True overconfidence: The inability of rational information processing to account for apparent overconfidence

Christoph Merkle*, Martin Weber

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

72 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The better-than-average effect describes the tendency of people to perceive their skills and virtues as being above average. We derive a new experimental paradigm to distinguish between two possible explanations for the effect, namely rational information processing and overconfidence. Experiment participants evaluate their relative position within the population by stating their complete belief distribution. This approach sidesteps recent methodology concerns associated with previous research. We find that people hold beliefs about their abilities in different domains and tasks which are inconsistent with rational information processing. Both on an aggregated and an individual level, they show considerable overplacement. We conclude that overconfidence is not only apparent overconfidence but rather the consequence of a psychological bias.

Original languageEnglish
JournalOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Volume116
Issue2
Pages (from-to)262-271
Number of pages10
ISSN0749-5978
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2011
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Bayesian updating
  • Belief distribution
  • Better-than-average effect
  • Overconfidence
  • Overplacement

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