Department of Political Science

The Yes Minister Effect: Delegated leadership and international bureaucrats in international institutional bargaining

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearch

  • Derek Beach
  • Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, Statskundskab KU, Denmark
  • Department of Political Science
Our argument in this paper is that even in what can be termed a ‘least likely’ case of states negotiating between themselves on creating new or reforming existing rules of cooperation for an institution, states are often dependent upon international bureaucrats to help them translate their relatively vague common interests into actual contractual agreements. We develop a theory of delegated leadership that explains why and when we should expect international bureaucrats to matter in institutional bargaining between states, and apply the theory in two case studies: the negotiation of the 1996-97 IGC and the institutional provisions of the Uruguay Round. It is argued that when governments are dependent upon international bureaucrats, this gives the bureaucrats opportunities to skew the final deals closer towards their own pro-integrative and bureaucratic-legalistic preferences.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternational Studies Association 2006 Annual Convention
Number of pages40
PublisherDepartment of Political Science, University of Aarhus and University of Copenhagen
Publication year2006
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Event47th Annual International Studies Association Convention - San Diego, United States
Duration: 22 Mar 200625 Mar 2006

Conference

Conference47th Annual International Studies Association Convention
LandUnited States
BySan Diego
Periode22/03/200625/03/2006

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