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Steen Brock, Aarhus

Reason, Culture and Education

Wittgenstein vs. Bakhurst and other recent philosophers of education

Abstract: On the basis of first a critique of Bakhurst view on (respectively) the notion of “the space of reasons”, “second nature” and “formation”, and second, Wittgenstein’s view on culture and education, I go into details about how one might apply Wittgensteinian thought within a new assessment of education, seen as a matter of “taking steps” within a toolbox or platform generated by forms of teaching. Invoking Kierkegaard, I conclude that the educated person does not incarnate “an absolute difference” in relation to non-educated beings. The educated person is instead the embodiment of “a difference”, that is, of an individuality. Education is not taking the individual from A (barbarian state) to B (better having than not having); it is providing the platform for *the possibility of the actuality* of somebody’s “being at B”. The argument is: Teaching gives different individuals the same such platform but each person appropriates the platform differently to the effect that the actuality of being “at B” is different from person to person.

Modest re-enchantment vs. re-enchanted modesty in the account of second nature

Presenting and discussing David Bakhurst’s view on formation, I will not only comment upon the impressive and well-written *The Formation of Reason* but also upon a number of papers where Bakhurst elaborates various central themes of that book.

In *The Formation of Reason* Bakhurst first explains how “the human mind is essentially a socio-historical phenomenon” (Bakhurst 2011: 3). He ascribes this view to both a range of Russian scholars (Vigotsky in particular), Wittgenstein, and Davidson. It is however the philosophical views elaborated by John McDowell since his *Mind and World* (McDowell 1994) that Bakhurst mainly draws upon and wants to supplement. Bakhurst thus endorses the following claims:

McDowell maintains that the distinctive feature of the kind of minds that human beings have is that we are responsive to reasons [...]. Human mindedness resides in this ability to commune with reasons [...].

[...] in the present context, the crucial aspect of McDowell's position is that human beings are not born into the space of reasons but are initiated into it by education, or *Bildung* [...]. Human beings are [...] born mere animals, and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity. (Bakhurst 2011: 7)

Like many writers before me, I will challenge this starting point of Bakhurst's account. For already, there are several questionable implications on our table: First of all, "the transformation" of animals into agents is a questionable notion in that it implies an idea of "first nature", the nature of animal being, by contrast to a "second nature" or "human nature". Bakhurst certainly in several places discusses and explains these ideas in detail (Bakhurst 2012, 2016, 2016a). But the question remains: Does the idea of a first nature associated with animal being make clear sense? How can *any* concept of nature be contrasted to a "second" nature? And how is "second nature" supposed to be "in contact" with first nature anyway?

Bakhurst follows McDowell in trying to enrich a natural-scientific notion of nature. McDowell and Bakhurst want to formulate a concept of a kind of "re-enchanted, second, nature". At the same time, they insist in different ways on giving a "modest" version of this rich concept of second nature (McDowell 1987). I will argue that this *modesty comes with a price*: The richness which McDowell and Bakhurst associates with "second nature", and thus with *Bildung*, does not – it seems to me – involve a strong notion of *work*. I here think of "work" as re-working *first* nature. So my question here is; does the idea of *Bildung*, the formation of a second nature, have anything to do with an impact on, and development of, nature *as such*? This question is important, I think, because it points to a second concern: Bakhurst relates the concept of formation to the concept of freedom. He elaborates on a Kantian notion of autonomy, and my question here is, if this notion does not, deep down, point to *a much too narrow idea of negative freedom* in that human beings are portrayed as in a certain sense set free from the bounds of the first nature and have thereby become capable of operating freely within second nature. Bakhurst writes:

To understand the character of our second nature, we can do no better than to address the two key notions [...] freedom and responsiveness to reasons [...]. For McDowell freedom and rationality are one. A rational agent is a source of judgment and action. She is in control of her thoughts and deeds. Rational agents are responsible, epistemically and morally, and they can be so precisely because there is a sense in which it is "up to them" what to think and do. (Bakhurst 2011: 69)

[...] the guiding idea of what McDowell calls "the rational agency" conception of freedom is that we are free to the degree that we are attuned to and guided by what are genuine reasons, and [...] that our freedom finds its fullest expression where we think and act in attune-

ment to rational necessity and know our reasons for what they are, thereby securing for ourselves smooth passage through the space of reasons. (Bakhurst 2011: 91)

But how can such “cultivated nature” set us free from nature as such? Should education these days, for instance, not be concerned about environment and ecology seen, one might suggest, not from the perspective of our cultivated interests, values, and perceptions, but seen from the perspective of our embeddedness in, first, nature. Is it not the condition of Nature itself, that should be our main concern, not the human condition? Indeed, this is today an explicit part of the curriculum in Danish Public Schools in relation to a concept of “learning for sustainability”. Also, how shall education be concerned with animal welfare and a sense of our communion with other forms of living beings? Is there no such thing as a bond between living beings *as such*, and what shall we say about a general humility on our part in relation to a reverence for the forces of first nature? My point here is, that what might be quite simple considerations become very complicated considerations if we invoke the distinction between first and second nature, because we in a sense both want our cake and wish to eat it too. We are thrown into a “troubled” dualism where we both say “it is natural” in the sense of embodiment and “it is more than natural” in the sense of mindedness.

This brings us to another set of questions concerning the place of morality and normativity in the formation of Reason: Following the first mention of McDowell, Bakhurst continues:

McDowell takes a modified version of Aristotle’s view of the development of virtue (as character) for his model of the *Bildungsprozess* [...]. The end of the *Bildungsprozess* is the emergence of an autonomous, critical, rational agent “at home in the world” [...]. McDowell takes a very strong view of what *Bildung* accomplishes. He casts *Bildung* not as the development of an already-existing self, but as the process in which minded beings come to be [...]. The transformation effected by *Bildung* makes the child not just something *in* the world, interacting with her immediate local environment, but a subject with a view *on* the world that can think and act in the light of that conception. (Bakhurst 2011: 9)

Bakhurst defends, as we shall see, a version of moral particularism, arguing that morality is not based on principles of moral understanding. Instead Bakhurst points to a neo-aristotelian notion of “practical wisdom” by reference to, first of all, Sabina Lovibond. This is in line with the expression above, “a subject with a view *on* the world” by contrast to (merely!!) being “*in*” the world. Again, responsibility is associated with inter-subjectivity, and not with reality as such. A world of obligations has been erected, and this world is filled with agents that can perceive such obligations.

Bakhurst pictures the human world, and the human aspirations, as if it is all placed, as it were, on “Neurath’s boat”: it is a matter of learning and rebuilding the ship as we sail along. We are in principle building, and rebuilding, a human space, and in this space responsiveness to *expressions and manifestations of reasoned, justified “meaning”* (see below) is constitutive. So we have been set free from a world of natural forces, evil powers, divine demands and other non-human voices.

But what if we ask, in what sense “doing good” is a matter of overcoming evil, or perhaps answer to divine demands? Then we break out of the moral circle in which Bakhurst moves. *Again, this has to do with a price that comes with “modesty”*: According to McDowell and Bakhurst, there is a limit to the “understanding” of *normativity*. For if, the argument goes, we did have such a full-blooded understanding, this would lead to a kind of infinite regress, for how could we justify this account if not by reference to a principle of normativity over and above normativity as such. We simply, Bakhurst thinks, must accept the autonomy (or what Bakhurst terms authority) of normativity.

Bakhurst’s notion of culture is for me tightly connected to his view on the “enculturation” of the first, raw, animal nature. This comes fully out in the following remarks from a paper on the relation between freedom and second nature:

[...] if the concept of second nature is to illuminate the unity of the rational and the animal in human life, we must elucidate not just how reason emerges in the course of development of an individual human being but how our form of animal life gives expression to reason. This matter inevitably leads us to mind externalized, if we are to capture how our form of life reproduces itself, how there can be traditions of thought for our children to be initiated into, and how there can be history that is the history of human kind. Until we have all this in view, the bare idea of *Bildung* will not be enough to eliminate the tendency to be puzzled by the idea of norms of reason. But once we get a sense of the myriad of ways we live in a world imbued with meaning, then the appeal to second nature begins to look more plausible [...]. Moreover we need a suitably rich sense of what the child is initiated into when we speak of “enculturation” (Bakhurst 2012: 186) [namely]:

We need to appreciate how a pre-linguistic responsiveness to reasons is cultivated in the infant and refined in its engagement with the bodily mindedness of others. The child is summoned to mindedness by the proleptic recognition of mature individuals, who in finding the germ of reason in her in turn demand recognition of their personhood from her. In *The Formation of Reason* I suggest that such reflections on the constitution of intersubjectivity promise to enrich our sense of the unity of the rational and the animal in our nature, for there is nowhere for the caretakers to find the child’s embryodic mindedness except in manifestations of her animal being, [FR, pp. 61–64]. (Bakhurst 2012: 183)

So “culture” comes with inter-subjectivity, mutual recognition of personhood and is based on an “engagement with the bodily mindedness of others”. We shall see below how this for Bakhurst also is associated with a kind of “moral” education among people. After that, we shall see that perhaps Wittgenstein had a quite different understanding of culture.

Morality, moral education and reason

I think that Bakhurst’s general ideas about formation, reason, and personhood come out in the fullest sense in his account of morality. Bakhurst writes:

[...] it is crucial that the values, virtues, emotions, and attitudes that my children acquire should add up to a coherent moral personality of an autonomous agent. I want my children to be, in Sabina Lovibond’s apt phrase, “authors of their own moral judgements.” The notion of authorship here has two components. First there is the idea of an independent moral voice, given expression in the agent’s words and deeds [...]. What is critical is that they take fidelity to the views and attitudes in question as partly constitutive of their identity [...]. Second, there is the notion of accountability. I want them to stand by their moral conceptions and take responsibility for actions that issue from them [...]. They must in short take morality seriously as an expression of rational agency. This suggests not just that particularism has *some* account of moral education, but that the account might prove genuinely insightful. (Bakhurst 2005: 272)

Such a person [which Bakhurst wants his children to become] needs to acquire a “way of seeing” significance and this involves the cultivation of certain modes of appreciation. The novice needs to be initiated into a point of view, not taught procedures, rather in the way of developing an appreciation for a musical genre involves getting a “feel for” the music.

The non-codifiability of moral competence together with the holism of virtue, value, and moral relevance, makes it impossible to see moral instruction as the inculcation of a set of discrete skills that might be informally specified and acquired piecemeal by grasping their specifications. Rather, we have to see moral education as initiation into a culture of evaluation. It comprises the acquisition of the language of moral appraisal and criticism – understood not simply as a repertoire of concepts, but as a tradition of thinking, justifying, and reasoning – and the cultivation of values, virtues, and sensibilities in the service of autonomous rational agency.

[...] we should be wary using problem cases in moral education. Better to explore children’s moral abilities by discussing literature, history, politics, and society, and through creative writing and artistic production. This suggests that moral education is not best seen as a distinct discipline, but one that permeates the humanities. The humanities provide material for moral reflection and they cultivate sensibilities and capacities – attentiveness to detail and relevance, skills of intellectual perception and narrative explanation – that figure in moral judgment and reasoning [...]. So I believe that particularists [should] place a compelling moral psychology at the core of their position. (Bakhurst 2005: 274–5)

We find here a kind of *essentialism* despite the insistence on “particularism”. Morality is associated with “a culture of evaluation”, with “the language of moral appraisal and criticism”, and “a tradition of thinking, justifying, and reasoning”. Bakhurst is a particularist in the sense that he denies there being general principles that express and determine the moral significance of given situations or express and determine any action. There are no principles of practical necessity. But there is a *formal* necessity associated with “the culture of evaluation” that one has to be initiated into. Again, culture has been associated constitutively with a form of excellence, a form of “lifting oneself” up above the muddled and confused ways of dealing with things.

The example with music and the humanities is telling: Bakhurst does not want his children to be *artists*. He wants them to be art experts. The contrast here is, as I see it, that the artist, metaphorically put, gets a lot of dirt on her hands. The artist, as I understand her, is a *participant* in relation to the culture to which she belongs. The artist is creating works that work *on* the culture. The artist is not evaluating anything. She engages in a process of change, not a tradition of assessment. Why does Bakhurst not want his children to be taught specific skills? Again, *this is the price of “modesty”* (here a modest conception of normativity): The supposedly “non-codifiability” of moral competence means that there is no instructive, practically functional, “link” between moral assessment and *actual handling of things*. Morality is over and above any kind of particular *Praxis*.

Wittgenstein: *Sprachlehre* between Mythos and Logos

In the following I will present a reading of a set of related major themes in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (1931–51). In my understanding, Wittgenstein formulated what I have elsewhere called a “constellation” of topics which, I conjecture, was more or less in place when he wrote TS 213 in 1933, and where subsequent works are elaborations on the individual topics.¹ The “constellation” of topics include (culture, grammar, form of life, mathematics: rule-introduction, psychology: the attitude towards a soul).

We shall say more on Wittgenstein’s conception of culture, but two things are crucial: It is something *inherited*, not invented, and it is based on *traditions*, where some are ceremonial or ritualistic in character. Wittgenstein writes:

¹ See (Brock 2016: 189–91).

An entirely mythology is stored in our language. (GB 1993: 133)

According to Wittgenstein, we have never broken *out* of this condition. Logos has not substituted Mythos. Instead we have, what Wittgenstein initially (in 1931) called a *Sprachlehre*, in that we have ways in which we can *infuse discipline and technique* into the language, despite its essential mythological character. *Sprachlehre* is where the “grammar” of our language games can be elucidated and reshaped, but not invented from scratch. As such, *Sprachlehre* represents a space within human interaction, which we can call “that which can be taught”. In this space we find methods of learning, methods of demonstrating, methods of explaining, methods of justifying etc. We shall see that Wittgenstein later, instead of talking about the entire space of *Sprachlehre*, rather pointed to a variety of its elements, making up a variety of different *Lehre*. These are the “disciplines” concerning which there are established canonical forms of teaching (*Unterricht*). We will scrutinize this in detail below. But first let it be noted that such disciplines can supplement human interaction and become a part of a given culture, but education never becomes constitutive or goal-setting in this respect. We can say that in principle, learning to cope with *real-life situations* is non-scholastic, and not strictly speaking a result of education.² Wittgenstein writes:

[...] there is no such thing [...] as a special examination (Fachprüfung) of knowledge of mankind. (LW I 1990: 918)

An important fact [...] is that we can learn certain things only through long experience and not from a course in school. (LW I 1990: 925)

For Wittgenstein it is consequently important to say something about “that” which *cannot* be taught, for instance, traditions and, importantly, learning to *imagine things*:

A tradition is not something a man can learn; not a thread he can pick up when he feels like it; any more than one can choose one’s ancestors. (CV 1980: 76e)

We learn language games. We learn how to arrange objects according to their colours, how to report the colours of things, how to produce dyes in different ways, how to compare shapes, report, measure etc. etc. Do we also learn imagining them to ourselves? (LW II 1993: 12–3e, my translation of the last sentence).³

² I will give more precise definitions of the terms teaching and instructing below!

³ How can “Lernen wir auch sie uns vorzustellen?” be translated “Do we also learn to form mental images of them?” The published English translation is, as usually is the case with English Wittgenstein editions, very poor!

Here we should notice the point that *Sprachlehre* is culturally and historically placed within a given “cultural situation”. Logos is not a “new beginning” but part of an ongoing transformation. Wittgenstein writes:

The newborn child can neither be malicious, friendly, or thankful. Thankfulness is only possible if there is already a complicated pattern of behaviour. (LW I 1990: 942, my translation)

Feigning and its opposite exist only when there is a complicated *play of expressions* [...]. And if the play of *expression* develops, then indeed I can say that a soul, something *inner* is developing. But now the inner is no longer the cause of the expression. [No more than mathematical thinking produces calculations]. (LW I 1990: 946–7)

It may seem as if I am changing the issue. For were we not talking about the phylogensis of cultural traditions, and the quotes are about ontogenesis? Yes, but the point is that on Wittgenstein’s view, phylogensis is so to speak the outcome of , let’s call it, a bundle of ontogenesis. Indeed that is part of the idea of *Sprachlehre*, and it will lead us to Wittgenstein’s view on education (*Unterricht*). In short, education is essentially to be understood as a cultural tradition, where a variety of forms of teaching and learning-techniques are unfolded with the purpose of “directing” the individual formation, directing ontogenesis, but never, on this account, constituting it. Indeed, as I read Wittgenstein this is crucial, for if the organized forms of learning dominate, then we are *losing* culture, and we are turning (living) culture into (dead) “civilization”.

Culture and civilization in Wittgenstein

We will return to this issue shortly, but first: The ongoing transformation of culture has according to Wittgenstein no other motor than the formation of individuals. But thanks to the normative patterns and institution of education, certain traditions within the culture develops. We can think of culture as a tree with many branches that has a common trunk and roots. Wittgenstein does not use this metaphor explicitly, but I still think it helps understanding his, in my view, post-Romantic organic view of culture. We can imagine that the point where the trunk spreads into several branches represents the position of an individual human being. This is the position of a contingently given “pattern of behavior” and similar “play of expressions”. It is *from there* that each individual can be initiated into the disciplinary cultures of the branches. This is a *metaphysical* remark, not a historical: it says that “objective learning” is based on contingency and subjectivity. As Wittgenstein said in the quote above: The develop-

ment of the “inner” of an individual is a matter of *extending* “the play of expressions”, and not a matter of something inner lying “behind” this pattern of behavior. Indeed, this will be a main theme in what follows.

Wittgenstein drew the distinction between civilization and culture in the following paragraph (which was written as a draft to the introduction of a longer text, about 1930–31):

This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it was written. This is not, I believe, the spirit of the main current of European and American civilization. The spirit of this civilization makes itself manifest in the industry, architecture and music of our time, in its fascism and socialism, and it is alien to the author [...]. A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise. In an age without culture on the other hand forces become fragmented and the power of an individual man is used up in overcoming opposing forces and frictional resistances; it does not show in the distances he travels but perhaps only in the heat he generates in overcoming friction [...] the fact remains that I have no sympathy for the current of European civilization and do not understand its goals, if it has any. (CV 1980: 6e)

I think one shall read this quote in the context of variety of topics that Wittgenstein dealt with in the years 1930–34. He had come to see that his own early endorsement of a scientific language based on logical operations had dealt with a kind of expert culture, modern physics, which was presented in abstraction from the historical and social practices from which it had developed. The logical syntax of the language of physics, this special grammar, Wittgenstein now wanted to say, only makes sense if it is seen as a special kind of regimentation of already given languages; languages which are part of ordinary practices of counting things, sorting things, grouping things etc. The regimented, disciplinary activity is a matter of civilization in the sense that it has been constructed with a specific purpose. The modern civilization which Wittgenstein points to in the introduction above is seen as a “rhapsody” of such regimentations each associated with a set of diverse interests and goals. These interests point in all directions and thus civilization lacks *cultural integrity*. What’s more, *people* have lost an integrated sense of human activity. Human lives are fragmented into different compartments, and what is done in excellence in one compartment may not really matter in other such. Civilization lacks an organization of possible interrelations between the doings of different people. Clearly, this organization is not to be seen as a construction that is implemented by reasons. Instead it is seen as purely historical, as “the given” background of everybody’s life.

Wittgenstein saw “culture” as an Order, or system of orders, and he regarded any human life as part of “the weave of life”, a term which consequently refers

not only to the continuity and coherence of an *individual* life, but also to the way individual lives is “connected”, intertwined, interdependent and so on.

Enlightened animalistic life: Finding our feet with one another despite separateness

I think Wittgenstein throughout his post-Tractatus philosophy continued contrasting “culture”, as such, with special techniques and their related “expert cultures” or expertise. And I think he always distinguished between (on the one hand) such “techniques” (“constantly trained uses”, or *Verwendungen* in German) and (on the other) word uses and other actions seen as “expressions of life” (*Lebensäusserungen*) and where these always are “situated” within what Wittgenstein called the “weave of life”.

[...] pretense is a (certain) pattern in the weave of life. It is repeated in an infinite number of variations [...]. But you can portray the pretender on a stage. So there is such a thing as the appearance of pretense. (LW I 1990: 862–3)

So we are talking about patterns in the weave of life [...]. Imagine that it was really patterns on a long ribbon. The ribbon moves past me and now I say “this is the pattern S” now “this is the pattern V” [...]. How can I be taught to recognize these patterns? I am shown simple examples and then complicated ones of both kinds. It is almost the way I learn to distinguish the styles of two composers. But why in the case of the patterns does one make this distinction *that is so difficult to grasp*? Because it is of importance in our life. (LW II 1993: 42–3e)

[...] it is not a matter of the *words* one uses or of what one is thinking when using them, but rather of the difference they make at various points in life. How do I know that two people mean the same when both say they believe in God? [...]. *Practices* [Die Praxis] give words their meaning. (RC 1977: III, 317)

[...] thinking and inferring (like counting) is of course bounded for us, not by an arbitrary definition, but by natural limits corresponding to the body of what can be called the role of thinking and inferring in our life. (RFM 1978: I, 116)

Would it be correct to say our concepts reflect our life?
They stand in the middle of it.

The rule-governed nature of our language permeates our life (RC 1977: III, 302–3)

As I read Wittgenstein he is not trying to *downgrade* the knowledge and expertise of disciplinary expert cultures. He wants to *describe* such, “leaving them as they are”. So just as is the case when Wittgenstein associates even scientific statements with life-expressions, similarly with the case, where he associates human behavior with that of animals: In both cases he means to underscore

the *depth and the force* of the matter (see below). And he is underscoring (what we shall see he might have learned from Kierkegaard) how (living in the light of) human understanding is something *concrete* and never a kind of “reasoning in the abstract”.

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination ... Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc., – they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. (OC 1975: 475–6)

In all great art there is a wild animal, tamed. Not, for instance, in Mendelsohn. All great art have the primitive drives of people as its baseline. It is not the melody (as perhaps in Wagner), but that which gives the melody its depth and force. One can in that sense call Mendelsohn a reproductive artist. In the same sense: the house I built to Gretl [Wittgenstein's sister] is a product of sympathy and good manners as an expression of a high understanding (of a culture). But the original life, the wild life, which it wanted to push out, is missing. One could then also say: It lacks health (Kierkegaard)(plant in a green house). (MS 122: 88v, my translation)

Kierkegaard writes:

This will be the absolute difference between modernity and ancient times. The whole is not concretion supporting and forming the individual without absolutely developing him, but is an abstraction that in its abstract equality repellently helps him to be formed absolutely, if he does not die. (Kierkegaard 1963 :85, my translation)

These quotes are telling: Mature human beings are, for Wittgenstein, not formed such that they “absolutely” leave a wild animal part behind. The Enlightenment did perhaps not release mankind from a darker and harder time. There never was *such* enlightenment. This is the thought I will try to develop: The “claim of reason” in modernity makes sense in that we have reached a “point of no return” where the institutions of science, art, politics, art, and maybe forms of religion and moral deliberation cannot be brushed aside. Reflectivity and normativity “has come to stay”. But like Peter Winch did in his response to Alasdair MacIntyre, we will [with Wittgenstein] question the idea of “standards of rationality”, not by denying there being such criteria, but by questioning *the rationality of standards*.⁴ That is, it is questionable whether these standards are ahistorical and independent of cultural settings. In the same way: “Standards of goodness”

⁴ (Winch 1970: 35). Winch here uses the term “criteria”, where I use the more common term “standard”!

may be questioned and perhaps shown to be relative to a form of cultural integrity that involves a variety of *irrational* elements. And maybe living in accordance with such cultural integrity is the true mark of individual formation:

Accordingly, I take Wittgenstein to be pointing to a non-Kantian, non-Hegelian, post-Romantic form of enlightenment; namely the enlightening of what always was and will be dark and hard, “leaving it as it is”. He writes:

Look at the human beings: The one is poison for the other, the mother for the son and vice versa. But the mother is blind and so is the son. Maybe they have a bad conscience, but how does this help them? The child is wicked, but no one is teaching it to be different, and the parents spoil it by their stupid attachment. And how will they learn that, and how can the child learn it? They are so to speak *all* wicked and *all* innocent. (MS 174: 8r, my translation)

So the higher Ends of culture, and thus also of education, should maybe not be concerned with “justification” and “virtue”. Maybe it is more important that one learns how to cope with irrationality, misery, vagueness, confusion, evil, disorder, complexity, all in all learn to cope with the *non-perspicuous character* of the situations in which we find ourselves?

I think that when Wittgenstein compared culture with a kind of “order”⁵, he implicitly referred to the possibility of a special clarity about the “place” certain things have in our lives, and how this special clarity enables us to *live within the wilderness*, so to speak. Culture is when things are “in the clear” *within the disorders* around us and among us. It was Wittgenstein’s diagnosis, as I see it, that modernity with its efforts of science and justification, is under the spell of believing that one can provide a better clarity than the culturally given, and that this belief is actually expression of a kind of mental dis-order, a kind of disease that has hit the human form of life.

I consequently think the idea of “the space of reason” causes trouble, because it makes one blind to Kierkegaard’s demand, that we should realize how the “concretion” – which is an inevitable part of the formation of individuals – never can be so uniform, and common among people, that we all so to speak in principle can acquire a common space for general standards of rationality. By contrast, there will always be a certain amount of misunderstanding and darkness between people which (I think Wittgenstein argues) implies that *the human form of life is based on a special kind of dynamic attention* to the effect that both of the following is true:⁶

⁵ (See MS 109: 205; MS 169: 62).

⁶ I end this paper by analysing this dynamic attention!

(1) People constantly “*find their feet*” with one another, in ever new ways and in new situations

(2) There will always be many forms, and instances of, [let’s call it] *human separateness*

This separateness is maintained through the contingency and manifold of the “concretions” within human formation, as Kierkegaard pointed out. That is why formation is contingent in respect to the given cultural spectrum of behavioral patterns, and as we shall see, thereby contingent in respect to a culturally given “play of expressions”.

Wittgenstein on education

I have gone through the whole of the electronic version of Wittgenstein’s *Nachlass* checking his use of the two terms *Unterricht* and *Abrichten*. I will translate the two terms as *teaching* and *instructing*. I think Wittgenstein uses the expressions like this:

Teaching:

is the teaching of a *Lehre*. The *Lehre* is “what matters” as a cultural historical fact (say, it matters that we can diagnose diseases). The teaching of the *Lehre* is the discipline of handling what matters. It is a *Fach* giving witness to a *Sache*. The discipline, the *Fach*, is the teaching of how to sustain a cultural tradition of being competent in relation to special “fields” of issues, and an associated range of possible occupations (*Beschäftigung, Handeln*) with “things”. It is a matter of learning forms of activity, and one is supposed to learn the *Praxis* of the field of occupation, say learning to sort fruit into certain types, or learning to measure with a ruler, or tell different colors from one another.

Teaching is itself a set of activities where the teachers demonstrate something. It is a *Vorführen*, a kind of preliminary performance that shall make the practice of the kinds of occupation dawn on the pupils. But *Unterricht* is not a determination and encircling of how the pupil is supposed to behave and act onwards. It is initiation into how “we” are concerned about things, and in that sense teaching is a kind of invitation to join the *Praxis*. Teaching in this sense provides the pupil with a toolbox that, as a matter of tradition, is associated with kinds of occupation.

Instruction:

Whereas teaching “merely” demonstrates *that* a number of tools, schemes, tables, instruments [and in general “expressions of rules” or “paradigms”] can

be of use for given purposes, instruction involves an order (*Befehl*). Instruction in the contrasting sense orders the pupil to make a *particular use* of the toolbox, saying *this*, and only this, is how to use, for instance, the table for multiplying integers.

Wittgensteinian teaching is “enculturation”. It is a combination of learning *what* to occupy yourself with and *how*. And we can say this *without having to add* that through what we are taught we acquire the same “knowledge”, “skills”, “ideas”, “norms”, “values” and so on. It is not “wrong” to say it. But it does not really add to the story. The point I try to make here is that we are, so far, talking about something that is not personal in a strong sense. We are talking about becoming a member of certain groups of social actors, of becoming a participant in a variety of social settings. We need not ask and answer any question as to how much the people who are initiated into these cultural settings as participants, are “identical” in any respect to their teachers. What teachers and pupils share is first and foremost having learnt to continue a tradition of learning about certain subject matter, of continuing a *Lehre*.

Being instructed, the pupil must use the paradigms as does the teacher. But this application in the classroom is *not* the real application outside of the classroom which after all is the aim of the teaching. Learning to *apply the toolbox outside of the school in real-life situations* is the aim of teaching. Education shall deliver knowledge. But this will be mere “civilized” interaction if education does not unfold within what, following Goethe, we can call a certain *culture of knowledge* (Goethe 1976: 241 ff.). The acquisition of epistemic techniques and standardized information should take place within a re-assessment of the deeper concerns of human beings that you can never be taught at knowledge producing Institutions. Education should not have the formation of *persons*, as such, as its goal. Education shall be directed at developing new *participants* such that these can continue in the ongoing *heritage* of a *Lehre*.

Saying, the goal of education is not developing persons but participants, actually underscores *the importance of instruction*. The latter is necessary for the *achievement* of education, not for the *content* of education. Through instruction pupils learn particular techniques and develop individual skills. In that way instruction is a normative initiation into a variety of forms of expertise, and thereby the pupil becomes a candidate, a *possible* participant in various forms of occupation. One can use Thomas Kuhn’s ideas to illustrate the matter: Instruction is so to speak the exercise of textbook introduction into a “normal science”, into a given set of “exemplars” that falls within the particular form of science. Such instruction does not make you able to *conduct* normal science yourself in the sense of finding *new* exemplars. You have learnt the topic and you can *instruct*

others, but you have not necessarily become a *researcher*. Teaching by contrast to instruction (in our sense of the terms) is where you learn to *try to* do research by *applying* the toolbox in ways you were not explicitly instructed about. Still, it is instruction that “delivers”. There were no composers if there were no musicians, or no theatre plays if there were no actors. My dispute with Bakhurst is that I have challenged the idea of, say, actors *in the abstract* from any reminder about the character and significance of theatre plays. Similarly, for me there is no such thing as becoming a *citizen* in the abstract, where we are not considering any real historical circumstance of societies and communities, but only relating to an *ideal* of a human community.

On the *bürgerliche Stellung* of questions within philosophy of education

As I understand the discussions among a variety of recent philosophers of education, there seems to be an agreement that the *ends* of education and learning must include, generally speaking, intellectual virtues and conceptual capacities. This agreement does not prevent a certain scope in the more precise characteristics of these ends, if for example they involve “critical” understanding, “cultural” understanding (“citizenship”), or formation of the educated *person*. For “Wittgensteinian reasons”, that will follow, I will call all such ends “higher ends”, the ways of achieving them “education”, and the practices involved in these ways “teaching”. Consequently, I will raise a number of questions to the idea of there being *higher ends* in all education of human children. Of course what I challenge is there being specific such ends, both concerning the kind of abilities at issue, the kind of subject matter at issue, and the kind of agency at issue. There is, I think Wittgenstein would have said, a *diversity* in regard to all these parameters of education. There are several philosophical points involved: (1) We question the *uniformity and generality* of the very idea of cognitive skills. (2) We *relativize* those skills in that cognitive skills are embedded in practical situations but again, not *uniformly* so. (3) Finally we challenge the idea of a normative theology of practices. There are no fixed virtues, utilities, interests, nor Luntley’s “aesthetic sense of fit”, that form the baseline of practical life. In short, we underscore the way in which “rational” endeavors form part of the whole “hurly burly” of (having to lead a) human life.

One should notice that all of the epistemic concerns in Wittgenstein after October 1931 are related to a broader anthropological, cultural, historical account. (See Brock 2016). Wittgenstein says in OC:

We are satisfied that the earth is round (OC 1975: 299)

That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are *in deed* [in der Tat] not doubted. (OC 1975: 342)

My *life* consists in my being content to accept many things. (OC 1975: 344)

I notice three things, the epistemic issue concerning the seeming strange link between empirical and logical sentences is dissolved when one realizes that we have to do with a straightforward practice within the sciences. Second, sciences are based on human action, and third, there being fixed forms of action within science is a hinge, not for my understanding as such, but for my whole *life*. This is the “line of argument” in OC as I see it. Some paragraphs in OC might give the impression that the issue is as follows: There is an individual person. She judges that, say, “gold is yellow”, and now we, philosophers, can play skeptical games with that person, and “ask for reasons” for making the particular judgment. We, philosophers then “save” the poor lady by giving an account in which we point out, (a) judgments are part of clusters of judgments, (b) such clusters are associated with certain (accepted) social practices, and (c) these practices “come natural”. But I think Wittgenstein would here ask philosophers giving this account; *for whom* are you trying to save the lady’s judgment? For obviously, Wittgenstein pointed to this:

It is simply the normal case to be incapable of mistake about the designation of certain things in one’s mother tongue. (OC 1975: 630)

The lady might not be in need of being saved. As Wittgenstein explicitly says in PI:

The civil status [bürgerliche Stellung] of a contradiction, or its status [Stellung] in civil life, there is the philosophical problem. (PI 1997: 125)

The seeming surprising thing, that what one day is logical may become empirical the next day, does not lead to an *epistemic* puzzle. It is plain scientific practice as Wittgenstein knew from his time as a student of engineering. Take the ideal gas law ($P \times V = k \times T$) or Ohm’s law or ($V = R \times I$). Maybe one did first pick a source of electricity and “defined” that the power of that source had so and so much “voltage”, and then one (Ampere) defined what should count as the “strength” of an electric current by constructing an electrical devise, and finally defined what “a resistant” would be (say, there is a loss in voltage from the input pole to the output pole of the item). Then one could “discover” that the quantity of that loss in voltage – called now “the resistance” of the item – followed a certain empirical regularity. However, after this empirical law had been used for decades

and thus had led to the production of different “resistants”, one could now change the game, and make these resistants the *paradigms* of the next game where currents and resistances are now fixed but the voltage of diverse power sources have become the object of investigation. Batteries, components in electric circuits, and different wires connecting it all; these three “elements” of the game of measuring electric currents can be, and *are*, as a historical fact, constantly *calibrated against one another*. This is scientific *Praxis*, and “we” are content in our *lives* that this *Praxis* holds. Wittgenstein says in OC:

“An empirical proposition can be *tested*” (we say). But how? And through what? (OC 1975: 109)

What *counts* as its test? [...] As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded proposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting [*Handlungsweise*]. (OC 1975: 110)

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our acting [*Handeln*], which lies at the bottom of our language-game. (OC 1975: 204)

Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings [*Handlungen*]. (OC 1975: 259)

Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement. (OC 1975: 378)

You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).

It is there-like our life. (OC 1975: 559)

I read such paragraphs as trying to bring the reader to see that epistemological and semantic questions might fail to invoke the practical part of the issues. Wittgenstein’s post TLP philosophy operates in a landscape of human action, *Handeln*, which expresses the daily commerce of doings and concerns. Wittgenstein talks about and addresses human beings that cannot but unfold their lives in the midst of actual and past *Handeln*, and where we each, constantly must “act”. The point is that we, readers, are not supposed to leave this “space of daily commerce”. When we deal with thought, deliberation, choice, identification, norms, values, truth, whatever, we are *still* merely making commentaries on daily commerce. Of course such commerce can be very sophisticated like that of the wiz kids running the computers at a modern high technology stock exchange. Not leaving the space of daily commerce also means; you have to *count all in*. We are not leaving anything out, only we do not invoke an *external* stratification of the daily commerce. In this light, we might understand what Wittgenstein further says in OC:

Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing [festzulegen] a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice [Die Praxis] has to speak for itself. (OC 1975: 140)

Clearly what is stated here is that the purpose of establishing a practice cannot be external to the practices involved in the establishing. In short, I think that a main part of Wittgenstein's post TLP philosophy is based on the insight, that human judgment must involve, call it, epistemic techniques, and such techniques are, at the end of the day, *Handlungen*. Consequently, in philosophy we should recognize the primacy of *Praxis*.

[...] thinking and inferring (like counting) is of course bounded for us, not by an arbitrary definition, but by natural limits corresponding to the body of what can be called the role of thinking and inferring in our life. (RFM 1978: I, 116)

For Wittgenstein, since October 1931, questions about the “determinateness of sense” were always embedded in an assessment of linguistic practices relative to a variety of cultural-historical settings. I think Wittgenstein was serious when he wrote in OC:

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination [...]. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc., – they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. (OC 1975: 475–6)

Learning things, even in School and at Universities, are at the end of the day to be seen as what Kant called “concepts of the world” by contrast to “concepts of school”. [here the case of bonobo Kanzi is telling, Sägerdal et.al. 2009)]. For we must not confuse; the “learning goal” of the *teachers* can never *circumscribe* the eventual learning goal of the pupils: The teacher shall perhaps learn Peter how to calculate with tensors in order to deal with textbook problems written in books on electrodynamics. But Peter has to learn to *apply* the tensor calculus, say when he later works as a researcher in a certain lab run by a certain company. The point here is not that one thing is theory and formalism, another thing is practice and real life. The point is simply, that whatever Peter “learnt”, he has to *use it continuously*. Teaching is not done merely to produce *new copies of teachers*. Teaching primarily leads to the production of skilled and informed agents acting on ever new arenas.

Teaching as a-temporal work

So education is not innocent in terms of *temporality*. Two things are important here: The *a*-temporal (logical) character of the “learning-situation” and the fact that it nevertheless involves *dealings* [*tätigkeit*]. That is why we shall distinguish below between different *relations between activity and temporality*

There is always the danger of wanting to find an expression’s meaning [Bedeutung] by contemplating the expression itself, and the frame of mind in which one uses it, instead of always thinking of the practice [Die Praxis]. (OC 1975 601)

Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a “proto-phenomenon” [Urphänomen]. That is, where we ought to have said: *This language-game is played*. (PI 1997: 654)

The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game. (PI 1997: 655)

[...] the term “language-game” is meant to bring to prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity [Tätigkeit], or form of life. (PI 1997: 23)

Writers within philosophy of education such as Bakhurst, M. Luntley, M. Williams, and J. Stickney do certainly not think of themselves as “explaining” the modalities of teaching, but still they all in some sophisticated way try to give an account of “what goes on *while* a pupil learns something”. They have not managed in following Wittgenstein in *noting* language games as activities in an atemporal way. *They confuse the actuality of teaching with the actuality of learning*. That is the main argument of the present paper and will be the key to the overcoming of McDowellian modesty.

M. Williams talks about a kind of calibration of pupils, the calibration of facts and observation of facts, Stickney about the rigidity of the techniques developed, turning basic language-games into “clocks”, M. Luntley about an a priori “sense of fit” that is induced by means of a catalyzing teaching, and Bakhurst points to a special kind of socialization. They all take education to be an *actual* formation of a person. Education even becomes “the making of a civil, rational Man”. They all have some idea about how nature becomes second nature, or nature becomes culture. The case of the individual child is presented as a case in point for the prospects for, and purposes of, education in general. Their respective accounts all have this overriding point: The lucky thing is that the pupil becomes “one of us” and has acquired the same “position” as we have, say in relation to reality, society, fellow human beings, conceptual understanding, thought. It is like going directly from the kinder garden to a variety of associations of adults where equals can exchange ideas, and co-operate. Such writers

as we discuss, all give an account of the *goods* they believe are achieved by means of education. They tell us *what* is achieved for anybody, and they tell us how to *get there*. They literally speaking turn education into ABC: How to get from A to B under condition C.

Am I simply saying, there is no overall theology, and so “anything goes”, if it goes? Not at all. I just say; you should look for the *works of teachers* and not their “effects” on pupils. The works, the activities, of teachers stand there, in an atemporal manner, like sign-posts, as expressions of rules. *The sign-posts are not actualities, they provide actual possibilities*. One can say: “The pupil” is tense-less, with no historical meaning, and say that education is part of the history of keeping the language games going, not the pupils. This is phylogenesis, not ontogenesis.

A concrete example of how to teach people about (colored) things

“We” think there is such a thing as the ability to observe the colors of things and that we have somehow learnt this ability by some forms of teaching on the part of the adults we grew up with.

There may be mental defectives who cannot be taught the concept of “tomorrow”, or the concept “I”, nor to tell time.

Now to whom can I describe *what* these people cannot learn? (RC 1977: I, 75)

We speak of “colour-blindness” and call it a “defect”. But there could easily be several differing abilities, none of which is clearly inferior to the others. -And remember, too, that a man may go through life without his color-blindness being noticed, until some occasion spring to light.

Is it possible then for different people in this way to have different colour concepts? *Some-what* different ones. Different with respect to one or another feature [Zug]. And that will impair their mutual understanding to a greater or lesser degree, but often hardly at all. (RC 1977: III, 31–2)

We must always bear in mind the question: How do people learn the meaning [Die Bedeutung] of color names? (RC 1977: III, 61)

We could say: It is a phenomenon that there are people who can't see this or that. This phenomenon is colour-blindness. — It would therefore be an inability; seeing however, would be the ability. (RC 1977: III, 281)

I can't teach someone a game I can't learn myself. A color-blind person cannot teach a normal person the use of color words. Is that true? He can't give him a *demonstration* of the game, of the use [nicht *vorführen*]. (RC 1977: III, 284)

Being “color-blind” is for Wittgenstein *not* a “defect” but an inability to play *specific* games by the means of which one learns to use color-words. So there is nothing called what it is that you *cannot* learn if you cannot learn a certain game. For yes, you cannot learn *this* technique, but that might imply very many things. Also, perhaps you can then learn *another* game which either has some significance for “us” or it hasn’t, and precisely therefore, you are extraordinary, and extraordinarily important for, say, apple picking. We can all learn from one another despite how we *stand* towards each other. Teaching is *never* a one way process, from teacher to pupils. We are all each other’s teachers and pupils. “Bringing up baby” is nothing neutral or undetached, as some young parents have found out. Educating, learning, teaching, exercising etc. are not unfolding in a rational sphere or in a special “learning situation”, and it is not nature coming to culture, it is Man coming to Man.

So the “color-blind” is always right in the middle of “joining” into a complex, given set of language games. He can join some and not others, and so he is both part of some future activities and must put some ambitions of the past on hold; for “if you fail this test of red-green, you can’t have a driver’s license”. The “defect” of the color-blind is like a “handicap”, but handicaps do not rule you out of all the games, you only join the constellation of games differently. Education here means: Taking the handicapped and bringing him into as many games as possible, not taking him from A to B. That is how activity, temporality, and individuality hang together.

Taking steps in education: Training, constructing, instructing, exercising, and following (the teaching)

I therefore propose that we make the following distinctions when we try to represent educational activities: I suggest we talk about *training* as an effort to become familiar with things, like when you learn to “feel the ball” or “become acquainted with apples”, how they can taste, how to cut them, plant them. In short think of training as a kind of hands-on learning that familiarizes you with things. Training in this sense is training *Gebrauch*. Now some uses of things can turn into “arrangements” or even “constructions”. Say I learn to arrange a deck of cards in several ways, or organize my Donald Duck magazines in several ways. When I learn that, I prepare the deck of cards for a variety of *instructions*. I can now “arrange it like *this* and not like *that*”. Constructions prepare for instructions. But that still leave open how and why one could “follow up on” such instructions. That is what I will call *exercise*. Doing exercises is when you *try to follow up on* certain instructions. This is the step where you exercise *ver-*

wendungen, recurrent uses, techniques etc. Now it is still not settled how such techniques can and are supposed to be *applied*.

To say that a sentence which has the form of information has a use [verwendung], is not yet to say anything about the *kind* of use [Verwendung] it has. (RC 1977: III, 336)

[...] A meaning [Bedeutung] of a word is a kind of employment [Verwendung] of it.

For it is what we learn when the word is incorporated into our language. (OC 1975: 61)

Dass wir einen Satz verstehen, zeigt uns dass wir ihn unter Umständen verwenden könnten ... aber es zeigt uns nicht *was*, und *Wieviel* wir mit ihm anfangen können. (MS 137: 116a)

I want to say:

1. Matters of education should concern the “pupils” *taking steps* – available from teachers works – from training to constructing, from constructing to exercising and then finally from exercising to learning to *follow a teaching* concerning the application of a sign-post.

2. Do not see it backwards. Do not let the “learning goal” decide how you analyse exercise, construction/instruction, and training.

3. And don’t take “training” to be the only real activity. Do not confuse training with rehearsing, which is a feature of exercising.

4. Going from training to learning what you should learn is not moving *up* from a concrete to an abstract level. Training should be seen more like the practice you get, say, when you enter a new field of Sport, such that you become so familiar with, say a ketcher, that you can begin receiving instructions and doing exercises relevant for the game of tennis.

Education is in that sense more like jumping into the water and gradually learning to “swim about”, and finally reaching the possibility of engaging in swimming competitions if – for whatever “reason” such competitions count in our pattern of life.

Between techniques of observation and the exercise of the power of Imagination

I am quite sure that one finds the same point in Wittgenstein, and that Wittgenstein associated the difference between teaching and instruction with a difference between *observing* and *seeing*. We now turn to this last topic. Wittgenstein writes:

One must take the concept of seeing as one finds it, and not try to refine it [...]. For it is not our job to change the concept and introduce that as suitable for some particular purpose

(as science does). Our job is to understand the concept, and that means: not make a false picture of it [...]. It is rather a matter of catching on to the language games that are played, and to point out that tempting explanations, constructions are not right [...]. It always is a matter of distinguishing expression and technique, and thus the case where we can explain the technique from cases where we cannot. (MS 137: 15a-b, 16a, my translation)

What I observe and what I see do not have the same (kind of) identity. (RC 1977: III, 318)

What do we call observing? Roughly this: putting oneself into the most favourable position to receive certain impressions – with the purpose, for example, of describing what they tell him. (LW II 1993: 7e)

One observes in order to see what would not see if one did not observe. (RC 1977: III, 326)

The indefiniteness in the concept of colour lies, above all, in the indefiniteness of the concept of the sameness of colors, i.e. of the method of comparing colours. (RC 1977: III, 78)

I introduce, say, the word “cobalt blue”: How do I fix what “C” is? I could take as the paradigm of this color a paper or a dye in a pot.

How do I determine that a surface (for example) has this color? Everything depends on the method of comparison. (RC 1977: III, 259)

So Wittgenstein urges us to “distinguish the expression from the technique” and this implies that coming to *see* something is not “directly” a matter of having employed a certain technique of observation. However, in another sense, these techniques frames and sometimes even conditions the possibility for seeing things; an example being how the ascription of color concepts presuppose methods of comparison. So observation can *change* the way we see some things. But observation, again, does not generate our perceptions.

I think it was such issues that led Wittgenstein to first reflect on “aspect blindness” and later “the dawning of an aspect”, and I think that these two issues are concerned with both an “objective” part and a “subjective” part. In short, for Wittgenstein there is “subjectivity in the objective” and “objectivity in the subjective”. We will learn that the combination of the subjective and the objective in human understanding is associated with the following issue; namely the issue of how the ability to *make* observations in certain ways is associated with a power, which we can never be taught how to make use of, namely the “power of imagining” (*Vorstellungskraft*). Wittgenstein writes in relation to his analysis on “aspect seeing”:

Now, there is a connection between aspect and imagination. The aspects of cover and basic plane: What is someone who is blind to these aspects lacking? It would not be without sense calling it *Vorstellungskraft*. (MS 137: 30a, my translation)⁷

7 Other remarks in the Nachlass (Wittgenstein 2000) on this power are: MS 122: 121, MS 169:

Wittgenstein writes:

Colour, sound, taste, temperature, all have a subjective and an objective side to them. And that undoubtedly means that sometimes they show what I feel, sometimes they describe the external world. – Now, my knowledge of the position of my body seems to be lacking the subjective link (*Zwischenglied*). (LW I 1990: 53–54e)

Note the remark on a *subjective* “*Zwischenglied*” between the objective and the subjective! The “Subject”, the “agent”, is moving back and forth between the 1. person and the 3. person perspective. This takes the power of Imagination. It is by exercising *Vorstellungskraft* that we can move back and forth between the subjective and the objective, and that we can “paint” the *whole* spectre associated with “a concept”:

One has to look at the concepts ‘to be in pain’ and ‘to simulate pain’ in the *third and first* person. Or: the infinitive covers all persons and tenses. Only the whole is the instrument, the concept. (LW II 1993: 37e)

So human understanding is mediated by the subjective power of Imagination, making our “attention” (*Aufmerksamkeit*) objectively dynamic:

One might say: The attention is dynamic, not static ... I first compared paying attention with casting a glance, which is not what I call attention, and I will now say, one *cannot* pay attention in a static way ... In a particular case, when I say; the attention consists in the readiness to follow every little motion that may show, you will soon see that the attention is not the stiff looking at something, but is a concept of a different kind. (MS 137: 31b, my translation)

Through the personal exercise of the power of imagination you become “observant” in a way in which you were not if you did not exercise this power. But the manners of observation, which you are taught, do not shape nor determine this personal exercise. Also, you can be taught manners of observation, but the historical fact *that* these manners are adequate, is not something you can be taught, it is part of a cultural *tradition* for observing things. So learning the techniques of language, learning to observe in various ways, can take you from two cultural historical positions, from A to B. Thus, in position B you see things *different* than in position A. This is what education generally speaking can bring you, not why to begin at A in the first place, and what it is precisely you come to

62v, MS 114: 121, MS 116: 75, MS 137: 27a, 34b, MS 138: 1a, 1b, MS 144: 61, TS 232: 728, 731, 736.

see at position B. *Now we have overcome the price of modesty* and what Kierkegaard called an abstraction concerning an absolute conception of formation. The formed person does not incarnate “an absolute difference” in relation to other animals, but is the embodiment of “a difference”, namely the individualized ability to view things *from* position B by contrast to both viewing things from *other positions* and to *others persons* viewing things from position B.

Conclusion

In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy we find a view on formation and education that underscores the ability to *objectify* but in a manner that preserves an emotional and real life character of what we learn. The ideal is not the formation of rational judgment but the formation of engaged participants that maintain a kind of reverence for the things they handle within their occupations. There is a *wholeness* at stake which put a limit to the way in which we can categorize and separate things, a wholeness that is the mark of culture by contrast to the fragmented learning of civilization. This also means that there is a limit to our communion. Education does not build a common space for “humanity”. The rational separation of things is rather seen as blinding us from the real separateness, the separateness of people. However, education can help us recognize this separateness as guided by cultural orders. I know of no better word for this task than “historical *übersichtliche Darstellung*”. This is a special historical form of aspect-seeing, which is characterized by an ability to go crisscross among many different historically given scenarios and experiences, and all to the effect that one is better suited for trying to *see the man in men*.

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