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Abstract

Political myths contribute to effective political communication in their ability to render a social group's world and experiences more coherent by providing stories or narratives that explain where it came from, how it came to be in its present condition, and what its future holds. One such contemporary political myth, identified as Global Britain, has been vigorously promoted by English conservative politicians and public intellectuals – both before and after the 2016 European Union membership referendum – in an effort to alter perceptions about what the UK's proper orientation and identity should be in the international system. Global Britain's advocates view Brexit as an opportunity to reclaim Britain's internationalist credentials by renewing old relationships with people's and societies in its former empire. Among many rhetorical tools used in the articulation of Global Britain is a Commonwealth as a 'family of nations' conceptual metaphor which contributes content to the political myth and force behind its main purpose – promoting the imagination of a positive future when the British people and their country will range out in the world among their closest 'kith and kin' rather than being tied down in what Global Britain's advocates view as an inefficient, undemocratic and sclerotic European Union.

Keywords: political myth; conceptual metaphor; Global Britain; Brexit; UK-Commonwealth relations; transnational identity

‘We are all children of the Commonwealth’: political myth, metaphor and the transnational Commonwealth ‘family of nations’ in Brexit discourse

Introduction

On 19-20 April 2018, the 25th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) took place in London, England, and not surprisingly given ongoing Brexit negotiations, the host organizers ensured that intra-Commonwealth trade was near the top of the agenda. That the international trade theme occupied much of the leaders’ attention is reflected in the large section of the meeting’s final communiqué entitled ‘A More Prosperous Future’ which includes the themes ‘intra-Commonwealth trade’ and ‘multilateral trading system’, while the leaders agreed to a ‘Declaration on the Commonwealth Connectivity Agenda for Trade and Investment’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2018) which will according to Prime Minister Theresa May (the CHOGM chairperson) ‘help to expand investment and boost intra-Commonwealth trade to a value of \$2 trillion by 2030’ (May 2018). Leaving aside the future results of these statements and initiatives, they in themselves can be regarded as products of a concerted rhetorical campaign on the part of English conservative politicians and public intellectuals to promote the idea of the UK as Global Britain, a country with a clearly identifiable global past capable of a global future.

This study approaches Global Britain as a contemporary political myth, which has played a crucial role in pre- and post-EU Referendum political discourse. Political myths aid effective political communication in that they are actively used to influence peoples’ values and beliefs and/or to activate some form of behaviour in them. Global Britain’s

advocates hope to alter views on the UK's proper place in the world, and more specifically, that Britain and the British belong less in Europe than in the wider world and that the country's imperial and deeply internationalist past provides pathways to rediscovering this orientation and identity. Thus, the communication of Global Britain is intended to encourage the imagination of a prosperous future outside the EU that is indeed possible and desirable.

This study first introduces the concept of political myth and subsequently provides an extensive thematic overview of the Global Britain political myth (GBPM) specifically. At the same time, it addresses a key element of the political myth-making process: the use of conceptual metaphors, which are viewed as critical due to their sense-making and emotive qualities. The metaphorical relation of the Commonwealth to a historically-rooted, harmonious and prosperous 'family of nations' by English conservative political communicators, it is argued, contributes content to the GBPM and force behind its main purpose. Importantly, the narratives infused in this particular political myth and its contributing metaphor are deeply rooted in the past, and history is actively used by its communicators as a means of making sense of the present and in the imagination of a brighter future outside of Europe's economic and political structures. Furthermore, the GBPM and its associated Commonwealth 'family of nations' (CW-FON) metaphor reflect an influential and persistent theme in English conservative narratives regarding the UK's past, present and future global orientation and identity, which may also have broader implications in relation to the study of contemporary English nationalism and national identity.

Method and Process

This study has emerged from an ongoing project investigating the intersections between political mythology, conceptual metaphor and history, in political discourse and debate in the contemporary UK. An early stage of this project involved rigorously searching the official UK parliamentary record service (Hansard Online) for 'family of nations' (FON) metaphorical references (in the period from 23 June 2015 [one year before the EU Referendum] through October 2018). The following keywords and terms were used in conducting the research: 'family of nations', 'Commonwealth family', 'Commonwealth' and 'family', 'United Kingdom family', 'UK family', 'British family', 'European family', 'European Union family', and 'EU family'. It quickly became clear that British parliamentarians refer to a wide range of metaphorical multi-national families in their speeches. In all, 256 FON references were identified, the most frequent being in relation to the Commonwealth (95), followed by the UK (91) and the EU (52) [see Table 1]. An appendix has been included listing all of the CW-FON metaphor references by date of utterance, speaker, party affiliation, and location (Commons or Lords).

[Insert Table 1 here]

The decision to use parliamentary speeches is due to the central role members of the political elite play in the construction and communication of political narratives, including the political mythology surrounding Global Britain (as will be elaborated upon below). Political communicators in both the public and private realms – politicians, policymakers and public intellectuals – often closely collaborate in the construction and communication of political narratives, including political myths (as will also be

elaborated upon below). Furthermore, the specific parliamentary speeches used in this study are deemed highly relevant to an analysis of the GBPM because the highest frequency of CW-FON metaphorical references have been made during debates focussed on increasing intra-Commonwealth trade post-Brexit (on 22 February and 16 March 2017), in both cases initiated by Conservative Party members, only weeks following Theresa May's 17 January 2017 'Global Britain' speech in which she presented her government's vision of a more internationalist future for the UK, one she argued is in keeping with the country's history and the instincts and interests of its people (May 2017). The parliamentary speeches, and the CW-FON metaphor references they contain, are therefore approached as part of a rehearsed rhetorical exercise in the promotion of Global Britain.

Theory and Literature Review

The Definition and Power of Political Myth

Political myths are critical to political communication as they can influence peoples' beliefs, values, identities, and even behaviours. One of the most widely cited authorities on the subject, Henry Tudor, likens them to stories. In his view, they are narratives of events in 'dramatic form' and include a protagonist and a plot 'with a beginning, a middle, and an end' (Tudor 1972, 137). Political myths have also been described as powerful instruments that influence how people differentiate between right and wrong and the formation of their beliefs concerning the proper and effective use of political power (Della Sala 2010, 3).

Political myths interact in important ways with the experience of crisis and traumatic events; specifically, in unsettled times political myths can be triggered, resurface or become intensified in the frequency and force of their communication. As the influential 19th century Swiss cultural historian Jakob Burkhardt proposed, crises act as accelerators of the 'whole process of history' due to their disruptive potential to such an extent that changes 'which would otherwise take centuries seem to fleet by like a phantom in months or weeks, and are fulfilled' (qtd. in Martin 2010, 308-309). Charteris-Black (2011) argues that it should come as no surprise that political myths become more impactful in times of 'crisis and anxiety' (326). Della Sala (2010) has similarly argued that as social complexity increases so too does the need for societies and social groups 'to tell stories that make sense of what seems confusing and unconnected' (4). Others have argued that political myths can have a calming social effect as they can contribute to the accumulation of social confidence by providing 'a way to sequence events and the environment so that social actors can make choices in the face of uncertainty ...' (Della Sala 2016, 526).

In order for political myths to resonate with people and become effective tools in political communication they require social actors to 'bring them to life' and 'keep them relevant' (Della Sala 2010, 8). These myth-tellers often clearly identify as advocates – they hope that the narratives they have a role in shaping and communicating will result in some form of action or transformation. In this regard, nebulous and diverse communities of so-called public moralists (Collini 1991) or public intellectuals (Stapleton 2001; Bell 2007; Collini 2006; Jennings 2000; Crick 1998) have been regarded as critical. Whether working independently or collaboratively in think-tanks, research

institutions, non-governmental organizations, as well as with policymakers and politicians, these actors actively seek to shape public opinion and government policy through the publication of research and its dissemination in the mass media, the organization of conferences, public petitions and online referenda, and advocating in political institutions (formally) and circles (informally). The state therefore does not hold a monopoly on the shaping or communication of political myths, and cooperation between state and non-state actors in these areas can be both formal and informal.

So why should we study political myths? One answer is that they provide important sources of significance and meaning for people in their everyday lives. Edelman (1971), for example, views political myths as beliefs commonly held by a specific and large group of people that 'gives events and actions a particular meaning' (14). They differ from simple narratives in the way they solidify and reproduce significance for an identifiable social group and their specific political conditions and experience (Bottici and Challand 2006, 316, 320). Scholars have also shown that political myths have a significant role to play in identity formation (Kaufman 2001). The Hungarian politician and scholar George Schöpflin (1997) has proposed that myths influence 'the ways in which communities regard certain propositions as normal and natural and others as perverse and alien' (19). In other words, political myths can provide a narrative or story outlining the origins of a social group and the values that distinguish them from others (Della Sala 2010, 5).

Political myths are also worthy of study because they can contribute to the effective communication of complex themes and issues. Their narratives are often

framed in dramatic ways that help people 'come to grips with reality' by rendering their world and experiences 'more coherent ... by enabling them to see their present condition as an episode in an ongoing drama' (Tudor 1972, 16-17, 139). A powerful political myth tells a simple story, ideally reducing the 'complexity of experience', thereby enabling individuals and social groups to 'come to terms with the multifaceted character of the world we live in' (Bottici and Challand 2006, 321). As Duncun Bell writes, 'Myth serves to flatten the complexity, the nuance, the performative contradictions of human history; it presents instead a simplistic and often uni-vocal story' (2003, 75).

A potent political myth is rooted in what Della Sala (2010) describes as a sort of 'Gramscian common sense' or 'something that has always been around because it is so normal' (9). At the same time, the success of a political myth does not hinge on its veracity. For Schöpflin (1997), political myths involve 'perceptions rather than historically validated truths (in so far as these exist at all)' (19), while Geis (1987) and Della Sala (2010) stress that they are not usually verifiable, at least not in their entirety. 'The truth or falsity of the myth is irrelevant', argues Kaufman (2001). Its central purpose 'is to help a person understand what a set of events means to him or her' (16, 28).

Nonetheless, while myths are often popularly understood as the stuff of poetry and legend, and contrasted as a result with the rationality generally ascribed to the world of politics, Della Sala (2010) explains that the distinction is far from clear-cut. Myths, he argues, and particularly political myths, always contain some 'grain of truth' in

them. Take the well-known political mythology surrounding the peace-creating effects of European integration as an example:

Empirically, we can affirm that there has been a period of almost unprecedented stability in post-war Europe and that coincided with the creation of the European Union. But it does require us to believe a story about European integration for the correlation of the two factors to become causal (4).

Political myths are “born in facts” (4), however selectively the content is assembled and shaped, and it is crucial to recognize that they are genuinely believed by their advocates and receptive audiences. So although political myths cannot be scientifically verified in their entirety, they are of interest to scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines (including political science, history, anthropology, among others) because of the manner in which they do “shape the beliefs and actions of political actors” (4).

Political myths are also characterised by the intentionality of their advocates. As Tudor (1972) explains, a political myth is not told to amuse; it presents ‘a practical argument’ and is told ‘to promote some practical purpose’ (16, 139). Since political myths are viewed as critiques of present affairs and a call for something better, they typically generate solutions – ‘... a project, a political trajectory or a horizon for the full realization of the community’ (Kølvraa 2016; see also Bottici 2007, 1980). In this way, political myths have been characterized as ‘determinations to act ...’ (Bottici and Challand 2006, 321; see also Bottici 2007). The communicators of political myth – the myth-tellers – often claim that their narratives contain the answers to contemporary problems or challenges and offer a vision for a more prosperous, secure, or simply,

better future, and these answers are very often anchored in the past (Tudor 1972, 15, 131). Scholars of political myths argue that they explicitly connect 'the past, present and future of a community' in meaningful ways (Kølvraa 2016; see also Della Sala 2010 and Manners 2010), providing groups with information about their origins and where they are headed (Bottici and Challand 2006, 319). Political myths thus offer explanations of the historical trajectory of a social group – how it arrived in its present condition – and reason to believe in a better future where the past may serve as a useful guide (Della Sala 2010, 2).

Metaphor and the political communication of mythic narratives

Scholars have studied the communication of conceptual metaphors in the context of domestic and international politics from a wide range of perspectives. In an early example, Edelman (1971) showed how political actors frequently use metaphors as part of their communicative efforts to shape support and opposition in policy-making contexts. Others have studied how metaphorical language and reasoning has played significant roles in the outbreak and resolution of international conflicts (Chilton 1996) and domestic foreign policy-making processes and debates (Shimko 1994; Paris 2002). In addition, International Relations scholars applying constructivist approaches to the study of metaphor have argued that there is evidence that the communication of metaphorical relations contributes to the shaping of social reality, including the formation of collective identities (Chilton 1996; Hülse 2006; Hülse and Spencer 2008; Milliken 1999). Hülse (2006), for example, has shown how metaphors of EU

enlargement (including its relation to a family reunion) contribute to the construction of a European identity.

Studies have also shown that the communicators of political myth often use conceptual metaphors in their efforts to construct their emotional and persuasive narratives. Charteris-Black (2011), for example, argues that one of the primary rhetorical purposes of metaphor is 'to contribute to developing political myths' (38) in the sense that it is a type of thought 'that deals with the difficult emotions for which myth provides the answers' (23). Political communicators construct their narratives in part through the use of metaphor, both to illustrate more clearly how certain issues can be seen as problematic, and also in the representation of 'future scenarios that are construed as solutions to problems' (32).

Furthermore, the ability to persuade, or to influence 'a change in a given attitude or behaviour' (O'Donnell and Kable 1982, 9; see also Jowett and O'Donnell 2012, 32), is facilitated with the use of metaphor because it applies what is familiar and known to new topics that may be less comprehensible. (Charteris-Black 2011, 35-36). The figurative equation of two or more different things or situations is effective because of the natural tendency of people to be attracted by narratives that remind them of familiar objects, situations, and feelings (Brysk et al. 2002, 272). By changing how a word or phrase is used by 'giving it a new sense', metaphors can 'evoke emotional responses', contributing further persuasive power to the narratives in which they are embedded (Charteris-Black 2011, 31; see also Charteris-Black 2009, 141-42 and Povozaev 2013, 44). For these reasons, metaphors assist myth-tellers in the

achievement of their main goal – ‘telling the right story’ – and their study can provide key insights into the construction and communication of political myth (23). In the following section, the narrative structure of the Global Britain political myth will be outlined, including the role played by the metaphorical relation of the Commonwealth as a family unit that facilitates the imagination of a new (rooted in old) global orientation and identity as the UK pivots away from Europe and toward the wider world.

‘Global Britain’ as Contemporary Political Myth

The 21st century GBPM is a close descendent or variant of other political myths triggered by actual or perceived crises in British history. In the late Victorian era, for example, agitation for greater autonomy and the rise of nationalism in various British colonies, growing indifference and apathy about the empire in Britain, the rise of competitors to Britain’s global hegemony, among other factors, sparked anxieties and fears about the future of the empire and British power (Bell 2007, 32-33, 181-182; Boehmer 2005, xix-xx). These fears led many among the political and intellectual elite to call for a deepening of the political, economic, military, social and cultural ties of the Empire – ‘a reinvigorated global Anglo-Saxon community’ (Bell 2007, 182) – which became popularly referred to as ‘Greater Britain’ (see Dilke 1869; Freeman 1886; Seeley 1914). The narratives surrounding the ‘Greater Britain’ political myth drew on Britain’s imperial experiences, past and present, promoting a vision of the future when a closer knit and inter-dependent empire would ensure that the country remained powerful and secure. The myth-tellers hoped that in the process of being exposed to the myth the British public would be led to imagine themselves as citizens not just of Great Britain, but of a broader Anglo-global polity and community.

In the 21st century, the GBPM has emerged as a successor to 'Greater Britain', triggered in part by the growth of Euroscepticism in the UK (Spiering 2014; Startin 2015; Vasilopoulou 2016), and more recently in response to the uncertainties surrounding Brexit. Global Britain's advocates, typically English and conservative, actively encourage the British people to imagine their country and its future prosperity as dependent upon the development of new, and crucially the revival and nurturing of old, international relationships. Political myths like Global Britain obtain their content from many sources. For example, recent work has shown how the 2005 (and later in 2016) re-publication of Henrietta Marshall's *Our Island Story* by the right-wing think tank Civitas (Institute for the Study of Civil Society) should be viewed as part of a broader process of the UK's disengagement with Europe. The book's re-publication was significant, according to Ben Wellings (2016), because of the role it plays in helping readers 'imagine a different political future where Britain's European moment was a mere interregnum in its global trajectory' (369). In this sense, both Marshall's 1905 book, and the 21st century GBPM to which it arguably contributes content, assert that Britain properly belongs out in the world, not just in one specific part of it.

Furthermore, the advocates of Global Britain argue that Brexit provides an opportunity that is positive for both Britain and the world. For example, in his meetings with foreign leaders and officials as minister for international trade, Liam Fox (2018) has reported that there is a 'palpable' desire not only to expand trade relations with the UK, but to 'once again hear us champion the case for free trade...'. In his former role as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Boris Johnson (2016) similarly reported being 'repeatedly impressed' by the desire among people around the world for

Britain to be more internationally engaged: 'It is in the interests of global order that we are at the centre of a network of relationships and alliances that span the world.' For its advocates then, this is Global Britain by invitation.

One of Global Britain's most central themes relates to the UK's uniquely internationalist past, which its advocates claim has produced a set of legacies the country can leverage as it navigates itself out of the EU. In a speech delivered in early 2018 at Bloomberg in London, for example, Britain's first ever minister of international trade, Liam Fox, stated that 'history, experience and values' would be 'vital navigational tools' in the UK's post-Brexit re-orientation toward the wider world beyond Europe (Fox 2018). The Conservative Party MEP Daniel Hannan, referred to as the intellectual leader or architect of the Leave campaign (Switzer 2017), told audiences in the lead-up to the Brexit referendum that success depended on the ability to offer voters 'something better', which included a vision of an 'independent' and 'global Britain' which remembered 'its older friendships across the oceans' (Hannan 2016). Other Pro-Leave campaigners have argued that although joining the EEC in 1973 left Commonwealth countries 'feeling betrayed'¹, Brexit provides 'a golden opportunity ... to rekindle those relationships' which made Britain 'a global superpower two hundred years ago' (Tice 2017).

Global Britain's advocates claim that the UK's internationalist credentials derive not only from experience but also from more innate qualities that set the country and its

¹ Recent research shows that by 1973 most Commonwealth countries had come to terms with Britain's decision to enter the EEC, with many leaders publicly stating their support for the idea (see May 2013).

people apart. Being tied down in Europe is contrary to the natural affinities and impulses of the British people, and the wider world they claim is a place where the British feel comfortable, easily engage with, and where they have the skills and intuitions needed to prosper. PM May referred to this instinctive internationalism in her so-called 'Global Britain' speech in early 2017: Instinctively ... we want to travel to, study in, trade with countries not just in Europe but beyond the borders of our continent (May 2017). Others have referred to the 'temper' of the British 'as a people' to go out into the world (Hannan 2016), and the referendum vote to leave the EU meant that Britain was 'now on its mettle', ready to reassume its global identity 'more outward-looking and more engaged with the world than ever before' (Johnson 2016). For Boris Johnson, Britain's global-ness is inherent: '...whether we like it or not we are not some bit part or spear carrier on the world stage. We are a protagonist – a global Britain running a truly global foreign policy' (Ibid.).

The GBPM also stresses Britain's history as a great maritime and trading nation, and the importance these realms of experience have in providing the UK with the competencies needed to re-orient away from Europe. According to Menno Spiering (2014), Britain's 'Island story' is not only a story of isolation; it is also a story of 'liberation'. Geographically detached from mainland Europe, 'the Islanders are free to venture out into the seven seas.' In this sense, Britain has historically been a 'world island' at the 'centre of an Empire spanning the entire globe' (37), with the sea functioning both as a defensive 'moat' but also as 'a pathway out of Europe' (38). For some, Brexit can thus be interpreted as a liberating event that has re-triggered a deep-seated and historically-rooted impulse to explore.

The liberating effect of Brexit is a central rhetorical claim of Global Britain's advocates, including Boris Johnson, who at the launching of the Institute for Free Trade (established by Hannan but tellingly launched at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) declared: 'You can imagine what our brilliant companies, aided and assisted by our wonderful and new Department of International Trade, are going to be able to do when they are finally ... unbound, unshackled, unleashed from the coils of the common commercial policy' (Johnson 2017; see also Johnson 2016). Reasserting itself in this role, according to the myth's most fervent supporters, is critical for ensuring Britain's future prosperity outside Europe: 'We did it before; we can do it again. What raised us once to greatness, will do so a second time' (Hannan 2017). As Liam Fox declared in a speech to British and international business leaders in early 2018, Europe is just one region of interest for British trade and it cannot be the only one:

We are Britain, and what's more we want to be a truly global Britain. A global Britain with ambitions to maximize our trade opportunities both inside and outside the EU. A global Britain that wants the freedom to work with global partners. And a global Britain which seeks to minimize any barriers to trade ... (Fox 2018).

Since the establishment of his new department, over 150 overseas trade missions have been sent out *exploring* in 'all parts of the globe to old friends and new allies alike and to markets large and small' (Fox 2018). In this sense, Brexit, as PM May has argued, will enable Britain to 'get out into the world' and 'rediscover its role as a great, global, trading nation' (May 2017).

On its official website, the advocacy organization Maritime Nation declares that the UK is 'an island nation' with a 'proud history as a great maritime power' (Maritime Nation website), and that the UK should build on its existing maritime capacities so that it can have 'a truly global outlook'. Importantly, the organization makes explicit links between Britain's maritime history, the contemporary crisis surrounding Brexit and its future as a global maritime trade leader, declaring that the British maritime sector is 'not just the foundation of our trade and prosperity in the past; they are the foundation of our trade and prosperity in the future (Maritime Nation website).

Not only does Brexit serve to remind the British people of their country's history and identity as a great maritime and trading power, the advocates of Global Britain also stress the historical role Britain has played as a vigorous champion of free trade, and how membership in the European common market has diminished that role. The pro-Brexit organization Global Britain, for example, proudly declares that Britain is the birthplace of free trade thinking, 'born' there in the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo among others – and that as a result the country was the first to engage widely in free trade practices (Global Britain n.d., 6; see also Hannan 2017). The UK was once the champion of global free trade and, according to Fox, despite several decades of membership in the common market it is still in the country's 'national DNA'. The UK, he argued, must 'once again, loudly and unequivocally' serve this function (Fox 2017).

According to Global Britain's advocates, one of the consequences of Britain's imperial past is that there are places and peoples around the world with which it shares much in common and which provide a set of alternate relationships. Whether referred

to collectively as the Anglosphere, the Commonwealth, or the English-Speaking World, these places and peoples share historical links with Britain, the by-products of which they argue can facilitate a smooth transition out of Europe and provide more ideal relationships for a more prosperous future. One of the most persistent promoters of this narrative is the so-called CANZUK movement. Centred in the main organization promoting closer political, economic, social and security co-operation between the CANZUK countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK), CANZUK International (CI) has a broad presence online and particularly on social media. According to one of CI's most vocal supporters, the British historian Andrew Roberts, renewed interest in the CANZUK idea resulted from 'the British people's heroic Brexit vote' (Roberts 2016). Founded originally as The Commonwealth Freedom of Movement Organization (CFMO) in January 2015, CI calls for freedom of movement, free trade and foreign policy coordination between the CANZUK countries, with the main goal of forging 'a cohesive alliance of nation-states with a truly global outlook' (official website). The organization's official website states that the four countries have shared histories, values, languages and cultures, and that sharing the same monarch represents 'an essential symbol of a common heritage.' Deepening the ties between the four countries would serve to 'reinforce a feeling of solidarity amongst the four kindred peoples' (official website).

The emphasis on the close and intimate relations between Britain and the other CANZUK countries forms part of a broader rhetorical strategy to allow the British people to imagine a future outside European economic and political institutions. And as the narrative is unfolded further, it becomes clear that these shared characteristics and

competencies have the potential to translate into advantages not possible while the UK is tied to Europe. Because CANZUK countries are linked 'by language and laws, by habit and history, and by kinship and migration' (Hannan 2016), some have argued that trade would be more efficient and cheaper as 'convergence and mutual recognition would happen automatically' without the need for EU-style directives and regulations imposed from above (Lilico 2017b). CANZUK countries have 'shared values' and 'a rich history and a relationship no other countries share' and Brexit therefore provides 'a unique opportunity to capitalize' on this and 'boldly chart a new course for the 21st century' (Lilico and Andrews 2016).

Building on this idea of great potential in future relations between old partners, another theme central to the GBPM is that Europe is a place of stagnation and decline. In this vision, Britain is an 'outward-looking free trading country' while the EU is 'sclerotic, indebted and economically in trouble' (Switzer 2017). In making their case, Global Britain's advocates claim, for example, that: 85-90% of global economic growth will originate outside of the EU by 2025 (Fox 2018; Global Britain 2016); EU job growth has stagnated compared to non-EU OECD countries (Burrage 2017, xiii-xiv); the value of UK exports outside the EU are already 36% greater than those to the EU [as of 2015] (Global Britain 2016), and; that EU membership acts as a disincentive for foreign direct investment (Burrage 2017, xiii-xiv). The EU is described as the 'world's slowest growing region', a 'costly relic' of the 1850s and 1950s, and hopeless at negotiating free trade deals with 'significant nations'. The advocates of Global Britain therefore argue that Britain should be 'optimistic' and 'open to the world', including 'Our real friends in the Commonwealth' (Farage 2013).

One of the leading intellectual figures of the CANZUK movement and a member of CI's advisory board, economist Andrew Lilico, has stated that the British people think of the peoples of the CANZUK countries differently from people of other countries. The citizens of Canada, New Zealand and Australia are according to Lilico 'our closest kin in the world' (Lilico 2017a). He also stresses the 'shared history and culture' of the CANZUK countries, their 'similar interests and values', and the fact that 'our citizens often travel to, work, and even live in each other's countries' (Lilico and Andrews 2016). Furthermore, when asked what countries UK citizens feel most positive about, Canada, Australia and New Zealand score well ahead of all European countries as well as the US (Lilico 2017a; Chatham House 2010). Others have argued that countries in the Anglosphere have more intimate relations with each other than they do with other countries, and that this intimacy and closeness is based on high levels of trust derived from 'their shared linguistic, historical and cultural heritage' (Hulsman 2016). Perhaps this is why, as the political journalist and editor of *The Spectator Magazine* James Forsyth has argued, several 'colonials' hold influential political and bureaucratic positions in the UK, including, for example, the Canadian governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney. For Forsyth, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders are not seen as 'really foreign' by the British people, and this familiarity could be used to raise Britain's sights 'from the Channel to the oceans beyond' (Forsyth 2013).

Another important element of the GBPM relates to issues of collective identity. For Greater Britain's advocates, Britain and the British are not European. In order to create distance between their country and Europe in the British imagination and in the process support the position that Britain belongs out in the world with old friends, Global Britain's

advocates paint a picture of Britain and Europe as two very different places with very different and in some cases incompatible histories, political systems, institutions and cultures. As Menno Spiering (2014) has explained, there are strong indications that the difficult historical and contemporary relations between the UK and the EU are not simply based in political or economic disputes; apparently there is 'a disconnect that goes much deeper' and in fact we may be dealing with 'two opposing concepts' – one called Britain, the other Europe (2). Britain's relationship with Europe appears to be determined by 'strong cultural notions of differentness' (5) whereby Britain and the British are understood to be un-European, and alternately, Europeans are viewed 'en masse as non-British' (20). Recent scholarship by Carl et al. (2018) offers convincing evidence in support of this point. The British people, the authors argue, have a 'comparatively weak sense of European identity' and that this lack of European-ness helps to explain why over 50% of British voters sided with Leave in the 2016 referendum.

This tendency to differentiate between Britain and the British on the one hand, and Europe and Europeans on the other, is a rhetorical strategy used explicitly and frequently by the advocates of Global Britain. One way of differentiating between the two places and peoples has been to articulate a sense of detachment whereby Britain and Europe are separated – physically, emotionally and ideologically. For example, supporters of Brexit have quoted influential figures in British history to support their case for leaving the EU. Well-known statements such as Winston Churchill's proclamation in 1930 – 'We are with Europe, but not of it...' – and his remark to Charles DeGaulle in 1944 on the eve of the Normandy invasion – 'If Britain must choose between Europe and the open sea, she must always choose the open sea...' – were cited, often out of context, by

Leave campaign supporters to provide authority and credibility to their positions (Danzig 2015; Johnston 2016). Others have claimed that the British people don't 'feel' European, and therefore don't identify closely with their neighbours on the continent. Studies have consistently shown that the British people, and particularly the English within Britain, are the least likely EU citizens to 'feel European' (NatCen 2015; Mac Shane 2015, xxiv).

When asked by the former Labour leader Ed Miliband one month before the Brexit referendum 'which non-EU country would the UK be like post-Brexit?', the prominent Conservative Party 'Leave' campaigner and (now former) Secretary of State for Leaving the European Union, David Davis, replied: 'Great Britain!'. He then elaborated on his view of British exceptionalism:

Great Britain is different. We are the world's fifth biggest economy. We are a permanent member of the UN Security Council. We are a leading member of Nato, of the Commonwealth, and of the G7. ... We owe none of these things to the EU. We are the nation of Shakespeare and Newton, of Faraday and Rutherford, of Gladstone and Churchill. ... And the Remain team want us to choose between being Norway and Switzerland? (Davis 2016).

UKIP leader Nigel Farage (2013) similarly described Britain and the British in exceptional terms in a speech to party supporters: '... we just don't belong in Europe. ... Our geography puts us apart. Our history puts us apart. Our institutions produced by that history put us apart. We think differently. We behave differently'.

This narrative of British exceptionalism provides important content for the GBPM. According to MacShane (2015), many British people believe they

are different from Europeans in their manners and forms of recreation, in their diets and landscapes, and in their experiences with war and democracy. Most European countries have been invaded, occupied or lived under authoritarian rule, and as a result ‘for half a millennium the English have been told that across the channel lie menace, danger, and a threat to the island way of life’ (xxiv, 35). Others argue that Britain is distinct and exceptional compared to its European counterparts because the central tenets of Western civilization have deeper roots and are more fiercely defended in the former. As Hannan (2013) claims, the rule of law, democracy and individual liberty ‘are not equally valued across Europe’, and therefore Britain belongs in the Anglosphere, not in Europe, as ‘the story of freedom is the story of the Anglosphere’ (Hannan 2013, 24).

The Commonwealth ‘family of nations’ metaphor and Britain’s global future

English conservative politicians have contributed to the construction and communication of the GBPM – including its emphasis on the exceptionally global and non-European character of Britain and the British – through their increasingly frequent use of a Commonwealth as a ‘family of nations’ (CW-FON) metaphor in parliamentary debates. While the ‘nation as a family’ metaphor has been studied in different national contexts (Lakoff 1996; Hayden 2003; Garcia 2015), this study shows how the concept of the family has been actively and purposefully used to promote the idea of the Commonwealth as a historically-rooted, harmonious and prosperous alternative to the EU that can be utilized in the recovery Britain’s traditional global orientation and identity. Despite the fact that family metaphors have a long history of usage in British political

discourse to describe the UK's relations with its colonies and later fellow Commonwealth members (McIntyre 1998, 6, cited in Brysk et al. 2002, 294; Chan 2013; Clendinning 2012), few studies have examined the phenomenon and the existing studies (Brysk et al. 2002; Namusoke 2016) do not extensively analyse the content or structure of the Commonwealth as a 'family of nations' metaphor, including how it has been used as a rhetorical tool in political communication and myth-building in the context of debates surrounding the UK's past and future relationship with Europe.

In conjunction with the larger project from which this more focused study has emerged, it has been determined that between 23 June 2015 and 31 October 2018, 45 British parliamentarians made a total of 95 CW-FON metaphor references (see Table 1 above). Conservative speakers made the most frequent references by a large margin (59 or 62%), followed by Liberal Democrats (10 or 11%), and non-affiliated members (10 or 11%). Interestingly, as Chart 1 illustrates, CW-FON references increased dramatically following Theresa May's so called 'Global Britain' speech of 17 January 2017. From the date of this speech until the end of March 2017 parliamentarians referenced the Commonwealth as a 'family of nations' 33 times, representing 35% of the total CW-FON metaphor references, with Conservative speakers making the most references of speakers from all parties and affiliations (18 or 55%).

[Enter Chart 1 here]

The fact that 30 of the 33 CW-FON metaphor references in this roughly two-and-a-half month period were made in the course of two individual days of debates on deepening and expanding intra-Commonwealth trade and relations – in the House of

Commons on 22 February and in the House of Lords on 16 March, in both cases initiated by Conservative members – is viewed as significant granted the broader context in which these debates took place. Although it is not claimed here that a direct relationship exists between the dramatic increase in CW-FON references in early 2017 and the May government's simultaneous effort to promote a post-Brexit 'Global Britain' orientation and identity, the period and the political and institutional context in which parliamentarians began to more frequently discuss UK-Commonwealth relations in familial terms provides an interesting exploratory case study on the purposeful use of metaphor in contemporary political discourses on Britain's future place and roles in the international system.

A standard 'critical metaphor analysis' was used in the quantitative analysis of the parliamentary speeches, which involved three stages, including: first, the identification of the metaphor; second, the interpretation of the metaphor, and; third, the explanation of the metaphor (Charteris-Black 2011, 45). Following the identification of the base metaphor (the Commonwealth 'family of nations'), each reference was interpreted and classified as being either positive and aspirational (framing the Commonwealth as a historically-rooted, harmonious and prosperous alternative to the EU) or critical and judgmental (framing the Commonwealth as discriminatory, unequal and failing to defend mutually-agreed upon human rights agreements) in sentiment. Otherwise, the remaining references were classified in an 'Other' category. As Table 2 shows, Conservative speakers were much more likely to describe the Commonwealth in positive aspirational terms (and positive generally), whereas Labour and Liberal

Democrat speakers were more likely to communicate a critical vision of the Commonwealth family.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Several themes have been identified in the analysis of speeches which include the positive aspirational CW-FON metaphor and which serve to promote closer and deeper ties between the UK and Commonwealth countries following Brexit. At the most explicit level, speakers make numerous DIRECT FAMILY REFERENCES to the Commonwealth as a family. The most common examples include references to the 'Commonwealth Family' and the Commonwealth as a 'family of nations', but there are also references to specific positions within families, including, for example, one speaker's declaration that 'We are all children of the Commonwealth' (Lord Popat, 16 March 2017) and another's call to increase trade with 'our Commonwealth brothers and sisters' (Jim Shannon, 22 February 2017). Other speakers stressed the 'unique' (Baroness Anelay, 16 March 2017) and 'extraordinary' (Jake Berry, 22 February 2017) nature of the Commonwealth family, which has the effect of both creating an image of closeness between the organization's members and also distancing them from non-Commonwealth countries. As one speaker stated (quoting Lord Howell): "Europe is our region, America our ally, and the Commonwealth our family" (Lord Popat 16 March 2017). Commonwealth countries share a 'natural bond' which according to another speaker distinguishes them from other countries and which 'should be strongly explored ...' (Jim Shannon, 22 February 2017).

Some articulated what is labelled here the FAMILY IN CRISIS theme, arguing that history has shown that the countries of the Empire-Commonwealth have come to each other's aid in times of crisis:

... it is at the time of our greatest national need that these countries have stood shoulder to shoulder with Britain. ... Commonwealth soldiers have left home to fight and die alongside British troops on far-flung battlefields ... They have not forgotten our bond of shared culture and history that binds the Commonwealth together. It is now time for Britain to remember its old alliances (Jake Berry, 22 February 2017).

Despite its more recent neglect of the Commonwealth, this speaker implies, the UK needs (and can expect) its old friends and allies in the Commonwealth to come to its aid in this current time of crisis.

Although families often can be diverse in composition and in their beliefs, values, and behaviours, family members also often develop common characteristics and competencies as a consequence of years of mutual socialization, the passing down of values and shared experiences. The latter view is reflected in THE VALUE OF SHARED EXPERIENCES, CHARACTERISTICS AND COMPETENCIES theme. For example, one speaker reflected on living and working in various Commonwealth countries that led him to 'truly ... feel part of a worldwide family, with shared values, vulnerabilities, hopes and aspirations' (Lord Goodlad, 16 March 2017). This speaker identified shared characteristics but also emotional connections ('feel', 'hopes' and 'aspirations') which he believes binds Commonwealth countries and peoples. The Commonwealth's strength derives from what the member countries share, and according to another speaker this strength is further enhanced by 'the strong common instincts' of its members (Baroness Anelay, 16 March 2017). The varied factors binding the Commonwealth together led

another speaker to describe the organization as a 'network of networks' linking governments, state institutions, and businesses and characterized by 'fluid and dynamic patterns of allegiance, alliances and friendships, linked by our shared history, language, legal systems and values' (Lord Goodlad, 16 March, 2017).

As a consequence of these binding factors speakers lauded what is here identified as the FAMILY BUSINESS ADVANTAGE. This theme promotes at least two inter-related goals of its communicators: increasing UK trade with an expanding and dynamic Commonwealth and by doing so facilitating or cushioning the effects of leaving the EU. Several speakers, for instance, referenced a recent report published by the Commonwealth Secretariat that argues that Commonwealth countries experience an average of 19% savings when trading with each other compared with trading with non-Commonwealth countries (Commonwealth Secretariat 2015). The comparative advantage of intra-Commonwealth trade derives from, according to one speaker, 'our common legal systems, language and culture' (Jake Berry, 22 February 2017) and (according to another) represents 'a huge advantage ... that we should all seek to exploit more effectively' (Baroness Anelay, 16 March 2017). Belief in the Commonwealth trade advantage led Lord Popat to argue that the Commonwealth should be reformed 'around a trade agenda' as a means of re-balancing Britain's significant trade deficit and to help 'spread prosperity' (16 March 2017).

The potential economic advantages derived from the alleged homogeneity of the Commonwealth and the consequent 'Commonwealth trade advantage' naturally led speakers to stress the importance of FOSTERING (defined as the provision of

parental care or nurture, or more generally to promote growth and development) the largely untapped potential of this 'unique family'. Some did so by contrasting the economic trajectories of EU and the Commonwealth. While the GDP of the EU is higher than the combined GDP of Commonwealth countries, economic growth rates are higher in the latter, leading one speaker to declare that as the UK leaves the EU 'it is with the Commonwealth – our extraordinary family of nations – that we should seek to strike trade deals' (Jake Berry). In anticipation of the 2018 Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) held in London, Baroness Anelay (16 March 2017) stressed the need to support the development of the Commonwealth's potential:

We will also work with our fellow members around the Commonwealth ... to ensure we show a Commonwealth that is forward-looking, revitalised and relevant to the new generations that have grown up since its formation – a Commonwealth that can play an essential role in resolving some of the world's greatest challenges and can build inclusive prosperity for all.

The UK government, at the ministerial level and in diplomatic relations with member countries would, according to Anelay, work 'to ensure that this unique family of nations fulfils its undoubted potential.' The Commonwealth is thus portrayed as a multi-generational cooperative family unit with enormous potential, which given adequate focus and resources, could bring positive economic benefits to all its members.

In summary, the above analysis suggests that the CW-FON metaphor contributes content to several of the GBPM's central themes, including: that the UK's unique imperial past has produced a set of legacies and competences that distinguish it from its European neighbours; that these legacies and competences are shared with societies and peoples in former colonies around the world; that these shared characteristics

contribute to a sense of belonging and identity, as well as identifiable interests, that locates Britain and the British in the wider world outside Europe, and; that the UK's future economic needs are better served in a growing and dynamic Commonwealth rather than a stagnating and sclerotic EU. By equating the Commonwealth with the concept of 'the family' its communicators simplify the relationship between the UK and other Commonwealth members, as well as the nature of UK-EU relations, making arguments in support of the adoption of a more global orientation and identity in UK international policies potentially more comprehensible and compelling.

Conclusion

This study has examined the role of political myth and conceptual metaphor in pre- and post-Brexit referendum political discourse, arguing that English conservative politicians and public intellectuals have communicated a Global Britain narrative in an effort to influence views about the UK's proper orientation and identity in the international system. In the communication of the GBPM, a Commonwealth as a 'family of nations' metaphor has been utilized which contributes content to the political myth and to its main purpose – promoting the idea that the British people and their country belong not in Europe but in the wider world with other similar and more like-minded peoples, including crucially in Britain's former colonial empire. The GBPM is deeply-rooted in Britain's imperial past and this history is utilized to make the current crisis surrounding Brexit more intelligible and in the presentation of a vision of a more prosperous future outside the economic and political structures and institutions of Europe.

The prevalence of the GBPM is reflected in the many critiques it has provoked. Some critics stress that the Commonwealth is not a distinct or integrated economic entity (such as the EU) and that future UK governments will be forced to negotiate free trade agreements with individual countries in expensive, long drawn-out and uncertain processes, with no guarantee of success in each case (Dilley 2018). Others question the rationale for favouring trade deals with Commonwealth countries over membership in the EU. The so-called 'Commonwealth trade advantage' touted by Global Britain's supporters, some argue, existed before the Brexit vote with limited effect and there is little reason to believe that it will become more enticing to businesses and governments in the future (Dilley 2018). Others point out that the laws of economics, and more specifically the 'gravity theory of trade', show that relative economic size and geographic distance determine the direction of trade flows (Chaney 2011; Grice 2018), and that the EU will therefore likely remain the UK's largest export market post-Brexit, regardless of the global ambitions of the May government and other Global Britain advocates (Donnan 2017). In fact, recent studies (Langan 2016; Murray-Evans 2016; Price 2016) suggest that rather than ushering in a new golden age in UK-Commonwealth relations, Brexit may have serious negative impacts on the economic and social development and international trade prospects of many Commonwealth countries, and particularly under-developed former British colonies in Africa. Finally, the Global Britain initiative has been described as a 'sentimental project' inspired by a 'peculiarly English neurosis about national pride' or imperial 'nostalgia' whereby rational assessments are subordinated by a desire to put 'the *Great* back in Great Britain by evoking the indomitable spirit of a time when Britain conquered the globe' (Wismayer

2017; see also Tharoor 2017 and Murphy 2015). Despite these critiques, however, Global Britain remains a central theme in the narratives of hard and soft Brexiteers alike.

This study and the approach utilised have numerous possible implications for future research. Certainly in this current era of 'fake news' and populist-style political movements and campaigns there are a multitude of possible areas of research in the realm of political communication, including (but also beyond) the construction and communication of political myths. The CW-FON metaphor is one of many conceptual metaphors and other rhetorical figures of speech that influence how the narratives surrounding Global Britain are communicated and understood, and the types of responses its advocates are hoping to evoke, which present potentially rich subjects of inquiry. Although the present study was limited to an analysis of one of the variants of the 'Commonwealth as family' metaphor identified by this author, studying the existence of multiple variants of the same metaphor used in the same setting for competing purposes can provide insights into the dynamics of cross-party political debate and communication, including within the context of Brexit. In addition, it is the view of this author that further research into the GBPM, its metaphorical content and the extensive and selective use of history by its advocates, can contribute insights and advance our understanding of the nature and evolution of English conservative nationalism and national identity in the contemporary UK.

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Appendix: Tables

Table 1 – Family of nations references in the UK Parliament (23 June 2015-10 October 2018)

	CON	LAB	LD	SNP	PC	DUP	CB	NON-AFF	LS	Total
CW-FON	59	4	10	2	0	2	8	10	0	95
UK-FON	37	7	2	35	9	0	0	0	1	91
EU-FON	11	21	2	10	1	1	5	1	0	52
INT-FON	2	3	1	4	1	0	0	0	2	13
UN-FON	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	4
E-A-FON	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	111	36	16	51	11	4	13	11	3	256

(CON [Conservative Party]; LAB [Labour Party]; LD [Liberal Democrat]; SNP [Scottish Democratic Party]; PC [Plaid Cymru]; DUP [Democratic Unionist Party]; CB [Crossbencher]; NAFL [non-affiliated]; LS [Lord Spiritual])

Chart 1 – Commonwealth Family of Nations (CW-FON) references (23 June 2015-31 October 2018)




Table 2 – Variants of the CW-FON metaphor (23 June 2015-31 October 2018)

	Aspirational (positive) variant	Judgmental (critical) variant	Other	
			Positive	Critical
CON	30	6	19	4
LAB	0	4	0	0
LD	0	7	0	3
SNP	0	1	1	0
DUP	1	0	1	0
CB	1	3	2	2
NAF	8	1	0	1

(CON [Conservative Party]; LAB [Labour Party]; LD [Liberal Democrat]; SNP [Scottish Democratic Party]; DUP [Democratic Unionist Party]; CB [Crossbencher]; NAF [non-affiliated])

Appendix 1 – List of CW-FON metaphor statements, 23 June 2015 – 31 October 2018

<u>Date</u>	<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u># CW-FON refs</u>
09-09-2015	David Cameron	Conservative	Commons	1
15-09-2015	Andrew Rosindell	Conservative	Commons	1
01-12-2015	Martin John Docherty	SNP	Commons	1
17-12-2015	Lord Luce	Crossbencher	Lords	1
04-02-2016	Craig Mackinlay	Conservative	Commons	1
11-02-2016	Baroness Verma	Conservative	Lords	1
14-03-2016	Hugo Swire	Conservative	Commons	2
14-03-2016	Ian Liddell-Grainger	Conservative	Commons	2
14-03-2016	Patrick Grady	SNP	Commons	1
21-04-2016	David Cameron	Conservative	Commons	1
08-09-2016	Lord Howell	Conservative	Lords	1
11-10-2016	Jake Berry	Conservative	Commons	1
20-10-2016	Lord Howell	Conservative	Lords	1
20-01-2017	Alan Mak	Conservative	Commons	1
20-01-2017	Peter Heaton-Jones	Conservative	Commons	1
21-02-2017	Lord Taylor (Warwick)	Non-affiliated	Lords	1
22-02-2017	Jake Berry	Conservative	Commons	2
22-02-2017	John Howell	Conservative	Commons	1
22-02-2017	Jim Shannon	DUP	Commons	1
16-03-2017	Baroness Anelay	Conservative	Lords	4
16-03-2017	Baroness Benjamin	Liberal Democrat	Lords	1
16-03-2017	Baroness D’Souza	Crossbencher	Lords	1
16-03-2017	Baroness Jenkin	Conservative	Lords	1
16-03-2017	Baroness Mobarik	Conservative	Lords	3
16-03-2017	Baroness Uddin	Non-affiliated	Lords	1
16-03-2017	Earl of Sandwich	Crossbencher	Lords	1
16-03-2017	Lord Goodlad	Conservative	Lords	1
16-03-2017	Lord Lexden	Conservative	Lords	1
16-03-2017	Lord Popat	Conservative	Lords	3
16-03-2017	Lord Purvis	Liberal Democrat	Lords	3
16-03-2017	Lord Scriven	Liberal Democrat	Lords	5
16-03-2017	Viscount Waverly	Crossbencher	Lords	1
20-04-2017	Nigel Evans	Conservative	Commons	1
12-09-2017	Hugo Swire	Conservative	Commons	1
12-09-2017	Lord Ahmad	Conservative	Lords	3
02-11-2017	Lord Ahmad	Conservative	Lords	1
02-11-2017	Lord Cashman	Labour	Lords	1
02-11-2017	Lord Collins	Labour	Lords	1
02-11-2017	Lord Mendelsohn	Labour	Lords	1
02-11-2017	Lord Taylor (Warwick)	Non-affiliated	Lords	2
27-11-2017	Baroness Fairhead	Conservative	Lords	1
27-11-2017	Lord Taylor (Warwick)	Non-affiliated	Lords	4
13-12-2017	Lord Ahmad	Conservative	Lords	2
31-01-2018	Lord Taylor (Warwick)	Non-affiliated	Lords	2
22-01-2018	Lord Popat	Conservative	Lords	1
20-02-2018	Hugo Swire	Conservative	Commons	1
20-02-2018	Lord Ahmad	Conservative	Lords	1
06-03-2018	Hugo Swire	Conservative	Commons	3

06-03-2018	Mark Fields	Conservative	Commons	1
21-03-2018	Baroness Spelman	Conservative	Lords	1
21-03-2018	Hugo Swire	Conservative	Commons	1
21-03-2018	Richard Graham	Conservative	Commons	1
21-03-2018	Sir Nicolas Soames	Conservative	Commons	2
22-03-2018	Baroness Anelay	Conservative	Lords	1
22-03-2018	Earl of Sandwich	Crossbencher	Lords	1
22-03-2018	Lord Cashman	Labour	Lords	1
22-03-2018	Lord Kakkar	Crossbencher	Lords	1
22-03-2018	Lord Luce	Crossbencher	Lords	1
22-03-2018	Lord Popat	Conservative	Lords	1
22-03-2018	Viscount Waverly	Crossbencher	Lords	1
27-03-2018	David Evennett	Conservative	Commons	1
18-04-2018	Theresa May	Conservative	Commons	1
03-05-2018	Lord Ahmad	Conservative	Lords	1
15-05-2018	Jim Shannon	DUP	Commons	1
15-05-2018	Mary Robinson	Conservative	Commons	1
14-06-2018	Tom Tugendhat	Conservative	Commons	1
21-06-2018	Lord Stunell	Liberal Democrat	Lords	1
23-07-2018	Lord Ahmad	Conservative	Lords	1
TOTAL				95

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