The effect of voting rights on firm value

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  • irfi.12318

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We present a simple framework for dual-class stock shares in which common shareholders receive public and private cash flows (i.e., dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred shareholders only receive public cash flows. We isolate these two cash flows in order to identify the role of voting rights on equity-holders' wealth. In particular, using a structural cointegrated VAR model, we find a negative relationship between the value of the voting right and the preferred shareholders' wealth.

Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Review of Finance
Pages (from-to)1106-1111
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Authors. International Review of Finance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of International Review of Finance Ltd (2020)

Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

    Research areas

  • dual-class shares, private benefits, voting right

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