The role of costs, benefits, and moral judgments in private-to-private corruption

TY - JOUR

T1 - The role of costs, benefits, and moral judgments in private-to-private corruption

AU - Jaakson, Krista

AU - Johannsen, Lars

AU - Pedersen, Karin H

AU - Vadi, Maaja

AU - Ashyrov, Gaygysyz

AU - Reino, Anne

AU - Sööt, Mari-Liis

PY - 2019/2

Y1 - 2019/2

N2 - Private-to-private corruption has no direct victim and is therefore difficult to combat. Yet it undermines market competition, impedes growth, and sets development at risk. Therefore, knowledge about the reasons for committing crimes is necessary for changing corrupt practices within private sector. This article explores business managers’ perceptions of the extent of bribing within their lines of business and possible explanations for these perceptions. We analyze a survey of 1000 managers of private companies in Denmark and Estonia using structural equation models. Comparing two behavioral causes for bribes, a rational choice theory and a cognitivist theory of action, which adds moral judgment to instrumental rationality, we find that managers find corruption less common when they see it as a breach of their own moral judgment. Costs of bribing do not matter and benefits from bribing play a marginal role in the perceived extent of bribing. Context is also important: managers in Denmark and outside capital cities in both countries deem bribing less common and this is not because they are personally less tolerant of bribing. The implication of this study is that fostering condemnatory attitudes toward private-to-private corruption should be a standard act in combating this form of corporate crime.

AB - Private-to-private corruption has no direct victim and is therefore difficult to combat. Yet it undermines market competition, impedes growth, and sets development at risk. Therefore, knowledge about the reasons for committing crimes is necessary for changing corrupt practices within private sector. This article explores business managers’ perceptions of the extent of bribing within their lines of business and possible explanations for these perceptions. We analyze a survey of 1000 managers of private companies in Denmark and Estonia using structural equation models. Comparing two behavioral causes for bribes, a rational choice theory and a cognitivist theory of action, which adds moral judgment to instrumental rationality, we find that managers find corruption less common when they see it as a breach of their own moral judgment. Costs of bribing do not matter and benefits from bribing play a marginal role in the perceived extent of bribing. Context is also important: managers in Denmark and outside capital cities in both countries deem bribing less common and this is not because they are personally less tolerant of bribing. The implication of this study is that fostering condemnatory attitudes toward private-to-private corruption should be a standard act in combating this form of corporate crime.

KW - BRIBERY

KW - BUSINESS

KW - CULTURAL-VALUES

KW - DEPLETION

KW - FIRM

KW - ISOMORPHISM

KW - MANAGERS

KW - MARKET COMPETITION

KW - ORGANIZATIONS

KW - RATIONAL-CHOICE

U2 - 10.1007/s10611-018-9790-y

DO - 10.1007/s10611-018-9790-y

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0925-4994

VL - 71

SP - 83

EP - 106

JO - Crime, Law and Social Change

JF - Crime, Law and Social Change

IS - 1

ER -