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Please cite the final published version:

Finke, D. (2020). EU Enlargement and Foreign Policy Coordination: More Powerful, but Less Cohesive? *The Review of International Organizations*, 15(1), 189-210. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9328-1>

## Publication metadata

**Title:** EU Enlargement and Foreign Policy Coordination: More Powerful, but Less Cohesive?  
**Author(s):** Daniel Finke  
**Journal:** *The Review of International Organizations*, 15(1), 189-210  
**DOI/Link:** <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9328-1>  
**Document version:** Accepted manuscript (post-print)

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# EU Enlargement and Foreign Policy Coordination:

## More Powerful, but Less Cohesive?

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**Forthcoming in *Review of International Organizations*.**

### Abstract

Eastern enlargement posed a challenge to the cohesiveness of EU foreign policy because new member states had a different regional focus and divergent policy interests. Yet Eastern enlargement also reinforced the EU's potential influence at the world stage. Specifically, it implied higher strength in numbers within the decision bodies of international organizations, for example in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). To what extent has EU foreign policy coordination been able to handle the lower level of internal cohesion and to act cohesively in the UNGA?

To answer this question, the article presents the first large scale analysis of co-authorship activities in the UNGA in the period from 1993 to 2016. First we study the cohesiveness of co-authorship before we control for characteristics of member states and draft in a regression model. We find that the EU has been able to uphold a high level of cohesiveness despite the lower cohesion of foreign policy interests after Eastern enlargement. Today, the observed divergence in co-authorship does not follow an East-West divide but runs across all countries and issues. Overall, Eastern enlargement reduced the EU's cohesiveness in the UNGA only temporarily and to a lower extent than expected.

## Introduction

The EU has reached an unprecedented level of market integration, but finds it challenging to institutionalize a common foreign policy with the notable exception being the powerful role of the EU in international trade. This is surprising because even the larger EU member states have diminished influence in international politics. Yet, the EU still represents a significant amount of economic, financial, and even military resources. But whereas any attempts to centralize foreign policy competencies have, so far, been carried out half-heartedly, the EU features strong networks and coordination routines at the working level. These routines are reflected by a fairly homogenous voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) (Panke 2014). The relevance of these coordination efforts are particularly visible when new states enter or old members leave the EU. Recently, the latter case became painfully visible when the EU denied its solidarity and support for post-Brexit Britain in a vote on the dispute over forced relocations from the Chagos islands during colonial times.<sup>1</sup>

Eastern enlargement posed a major challenge to the cohesiveness of the EU's common foreign policy. New member states held different interests and had a different focus. Given their history as part of the Soviet Union and the neighbourhood of a reinvigorated Russia, many of them placed a particularly high importance on the USA as ultimate protector of their national sovereignty. Consequently, many new member states were eager to demonstrate their loyalty; for example as members of the US-led "coalition of the willing" in the Second Iraq War (Edwards 2006). At the same time, they had a regional focus on their immediate neighbourhood and limited interests in the Mediterranean or the Middle East (Smith 2006; Sjursen 1998). On top of this, politicians in the new member states had to get used to their country being donors (instead of recipients) of foreign aid

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<sup>1</sup> Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/22/un-vote-backing-chagos-islands-a-blow-for-uk>

(Lightfoot 2008). Finally, the new member states belonged to a different UN regional group than the members of the EU15.

Eastern enlargement thus cause a drop in *preference cohesion* and, consequently, put a strain on the *cohesiveness* of the EU's common foreign policy (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014). This article analyzes how the EU's common foreign policy performed under this strain by studying co-authorship patterns in the UNGA. Please note that we study the effect of *preference cohesion* on *cohesiveness* of member states' co-authorship behavior, but we do not evaluate the *effectiveness* of the Common Foreign Policy. Specifically, we analyze co-authorships from session 48 (1993-94) to session 70 (2015-16) in the UNGA. Instead of comparing the EU to other regional organizations (e.g. Panke 2014), we opt for a longitudinal design which leverages the expected effects of enlargement on the cohesiveness of EU member states' co-authorship activities. Compared to voting, where the EU's cohesiveness has long been very high, co-authorship patterns enable us to observe differences in member states' foreign policy focus and preferences at an early stage of the decision making process (Smith 2016). Simplified, we consider enlargement to constitute an exogenous shock to those areas of the EU's foreign policy that are of relevance for the UNGA. Enlargement decreased the cohesion of foreign policy preferences within the EU which challenged EU foreign policy coordination and, ultimately, its cohesiveness in the UNGA. If EU coordination is ineffective, enlargements should have caused a decline in the cohesiveness of member states' co-authorship patterns in the UNGA. In that case, we should observe an increase of sub-groups of EU member states supporting different draft resolutions rather than all EU member states supporting a similar set of draft resolutions.

Overall, we find that the EU withstood the challenge posed by Eastern enlargement surprisingly well. In absolute terms, the effectiveness of EU coordination declined after Eastern enlargement; in

particular on urgent and security-related drafts discussed in the UNGA. However, EU coordination successfully overcame the East-West divide that was visible before Eastern enlargement. The result is robust against controlling for country and proposal characteristics as well as changes of the UNGA agenda over time. One possible explanation for successful agenda setting coordination by the EU is that the inclusion of thirteen Central Eastern European states increased the EU's overall agenda setting power and its role as pivotal actor inside the UNGA (Panke 2014).

This article continues with a brief recap of the relevant literature on the EU's common foreign policy and enlargement which summarizes the divergent foreign policy preferences between new and old member states. Thereafter, we outline the theoretical framework for studying agenda setting in the UNGA. Subsequently, we present the empirical analysis starting with a description of the observed level of cohesiveness in co-authorship followed by a panel regression on dyadic co-sponsorship and, finally, I offer an analysis of the observable co-authorship patterns before and after enlargement.

### **Enlargement and the Cohesion of Foreign Policy Preferences**

da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014) study the nexus between “*internal cohesiveness* and *external effectiveness* of the EU in global governance”. They conclude that overall an internally cohesive EU is more effective in international politics. Internal cohesiveness is a result of (i) *preference cohesion* and (ii) *internal coordination* or *delegation*. Trade policy is the only major foreign policy area in which member states delegated competences to the EU. Apart from international trade, the question is: Has the internal coordination of EU foreign policy been effective enough to uphold a high level of cohesiveness when Eastern enlargement caused lower

preference cohesion? Here, we study the nexus between preference cohesion and internal cohesiveness by isolating the effect of Eastern enlargement. This section begins by arguing that Eastern enlargement caused lower cohesion of relevant foreign policy preferences among EU member states. Specifically, it looks into those areas in which member states did not delegate competences to EU institutions, i.e. it excludes international trade. The subsequent section discusses how this lower cohesion may have effected cohesiveness via internal coordination.

A priori, a majority of scholars were certain that Eastern Enlargement would increase preference heterogeneity and introduce a new geopolitical focus to the EU's common foreign policy (Sjursen 1998; Cameron and Primatarova 2003; Duke 2003; Nugent 2006). Hence, prior to Eastern enlargement the outlook on the future development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been rather pessimistic (Sjursen 1998). At the heart of these expectations were the following four observations.

First, geopolitically, many new member states had been under Soviet influence for decades and feared that the new Russian state could eventually follow-up on this legacy. Especially Poland and the Baltic states saw the USA as their ultimate protector against a reinvigorated Russia (Edwards 2006). The argument has been most visible in 2003 when all Central and Eastern European candidate countries signed letters supporting the US policy to 'disarm' Saddam Hussein's Iraq in Rumsfeld's notion about 'old Europe' versus 'new Europe'. In contrast, the position of most Western European states; Germany and France in particular, was one of emphatically rejecting the impending war. Divisions were deepened by French President Jacques Chirac who noted that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had 'lost a good opportunity to keep quiet', calling their support for the US 'infantile' and 'reckless'. There was even an implicit threat that they might have their EU accession blocked by a last minute French referendum (Blockmanns 2014).

Second, in addition to the latent Russian threat, many of the new member states shared a distinct regional focus on their Eastern neighborhood, especially Belarus and the Ukraine (Smith 2008; Sjursen 1998). Similar to the Northern dimension of CFSP introduced after Northern enlargement in 1995, some Central and Eastern European governments explicitly demanded an Eastern dimension. Yet, almost fifteen years later, there is less indication of a homogenous Central Eastern European coalition on Foreign Policy. At best, there are changing coalitions, for example around the 'Visegrad 4' (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). Other examples include Slovenia and Hungary's focus on the Western Balkans, Cyprus' attention to the Mediterranean, and the Middle East and Lithuania's ambition to turn Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia away from Russia. In addition, Juncos and Pomorska (2006) find that the Eastern enlargement had different effects throughout the CFSP working groups.

Third, related to both the regional focus and as newly established democracies and market economies, many Central Eastern European governments had to get used to the political responsibility of the EU in the world. As former recipients of EU foreign aid, they were now part of this donor and, consequently, responsible for the allocation and conditional requirements of EU foreign aid (Lightfoot 2008). Here, too, a distinctly different focus between Central Eastern European members compared to Western European members has been anticipated. In particular, it was apparent that the new member states would have a limited interest in the Mediterranean region and North Africa.

Finally, scholars saw Eastern enlargement as a potential obstacle for any future centralization or even supra-nationalization of the Common Foreign Policy (Smith 2008; Sjursen 1998). On the one hand, this may follow logically from the increased preference heterogeneity, although Heidbreder (2014) finds that lower cohesion can, unexpectedly, foster integration. On the other hand, the

history of Soviet rule and the recently gained independence made the new member states wary against any loss of national sovereignty.

To what extent has Eastern enlargement been exogenous to the EU's foreign policy coordination in the UNGA? Stabilizing the Eastern neighborhood of the EU was certainly one motivation for accepting thirteen Central Eastern European states, and the common neighborhood policy is part of the Common Foreign Policy. However, stabilizing democracies in Central Eastern Europe was not a major concern on the UNGA's agenda, hence Eastern enlargement is not immediately endogenous to those areas of the Common Foreign Policy that affect the EU's cohesiveness in the UNGA. Moreover, foreign policy was certainly not the only motivation behind Eastern enlargement. Long-term economic advantages of enlarging the single market were at least equally important (Plümper et al. 2007).

Overall, the early literature expected that Eastern enlargement would cause a lower cohesion of foreign policy preferences among EU member states as well as the danger of a distinct East-West cleavage and, correspondingly, it had a pessimistic perspective for the future integration of the CFSP (Sjursen 1998; Cameron and Primatarova 2003; Duke 2003; Nugent 2006). The primary reasons for this concern were different geopolitically and historically motivated security interests. Yet, the more recent literature finds that Eastern enlargement did not cause the anticipated deadlock after all (Smith 2008). Next, we discuss how the decrease in preference cohesion may have affected the cohesiveness of the EU's co-authorship activities in the UNGA.

*Enlargement and the Cohesiveness of the Common Foreign Policy*

The majority of existing studies on EU foreign policy coordination are qualitative (a.o. Smith 2006; 2008; Sjørusen 1998; Duke 2003). Yet, co-authorship, voting, and statements in the UNGA provide researchers with an opportunity to study the cohesiveness of the EU's common foreign policy quantitatively; for an overview see Panke (2014). The majority of studies focuses on voting which, following a common assumption, reflects member states' preferences for the two policy alternatives put to vote. Consequently, UN voting data has been used to estimate states' foreign policy positions (Bailey et al. 2017).

da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014) argue that a cohesive foreign policy position ("speaking with one voice") is a crucial condition for actorness. Does the EU speak with one voice in the UNGA? And, if so, what explains the cohesiveness of the EU's position in the UNGA? Internally, the EU holds neither shared nor exclusive competences, but its common foreign policy is based on voluntary coordination. The EU Delegation to the UN, which is now part of the External Action Service, plays an active role in defining EU positions and thereby contributing to the enhanced role of the EU at the UN. The delegation hosts more than 1,300 working-level coordination meetings per session. Each of these meetings is attended by staff from the 28 national missions to the UN. The primary motivation behind this plentitude of meetings is to form a common EU position which then enables the EU speak and act united at the UN. If coordination meetings cannot find a common position, the case is referred to the heads of mission, who meet at least once a week. A detailed description of the coordination mechanism can be found in Degrand-Guillaud (2009) or in Farrell (2006). Externally, compared to other regional groups, the EU enjoys a number of hard fought privileges in the UNGA. Since 2011, the EU has presented a common position, and its representatives have the right to make interventions during sessions and to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the EU can circulate its own communications directly as official UN documents.

Above, we outline that enlargement should have decreased the cohesion of EU member states' foreign policy preferences. But at the same time, enlargement has increased the EU's potential power in the UNGA. In cooperation with aligning countries such as EFTA members, the EU28 can form a block of approximately 40 countries. This way, effective EU coordination could bind up to one fourth of UN member states and, consequently, stands a high chance of being pivotal. That is particularly likely if sponsors of draft resolutions prefer consensus without a formal vote, thus raising the effective majority threshold significantly (Panke 2014).

Empirically, the bloc votes together on more than 95 percent of all proposals (Panke 2014). Only the most conflictive issues, e.g. the status of Palestine in the UN (A/67/L.28), lead to different voting by EU member states. In contrast, EU member states act less cohesively with regard to statements and co-authorships. Studying the Human Rights Committee and the third main committee, Smith (2016) finds that EU member states are reluctant to jointly support UN resolutions. There are two reasons for this lack of cohesiveness in co-authorship. First, member states have a different focus on EU Foreign Policy and emphasize different issues. For example, only Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Estonia co-authored a resolution on "Oceans and the law of the sea" (A/72/L.18), and only Germany, Hungary and Poland co-authored a resolution on "Improving Global Road Safety" (A/68/L.40). This division of labor corresponds to a different foreign policy focus and, at the same time, allows member states to develop and uphold their own profile in the world community (Smith 2016).

Second, member states refuse to reject a draft resolution because they hold substantively different foreign policy positions. For example, Germany and the United Kingdom hold very different perspectives on the right to privacy and the corresponding protection of personal data.

Consequently, the UK and a number of other EU member states refused to co-author a draft

resolution on “the right to privacy in the digital age” (A/C.3/71/L.39), which has been co-authored by Germany, France, Belgium and others. Moreover, the lack of cohesiveness in EU states’ co-authorship of resolutions may result from a combination of divergence in preference and focus:

*“France has worked with African states on issues relating to the Sahel, partly because its preferences are not completely shared within the EU and partly because the Sahel situation developed quickly and the EU could not act as rapidly as a looser cross-regional grouping could”* (Smith 2016:639).

So far, we have established that (i) upon entering, the new Central European EU member states had systematically different foreign policy interests, and (ii) therefore the enlarged EU should have been less cohesive in its co-sponsoring of UNGA resolutions unless (iii) the EU features effective internal coordination mechanisms to deal with the decrease in cohesion. The remainder of this article tests for the effect of Eastern enlargement on the cohesiveness in the UNGA using unique data on co-authorship among EU member states between 1993 and 2016. Specifically, it will present three analyses. First, a study of aggregate cohesiveness operationalized by the size-corrected Rice Index. Second, a panel regression on co-authorship controlling for characteristics of member states, time, and proposals. Third, a cluster analysis to discern the patterns of co-sponsorship before and after enlargement.

### **Rules for Drafting UNGA Resolutions**

The UNGA offers students of comparative foreign policy a unique opportunity to measure and compare foreign policy preferences in a systematic fashion (Bailey et al. 2017; Mattes et al. 2015). So far, the focus of these quantitative empirical studies has been almost exclusively on recorded

votes. Only recently have the texts of UN general debates been processed and speeches been analyzed (Baturó et al. 2017). In this article we offer the first large scale analysis of co-authorship patterns in the UNGA. In this section, we briefly introduce the rules for and logic of co-authorship and compare them to the frequently used UNGA voting data.

At the beginning of each session, the UNGA decides on an agenda. Similar to parliamentary processes, an agenda item is usually assigned for discussion in one of the six main committees. At the same time, informal negotiations take place and resolutions are drafted and, if necessary, amended before finally being adopted. In 1945, the UN had only 51 members and almost all resolutions were adopted by a vote. In contrast, today's UN counts 193 members, and about 80 percent of the resolutions are adopted by consensus, i.e. without taking an explicit vote. Therefore, our co-authorship data includes more than five times as many resolutions as the corresponding voting data.

The prime reason for the importance of consensus is the UN's lack of sanction or enforcement mechanisms. In effect, consensus is tantamount to an informal higher voting threshold and, consequently, a lower blocking minority. The standard voting threshold in the UNGA is simple majority except for items of extraordinary importance for which the UN Charter requires a two-thirds majority. These important items are overrepresented in the 20 percent of drafts that are put to vote. They include questions of international peace and security, elections to the Security Council, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of members, and budgetary questions. As a principle, any member state or group of member states can either propound draft resolutions or amendments to any of the items on the session's agenda. However, in contrast to national parliaments, the UNGA meets rather infrequently, and every proposal must be distributed

at least 30 days before the meeting. Therefore, the informal negotiations on any draft resolution are of significant importance, and formal votes on amendments hardly ever occur.

To what extent the authors of the proposal can reap agenda setting benefits depends on the transparency and openness of the prior informal negotiations. Following the informational theory of legislative bargaining, information asymmetries can cause substantive agenda setting advantages (Krehbiel 1992). Without such information asymmetries, the agenda setting process in the UNGA equals bargaining under open rule (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) since formally every state gets a chance to propose amendments. Consequently, the outcome should be equal to the position of the median state (simple majority) or within the gridlock interval of the two pivotal states (two-thirds majority). Acting cohesively, the enlarged EU stands a high a priori (i.e. numerical) chance of being pivotal. Hence, it has every incentive to coordinate its agenda setting activities.

## **Research Design**

To what extent has the enlarged EU been able to realize its potentially powerful position in the UNGA via effective foreign policy coordination? To answer this question, we depart from previous studies in two crucial ways.

First, how can we evaluate the effectiveness of EU coordination? Previous studies find that the EU features very high levels of voting cohesion if compared to other regional organizations (Panke 2013). However, such a cross-sectional design cannot disentangle the effect of preference cohesion from the effect of coordination. Moreover, regional groups have very different policy objectives and, accordingly, follow very different agendas in the UNGA. For example, the G77 is

predominantly active in setting the agenda of the Third Main Committee which focuses on social, cultural and economic aspects. In contrast, the EU represents developed countries with significant military and economic power. It engages in setting the agenda on a number of specific conflicts and rights violations. Consequently, there are limits to what we can learn about the effectiveness of EU coordination by comparing its cohesion to other regional blocs.

Here, we opt for a longitudinal design instead. Specifically, we argue above that enlargement has been an exogenous shock to those areas of EU foreign policy which are on the agenda of the UNGA. This shock lowered the cohesion of foreign policy preferences within the EU, thus challenging EU coordination. At the same time, enlargement increased the voting power of the EU inside the UNGA and, consequently, the incentives for coordination. If EU coordination works effectively, it will be able to uphold the high level of cohesiveness observed before Eastern enlargement. More specifically, it will be able to integrate the new member states into its coordination processes. Importantly, this longitudinal design allows us to disentangle the effect of preference cohesion and foreign policy coordination by comparing the cohesiveness of all 28 EU member states before and after the enlargement.

Second, compared to voting data, co-authorship data has both advantages and disadvantages. The major drawback of analyzing co-authorship lies in the interpretation of non-authors (Peress 2013). No-votes clearly indicate a preference for the status quo over the proposal put to vote. Contrary to this, there can be different reasons for non-authorship such as opposed preferences, disinterest, or lack of resources. On the other hand, UNGA voting comes with zero transaction costs and therefore contains no information on the importance of the proposals put to vote. Specifically, a vote on a resolution of core relevance to the EU has the same weight as a vote on completely irrelevant proposals. In contrast, given the time and resources necessary to draft a successful proposal, co-

authorship clearly indicates member states' interests in an issue. Moreover, the UNGA adopts only 20 percent of its resolutions by formal vote, whereas the rest is adopted by "consensus" (see above). Consequently, voting data only contains information on one fifth of the proposals. In addition, the EU has an extremely high cohesiveness of votes on the remaining fifth of the proposals, hence defections are rare events. Consequently, voting cohesion may be seen as the result of few exceptions rather than a valid measure of foreign policy coordination. In our period of observation, approximately 75 percent of all final draft resolutions are adopted. Therefore, cohesive EU co-authorship of these drafts can be seen as a valid measure of effective foreign policy coordination. As outlined above, EU member states' delegations to the UN organize more than 1,300 coordination meetings during each session. If those meetings have any effect, we should expect that they produce draft resolutions all members can agree on.

In the remainder of this article, we first present the data on agenda setting activities in the UNGA. Subsequently, we analyze coordination before and after enlargement. In a first step, we do so by means of an agreement index before we control for unobserved characteristics of a country dyad by estimating a Poisson panel regression model. In a final step, we open up the cohesion indicator to identify coalition patterns among member states before and after enlargement using non-parametric cluster analysis.

### **Drafting Activity in the UNGA**

We extracted information on UNGA Draft Resolutions from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, which contains a digital collection of all official UN documents. Figure 1 plots the number of draft resolutions proposed in UNGA sessions 49 (1994-95) to 70 (2016-17). During the first ten years of

our observation period, we observe approximately 400 drafts per session. However, from session 59 (2004-5) onward, we observe a steady increase in the number of drafts, counting more than 600 drafts in session 70. One explanation for the observed increase is the rising number of violent conflicts and humanitarian crises during that period. Moreover, we observe an increasing activity of China as emerging leader of the G77 group.


Next, we turn to the number of draft resolutions co-authored by EU member states. In Figure 1, the plot to the right shows the number of draft resolutions per session signed by the EU15 members. The dashed vertical lines indicate the rounds of EU enlargement. In the long-term perspective, the increase in EU15 activity reflects the increase in overall draft resolutions propounded in the UNGA. In a short-term perspective, some of the spikes run parallel to the UNGA trend, whereas others either do not resemble or run against the overall trend. On average, EU15 countries authored roughly one fourth of all UNGA resolutions. However, we also observe significant differences across member states. For example, in session 67 the UK co-sponsored 93 resolutions whereas Germany co-authored 159 resolutions. The observed number of draft proposals is uncorrelated to country size. Even more interesting, and a first step towards answering the research question, are the following two observations. First, the variation in the number of drafts signed by EU15 states increases after session 60, i.e. immediately after Eastern Enlargement. Second, the EU15 has been involved in a lower share of UN resolutions after Eastern Enlargement.

In Figure 1, the plot to the left shows the number of draft resolutions signed by the thirteen Central Eastern European countries that have joined the EU since 2004. Compared to the EU15, they signed significantly less drafts before joining the EU. On average, these states signed 'only' every eighth resolution propounded in the UNGA. However, the difference between 'old' and 'new' member states became smaller after enlargement when the latter states participated in every fifth proposal. The plot reveals a significant variation, too. In the ten sessions preceding enlargement, Latvia and

Estonia were rather reluctant to sign proposals (15-40 per session), whereas Romania, Hungary and Poland signed 50-80 proposals per session. If anything, (and with the exception of Malta that signed extremely few drafts), this variation decreased after enlargement.

Overall, enlargement seems to have had an opposite effect on the activity of old and new member states in the UNGA. Whereas the group of old members revealed relatively lower levels of activity and became more heterogeneous, the group of new members revealed relatively higher levels of activity and became less heterogeneous in terms of activity.

**Figure 1.** Number of Draft Resolutions co-authored by EU15 (right) and the thirteen states that joined the EU after 2004 (left). (*Note: Different right Y-axis for overall number of resolutions (dashed line).*)



## Coordination and Cohesiveness in the EU

In this section, we study the cohesiveness of EU's agenda setting over the course of the last 23 years. In order to operationalize cohesiveness, we apply the Agreement Index (AI) widely used by scholars studying group cohesiveness in the UN (Hosli et al. 2012), in the European Parliament (Hix et al. 2013), and in national parliaments (see Bailer et al. 2009). Without abstentions, the AI is identical to the Rice Index:  $\frac{|\#Authors-\#NonAuthors|}{\#Authors+\#NonAuthors}$ . In our application, the numerator is the absolute difference in the number of authoring EU states as compared to the number of non-authoring EU states. The denominator is the total number of EU states. If, for example, 28 out of 28 EU states co-author a draft, the AI equals 1 (perfect agreement). If, on the other hand, 14 out of 28 EU states co-author a draft, the AI equals 0 (perfect disagreement). Finally, we follow Desposato's (2005) correction for the number of members in each group.<sup>2</sup>

Figure 2 compares the cohesiveness of the original EU with the cohesiveness among the 28 members of today's EU during the entire period of observation. The solid line depicts the average AI based on co-authorship patterns. It reveals that the EU's cohesiveness decreased with each round of enlargement. Among the EU12, the average agreement was about 0.89, dropping to below 0.86 right after the Northern enlargement. It took the EU five years to recover and another three years to reach a historic high in its coordinated efforts to set the UNGA agenda (AI = 0.9 in session 56). However, right after the Eastern enlargement, the average agreement dropped from almost 0.9 to below 0.86. The subsequent years reveal that it has been very difficult for the enlarged EU to coordinate its agenda setting activities. In the 67th session (2012-13), the average AI had reached a historic low at 0.84. At that time, the ten percent least cohesive proposals were supported by only one third of the member states and the twenty percent least cohesive proposals by approximately

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<sup>2</sup> Desposato (2005) shows that the Rice Index is systematically biased towards higher agreement for small groups. He proposes a correction which, however, alters our results only marginally.

two thirds. Not until the Lisbon Treaty had installed its delegation to the UN as part of the External Action service in 2012, did it improve the process of coordinating its agenda setting in the UN. In the 70th session, the agreement was almost back at 0.88.


Concentrating on the dashed line, we calculated the co-authorship cohesion of all 28 EU member states in 2017. In other words, instead of looking at the effect of enlargement on cohesiveness, we keep the group members constant during the entire observation period. The figure provides an interesting insight into the Eastern enlargement as the ten Eastern European member states that joined the EU in 2004 started to coordinate their sponsoring activities in the UNGA with the EU15 about five years before they joined. Although, the future members were invited to working group meetings almost a year before the official enlargement (Juncos and Pomerska 2006), this early convergence is surprising. Figure 2 reveals a steady increase in cohesiveness from 1999 (session 55) onwards. In fact, immediately before becoming members, the ten candidates coordinated their UN activities so well that the hypothetical EU28 (dashed line) reveals the same level of agreement as the EU15 (solid line). However, immediately after Eastern Enlargement the overall EU cohesiveness in co-authorship declined. This development seems to support the view that candidate countries were more careful to avoid conflicts with the EU. This view has been prominently expressed in connection with president Chirac's threat to stall the enlargement process due to new members' open support for the US invasion of Iraq.<sup>3</sup> For the sake of comparison, Figure A2 in the online appendix<sup>4</sup> offers the same plot based on voting data in which we do not observe any effect of Eastern enlargement.

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<sup>3</sup> "Chirac told Central and Eastern European countries to keep their views on Iraq to themselves or risk losing their chance to join the European Union. "We thought we were preparing for war with Saddam Hussein and not Jacques Chirac," said Alexandr Vondra, deputy foreign minister of the Czech Republic (...)" Source: NYT, 19 February 2003.

<sup>4</sup> The Online Appendix is available at the journal's website: <https://link.springer.com/journal/11558>.

**Figure 2.** Cohesiveness of Real EU (solid line) compared to EU 28 states (dashed line). (Note: AI is corrected for group size (see Desposato 2005)).



We could discuss to what extent the inclusion of all draft resolutions delivers a valid measure of cohesiveness among EU states. A number of the draft proposals are certainly of limited salience and interest to all EU member states, for example those touching upon distant world regions. Consequently, those drafts will not be sponsored by any of the EU member states because they are not part of 'their' agenda. If this share is constant across sessions, it only inflates the overall level of cohesiveness. However, if this share differs across sessions, it may bias our findings on the effect of enlargement on EU agenda coordination in the UNGA. Consequently, we recalculate the agreement

index depicted in Figure 2 by excluding all the drafts that have not been signed by any of the EU member states (55-65%). As a result, the average level of cohesiveness is significantly lower and varies between 0.61 (session 50) and 0.75 (session 56). However, the observable variation across time remains unaffected. Finally, the variation across time could be explained by a change in agenda. Fortunately, the UNGA agenda is much more stable than for example the content of the speeches held by heads of state and government at the UN General Debate. Nevertheless, we are going to control for changes in the agenda in the regression analysis below.

### **Panel Regression**

Above, we find that the Eastern enlargement challenged the coordination of EU agenda setting in the UNGA, but that the EU has proven capable of accommodating this challenge within a decade after Eastern enlargement. In this section, we go beyond studying aggregate cohesiveness and scrutinize to what extent enlargement altered the patterns of co-authorship among (i) EU15, (ii) new member states, and (iii) between EU15 and new member states. To this end, we reshape the data into a panel structure that accounts for every dyad of two EU member states ( $m=300$ ) for each draft resolution ( $k=9144$ ). The data set includes only those draft resolutions co-authored by at least one of today's 28 EU member states. The dependent variable "co-authorship" is binary and equal to "1" if both states signed the draft resolution. The dyads are categorized into the following three groups: (i) both states are EU15 members; (ii) neither state is an EU15 member; (iii) one state is an EU15 member, and the other state is a 'new' member. Cohesiveness, as measured by the AI and displayed in Figure 2, is an aggregate measure which is related to the probability of co-authorship. *Ceteris paribus*, an increase in cohesiveness could be either associated with a higher probability of co-authorship (both states signing a draft) or of non-co-authorship (no state signing a draft).

Subsequently, we are focusing on the probability of co-authorship. The analysis begins with discussing descriptive statistics before running a logistic panel regression to explain the co-authorship patterns among dyads of states across time.

For each of the three categories of dyads, we study the average number of divergent co-authorships per session (see Table A3 in the appendix). Before enlargement, two EU15 states co-authored approx. 22 percent of all proposals jointly. Before enlargement, this number compares to an average of 16 percent of drafts co-authored by EU15 states and 'new' member states. While this difference is substantive and significant, it disappeared after enlargement when both types of dyads co-authored between 19 and 20 percent of all draft resolutions. Moreover, a dyad between two new member states experienced a significant increase in the percentage of co-authored proposals from approx. 11 percent before to approx. 18 percent after enlargement. These numbers substantiate the above finding that there is no systematic difference in co-authorship behavior between new and old member states after enlargement.

While the descriptive numbers provide important first insights, we cannot know to what extent the differences across categories of country dyads are due to other unobserved characteristics. The assignment of states to the three categories of dyads is constant over time and therefore collinear with any fixed effects. Hence, we estimate a logistic panel regression model with random effects in dyads ( $m=300$ ) and proposals ( $k=9144$ ) while explicitly estimating the effect of the three types of dyads introduced above as well as fixed effects for each session.

Finally, changes in co-authorship may be driven by systematic changes of the UNGA's agenda during the period of observation. Although the UNGA is generally characterized by a fairly stable agenda with a number of recurring resolutions (Bailey et al. 2017), we cannot rule out that a changing agenda has systematically different effects on two states' probability to co-author draft

resolutions. Unfortunately, the UN database offers very limited systematic information on the content of each draft. Therefore, we decided to infer that information from the full texts of all draft resolutions which are available from the UN Digital Library. Specifically, we (i) downloaded all drafts since 1993, (ii) cleaned the texts for further analysis (e.g. removing punctuation, numbers and stop words, stemming and case lowering), and (iii) deployed an unsupervised Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) algorithm to identify topics within the corpus of draft resolutions.<sup>5</sup> We altered the number of topics from three to ten which does not change our substantive findings. The results for five topics, however, are most meaningful in terms of interpretation: Migration, Middle East Conflict, Climate Change, Drug Trafficking, and Denuclearization. In the following regression models, we control for changes of the agenda by controlling for each draft's estimated probability to belong to one of those topics. To control for the robustness of the results, we altered the chosen number of topics between five and ten. We provide a description of our topic modelling approach and results in the appendix.

The results of the Panel regression are presented in Table 1 and Figure 3. Here, we focus on Eastern enlargement and therefore start in session 52, i.e. almost two years after Northern Enlargement. Before session 59, the first session after Eastern enlargement, our model predicts stable and highly significant differences in EU member states' probability to co-author draft resolutions. Dyads composed of two EU15 members have the highest predicted probability (0.18-0.26), whereas dyads of two new member states have the lowest predicted probability to co-author agreements (0.08-0.14). Mixed dyads' probability to co-author is estimated at an intermediate level (0.10-0.20). Interestingly, the probability for all three groups dipped between 0.07 and 0.09 points in the session

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<sup>5</sup> Overall, the corpus comprised 27,929 draft texts. To improve the discriminatory power of the LDA algorithm, only the top 5% of the most frequent tokens that appear in less than 10% of all documents have been selected for the final analysis.

immediately after the 9/11 attacks, reflecting Europe's struggle to uphold a high level of coordination in the wake of this fundamental security challenge.


The observed difference almost completely disappears after Eastern Enlargement, i.e. from session 59 onwards. With a few small exceptions, the model does not predict different probabilities for co-authorship between dyads of old, new or mixed member states. Immediately after enlargement, the EU's overall probability to co-author converged at a relatively low level (approx. 0.15). At this point, all member states were subject to the same coordination mechanisms which, however, were not able to fully overcome the higher preference divergence in an enlarged EU. Yet, the overall probability to co-author gradually increased to around approx. 0.22 in session 69. Interestingly, the model predicts another dip in the probability of co-authorship for session 70, which had a strong emphasis on the achievement of the UN's sustainable development goals. Overall, the results support the argument that EU coordination in the UNGA has a significant effect on co-authorship. Please note that co-authorship is not due to costless automatism but to more time-consuming coordination meetings (>1,000 per session) that enable convergence on a common EU foreign policy agenda. If it was due to automatism, we should expect fewer coordination meetings, higher overall levels of co-authorship, and no decrease in the probability of co-authorship after enlargement.

Importantly, the panel models assume that member states' foreign policy interests are constant over time. In other words, the model cannot distinguish between convergence of foreign policy preferences after enlargement on the one hand, and effective coordination of heterogeneous preferences on the other. However, the subsequent cluster analysis of co-authorship patterns improves our understanding of the changing co-authorship patterns.

For the sake of comparison, we run the same analysis on the almost 2,000 votes that have been recorded in the sessions 52 to 71. Our binary dependent variable identifies Common Yes-Votes, i.e. votes in which both states of a dyad vote “yes”. The results are unequivocal: We do not find any systematic difference between the voting records of old, new or mixed dyads (see Figure 3).

The different results provide an interesting insight into the information that can be inferred from the two types of data. When co-authoring drafts, states enjoy significant discretion to set the agenda according to their foreign policy interests. In contrast, when voting, states are constrained to choose between any two given policy alternatives, no matter their importance to the EU.

**Figure 3.** Predicted Probability of a Common Yes Vote (top) and Co-Authorship (bottom). *Note:* 97.5% CIs, Based on Table 1.



**Table 1.** Panel Regression Models. Y=Co-Authorship (M1, M2); Common Yes Vote (M3, M4). Note: Random Effects in Dyads (m=300) and draft resolutions (9144) or votes (1780).

	M1 (N=2,720,700)	M2 (N=2,720,700)	M3 (N=534,000)	M4 (N=534,000)
EU15 - EU15	<i>Base</i>	<i>Base</i>	<i>Base</i>	<i>Base</i>
	<i>Category</i>	<i>Category</i>	<i>Category</i>	<i>Category</i>
NewMS - EU15	-0.322*** (0.0237)	-0.324*** (0.0239)	-0.0536 (0.0363)	-0.0609 (0.0388)
NewMS - NewMS	-0.749*** (0.0360)	-0.754*** (0.0362)	-0.0163 (0.0507)	-0.0186 (0.0543)
53.session	0.135*** (0.0174)	0.136*** (0.0174)	0.753*** (0.0358)	0.826*** (0.0378)
54.session	0.0370** (0.0171)	0.0365** (0.0172)	0.614*** (0.0344)	0.824*** (0.0362)
55.session	0.325*** (0.0167)	0.336*** (0.0168)	0.657*** (0.0347)	0.794*** (0.0366)
56.session	-0.175*** (0.0178)	-0.198*** (0.0179)	0.411*** (0.0344)	0.595*** (0.0363)
57.session	0.0426** (0.0170)	0.0186 (0.0171)	0.497*** (0.0337)	0.707*** (0.0356)
58.session	-0.113*** (0.0178)	-0.129*** (0.0179)	0.315*** (0.0332)	0.633*** (0.0353)
59.session	-0.249*** (0.0178)	-0.262*** (0.0179)	0.503*** (0.0337)	0.778*** (0.0357)
60.session	-0.136*** (0.0171)	-0.137*** (0.0172)	0.531*** (0.0336)	0.803*** (0.0356)
61.session	-0.195*** (0.0172)	-0.204*** (0.0173)	0.731*** (0.0320)	0.957*** (0.0339)
62.session	0.0356** (0.0168)	0.0250 (0.0169)	0.682*** (0.0335)	0.940*** (0.0354)
63.session	0.0446*** (0.0163)	0.0540*** (0.0164)	0.478*** (0.0332)	0.733*** (0.0352)
64.session	-0.0351** (0.0169)	-0.0582*** (0.0170)	0.319*** (0.0344)	0.485*** (0.0363)
65.session	0.176*** (0.0160)	0.157*** (0.0161)	0.454*** (0.0338)	0.655*** (0.0357)
66.session	0.107*** (0.0164)	0.0890*** (0.0165)	0.566*** (0.0346)	0.779*** (0.0364)
67.session	-0.000872 (0.0161)	-0.00843 (0.0162)	0.494*** (0.0338)	0.734*** (0.0357)
68.session	0.186*** (0.0160)	0.194*** (0.0161)	0.355*** (0.0348)	0.539*** (0.0366)
69.session	0.168*** (0.0161)	0.168*** (0.0162)	0.422*** (0.0331)	0.721*** (0.0349)
70.session	-0.335*** (0.0165)	-0.327*** (0.0166)	0.130*** (0.0331)	0.361*** (0.0350)
71.session	-0.00913 (0.0183)	-0.0430** (0.0185)	0.386*** (0.0328)	0.631*** (0.0347)
NewMS-EU15#53.session	-0.0692*** (0.0237)	-0.0703*** (0.0238)	0.0367 (0.0467)	0.0427 (0.0491)
NewMS-EU15#54.session	0.0334 (0.0233)	0.0331 (0.0234)	0.0478 (0.0448)	0.0548 (0.0471)
NewMS-EU15#55.session	-0.0167 (0.0227)	-0.0174 (0.0228)	0.0660 (0.0453)	0.0740 (0.0474)
NewMS-EU15#56.session	-0.307*** (0.0251)	-0.309*** (0.0252)	0.0279 (0.0448)	0.0332 (0.0471)
NewMS-EU15#57.session	0.0716*** (0.0231)	0.0718*** (0.0232)	0.113*** (0.0440)	0.125*** (0.0462)
NewMS-EU15#58.session	0.112*** (0.0241)	0.113*** (0.0242)	0.0960** (0.0434)	0.108** (0.0459)
NewMS-EU15#59.session	0.232*** (0.0238)	0.234*** (0.0239)	0.113** (0.0440)	0.126*** (0.0464)
NewMS-EU15#60.session	0.195***	0.197***	0.0947**	0.105**

	(0.0230)	(0.0231)	(0.0439)	(0.0462)
NewMS-EU15#61.session	0.205***	0.206***	0.0713*	0.0800*
	(0.0231)	(0.0232)	(0.0418)	(0.0440)
NewMS-EU15#62.session	0.216***	0.218***	0.0504	0.0575
	(0.0226)	(0.0227)	(0.0437)	(0.0460)
NewMS-EU15#63.session	0.176***	0.177***	0.0760*	0.0850*
	(0.0220)	(0.0221)	(0.0434)	(0.0457)
NewMS-EU15#64.session	0.224***	0.225***	0.0997**	0.111**
	(0.0226)	(0.0227)	(0.0448)	(0.0473)
NewMS-EU15#65.session	0.223***	0.225***	0.0558	0.0633
	(0.0215)	(0.0216)	(0.0441)	(0.0463)
NewMS-EU15#66.session	0.227***	0.228***	0.0940**	0.104**
	(0.0220)	(0.0221)	(0.0452)	(0.0473)
NewMS-EU15#67.session	0.232***	0.234***	0.0482	0.0552
	(0.0217)	(0.0218)	(0.0440)	(0.0463)
NewMS-EU15#68.session	0.251***	0.253***	0.0740	0.0826*
	(0.0215)	(0.0216)	(0.0454)	(0.0476)
NewMS-EU15#69.session	0.257***	0.259***	0.0959**	0.106**
	(0.0216)	(0.0217)	(0.0432)	(0.0453)
NewMS-EU15#70.session	0.199***	0.201***	0.0617	0.0697
	(0.0222)	(0.0223)	(0.0432)	(0.0454)
NewMS-EU15#71.session	0.273***	0.275***	0.0953**	0.105**
	(0.0245)	(0.0246)	(0.0429)	(0.0450)
NewMS-NewMS#53.session	-0.150***	-0.152***	-0.0117	-0.0116
	(0.0392)	(0.0393)	(0.0652)	(0.0686)
NewMS-NewMS#54.session	0.108***	0.108***	0.00895	0.0108
	(0.0373)	(0.0375)	(0.0626)	(0.0658)
NewMS-NewMS#55.session	-0.00625	-0.00777	0.0460	0.0499
	(0.0366)	(0.0367)	(0.0634)	(0.0663)
NewMS-NewMS#56.session	-0.148***	-0.149***	-0.0106	-0.0104
	(0.0409)	(0.0410)	(0.0626)	(0.0659)
NewMS-NewMS#57.session	0.199***	0.199***	0.139**	0.150**
	(0.0367)	(0.0369)	(0.0617)	(0.0648)
NewMS-NewMS#58.session	0.324***	0.325***	0.102*	0.113*
	(0.0379)	(0.0380)	(0.0607)	(0.0643)
NewMS-NewMS#59.session	0.561***	0.565***	0.143**	0.157**
	(0.0367)	(0.0368)	(0.0617)	(0.0651)
NewMS-NewMS#60.session	0.527***	0.531***	0.101	0.110*
	(0.0356)	(0.0357)	(0.0615)	(0.0648)
NewMS-NewMS#61.session	0.539***	0.542***	0.0568	0.0621
	(0.0358)	(0.0359)	(0.0585)	(0.0616)
NewMS-NewMS#62.session	0.544***	0.548***	0.0189	0.0215
	(0.0351)	(0.0352)	(0.0612)	(0.0643)
NewMS-NewMS#63.session	0.474***	0.477***	0.0872	0.0950
	(0.0344)	(0.0345)	(0.0608)	(0.0640)
NewMS-NewMS#64.session	0.575***	0.579***	0.114*	0.125*
	(0.0350)	(0.0351)	(0.0628)	(0.0662)
NewMS-NewMS#65.session	0.554***	0.557***	0.0434	0.0475
	(0.0335)	(0.0336)	(0.0617)	(0.0648)
NewMS-NewMS#66.session	0.555***	0.558***	0.103	0.111*
	(0.0342)	(0.0344)	(0.0634)	(0.0664)
NewMS-NewMS#67.session	0.578***	0.581***	0.0371	0.0410
	(0.0337)	(0.0338)	(0.0616)	(0.0649)
NewMS-NewMS#68.session	0.602***	0.606***	0.0665	0.0719
	(0.0335)	(0.0336)	(0.0635)	(0.0666)
NewMS-NewMS#69.session	0.631***	0.635***	0.106*	0.114*
	(0.0335)	(0.0336)	(0.0605)	(0.0635)
NewMS-NewMS#70.session	0.544***	0.548***	0.0241	0.0270
	(0.0345)	(0.0347)	(0.0604)	(0.0635)
NewMS-NewMS#71.session	0.663***	0.667***	0.0988*	0.106*
	(0.0373)	(0.0374)	(0.0600)	(0.0630)
topic1		0.320***		-3.318***
		(0.0142)		(0.0821)
topic2		0.434***		-2.411***

		(0.0150)		(0.0814)
topic3		0.0794***		-2.396***
		(0.0166)		(0.0853)
topic4		-0.154***		0.128***
		(0.0187)		(0.0490)
topic5		1.020***		-4.490***
		(0.0142)		(0.0837)
topic6		0.230***		-5.085***
		(0.0145)		(0.0848)
topic7		0.292***		-3.728***
		(0.0140)		(0.0822)
topic8		0.725***		-3.037***
		(0.0185)		(0.0852)
topic9		0.598***		-4.412***
		(0.0161)		(0.147)
Constant	-1.358***	-1.756***	-0.0644**	3.129***
	(0.0178)	(0.0222)	(0.0278)	(0.0858)
Panel Level Variation ( $\Sigma$ )	0.1303	0.1315	0.1355	0.1465
Intra Class Correlation (P)	0.0051	0.0052	0.0055	0.0064
Log-Likelihood	-1293240	-1281724	-356187	-3359.37
AIC	2586602	2563588	712520	672039

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Random Effects in Dyads (300) and Proposals (9144) or Dyads (300) and Votes (1780). For a description of the topics, please consult the appendix.

## Patterns of Cooperation


To substantiate the interpretation of the above results, we analyze the coalition patterns by conducting a simple, non-parametric cluster analysis. Specifically, we cluster the data by using the Dice similarity measure,  $Dice = 2a/(2a+b+c)$ , where  $a$  denotes the number of times both member states have co-authored a joint draft resolution, whereas  $b$  and  $c$  denote the frequencies with which only one state has authored a draft. Compared to other similarity measures, Dice emphasizes joint action, hence it is perfectly suited for an application on joint authorship. The advantage of the non-parametric cluster analysis is that it does not require any assumptions on dimensionality or parameter distributions. The disadvantage of this approach is that, given its flexibility, the results are difficult to display in a two dimensional graph. In Figure 4, we opt for the traditional dendrogram based on complete linkages.

The upper part of the figure shows the similarity between member states' co-authorships before Eastern Enlargement (sessions 52-57). We can clearly identify a cluster that includes all EU15 states which merges at a minimum Dice similarity of 0.77. The EU15 cluster is joined by Cyprus, Malta and Croatia at 0.54 and most other Eastern European states at 0.52. Estonia and Latvia, the two Baltic countries with a significant share of Russian population, join the rest of the EU at a Dice score of 0.4.

The lower part of Figure 4 shows the similarity between member states' co-authorships after Eastern Enlargement (sessions 64-70). It differs from the upper figure in three important ways. First, it no longer reveals clusters of old and new member states. Second, the detected clusters are all (with the exception of Malta) joined within an interval between 0.8 and 0.69, compared to a span between 0.85 and 0.4 before enlargement. In other words, the displayed clusters of member states are hardly discernable and, probably, depend on the difference in relatively few draft resolutions. Finally, the similarity of Central Eastern European and Western European states' co-authorship behavior increased. Before enlargement, the first cluster of Eastern states joined the cluster of EU15 at a similarity of 0.54. After enlargement, there is no longer a discernable EU15 cluster, and all states (except Malta) are joined at a Dice similarity of 0.69.

In sum, the results lead to the conclusion that EU coordination has effectively overcome the previous West-East divide in co-authorship. For the sake of comparison, we also conducted a cluster analysis with voting data but without identifying an EU15 cluster either before or after enlargement (Figure A4 in the appendix).

**Figure 4.** Dissimilarity in co-authorship (Dice) before and after enlargement (Dendrograms based on complete linkage).



## Conclusion

The literature agrees that, overall, an internally cohesive EU is more successful and effective in international politics (da Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014). Internal cohesiveness is the result of (i) preference cohesion and (ii) coordination or delegation. In the present article, we study Eastern enlargement as an event which lowered the cohesion of foreign policy preferences in the EU. In the absence of effective coordination, Eastern enlargement should have resulted in a lower level of internal cohesiveness and, ultimately, a less effective EU foreign policy. Empirically, we study the

nexus between cohesion and cohesiveness by analyzing patterns of co-authorship in the UNGA. Specifically, we study the aggregate level of cohesiveness over time, the probability of co-authorship between dyads of states before and after Eastern enlargement as well as the discernable clusters of co-authors before and after enlargement. All three parts of the analysis support the same conclusion.

As a starting point, we observe vastly different co-authorship patterns between old and new member states prior to Eastern enlargement. This corroborates the early literature on the challenges of enlargement for the Common EU Foreign Policy. How did the EU handle this challenge? First, the overall cohesiveness in co-authorship decreased immediately after enlargement, recovering only slowly. Second, the systematic difference in co-authorship patterns between old and new states disappeared with enlargement. In fact, co-authorship patterns of the Central-Eastern European states and the EU15 began to converge approximately two years prior to enlargement. As a result, we can discern clusters of old and new member states prior to, but not after the date of enlargement. Third, the main reason for decreased cohesiveness are different foreign policy interests. In 2005, the states of the newly enlarged EU revealed a significantly lower probability to co-author draft resolutions than the previous EU15. However, within a decade the EU coordination mechanisms managed to overcome the internal divide, and we observe co-sponsorship activities just as high as prior to enlargement. The findings allow for two possible interpretations. First, enlargement decreases the cohesion of foreign policy preferences, but EU coordination could effectively uphold cohesive action in the UNGA. Second, preferences of new and old member states converged after enlargement, which may, in the long run, be seen as a result of EU coordination, too.

This is the first large scale analysis of co-authorship pattern in the UNGA. Hence, it includes information on five times as many draft resolutions as studies using voting data which is most commonly used to study cohesiveness in the UNGA. To compare the two different data sources, we

repeated the entire analysis using voting instead of co-authorship data. We find that enlargement had hardly any effect on voting cohesiveness. The main reason for this finding is that we did not see any systematic difference in voting patterns between old and new member states to begin with. Voting reveals state preferences for or against any UNGA resolution, whereas co-authorship captures proactive coordination over issues of importance to the EU. Caveat to a potential selection bias, recorded votes are well suited to estimate states' ideal positions. But voting data has limitations for studying the effect of EU coordination and the overall cohesiveness of EU member states policies in the UNGA.

Overall, the EU has been successfully able to counterbalance the negative effects of lower preference cohesion on cohesiveness in the UNGA. Future research should scrutinize the EU's cooperation with third countries and focus on the differences across various areas of foreign policy. Moreover, it should explore the implied causal mechanisms in qualitative case studies.

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