The effect of voting rights on firm value

Cristina Mabel Scherrer*, Marcelo Fernandes

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

28 Downloads (Pure)


We present a simple framework for dual-class stock shares in which common shareholders receive public and private cash flows (i.e., dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred shareholders only receive public cash flows. We isolate these two cash flows in order to identify the role of voting rights on equity-holders' wealth. In particular, using a structural cointegrated VAR model, we find a negative relationship between the value of the voting right and the preferred shareholders' wealth.

Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational Review of Finance
Pages (from-to)1106-1111
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2021


  • dual-class shares
  • private benefits
  • voting right


Dive into the research topics of 'The effect of voting rights on firm value'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this