Department of Economics and Business Economics

Wait, What? The Consequences of Not Disclosing Feedback-Stimulating Information

Research output: Working paper/Preprint Working paperResearch

  • Matthias Lassak
  • Tanja Keeve, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Germany
Recent evidence suggests that managers use voluntary CAPEX guidance to stimulate market feedback by incentivizing informed trading in their stock prices. We show a related decrease in nondisclosing firms' informed trading measures. The reduction in informed trading is pronounced in unexpected nondisclosure, consistent with the interpretation that traders perceive nondisclosure as indicating low gains from informed trading. Less informed trading is associated with a reduction in investment-q sensitivity and future performance for nondisclosing firms. Overall, we document a novel link between managers' strategic disclosure decisions, the feedback channel, and real effects.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 17 Feb 2022

    Research areas

  • Voluntary Disclosure, Feedback Disclosure, Unexpected Nondisclosure, Informed Trading, Real Effects

See relations at Aarhus University Citationformats

ID: 269564895