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Final published version
We present a simple framework for dual-class stock shares in which common shareholders receive public and private cash flows (i.e., dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred shareholders only receive public cash flows. We isolate these two cash flows in order to identify the role of voting rights on equity-holders' wealth. In particular, using a structural cointegrated VAR model, we find a negative relationship between the value of the voting right and the preferred shareholders' wealth.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | International Review of Finance |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1106-1111 |
| ISSN | 1369-412X |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sep 2021 |
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Authors. International Review of Finance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of International Review of Finance Ltd (2020)
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
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