Department of Economics and Business Economics

The Transition of Corruption: Institutions and dynamics

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

The Transition of Corruption : Institutions and dynamics. / Paldam, Martin.

Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2019.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Paldam, M 2019 'The Transition of Corruption: Institutions and dynamics' Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

APA

Paldam, M. (2019). The Transition of Corruption: Institutions and dynamics. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. Economics Working Papers, No. 2019-06

CBE

Paldam M. 2019. The Transition of Corruption: Institutions and dynamics. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet.

MLA

Paldam, Martin The Transition of Corruption: Institutions and dynamics. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. (Economics Working Papers; Journal number 2019-06). 2019., 26 p.

Vancouver

Paldam M. The Transition of Corruption: Institutions and dynamics. Aarhus: Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet. 2019 May 15.

Author

Paldam, Martin. / The Transition of Corruption : Institutions and dynamics. Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2019. (Economics Working Papers; No. 2019-06).

Bibtex

@techreport{61b4ec3569ed4fd18dfb9aa510dc7fcf,
title = "The Transition of Corruption: Institutions and dynamics",
abstract = "The cross-country data for honesty/corruption and income has a correlation of about 0.75, and the data have a typical transition path; but the correlation of the growth rate and honesty is negative. Thus, the short and long-run findings are contradictory, and it is shown that the contradiction lasts a dozen years. The transition of corruption happens relatively late and works through changes in institutions. To catch all institutions the Polity-index is used for the political dimension and the Fraser-index of economic freedom for the economic one. The two indices explain as much as income, but they both have a transition, so the relations are partly spurious. To identify the non-spurious part of the relation and sort out causality, the D-index is defined as the difference between the corruption index and the transition path. Institutional instability increases corruption, but when institutions stabilize, both democracy and economic freedom increase honesty.",
keywords = "Corruption, cross-country, income vs institutions",
author = "Martin Paldam",
year = "2019",
month = "5",
day = "15",
language = "English",
publisher = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut for {\O}konomi, Aarhus Universitet",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - The Transition of Corruption

T2 - Institutions and dynamics

AU - Paldam, Martin

PY - 2019/5/15

Y1 - 2019/5/15

N2 - The cross-country data for honesty/corruption and income has a correlation of about 0.75, and the data have a typical transition path; but the correlation of the growth rate and honesty is negative. Thus, the short and long-run findings are contradictory, and it is shown that the contradiction lasts a dozen years. The transition of corruption happens relatively late and works through changes in institutions. To catch all institutions the Polity-index is used for the political dimension and the Fraser-index of economic freedom for the economic one. The two indices explain as much as income, but they both have a transition, so the relations are partly spurious. To identify the non-spurious part of the relation and sort out causality, the D-index is defined as the difference between the corruption index and the transition path. Institutional instability increases corruption, but when institutions stabilize, both democracy and economic freedom increase honesty.

AB - The cross-country data for honesty/corruption and income has a correlation of about 0.75, and the data have a typical transition path; but the correlation of the growth rate and honesty is negative. Thus, the short and long-run findings are contradictory, and it is shown that the contradiction lasts a dozen years. The transition of corruption happens relatively late and works through changes in institutions. To catch all institutions the Polity-index is used for the political dimension and the Fraser-index of economic freedom for the economic one. The two indices explain as much as income, but they both have a transition, so the relations are partly spurious. To identify the non-spurious part of the relation and sort out causality, the D-index is defined as the difference between the corruption index and the transition path. Institutional instability increases corruption, but when institutions stabilize, both democracy and economic freedom increase honesty.

KW - Corruption, cross-country, income vs institutions

M3 - Working paper

BT - The Transition of Corruption

PB - Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet

CY - Aarhus

ER -