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## **Standing up against Islamist Extremism? British Muslims' Collective Action against Islamist Extremism in response to Action Appeals from different Mobilizers**

### **Introduction**

On 22 March 2017, Khalid Masood drove his car into pedestrians on the Westminster Bridge killing five people and then fatally stabbed a police officer in front of the British Parliament. Masood reportedly self-identified as a jihadist. After the attack, hundreds of Muslims rallied in the center of Birmingham, Masood's last town of residence, to denounce terrorism and extremism. This demonstration is an example of British Muslims' collective action against Islamist extremism. In the aftermath of jihadist terrorist attacks in the U.K. and other European countries, Muslims have often mobilized to denounce Islamist extremism. However, they have also often been criticized by political authorities, media and public opinion-makers for not doing enough, and the turn-out at such demonstrations has been used as evidence of lacking commitment within Muslim communities to fight extremism. Authorities put pressure on Muslim community leaders to mobilize and condemn violence. Consider, for example, the following extract from a letter sent to British mosques by Erick Pickles and Lord Ahmad, the then Secretary and Under Secretary of the State Department for Communities and Local Government, respectively, after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015:

We must show them [young Muslims vulnerable to radicalization] the multitude of statements of condemnation from British Muslims ... You, as faith leaders, are in a unique position in our society. You have a precious opportunity, and an important responsibility: in explaining and demonstrating how faith in Islam can be part of British identity. We believe together we have an opportunity to

demonstrate the true nature of British Islam today...We welcome your thoughts, ideas and initiatives on how to ensure that Islam's true message of peace triumphs over those who seek to divide our communities.<sup>1</sup>

This action appeal is in line with the general approach to fighting violent extremism in the U.K., which for a decade has rested on the premise that “communities defeat terrorism” and that the state should therefore engage with communities to support them in that endeavor.<sup>2</sup> The underlying assumption is that certain counter-extremism initiatives, messages and mobilization attempts are more effectively delivered by someone other than the state and that more compliant behavior is achieved that way.<sup>3</sup> Muslim community leaders are thus thought to be more credible and trustworthy voices in mobilizing against Islamist extremism. However, such action appeals from the government are often met with skepticism from Muslim communities. As an interviewee from a British Muslim association said about counter-extremism initiatives; “where the government is involved in this issue it just completely taints it, it is like putting poison in the water and no one is going to drink it anymore.”<sup>4</sup>

The rally by British Muslims in Birmingham following the Westminster bridge attack was organized by a coalition of local Muslim organizations and leaders. But what if the action appeal had come from the British government? Are mobilization attempts by Muslim community leaders always more trustworthy and effective than appeals by state authorities? Is state involvement in counter-extremism mobilization necessarily “toxic” as suggested by the quote above?

In order to address these questions, we conduct the first empirical test of the assumption that the identity of the actor putting out an action appeal in the area of counter-extremism affects the success of the mobilization. We investigate under what circumstances

British Muslims<sup>5</sup> are more willing to stand up against Islamist extremism and take part in collective action against it. We do this via a survey experiment fielded to 825 British Muslims, which allows us to compare the mobilization outcome following an appeal by the government, a Muslim community organization (we chose to focus on the *Muslim Council of Britain* (MCB); see methodology section for rationale) or no appeal (control condition) at different levels of trust in these bodies. We argue that action appeals affect mobilization and that the effect of action appeals on mobilization outcomes depend on the level of trust in the actor behind the appeal. Our results broadly support this. We find that, in general, higher trust levels increase the willingness to engage in collective action, but it is the situation of an action appeal by somebody highly trusted that really sparks mobilization. In contrast, an action appeal from somebody distrusted can be demobilizing. Accordingly, there seems to be nothing de facto superior to action appeals by Muslim community organizations or de facto “toxic” about government appeals regarding counter-extremism mobilization. It comes down to levels of trust in said mobilizers; British Muslims distinguished by their level of trust in the government and the MCB react differently to action appeals coming from these actors respectively. Our results are robust to the control of a range of factors shown in previous research to be important for mobilization to collective action.

The article offers three main contributions. The first contribution is theoretical. Although trust and credibility have been theorized as important factors in social movement research on mobilization, in particular with regard to the effect of framing efforts on resonance-building,<sup>6</sup> the interaction between trust levels and action appeals has not been empirically untangled. Our study is the first to compare British Muslims’ willingness to engage in collective action against Islamist extremism in response to action appeals coming from different actors, controlled for the dominant explanations of collective action

mobilization in the social movement literature. This gives us a better theoretical handle on the direct and interaction effects of action appeals and trust levels on mobilization outcomes, above and beyond standard explanations of collective action. By highlighting the role of action appeals and trust in collective mobilization, we provide new insights about when action appeals are likely to lead from “consensus mobilization” to “action mobilization”.<sup>7</sup>

Our second contribution is methodological. We contend that the time has come for studies of mobilization to engage more with research designs that allow us to isolate the causal effects of key variable. By applying, for the first time, an experimental design to the study of Muslim collective action against Islamist extremism, we take a first step in that direction and provide a much-needed supplement to the many correlational and case-based studies of mobilization in the field.

Finally, we argue that our study offers important guidance in the area of counter-extremism practice by tackling head-on the question of which actors are best suited to deliver counter-extremism initiatives and mobilize against extremism. These considerations are particularly acute in a practice field where more and more counter-extremism work is based on ideas of community engagement and state-civil society coproduction, but where mutual trust can be limited and fragile.<sup>8</sup> European governments are currently investing heavily in community outreach, coalition building and community resilience in the area of counter-extremism. Our hope is that our findings can inform the design of these state-civil society engagements.

The article is structured in three main sections. We explain the theoretical argument of the direct and interaction effects of action appeals and levels of trust in explaining British Muslims’ collective action against Islamist extremism, and hypothesize the effect of these

variables over and above other relevant factors suggested in the literature. We describe the design of the survey experiment and the data collected. In the result section, we present and discuss the analysis of the data in light of our guiding hypotheses. We conclude by highlighting the theoretical and practical implications of our findings for countering violent extremism.

### **Why action appeals and trust levels affect mobilization**

In the following, we theorize the relationship between action appeals, trust levels and mobilization. We draw on and connect three main literatures; a) social movement theory (especially framing theory), b) persuasive communication theory, and c) insights from research on state authorities, trust levels and compliance with the law.

#### *Action Appeals*

Klandermans distinguishes between “consensus” and “action” mobilization, which together make up the mobilization process.<sup>9</sup> Consensus mobilization is concerned with convincing people about the importance of the issue, the attribution of blame or proposed solutions, while action mobilization is about activating those already convinced into taking action.

Snow and Benford further elaborate the two concepts by integrating them into their framing theory, assigning consensus mobilization to the development of diagnostic and prognostic frames and action mobilization to the task of motivational framing.<sup>10</sup>

A key component of action mobilization and motivational framing is the issuing of a concrete action appeal. Action appeals can be indirect, suggesting that some action is needed at some point by somebody, or direct, appealing to a specific audience to take a specific action at a specific point in time. Here we focus on direct action appeals. Abelson

has suggested that only when the connection between a certain attitude and action is highlighted and strongly encouraged is attitude-corresponding action likely. This happens when “encouragement cues” are provided by for example watching somebody you know perform the act or by some authority directly encouraging the action.<sup>11</sup> Likewise, studies on persuasive communication highlight how providing actionable information – highlighting explicitly what to do, how and when – increases the likelihood of audiences complying with the content and guidance of messages.<sup>12</sup> Following these observations, we formulate our first hypothesis:

*H1: British Muslims will be more likely to engage in collective action against Islamist extremism if they receive an action appeal (from the government/MCB) than if they receive no action appeal (control condition).*

People often act based on cues and shortcut reasoning without extensive cognitive processing.<sup>13</sup> In social movement studies, Benford accordingly noticed that some activists took action first and then developed motives for it during or after.<sup>14</sup> Likewise, persuasive communication theory suggests that providing “source cues” – cues about who the source or sender of the message is – affects audiences’ likelihood of accepting or complying with the content of the message.<sup>15</sup> Based on these observations, it is reasonable to assume that mobilization to collective action is not only affected by what the mobilizer *does* (i.e. issue framing and providing action appeals) but also by cues on who the mobilizer *is*. We believe that the identity of the mobilizer is especially important in the action mobilization phase when appeals for specific collective action are made. Actual participation requires more

effort and costs on the part of activists than mere opinion formation, so the question of who makes the action appeal likely weighs heavier in deciding whether to participate or not.<sup>16</sup>

Studies in persuasive communication have shown that perceived similarity between communicator and audience has a positive effect on the audience's attitudes and willingness to comply with the message. Whether it is ideology,<sup>17</sup> identity,<sup>18</sup> ethnicity,<sup>19</sup> race<sup>20</sup> or just incidental,<sup>21</sup> perceived similarity seems to play a role in persuading people to think or act in the direction desired by the communicator. Although understudied, cultural differences also seem to be important when people form opinions about the source of communication.<sup>22</sup> These conclusions are in line with social identity theory, which holds that people are positively predisposed towards members of their own social category compared to the outgroup.<sup>23</sup> Based on this similarity argument, we formulate our second hypothesis:

*H2: British Muslims are more likely to engage in collective action against Islamist extremism if they receive an action appeal from the MCB than if they receive it from the government.*

### *Trust*

The literature on mobilization and collective action touches on the subject of trust only marginally and mainly indirectly through concepts such as credibility or legitimacy. For example, the resource mobilization approach acknowledges that some mobilizers have more resources, including credibility, legitimacy or trustworthiness than others.<sup>24</sup> However, these resources are mostly thought of in terms of external supply, and so scholars have analyzed the way credibility, legitimacy or trustworthiness is buttressed by experts or celebrities who lend their support to the mobilizer.<sup>25</sup>

As mentioned, framing is a strategic way of inducing consensus and action mobilization. This is done by creating alignment between the mobilizer's interpretation (frames) of the particular issue and that of the prospective activist. Frame resonance depends on two factors: the credibility of the frame and its relative salience.<sup>26</sup> The credibility of the frame articulator is conceptualized as one of the determinants of overall frame credibility. Nevertheless, this aspect gets much less attention than other components of framing efforts, which are, again, about what the mobilizer does (how the content of frames is constructed) rather than who the mobilizer is. The main reason for this neglect is the tendency in the social movement literature to study only successful instances of mobilization.<sup>27</sup> In such cases, the mobilizer and the appeal for action have already proved "trustworthy". Without variation in the source of the action appeal, the role of the mobilizer identity is obscured and left out of the equation.

The effect of credibility and trust on behavior is more developed in the literature on persuasive communication. Almost seven decades ago, Hovland and Weiss established that the audience's attitude towards the communicator moderates the effectiveness of the communicator's message.<sup>28</sup> Since then, the communicator's credibility has been determined as a moderator of persuasiveness of appeals on the target audience in a number of studies.<sup>29</sup> Credibility is thought to be composed of *trustworthiness* and *competence*.<sup>30</sup> Importantly, research in persuasive communication<sup>31</sup> as well as on state and trust<sup>32</sup> shows that communicators (e.g. governments) with high trustworthiness elicit more compliant behavior. If recipients of a message feel that the communicator has benevolent intentions and therefore can be trusted, they are more open to consider his arguments. Conversely, if people distrust the communicator, they will resist considering his arguments.<sup>33</sup>

In this article, we focus on trust in the mobilizer as a variable that we expect has an effect on the willingness to comply with action appeals. Although we acknowledge that trust and trustworthiness are not identical constructs, trust is thought to be largely based on perceived trustworthiness.<sup>34</sup> We predict that trust levels will have a direct effect on mobilization, and we expect to see a different impact of action appeals on the willingness to undertake collective action depending on the level of trust in the mobilizer behind the appeal. In other words, we expect to find an interaction effect between the identity of different mobilizers and levels of trust in them. Building on this, we can formulate the following hypotheses about the direct and interaction effects of trust on mobilization:

*H3: Levels of trust in mobilizers have a direct and positive effect on British Muslims' likelihood of engaging in collective action against Islamist extremism over and beyond standard explanations.*

*H4: The effect of an action appeal from the government/MCB on the likelihood of engaging in collective action against Islamist extremism is larger for individuals with high levels of trust in government/MCB respectively.*

As indicated, research in both persuasive communication and governance links distrust with the lack of sympathy for the communicator,<sup>35</sup> negative evaluation of the government's performance,<sup>36</sup> lack of confidence in political institutions and the political system,<sup>37</sup> suspicion of dishonest motives,<sup>38</sup> and antagonism towards the government.<sup>39</sup> Given the high level of criticism and suspicion in British Muslim communities<sup>40</sup> of the U.K. government's foreign policy and approach to terrorism and extremism, and given that people have been

shown to use simple heuristics of similarity when forming political opinions<sup>41</sup> or processing requests and appeals,<sup>42</sup> we expect that British Muslims, on the whole, will trust the government less than the MCB. This leads us to our final hypothesis:

*H5: British Muslims who strongly distrust the government are more likely to participate in collective action against Islamist extremism if they are called to action by the MCB.*

In order to test our hypotheses, we need to take into account and control for a number of variables that have been found to affect collective action engagement in the past. The factors included in this study are: the level of perceived *grievances* relevant to the mobilization appeal,<sup>43</sup> perceived *political efficacy* of mobilizing on the issue,<sup>44</sup> sense of *moral obligation* to speak out,<sup>45</sup> degree of *emotional response* to the issue,<sup>46</sup> *collective identity strength*,<sup>47</sup> and *past experience in political activism*.<sup>48</sup>

## **Methodology and data**

### ***Participants and procedure***

The choice to focus on British Muslims' collective actions against Islamist extremism is driven by the high salience and politicization of Islamist extremism in the U.K. context, which makes it interesting to investigate under what conditions British Muslims are more likely to engage collective action.

Participants in the survey experiment were self-identified Muslims who live in the U.K. Based on quota sampling, a national representative sample was drawn to match the population on gender, age (18-84) and education. The sample (n = 825) was recruited by the online panel service of the Qualtrics survey agency between December 18 2017 and January

9 2018. In order to target a hard-to-reach minority population, Qualtrics employed a strategy of panel aggregation in cooperation with partner companies. Participants were paid for their time via Qualtrics' reward system.

The final sample was representative of the Muslim population in the U.K. in terms of gender (men = 430, women = 395), age (although the age groups over 55 were underrepresented) and education (the graduate and post-graduate levels of education were slightly overrepresented). About 68 % of the participants were born in the U.K, while 32 % indicated they were born outside of the U.K. On average, the participants identified strongly with being Muslim (on a 0-1 scale, mean scores were .83, .73 and .78 for the three included Muslim identity items respectively), which is to be expected for a sample of self-identifying Muslims (see online supplement A1 for full details on sample characteristics).

The procedure of the survey and its experimental component was as follows: First, the participants replied to screening questions regarding their self-identification as Muslims (Qualtrics could verify this assessment by using their internal archive data) and whether they lived in the U.K. Questions on gender, age and education followed for the purpose of quota sampling. Participants then answered questions regarding past experience with collective action, Muslim identity strength, grievances regarding Islamist extremism, efficacy of protest, emotional response, perceived moral obligation and trust in the MCB and the government. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Each condition presented a short scenario of a hypothetical terrorist attack in the U.K. where the perpetrator turned out to be British Muslim followed by an action appeal from either the British government or the MCB (treatment conditions) to British Muslims to participate in an upcoming public demonstration against Islamist extremism or just information about the upcoming demonstration without any action appeal (control group). Next, the main

dependent measure asked participants about their intentions to participate in the upcoming demonstration if they had the opportunity to do so. Finally, participants were asked about their place of birth (in/outside the U.K.) and to fill in a manipulation check (recall of identity of the mobilizer behind the action appeal).

### ***Measures***

*Action appeal.* The two treatment conditions only varied in terms of source of the appeal (the government or MCB) to British Muslims “to stand up against Islamist extremism by taking part in a public demonstration the following Saturday”. In the control condition, respondents received no action appeal and were just informed that “a public demonstration against Islamist extremism is organized for the following Saturday”. In the government condition, the scenario was accompanied by a photo of the entrance of 10 Downing Street, a recognizable image symbolizing the British government. In the Muslim Council of Britain condition, the text was supplemented by the MCB logo, which spells the full name of the organization (see online supplement A3 for full descriptions of manipulations). We chose MCB because it is the largest and best-known Muslim community organization in the U.K., although by no standards representative of British Muslims.<sup>49</sup> While MCB was initially created partly in response to the U.K. government’s wish for a moderate Muslim community organization to consult with, the MCB has in recent years dropped out of government collaborations and has been very vocal in its critique of the U.K. government.

*Collective action intentions.* The main dependent variable was measured on a 7-point Likert scale from extremely unlikely to extremely likely in response to the question, “Provided you had the opportunity, how likely is it that you would follow the [government/MCB] 's call [control condition: no call mentioned] and participate in the public

demonstration?” The measure was scored 0 to 1 with a mean of .62 (SD = .32). It is important to underline that we are measuring *intentions* for participation in collective action and not actual participation, which would require a different (and very difficult) design. However, behavioral intentions tend to be good proxies for behavior.<sup>50</sup>

*Trust.* A single item measured trust in MCB on a 7-point Likert scale (I trust the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) to act in my best interest), scored 0 to 1 with a mean of .62 (SD = .26). Trust in government was measured by a more complex method. Several scholars have concluded that public trust in government can be measured by the extent to which people believe that the government operates in their best interest.<sup>51</sup> Levi and Stoker noted that political trust is domain-specific so that people can trust government to different extents in different policy fields.<sup>52</sup> Therefore, we constructed a factor score variable of trust in government (I trust the current government to act in my best interest in the area of ...) in six policy areas (counter-terrorism, anti-discrimination, healthcare, transportation, foreign policy, and environmental policy;  $\alpha = .95$ ). The factor score weights each item according to how salient it is to the concept of trust in government. The measure is mean-centered, has a standard deviation of 1, and ranges from -2.28 to 1.71.

In addition to the main independent and dependent measures, a number of variables that have been found to have an effect on collective action engagement in the past were included (political efficacy, grievances, moral obligation, emotional response, Muslim identity strength and past experience with collective political action). All measures were scored 0-1. Full measurement details for these factors are provided in online supplement A2.

## Results

We present our findings regarding H1-H3 in table 1, which is a stepwise regression table. The table presents two models estimating the direct effects of action appeals and trust on mobilization. A randomization check uncovered that the subsamples were not balanced on gender (significantly more females in the MCB condition ( $\chi^2 = 8.44, p = .01$ ), which is why we included gender as a control in all models (females are less likely than males to participate in collective action against Islamist extremism). Randomization was successful regarding all other demographic controls (age, education and being born inside/outside the U.K.). We use these models to discuss our hypotheses below.

*Table 1. Direct effects of action appeals and trust levels on mobilization, controlled for gender.*

	Model 1	Model 2
	<b>B (SE)</b>	<b>B (SE)</b>
Gender (male)	-.05* (.02)	-.04* (.02)
Action appeal (0 = MCB):		
Government	-.01 (.03)	-.02 (.02)
None	-.05* (.03)	-.06* (.03)
Trust in government		.07*** (.01)
Trust in MCB		.26*** (.04)
N	825	825
r <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.131
$\Delta R^2$		0.121***

NOTE: Coefficients reported as regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

†  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Model 1 shows the direct effect of our manipulations regarding the identity of the mobilizer behind the appeal for action on British Muslims' willingness to participate in collective action against Islamist extremism. In line with H1, we find that British Muslims are more likely to engage in collective action against Islamist extremism when the action appeal comes from the MCB than if there is no action appeal (control). However, the support for H1 is only partial as the difference between a call from the government and the control condition is not significant (although in the expected direction and significant in all other models). It seems that direct action appeals lead to action mobilization for British Muslims in terms of standing up against Islamist extremism. In a highly contested political field, direct action appeals reduce uncertainty and costs of participation.

In contrast to H2, the results of model 1 also tell us that there is no statistically significant difference in the likelihood that British Muslims engage in the demonstration against Islamist extremism based on whether the appeal comes from the government or MCB. Although the mean of trust in MCB is higher than the mean of trust in the government across the full sample (.62 vs. .57, when both scaled 0-1), we do not see a difference in the direct effect between the appeal from the government and MCB on the willingness of British Muslims to mobilize. The reason could simply be that, on the whole, the government and MCB elicit similar levels of (relatively high) trust, and there is a positive but weak relationship between the two types of trust ( $r_s = .38, p < .001$ ). However, a more likely explanation is that the level of politicization and expectations of Muslim condemnation of terrorism and the level of urgency felt at the time of data collection (2017 saw multiple attacks and failed attacks in the U.K.) made compliance with the appeal for action more important than who the specific mobilizer was.

The second model tests H3 by adding the trust variables. Trust in both the government and MCB is positively correlated to mobilization and statistically significant, which supports the hypothesis. On average, the more trust British Muslims have in the “system” and relevant civil society actors, the more likely they are to mobilize against Islamist extremism. In order to test if the effect of the trust variables holds above and beyond standard explanations of collective action in the literature, we ran the model again including these measures (results reported in the online supplement A4, table A4.1). The direct effect of the trust variables remains positive and significant, lending further support to H2 and highlighting the importance of trust levels in terms of explaining mobilization outcomes. In fact, we find that trust levels explain the largest part of the variance in willingness to engage in collective action against Islamist extremism among British Muslims, after a sense of moral obligation to do so and the belief that standing up matters (political efficacy).

Model 2 in table 1 gives estimates based on the entire sample of British Muslims across all three conditions. In table 2 below we disaggregated the sample into conditions to further investigate the direct effect of trust on mobilization outcomes, controlling for the standard explanations of collective action.

*Table 2. Direct effects of trust levels on mobilization by action appeal condition, controlled for standard explanations of collective action.*

	<b>Government condition</b>	<b>MCB condition</b>	<b>Control condition</b>
Efficacy	.34*** (.09)	-.01 (.09)	.20 (.11)
Moral obligation	.21* (.09)	.31*** (.08)	.38** (.11)

Identity	-.07 (.07)	-.04 (.07)	-.10 (.09)
Grievance	.01 (.06)	.18** (.06)	.03 (.07)
Emotion: guilty	.15** (.05)	.14** (.05)	-.01 (.06)
Past protest	.00 (.01)	.03* (.01)	.04** (.01)
Trust in government	.07*** (.02)	.01 (.02)	.06** (.02)
Trust in MCB	.12 (.07)	.27*** (.07)	.07 (.08)
N	282	291	252
r <sup>2</sup>	.31	.29	.23

NOTE: Coefficients reported as regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

In the government condition, only trust in the government has a direct effect on participation; in the MCB condition, only trust in MCB matters. This indicates that it is trust in the mobilizer specifically rather than trust in general that drives the overall effect. It also provides some initial support for our interaction hypothesis (H4), which we investigate further below. Interestingly, trust in the government has an effect on mobilization in the control condition. There are two likely reasons. First, trust in the government might also capture an aspect of general trust in the “system” or society at large that stimulates social engagement. Second, in the absence of specific information, respondents in the control group might have assumed that it is the government or some kind of government-sanctioned entity that makes the mobilization appeal (this interpretation is supported by manipulation check data that indicates that 21 % in the control condition recalled the appeal to be from the government, see online supplement A3.4).

Another finding revealed by the disaggregation of the sample is the changing role of some of the standard explanatory variables of collective action. This finding corresponds to

the results of one of the few experimental studies in the social movement literature, which showed that different social movement organizations appeal to different motivations of protestors over the same issue.<sup>53</sup> A sense of efficacy plays a role only in the government condition, while grievances and past political protest experience matter more in the MCB condition. This suggests that when the action appeal comes from a more resourceful actor (the government), perceptions of political efficacy of engaging in collective action matter more. In contrast, when the appeal comes from a less resourceful actor, the degree of felt grievances and past protest experience trump efficacy of protest in motivating to collective action. A sense of moral obligation to stand up against Islamist extremism is a positive and strong predictor of willingness to engage in collective action across all conditions, while the feeling of guilt by association positively predicts engagement in the government and MCB conditions.

Model 3-5 in table 3 below test our interaction hypotheses (H4 and H5).

*Table 3. Direct and interaction effects of action appeals and trust levels on mobilization, controlled for gender.*

	Model 3 <b>B (SE)</b>	Model 4 <b>B (SE)</b>	Model 5 <b>B (SE)</b>
Gender (male)	-.04 (.02)	-.04* (.02)	-.04 (.02)
Action appeal (0 = MCB):			
Government	-.02 (.02)	.05 (.06)	.10 (.07)
None	-.06* (.03)	.03 (.07)	.07 (.07)
Trust in government	.04** (.02)	.07*** (.01)	.03 (.02)

Trust in MCB	.26*** (.04)	.34*** (.07)	.39*** (.07)
Interaction 1 (0 = Trust in government X MCB):			
Trust in government X government	.05* (.02)		.07* (.03)
Trust in government X None	.02 (.03)		.04 (.03)
Interaction 2 (0 = Trust in MCB X MCB):			
Trust in MCB X government		-.11 (.09)	-.19 <sup>†</sup> (.10)
Trust in MCB X None		-.15 (.10)	-.21* (.11)
N	825	825	825
r <sup>2</sup>	0.135	0.133	0.140
ΔR <sup>2</sup>		-0.002	0.009 <sup>†</sup>


NOTE: Coefficients reported as regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Model 3 includes an interaction term between the identity of the mobilizer and trust in the government and shows that there is positive and significant interaction between the level of trust in government and receiving an action appeal from the government. For the average British Muslim there is, as mentioned, no difference in receiving an action appeal from the government or from MCB. But for one standard deviation increase in trust in government, there is a .06 increase in the effect of an action appeal from the government on mobilization compared to the MCB condition. Thus, for high levels of trust in government, the effect of an action appeal from the government on mobilization is larger. As trust in government increases, the difference in effect of an action appeal from the government and MCB on

mobilization respectively grows. These results support H4, indicating that the effect of an action appeal on mobilization is moderated by trust in the mobilizer. We can further investigate this interaction effect by looking at the estimated marginal effects of action appeals:

Figure 1: Marginal effects of action appeals on mobilization, conditioned by trust in government.



Note: Based on the estimates of model 3 in table 3.

Figure 1 shows that for very low levels of trust in the government (below approximately -1 standard deviations from the mean), receiving an action appeal from MCB (baseline = 0) has a larger marginal effect on mobilization than an appeal from the government. British Muslims with very low levels of trust, thus, respond stronger to an action appeal from the MCB than to an appeal from the government, while British Muslims with high levels of trust in government are more likely to engage in collective action against Islamist extremism if called upon by the government. This supports H5. It appears that British Muslims who are

distrustful of the government react reluctantly or negatively to an action appeal from the government but can be mobilized by Muslim civil society organizations like the MCB.

Model 4 in table 3 tells us that the interaction between trust in mobilizer and action appeal does not hold up for the MCB. At the same level of trust in MCB, there is no statistically significant effect on mobilization by moving from an action appeal from the government to an action appeal from the MCB. The effect of an action appeal from the MCB does not change as trust in MCB increases. However, the relationship is in the expected direction, and model 5, which includes both interaction terms, suggest that the interaction between trust in mobilizer and action appeal may actually also hold up for the MCB (the effect of moving from an action appeal from the MCB to the government on mobilization is negative and growing as trust in MCB increases ( $b = -.19, p = 0.054$ )). Accordingly, we find support for H4, with the caveat that British Muslims' perception of trustworthiness of the government seems to have a greater effect on their evaluation of an action appeal for mobilization against Islamist extremism than their perception of trust in MCB. Additional analysis (reported in the online supplement A4, table A4.1) shows that these findings regarding the interaction between action appeal and trust in mobilizer are robust to the control of the standard explanations of collective action in the literature. Furthermore, to assess the distinctness of this interaction effect, we reran the models in table 3 including alternative interactions between action appeal and a) Muslim identity strength, b) moral obligations, and c) grievances (findings reported in online supplement tables A4.2). The absence of significant interactions testifies to the uniqueness of the interaction effect between the action appeal and levels of trust in this mobilizer identified above.

## **Discussion and Conclusions**

What moves people to take collective action? This question has been answered pointing to a range of structural, processual and psychological factors by scholars from multiple disciplines. However, the effect of action appeals on mobilization and, in particular, the role of trust in the mobilizer in moderating that effect have received little attention. Using a survey experimental design, we contributed to filling this void by manipulating action appeals to come from either the U.K. government or the Muslim Council of Britain as compared to no appeal, investigating the mobilization of British Muslims in response to the appeal following a hypothetical terrorist attack involving a British Muslim perpetrator. We found a direct effect of the action appeal on the likelihood of participating in collective action among British Muslims and that action appeals from the government or MCB are more effective than no appeal (control). We also found that, on the whole, it did not matter whether British Muslims were called to action by the government or the MCB, but it did matter for certain segments. Muslims with very low trust in government were more likely to participate in collective action against Islamist extremism if the action appeal came from the MCB. Likewise, we found that the effect of an action appeal from the government was moderated by levels of trust in the government, as British Muslims with high levels of trust were more likely to follow an action appeal from the government. In short, there seems to be nothing de facto superior to action appeals by Muslim community organizations or de facto “toxic” about government appeals regarding counter-extremism mobilization. It comes down to individual levels of trust in the mobilizers. British Muslims distinguished by their level of trust in the government and the MCB react differently to action appeals coming from these actors respectively.

There are important theoretical, methodological and practical policy implications of these findings. Theoretically, the study shows the importance of the interaction between

trust in the mobilizer and action appeals in explaining mobilization outcomes – a frequently neglected perspective that merits further investigation. This seems to be particularly crucial when in connection with highly contested political issues like mobilizing against Islamist extremism among Muslim minorities, which is loaded with accusations and questioning of loyalty and trustworthiness. Future research on mobilization to collective action should move beyond the tendency to focus exclusively on “consensus mobilization” via framing processes and factor in the way concrete action appeals and trust in the actors behind shape “action mobilization”, and therefore the degree to which attitudinal alignment and consensus actually lead to collective action. Direct action appeals lower the costs of action mobilization – especially when they involve “source cues” identifying a trusted authority behind the call to action.

In terms of methodology, we hope to have demonstrated the promise of using experimental designs capable of isolating causal effects especially in social movement and counter-extremism research, which is overwhelmingly based on single-case and correlational studies. In addition, our findings underline that other research fields such as social psychology should specify the identity of the mobilizer in survey-based lab studies of collective action. Our data show that variation in the identity of actors behind an action appeal can yield different results in mobilization outcomes and in terms of different motivations that seem to be triggered by action appeals from different mobilizers. If we do not specify who makes the appeal or pay attention to variations in trust levels, we will not get the full picture.

Finally, on the policy level, our findings suggest that, in the context of counter-extremism, the level of resistance to and distrust in the government among British Muslims is not as high as sometimes portrayed. 62 % of British Muslims in our sample report that

they are likely, very likely or extremely likely to follow a call for collective action against Islamist extremism coming from the British government (the same number as with a call from the MCB). Nevertheless, a small part of British Muslims (3-4 %) strongly distrust the government and is unwilling to take collective action against Islamist extremism if the appeal to do so comes from the government. An appeal from a Muslim organization is more likely to move them into action. Based on these findings, it seems that the government can increase participation in counter-extremism activities by the more antagonistic parts of the British Muslim communities by facilitating the mobilizing role of Muslim organizations they perceive as more trustworthy. Partnerships and coalition-building between government authorities and Muslim civil-society organizations may overcome reservations for some British Muslims. However, our findings also clearly indicate that commissioning Muslim organizations to secretly mobilize against extremism or deliver other counter-violent extremism work can be a very risky strategy for governments, as this strategy, if exposed, may lead to a drop in trust in both government authorities and involved Muslim civil society organizations. This could seriously damage future mobilization on the issue.

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Online appendix to

**“Standing up against Islamist Extremism? British Muslims’ Collective Action against Islamist Extremism in response to Action Appeals from different Mobilizers”**

Version: May 2018

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## A1. Sampling procedures and sampling characteristics

The sample was collected as an online web survey among self-identified Muslims living in the UK by the Qualtrics survey agency between December 18 2017 and January 9 2018. Based on quota sampling, a national representative sample was drawn to match population on gender, age (18-84) and education.

The total number of completed responses (n = 1098) was cleaned for duplicates and speeding respondents (below 1/3 of the median time used) as a result of joint collaboration between the authors and the Qualtrics team.

*Table A1: Sample characteristics*

n = 825	
Demographic characteristics	Frequency ( %) / mean (SD)
<b>Sex</b>	
Female	395 (48 %)
Male	430 (52 %)
<b>Age</b>	
18-24	193 (23 %)
25-34	293 (36 %)
35-44	229 (28 %)
45-54	74 (9 %)
55-64	24 (3 %)
65-74	11 (1 %)
75-84	1 (0 %)
<b>Education</b>	
No qualifications	14 (2 %)
Secondary education	113 (14 %)
Post-secondary education	144 (17 %)
Vocational qualification	97 (12 %)
Undergraduate degree	269 (33 %)
Post-graduate degree	147 (18 %)
Doctorate (PhD)	29 (3 %)
Other qualifications	12 (1 %)
<b>Born in the UK</b>	
Yes	565 (68 %)
No	260 (32 %)
<b>Muslim identity (mean(SD))</b>	
I am glad to be Muslim	.83(.26)
I feel strong ties to other Muslims	.73(.27)
Being Muslim is an important part of my life	.78(.27)

## A2. Measurement details

*Collective action intentions.* The main dependent variable was measured on a 7-point Likert scale from extremely unlikely to extremely likely in response to the question: *Provided you had the opportunity, how likely is it that you would follow the [ condition] 's call [control condition: no call mentioned] and participate in the public demonstration?* The measure was scored 0 to 1 with a mean of .62 (standard deviation = .32). Across the entire sample, a majority of British Muslims are either slightly likely, moderately likely or extremely likely to participate in the called for demonstration against Islamist extremism (59 %):

*Table A2.1. British Muslim intentions to participate in demonstration against Islamist extremism. Frequencies for the full sample.*

<i>Provided you had the opportunity, how likely is it that you would follow the [government/MCB] 's [control condition: no call mentioned] call and participate in the public demonstration?</i>	<b>Extremely unlikely</b>	<b>Moderately unlikely</b>	<b>Slightly unlikely</b>	<b>Neither likely nor unlikely</b>	<b>Slightly likely</b>	<b>Moderately likely</b>	<b>Extremely likely</b>
	79 (10 %)	58 (7 %)	64 (8 %)	129 (16 %)	129 (16 %)	179 (22 %)	172 (21 %)

*Trust in Government.* Several scholars have concluded that public trust in government can be measured by the extent to which people believe that the government operates in their best interest (Cleary & Stokes, 2006; Kim, 2005; Thomas, 1998). Levi and Stoker (2000) noted that political trust is domain-specific so that people can trust government to different extents in different policy fields. Therefore, we constructed a factor score variable of trust (*I trust the current government to act in my best interest in the area of ...*) in six policy areas (counter-terrorism, anti-discrimination, healthcare,

transportation, foreign policy and environmental policy;  $\alpha = .95$ ). The measure is mean-centered, has a standard deviation = 1 and ranges from -2.28 to 1.71.

*Table A2.2. British Muslim trust in government across policy areas. Frequencies.*

<i>I trust the current government to act in my best interest in the area of...</i>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Somewhat disagree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Somewhat agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly agree</b>
Transportation policy	51 (6 %)	62 (8 %)	73 (9 %)	201 (24 %)	188 (23 %)	159 (19 %)	91 (11 %)
Anti-discrimination policy	68 (8 %)	72 (9 %)	97 (12 %)	174 (21 %)	181 (22 %)	145 (18 %)	88 (11 %)
Foreign Policy	82 (10 %)	63 (8 %)	91 (11 %)	212 (26 %)	158 (19 %)	138 (17 %)	81 (10 %)
Healthcare policy	66 (8 %)	68 (8 %)	93 (11 %)	176 (21 %)	162 (20 %)	169 (21 %)	91 (11 %)
Environmental policy	52 (6 %)	54 (7 %)	79 (10 %)	198 (24 %)	201 (24 %)	159 (19 %)	82 (10 %)
Counter-terrorism policy	62 (8 %)	67 (8 %)	87 (11 %)	168 (20 %)	183 (22 %)	157 (19 %)	101 (12 %)

One-way ANOVAs show that there is no significant difference in the average level of trust in the government across basic demographic variables (gender, age, education) among British Muslims.

However, British Muslims born outside the UK have more trust in the UK government on average than British Muslims born in the UK ( $F = 8.30, p = 0.004$ ).

*Trust in MCB.* A single item measured trust in MCB on a 7-point Likert scale (*I trust the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) to act in my best interest*), scored 0 to 1 with a mean of .62 (standard deviation = .26). Across the entire sample, a majority of British Muslims somewhat agree, agree or strongly agree that they trust MCB to act in their best interest (56 %).

*Table A2.3. British Muslim trust in the Muslim Council of Britain. Frequencies.*

<i>I trust the Muslim Council of Britain to act in the best of my interests</i>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Somewhat disagree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Somewhat agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly agree</b>

	47 (6 %)	27 (3 %)	51 (6.18 %)	234 (28 %)	185 (22 %)	167 (20 %)	114 (14 %)
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One-way ANOVAs show that there is no significant difference in the average level of trust in MCB across basic demographic variables (gender, age, education, being born inside/outside the UK) among British Muslims. An OLS regression with trust in MCB as the dependent measure and Muslim identity strength as the independent measure shows that Muslim identity strength is a significant predictor of trust in MCB ( $b_{\text{Muslim identity strength}} = .32, p = 0.000$ ), which is to be expected.

Comparing British Muslim trust in government and the MCB we find that British Muslims on average trust the MCB more than the government (.62 vs. .57, both scaled 0-1).

*Grievances.* One item was used to measure the extent of Muslim grievances vis-à-vis Islamist extremism on a 7-point Likert-scale (*Islamist extremism is a serious problem in the UK*). The measure was again scored 0 to 1 and had a mean of .65 and standard deviation of .28.

*Efficacy.* We constructed an index measuring instrumental motivation based on three items ( $\alpha = .78$ ) on a 7-point Likert scale, following Honsey et al.'s (2006) distinction of three aspects making up the concept (*As Muslims, I think we can help to reduce the level of Islamist extremism in the UK / prove to the rest of society that Muslim communities in the UK do not support Islamist extremism / inspire fellow Muslims in the UK to become involved in countering Islamist extremism*). The measure was again scored 0 to 1 and had a mean of .78 and standard deviation of .21.

*Moral obligation.* We constructed an index measuring moral obligation to act against Islamist extremism based on two items ( $\alpha = .85$ ) on a 7-point Likert-scale (*I feel a sense of moral duty to take action against Islamist extremism; I feel a sense of religious duty to take action against Islamist extremism*). Mean scores for the two items were .74 and .73 respectively, and .73 for the combined index (SD = .22).

*Emotions.* Four emotions in response to Islamist extremism were measured, each by a single item on a 7-point Likert scale (*Islamist extremists make me feel angry/guilty/ashamed/afraid*). Mean scores and standard deviations were .79 (.24), .47 (.33), .66 (.33) and .67 (.30) respectively.

*Muslim Identity Strength.* We constructed an index measuring Muslim identity strength based on three items on a 7-point Likert scale that correspond to Cameron's (2004) three aspects of social identity: in-group ties (*I feel strong ties to other Muslims*), in-group affect (*In general I am glad to be a Muslim*) and cognitive centrality (*Being a Muslim is an important part of my self-image*). The index showed good reliability ( $\alpha = .88$ ), with a mean score of .78 and standard deviation of .24.

*Past experience in political activism.* Based on yes/no answers to the question of '*whether you have actually done any of these things in the past 12 months*' (listing then fourteen forms of political activism ranging from liking a Facebook group to fighting with police or rival demonstrators; randomized order), we constructed a simple formative index of past experience in political activism by adding up responses.

On average, British Muslims had participated in six forms of political activism within the last twelve months. The following table shows the distribution of answers on the twelve items:

*Table A2.4. Past experiences in political activism. Frequencies.*

<i>The following questions relate to different forms of political protest actions that people can take. Please indicate, by ticking off one or more boxes, whether you have actually done any of these things in the past 12 months.</i>	<b>Yes frequency ( %)</b>	<b>No frequency ( %)</b>
Joined/liked a Facebook group expressing a particular political opinion	261 (32 %)	564 (68 %)
Signed a petition	489 (59 %)	336 (41 %)
Written a letter-to-the-editor	68 (8 %)	757 (92 %)
Leafleting	106 (13 %)	719 (87 %)
Joined boycotts	118 (14 %)	707 (86 %)
Attended lawful/peaceful demonstration	140 (17 %)	685 (83 %)
Attended unapproved demonstration	31 (4 %)	794 (96 %)
Joined unofficial strikes	46 (6 %)	779 (94 %)
Occupied buildings or spaces	55 (7 %)	770 (93 %)
Joined sit-ins or walkouts	61 (7 %)	764 (93 %)
Threatened political opponents	31 (4 %)	794 (96 %)
Damaged property	33 (4 %)	792 (96 %)
Fought with police, rival demonstrators etc.	24 (3 %)	801 (97 %)
I did nothing of the above	N = 239	

### A3. Supplemental information on manipulations and manipulation checks

Participants were randomly assigned to three conditions, each presenting a short scenario of a hypothetical terrorist attack in the UK where the perpetrator turned out to be British Muslim followed by an action appeal for participation by British Muslims in an upcoming public demonstration against Islamist extremism coming from either a) the British government, b) the MCB or c) included no action appeal, but only information about the upcoming demonstration (control group). On a separate screen, respondents first saw the following introduction: “On the next screen, you will read a short scenario. **Please pay close attention.** You will be asked questions about it afterwards”. The wording of the three conditions are detailed below.

#### A3.1. Treatment condition 1: Appeal from the Government

After reading the introduction screen, respondents saw the following text on a separate screen:

“Imagine there was a deadly terrorist attack in the UK today. The perpetrators turn out to be British Muslim. In the aftermath of the attack, the government calls on Muslims to stand up against Islamist extremism by taking part in a public demonstration the following Saturday”.

Accompanying this text was a picture of 10 Downing Street, an often-used symbol of the British government:



### A3.2. Treatment condition 2: Appeal from the MCB

After reading the introduction screen, respondents saw the following text on a separate screen:

“Imagine there was a deadly terrorist attack in the UK today. The perpetrators turn out to be British Muslim. In the aftermath of the attack, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) calls on Muslims to stand up against Islamist extremism by taking part in a public demonstration the following Saturday”.

Accompanying this text was a picture of the Muslim Council of Britain logo and name:



### A3.3. Control condition: Appeal from nobody specific

After reading the introduction screen, respondents saw the following text on a separate screen:

“Imagine there was a deadly terrorist attack in the UK today. The perpetrators turn out to be British Muslim. In the aftermath of the attack, a public demonstration against Islamist extremism is organised for the following Saturday”.

No picture was shown in the control condition.

#### A3.4. Manipulation check

At the end of the survey, we included a question that served as a manipulation check as to whether respondents had picked up and noticed which actor was behind the appeal to attend the demonstration against Islamist extremism. The following question was used:

“Previously in this survey you answered questions related to a deadly terrorist attack, whose perpetrators turned out to be British Muslim. In that scenario, which of the following institutions called on Muslims to stand up against Islamist extremism by taking part in a public demonstration in response to the attack?”

In total, 59 % were able to correctly recall from whom the appeal originated. The distribution of answers across conditions are displayed here:

*Table A3. Recall of identity of mobiliser by condition. Relative frequencies.*

<i>which of the following institutions called on Muslims to stand up against Islamist extremism by taking part in a public demonstration in response to the attack?</i>	Condition		
	<b>The Government</b>	<b>The MCB</b>	<b>No call made</b>
The Government	175 (62 %)	36 (12 %)	52 (21 %)
The MCB	69 (24 %)	207 (71 %)	103 (41 %)
Nobody in particular	38 (14 %)	48 (17 %)	97 (38 %)
Total	282 (100 %)	291 (100)	252 (100 %)

As shown by table A3, the most correct recalls were made in the MCB condition (71 %) followed by the government condition (62 %) and the control condition (38 %). The large share of incorrect recalls in the control condition where no information is provided as to who the mobiliser is, is to be expected.

There is a strong correlation between the manipulation check variable and the conditions of the experiment with Goodman & Kruskals lambda = .35, meaning that we reduce misclassifications/error on the manipulation check by 35 % when we know to which condition the respondent was allocated.

## A4. Supplemental analysis

### A4.1. Robustness check: Expanding the regression models

As a way of assessing the robustness of the findings from the main text regarding the effect of action appeals, trust and their interaction, we reran the regression models presented in table 1 and 3 in the main text including a range of factors, which have previously been shown to influence collective action intentions. This provides an opportunity to test whether the detected effect of action appeals and the trust x action appeal interaction holds beyond the effect of a range of relevant controls.

Model 1 in Table A4.1 shows the effect of the covariates in and by themselves, controlled for gender.

Model 2-6 match model 1-5 in table 1 in the main text.

*Table A4.1. Direct and interaction effects of Action Appeals and Trust levels on Mobilization, controlled for gender and standard explanations of Mobilization.*

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
	<b>B (SE)</b>	<b>B (SE)</b>	<b>B (SE)</b>	<b>B (SE)</b>	<b>B (SE)</b>	<b>B (SE)</b>
Gender (0 = male)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.03 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.03 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
Born in UK (0 = yes)	.06** (.02)	.06** (.02)	.05* (.02)	.05* (.02)	.05* (.02)	.05* (.02)
Efficacy	.23*** (.06)	.23*** (.06)	.26** (.05)	.17** (.06)	.16** (.06)	.16** (.06)
Moral obligation	.29*** (.06)	.30*** (.06)	.26*** (.05)	.26*** (.05)	.26*** (.05)	.27*** (.05)
Identity	.00 (.04)	.00 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)	-.04 (.04)
Grievance	.10** (.04)	.10** (.04)	.08* (.04)	.09* (.04)	.08* (.04)	.08* (.04)
Emotion: Anger	.01 (.05)	.00 (.05)	.04 (.05)	.04 (.05)	.04 (.05)	.03 (.04)
Emotion: Guilt	.13*** (.03)	.14*** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.09** (.03)	.10** (.03)	.09** (.03)
Past protest	.03*** (.01)	.02*** (.01)	.02** (.01)	.02** (.01)	.02** (.01)	.02** (.01)
Action appeal (0 = MCB)						
Government		-.01 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	.01 (.06)	.07 (.06)
None		-.06 (.02)*	-.06** (.02)	-.06* (.02)	.00 (.06)	.05 (.07)
Trust in Government			.04*** (.01)	.01 (.02)	.04*** (.01)	.00 (.02)
Trust in MCB			.16*** (.04)	.16*** (.04)	.21** (.07)	.27*** (.07)
Interaction 1 (0 = Trust in Government X MCB)						
Trust in Government X Government				.06* (.02)		.06** (.02)
Trust in Government X None				.03 (.02)		.05* (.03)
Interaction 2 (0 = Trust in MCB X MCB)						
Trust in MCB X Government					-.05 (.09)	-.14 (.09)
Trust in MCB X None					-.11 (.09)	-.18 <sup>†</sup> (.06)
N	825	825	825	825	825	825
r <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.21	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.25
ΔR <sup>2</sup>		0.0067*	0.0366***	0.0054 <sup>†</sup>	0.0013	0.0088 <sup>†</sup>

NOTE: Coefficients reported as regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table A4.1. shows that both the direct effect of action appeal on collective action intentions of British Muslims and the interaction effect with trust in government is significant over and beyond the effects of the controls. Thus, the findings from the main text holds when controlled for being born inside/outside the UK, political efficacy, perceptions of moral obligation of standing up against Islamist extremism, Muslim identity strength, level of felt grievances from Islamist extremism, emotional reactions to Islamist extremism and past experiences of collective protest. We also ran the models in table A4.1 including further demographic variables as controls (age and education), which changed estimates minimally, confirming that these demographical variables are unrelated to the outcome variable of collective action intentions. In short, the main findings seem rather robust.

#### A4.2. Assessing the distinctness of the interaction effect between action appeal and trust

In order to test the distinctness of the interaction effect found in the main text between the identity of mobilizer behind the action appeal and trust in the same mobilizer, we ran a series of OLS regression models mirroring table 3 in the main text, but including step-wise three other theoretically meaningful interaction terms. First, we included the interaction between action appeal and Muslim identity strength, based on an expectation that an appeal from the MCB would have a larger effect for British Muslims that identify strongly with being Muslim. Secondly, we included the interaction between action appeal and moral obligation, based on the possible expectation that an appeal from the MCB would have a larger effect among British Muslims who feel more morally or religiously obliged to speak out against Islamist extremism. Finally, we included the interaction between action appeal and grievances.

*Table A4.2. Direct and interaction effects of Action appeals and Muslim Identity strength/Moral obligation/grievances, controlled for gender.*

	Model 1 B (SE)	Model 2 B (SE)	Model 3 B (SE)
Gender	-.04 (.02)	-.03 (.02)	-.05 (.02)
Action appeal (0 = MCB):			
Government	-.04 (.08)	-.04 (.08)	.05 (.06)
None	-.03 (.09)	-.13 (.09)	.01 (.06)
Trust in Government	.07*** (.01)	.06 (.01)***	.07 (.01)***
Trust in MCB	.24*** (.04)	.19*** (.04)	.24 (.04)***
Muslim identity strength	.05 (.07)		
Moral obligation		.34*** (.07)	
Grievances			.22 (.06)***
<i>Interaction 1 (0 = Muslim identity strength X MCB):</i>			
Muslim identity strength X Government	.03 (.10)		
Muslim identity strength X None	-.04 (.10)		
<i>Interaction 2 (0 = Moral obligation X MCB):</i>			
Moral obligation X Government		.02 (.10)	
Moral obligation X None		.09 (.11)	
<i>Interaction 3 (0 = Grievances X MCB):</i>			
Grievances X Government			-.11 (.09)

Grievances X None			-.13 (.09)
N	825	825	825
r2	0.13	0.20	0.15

NOTE: Coefficients reported as regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

As shown by table A4.2, there are no significant interactions between the identity of mobilizer behind the action appeal and Muslim identity strength, moral obligation or felt grievances vis-à-vis Islamist extremism. This testify to the uniqueness of the interaction effect between the identity of the mobiliser and levels of trust in this mobilizer identified in the main text.