

European History Quarterly

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European History Quarterly 2013 43: 96

DOI: 10.1177/0265691412467741

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European History Quarterly

43(1) 96–106

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DOI: 10.1177/0265691412467741

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Ivan T. Berend, *Europe since 1980*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2010; 342 pp., 25 illus., 4 tables; 9780521112406, £53.00 (hbk); 9780521129176, £18.99 (pbk)

Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel, eds, *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches*, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2010; 304 pp.; 9780230232686, £55.00 (hbk)

N.J. Crowson, *Britain and Europe: A Political History since 1918*, Routledge: Abingdon, 2010; 214 pp.; 9780415400183, £95.00 (hbk); 9780415400206, £27.99 (pbk)

Fernando Guirao, Frances M.B. Lynch and Sigfrido M. Ramirez Pérez, eds, *Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change*, Routledge: Abingdon, 2012; 634 pp.; 9780415878531, £150.00 (hbk)

Dan Marek and Michael Baun, *The Czech Republic and the European Union*, Routledge: Abingdon, 2010; 206 pp.; 9780415460972, £85.00 (hbk)

Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Bo Stråth, *The Political History of European Integration: The Hypocrisy of Democracy-Through-Market*, Routledge: Abingdon, 2010; 242 pp.; 9780415578837, £85.00 (hbk); 9780415502757, £26.00 (pbk)

Antonio Varsori, *La Cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi*, Rubbettino Editore: Soveria Mannelli, 2010; 474 pp.; 9788849825893, €23.80 (pbk)

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When Alan Milward passed away in September 2010 the scholarly community lost one of the most important historians of contemporary Europe. The seven books under review here are all concerned with a theme that was at a core of his work, the history of European integration, but they fall into two separate categories. On the one hand, there are three general histories (Berend; Crowson; Varsori). On the other hand, there are four works that deal in one way or another with what might be termed 'Europeanization' (Marek and Baun; Conway and Patel; Schulz-Forberg and Stråth; the volume on *Alan Milward and a Century of European Change*). Milward, of course, did not limit himself to the study of European integration. The book edited by Guirao, Lynch and Ramirez Pérez is an overview of his life's scholarship, with contributions from more than twenty former students and colleagues. Contributions to such volumes can be dispersive in content and uncritical in tone. By and large, *Alan Milward and a Century of European Change* diverges from that type. The contributors, while affectionate, are not effusive. Their book is well planned. Though the subjects covered range from 'the impossible dream' of transferring 'Danish agricultural policy to Iceland', to the nature of the Nazi war economy, the necessity of the Marshall Plan and to the role of history in political science theory, the volume never gives the impression of being an unrelated congeries of essays – it dawns upon the reader that Milward wrote original work on *all* the topics covered by the army of contributors. The volume thus successfully conveys the sheer scale of the academic enterprise Milward undertook (and the empirical and theoretical rigour he brought to his work). His work always had a point, albeit often a polemical one.

Antonio Varsori's *La Cenerentola d'Europa? (The Cinderella of Europe?)* also has a sharp point to make, namely that European integration has played a crucial role in post-war Italian political development. Italy is the polar opposite to Britain within the EU. Europhile where Britain is Eurosceptic, Italy has consistently applauded the widening and the deepening of the European project. Varsori ably shows why. The medieval speed with which Italian diplomatic documents are being published (official documents are available only until the mid-1950s), meant that Varsori was denied the access to official thinking that a British, Danish, French or German scholar would take for granted. As he points out (130), it is this lack of documents that has led most of the historiography to treat Italy's role in the negotiation of the EEC treaty as being limited to that of a 'tour guide' at the key meetings of the Six's foreign ministers at Messina, Venice and Rome.

Varsori has got round this lack of sources by delving deep into the personal archives of a number of leading Italian statesmen, notably Giulio Andreotti, Amintore Fanfani and Aldo Moro, and by reading widely in the EU's archives, in French and British archives and in the secondary literature. The result of his labours is a general history full of findings that will be new even to experts in the fields of European integration history and contemporary Italian history. Britain's failed bid to achieve entry into the EEC between 1961 to 1963, for instance, takes on new interest when it is looked at from an Italian perspective (175–87). Varsori shows that the Italian government considered British membership to be a 'primary

objective', and pressed hard to obtain it. The British were not grateful for Rome's endeavours. Varsori thinks, plausibly, that the Rolls Royce minds in Whitehall were too prone to condescend to Rome, both in this case and in others.

But the book's principal utility lies in explaining why Italians are so committed to the 'European project'. Varsori lays to rest the patronizing myth that Italians are committed to European integration primarily because of the sleaziness of the political process in Rome. Throughout the book, and then more explicitly in the lucid concluding chapter, he identifies several key factors that over time have contributed to Italy's strongly Europeanist stance. The first of these is the way in which integration has enabled Italy to find a precise and meaningful role for the nation on the international stage. After 1945 Italy needed rapidly to supersede its status as a defeated enemy. In this context, Italy's role as a founding member of the 'Six' was an important boost to the country's self-esteem. Europe gave Italian foreign policy an important arena for action, which Varsori plausibly claims Italy has exploited more skilfully than many realize. As he points out, as well as Alcide de Gasperi, whose importance is widely acknowledged by non-Italian writers, individuals such as Amintore Fanfani, Aldo Moro, Ugo La Malfa, Giuseppe Saragat, and Emilio Colombo ensured, in one way or another, that Italy 'left her mark' on the Community's development (405).

EEC membership was also a decisive stimulus that transformed a backward, resource-poor country into a dynamic modern economy within the space of a generation. The Republican Party leader Ugo La Malfa was particularly important in pushing for this choice. In the early and mid-1950s, plenty of leading Italian politicians, especially in the *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC), preferred the false security of protectionism to the wrenching change in the country's economic model that EEC membership threatened (80–2). Yet thanks largely to La Malfa, Italy was the OEEC country that pursued market liberalization most vigorously, Varsori affirms, even before the signing of the treaties of Rome (81). As Italian growth has fallen into stagnation since the late 1990s, public support has waned, but the equation of prosperity with Europe remains an extremely powerful one in the collective imagination. Varsori goes so far as to say that 'being European' has become almost a myth, especially on the political centre-left (415).

This is not least because several times EEC or EU membership has kept political antagonism in check and ensured that parliamentary politics, not street politics, prevailed. In the immediate post-war period the lay parties (Republicans, Liberals and Social Democrats), many of whose leaders were *mangiapreti* (literally 'priest-eaters'), were able to cooperate with the Catholic DC for two main reasons: they all detested Soviet communism, and they all agreed on the need to supersede national sovereignty. European integration thus bound very disparate political forces together into a common cause. Varsori suggests that the massive political crisis of the 1970s might also have spiralled out of control had the Communist Party (PCI) not signalled its support of the democratic status quo by converting itself to support for EEC membership in the late 1960s. The desire to stay in Europe was, moreover, probably the only thing that could have rallied public opinion behind

a discredited political system in the 1990s. The post-war political order collapsed between 1991 and 1995 and was not replaced by convincing alternatives. Italians nevertheless accepted the huge cuts and sacrifices required to join the euro in 1999 because of their conviction that membership of the EU was a badge of pride and a source of strength.

Many of them also believed that European integration was a moral value and not just a political strategy. The only serious criticism that might be made of *La Cenerentola d'Europa* is that it pays little attention to the ideological dimension of Italy's commitment to Europe. In a way this is understandable, since so much Italian commentary on the subject starts from the premise that treats European integration as a kind of crusade. Varsori plainly wants to redress this highly normative approach. He is not wrong, but his narrative would have been even richer had he illustrated the way in which European integration has been portrayed in Italy by intellectuals, by the press and by politicians. There are places in this book where one might think that ideas are just decoration in human affairs. They are not – but this is a marginal criticism of a book of authentic importance.

The main weakness of Ivan T. Berend's *Europe since 1980* is that he executes a good point in an indifferent way. His intention is to show that since the 1970s technological change, economic globalization, the collapse of communism and the discrediting of neo-liberalism have opened a new era of economic development that will pose huge challenges for the process of European integration, which he appears to regard as the continent's inevitable destiny. He develops his theme less well than he might have. The book is structured thematically rather than chronologically. After a brief chapter on the 'dual crises' in the West and the East in the 1970s, it is divided into two chapters dealing with largely 'political' events and two dealing with developments in the economy and society. The latter two chapters are much more successful. Berend says some pertinent things about globalization, demographic shifts and technological change and how they have affected European life in the past three decades. He is particularly good at showing how investment in Central Europe has transformed the economy of Europe as a whole since 1989.

Even so, the 'economic' chapters of the book ramble somewhat and contain more statistics, too often fired in birdshot-fashion, making *Europe since 1980* very tough going at times. Some of the statistics, moreover, are shaky. Ireland is in a mess, but is it true that its indebtedness amounted to *nine* times its GDP in 2008 (217)? No citation is given to back this assertion up. I am even more sceptical that the EU provided \$51 *billion* for its 'Decade of Roma Inclusion' project between 2005 and 2007 (245), especially when Berend informs us that 'health spending' in *Western Europe* will increase from \$9.6 billion in 2007 to \$12 billion by 2011 (264), a figure that would just about keep the NHS in bed linen.

The chapter on politics raises bigger questions. 'The End of Two Europes and European Integration' deals with the collapse of communism in central Europe (with particular emphasis on Poland and Hungary), the demise of the USSR, the unification of Germany, and a discussion of the 'new world order' in a mere 20 pages. It then proceeds to assess developments in the European Community

for 25 pages before concluding with a six-page dash through the list of nation states which experienced internal problems of ethnic or nationalist unrest. Bizarrely, more space is dedicated in this chapter to the EU's post Cold War 'Stabilization and Accession' project for South East Europe than to *perestroika* and Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy, which get a dozen lines on pages 51–2. *Perestroika* is not the only major political event to be given such brief treatment. In the chapter entitled 'The New Cultural and Political Setting', too little effort is made to show the principal shifts in party politics in Europe, or to single out key leaders and their ideas. Mrs Thatcher, for instance, gets only a few brief paragraphs where we learn, among other things, that she defeated the miners' strike in 1982 and 'went so far as to attempt replacing income tax with the unpopular neo-liberal ideal of indirect taxation' (116–17). A paragraph on Italian politics in the 1980s (114–15) contains more errors and over-simplifications than I would have thought possible in 17 lines. Overall, the book's handling of the political framework of Europe since 1980 is disappointing.

N.J. Crowson's *Britain and Europe: A Political History since 1918* is a broad-brush account of some key aspects of British policy towards Europe since the end of World War I. In the first chapter, which deals with the period from 1918 to 1939, Crowson outlines British policy towards France and the League of Nations and the subsequent strategy of appeasing Italy and Germany. He is clearly expert in the literature, but one wonders whether there was really any need to trek across this terrain again. Nevertheless, some aspects of the chapter, notably his discussion of the British rejection of the 1930 Briand Plan for European unity, are well done and genuinely useful.

Crowson's book inexplicably then becomes a chronological account of British official attitudes to the various phases of European integration. As a pre-emptive justification for this narrative choice Crowson says in the Introduction that the EEC has become the 'organisation synonymous with "Europe" and that of all the "Europes" it has most disproportionately absorbed the energies of British politicians, the media and public opinion' (1). Maybe, but the habit of associating 'Europe' too closely with the EU is a bad one. There are, moreover, plenty of general histories that have dealt with Britain's approach to European integration in lively and opinionated fashion. What does Crowson's account add to Stephen George's *An Awkward Partner*, to John Young's *Britain and European Unity*, or to Hugo Young's *This Blessed Plof*?

Unfortunately, the answer is not enough. To begin with, the book is poorly edited for style. A sentence like: 'Not that Britain's counterparts saw matters in this manner, and the French were keen to extract more precise British troop commitments, no doubt mindful of historic British reluctance to continentally commit' (69) speaks for itself. This is an extreme example, but too much of the book gives the impression of having been drafted too hastily. Crowson does not provide much interpretation either, although he does make the interesting suggestion that under New Labour Britain 'witnessed a level of Europeanisation of the policy process not previously seen' (158). He backs this assertion up by pointing out that devolution

means that the UK 'now experiences a multi-levelled system of government' (sic), an independent Bank of England and has incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into British law. As evidence, this seems a little thin (the Bank of England was not given independence to fit better with our European partners' arrangements and nor was devolution driven by the EU's regional agenda), but Crowson is surely right to identify Europeanization as a promising line of future inquiry for historians of British policy-making. His book would certainly have been better had it investigated the impact of 'Europe' on the conduct of British foreign policy and ascertained, for example, to what extent engagement with the EC-EU has displaced the transatlantic relationship at the heart of British policy.

'Europeanization', the second theme addressed in the books under review, is at the heart of Dan Marek and Michael Baun's book. Their account of Czech accession to the EU conveys a great deal of information of which non-readers of Czech would otherwise be deprived. Although the book deals with the post-1989 period only, its methodological approach is a kind of analytical history. The authors depict what happened, making wide use of primary sources, and then ascertain whether theorists of 'Europeanization' were able to predict 'the impact of the EU on the politics, governing institutions and processes, and policies' of the Czech Republic during the accession talks and after entry in 2004 (1), and assess how the Czech Republic has behaved as a member state of the EU.

There is more than an echo of Varsori's account of Italian modernization in the 1950s in Marek and Baun's analysis. They consider that EU membership has, by and large, been of benefit to the Czech Republic. The economy has boomed and Czech income per head reached 80 percent of the EU-27 average as early as 2008. Foreign direct investment has 'surged' and Prague benefited from €9 billion in EU structural funds in the period 2004–2009. Some of these benefits may have transpired had the Czech Republic merely become a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), but on balance Marek and Baun believe that EU membership has boosted growth, not least by compelling the Czechs to reform their legal system, which made investment in the Czech Republic a safer bet. Political change has also been prompted by joining the EU. Membership promotes greater centralization of political power since the 'core executive' has to acquire the ability to act speedily in response to Brussels' demands. On the other hand, this centralizing tendency has been counteracted by strengthening the courts and by diffusing power to the regions. In 1997, the Czechs established 14 regional governments since EU law specifies that regional bodies must be involved in planning and administering the distribution of EU funds. Confusingly, the regions have been lumped together into eight bigger regions (the egregiously named 'NUTS 2' regions) for this purpose (69–71). One wonders whether the cash that Prague has received from Brussels will compensate in the long run for the thick layers of bureaucracy that membership has generated.

By and large, these developments might have been predicted by an academic who possessed the 'toolkit' of Europeanization theory, but no empirical knowledge of the Czech Republic. Marek and Baun underline, however, that theory cannot

account for much that has happened since the Czech Republic first applied for membership. The biggest anomaly is that domestic politics has so far dominated the formation of the Czech Republic's policy towards the EU and public debate has been both heated and lively. (The book has a particularly good section on the way in which President Vaclav Klaus held the EU hostage in 2009 by refusing to ratify the Lisbon Treaty.) Overall, one is left wishing that rather more of this debate and Eurosceptic rhetoric had found its way into the book's pages. While the book could thus have done more to bring Czech politics to life, it is analytically excellent: Marek and Baun possess a clear definition of what Europeanization is and hence know where to look for it and how to measure it.

The volume on *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches*, edited by Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel, lacks such clarity. The editors do not explain coherently what they think Europeanization is. As a result they find it everywhere they and their authors look. A book that contains, among much else, chapters on Holocaust remembrance and Europeanization, the spread of British pop music across continental Europe, T.S. Eliot's conception of Europe, and the Europeanization of West African architecture plainly does need its editors to give it a clear rationale. In the introductory essay by Patel and Ulrike von Hirschhausen Europeanization is defined as

a variety of political, social, economic and cultural processes that promote (or modify) a sustainable strengthening of intra-European connections and similarities through acts of emulation, exchange and entanglement and that have been experienced and labelled as 'European' in the course of history. (2)

This definition is re-elaborated on several occasions throughout the book, but its shortcomings are obvious. First, it does not exclude enough; second, it leaves a wide door open to anachronism. Martin Conway recognizes this in the book's concluding chapter where he describes Europeanization as an 'elusively obstinate' concept (271) and contends that historians should limit themselves to explaining why the label of Europeanization has become attached to some phenomena but not others. He hopes that this 'commonsensical methodology', which he regards as being in keeping with the 'anti-theoretical tenor of much recent historical writing', has enabled the book's authors to avoid the 'pitfalls' of working to an excessively theoretical approach (273).

Coming from the editor of *this* volume, Conway's comments seem rather odd. Several of the book's chapters fail to show that their subject matter has ever had the label Europeanization attached to it and others are suffused with theoretical jargon that, to this reader at least, often defeated its purpose. To give an example of the first of these shortcomings: John Davis's "'Die Briten kommen": British Beat and the Conquest of Europe in the 1960s', is a very readable account of how pop groups across Europe began singing in English because it was more 'authentic'. Davis quotes a German rock promoter saying that in the 1960s 'either you were an Englishman or you were an arse' (238). English became

the language of rock and roll and consigned those artistes who persisted in singing in their own tongues, or in 'yaourt' (phonetic English), to the rubbish bin of history. The obvious question raised by Davis's lively essay is why he calls the spread of English-language beat music Europeanization rather than 'Anglicization'? Did the bands themselves think they were 'Europeanizing' as opposed to being hip? If so, Davis does not demonstrate it. The assumption of his paper is that English music crossed European boundaries, therefore it was Europeanization.

Jessica Wardhaugh, Ruth Leiserowitz and Christian Bailey's chapter on 'Intellectual Dissidents and the Construction of European Spaces', by contrast, shows the perils of paddling unwarily in the murky waters of theory. The authors look at *Europe, Revue Mensuelle*, a Paris review of some prominence between the wars, at the German periodicals *Europäische Revue* and *Merkur*, and at the activism of central European and Russian intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s in order 'to explore the creation of European spaces in Western, Central and Eastern Europe' (22). What does this mean? The three authors add, by way of explanation, that their chapter is 'underpinned by a threefold concept of European space that spans imagination, conviviality and communication' (ibid). In effect, the authors maintain that in all three cases intellectuals constructed 'dream-Europes', built networks and communicated with like-minded individuals across borders to build European 'spaces'. To put it more simply, intellectuals did what they do best: they wined and dined one another, espoused ideas and conducted debates between themselves across national borders. But why should we regard this behaviour as Europeanization? And what links the three experiences together apart from similarity of behaviour? Certainly, the fact that Giuseppe Bottai (one of the chief enforcers of the 1938 Italian racial laws and a contributor to *Europäische Revue*) imagined 'dream Europes' does not make him an 'intellectual dissident' on a par with Vaclav Havel, as the title of the chapter suggests.

The volume edited by Conway and Patel seems to fight shy of any idea that 'Europeanization' might mean convergence on a single model of society or value system, and hence the reduction of diversity. Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Bo Stråth, in contrast, argue that European integration historiography (and Brussels itself) has been in thrall to teleology and path dependency and has portrayed the EU as a 'goal-driven project that is taking, as if by nature, automatic steps towards ever-tighter integration and ever-higher Europeanness' (xi). They present this finding as a revelation in *The Political History of European Integration*. To a British reader this discovery might seem like old news, but Schulz-Forberg and Stråth contend that rather than European integration being a one-way street towards the gradual superseding of nation states, the path to greater unity has in fact turned into a blind alley. The early momentum of European integration petered out in the monetary crisis of the early 1970s. When it was re-launched in the 1980s in the heyday of Jacques Delors, it took the form of a neo-liberal project masquerading as an attempt to build a continental democracy and construct a European identity. The failure of this endeavour is now visible to everybody. Taking their lead from

the work of Perry Anderson, the two authors argue that the EU 'has weakened national without creating supranational sovereignty, leaving rulers adrift in an ill-defined limbo between the two' (191). They approvingly quote a Dutch sociologist, Abram de Swann, who believes that the European 'public space' is one of 'emptiness', without 'European universities, European media, European intellectuals or European discussions' (171).

There is therefore a huge gap between rhetoric and reality in the EU. While the EU's boosters are proclaiming zealously that Europeans are marching into a splendid future, in reality we have sparse knowledge of one another's ideas and interests and care less. Schulz-Forberg and Stråth, following Reinhardt Koselleck, argue that the EU papers over the gap between rhetoric and reality with the 'hypocrisy' referred to in the book's title. In effect, the EU is living and propagating a lie (their argument strongly recalls Vaclav Havel's *The Power of the Powerless*). Just as, according to Koselleck, discourses of freedom and human equality were used by the protagonists of the Cold War to mask the reality of ever-accumulating arsenals of mass destruction, so EU discourse seeks to stifle doubts with grandiose pronouncements about Europe's destiny. Since the two authors believe that only through constant criticism of prevailing hegemonic discourses can society improve and stay democratic, they do not hide that their book is in intent both a work of scholarship and a political act (viii).

There is a whiff of vainglory about this, but that does not mean their ideas are wrong. Actually, the book is both thought-provoking and original. Schulz-Forberg and Stråth would have more political and academic impact, however, if they wrote more concisely and directly. One quotation will have to do: 'The public sphere of relevance in analysing the performance of the EU would not be primarily a civil society arrangement for consensus-oriented reflection governed by Reason, but an arena of critique and conflict that needs a political centre in order to respond' (16–17). Too much of the book is written like this. Overall the volume could have been clipped of 50–60 pages without harm to the solidity of its central argument.

Alan Milward, of course, is probably the most important scholar to have worked upon the question of why West European governments took the bold step of beginning a process of 'Europeanization' in the post-war period. His argument, by now canonical, though not necessarily universally accepted, is that they did so in order to 'rescue' the nation states of Europe from their own peoples' demand for greater welfare: the post-war state had to 'be constructed on a broader political consensus and show itself more responsive to the needs of a greater range and number of its citizens if its legitimacy was to be accepted' (Guirao, Lynch, Pérez, 90). As Frances B.M. Lynch and Fernando Guirao say in their lengthy (130-page!) opening chapter to *Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change*, Milward rejected the notion that European integration was a diplomatic manoeuvre in the Cold War, or an idealistic quest for European federation, or even primarily an outcome of the need to control West Germany, and focused instead on the 'challenges facing the post-war state in Europe' (90).

These challenges, he thought, were primarily economic in character. The institutions of the EEC, therefore, should be regarded as *tools* that the member states evolved to ‘improve the material conditions and happiness of large numbers of people’, as the Introduction to the *European Rescue of the Nation State* contended (quoted p. 90). As ‘constructing’ the EU has become more of an end in itself, this initial motivation has been lost, or so the chapter seems to imply. Lynch and Guirao’s essay concludes by quoting Milward as arguing that ‘domestic politics in Europe will determine the euro’s fate, not central bankers’ (129). He may well shortly be proved right.

Lynch and Guirao’s long essay moreover brilliantly locates Milward’s famous theory of the origins of European integration in the context of his wider work, which they argue was characterized by ‘A Lifetime’s Search for A Theory of Historical Change’. By a close reading and clear exposition of all Milward’s major works – *The German Economy at War* (1965), *The New Order and the French Economy* (1970), *An Economic History of Continental Europe 1780–1914* (1973–1977), *War, Economy and Society* (1977) and *The Reconstruction of Western Europe* (1984) – they simultaneously provide the book’s contributors with a peg to hang their own contributions upon, provide an introduction for the reader of ideas that some of the contributors inevitably take for granted, and underline that Milward did indeed, by the end of his career, arrive at an ‘implicit theory of historical change’ (127).

The essence of this theory was that there is no single model of development – certainly not Marxism, or neo-liberalism – able to bring about prosperity and development for all, at all times. The historical diversity of nations ensures that. Economic progress comes about through statesmanship – through the ability of leaders to grasp what the demands of their societies are and to find creative solutions to satisfy them. The great generation of post-war West European leaders was one which realized what its priorities were: the provision of economic, as well as military security for its populations. It is also true, however, that in *The United Kingdom and the European Community: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy* (2002), Milward thought that the Community’s leaders had already retreated into a parochial concept of a ‘European preference area’ by the time of Britain’s application to join: like Andrew Moravcsik, Milward thought that the motivation for the General’s ‘Non’ was largely due to the impossibility of reconciling the Commonwealth with the Six’s agricultural arrangements and an antipathy to Britain’s outward-looking vision of Europe’s role (121).

It might have been interesting to have a reflection, even a chapter, about Alan Milward’s intellectual formation. Milward’s understanding of modern European history, and in particular his insistence that the great political fact of the twentieth century is the demand of the masses for economic security, is reminiscent of E.H. Carr’s arguments in *The Conditions of Peace* (1942) and *Nationalism and After* (1945) – it would have been interesting to know how far scholars such as Carr influenced Milward. But this is greediness: there is a wealth of excellent chapters here by such well-known scholars as Charles Maier, David W. Ellwood,

Vera Zamagni, Federico Romero and Michael Newman, to name but a few. The book is a fitting tribute to its subject and it is to be hoped that it will be widely used by scholars of contemporary European history.

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