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The Democratic Consequences of Anti-Immigrant Political Rhetoric:

A Mixed Methods Study of Immigrants' Political Belonging

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Anti-immigrant political rhetoric is proliferating in Europe, inspiring research to examine the potential effects on public opinion. However, studies of the reactions of first- and second-generation immigrants—the objects of this rhetoric—remain scarce. This article argues that political rhetoric should be treated as a context of integration affecting political outcomes, in particular political belonging. To that end, the article combines qualitative evidence from focus group discussions conducted in Denmark, a high-salience context, and quantitative evidence from cross-national survey and party manifesto data from 18 Western European countries over a 12-year period. In addition to demonstrating a negative mean effect, the analyses show that those most in focus of contemporary political messages (Muslims and immigrants with shorter educations) are most affected, suggesting a sophisticated processing of political rhetoric. In contrast, traditional explanations concerning structural incorporation, generational integration, and exposure to rhetoric are not supported. The article discusses the implications of the results for democratic inclusion in contemporary Europe.

Key words: Political rhetoric, Immigrant integration, Political incorporation, Political belonging, Mixed methods

Introduction

One of, if not *the* most apparent features of contemporary Western European politics is the intense politicization of immigration issues. In several countries, anti-immigrant rhetoric from political elites is not only highly salient, it is also widespread; no longer being the exclusive trademark of radical-right parties (Abou-Chadi 2014; Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; van Spanje 2010). In light of this, a recurring theme of public debate is the broader implications for society of increasingly anti-immigrant political environments.

Recent scholarship sheds light on one of these possible implications in particular; the mobilization effect on public opinion. A common finding in this literature is that anti-immigrant political rhetoric increases the level of nationalist sentiment and ethnocentric attitudes in the majority population (Helbling et al. 2016; 2015; Bohman 2011; Hopkins 2011; 2010; however, see Hjerm and Schnabel 2010), suggesting that political rhetoric can drive the development or cementing of anti-immigrant environments more generally. How this rhetoric affects its objects—first- and second-generation immigrants[1]—remains an understudied question, however. Considering the growing presence and long-term settlement of immigrants and their children in many of these societies, it is central that we gain insight into how exclusive political contexts may affect immigrants' political incorporation, understood as the process by which they become part of the political community (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009, pp. 15-16; Gerstle 2006). This article addresses the issue by examining the effect of anti-immigrant political rhetoric on first- and second-generation immigrants' sense of being

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[1] Throughout the text, "immigrant" refers to both the first and second generations. The reasoning behind looking at effects on both generations is that much of contemporary political rhetoric focuses not only on immigrants but also on their children, born in the country of residence. In the statistical analysis, generation effects are formally tested.

included in the country's political community and recognized by its politicians; in short, their political belonging (Gerstle 2006, p. 28; Yuval-Davis 2006).

While research in the field is scarce, the few studies that do consider the role of political rhetoric in shaping immigrants' political incorporation provide evidence to suggest an effect. Yet, these studies are limited in one of two ways. Either they measure rhetoric only indirectly, using locality or time as a proxy (Pantoja et al. 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Michelson 2016), or they study rhetoric as a one-time treatment, using survey experimental setups (Pérez 2015a; 2015b). The first set of studies raises questions of internal validity; is rhetoric actually the driving force explaining different outcomes across time or space? The second set of studies raises questions of potential generalizability to real-world settings in which immigrants are exposed to not only one (targeted) but several (more dispersed) negative political messages, together constituting a *context* of anti-immigrant rhetoric. This article contributes to the study of political rhetoric effects and immigrant political incorporation in four distinctive ways.

First, building on the literature on comparative integration contexts (Crul and Schneider 2010), I theorize the role of political rhetoric as a contextual factor shaping immigrant political incorporation. While studies within the integration contexts paradigm apply a rather narrow focus on formal political institutions (e.g., citizenship policy or incorporation regimes), the contextual factors that matter for immigrant incorporation are clearly not exclusively formal. Indeed, as acknowledged by the originators of the theory, "government rhetorics have an influence on the political and social climate, directly affecting immigrants' and their children's quest for a place and position in the host society" (Crul and Schneider 2010, p. 1260, see also Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009, p. 27). However, the theory does not specify the mechanisms through which immigrants should perceive and be affected by political rhetoric. This article contributes to theory

development by identifying these mechanisms, including which immigrant groups should be affected the most.

Second, the article adds to the study of political incorporation by examining its subjective side: political belonging (Gerstle 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006). This differs from most other work in the field, which focuses on more formal and objective measures of incorporation, especially voter turnout. However, many immigrants are not entitled to formally participate in their host country's politics, meaning that studies of voter turnout give a truncated and selective evaluation of immigrant incorporation, as they are restricted to individuals who have already passed many bars to inclusion (citizenship chief among them). Attention to the subjective dimension of incorporation is important because it matters for democratic inclusion beyond (and before) the voting booth for citizens and non-citizens alike. Being recognized as an equal member of the political community provides the foundation upon which individuals can claim a voice and engage in society. Not being recognized corresponds to being denied status and, thus, access to power (Fraser 2000).[2]

Third, the article goes beyond the most heavily studied case, Latinos in the US, and examines the effect of political rhetoric for a varied sample of first- and second-generation immigrants in Western Europe. This is an important research site, as anti-immigrant rhetoric is spreading in the region. At

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[2] In addition to the intrinsic importance of political belonging, perceptions of exclusion may reduce engagement in the political life of the nation because it is not considered meaningful or "worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (Campbell et al. 1954, p. 187). It may also be connected to decreased willingness to support and comply with public policy (Michelson 2016). Examining these hypotheses is beyond the scope of the paper, but the considerations figure as a backdrop for broader discussions of political alienation.

the same time, immigrants in Europe differ from Latinos in the US in that most ethnic groups are too small for politicians to cater (specifically) to them. Immigrants to Europe might therefore display greater frustration and powerlessness in the face of anti-immigrant rhetoric. The greater variation in the study's sample allows for analysis of which immigrant groups are most affected by political rhetoric.

Fourth, the study applies a mixed methods design to avoid some of the analytical shortcomings of existing studies. This design combines qualitative content analysis of focus group discussions with first- and second-generation immigrants in Denmark—a country where anti-immigrant rhetoric is particularly salient—and multilevel regression analysis of party manifesto and survey data from 18 Western European countries across a 12-year period. The qualitative part examines the extent to which immigrants perceive anti-immigrant political rhetoric, including the channels and cues they rely on. Moreover, by allowing participants to reflect on political belonging in their own words, this part of the study suggests a dimension of the concept previously overlooked in the literature, namely the sense of being excluded from democratic politics. This finding highlights the potentially very damaging effects of contemporary political rhetoric. The quantitative part takes advantage of empirical variation in the salience of anti-immigrant political rhetoric across Europe to test theoretical hypotheses and patterns indicated in the qualitative part. This mixed methods design adds to extant research by using both subjective (perceived) and objective measures of rhetoric from real-world settings, rather than treating rhetoric by proxy or survey experiment. The following section discusses existing studies of political rhetoric effects and develops a theoretical framework that treats rhetoric as a context for immigrant integration.

Consequences of anti-immigrant political rhetoric

Recent scholarship on the potential consequences of anti-immigrant political rhetoric has shown that it increases the level of anti-immigrant/nationalist attitudes in the majority population (Helbling et al. 2016; 2015; Bohman 2011; Hopkins 2011; 2010; however, see Hjerm and Schnabel 2010) and strengthens majority members' in-group/out-group framing of social interaction (Sønderskov and Thomsen 2015). These insights are important for understanding the societal consequences of political appeals to ethnocentrism. However, obtaining the full picture also requires considering how these messages affect their objects: first- and second-generation immigrants. One concern is that an exclusive political climate can damage the political incorporation of immigrants, thereby constituting a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the image often evoked by politicians critical of immigration is that of the passive immigrant, withdrawn from mainstream society.

A fruitful perspective for theorizing the role of political rhetoric in immigrant integration is the theory of comparative integration contexts (Crul and Schneider 2010). The crux of the theory is that different contexts help or hinder participation and belonging, depending on the institutional and discursive challenges or resources they offer immigrants and, in particular, their children.[3] While

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[3] Crul and Schneider (2010) are not alone in pointing to the importance of contextual factors. The theory of segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993) stresses that different types of barriers in the receiving environment may push some immigrant groups away from "straight-line" assimilation to downward mobility. In this paper, I discuss the perspective offered by Crul and Schneider because it is geared specifically to the European situation of *cross-national* (more than local and cross-ethnic) variations.

the theory highlights both institutional arrangements and "the context of social and political discourse" as dimensions of the integration context (Crul and Schneider 2010, p. 1260), most empirical studies have focused on the role of formal institutions and policy. The scarcity of research studying rhetoric effects is unfortunate, as political institutions and rhetoric are analytically and empirically separate (as acknowledged by Crul and Schneider 2010, p. 1259). While both may matter for how immigrants experience their position in society, they will likely do so through different mechanisms and in different ways. In fact, the discursive context is likely to be particularly important for the more subjective dimensions of incorporation, as structural conditions (such as formal rights) are generally considered insufficient for fostering a sense of belonging in the absence of more informal acts of recognition (Antonsich 2010, pp. 649–650).

Surprisingly, a number of studies using cross-national data from Europe find either no or only limited evidence that political institutions affect immigrants' political incorporation and belonging (Wright and Bloemraad 2012; Goodman and Wright 2015; Just and Anderson 2012; Simonsen 2016). In contrast, a handful of American case studies suggest that political rhetoric may be important for immigrants' political incorporation. Studying Latino trust in the US government, Michelson (2016) argues that higher trust levels in 2012 can be explained by politicians having that year signaled to Latinos their being important and powerful members of the polity. Low trust levels in 2006, Michelson contends, was a reaction to Latinos being "told that they did not belong" (2016, p. 61). Pantoja and Segura (2003) and Pantoja et al. (2001) argue that racially charged ballot propositions in California in the mid-1990s created an environment of political threat that heightened Latinos' motivation to follow and engage in politics. In sum, these studies suggest that immigrant-origin groups—specifically Latinos in the US—are aware of anti-immigrant political messages and react to them. One shortcoming, however, is that none of these studies offers a measure of political rhetoric, using locality or time as a proxy instead. At most, then, they can be

considered suggestive of political rhetoric effects. Recent survey experiments improve over these studies by providing a measure of rhetoric, namely the experimental treatment, and support the proposition that political rhetoric affects Latino political incorporation in terms of political trust, political values, and intention to vote (Pérez 2015a; 2015b). However, while survey experiments provide evidence of individuals reacting to the particular treatment given in the laboratory setting, such experiments fall short in providing insight into whether immigrants are aware of and affected by political rhetoric in real-world settings where political messages are more dispersed but often also recurring. In addition, these survey experiments do not examine whether the demonstrated effects are permanent and go beyond immediate reactions to the treatment. Answers to these questions matter for how concerned we should be about the current surge in anti-immigrant political rhetoric across Europe.

The present study builds on and adds to extant research by studying immigrants' perceptions of political messages and introducing a measure of political rhetoric as a context for immigrant political incorporation. In line with previous studies, I expect political rhetoric to affect immigrants' political incorporation (H1). However, the mechanism I propose differs: Previous studies use social psychology arguments to argue that anti-immigrant messages heighten immigrants' experiences of threat to their minority identity (Perez 2015a; 2015b) and minority interests (Pantoja and Segura 2003; Pantoja et al. 2001). In reaction, immigrants pursue strategies—such as supporting pro-group/ethnocentric policies—that will uphold a positive self-image (as minority individuals) and protect their minority interests. In treating identities and interests as psychological properties "located in peoples' heads" (Lamont 2018, p. 432), these studies tend to overlook the fact that community boundaries—and thus, group membership—are actively constructed. Following work in cultural sociology (in particular Lamont 2018; Edgell et al. 2006), I argue that political rhetoric should be seen as a context for integration (Crul and Schneider 2010) because it signals to

immigrants whether they are considered legitimate and valued members of the *wider* political community. The next section discusses which types of immigrants are most likely to take these signals to heart.

Awareness and sensitivity

Classic assimilation theory expects immigrants incorporated in socio-structural terms and members of later generations to conform more to host society norms and behaviors, including feeling greater attachment to the host society (Gordon 1964). By extension, higher education and second-generation status may make immigrants less aware of and thus less affected by anti-immigrant messages (H2a and H3a), as—given their inclusion in socioeconomic and generational terms—this rhetoric is not perceived as targeting them. In contrast, the "integration paradox" (Verkuyten 2016) states that immigrants with higher education are more prone to perceive discrimination and to react more negatively than immigrants of lower education. The paradox (that socioeconomic incorporation is *not* positively associated with subjective experiences of integration) is a result of higher education leading individuals to endorse principles of fairness and hold strong expectations of equal treatment. Disappointment of these expectations leads these individuals to react more negatively than others (H2b). A parallel expectation can be formulated for generational differences. It is likely that the second generation is more prone to perceive anti-immigrant rhetoric as unfair or hurtful because they—as native-born—expect to be recognized as fellow nationals (H3b).

It is also reasonable to expect greater exposure to political rhetoric to be associated with a stronger response because the negative messages are more salient in everyday life. The survey experiments discussed above (Pérez 2015a; 2015b) manipulate this factor by exposing only some respondents to negative political statements. In reality, exposure to anti-immigrant rhetoric is more self-selected, as it depends on political interest and news media consumption (H4).

Finally, as with the focus on Latinos in the US, it is evident that contemporary European political rhetoric is often concerned with one immigrant group in particular; Muslims. Muslims are frequently portrayed as a threat to European nations, with politicians making reference both to the historically Christian roots and the contemporary secularism of European societies (Simonsen and Bonikowski forthcoming; Brubaker 2017; Foner and Simon 2015; Foner and Alba 2008). If immigrants are aware of the specific rhetorical content, Muslims should react more strongly (H5).

Overview of hypotheses

General hypothesis H1: Anti-immigrant political rhetoric negatively affects immigrants' political belonging.

The negative effect of political rhetoric is moderated by…

H2a(b): Education. More highly educated immigrants are less (more) affected.

H3a(b): Generation. Second-generation immigrants are less (more) affected.

H4: Exposure. More politically interested immigrants and/or immigrants who spend more time on news media consumption are more affected.

H5: Rhetorical content. Muslim immigrants are more affected.

A mixed methods study

Examining the effect of political rhetoric on immigrants' political belonging requires both that an association between the two is established and insight into whether and how immigrants observe the political messages in their context and feel affected by them. To meet both of these demands, I employ a mixed methods design. The first step consists of an analysis of five focus group interviews from Denmark, which I consider a context of high salience of anti-immigrant political rhetoric (see below). The Danish case thus provides "most-likely" conditions for seeing political rhetoric effects, rendering it ideal for investigating how immigrants perceive and react to an anti-immigrant political context. The second step consists of a comparative study of contexts with

varying salience of anti-immigrant rhetoric utilizing party manifesto and survey data covering a 12-year period in 18 Western European countries. With variation in contexts and immigrant characteristics, this step enables a statistical test of the five hypotheses.

The strength of the design is its combination of in-depth knowledge of how immigrants perceive the discursive context and how it affects them on a self-reflective and inter-subjective level with assessment of general patterns across contexts with varying salience of anti-immigrant rhetoric. Additionally, insights from the qualitative analysis provide a valuable basis for interpreting the statistical results, particularly with respect to the mechanisms making some immigrants react more negatively than others.

Designing the focus groups

I treat the Danish case as an anti-immigrant context (even an extreme case, cf. Figure 1). The Danish political debate has been concerned with issues of immigration, integration, and national identity in recent decades (Mouritsen and Olsen 2013), and at the time of the interviews (fall 2016), Danishness and demands to "be Danish" emerged as central themes. For instance, the Minister of Culture introduced an initiative to establish a list of the 10 most significant Danish values. This list—the "Canon of Denmark"—was explicitly framed as a tool to teach immigrants about Danish norms, including gender equality, the welfare state, and Christian cultural heritage. Other themes concerned the tightening of the requirements to naturalize and the declared intention of the Minister of Integration to make Denmark unattractive for refugees, which led her to place adverts in Lebanese newspapers describing the country's restrictive access to asylum.

The five focus groups were recruited as acquaintance groups (Morgan 1998, pp. 67–68) through a central contact person for each group (3–7 participants in each group; 26 participants in total). Participation was rewarded with a cinema ticket for each participant, an incentive intended to

broaden the group of participants to also include people without deep interest in the topic (Gamson 1992, p. 16). The groups comprise a mixed set of individuals in terms of age, gender, ethnic background, education, and occupation, while being segmented on age (see Appendix 1). The only requirement for participation was a non-Western background, which was intended to limit recruitment to the immigrant groups most in focus in Danish political rhetoric. The participants, all born in or having spent most of their lives in Denmark (most having Danish citizenship), were aged 16–53 at the time of interview. While politics was mentioned to neither recruiters nor participants (the project was described as being about "how immigrants are seen and talked about in Denmark"), the mean level of self-reported political interest is rather high (7 on a 0–10 scale, although varying across the entire scale), which should be taken into account in the evaluation of the results. All participants happened to be of Muslim background, which colored parts of the discussion. As the purpose of the focus groups is not to test the five hypotheses, this is not a problem but rather underscores the potential of the qualitative analysis for obtaining insights into how an uninviting political context is experienced by one of the groups most in focus.

A quality of focus groups, compared to single-person interviews, is that they highlight social dynamics and negotiations of meaning (Morgan 1998; Gamson 1992). This is advantageous for shedding light on political belonging as based on understandings of group membership rather than on a private feeling (Gerstle 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006; Lamont 2018). In addition, focus groups allow for a more natural (i.e., non-directed) mode of conversation. While I, the facilitator, asked questions and gave the participants tasks, they were told that I was interested in *their* viewpoints and were encouraged to agree and disagree with each other freely. The ambition to create an open forum for discussion was met in all groups, seemingly facilitated by the fact that participants were already acquainted.

Each focus group discussion lasted around 1.5 hours and was conducted at a place of the contact person's choosing (e.g., a room in a local youth club, housing association, or public library). The discussion followed a rough interview guide with topics concerning the participants' perceptions of how immigrants are seen and talked about in Denmark, what sources they based their impressions on, the most salient topics when there is talk about immigrants, participants' political trust, and their perception of political responsiveness (i.e., whether politicians care about and listen to people "like us"). The interviews also included video clips of four politicians (taken from local TV and one politician's Facebook page) delivering short statements about immigrants in Denmark (some negative/restrictive, some positive/acknowledging; see Appendix 2). Participants were asked to discuss these statements, including how representative they felt they were of the general political debate in Denmark. This exercise was intended to enable observation of reactions to political messages and to provide a common reference point for evaluations of the tone of debate in Denmark (see Colucci 2007 on the use of activities in focus groups). To avoid priming too early, the video clips were shown late in the interview, after participants had described their impressions of the discursive context in Denmark.

The interviews were audio recorded, transcribed (by two student assistants), and coded in two rounds of coding (by myself): first, a phase of in-vivo coding, where themes were coded from participants' own words and expressions; second, a phase of focused coding based on a coding tree developed from the first phase and theoretical concepts. The main codes concern a list of themes associated with the discourse on immigrants (e.g., "crime"), the sources upon which participants based their perceptions, evaluations of political responsiveness and political trust, and a code emerging from the in-vivo phase referring to the notion that "democracy is not for immigrants."

Analysis of focus group discussions

Perceptions of political rhetoric

Discussions began with an open-ended question about how the participants thought immigrants are talked about and seen in Denmark. As participants were not primed to think of particular actors, responses to this question gives insight into the sources and cues immigrants use when assessing the general discourse in the country. Table 1 displays the "senders" of messages about immigrants mentioned by the participants. Politicians were mentioned most often, followed closely by meetings/interactions with "ordinary Danes." In this connection, participants expressed the idea that because most ethnic Danes do not know immigrants personally, they base their impressions on what they hear from politicians and the media. The media were mentioned more as the medium for messages from politicians than the sender of messages. Furthermore, news media were typically blamed for what was perceived as selective coverage; presenting mainly negative stories when reporting about immigrants (with this being an additional cause of negative stereotypes about immigrants among ethnic Danes). This pattern strengthens the expectation of political rhetoric effects, as politicians are an important source, both in terms of the messages sent and as a perceived influencer of ordinary people's opinions of immigrants (cf. Bohman 2011; Helbling et al. 2016).

Table 1. Senders of messages about immigrants

Sender	No. of sources	No. of references
Politicians	5	47
Meetings with "ordinary Danes"	5	40
The media		
As selective news provider (medium)	5	12
As messenger	4	9
Social media	2	5

Note: Entries based on systematic content analysis of five focus group discussions (sources). No. of references gives total count of mentions of the relevant sender.

Moving to the question of *how* the discourse was perceived, Table 2 gives an overview of themes that participants saw as salient. Participants agreed that immigrants are negatively viewed and that

negative rhetoric is widespread among politicians. The agreement on this impression is worth

noting given the substantial variation in background characteristics such as age, generation,

ethnicity, and education. When judging the video clips shown late in the interview, all participants

indicated that the most negative statements were the most prevalent among Danish politicians. The

negative themes were seen as part of broader generalizations about immigrants.

Table 2. Most salient themes in rhetoric on immigrants

Theme	No. of sources	No. of references
Islam, Muslims	5	58
Crime	5	25
Oppression of women	5	23
Unemployment	5	13
Terrorism	5	12
Integration	4	13

Note: Entries based on systematic content analysis of five focus group discussions (sources). No. of references gives total count of mentions of the relevant theme. Themes with fewer than 10 references not presented.

Islam and Muslims were considered to be particularly in focus of anti-immigrant political rhetoric,

either explicitly or implicitly:

> When they talk, politicians, they say: "We want to sort, like, immigrants—the ones we want here. And
>
> it's those [we don't want]—who don't have, who don't know our norms and democracy and values, our
>
> Danishness." What they mean is Muslims. (Group 1)

The experienced dominance of this theme among the participants is likely influenced by their

Muslim background, potentially leading to overestimations of negative messages about Muslims.

However, scholars agree that Muslims *are* in focus in Danish political debates (Mouritsen and

Olsen 2013). More importantly, the point is not to test the accuracy of immigrants' perceptions but

to examine how particular groups experience political rhetoric. The fact that these Muslim

participants experienced political rhetoric as negatively focused on them as a group strengthens the

expectation from H5 that Muslims may be particularly negatively affected (this is formally tested in

the statistical analysis). Note too, that the participants highlighted their sense of exclusion from the wider political community (being portrayed as those "who don't know our norms and democracy and values, our Danishness"), more than feelings of threat to their minority identity or interest, underlining the usefulness of considering political rhetoric as a medium through which group membership is defined.

"Democracy—that's not for us"

As discussed earlier, political belonging concerns the sense of being included in the political community and recognized by its politicians (Gerstle 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006). This is typically operationalized in terms of political trust, political responsiveness, and political recognition; that is, expressions related to judgments of politicians. These expressions were present in the material, but the most dominant theme related to political belonging—the sense of being disregarded as subjects entitled to democratic rights and agency—was unanticipated. Compared to judgments of politicians, the sense of democratic exclusion is more serious as it locates the lack of political belonging at the systemic level. Feeling excluded from the demos was repeatedly mentioned, with agreement on the impression that "democracy is not for us;" it is only for "the Danes."

One reflection of this was seeing Danish politicians as having double standards. While "preaching" liberal democratic values such as freedom of expression, individual autonomy, and gender equality, these rights were seen as not extending to immigrants. A recurring example mentioned by men and women alike was the perceived double standards characterizing discussions about the Muslim headscarf and oppression of women:

> We hear, like all the time; those politicians will fight oppression. And the women, they need equality. But
> in this way … they oppress us just as much as the powers they want to fight … I'm being talked
> completely down to, really. I'm not spoken to like a person of equal worth in this society … I'm thinking,

"well, I'm just as fond of democracy, just as all other Danes," and I can feel that I, I can't. I begin to feel

that I don't live in a democratic country, because I get put in this way that I can't control my life. I can't

take responsibility for my own life. Then there are programs for women who are oppressed—and because

I wear a scarf I'm also seen as oppressed … Democracy isn't for me—it's for the others. (Group 4)

The quote reflects a common impression that immigrants, especially Muslims, are denied the status that others in society have to be considered capable of making their own judgments about how they want to live their lives. While they have the same formal democratic rights as others, the tone and content of political rhetoric are experienced as prohibiting them from enjoying these rights.

As a consequence of the sense of democratic exclusion, participants felt frustrated and disappointed. In particular, they emphasized that they embrace the democratic principles but are denied true democratic inclusion. This led some participants to state—quite provokingly—that it would be better to "remove that thing with the Constitution (*Grundloven*)" (Group 1), as it is not in effect anyway. This gives an impression of the potentially damaging effects on engagement and democratic support that can result from experiencing the demos as closed for one's group.

Lacking political responsiveness and low political trust

More narrowly related to the evaluation of politicians, the participants concurred that Danish politicians do not listen to or care about immigrants. First, politicians were considered to have their own agenda that does not include minorities. This was related to a belief among participants that anti-immigrant politicians are more popular in the electorate and so, to gain power, politicians have no issue with expressing negative views about immigrants. While a few participants acknowledged that some politicians talk of immigrants as a a contribution to society (sometimes referring to one of the video clips), the power of these politicians was considered negligible because the "big" politicians have another agenda: "the more famous a politician is in Denmark, the less he cares about, listens to Muslims" (Group 2). Second, politicians were seen to ignore the expertise that

immigrants have on integration problems. Not seeking counsel from immigrants contributed to the sense of not being acknowledged and included in the political community.

To learn about participants' political trust, they were asked to rank their political trust on a 0–10 scale toward the end of the interview (first individually on paper, then sharing their number and reasons in plenum). While the interview themes may have negatively affected participants' political trust, preceding discussions had already touched upon their limited trust in politicians. Of the 26 participants, eight indicated having medium levels of trust in politicians (5–6 on the 11-point scale), with the remaining participants expressed very low levels of trust (0–3). The main reason stated for having little trust in politicians was the impression discussed above that politicians are led by votes rather than values. In other words, they take a negative stance on immigration to increase popularity. In this connection, many participants felt that the anti-immigrant tone had spread from extreme/fringe parties to the mainstream, which was another reason for low trust in politicians.

Second-generation and higher-educated participants tended to be more balanced (stating pros and cons) in their judgments. While they agreed that politicians' rhetoric is harsh and shared the notion that democracy is limited for (Muslim) immigrants, they stressed the competency of most politicians to run the country and upholding the social democratic welfare state. This, in turn, was expressed as a reason to invest some trust in politicians. Differing levels of trust therefore do not seem to stem from different perceptions of political rhetoric; rather, individual-level moderators such as education (H2a) and generation (H3a) appear to be at work. As the educational level of the first-generation immigrant participants was generally lower, it is difficult to disentangle whether generation or education (or both) are operative here. This will be tested in the statistical study.

An emerging picture

The qualitative analysis strengthens the general expectation of political rhetoric effects (H1), as participants explicitly referred to perceptions of politicians when discussing their sense of exclusion. The focus groups suggest that the negative effects may not be limited to evaluations of politicians' care for immigrants (reflected in political trust and responsiveness) but also involve a sense of democratic exclusion and loss of faith in democracy. The analysis also offers some early insights on the moderation hypotheses. It appears that having a higher education/being of the second generation serve to soften rather than strengthen the negative effect of anti-immigrant political rhetoric (cf. H2a and H3a). Moreover, considering the rather high level of political interest among participants and their Muslim background, it is possible that the focus groups were skewed toward immigrants more affected by political rhetoric, as they are likely to be more aware of (H4) and feel more in focus of such messages (H5).

Statistical test of hypotheses

I use several data sources to perform a statistical test of H1–H5. Cross-national survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) are used to measure the dependent variables (along with the factors suggested as moderators); party manifesto data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, Volkens et al. 2018) to measure the independent variable.

The ESS is a biennial cross-national survey program covering a large number of European countries and generally recognized for high data quality (Kittilson 2009). For this study, the survey program is ideal because it includes information on whether the respondent and their parents were born in the

country of residence; information that enables the construction of an immigrant sample[4] in addition to including measures of the central individual-level variables under consideration. While the ESS is not designed to investigate immigrant populations in particular (and therefore does not oversample this population group), Just and Anderson (2012, pp. 490–491) have demonstrated a close fit between the survey's sample and official immigrant statistics (both in terms of the relative size of the immigrant population and the representation of origin countries). Since the ESS is conducted in the national language(s) of the relevant country, immigrants with poor language skills may be unable or unwilling to participate, meaning that sampling is biased toward better-integrated immigrants in linguistic (and possibly other) terms. The same applies to the focus group sampling. While this limits the generalizability of the study, a certain level of linguistic competence seems necessary for political rhetoric to have an effect, as it is otherwise difficult to obtain an impression of the tone of debate.

I utilize the first seven rounds of the survey (ESS1–ESS7), which amounts to a 12-year period (2002–2014) in which the CMP also has data on the independent variable. In addition to enlarging the immigrant sample, utilizing all seven rounds makes it possible to exploit variation in anti-immigrant rhetoric over both time and space.[5] The effective samples are 17,800/18,330 respondents

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[4] Respondents are considered first-generation immigrants if both they and their parents have been born outside of the country of residence. Second-generation immigrants have been born in the country to parents who have not. Excluded from the analyses are respondents born in the country to parents born in the country.

[5] The study is restricted to Western European countries to avoid too much unobserved variance at the country level. In addition, the flavor of anti-immigrant political rhetoric is more comparable within Western Europe than across East and West. Countries included are Austria, Belgium,

for the models on political trust and satisfaction with democracy, respectively. The analytical technique employed is multilevel linear regression with country random effects (Snijders and Bosker 2012; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012), which takes the nested structure of the data (individuals within countries) into account. Testing the multilevel model against an OLS model shows significant variation on the dependent variables across countries (with an intraclass coefficient of .13 for political trust and .14 for democratic satisfaction). I also tested whether the effect of negative rhetoric is consistent cross-nationally or varies over time (i.e., by survey round). This test indicated that survey round should be treated as a fixed rather than random parameter (included as a control variable).

Dependent variables: political trust and satisfaction with democracy

The ESS includes measures on political trust and satisfaction with democracy (tapping democratic faith). Unfortunately, there is no measure of the third expression of political belonging discussed in the focus groups, political responsiveness, but this is less of a problem given that the expectation of a negative effect applies to all three expressions. At the same time, the possibility to test the hypotheses on two different measures is advantageous, particularly the unexpected notion that democracy is flawed.

Political trust is measured with an index, scaled 0–1, based on two 11-point trust indicators: trust in parliament and trust in politicians ($r = .68$). While political trust is sometimes defined as including trust in institutions (e.g., the judicial power and the law-enforcement apparatus), factor analysis of such a broader set of indicators gives two factors: one for political trust "proper" (parliament and

Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

politicians), another for institutional trust (police and the legal system). The narrower political trust index resonates best with the focus group discussions in that the charge went against politicians as debaters and lawmakers, not against the institutions meant to implement, uphold, or enforce the law. Analyses performed with the two items separately produce parallel results to analyses with the indexed measure.

Democratic faith is measured with a question that asks respondents to rate their satisfaction with how democracy works in the country on an 11-point scale (0–1). While the question does not explicitly refer to a sense of democratic exclusion and there may be other reasons to have low ratings on this item, the notion of dissatisfaction should tap into the perception that democracy is flawed expressed in the focus groups.

The independent variable: anti-immigrant political rhetoric

I use CMP data to measure anti-immigrant political rhetoric. The CMP codes party manifestos on 56 issue areas using the quasi-sentence as the unit of analysis. The result is a database that gives the salience of each area for each electorally relevant party in a given country for a given (general) election. The CMP contains data for most Western European countries for the period 1945–2014.

The use of party manifestos to capture political rhetoric, particularly in studies of effects on voters, has been criticized, as "ordinary people" are unlikely to actually read them, and therefore, they cannot exert the proposed effects (Kriesi 2008, 67). However, the point here is not that immigrants (or members of the ethnic majority for that matter) read party manifestos. Rather, the idea is that a party manifesto is a good indicator of both the priority given to a policy area (salience) and the party's position on that area (valence). To substantiate this argument, manifesto data has been found to lead to similar results as expert surveys and media coverage analyses (Marks et al. 2007;

Helbling and Tresch 2011). CMP data has also been used in studies of the effect of anti-immigrant rhetoric on majority populations, including those discussed in the theoretical section of this article.

The measure of anti-immigrant political rhetoric is based on the code "multiculturalism, negative." This code applies to sentences referring to "the enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration and appeals for cultural homogeneity in society" (Volkens et al. 2018). As such, the code does not exclusively refer to immigrant integration but can also refer to national minorities in a country. As the CMP includes no separate code for sentences referring explicitly to immigration issues, this code is deemed the best available while keeping in mind that it may contain some noise, particularly in countries with national minorities.

As the survey data spans over 12 years, the salience score is taken from each party elected to parliament in the most recent election preceding the relevant ESS-round. These scores are then weighed by the electoral strength of the parties and, finally, summed for all parties in the country. In effect, the country score indicates the salience of negative attention to issues of multiculturalism across all parties in a country at the relevant election, with statements from strong parties considered as relatively more influential than those of smaller parties. This is in line with the focus groups, where participants referred to how politicians generally (i.e., from across the political spectrum) talk about immigrants, underlining that messages have a greater impact if they come from "important" or "famous" (i.e., electorally strong) politicians and parties. This political rhetoric measure is in line with previous studies using CMP data to analyze effects on the majority population (Schmidt and Spies 2014; Helbling et al. 2016; Careja 2016).[6]

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[6] The analyses reported in the next section are based on this absolute measure of negative political rhetoric, since the focus group participants emphasized anti-immigrant rhetoric and even seemed to

Figure 1 illustrates country scores on this measure, displayed for the years in which corresponding survey data exists. In line with the treatment of Denmark as an anti-immigrant context in the qualitative analysis, Denmark has the most extreme score for all years included, but other countries also score relatively high (e.g., the Netherlands in 2010, Switzerland in 2004–2006).

Figure 1. Negative political rhetoric on issues of multiculturalism

Note: Measure based on the latest election preceding the relevant survey year. Scores give the summed salience of negative mentions of multiculturalism for the parties in a given country, weighed by each party's vote share in the relevant election. Scores sorted in ascending order.

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disregard examples of positive messages that came up in the discussion. This is in line with Helbling et al.'s (2016) finding that inclusive appeals are ineffective for impacting the majority population's view on the nation. However, all analyses were also performed with a ratio measure (following Helbling et al. 2015): $Ratio\ measure = \frac{Multiculturalism, negative - Multiculturalism, positive}{Multiculturalism, negative + Multiculturalism, positive}$

I note when results from these analyses differ from analyses with the absolute measure.

Control and moderating variables

To estimate the effect of rhetoric on the two outcomes correctly, the regression models include individual-level and country-level control variables that may be connected to political rhetoric and political trust/satisfaction with democracy. At the individual level, this concerns age, gender, whether the respondent is a citizen of the country, and employment status. In addition to being control variables, the following variables are also hypothesized to moderate the relationship between political rhetoric and the two dependent variables: immigrant generation (first- vs. second-generation cf. footnote 4), years of education, religion (Muslim compared to being of any other religion or non-religious), TV consumption of political news/current affairs in hours/week, and political interest (0–1 scale).

The rather low number (18) of countries in the analysis does not allow for many country-level controls. As the most important, controls for the size of the foreign-born population (as a percentage of the total population) and the immigrant unemployment level in each country for each survey year (OECD 2018) are included. Both factors may contribute to a sense of threat or dissatisfaction in the broader population, in turn making anti-immigrant political rhetoric more salient. At the same time, through offering stronger networks (foreign-born population) or blocked opportunities (immigrant unemployment), they may be related to immigrant political belonging.

Political trust and perceptions of the state of democracy vary across countries due to difficult-to-observe factors (e.g., "political culture"). To adjust for these unobservable country differences, I include the mean of political trust, respectively satisfaction with democracy, for the sample of non-immigrant respondents in the relevant survey year. Including this country-level control means that the results concern immigrants' political trust/democratic satisfaction relative to the majority population. Finally, a control for survey round is included to account for potential trend effects.

Results from the statistical analysis

Table 3 presents results from testing the direct relationship between political rhetoric and political belonging (H1). The same trend applies for both outcomes: Anti-immigrant political rhetoric has a statistically significant and negative effect on immigrants' political trust and satisfaction with democracy (see also Figures 2 and 3). For political trust, comparing an immigrant in a context of no negative rhetoric with an immigrant in the context with most negative rhetoric makes a difference of around four percentage points, all else being equal. For satisfaction with democracy, it is five percentage points. While a difference of four to five percentage points may not sound impressive, the results are noteworthy as the effect is robust despite the concerns about noise pertaining to the measurement of anti-immigrant political rhetoric. In addition, political rhetoric is a stronger predictor of political belonging than most other variables included in the models (including differences between first- and second-generation immigrants, citizens and non-citizens, and people of different religions; all considered important explanatory factors in the literature). Only political interest stands out in exerting a stronger influence on immigrants' political trust (but not democratic faith) than political rhetoric.

Table 3. Multilevel regression models, direct effects of political rhetoric

	Model 1a Political trust	Model 2a Satisfaction with democracy
Gender (male)	.002	.014***
	(.003)	(.003)
Age	-.000	.000
	(.000)	(.000)
Second-generation	-.034***	-.035***
immigrant (first=ref.)	(.004)	(.005)
Citizen of country	-.030***	-.039***
	(.003)	(.004)
Religion (other=ref)		
Muslim	.023***	.032***
	(.005)	(.005)
No religion	-.030***	-.023***
	(.003)	(.004)
Education in years	.001*	.001**
	(.000)	(.000)
Employment status (paid work=ref.)		
In education	.029***	.036***
	(.006)	(.006)
Unemployed	-.010	-.027***
	(.006)	(.006)
Out of workforce	-.007	-.012**
	(.004)	(.005)
Other	.007	.004
	(.012)	(.013)
TV news consumption	.000	-.003
(hours/week)	(.002)	(.003)
Political interest	.088***	.040***
	(.005)	(.006)
Negative	-.005***	-.006***
political rhetoric	(.002)	(.002)
N (respondents)	17,800	18,330

Note: n(countries) = 18. Models include country level controls for: foreign-born population, foreign-born unemployment, mean level of political trust in majority population, ESS round.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 2. Political trust

Figure 3. Satisfaction with democracy

Note: The figures display the effect of negative political rhetoric on the relevant outcome, with 95% confidence intervals.

As most countries score on the lower half of the X-axis in Figure 1 and Denmark is the country with the most scores in the higher end of the continuum, all analyses have also been performed with Denmark excluded. This check shows that the results are robust; the negative effect remains statistically significant, with effect sizes increasing slightly.

Results are also parallel for the two outcomes in relation to the moderation hypotheses. Beginning with a group of null findings, analyses show no statistically significant moderation effect of generation (lack of support for H3a/b), indicating that first- and second-generation immigrants feel equally affected by contemporary anti-immigrant rhetoric.[7] In addition, there is no evidence that political interest or news media consumption moderates the negative effect of anti-immigrant

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[7] This is the only case where choice of rhetoric measure makes a difference, since generation moderates the relationship between the ratio measure and political trust (but not satisfaction with democracy). While first-generation immigrants appear unaffected by political rhetoric using the ratio measure, second-generation immigrants display lower levels of political trust when confronted with a greater proportion of negative-to-positive messages.

rhetoric (lack of support for H4). In other words, irrespective of differences in immigrants' attention to political affairs, political elite messages affect them equally. The focus group discussions offer a potential explanation for this result, as the conception that politicians make negative statements about immigrants was broadly shared among the participants, including those declaring themselves disinterested in politics. Additionally, the idea that "ordinary" members of the majority population receive their impressions of immigrants from politicians (so that everyday meetings with "ignorant" majority members are taken as expressions of political influences) may be another indirect source through which even politically disinterested immigrants receive cues about political rhetoric. In this connection, it is relevant to be reminded that survey experimental analyses rely on the assumption that immigrants must be directly exposed to political messages to be affected. In contrast, the present results indicate that political rhetoric is truly a contextual variable in that it shapes intersubjective perceptions of community boundaries and membership definitions and, thus, affects all immigrants irrespective of whether they "expose" themselves to it or not.

Two hypotheses enjoy support in the statistical analysis.[8] In contrast to the integration paradox thesis (H2b) and in line with the qualitative analysis, longer education is associated with being less affected by political rhetoric (support for H2a). The effect even turns statistically insignificant for immigrants with very long educations (above 15 years for political trust and above 16 years for

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[8] Note that although likelihood ratio tests do not suggest the need for a random slope for neither education nor religion, interaction terms were specified based on theoretical reasoning. The fact that the interactions of education and political rhetoric, respectively religion and political rhetoric are statistically significant testifies to the higher power of testing an interaction directly compared to testing for a random slope (Snijders and Bosker 2012, p. 106).

satisfaction with democracy, corresponding to at least a master's degree in most countries) (see

Figures 4 and 5 and Appendices 3 and 4 for full regression models).

Figure 4. Political trust	Figure 5. Satisfaction with democracy

Note: The figures display the marginal effect of negative political rhetoric on the relevant outcome across the observed range of years of full-time education. Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Importantly, the qualitative analysis indicates that this pattern should not be taken as unconditional

support for classic assimilation theory (the basis for H2a). In particular, participants with longer

education were not less aware of or less concerned about anti-immigrant political rhetoric. Instead,

they had a sense of "matching" fewer of the stereotypes presented in Table 2. For instance, a young

woman in Group 3 who was enrolled in a master's degree program explained that she did not feel

"*personally* affected" by the talk of "criminal immigrants, immigrants on unemployment benefits,

and immigrants with low education" because "that's not me." The only political discussion she did

feel affected by was the one that attacks her right to cover her hair. Thus, it is not that immigrants of

higher socio-economic status automatically consider themselves as out of the line of sight; rather, it

is the specific way in which the boundaries of membership are drawn in contemporary European

political rhetoric that allows them to take this rhetoric less personally.

Support is also found for the hypothesis that Muslims are more affected by anti-immigrant rhetoric

than non-religious immigrants and immigrants of another religion (H5) (see Figures 6 and 7 and

Appendices 3 and 4 for full regression models).[9] Note that on the mean, Muslims are the group most trusting of politicians and most satisfied with the state of democracy (cf. Table 3). In other words, contrary to popular stereotypes, Muslims are not predisposed to be critical of democratic politics; distrust and lower levels of democratic faith are *reactions* to negative political rhetoric.

| **Figure 6. Political trust**	**Figure 7. Satisfaction with democracy**

Note: The figures display the marginal effect of negative political rhetoric on the relevant outcome across three different religious groups. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals.

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[9] One may wonder whether this effect is indeed driven by differences between religious groups or between people with different regions of origin. As people of the same origin often share religious affiliation, disentangling these effects in the quantitative analysis is difficult. However, results are robust to adding a control for region of origin. Unfortunately, this control leads to more than 3,000 missing respondents, which is why I do not include it in the reported analyses. Insights from the qualitative analysis add important leverage to the interpretation of the moderation effect as demonstrating the negative impact that contemporary European political rhetoric has on Muslims. While the focus groups were comprised of participants with very different ethnic backgrounds (Somalian, Syrian, Pakistani, Palestinian, and Moroccan), varying in phenotypical and cultural traits, the focus group discussions uniformly highlighted the dominance of attacks on Muslims and Islam (cf. Table 2).

Interestingly, non-religious immigrants are unaffected by negative political rhetoric, while immigrants of another religion are somewhat affected (however, only at a marginally statistically significant level for political trust). Thus, religion appears to be a central factor; a finding that may be explained by the fact that many politicians underscore the need for religion to be a private matter in secular Europe (Brubaker 2017). This is the basis of the claim made by Foner and Alba (2008) that religion is a barrier to integration in Western Europe (while a "bridge" in the US), because the secular mindset of many Western European countries makes it difficult to recognize religious claims and accommodate religious minorities in the image of the national political community. While the focus groups were composed of Muslims only and therefore limited in terms of generating insights into the experiences of other religious groups, they support this interpretation:

> What I think is funny about Denmark is that in our countries, for instance Palestine, there is room for churches, mosques, and synagogues. There's room for everyone. You see a church next to a mosque where they call for prayer, and the church bells ring, right? … So religion is part of building a bridge between people. But I just think here in Denmark, people they are very stupid-nationalist, sorry for saying it … I think people obsess about small things that don't matter. Like whether the children eat pork or chicken in kindergarten. I mean—what difference does that make? (Group 5)

While substantiating the idea that the divide between the majority population and Muslims is particularly politicized (e.g., in reference to "whether the children eat pork"), the quote also suggests that religion as such is experienced as a barrier to being included and that being nationalist means being dismissive of religious practices and habits.

Conclusion

Using a mixed methods design, this study demonstrates that first- and second-generation immigrants' subjective political incorporation is affected by how politicians talk about them. First, the analysis of the focus group discussions offers insight into how anti-immigrant political rhetoric

is transmitted to its object: Not only does political rhetoric figure as a central independent element in immigrants' perceptions of a country's "political and social climate" (Crul and Schneider 2010), media reporting and encounters with majority nationals are considered as transmitters of political messages. In line with existing quantitative studies, formal political institutions did not figure centrally in the material.

Second, the article shows who is most likely to take anti-immigrant political rhetoric to heart. Contrary to theoretical expectations, first- and second-generation immigrants are equally affected, and exposure to political messages (through political interest and consumption of political news) is not a precondition for being affected. This latter finding substantiates the theoretical claim made in the article that political rhetoric is best conceived as a *context* of integration that affects general membership notions among immigrants. In addition, this finding casts doubt about the ecological validity of survey experimental studies of political rhetoric effects and urges scholars to develop ways to analyze rhetoric as context. Political rhetoric should not only be seen as a threat to immigrants' predefined minority identities and interests but, more basically, as a medium through which their in- or exclusion in the political community is constructed.

Third, and relatedly, the article demonstrates that the content of political rhetoric matters, as the groups against which the strongest rhetorical boundaries are drawn, Muslims and immigrants of low socio-economic status, respond in the greatest measure with negative judgments. This suggests a sophisticated processing of political rhetoric; an interpretation that is strengthened by integrating insights from the statistical analysis and the focus group discussions. In particular, the qualitative evidence indicates that socio-structural integration does not make immigrants immune to anti-immigrant political rhetoric. Rather, the particular content of contemporary political messages is what matters. Together with the finding that first- and second-generation immigrants feel equally affected, this indicates that classic assimilation theory holds limited promise for understanding

political rhetoric effects. Instead, attention to the particular boundaries generated in contemporary elite messages is crucial.[10]

At a time when many politicians across Europe are rhetorically drawing exclusive boundaries against immigrants in their countries, this study is a reminder that anti-immigrant messages—even if primarily targeting the majority population—are also heard by their objects. The consequences for the individual immigrant concern not only frustration and disappointment but, more basically, losing out on the sense of worth and political agency that comes with being considered an equal member of the national community. For society, political exclusion risks developing into deep-seated cleavages and may result in immigrants' withdrawal from or rejection of engagement in society. Moreover, the legitimacy of a democratic political system rests on inclusivity. Democracy is not just about outcomes but also about norms of equal access to and consideration in the political process (Young 2000). When a significant minority has limited faith in these basic principles, the democratic ideal is challenged.

Given the lack of studies in this field, future research should examine the scope of the findings in other comparative setups. Another direction for future research is to explore in greater detail the

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[10] Other groups may also be affected by political rhetoric. In particular, the tendency for the working class to abstain from politics in recent decades is seen in the literature as a function of the departure of traditional political parties from using class-based rhetoric and appeals (Evans and Tilley 2017). However, while politicians may have forgotten the working class, they do not portray blue-collar workers as not belonging to the political community. This likely offers them a sense of worth and political belonging, after all, which can be utilized, for instance, to claim their status against immigrant groups (Lamont 2000).

mechanisms behind the moderation results found in the present study. This applies to the interpretation of longer education as a buffer against negative political rhetoric through feeling less as an object of contemporary political messages. In addition, qualitative evidence on the experiences of non-Muslim religious (and non-religious) groups would contribute further to evaluating the religion-as-barrier hypothesis (Foner and Alba 2008). As Foner and Alba's argument is comparative in character (understanding religion as a "bridge" to integration in the US), a highly relevant question is whether religious immigrants in the US feel less in focus of negative political rhetoric than they do in Europe and whether this in turn leads them to feel greater political belonging. With the recent hardening in American rhetoric on Muslims, Foner and Alba's bridge/barrier dichotomy may need qualification, as politicians in Europe and the US no longer seem so far apart in the rhetoric applied toward this particular group.

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Appendix 1. Composition of focus groups on central background characteristics

Group	Part. no	Age	Gender	DK citizen	1./ 2.g	Ethnic bgr.	Education level	Job	Pol intr. (0-10)
1	1	16	F	Yes	1	Somalian	Middle school (9. grade)	No	7
1	2	20	F	Yes	1	Somalian	High school	Yes	1
1	3	20	F	No	2	Somalian	High school	Yes	8
1	4	19	F	Yes	2	Somalian	High school	No	6
1	5	23	M	No	1	Somalian	High school	Yes	4
1	6	35	M	Yes	1	Somalian	Master's	Yes	7
2	1	22	M	Yes	2	Somalian	High school	No	7
2	2	18	M	No	1	Somalian	High school	No	6
2	3	25	M	Yes	1	Syrian	Middle school (9. grade)	Yes	10
2	4	17	M	Yes	2	Somalian	Middle school (9. grade)	No	5
2	5	26	M	No	1	Somalian	High school	No	6
2	6	18	M	Yes	2	Somalian	Middle school (9. grade)	No	8
2	7	17	M	Yes	2	Somalian	Middle school (9. grade)	No	10
3	1	25	M	Yes	2	Pakistani	Bachelor's	Yes	9
3	2	26	M	Yes	1	Moroccan	Master's	Yes	7
3	3	22	F	Yes	2	Pakistani	Bachelor's	Yes	8
3	4	21	M	Yes	2	Palestinian	High school	Yes	9
3	5	24	M	Yes	2	Pakistani	Master's	Yes	0
4	1	44	F	Yes	1	Palestinian	Technical education	Yes	8
4	2	30	M	Yes	1	Somalian	High school	No	7
4	3	51	F	Yes	1	Palestinian	Middle school (9. grade)	No	7
4	4	53	M	Yes	1	Palestinian	Bachelor's	Yes	8
4	5	46	M	Yes	1	Somalian	Master's	No	10
5	1	31	M	Yes	1	Palestinian	Bachelor's	Yes	8
5	2	31	M	Yes	1	Syrian	Technical education	Yes	7
5	3	39	M	Yes	1	Palestinian	Technical education	Yes	10

Appendix 2. Transcripts of video clips shown during focus group sessions

Statements from three local politicians, TV2 Østjylland, Sep. 29, 2016, 7:30pm

1. I know you can go to school, e.g. as a pupil, or to work, but if in your spare time you socialise with Muslims, watch Al-Jazera, and in general you are a Muslim when you come home, and pray, and so on, and support sharia law, then you can definitely not say that you're Danish.

2. What I think is most important, that is that you live by the Danish norms and the Danish values and that you won't work against them. And then, there is also something we call a Danish democracy, and you need to fully respect that and when you do that, then you're a Dane.

3. If you have all kinds of special demands – it could be about what you eat or how you are in relation to change of clothes and waterparks and swimming and gymnastics, then you're not Danish. No matter how long you've lived here and whether you have Danish citizenship. But if you agree to be part of Danish democracy and the Danish culture, then of course you're Danish – also with a foreign mom or dad.

Facebook-video 'Freedom for the people', Ida Auken (uploaded June 16, 2015)

I think we need to pull ourselves together. I think we should welcome the people who come here. And we need to remember that Denmark is a country which has a strong tradition, a strong culture, which easily can take outside inputs. We have existed for hundreds of years, and we shouldn't talk down to our own country like that, in the sense that we think that because someone comes here with another culture, then we are destroyed. Quite on the contrary, throughout history we have become stronger, smarter, richer from letting ourselves be inspired by other countries and other ways of doing things. So I hope that Denmark again can be a "high-ceilinged" country, with room for differences, with freedom to not look completely alike, and to do things in slightly different ways. Then I hope we will properly welcome the people who choose to be in Denmark.

	Model 1a Direct effect	Model 1b Moderation by religion	Model 1c Moderation by education
Gender (male)	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Second-generation immigrant (first=ref.)	-0.034***	-0.034***	-0.035***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Citizen of country	-0.030***	-0.030***	-0.030***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Religion (other=ref.) Muslim	0.023***	0.039***	0.024***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
No religion	-0.030***	-0.035***	-0.030***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Education in years	0.001*	0.001*	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Employment status (paid work=ref.) In education	0.029***	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Unemployed	-0.010	-0.009	-0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Out of workforce	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Other	0.007	0.006	0.008
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
TV news consumption (hours/week)	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Political interest	0.088***	0.088***	0.089***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)

ESS round (1=ref.)			
2	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
3	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
4	0.010	0.010	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
5	0.007	0.006	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
6	0.013*	0.012*	0.013*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
7	0.014*	0.014*	0.015*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Foreign-born population	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Foreign-born unemployment	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mean political trust in majority population	0.833***	0.834***	0.833***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Negative political rhetoric	-0.005***	-0.004*	-0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Muslim (other=ref.)* Political rhetoric		-0.016***	
		(0.004)	
No religion (other=ref.)* Political rhetoric		0.005	
		(0.003)	
Education in years* Political rhetoric			0.001***
			(0.000)
Constant	0.073***	0.074***	0.086***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
N	17800	17800	17800

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Model 2a Direct effect	Model 2b Moderation by religion	Model 2c Moderation by education
Gender (male)	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Second-generation immigrant (first=ref.)	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.036***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Citizen of country	-0.039***	-0.038***	-0.039***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Religion (other=ref.)			
Muslim	0.032***	0.044***	0.032***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
No religion	-0.023***	-0.029***	-0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education in years	0.001**	0.001**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Employment status (paid work=ref.)			
In education	0.036***	0.036***	0.037***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Unemployed	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.027***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Out of workforce	-0.012**	-0.012**	-0.012**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Other	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
TV news consumption (hours/week)	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political interest	0.040***	0.040***	0.040***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)

ESS-round (1=ref.)			
2	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
3	0.008	0.007	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
4	0.012	0.012	0.013*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
5	0.006	0.005	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
6	0.009	0.009	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
7	0.015*	0.015*	0.016*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Foreign-born population	0.001	0.001	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Foreign-born unemployment	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Mean satisf. w. democracy in majority population	0.854***	0.855***	0.853***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Negative political rhetoric	-0.006***	-0.007**	-0.016***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Muslim (other=ref.)* Political rhetoric		-0.012**	
		(0.004)	
No religion (other=ref.)* Political rhetoric		0.006*	
		(0.003)	
Education in years* Political rhetoric			0.001*
			(0.000)
Constant	0.112***	0.114***	0.121***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
N	18330	18330	18330

Standard errors in parentheses

$^*\,p < 0.05,\,^{**}\,p < 0.01,\,^{***}\,p < 0.001$