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MANAGER–EMPLOYEE GENDER CONGRUENCE AND THE BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES: EVIDENCE FROM SCHOOLS

The role of gender in management has long been a subject of research attention and debate (Kanter, 1977; Hearn & Parkin, 1983; Marshall, 1995; Butterfield & Grinnell, 1999), and yet scholarly consensus on the relationship between gender, management, and employee behavior remains elusive.

This article expands our knowledge concerning the role of manager–employee gender congruence (M–EGC) to key aspects of bureaucratic accountability among public service employees. M–EGC refers to the match in personal characteristics that occurs when a manager and employee share the same gender. Bureaucratic accountability involves “the means by which public workers manage diverse expectations within and outside the organization” (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, 228).

This research focus is pertinent for two reasons. First, person–supervisor fit theory, a subset of person–environment fit theory (Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005; Edwards, 2008), suggests that a match in corresponding characteristics between supervisor and subordinate may result in positive work outcomes. Yet public administration research on the consequences of M–EGC in public organizations is sparse (Grissom, Nicholson-Grotty, & Keiser, 2012). Private sector studies are also limited (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005) and yield conflicting results: Some studies find significant relationships whereas others do not (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998). Meta-evidence suggests that the person–supervisor fit is associated with employee job satisfaction but finds no significant relationships with respect to performance and organizational commitment (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005). For person–supervisor studies
that look specifically at gender, some studies find that M–EGC is associated with differences in outcomes (Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989; Konrad, Winter, & Gutek, 1992; Giuliano, Leonard, & Levine, 2005; Grissom, Nicholson-Grotty, & Keiser, 2012), whereas others expect—but fail—to find such differences in outcomes (Mobley, 1982; Pulakos et al., 1989; Goldberg, Riordan, & Zhang, 2008). In this perspective, this article offers new knowledge concerning the role of M–EGC in public organizations.

Second, research attention to the determinants of the bureaucratic accountability of public employees is important. Bureaucratic accountability is a key feature of representative democratic government (Day & Klein, 1987; Bovens, 2007). Due to information and time constraints, decision-making authority is delegated from the elected officials through political executives to the employees on the frontlines of the public organizations (Lipsky, 1980). However, while the public service employees are to act on behalf of the political principals, they are largely immune to electoral accountability. In addition, information asymmetry limits the potential for supervisory control and oversight (Pratt, 1985). Street-level bureaucracy literature thus emphasizes the importance of public employees’ organizational goal alignment and their compliance with organizational rules and regulations (Lipsky, 1980)—two key aspects of bureaucratic accountability.

Moreover, bureaucratic accountability is a perennial public management concern (Meyers & Nielsen, 2012). Scholars and practitioners have long debated the importance and challenges involved in ensuring that public employees work tenaciously and aligned with the established policy goals (McCubbins, Noll, & Wiengast, 1987; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Brehm & Gates, 1997; Meglino & Ravlin, 1998; Boswell, 2006). Knowledge of the factors affecting their bureaucratic accountability is thus a cornerstone for public management. As no study has examined the role of M–EGC to public service employees’ bureaucratic accountability, this article contributes to this end.
In particular, this article examines the role of M–EGC among public service employees in relation to two key aspects of bureaucratic accountability: (a) organizational goal alignment and (b) compliance with organizational rules and regulations. With schools as the setting for our study, we test our M–EGC hypotheses among school teachers, a prototypical example of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980). That is, we examine how gender congruence between school principals and teachers relates to differences in the school teachers’ organizational goal alignment and their compliance with organizational rules and regulations. Our data consist of teacher survey data and administrative school data. We use OLS regression but also capitalize on school fixed effects that provide a strong control for confounding effects.

**BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY**

What exactly is bureaucratic accountability? In line with Burke (1990) and Hupe and Hill (2007), this article approaches bureaucratic accountability from an actor-centered perspective referring to the public employees’ accountability toward political and administrative principals. By defining the construct as involving “the means by which public workers manage diverse expectations within and outside the organization” (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987, 228), we focus on the public service employees and their strategies and actions for managing expectations from both organizationally external and internal audiences (Levine, Peter, & Thompson, 1990; O’Loughlin, 1990; Gregory, 2003).

We examine two aspects of bureaucratic accountability. Drawn from the literatures on organizational behavior and public administration, *organizational goal alignment* relates to the employees’ alignment with the goals of the organization and their personal concern for unit goals and objectives (Watermann & Meier, 1998; Borman et al., 2001). *Compliance with organizational rules and regulations* captures the alignment with managerial orders and
regulations (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Borman et al., 2001; Snell, 2004) and with the organizational policies (Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983). Both aspects refer to the public employees’ reactions to the expectations of external and internal audiences (political actors and administrative principals within the organization).

Public employees work in settings characterized by changing political principals, agendas, and policies. Hence, the content of public organizational goals, rules, and regulations is subjected to occasional change. A key component of public management is to continuously manage and communicate prevailing goals, rules, and regulations to the employees—and not least to establish employee support and commitment (Rainey, 2014). However, the extent to which employees accept and internalize (Gagné & Deci, 2005) externally defined and changing goals, rules, and regulations is likely to be influenced by congruence in personal characteristics between the manager and employees. As we discuss in the following, person-to-person congruence in demographic characteristics, such as gender, may affect the effectiveness of a public manager in terms of ensuring that the employees act in alignment with the organizational goals, rules, and regulations.

**GENDER CONGRUENCE: THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS**

The role of person-to-person congruence in demographic characteristics has attracted increasing attention in the field of public administration. From a representative bureaucracy perspective (Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Dolan & Rosenbloom, 2003), scholars have studied the consequences of congruence between public employees and clients in characteristics such as race (Meier, Wrinkle, & Polinard, 1999; Stoll, Raphael, & Holzer, 2004; Wilkins & Williams, 2008; Roch & Pitts, 2012) and gender (Keiser et al., 2002; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Wilkins & Keiser, 2006; Wilkins, 2007). Grissom, Nicholson-Grotty, and
Keiser (2012) have found that M–EGC among school principals and teachers yields lower teacher turnover propensities.

Public management research on gender congruence outcomes, whether focusing on the employee–client or manager–employee dyad, is marked by a key commonality: In line with the assumption of person–supervisor congruence effects in person–environment fit theory (Kristof, 1996; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005; Edwards, 2008), supervisor–subordinate interaction is expected to yield distinctive outcomes when supervisor and subordinate are similar to one another. While labor market segregation scholars (Becker, 1971) and organizational demography research (Pfeffer, 1983) have long suggested that people prefer to work with similar others, the field of social psychology provides theories elaborating on the similarity–dissimilarity process. In particular, similarity/attraction theory (Berscheid & Walster, 1969; Byrne, 1971) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggest that we, as human beings, tend to better understand and identify with people exhibiting the same characteristics as ourselves. Similarity on demographic dimensions such as gender promotes compatibility and mutual understanding, whereas dissimilarity fosters incompatibility and disagreement (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; Hogg & Abrams, 1998).

For example, research shows that managers communicate more effectively and have fewer misunderstandings with demographically similar employees (Triandis, 1960; Lang, 1986; Tannen, 1990). Moreover, managers make better role models for employees sharing their demographic characteristics (Thomas, 1990) and similar individuals engage in work relationships with greater mutual trust and cooperation (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Costa & Kahn, 2003). Findings such as these suggest M–EGC may promote the effectiveness of a manager’s efforts and actions in relation to mustering employee support for organizational goals, rules, and regulations. In line with somewhat stereotypical gender beliefs, similarity/attraction theory, social identity theory, and person–supervisor fit theory support
that M–EGC may enhance the employees’ internalization of organizational goals and their acceptance of organizational rules and regulations—for male and female employees alike. We thus expect that M–EGC is positively associated with the bureaucratic accountability of public employees (Hypothesis 1A).

However, some research lends support to a contrasting hypothesis. As mentioned, some studies do not find that M–EGC relates to significant differences in outcomes (Mobley, 1982; Pulakos et al., 1989; Goldberg, Riordan, & Zhang, 2008). In support of these null findings, Harrison, Price, and Bell (1998) hypothesize and find that “surface-level” diversity (demographics) is unlikely to have substantial, long-lasting effects. Over time, dissimilarities in a “surface-level” dimension, such as gender, become less important than “deep-level” (attitudinal) dissimilarities. Milliken and Martins (1996, 415–416) offer a similar argument: “Negative affective outcomes of diversity in observable attributes [gender] appear to decrease with the amount of time that the group stays together” (see also Amir, 1969; Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen, 1993; Ellison & Powers, 1994).

Moreover, some representative bureaucracy research suggests that gender may matter less than job characteristics for employee behavior. For example, the effects of supervisor–subordinate congruence necessitate a significant amount of administrative work discretion (Meier & Bohte, 2001; Sowa & Selden, 2003). Such findings emphasize that M–EGC may result in insignificant effects in real-life organizations.

As gender is a “surface-level” characteristic, the effectiveness of a manager’s efforts and actions in relation to mustering employee support for organizational goals, rules, and regulations may be unaffected by M–EGC. The bureaucratic accountability of public employees may vary but without any systematic association to their supervisor’s gender. We thus accept the possibility that M–EGC is unrelated to differences in bureaucratic accountability across males and females (Hypothesis 1B).
A study by Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly (1992) spurs a third hypothesis. They examine the role of race and gender diversity on organizational attachment; a concept involving substantial overlap with the domain of bureaucratic accountability. They find that people of a minority gender at their work organization are less likely to be attached to their organization and have higher absenteeism. However, belonging to an under-represented gender at the workplace appeared to reduce organizational attachment for males only—not females. We therefore suggest that minority male public employees might generally exhibit lower levels of bureaucratic accountability than their female colleagues.

In addition, identity theory emphasizes how individuals are members of multiple social groups and therefore hold multiple social role identities (Deaux, 1996; Hogg & Abrams, 1998). These identities are internally organized in saliency hierarchies, which vary from one situation to another (Thoits, 1991). From the perspective of identity theory, a public manager’s role identities thus comprise both a “gender identity” and a “manager identity.” The “manager identity” is likely to involve a general desire to restrict and minimize dysfunctional bureaucratic accountability activity among employees of both genders—for male and female managers alike. However, similarity/attraction theory (Berscheid & Walster, 1969; Byrne, 1971) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) support that managers may exhibit greater restraint in sanctioning the dysfunctional bureaucratic accountability activity of same-gender employees. First, because they understand and identify with their same-gender employees to a greater degree. Second, because this line of theory suggests that a manager’s “gender identity” is often more salient than their “manager identity” in situations where the two identities involve different behavioral prescriptions; gender is an attribute often overriding other personal characteristics (Stryker, 1987). Thus, based on the Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly (1992) study and identity theory, we expect that male and female managers might exhibit different sanctioning behavior toward employees—despite similar inclinations.
to enact a general managerial role identity that encourages efforts to minimize dysfunctional bureaucratic accountability activity among employees of both genders. In other words, male managers in organizational settings in which males constitute the minority gender group—and hence have lower levels of bureaucratic accountability—may not notice and respond as easily to the dysfunctional behavior of male employees as female managers. On this basis, we theorize that in public service settings where males constitute the minority gender group, the bureaucratic accountability of employees is negatively related to M–EGC for male employees (Hypothesis 2).

The area of schooling provides a useful case for shedding light on this third expectation. Compulsory schooling is characterized by a predominance of females in the workplace (i.e., males are the minority gender group), both in the Danish context (Danish Ministry of Children and Education 2010; Pedersen et al., 2011; Molsgaard, 2012) and internationally (OECD, 2009).

In sum, different studies and theories found a set of competing hypotheses concerning the role of M–EGC to the bureaucratic accountability of public service employees. Similarity/attraction theory (Berscheid & Walster, 1969; Byrne, 1971) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) support that M–EGC may promote the effectiveness of a manager’s efforts and actions in relation to mustering employee support for organizational goals, rules, and regulations. Other studies suggest that the employees’ bureaucratic accountability may remain unaffected by M–EGC (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Milliken & Martins, 1996). Finally, for public service settings in which males constitute the minority gender group, identity theory (Deaux, 1996; Hogg & Abrams, 1998; Stryker, 1987) and extant research (Tsui, Egan, & O’Reilly, 1992) support that M–EGC may be associated with lower bureaucratic accountability for male employees.
DATA AND METHOD
The data consist of teacher survey data and administrative school data. The Danish National Centre for Social Research (SFI) conducted the teacher survey in the spring of 2011. A total of 2,612 teachers were invited to participate, 1,632 of whom responded (62.5%). Past sample analyses support an acceptable sample representativity (Pedersen & Hvidman, 2011). We test the hypotheses using school fixed effects regression that necessitates a minimum of two teacher observations for each school. We therefore exclude all teacher observations that could not be matched to another teacher observation within a given school. The final sample contains 1,121 teachers in 407 schools. Sample attrition analyses suggest that the 1,121 teachers are not systematically different from the 511 excluded teachers (t-tests show no significant differences in means for the teacher characteristics of gender, ethnicity, age, educational level, tenure, and teaching experience).

UNI-C, an agency under the Danish Ministry of Children and Education, provided the administrative data holding information on all Danish schools, including measures of student enrollment, teacher statistics, and school principal gender. We joined the administrative data onto the teacher survey data using a national school identification denoting each school by a unique six-digit number.

Dependent Variables
We estimate the role of M–EGC in relation to two aspects of bureaucratic accountability: (a) organizational goal alignment and (b) organizational compliance with rules and regulations. We measure these variables using continuous scales composed of five-point teacher survey items. We generate each scale by mean pooling of the item scores. Kernel density plots suggest that the score distribution of each scale approaches a standard normal distribution.
We measure *organizational goal alignment* by three Likert-type items, anchored at 1 ("fully disagree") and 5 ("fully agree"), capturing the assessment of the schools’ goals, agreement with these goals, and effort toward accomplishing them. The items are: (a) “My schools’ established goals and values are concrete and tangible,” (b) “I agree on the established school goals and values,” and (c) “I try hard to meet the school goals and values.” Principal component analysis reveals factor loadings of .84 to .90 (eigenvalue 1.45 with 73 percent variance explained). Cronbach’s alpha is .82.

*Compliance with organizational rules and regulations* is measured by three items capturing orientation toward centrally-issued legislation, instructions, and managerial inputs (goals, instructions, and more informal dialogue). The items are anchored at 1 (“no emphasis”) and 5 (“great emphasis”). After the text “When making decisions about the organization of teaching and choice of methods, what emphasis do you place on…,” the teachers were asked to state their response to the following items: (a) “…the legislation and centrally issued demands and instructions,” (b) “…objectives, values, and instructions established by management,” and (c) “…dialogue and discussions with management.” The factor loadings range from .70 to .89 (eigenvalue 1.84 with 61 percent variance explained). Cronbach’s alpha is .67.

**Explanatory Variables**

The main independent variables are teacher gender and M–EGC. We measure teacher gender by a binary variable signifying female (1) or male (0). We measure M–EGC by a binary variable denoting whether the teacher is of the same gender as their school principal (1) or not (0). We construct the M–EGC measure using the teacher gender variable and a school principal gender variable from the administrative school data set. Our sample comprises more female teachers than male (59%) and more male school principals than female (65%).
predominance of male school principals and female teachers entails that 46 percent of the sample teachers are sharing gender with their principal (26% of the teacher observations are marked by male–male M–EGC, 20% by female–female M–EGC). Of the 407 sample schools, 275 are marked by within-school variation in M–EGC (177 male-led schools, 98 female-led schools).

**Control Variables**

Systematic selection of (fe)male teachers into schools with (fe)male principals could bias our results. We are unable to prove that teacher sorting into male-led versus female-led schools is “as good as random.” However, the occurrence of M–EGC is likely somewhat exogenous in practice. To the very least, no evidence appears to suggest that school principal gender is a critical attraction criterion when male and female teachers are looking for jobs. Later in this article, we proceed further and test if school principals are more likely to hire and retain teachers who share their gender.

As a safeguard against omitted variable bias, we nevertheless include a selection of teacher variables in all model specifications. The set of controls includes age, teacher and both parents born in Denmark, master’s degree program, regular teacher education, pedagogical diploma degree, tenure, teaching experience, and wage extras. In addition, we enter a set of school indicators in all basic OLS regressions (because the indicators are “constant” within the individual school, they are not included in the school fixed effects regressions). We control for school size and type.² We also include a measure of the number of full-time equivalent teachers at the school, thus taking account of human resources in terms of manpower. Moreover, we control for the teacher gender composition at the school (fraction of females in the teaching staff). Descriptive statistics appear in Table 1.
**Estimation Strategy**

We test our hypotheses by different model specifications. We present the three main specifications in the following. We estimate a basic production function for each accountability measure:

(eq. 1) \[ Y_{ik} = \beta_{0k} + T'_{ik}\beta_{1k} + S'_{ik}\beta_{2k} + G_{ik}\beta_{3k} + \epsilon_{ik} \]

For each dependent variable, \( Y_{ik} \) represents the outcome of teacher \( i \) at school \( k \). The outcome depends on teacher characteristics \( (T) \), including teacher gender, and school characteristics \( (S) \), including school principal gender. The effect of M–EGC on outcome is measured by variable \( G \). The error term, \( \epsilon_{ik} \), contains all of the unobserved effects on \( Y_{ik} \), including teacher, school principal, and school effects. We expand eq. 1 to test the separate effects of M–EGC for male and female teachers:

(eq. 2) \[ Y_{ik} = \beta_{0k} + T'_{ik}\beta_{1k} + S'_{ik}\beta_{2k} + G_{ik}\beta_{3k} + F_{ik}\beta_{4k} + \epsilon_{ik} \]

Basically, we add an interaction term that multiplies the M–EGC variable \( (G) \) with the teacher gender variable \( (F) \). As we measure teacher gender by a binary variable (female = 1), \( \beta_3 \) now shows the M–EGC effect for male teachers, while the product of \( \beta_3 \) and \( \beta_4 \) shows the M–EGC effect for female teachers. For the purpose of clarity, we will display the M–EGC effects for male and female teachers in terms of marginal effects.

While the occurrence of M–EGC may be somewhat exogenous in practice, we cannot reject that some unobserved characteristics may correlate with both M–EGC and the dependent variables, thus biasing our results. We therefore estimate school fixed effects models exploiting that we have multiple teacher observations for each school to eliminate between-school sorting effects. Using school fixed effect, we essentially exclude between-school variation in teacher outcomes and M–EGC, whatever their source.
By estimating the M–EGC effect using within-school variation only, all school characteristics are constant and therefore drop out from the model. Importantly, unobserved school principal effects are also constant and thus eliminated from the error term. By accounting for effects that are common to all teachers within a given school, we remove them as bias sources. We recognize that the school fixed effects approach does not provide the same potential for causal inference as the randomized experiment (Schlotter, Schwerdt, & Woessman, 2001; Margetts, 2011). However, while the school fixed effects approach does not account for all of the potential biases, it provides a strong control for confounding the school principal and place factors (not least between-school sorting) and therefore offers relatively robust M–EGC estimates.

The OLS estimates (eq. 2) and fixed effects estimates complement each other. The fixed effects strategy is superior to basic OLS procedures for estimating average M–EGC-outcome relationships, but the strong points of the fixed effects also bounds its utility for testing M–EGC-outcome relationships by teacher gender: The separate M–EGC-outcome associations for male and female teachers cannot be estimated within a single fixed effects specifications, because the school principal’s gender is constant within schools. For each dependent variable, we therefore (a) estimate the M–EGC coefficient for male-led and female-led schools in separate school fixed models. We (b) then calculate and compare the predicted values by M–EGC—holding all other variables at their mean—across these male-led and female-led school fixed effects models. We (c) then compare both the split-sample fixed effects findings and the predicted values by M–EGC with the OLS results on M–EGC effects by teacher gender (i.e., the results of eq. 2 estimation). Similar findings across the fixed effects and the OLS procedures minimize the likelihood of biased M–EGC estimates, thereby substantially strengthening the internal validity of our findings.
Non-Random Sorting
Carrington and Troske (1998) suggest that both men and women may be likely to hire same-gender employees. Such non-random sorting of teachers into schools could confound our findings. Using the administrative school data, we examine whether teacher allocation into schools is marked by gender sorting; that is, if the occurrence of M–EGC is related to the gender of the school principal. In particular, we test if the proportion of female teachers at the schools is different under male versus female supervision. If (fe)male teachers are inclined to hire (fe)male teachers, we expect a higher proportion of (fe)male teachers in (fe)male-led schools. However, the difference in the proportion of female teachers by principal gender is small (.007) and not significant at p < .1. Thus, we find no support for the non-random sorting of teachers into schools. Similarly, we test for differences in the number of enrolled students and number of teachers across male-led and female-led schools. The tests reveal no statistical differences, suggesting that principal gender is not associated with school characteristics relating to school or staff size.

FINDINGS
Teacher Gender and Average Differences in Outcome
Table 2 shows the results of a basic OLS regression. The ‘A’ columns show the associations of school principal and teacher gender to each dependent variable. The ‘B’ columns add the M–EGC variable to each specification (as explained by eq. 1) and thus show the average relationship between M–EGC and separate aspects of bureaucratic accountability. All estimations are performed at the teacher level and include the full set of teacher and school controls. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.

[Insert Table 2 about here]
The results indicate that male and female teachers are different with respect to goal alignment and organizational compliance: Female teachers are, on average, more aligned with the school’s goals (column 1B) and more compliant with the organizational rules and regulations (column 2B). This result is in line with the Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly (1992) findings: In the area of schooling where males are a minority gender group, male teachers appear less goal aligned and compliant with organizational rules and regulations than female teachers. Moreover, we see that M–EGC is not a significant predictor; that is, M–EGC is not associated with average differences in bureaucratic accountability.

Gender Congruence by Gender

To test if M–EGC is related to differences in bureaucratic accountability between males and females, we estimate eq. 2 for each dependent variable. Table 3 shows the marginal effects of M–EGC for male and female teachers, respectively.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

The results support that M–EGC is associated with differences in goal alignment and organizational compliance: Male teachers with male principals are less aligned with the school’s goals and less compliant with its organizational rules and instructions than male teachers with female principals.

School Fixed Effects

While the OLS specifications include teacher and school controls, the estimates may be confounded by an unobserved school principal and school characteristics. As previously explained, we therefore analyze the relationship between M–EGC and bureaucratic accountability using school fixed effects. Table 4 reports the results. The ‘A’ columns show the association between teacher gender and each dependent variable, while the ‘B’ columns
add the M–EGC variable. For each dependent variable, the ‘C’ and ‘D’ columns show the results of estimating the fixed effects specification by principal gender; that is, separately for schools under male and female management. Standard errors are clustered at the school level and all estimates include the full set of teacher controls. School control variables are not included, because all of the school factors that are common to all of the teachers within a school are constant and thus eliminated.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

The ‘A’ and ‘B’ columns reveal estimates that qualitatively match those produced by an OLS estimate of eq. 1 (Table 2): Female teachers are more aligned with the school’s goals (column 1A) and more compliant with organizational rules and regulations (column 2A) than comparable male teachers. Similarly, M–EGC does not appear associated with the average differences in bureaucratic accountability (B columns).

Moreover, the ‘C’ and ‘D’ columns display results in line with those of the marginal effects procedures following the OLS estimation of eq. 2 (Table 3). Figure 1 illustrates this consistency in findings. For each accountability indicator, we calculate the predicted value by M–EGC, holding all other variables at their mean. We do this for the fixed effects specifications comprising male principals only (thus predicting the respective values for female and male teachers under male supervision) and for those comprising female principals only (thus predicting the respective values for female and male teachers under female supervision). We then plot the predicted values for each manager–teacher gender dyad into a single plot. Subsequently, we calculate the predicted values by M–EGC using the coefficients of the OLS interaction analyses (eq. 2), again for each accountability indicator and keeping all other variables at their mean. The results of these analyses are plotted into separate plots. Figure 1 shows the results of these predictions. The right-side plots (“FE”) show the predicted mean values from the fixed effects predictions, whereas the left-side plots (“OLS”)
depict the predicted mean values using the coefficients from the OLS estimations of eq. 2. The dotted lines denote the female teachers, the full lines the male teachers. The line endpoints show the predicted mean value for teachers facing M–EGC (1) or not (0). The gradients of the “OLS” plot lines match the marginal effects estimates by teacher gender in Table 3. The plot line equivalence across the “OLS” and “FE” predictions thus corroborates the robustness of the marginal effects estimates (i.e., the M–EGC estimates by teacher gender produced by estimating eq. 2).

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

For each bureaucratic accountability measure, we see qualitatively matching line trends across the “OLS” and “FE” predictions for male and female teachers. The results of the OLS marginal effects and the school fixed effects estimations thus converge, in turn corroborating the estimated M–EGC associations for male employees on goal alignment and organizational compliance behavior.

In particular, the findings show that male teachers with male principals, as opposed to comparable males with female principals, are less aligned with the school’s goals and less compliant with organizational instructions and inputs. In terms of standard deviations, the estimated male teacher marginal effects coefficients (Table 4) suggest that male teacher M–EGC yields a decrease in goal alignment of around 15 percent of a standard deviation and a decrease in organizational compliance of around 25 percent of a standard deviation.

The results thus lend support to Hypothesis 1B (as opposed to 1A). M–EGC appears unrelated to significant average differences in the bureaucratic accountability of public employees. Importantly, however, M–EGC seems negatively associated with bureaucratic accountability for male employees. Male teachers appear less goal-aligned and comply less with the organizational rules and regulations when subject to male supervision relative to female supervision. This finding is in line with Hypothesis H2 (in public service settings...
where males constitute the minority gender group, M–EGC may be negatively related to bureaucratic accountability for male employees).

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

The consequences of M–EGC in public organizations are understudied. Public administration research on M–EGC associations comprises only a limited selection of public employee outcomes, including job satisfaction and turnover (Grissom, Nicholson-Grotty, and Keiser 2012). Salient yet unresolved questions thus relate to M–EGC consequences in relation to other outcomes. For example, what is the role of M–EGC to key aspects of bureaucratic accountability among public service employees?

This article advances an answer to this question. While we recognize the limitations for causal inference imposed by our non-experimental research design, the findings suggest that the consequences of M–EGC to bureaucratic accountability may depend on the gender composition of the organization. The results are in line with similarity/attraction theory (Berscheid & Walster, 1969; Byrne, 1971) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the notion that M–EGC may in some cases be associated with dysfunctional employee outcomes. Similar to Tsui, Egan, and O’Reilly (1992), we examine an area where males constitute the minority gender group and finds that the male employees—whether subject to female or male management—exhibit less bureaucratic accountability than their female counterparts. In such a context, similarity/attraction theory (Berscheid & Walster, 1969; Byrne, 1971) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) support and explain that M–EGC is negatively associated with bureaucratic accountability for male employees.

This article thus expands our understanding of the role of gender in management in three ways. First, it fills a gap in the gender literature on the relationship between gender, bureaucratic accountability, and management.
Second, this article develops and provides some evidence regarding the notion that the employee gender composition of the organization may moderate the role of M–EGC in relation to employee outcomes. In settings where males constitute the minority gender group, M–EGC may be negatively associated with at least some aspects of employee outcome for male employees. As previously mentioned, there are few extant studies on the consequences of M–EGC and they differ on whether or not relationships are detected (Grissom, Nicholson-Grotty, & Keiser, 2012; Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998). While our findings do not address the notion that “deep-level” (attitudinal) dissimilarities may become relatively more important than “surface-level” diversity (demographics) over time, they do contest that dissimilarities in a “surface-level” dimension, such as gender, does not have substantial, long-lasting effects (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Milliken & Martins, 1996). In this perspective, future research should examine if the conflicting results in the literature could be a product of sample heterogeneity in organizational gender composition (i.e., the effects of M-EGC may depend on whether the organization is marked by a predominance of female employees).

Third, this article contributes to public administration research and theory. A major question in this field relates to inter-organizational variance in employee motives, attitudes, and behaviors. Why are some employees more motivated and act in greater alignment with the organizational goals, rules, and regulations? To what extent are such differences attributable to selection-attraction as opposed to organizational socialization? Focusing on M–EGC, this article takes a step toward understanding the determinants of the bureaucratic accountability of public service employees. Our findings suggest that employee variation in bureaucratic accountability is associated with gender differences and M–EGC.

Moreover, our research provides practical implications for public organizations and their managers. The findings identify a human resource challenge for public managers to consider and resolve. For example, male-led public organizations may benefit from exerting
extra effort in terms of promoting their male employees to act in line with the organizational goals, rules, and procedures.

Furthermore, our findings invoke general “how” questions. For example, inasmuch as our findings reflect a causal relationship, understanding how managers may counterbalance the detrimental effects of male M–EGC on employee goal alignment and organizational compliance is pertinent. Other questions relate to the scope of M–EGC implications: How extensive is the range of employee outcomes associated with M–EGC? Our results suggest that male M–EGC is associated with bureaucratic accountability in the form of organizational goal alignment and compliance with organizational rules and regulations, and other studies suggest that M–EGC relates to job satisfaction and turnover (Grissom, Nicholson-Grotty, & Keiser, 2012). Still, unanswered questions remain concerning the role of M–EGC to other outcomes.

In addition, studies have yet to examine the role of M–EGC using data on other public service employees than teachers. The psychological mechanisms underlying the consequences of M–EGC are likely universal to human behavior in the workplace. Our findings may thus be generalizable to public employees in other sectors with comparable organizational set-ups and missions relating to public service provision. However, we recognize that the external validity of our M–EGC knowledge remains unsettled. In particular, contextual factors, such as differences in the extent of administrative work discretion (Meier & Bohte, 2001; Sowa & Selden, 2003), may condition the extent to which the observed associations between M–EGC and bureaucratic accountability can be extrapolated.

Similarly, our school fixed effects identification strategy provides a strong control for confounding school principal and place factors, but it does not safeguard against all potential biases; for example, within-school variance in the characteristics of the individual classes that
the teachers teach or reverse causation bias. The article’s findings should be interpreted with this caveat in mind—and we encourage future research that examines the effects of M–EGC via research designs ensuring the random or “as good as” random assignment of M–EGC.

The findings of this article thus birth new hypotheses and emphasize existing ones. Based on our results, M–EGC relates to differences in goal alignment and organizational compliance behavior for male employees. These findings and the new questions they invoke call for more research into M–EGC consequences and the underlying mechanisms.

NOTES

1. We use the sex of the principals and teachers as gender indicators. Some gender scholars emphasize that sex refers to biological differences whereas gender relates to social differences (Duerst-Lahti & Kelly, 1995). We recognize that any estimated M–EGC effects may be products of “gender” rather than “sex.” Similar to Grissom, Nicholson-Grotty, and Keiser (2012), we thus acknowledge that our gender indicators may be systematically related to behavioral variables, such as gender-specific leadership styles.

2. The sample does not include boarding schools or continuation schools. Danish independent schools are subject to national school legislation with educational standards equaling those of public schooling (Ernst, Forsberg, & Dalsgaard, 2011). They receive high levels of public funding and tuition fees are very low. Public funding is enrollment-based, roughly 75 percent per student (Andersen, 2008). The difference between independent and public schools is thus limited, at least compared with the US and UK.

REFERENCES


TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics, Dependent Variables and Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Goal Alignment (scale)</strong></td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>.725</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item (a)</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>.923</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item (b)</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>.811</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item (c)</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>.781</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compliance with Organizational Rules and Regulations (scale)</strong></td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.704</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Item (a)</td>
<td>3.57</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Item (b)</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Item (c)</td>
<td>2.77</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Teacher Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.492</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: Less than 30</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 30-39</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.462</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 40-49</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.432</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age: 50-59</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.439</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age: 60 or more</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.346</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher and both parents born in Denmark</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long-cycle higher education (5-6 years or more)</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Regular teacher education</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.309</td>
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<td>Pedagogical diploma degree</td>
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<td>Tenure, years</td>
<td>12.09</td>
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<td>Teacher experience, years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wage extras, function-related</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.487</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage extras, qualification-related</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School Characteristics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School principal, gender (female)</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.475</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>School type, public</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.429</td>
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<td>Students, number of (in 10s)</td>
<td>44.80</td>
<td>18.357</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers at school, number of</td>
<td>37.81</td>
<td>14.899</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers gender composition (fraction female teachers)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Based on the full sample of 1,121 teachers in 407 schools. All school characteristic statistics computed at the school level.
### TABLE 2. OLS Regressions. Teacher Gender, Principal Gender, and Gender Congruence Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Organizational Goal Alignment</th>
<th>Compliance with Organizational Rules and Regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1A)</td>
<td>(1B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher, female</td>
<td>.200*** (.048)</td>
<td>.185*** (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal, female</td>
<td>.065 (.050)</td>
<td>.076 (.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender congruence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher controls</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School controls</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: */**/*** denotes significance at the .1/.05/.01 level. S.E. clustered at the school level in parentheses. For brevity, we do not report the coefficients for the control variables. The full models are available from the authors.

### TABLE 3. Marginal Effects of Gender Congruence, by Teacher Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male teachers only (1)</th>
<th>Female teachers only (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dy/dx</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational goal alignment</td>
<td>-1.29*</td>
<td>.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance with organizational rules and regulations</td>
<td>-1.91***</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: */**/*** denotes significance at the .1/.05/.01 level. S.E. clustered at the school level.

### TABLE 4. School Fixed Effects. Congruence Coefficients, All Schools and by Principal Gender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Organizational Goal Alignment</th>
<th>Compliance with Organizational Rules and Regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All schools</td>
<td>Male principals (1C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher, female</td>
<td>.199*** (.058)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender congruence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.225*** (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher controls</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²-within</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: */**/*** denotes significance at the .1/.05/.01 level. S.E. clustered at the school level in parentheses.
Figure 1. Gender Congruence by Teacher Gender, OLS and School Fixed Effects

Organizational Goal Alignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>FE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Graph" /></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Compliance with Organizational Rules and Regulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>FE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Graph" /></td>
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