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The Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare

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  • Simina Branzei
  • Yiling Chen, Harvard University, United States
  • Xiaotie Deng, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Denmark
  • Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Denmark
  • Jie Zhang, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
The Fisher market model is one of the most fundamental resource allocation models in economics. In a Fisher market, the prices and allocations of goods are determined according to the preferences and budgets of buyers to clear the market. In a Fisher market game, however, buyers are strategic and report their preferences over goods; the market-clearing prices and allocations are then determined based on their reported preferences rather than their real preferences. We show that the Fisher market game always has a pure Nash equilibrium, for buyers with linear, Leontief, and Cobb-Douglas utility functions, which are three representative classes of utility functions in the important Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) family. Furthermore, to quantify the social efficiency, we prove Price of Anarchy bounds for the game when the utility functions of buyers fall into these three classes respectively
Translated title of the contributionThe Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare: The Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Number of pages7
PublisherAAAI Press
Publication year2014
ISBN (print)978-1-57735-661-5, 978-1-57735-677-6, 978-1-57735-678-3, 978-1-57735-679-0, 978-1-57735-680-6
Publication statusPublished - 2014
EventTwenty-Eighth Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Québec City, Canada
Duration: 27 Jul 201431 Jul 2014
Conference number: 28


ConferenceTwenty-Eighth Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ByQuébec City

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