Department of Economics and Business Economics

To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria

Research output: Working paperResearch

Documents

  • Wp11 11

    Submitted manuscript, 490 KB, PDF document

  • Norovsambuu Tumennasan
We study the classical implementation problem when players are prone to make mis
takes. To capture the idea of mistakes, Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium (LQRE)
is used, and we consider a case in which players are almost rational, i.e., the sophistication level of players, , approaches innity. We show that quasimonotonicity, a small variation of Maskin Monotonicity, and no worst alternative conditions are necessary for restricted Limiting LQRE (LLQRE) implementation. Moreover, these conditions are sucient for both restricted and unrestricted LLQRE implementations if there are at least three players and each player's worst alternative set is constant over all states.
Original languageEnglish
Place of publicationAarhus
PublisherInstitut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet
Number of pages32
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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