution: a “constructivist angle is required, because it takes into account the dynamic processing of a text by readers”, while “the linguistic-rhetorical perspective is not simply to be dismissed, as readers form hypotheses about the intentionality of a text on the basis of its linguistic, stylistic and generic, as well as paratextual features [...]” (166). Walsh, who finds the idea of voice as intuitively appealing as “story”—“commonsensical at first sight”, but “unexpectedly elusive on closer inspection”—proposes an alternative, transmedial perspective on the background of which he insists on differentiating between three diverging and partly overlapping metaphorical meanings of the term voice as “instance” (a representational act), voice as “idiom” (an object of representation), and voice as “interpellation” (a representational subject position) (87).

The current debate among Nordic scholars on the subject of strange voices in written, mainly literary narrative is international in nature and does not confine itself to work done in this region. Rather it draws upon and engages with work done in the growing international narrative community. We have chosen to include two of these voices from abroad: Brian Richardson, whose contribution to the issue of strange voices has been particularly important, and Sylvie Patron, whose defence of “older” theoretical positions like Hamburger’s, Kuroda’s, or Banfield’s have been an inspiration to many. What all contributors to this issue have in common is something that separates them from what arguably may be considered the dominant view of the connection between voice and narrative. Most of them take special interest either in strange voices in the literary text or in the strangeness of the voice of the literary text and they do so by questioning the widespread notion that literary narratives always abide by the same rules as real life narratives. All of them shed light on some of the analytical and theoretical consequences of working with narrative voices without necessarily presupposing that narratives are acts of communication—acts by which, as Phelan puts it, “somebody [is] telling somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened” (Phelan 2005: 18). And all of them probably would share the view that while Phelan’s elaboration of “standard theory” offers a most valuable widening of the field of narratological studies, it still runs the risk of leaving a range of phenomena, crucial to the literary narrative, in the dark—for instance the fact that literary narratives excel in the construction of and playing with the strangeness of the written, narrating voice.
Short Presentations of the Articles in this Issue

It can be extremely difficult to distinguish between homonymy and polysemy when the meanings compared are neither very distant nor very close. Sylvie Patron, in “Reflections on Voice”, investigates the phenomenon of homonymy (one word, different meanings) in the case of narrative voice, i.e. voice in narrative theory, and of the synonyms of the word “voice” in the different narrative theories. The first part concerns voice in “communicational” theories of narrative. Here Patron analyzes the relations of homonymy, polysemy and synonymy surrounding the notion of voice in the theories of Genette, Chatman and Stanzel. She finds three notions of voice in Genette’s work that are different in nature and in origin, and argues that the relation between these notions is merely one of homonymy. She then compares the notion, or notions, of voice in Genetian and post-Genetian narratology with the narrative theories of Chatman (for whom voice is synonymous with verbal expression and/or narratorial expressivity) and Stanzel, who seldom uses the notion of voice, replacing it with that of mediation, which he defines as the characteristic trait of the narrative genre as opposed to other literary genres. The second part of the article concerns Kuroda’s and Banfield’s critique of communicational theories of narrative in the case of fictional narrative. Kuroda does not employ the notion of voice, however, an implicit critique of the notion can be seen in his critique of John R. Ross’s performative analysis, according to which every sentence is derived from an underlying structure containing a performative verb in the first person. Banfield, for her part, demonstrates the inadequacy of what is known as the “dual voice theory” in a certain form of free indirect discourse (represented speech and thought in her own terminology). For Banfield, “As long as a third-person subjectivity is represented, no speaking voice can be realized”. (Banfield does not regard the author, who is responsible for the representation of speech and thought, as a “speaking voice”.) In conclusion, Patron questions whether it is advisable to retain the notion of voice in narrative theory, since eradicating homonymy and, incidentally, polysemy and multiple synonyms, in her view has to be the first logical and even ethical requirement of any theoretical language.

In “Alternative Strains Are to the Muses Dear: The Oddness of Genette’s Voice in Narrative Discourse” Rikke Kragelund Andersen analyzes The Seducer [Forfæren], a novel by Norwegian author Jan Kiærstad, in order to demonstrate how Genette’s focus on textual movements works in practice, and thus showing the necessity of Genette’s inclusion of time and level in the understanding of voice (a point often misrepresented in the reception of Genette). The text is a short study of Genette’s conception of
narrative voice, which is shown to be far more open-ended, "low structuralist", and less "categorical" than assumed among most critics of Genette’s narratology.

Intervening in the current discussion of how one should define the field of unnatural narratives, Henrik Skov Nielsen in “Fictional Voices? Strange Voices? Unnatural Voices?” attempts an answer with a specific view to strange fictional voices. “What are the implications of treating all narratives, including fictional ones, as if they were real-life instances of narration?” Observing that some peculiar narrative forms such as first person present tense narration, you-narration, and paraleptic first person narration challenge common sense understandings of narrative and fictional voices, and drawing on discussions with Fludernik, Tammi, Phelan, and others, he attempts to establish the relationship between the specific strangeness of each of these narrative forms and the general conditions of fictional narratives. A close reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Tell-Tale Heart”, which is “an especially interesting and challenging unnatural narrative that leaves almost all real world parameters behind”, concludes these discussions. It presents the reader to voices that are strange in that they conflate text and paratext, here and there, then and now, I and you. Finally, Skov Nielsen asks what consequences, if any, these peculiar forms and narratives have for our understanding of fictional narratives in general.

In “Significant Deviations: Strange Uses of Voice are one among other Means of Meaning Making”, Peer Bundgaard's approach rests on the tacit claim that there is no need to make any ontological fuss about the narrator, with whom “voice” is often identified, if by narrator we understand some substantial entity whose mode of being is essentially different from that of the formal narratorial devices of presentation. The narrator is neither a necessity nor an impossibility, but a semiotic and aesthetic resource at the disposal of any given author who may choose or not choose to make use of it in whatever way he may find convenient for his purposes. Thus, Bundgaard aims to shed some light on the semiotic function served by what is commonly called “voice” in narrative art: How do authors use voice, i.e. the narrating instance, in order to trigger specific meaning effects? Starting by framing the issue of voice and its semiotic function: viz. relative to what we mean by “natural”, “unnatural” or even “strange”, when we use such terms to qualify voice, he next uses a sample of examples from both first person and third person narratives to “flat-footedly”, as he says, show how meaning making obtains by virtue of specific uses of voice. Finally, the conclusion of the paper is that while it is certainly possible to determine the semiotic function of voice, whether strange or straight, it is so only on empirical, case-to-case grounds: there is no predetermined meaning effect linked to given variations in or applica-
tions of voice (such as change from hetero- to homodiegetic narrator, from authorial to figural mode of narration, or free indirect speech). Voice is a meaning-shaping device that applies to all narrative situations. The semiotic result of its application is therefore also relative to the specific whole in which it is used. Finally, Bundgaard makes a general claim as to this relation: an important subset of meaning effects in narrative art can be characterized in terms of significant deviations from a given standard.

In "How Strange Are the Strange Voices of Fiction?" Lars-Åke Skalin proposes an "Aristotelian" counter-model to standard narratological theories and their common assumption of a general retrospective position of narration. Skalin argues that while the telling of natural narratives can be seen as motivated by the teller’s relation to something past, fiction generally refrains from such motivation. Fictional stories, progressing "blindly", must violate the kind of expectations we have in meeting natural narratives. In the perspective of Skalin’s proposed poetics, standard narratological approaches commit "a narrative fallacy" in their dealing with literary fiction. Skalin demonstrates his points by exemplary close readings of selected passages from Dickens and Twain.

In "States of Exception: Decoupling, Metarepresentation and Strange Voices in Narrative Fiction", Stefan Iversen discusses narratives that defiantly challenges the possibility of answering the question "Who speaks?" The very strange voices of these texts emanate from a narrative that simultaneously evokes the mutually exclusive reading practices connected to fiction and non-fiction. In an attempt to describe how such exceptional "narrative situations" work, Iversen brings the concept of narrative voice in dialogue with the concepts of decoupling, metarepresentation and scope syntax as they are developed and used in evolutionary psychology. Investigating Leda Cosmides and John Tooby's theories of metarepresentation and scope syntax, he discusses some important ramifications they might have for the distinction between fiction and non-fiction and in particular the possible uses of these theories when treating voices in fiction. It turns out that the treated amalgamation of theoretical approaches has potential consequences, not only for dealing with this specific type of strange narrative voice, but also for an understanding of what fiction might be and how it might function. Demonstrating his points by an asceptualised reading of the Danish text *Selvomordsaktionen* [The Suicide Mission] (2005), written by clausbeck-nielsen.net, Iversen—in a critique of both Cosmides and Tooby and of Zunshine (2006)—concludes that what narratology and theory of fiction might, and perhaps should, learn from Cosmides and Tooby’s work, is not so much that fiction can act as a training ground for real life competences, but rather that fiction—a certain state of excep-
tion—is a crucial component of what enables real life competences to function in the first place.

In “Second Person Narration: A Backwater Project?” Rolf Reitan proposes a closer look at three very different perspectives on second person narratives. Brian Richardson (1991), Irene Kacandes (1994), and Monika Fludernik (1993, 1994h) have for some time been classical references, but according to Reitan they have never been seriously discussed. The article starts by discussing Kacandes’ concept of ‘radical narrative apostrophe’, and next analyses the three authors’ very different typological proposals. In particular, Fludernik’s famous typological “Diagram 1” becomes submitted to a lengthy close reading. Borrowing Richardson’s idea of a Standard Form second person narrative, the author returns to Butor’s La Modification to investigate the question of address (a pivotal question in Fludernik’s articles), which leads to a strict definition of a prototypical “genre” of Standard Form narratives. Passing through landscapes of fiction, apostrophe and postmodernism, the article addresses some tricky questions concerning self-address and Uri Margolin’s analytic schemes. At last, by way of proposing a much needed subdivision of the Standard Form, the strange “narrating voice” in La modification is discussed: not a narratorial voice, but a readerly voice created in the author’s writing.

In “Toward a Typology of Virtual Narrative Voices Voices”, Marina Grishakova, for whom Mikhail Bakhtin is a major inspiration, offers some preliminary observations on the phenomenon of virtual voice, i.e. hypothetical discourse that might have been, but allegedly is not, pronounced by the purported speaker, being instead attributable to a different textual consciousness (“originator-consciousness”). The author develops the concept of virtual voice by using Gerald Prince’s idea of the ‘dismarrated’ and Marie-Laure Ryan’s idea of ‘virtual narrative’. Narrative voice manifests itself on the level of discourse: it functions as a means of perspectivization and interpretation (cf. Aczel’s definition of reading as an experience of overhearing voices). Virtual voice is not an unrealized or discarded possibility of plot development, but a realized discursive effect whose value is purely interpretive. For example, narration by the dead or ghostly narrator as a representation of either “natural” (everyday) or “unnatural” (otherworldly) events—all components of the textual world and thus part of the game of “make-believe”—is not meant to raise the (rather trivial) question of whether ghosts are able to speak or whether represented events indeed took place, but rather to shed new light on these events and occurrences of human life, to reveal new perspectives on life and death in general—or to pose questions concerning the nature of fiction. Otherwise, the narrator’s voice establishes a certain interpretive transworld relationship between the fictional actual world and the reader’s actual world. The phe-
nomemon of virtual voices discloses a discrepancy between the mimetic and diegetic aspects of fictional storytelling: due to the existence of "virtual" counterparts of the representation, the storyworld opens indirect access to worlds much more extensive than the world it represents, which is its immediate communicative context (cf. Mukařovský 1970).

In "Masters of Interiority: Figural Voices as Discursive Appropriators and as Loopholes in Narrative Communication", Maria Mäkelä addresses the peculiarities of figural voice in consciousness representation and the disruptive effect that this voice has on our narratological readings of minds and of narrative transmission. Instead of taking natural narratives as her starting point, she bases her arguments on a diachronic reconsideration of figural voices in literary fiction. First, she argues that the seeds of the "unnaturalness" of figural voice are already planted in the discourse of the early modern novel and especially in epistolary narration. The psychologically "natural" (mimetic) reading of fictional minds—favoured by both classical and cognitive narratology—is shown to foreground the "unrestrained" expression of thought and emotion via figural voice. Yet the conventions of consciousness representation bear in themselves the traces of mediacy: conventional frames of verbalization, intentional structure, and communicative features. She continues by tracing the evolution of this charged relationship between mediacy and immediacy in the third person narrative context and in instances of focalization and stylistically unmarked free indirect discourse. The key argument of this article concerns both narrative as well as thematic conventions. Characters who master their own interiority by appropriating narratorial conventions form a recurrent motive through the early modern, modern, and the late modern novel. This literary convention is—and at the same time, peculiarly, is not—in contradiction to the hierarchization and the naturalization of literary discourse prevalent in narratology. The "narrativizing focalizers" and the like also issue a threat to the currently much favoured rhetorical approaches to narrative fiction, since, more than often, fictional minds highlight the nature of consciousness representation as incommunicable communication. Finally, encouraged by the epistolary digression, The Princess of Cleves, Madame Bovary and Coetzee's Disgrace, she sets forth a narratological take on consciousness representation as a derivative of, not speech, but writing (with a faint nod towards Bakhtin and Derrida).

In "The Fifth Mode of Representation: Ambiguous Voices in Unreliable Third Person Narration", Poul Behrendt and Per Krogh Hansen suggest that the problem of 'who speaks, and who sees?' requires more complex answers than usually given. Their aim is to show how two different parameters by which FID, and the related modes of representation of thought, are claimed to be analysed, do not necessarily support each other.
The authors refer to these levels as the 'level of discourse' (or the 'discursive level') and the 'level of narration' (or the 'narrative level'). The former is based on the grammatical parameters that usually determine the well-known modes of representation (that is FID, ID and DD) as definite kinds of discourse: person, inquit, tense and syntactical markers; the latter is based on parameters of voice distributions and characteristics more or less colliding with the grammatically defined parameters of discourse. Behrendt and Krogh Hansen's study encompasses two seemingly separate aspects of narrative unreliability—that of factual and that of ideological unreliability. Factual unreliability, usually regarded as unimaginable in third person narration, is examined in a reading of Isak Dinesen's subtle and seductive play with FID in her classical short story “Sorrow-Acre”. Ideological unreliability is discussed in an investigation of ambiguous discourse in Henry James' much-discussed third person narrated short story “The Liar”. A closer look at Wayne C. Booth's controversial transposition of this story to a first person narration 'in disguise' serves to reveal the deficiencies of an analysis of unreliability carried through without any consideration of the flexible parameters of FID. Thus, in both Dinesen's and James' texts a double voicing is uncovered, which as yet has passed unnoticed, also by supporters of the dual voice hypothesis.

In “Unnatural Voices in Ulysses: Joyce's Postmodern Modes of Narration”, Brian Richardson draws on the work of a number of Joyce scholars to provide an inventory of the more unnatural or impossible kinds of narration in Ulysses. He points out how Joyce's “subjectification” of traditional means of objective narration leads to a collapse of the opposition between objective third-person narration and subjective first-person discourse, arguing that this multiplicity of narrative practices that would seem to call for a narrator and an arranger or better, a supernarrator, is challenged by antithetical or incommensurate styles of narration that cannot be reasonably contained within a single figure, voice, or style. Moreover, as Ulysses progresses, Richardson finds ever more radical, unnatural, and impossible kinds of narration: Joyce both establishes and violates independent, autonomous sources of narration as he draws on and then moves away from a realist or humanist poetics. Virtually every binary opposition that mimetic narratives presuppose would seem to be undermined in this process. And repeatedly Joyce dissolves the notion of a single, human-like narrator who is telling a story. Richardson argues that for this text, we must replace the narrator concept with a broader, more fluent category, as the narrator—and even a single implied author—are supplanted by a depersonalized, deindividualized idea of narration. Concerning the larger issues of narratology, Richardson proposes to use Joyce's example to corroborate a relatively new position, which would seem to be
gaining ground in narrative theory, one can no longer presume the existence of a real human or a human-like narrator standing behind and above the discourse; in many works, there is only the discourse itself. Citing Monika Fludernik, Marie-Laure Ryan and his own *Unnatural Voices*, he defends the need for a theoretical model of narration that can embrace the full spectrum of narrative voices, from the most compellingly human-like to the most radically decentred and posthuman. The anatomy of Joycean strategies traced in this article confirms the importance of this position and firmly situates Joyce as a preeminent author of unnatural narratives.

Per Krogh Hansen, Stefan Iversen, Henrik Skov Nielsen and Rolf Reitan