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Archaeology, Theory, and War-Related Violence: Theoretical Perspectives on the Archaeology of Warfare and Warriorhood

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[–] Abstract and Keywords

Warfare may be understood as violent social encounter with the Other, and has in this sense occurred from the first hominid societies until today. Ample evidence of war-related violence exists across time and space: skeletal traumata, material culture, weapons, war-related ritual finds, fighting technologies, fortifications, and martial iconographies. The archaeology of war is a late ‘discovery’ of the mid 1990s, but advances have recently been made in understanding the scale and roles of warfare in pre- and protohistory and how warfare and warriorhood relate to society, culture, evolution and human biology. This chapter ventures into this discursive field from a theoretical and archaeological point of view while reflecting upon the effectiveness and role of war as a prime mover in history. It is argued that war was often present but never truly endemic, and that war essentially is a matter of culture.

Keywords: warfare, warriors, warriorhood, weaponry, social change

Introduction

Archaeology has failed to make substantial contributions to the theorization of violence and warfare, though one might claim that the potential is there. A basic reason for this absence of theory formation and scarcity of explicitly theory-driven studies is that the discipline has been historically unconcerned with the themes of violence, warfare, and war. The establishment of an ‘archaeology of war’ is a recent development of the last couple of decades (Vandkilde 2006a). The preoccupation with the peaceful sides of the human past, and the concomitant repression of obvious cases of violence, has been induced by persuasive myths of the Other in combination with traditions of research occurring within a wider matrix of contemporary economy and politics.

With the growing concern with understanding and explaining all kinds of human activity in the past, archaeology finally, albeit to variable degrees, adopted theoretical insights about warfare and violence from other academic disciplines. While prehistoric archaeology has mostly looked towards social anthropology (e.g. Otterbein 1970; Harrison 1996) and sociology (Jabri 1996) for inspiration, historical archaeology has taken to military philosophy (von Clausewitz 1968 [1832]) and military history (Keegan 1994). This distinction is here suggested to be rooted in evolutionary thinking about the human past in which warfare is thought to become more frequent/deadly (or infrequent/less deadly) after the advent of state formation. It should be noted that historical archaeology has been more inclined than prehistoric archaeology to study martial topics, probably also due to differences in the character of empirical sources related to prehistory and history.

The analytical emphasis here will be mostly on war before history, but the discussion should be relevant for historical periods as well. The present body of research in archaeology, anthropology, and related disciplines on war and violence is considerable, and rapidly growing, and to claim comprehensiveness in a short commentary would be misleading. Due to the discipline’s unlimited access—in principle—to material temporalities in other times and places, archaeology has the potential to be the main player in answering seminal questions such as: How and

when did war begin? For which reasons are wars waged? Is war biology or culture? Was war ever a permanent state of affairs? Does 'the civilizing process' bring more peace? Does warfare provoke social change? And if so, how should we understand the capacity of war as a social driver? How does the material world of weaponry influence the outcome of warfare? How do warfare, warriors, and weaponry relate to each other? These or similar questions take centre stage in any discussion about warfare in the past, even if answers at present are clearer in some instances than in others.

The main aim of the present chapter is to assess the theme of past warfare primarily from a theoretical perspective. The question immediately pops up as to why it took archaeology so long to incorporate this topic in its otherwise wide spectrum of social themes, and 'circumstantial evidence' will be discussed below. Not least because of the late arrival of warfare research, theoretical inferences must be widely drawn from the historiography of research. Important theoretical lessons can indeed be learnt when looking in the rear mirror at previous research and its interpretations of culture and social life—in this case violence, warfare, warriors, and weapons. Anthropology will furthermore occur as a reference point, and conclusions will be drawn from a comparison with archaeology. The discussion will begin with the history of research, using this as a platform for further theoretical reflections. However, first it is useful to introduce some basic definitions.

On the definition of 'warfare', etc

'Warfare' can basically be defined as a specific kind of aggressive social interaction, in which armed violence is exercised against individuals and groups other than your own. Warfare thus also implies targeted use of weapons, and it has a strong violent core. If warfare turns inward within the group (~ civil war), the group has in effect already been fractioned: warfare always seems to emerge from bounded social units. Warfare is waged against outsiders, and violent conflict as such tends to rise from the construction of exclusionist identities, as Jabri argues (1996: 120, 129ff.); basically it is a question of us against them. It is moreover hardly possible to undertake warfare alone. One agent can take the initiative, but what we categorize as warfare requires, in addition to the actual fighting, persuasion, agreement, planning, and cooperation among a group of people. Warfare is thus always communally based action, which furthermore involves a considerable amount of movement and learnt skills based on prescribed bodily techniques of fighting (Warnier 2011), which will vary with the cultural and social context.

What we call warfare is, more precisely, a *durée* of intentional activities: a continued flow of actions and interactions, which ultimately imply violence and which produce unintentional consequences that are again acted upon. As a form of social interaction, warfare cannot be meaningfully separated from the rules, norms, and resources of society as such. Besides, warfare often connects to rituals and other social activities, which may in sum be regarded more as a continuum of interaction than as separate practices. Warfare may be subdivided into a number of overlapping categories, varying from feuding among fraternal interest groups and raiding into foreign territory to large-scale military actions and place-bound battles, its precise form, scale, frequency, and content dependent on the specific societal setting. Because it requires a physical risk and offers a chance to display individual courage and bravery, warfare is in many societies acknowledged as a route to social success in that it may generate social capital suitable to invest in social strategies of power.

'War' is, by comparison, more a description of recurring situations of warfare, although a degree of synonymy between these two concepts must be accepted. Past and ongoing wars are often mentioned in the singular and even named (e.g. 'the Great War'); by implication, a historical or contemporary war comprises numerous events of warfare. Importantly, not all conflicts end up in war, but are often solved by non-violent means.

The fighters themselves, the 'warriors', are the chief actors of warfare, whereas wars also have other key identities such as civilians and victims. Warriors are the special agents, even in some cases literally professionals, who have been trained in the bodily-material techniques of warfare. War and warfare invariably produce death, suffering, and trauma, and warriorhood can therefore be defined as an identity, or profession, that domesticates the associated fear through a learnt scheme of skills and techniques, stored in brain, body, and material culture in complex, inseparable ways (cf. Malafouris 2004).

'Violence' is the most comprehensive of these concepts comprising, in addition to warfare, interpersonal aggression like homicide, intra-family hostilities and wife-beating, forceful kinds of sport, human sacrifice, and juridical or political punishments such as torture, maiming, and the death penalty. It may be difficult to distinguish

clearly between these forms of violence in every case based on purely archaeological grounds. Moreover, the boundary between them can be quite subtle, and ethnography suggests that a high occurrence of interpersonal violence other than strictly warfare quite often coincides with periods of intensified warfare (e.g. Chagnon 1968; Otto, Thrane, and Vandkilde 2006). The term 'war-related violence' can often serve as a preliminary classification or acceptable compromise when data do not allow a precise categorization of the kind of violence involved.

Archaeological research, war-related violence, and theory

A survey of research history immediately highlights the fact that war-related violence was not really allowed into archaeological interpretations until after c.1995 (Vandkilde 2003). Prior to this date, archaeologists studied weaponry, and in some measure warriors, but rarely violence and warfare. This is probably true of most archaeological subdisciplines, but especially prehistoric ones. This neglect began to wane after the publication of Keeley's influential book, *War Before Civilisation: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage* (1996). This book probably helped to trigger the formation of what may today be termed an archaeology of warfare, even if there was at the time much in the political-historical circumstances that may have been more decisive, not least the shockingly explicit presentations of genocide and ethnic wars, in and outside Europe, through modern media.

Keeley's claim that the archaeological past has been utterly pacified because of a predominant Rousseauian world-view of a peaceful Other needs to be more nuanced. At least in Scandinavian and Central European, prehistoric archaeology, and especially prior to c.1975, two opposing interpretations can be discerned: 'the warrior tale', regarding prehistory as populated with fierce warriors who repeatedly changed society, and 'the peasant tale', presenting prehistory as populated with peaceful peasants in harmonious and static societies (Vandkilde 2003; 2006a; 2013; see also Gramsch 2009). These two directions could perhaps be interpreted as rooted in the 'myth of the peaceful savage', since violence and war is absent or suppressed. Preferably, however, the warrior tale may be interpreted as a weak reflection of Hobbesian thought (Hobbes 1958 [1651]), grounded in the unquestioned belief that human beginnings were brutal and chaotic. Perhaps it is not very surprising that both these tales can be associated with major trends in 20th-century history and political thinking.

The archaeological warrior tale—with its focus on disharmony, migration, and revolution, clearly allowing for much less brutality than its Hobbesian prototype—took shape at the beginning of the 20th century, often connected to migrationist traditions in archaeology. The peasant tale—with its focus on harmony, tradition, and gradual change—emerged after the Second World War, but gradually lost ground after c.1975 in the face of the neo-Marxist agenda and the arrival of postmodern debates in archaeology. Neither tale, however, really agrees with the archaeological data, and it may be claimed that empirical data have been widely neglected. Publications of data on violence were produced early on (e.g. Kjær 1912; Wahl and König 1987), but were generally not taken at face value. Warfare is hidden in the warrior tale, which ignores the violence realistically associated with warriors, population movement, and social upheaval, whilst warfare is utterly absent in the peasant tale, which by comparison appears internally more comprehensible.

In effect, prehistory is pacified and adorned with idealized figures of male identity, especially warriors and peasants, whilst other kinds of identity are almost absent. In the few studies dealing with the subject of warfare (Childe 1941; Vencel 1984; Hedeager and Kristiansen 1985; Nordbladh 1989), its social functions were highlighted and the idea of ritual warfare was introduced from social anthropology—a bloodless theatrical kind of warfare. There are a few exceptions to the convention of absent violence, notably the work of Gimbutas, whose gendered narratives of a peaceful Old Europe contrasted with a brutally violent New Europe are nevertheless heavily coloured by politics and personal history (Chapman 1998).

The last twenty-five years have seen a steady flow of studies (e.g. Keeley 1996; Jørgensen and Clausen 1997; Carman 1997; Martin and Frayer 1997; Chapman 1999; Ringtved 1999; Raaflaub and Rosenstein 1999; Guilaine and Zammit 2001; LeBlanc and Register 2003; Halsall 2003; Harrison 2004; Parker-Pearson and Thorpe 2005; Hårde 2006; Armit et al. 2006; Schulting 2006; Harding 2007; Jockenhövel 2004–5). This veritable eruption in the number of publications about violence in the past coincided with a renewal of the warrior tale, which over the last twenty years has grown to prevail. The terms 'warrior elite', 'warrior society', and 'warrior aristocracy' are increasingly employed in archaeological representations continuing to highlight warrior figures of mainly, though not solely, male gender (Treherne 1995; Clausen and Egg 1999; Chapman 1999; Kristiansen 1999; Vandkilde

1999). These social categories may of course have a concrete bearing on past realities, but one-sided use runs the risk of continuing to celebrate violent identities of war instead of nuancing them, which is a tendency arguably traceable even in recent studies (e.g. Meller, Muhl, and Heckenhahn 2010).

Overall, it may be claimed that the near-absence of violence and warfare in prehistoric archaeology prior to 1995 is rooted in evolutionary thinking about early societies as innately peaceful. The difference, already noted in the introduction, in how warfare has been tackled in prehistoric and historic archaeology probably owed much to evolutionary reasoning, albeit in many cases probably as a subconscious disposition. The neglect of violence and warfare in prehistoric archaeology as opposed to the inclination in historical studies to include these subjects is then best explainable with reference to evolutionary understandings of how human life-worlds have evolved through time. This difference in the attitude to war in the past is sustained by the evolution-derived idea of more war (ultimately, more peace) in complex societies and states, but also by written sources describing large-scale military campaigns. Table 1 attempts to encapsulate major trends in how research has predominantly envisioned the position of war in societies of the past, before and after the breakthrough of the archaeology of warfare around 1995.

Table 1. Major trends in archaeological research into war in past societies

Archaeological research	Prehistoric society without the state	Historical society with the state
prior to 1995	PEACE →	WAR
after 1995	WAR →	more WAR (or PEACE)

(*) the state may alternatively be considered a pacifier of warring non-state polities through the monopoly of violence it establishes

The theoretical stances that have, post-1995, inspired the archaeology of war will be dealt with below in order to be able to pinpoint state of the art and outline future potentials. Together, recent studies of warfare explore a vast cultural depth and width, from primates and hominid ancestors to the most recent past; although there is a European emphasis, other continents are also represented (e.g. Turner and Turner 1999; LeBlanc and Register 2003; Otterbein 2004; Armit et al. 2006; Peter-Röcher 2007; Potter and Chuiipka 2010). Most studies are empirically preoccupied with questions of the scale, technology, and forms of warfare, and a few examine aspects of gender (Robb 1997; Chapman 1999; Shepherd 1999), but the theoretical role of archaeology seems mostly to be that of an onlooker to the debate in other disciplines, about origins, causes and effects: especially in evolutionary psychology, biological and social anthropology, and military history (Thorpe 2006). According to Harrison (1996), whose interest is social anthropology, a materialist-functionalist approach locates the causes of war in territorial-environmental conditions and the competition over scarce resources (females, food, land, etc.) necessitating raids into, and even appropriation of, neighbouring territories, whilst a more structural approach seeks the explanation of war in patterns of social structure, downplaying the role of the individual actor. Warfare either results from a breakdown of social norms, or war is capable of reproducing and changing the same norms. Archaeological war studies are doubtless associated with these two major approaches as well. In addition, warfare is sometimes regarded as the outcome of violent social rivalry by young males striving for status and prestige rather than material gain (Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998). A one-sided focus on male aggression is close to the assumption that violence is inherent to human biology.

The commemorative aspects of war have recently been introduced as an alternative to more traditional approaches (Gilchrist 2003). The concern of this research genre is to unveil how and why war and its agents have been celebrated, socially and materially, in different contexts and times. Reasons and motives for commemorating events, actions, and agents of war may comprise social strategies of power (e.g. Heinz and Feldman 2007), ideology, religion, and emotions. The horrors of war—as universally experienced by combatants, civilians, and victims of war (Kolind 2006)—are still not generally considered as anything archaeologists can trace and therefore incorporate in their interpretations of the past. However, by admitting the subject of emotions—with or without their

materialization—into the sphere of archaeological research it may no longer be beyond our abilities to perceive the absent (Tarlow 1999; Sørensen 2009). Indeed, the absent, or non-material, can be assumed to have had an agency of their own in terms of signifying and promoting change in the prehistoric past as well.

In the recent archaeology of warfare, the same historical and still ongoing rationalization of war that has characterized science in the 19th and 20th centuries is called to mind. Here, war has been systematically reduced to facts, rules, procedures, functions, causes, and effects, and this has been incorporated into a modern political project of legitimising nations and nationhood (Pick 1993). The recent establishment of a subdiscipline of battlefield archaeology, and even a whole new medium, namely the *Journal of Conflict Archaeology* from 2005, may similarly point in two different directions—one seeking to discover the variable social and emotional relations between people and battlefields over time as places of remembrance or as non-places lacking any living memory of past martial activity (e.g. Carman and Carman 2006; 2007; 2009; Moshenska 2010; González-Ruibal 2008), the other perhaps more a continuation of the rationalization project aiming to recover successes and failures of military tactics and logistics (e.g. Meller 2009).

As mentioned above, archaeological studies have broadly managed to repress the sinister and violent sides of human interaction; but recently the scholarly interest in warfare has exploded, revealing a clear tendency to make past societies militaristic and violent to their very roots. Throughout most of the history of archaeology, then, violence has been ignored as relevant for our understanding of past societies, but now the tide is turned by numerous studies that, through argumentation or merely through their thematic emphasis on warfare, present the distant past as an intrinsically violent place. The body of data on war-related violence has moreover grown substantially, now also encouraging studies of political and ritual violence that are more indirectly connected to martial activities (e.g. Swenson 2003; Aldhouse-Green 2006; Hårde 2006; Orschiedt and Haidle 2006). However, does all this mean that the Hobbesian stance of ‘the war of all against all’ (Hobbes 1651/1958) has been right all along?

What can be learnt from an analysis of the archaeological discourse is that scholars easily adapt to stereotypical, myth-informed thinking about the past, and as a consequence make it either intrinsically peaceful or violent and typically with evolutionary undertones. Some recent archaeological studies, interestingly, arrive at the more nuanced conclusion that war was often present but not anywhere near Hobbesian conditions (Thorpe 2006; Chacon and Mendoza 2007; Orschiedt 2008), and this modification is likely to be connected to the combination of theoretical insight with cautiously produced data patterns. In the opinion of the present writer, so-called endemic, chronic, or total war, as described by for instance Clastres (1994) and LeBlanc and Register (2003), has been widely exaggerated as a historical phenomenon (Vandkilde 2006c; 2011).

One way of avoiding being caught in the web of stereotypes is to embrace and connect the ideal and real sides of war instead of pinpointing one side as the more important. Warriorhood is for instance suitable for social representation (Treherne 1995), and makes excellent material in the creation of heroic tales; but warriors are also agents of war, with everything this implies in terms of death, suffering, and indeed courage. Weaponry similarly presents possibilities to kill, to maintain or enhance social status, and to recall previous events of death, loss, victory, defeat, or bravery, and actually often served all these purposes. Meta-archaeological reflections may moreover pinpoint the importance of exploring methodically and in depth the archaeological data in dialogue with relevant theoretical platforms. As a beneficial side effect, such a process of theorization may restrict the influence of persuasive stereotypes of the Other, notably those of the peaceful, noble savage and the brutal, bellicose savage and the evolutionary trajectories they often build on. In the above definitions of warfare, war, and warriors it has already been implied that those social theories that view humans as interacting with each other and with material culture might well be most suitable as tools to think with. This point will appear yet more clearly in the following sections, which start with insights from anthropology and then proceed to evolution—and biology-informed perspectives.

Archaeology and anthropology of war: comparative reflections

The social anthropology of war has advanced similar interpretations influenced by the myths of the peaceful and the bellicose savage, albeit without being mechanical reproductions (Harrison 1996; Brandt 2002; 2006). Data have been periodically ignored or repressed, argues Otterbein (2000), the grand old man of warfare anthropology,

precisely as was the case in archaeology. In contrast to archaeological studies, anthropology began as early as 1850–c.1920 to make war an object of study (Otterbein 2000). According to Engels, for instance, war began at the transition from barbarism to civilization with the onset of private property, and his so-called military democracy, originating in the work of Morgan (1877), corresponds roughly to the warrior associations found, for example, among the tribes of the Great Plains (Engels 1884; Lowie 1920; cf. also Sellnow 1961). Even if warfare was first marginal to the then-prevailing evolutionary approaches in anthropology (Tylor 1958 [1871]; Spencer 1896 [1876]; Morgan 1877; Engels 1884; Sollas 1911; Steward 1955; cf. Harris 1969) a strong database eventually came into being, which documents for us today that few societies were without war, but on the other hand that notable exceptions existed (Helbling 2006). Some regions, such as Melanesia and Amazonia, were often described in terms of endemic or ‘total war’, under the influence of Hobbes’ idea of *warre* of all against all (Brandt 2006). Interestingly, Mauss (1954 [1923–4]) held exchange to be constitutive of social life and social order because from a very early date it counteracted the fundamentally warlike nature of humanity (similarly Hegel: cf. Harris 1969).

Compared to the archaeological breakthrough of 1995, a marked rise in anthropological warfare studies occurred between 1960 and 1980 (Otterbein 2000), continuing into the 1990s with fieldwork-based ethnographies and analyses of the causes and effects of war (e.g. Vayda 1960; Chagnon 1968; Knauft 1990; 1991). In his critical research history, Otterbein (2000) emphasizes the controversy that developed at this time between ‘hawks’, contending that humanity’s nature is to wage war, and ‘doves’, arguing that it is human nature to live in peace. The latter position considered war to be a result of expanding and warring states, the so-called Tribal Zone Theory (cf. Clastres 1977; Ferguson and Whitehead 1992), or the result of states dissolving into warring ethnic groups (Otterbein 2000). In anthropology, the phenomenon of endemic war is today no longer a research issue, except in disciplinary history (Brandt 2002).

Even though the differences between the historiographies of the two disciplines are striking, there are also similarities in the apparent impact from opposing myths of the Other. The dramatic increase in anthropological warfare studies 1960–80 did not affect archaeology to any noteworthy extent (but see VencI 1984; Hedeager and Kristiansen 1985; Nordbladh 1989), and the final breakthrough of archaeological war studies in the mid-1990s is hardly directly linked to anthropology. Whilst archaeology has highlighted the warrior in an often highly idealized version, the anthropology of war, by comparison, contains little reference to the agents of war, notably warriors, who are out of focus and seriously under-theorized.

In general, the two disciplines have not informed each other over much in the field of warfare research, and this is despite the possibility that insight might have been accomplished through dialogue. The influential Tribal Zone Theory presented by Ferguson and Whitehead (1992), for example, would soon have been modified if its proposers and users had consulted archaeological sources for prehistory (Vandkilde 2006c). The comprehensive ethnographic record of peace and war collected over the years (Otterbein 1970) might similarly have been used to assess critically the prevalent absence of war in archaeological studies. On the other hand, the persistent idea of chronic war, alive in anthropology not so long ago (Brandt 2006), could perhaps have been dissolved earlier on by taking into consideration archaeological data. It is striking how careful analysis now documents variations in both scale and frequency of war-related violence through time and geographical space in both archaeology and anthropology (Robb 1997; Wiessner and Tumu 1998; Thorpe 2006; Helbling 2006).

Although, in the history of their approaches to warfare, anthropology and archaeology have both been influenced by persuasive myths of the Other, the realistic or authentic constituent has always been more substantially present in the former of the two disciplines. The reason for this may be linked to methodological differences in their access to human life-worlds. In anthropology, the more precise analytical handling of war has most recently undergone considerable changes, which for archaeology may open a door to additional understandings of the nature of war in the past. A general anthropological development can now be discerned, from explaining war through cross-cultural comparisons to understanding war in very specific settings, with the realistic component of chaos and horror moving into the very centre of attention.

During the last twenty years anthropology has incorporated a concern with understanding the actions, experiences, motives and feelings of combatants, civilians, and victims. Physical pain is considered a bodily experience which cannot be wholly communicated and which therefore is an instrument of power in the contexts of war and its aftermath (Scarry 1988). This should be seen as a supplement to the more impersonal political-science analysis (see Nordström and Robben 1995; Nordström 1998; Kolind 2006), and in some ways it is a break with the

classic anthropology of warfare, which despite the experienced disorder of war maintains that war can be analysed within its social and historical background and can be compared cross-culturally: structured and ordered patterns will then reveal themselves in the rear-view mirror. From a traditionalist archaeological point of view the latter is a reasonable approach, but some would add that the feelings of meaninglessness, horror, and pain are so universal in character that they can, and should, be integrated in studies of violence and death (Tarlow 1999; Vandkilde 2003; Carman and Carman 2006; Sørensen 2009).

Most recently, and from a combined ethnographic and historical perspective, Warnier (2011) has argued that fighting is such an extreme human experience that it can only be approached in terms of the fighter's subjectivity. It is certainly true, as he also contends, that to obtain as authentic a comprehension as possible of a specific war of the past—how it was experienced by the persons who were actually there—it is necessary to scrutinize specific material cultures of fighting and the bodily motions (and emotions) linked to them. Applied to archaeology *sensu stricto*, a similar approach highlighting bodily techniques (Mauss 1973 [1936]) may lead to a deeper understanding of individual and collective experiences on and off the battlefield in terms of the drives and competencies of combatants and the circumstances of brutalization, loss, and bereavement. The body, dead or alive, is indeed in itself a piece of material culture which can unveil details about the lives and deaths of individuals and about entire human life worlds through meticulous archaeological and scientific analyses (Sofaer 2006). In the same vein, pinpointing the inseparability of body and material culture could offer a way of uncovering the culturally specific meanings of war and violence as well as the degree to which values were shared. Harrison (1993) has notably shown that the attitude to war and violence varied markedly between the Highlands and the coastal areas of Papua New Guinea. Thus, a past with several kinds of cultural attitude to violence and warfare can be assumed to have existed, albeit that some components may at the same time have been shared.

In summary, prior to 1995, when archaeology finally broached the topic of warfare more consistently, social anthropology experienced a renewal of this subject in the direction of a marked interest in uncovering the multiple cultural meanings of atrocities committed during ethnic wars and revealing the human pain and disaster involved. The archaeology of war, as performed hitherto, compares best with the classic fieldwork ethnographies, and in part also with the political science kind of analysis based upon them; but there are recent movements towards the inclusion of emotional and social commemorative aspects of violence and war. What, then, can be learnt from this comparative exercise? The most evident conclusion—an illustrative case in point being the Tribal Zone Theory—is that, although the two disciplines can benefit from cooperating, it is ultimately archaeology which must provide the principal data on war and peace in the pre- and protohistoric past. This archaeological venture includes the human experiences on and off the fighting ground, which can and should be approached through case-specific and comparative studies of the techniques of the body, which are generally inseparable from material culture. Anthropology can in many cases supplement this with particular insights into how war impacts on the speed and kind of identification, while it is more likely to be sociology which can provide basic bricks from which to build theories of war as practice, power, processor, and interaction.

Evolution and war as prime mover

Evolutionary thinking has always been strong in archaeology, based on the biologically derived idea that societies and their social and material parts evolved from simple forms towards complexity and civilization. Evolution is inherent to archaeological thought and research, from the publication of Thomsen's Three-Age System through Montelius' object typologies to Childe's societal stages and far beyond (Trigger 1980; 1989). Development is often perceived as more step-wise than gradual. Inherent to the idea of evolution is that stages can be predicted from what goes before, and in an academic discipline based on fragments of past human action this may be more of a risk than a help. Warfare could either be the starting point or the end point, broadly dependent on whether the human brain is thought to be biologically inclined towards violence or not. The directional trend would then bring increased and more deadly forms of war, or the civilizing process would rather bring more peace, with the state as the ultimate pacifier of primitive *warre* through its achieved monopoly of violence (cf. Elias 1969; 1982; Fletcher 1997).

Neo-evolutionist approaches in social anthropology heavily influenced the first theoretical applications in archaeology in the 1960s and 1970s, and even later. Neo-evolutionism predicted peaceful sociality at the lower stages of societal development, and its transfer to prehistory promoted an interim strengthening of the 'peasant

tale'. Warfare itself tends, often subconsciously, to be subjected to evolutionary schemes implicating gradually more complex technological and organizational requirements and larger scales of fighting with deadly outcomes (e.g. Otterbein 1970). This, however, may be countered by examples of the realities of prehistoric warfare, which was quite often complex and with a high number of casualties (Keeley 1996), even if it is also true that hunter-gatherers of Europe's Mesolithic period did not use armies, and that weaponry became technically more sophisticated through time.

The idea of war as a prime mover—the very factor that has pushed societies without centralized control towards sociocultural change and centralization—is entrenched in the evolutionary thinking of the social sciences. Carneiro's 'A theory of the origin of the state' (1970) placed warfare right at the centre of the evolution of the state, and is still much cited in archaeology, anthropology, and political history (e.g. Fukuyama 2011). Carneiro's paper has produced a model that fits a specific case of state formation in an over-populated valley with inadequate resources. However, does warfare in general provoke social change and state formation? Or, put another way, does war produce social change, either smoothly or radically? The very idea that war can be 'creative' and produce change (in the positive meaning) might appear incomprehensible to people in the midst of the chaos of war. Sociologically and archaeologically, however, the question can and should be approached.

The first part of the question can be answered with a 'yes'. All kinds of social interaction between people, and between people and material things, produce small-scale changes of a reproductive kind, and insofar as it occurs, warfare can therefore be said always to contribute to the hardly noticeable changes that incessantly occur in every society, past or present. The answer to the second part of the question is a hesitant 'no', or a 'perhaps'. From the point of view of archaeology, evidence for war seems to cluster in certain periods of multiple large-scale transformation; in Europe, for example, at the point of transition to agriculture (Thorpe 2006), or much later, at the transition to the Middle Bronze Age around 1600 BC and again prior to 1200 BC, when a series of new geopolitical figurations were formed (Vandkilde 2007; 2011). This would suggest that warfare can be attributed a role in the web of causes and effects within major macroregional horizons of social transformation in prehistory, as well as in protohistory and history (cf. Raaflaub and Rosenstein 1999; Bekker-Nielsen and Hannestad 2001; Halsall 2003; Steuer 2006).

Warfare has often enough been employed strategically by groups or individuals to centralize and enhance their power, or resist the power of others, but *how effective is war in this respect?* Alongside economy, ideology, and politics, the military source of power is among Mann's four key sources of power. It mostly functions as a back-up of one or more of the other three power sources (1986). In Mann's interpretation of what fuels history, war and military organization often play roles in the games of power, as a tool in rivalries over leadership, but rarely stand alone. Strong leadership, in fact, does not inevitably result from warfare, but can emerge from non-violent activities and subsequently turn warfare into a directly power-attached tool and possibly make it more vicious: in the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea, among the Mai Enga, weak hierarchies developed connected to warfare and male cults, but had little effect on the routines of daily life. According to Wiessner (2002), it was activities within institutions with a predominantly peaceful purpose that changed the role of warfare, as she puts it, from a reproductive to a revolutionary force.

War is probably always waged with particular purposes in mind, even to obtain peace, but there is no linear relationship between input and output. Perhaps more than any other kind of strategic act, warfare tends to create unintended effects, very often more war. Over time and through a web of intended and unintended consequences of interaction, counteraction, and response, the result may be a transformation of social and cultural conditions. Since war is a violent form of social practice, it can, as suggested, be said to always contribute in some measure to social change. States have, once they are formed, typically attempted to maintain themselves through war, and other kinds of centralized societies have similarly used war and military organization to strengthen an existing base of power.

War is thus in a very general sense a driver, or perhaps more accurately a maintainer, with the potential to be something more (Otto, Thrane, and Vandkilde 2006). This being said, we can all cite examples of expanding states and empires whose successes in conquest and colonization are at least in part based on military organization and warfare. Going into details with individual cases, and stressing warfare as a flow of actions over shorter and longer periods, could nevertheless pinpoint several military campaigns by a state which went very wrong; the defeat of the Roman army at Kalkriese-Teutoburg is one of the most legendary (Wiegels 2007; Wolters 2009). To answer the

question posed above, warfare is never a trustworthy strategy, even if in a situation of recurring warfare peace might be a still riskier strategy inasmuch as allies can never be fully trusted (Helbling 2006). In addition, the dual nature of power should be remembered, in that dominance calls for strategic responses of either cooperation or resistance (Guha 1997).

Warfare, biology, and culture

The myths of the peaceful, noble savage and of the brutal, bellicose savage are surely projections of modernity's biosocial theories of evolution, with war in the role as either starter, driver, or result. In the end, however, it is only archaeology which can provide evidence to decide the extent to which the idea of cultural evolution can be sustained, hence reaching beyond the trivial knowledge of non-states becoming states. Likewise, it is only archaeology that can clarify the roles therein of warlike and peaceful forms of interaction. This leads to the question of whether war is actually culture or biology.

The variable occurrences of warfare, rather than total war or total peace, now beginning to emerge in both archaeological and anthropological case studies, and thus, grounded in empirical analyses, may suggest that war-related violence is culturally constructed much more than it is rooted in human psychology and biology (Thorpe 2006; see also Orchiedt 2008). This does not preclude that the capacity to be violent, and therefore to wage war, was not somehow coded into brain and genes from the very beginning and with distant origins in primate ancestors. Structural similarities noted between chimpanzee attacks and warfare in some stateless human societies may accord with this hypothesis (cf. Leblanc and Register 2003). This capacity for violence may nevertheless not be activated unless considered unavoidable, and non-violent culture is perhaps closer to the roots of 'the civilizing process'. Armed violence does not generally seem to emerge because people are devoted to war emotionally or ideologically, and not even the warriors' goal can be reduced to violence and warfare. We are speaking here in very general terms, and it would be possible to pinpoint cases that would seem to suggest the contrary. Rather large numbers of mass burials, for example, exist from prehistory as well as later periods, documenting massacre, mutilation, and genocide (e.g. Zimmerman 1997; Hårde 2006; Komar 2008), and thus strikingly similar to contemporary cases occurring within violent environments of ethnic-political conflict, perhaps against a background of overpopulation, famine, and climatic change. The variability over time and across the world nevertheless suggests that culture is a more influential factor than biology.

There are cases reported in historical and ethnographic sources with recurring instances of warfare and fighting, which impact other forms of sociality to a considerable extent—as brilliantly described by Clastres (1994). Examples include Apache guerrilla warfare of the American South West under increasing colonial pressure in the later 19th century, Maniot inter-clan feuding in the Ottoman period, or raiding among Amazonian Yanomamö especially in the early and mid-20th century. Rather than look to biology for an explanation, it would make sense in these extreme cases to classify the violence as habitual. Prolonged periods of warfare precisely seem to run the risk that war-related violence settles into a sociocultural structure fuelled by a long-running cycle of retaliatory killings. Fighting is no longer merely a bodily technique or resource that can be brought to use on demand; rather, warfare and violence have become a specific social *habitus*, individually felt and collectively shared. This is far removed from Hobbesian chronic war, however, and in down-to-earth language, such a situation of habitual war emerges because it is simply too risky to engage in a strategy of peace. Helbling (2006: 127) has in these (tribal) instances described war as 'the necessary, even though unintentional and damaging, result of the strategic interaction of groups under specific structural conditions'. If war has a logic, this is as close as we can get at present.

Helbling (2006) has made the wider observation that among ethnographically recorded tribes, war rarely breaks out when two parties are of equal strength. This provides an additional dimension to the concept of habitual warfare, and warns that in our archaeological settings under study we cannot expect always to find a one-to-one relationship between the number of weapons and the frequency of skeletal trauma. Marked emphasis on weapons in the material repertoire may actually sometimes indicate interim periods of relative peace explainable as an arms race within a stalemate or no-win situation. The frenzied competitive building of war towers for the defence of the clan against other clans in the landscape of southern Mani in the Peloponnese (until c.1850) displays some of these characteristics (Kalamara and Roumeliotis 2004). Weapons are indeed cultural things, with a series of potential uses outside the domain of violent confrontation. Their material agency, or power, reaches beyond warlike

interaction, although at the same time the link to violence should not be underestimated. It is precisely—and perhaps pre-eminently—the ubiquitous materiality of increasingly specialized weapons that elucidates the cultural, rather than biological, essence of hostile encounters and war.

Warfare: further theoretical reflections

Theorization of violence and warfare has the aim of enabling new insights into the possible causes, reasons, functions, feelings, meanings, and effects of war in particular situations, and the perspectives of individuals and groups, over short-term periods to longer-term trends. Analytically systematized data on violence certainly have a voice of their own in interpreting past warfare, and thus also in furthering its theorization in a dialectical process. Explicit theory should nevertheless be engaged as a tool to think with, to keep in check influential pre-understandings inevitably associated with living in a specific cultural context. Thus, theoretical reflection on warfare, its agents, and material objects is essential, inasmuch as a rich body of data is not the only prerequisite of 'striving to see the past as it was' (cf. Trigger 1989: 411).

The two extreme positions of the above-mentioned inquiries about aggressive vs. peaceful sociality easily become a question of being: humans are by nature violent or peaceful (Vandkilde and Bertelsen 2000). However, such a speculative innateness does not agree well with the basic categorization of warfare as social activity, discussed in the Introduction. This definition, moreover, correlates well with understanding archaeological remains as themselves fragments of past social practices. Elaborating on the interaction perspective, warfare implies the crossing of social and territorial boundaries, since war is—also by definition—waged against groups other than your own; even in civil wars it is a question of us against them, of inclusion and exclusion. The sociological theory of structuration may be one source of inspiration, in that warfare is regarded here as an indivisible whole of structure and agents situated within the continuities of social practice (Jabri 1996, based on Giddens 1984). However, warfare is much more interaction than it is simply action; it is also about social encounters. It is a mobile and highly communicative practice, the intentionality of which is the very key to an improved understanding: warfare and violence are never accidental, since they are always embedded in a cultural nexus. Looking at the history of war studies, warfare is quite often perceived of and treated as something divorced from other forms of practice (Thorpe 2001); yet war is never autonomous and self-regulating. Hence, it may be argued that attention should be paid not only to the violent interactions themselves, but also to the cultural meanings they carry and the cultural and social landscape that forms them.

There are some classic issues in human history and sociology which transcend the debate over social evolution briefly summarized above. One of them is contained in the following question: how did warfare become available as a coercive instrument in the hands of one person and/or a group of persons, since this situation is entirely foreign to many small-scale societies across the world described by early ethnography? Apparently, warriors and warfare occur either structurally connected to, or disconnected from, the societal authority. One possibility is that warfare is organizationally placed on the fringes of society separated from that authority, and it is thus not available as a tool to obtain and maintain control. A contrasting possibility is that warfare and warriors occur as integral to, and therefore available for, a societal authority. There are many historical examples of both ways of organizing warfare, and these are two very different social scenarios. In the first, war is not an instrument of power to back up the ambitions and authority of groups or individuals. Rather, it is a force that sustains society's integrity towards outsiders and therefore also works against the unification of disparate groups. In the second scenario, war has become the coercive instrument of a particular social group, which has the option of employing violence to suppress other actors and subgroups in society and also to acquire territory and resources from neighbouring groups. A related key question is how the change from one scenario to another should be envisioned, since the structural constraints against such radical change seem strong (Clastres 1977; Wiessner 2002). Essentially, this is about how strong autonomous leadership, not reliant on societal consensus, emerges. In addition, it once again brings to the fore the question whether warfare is a driver capable of delivering the extra push towards social transformation, and whether military organizations somehow can also be influential.

In the 1920s Lowie (1962 [1927]) hypothesized that military associations of the Great Plains Indians were central to the origin of the state due to their high standards of order and organization—an idea already implicit in the concept of 'militärische Demokratie' coined by Morgan (1877) and Engels (1884). In the next section we shall take a closer look at the mechanisms that characterize warrior institutions. In the meantime it suffices to say that the law and

order of these warrior institutions stood in some contrast to the otherwise decentralized societies of which they formed a part. One might say that originally these military clubs constituted well-defined but rather marginally placed social fields. They were not typically associated with strong leadership and central functions in society. Over time, however, an altered situation, with increasing power in the hands of the warrior associations, took place when the Plains tribes came under pressure from colonial state institutions, resulting in conquest, genocide, disease, and socioeconomic crisis, and more war. These Plains societies underwent social change towards hierarchy inasmuch as the warrior institutions grew strong and central to society, which however did not become a state. Rather, these societies became integrated into the existing state administration of the colonial power and eventually more or less annihilated. A similar process of internal change triggered by external pressure can be outlined in northern Europe with the expansion of Rome in the 1st century AD. In this latter case the result was qualitatively different. The warrior institutions—alongside successful attempts to emulate the Roman state administration—did play a key role in state formation processes among the Germanic tribes, as Steuer contends (1982; 2006).

As implied by these two cases, and in answer to the question posed above, warrior institutions may hold only a potential for social transformation, which can be activated under particular circumstances. It is thus possible that severe colonial pressure, the general chaos of war, and more broadly social identification as a process, are also influential, as detailed below, whereas the autonomy and efficiency of warfare as a driving force remain doubtful.

Warriors, weaponry, and identification

Warfare is at once cooperative interaction within a group and hostile interaction with other groups, and thus can be said to originate from narrowly defined groups. Even if warfare often appears to strengthen existing groups, it also tends to produce new groupings (Jabri 1996). The connection between war, warfare, and identity is thus both tight and complex. It seems beyond debate that war, as a hostile state of affairs with a flow and clustering of violent activities, in some way inspires new forms and frames of identification and may therefore, through this very binding, have the potential to produce historical change. Returning to the discussion of war as driver or prime mover, it seems not so much the hostile interactions themselves that accelerate the speed of change, but rather the new frames, and thus patterns, of social and cultural identification they allow over time. Warriorhood is not the only kind of identity associated with war and warfare, but nevertheless is central to archaeological research because of the huge number of weapons and weapon burials surviving from many periods and places of the past.

Warfare is one kind of social interaction amongst many others, and this insight promotes a relational understanding of warriors as a social identity constantly being negotiated with other identities within society. This may also suggest that the meaning of warfare and warriors depends on the perspective of the agents as well, and on their varied and changing identifications in society, including whether they are victors or victims. If not directly engaged in the actions of war, women may often be seen to orally and effectively defend the family's and society's honour: they may contribute by rousing to war and by variously assisting on the sidelines (Vandkilde 2006d). Also historically, war is waged mainly by men, but there are myths and written sources about women warriors and female soldiers which are sometimes confirmed archaeologically (e.g. Shepherd 1999; Davies-Kimball 2002; Guliaev 2003). There are no reasons, except cultural, preventing women from waging war and organizing in war bands. In archaeological studies of weapon graves, a fairly frequent phenomenon across time, skeletons are not invariably preserved, but when preservation permits osteological examination, the sex of 'armed' skeletons usually turns out to be male (e.g. Neth 2001).

Since warfare certainly inspires identification, the warrior is a social identity directly linked to warfare and fuelled by companionship with fellow warriors, and by violent encounters with warriors and people of other groups. The warrior is thus clearly a boundary-crosser, but at home he (she) is similarly a 'double being' who participates in everyday sociality and often holds representational roles in addition to partaking in warfare (Völger and von Welck 1990). Warriorhood feeds on a variety of apparent opposites, such as death and life, ugliness and beauty, brutality and bravery, which are the stuff legends and heroes are made of. The warrior seeks glory through prowess in warfare, says Clastres (1994). Commemorative myths of men and war inevitably impact on violent and non-violent practices in society, its burial traditions and rituals, the motivation of the warriors and the recruitment of new ones. The archaeological study of warriors certainly demands that both the real and ideal sides of this identity are incorporated.

Warrior institutions have been on the agenda in terms of their somewhat ambiguous potential for provoking change. They live their life on the periphery of society divorced from sociopolitical leadership, or place themselves right at the centre of power and authority, as discussed above. Warriors have, otherwise, not been a subject of much theoretical reflection, and therefore it is necessary to use ethnographic and historical sources as a launchpad for further modelling in a broad cross-cultural perspective. It appears from these sources that warriors do not necessarily create organizations, since warfare can easily be conducted by ad hoc war parties. However, when warriors create institutions—as, for example, among the Plains Indians and the east African Maasai—they organize in a limited number of ways (Vandkilde 2006b). This insight can be used to further theorize warriorhood, and this ought to have relevance not only for prehistory but also for historical periods and the contemporary world. Warrior associations or war bands may have several social objectives, a primary one being of military character, and their members are most frequently of male gender.

Such warrior institutions occur in three different varieties (Vandkilde 2006b), based upon whether access is regulated through the criterion of age, of status/prestige, or of social rank. Warbands of the first category comprise young unmarried men who have undergone initiation together, whereas in the second category recruitment depends on the prestige and status individual warriors have obtained in fighting. In the last category, admittance depends on relations of class: the war band is only accessible to warriors of the aristocracy, or an aristocratic war leader carefully selects followers for a personal guard, thereby making warriorhood a fully specialized and professional career. These three warband types all contain elements of *Gefolgschaft*, defined as reciprocal relations between a war leader and the group of warrior followers. The idea of fellowship is a relationship of interdependence between the members, and may be dictated by economics and access to material resources, but it is very much defined by a number of ethical, social, and moral rules glueing the warriors together as a group.

Gender within the war band is implicitly male (with very few exceptions), but this does not mean that this is an irrelevant theme to study, since warriorhood, like any other identity, is relational as well as changeable. The border between soldier and warrior is subtle, but warriors are generally characterized by a more individualistic mode of organization and belief (Harrison 1996). This individuality is reflected in the care warriors pay to their personal appearance, such as their selection of weapons, grooming of hair and body, and particular styles of clothing; 'the warrior's beauty' in the expression of Treherne (1995). In archaeology, material similarities macro-regionally of warrior presentations in rituals can suggest the existence of organized war bands comprising highly mobile warriors. Copper Age Corded Ware in Europe north of the Alps is a case in point, and the war band as an organisational unit in all likelihood continued in the Bronze Age, to judge from the rich material culture and data from this period. Written sources confirm the presence of organized warriorhood in the Bronze Age and in the Iron Age (Vandkilde 2006b; 2011; 2013). The materiality of armed violence has central significance in terms of bodily identity and of social and practical function.

Material culture mediates distinctions in society based on age, gender, social status, profession, and so forth. Warriorhood combines such distinctions in various culture-specific ways. Objects and bodily appearances more generally find uses in strategies of identification, and that warriors are no exception is amply testified by numerous prehistoric, historical, and ethnographic examples (Otto et al. 2006). Weapons, particular bodily postures and outfits for the body, can manipulate people's image of the warrior, but simultaneously influence the individual warrior by stimulating in turn self-understanding and personhood (Vandkilde 2006b).

Weapons are tools of war, and they make warriors, in a manner of speaking; and it takes warriors and weapons to engage in the flow of violent action we call warfare. Not all material objects are weapons, but many objects with other functional intents possess potential for use as weapons (Chapman 1999). In Europe it is not until the early third millennium BC that objects made exclusively for warfare appear more consistently in the archaeological record, first battle axes and advanced arrow projectiles, and then spearheads and swords. This break point coincides with evidence of what is probably the appearance of organized, institutionalized warriorhood (Vandkilde 2006b). Notably, technological advances can escalate conflicts and perhaps enable societal change—for example horses, wagons, swords, and new forms of fighting such as the phalanx. It is true that the potential lethal nature of warfare is accentuated with the progression of time as a suite of specialized weapons evolved through human interaction with each other and with materials. Still, weapons like battle axes, spears, and swords always have had social representational potentials and uses outside the strict sphere of warfare.

The steady material link, in different ways, makes it realistic to identify and study warriors and warfare

archaeologically. Material culture can be summarized as a substantial ingredient in our understanding of warfare, violence, and warriors in the past; and weaponry especially takes key roles in both the real and the ideal face of violent interaction and identification.

Conclusion

Theory must build on real-world data, and must simultaneously enable our understanding of emerging data patterns, which in turn means that theory itself must evolve. Such a situation of reciprocity between data and theory has not yet emerged in archaeology because the study of warfare and violence is a late arrival of the last decades. A research history perspective reveals that the absence of explicit theory has instead furthered the persistent survival of two stereotypical understandings of prehistory, here named 'the peasant tale' and 'the warrior tale'. Whereas warfare and violence were earlier widely ignored as relevant research themes, the establishment of an archaeology of war after c.1995 has tended to overemphasize the violent, vicious, and warlike character of the human past. Similar, but also in some respects deviating, debates have occurred in anthropology between Hobbesian 'hawks', contending that man's nature is to make war, and Rousseauian 'doves', holding that it is human nature to live in peace.

As opposed to these stereotypes of the Other, often rooted in evolutionary thinking, some recent archaeological studies, in concert with recent trends in anthropology, allow the qualified proposition that the level of warfare has varied with time and place. Even those more extreme situations where war has grown to become habitual are far removed from the Hobbes-inspired belief that human beginnings were intrinsically violent and chaotic. These new and emerging insights are probably connected to the combination of theoretical frameworks with cautiously produced data patterns in archaeology: so-called endemic, chronic or total war has been exaggerated as a historical phenomenon. In addition, it is difficult to find empirical or theoretical support for the evolutionist hypothesis that warfare (or peace) gets more common through time.

From a sociological perspective, warfare is communally based social interaction of armed violence against groups other than one's own, whilst warriorhood is a social identity attached to warfare. Warriors often organize in institutions, so-called war bands. Movement is central to warfare, including the learnt material-bodily techniques of combat, which vary with time and geography. The data situation is generally favourable for archaeological inquiries into most aspects of the complexity of human violence against other humans. It may be argued, in tune with the most recent research, that archaeology even has the capacity to illuminate human experiences and feelings of fear, horror, pain, and bereavement during the circumstances of war-related violence. Studying commemorative facets of war and warriors has recently grown to become a genre of its own.

If warfare can in some sense be understood as a driver in history, this capacity may be mostly indirect. There are archaeological indications that warfare occurred most frequently in those periods of the Stone Age and the Bronze Age with macroregional sociocultural shifts. These time zones of transition, in their broadest sense, have rather intense data on warfare and warriorhood, both ideal and real (Vandkilde 2007; 2013), and this may suggest that warfare is in some way situated within the web of causes and effects. Sociologically and historically, war tends to spring from exclusionist groupings—it both reinforces existing collectivities and has a tendency to produce new ones. Hence, it seems in general not so much the frequent warlike interactions themselves that propel societal change, but more the new frames of social and cultural identification they allow over time. Warrior identities and their institutions of military law and order are particularly interesting in this respect—albeit also somewhat ambiguous—but they seem to hold some potential for radical social change that can be activated in circumstances of social upheaval, colonial coercion, scarce resources, and generally changing environments of identification. Still, it is important to emphasize that examples exist of new forms of leadership and institutionalized inequality emerging in other societal domains with non-violent activities.

It can be argued, based on present knowledge and hence with some weight, that war-related violence is mostly rooted in cultural logics. Precisely the categorization of warfare as social interaction discords with reducing war (peace) to a question of biological essence. It is furthermore true that violence and warfare always form part of something else—gender, status, power, politics, economics, emotions, etc. The considerable variability in the occurrence and materiality of warfare, weapons, and warriors over time and across the world supports the argument that war is essentially a cultural matter. This notwithstanding, archaeology more than any other

academic discipline has the capacity to provide a deeper knowledge of which aspects of warfare and warriorhood are cross-culturally shared and which are culturally specific.

Suggested further reading

Keith F. Otterbein's recent book *How War Began* (2004) is a comprehensive report of warfare and violence in global perspective surveying forms of warfare from the earliest hominids to empires and states and incorporating materials and insights from a wide range of sciences such as archaeology, anthropology, history and psychology. The report of the research project *Warfare and Society: Archaeological and Social Anthropological Perspectives*, edited by Ton Otto, Henrik Thrane, and Helle Vandkilde, may provide a deeper understanding of several of the themes and questions addressed in this chapter. For questions dealing more with the social commemoration of war, this subject has been treated in a volume of *World Archaeology*, edited by Roberta Gilchrist (35(1), 2003). Likewise, the *Journal of Conflict Archaeology* can be consulted for studies and views on warfare in all varieties, even though probably favouring the new field of battlefield archaeology. High-profile journals such as *Journal of Material Culture*, *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology*, and *Antiquity* occasionally contain novel approaches to warfare or information about new discoveries (e.g. Warnier 2011; Jantzen et al. 2011). In general, the proceedings from the most recent conferences will present both new finds and new perspectives in a subject covered by a huge body of books and articles.

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