Department of Political Science

The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearch

Standard

The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums. / Beach, Derek.

2009. Paper presented at European Union Studies Association Biennual Conference, Los Angeles, United States.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearch

Harvard

Beach, D 2009, 'The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums', Paper presented at European Union Studies Association Biennual Conference, Los Angeles, United States, 23/04/2009 - 25/04/2009.

APA

Beach, D. (2009). The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums. Paper presented at European Union Studies Association Biennual Conference, Los Angeles, United States.

CBE

Beach D. 2009. The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums. Paper presented at European Union Studies Association Biennual Conference, Los Angeles, United States.

MLA

Beach, Derek The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums. European Union Studies Association Biennual Conference, 23 Apr 2009, Los Angeles, United States, Paper, 2009. 30 p.

Vancouver

Beach D. The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums. 2009. Paper presented at European Union Studies Association Biennual Conference, Los Angeles, United States.

Author

Beach, Derek. / The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums. Paper presented at European Union Studies Association Biennual Conference, Los Angeles, United States.30 p.

Bibtex

@conference{efcb84f0994111dea092000ea68e967b,
title = "The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums",
abstract = "What determines voter choice in EU referendums? Do voters treat referendums as {\textquoteleft}second order elections{\textquoteright} due to the complexity of the question posed to them; turning them in effect to a referendum on whether the voter trusts the government to represent his/her best interests, where the standard of evaluation is voter satisfaction with the economic and political performance of the incumbent government (Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; Franklin 2002). Or do voters undertake a utility calculation of the costs and benefits of the issue before them (whether the country should ratify an EU treaty) (Svensson 1994, 2002)? The argument in this paper is that issue-voting is increasingly becoming the prevalent dynamic in EU referendums as voters become increasingly knowledgeable about EU affairs and believe that referendums are important questions worthy of the investment of significant time and effort in understanding the issues. However, in contrast to existing issue-voting arguments, I argue that the calculation of the utility of voting yes/no by voters has two distinct dimensions. Existing models are based upon the idea that voters undertake a utility calculation of the benefits of ratifying an EU treaty (or removing an opt-out), but this does not capture the separate reasoning of voters regarding what happens in the event that the country votes no. ",
author = "Derek Beach",
year = "2009",
language = "English",
note = "null ; Conference date: 23-04-2009 Through 25-04-2009",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - The costs of no – a two-dimensional issue-voting model of voter behavior in EU referendums

AU - Beach, Derek

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - What determines voter choice in EU referendums? Do voters treat referendums as ‘second order elections’ due to the complexity of the question posed to them; turning them in effect to a referendum on whether the voter trusts the government to represent his/her best interests, where the standard of evaluation is voter satisfaction with the economic and political performance of the incumbent government (Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; Franklin 2002). Or do voters undertake a utility calculation of the costs and benefits of the issue before them (whether the country should ratify an EU treaty) (Svensson 1994, 2002)? The argument in this paper is that issue-voting is increasingly becoming the prevalent dynamic in EU referendums as voters become increasingly knowledgeable about EU affairs and believe that referendums are important questions worthy of the investment of significant time and effort in understanding the issues. However, in contrast to existing issue-voting arguments, I argue that the calculation of the utility of voting yes/no by voters has two distinct dimensions. Existing models are based upon the idea that voters undertake a utility calculation of the benefits of ratifying an EU treaty (or removing an opt-out), but this does not capture the separate reasoning of voters regarding what happens in the event that the country votes no.

AB - What determines voter choice in EU referendums? Do voters treat referendums as ‘second order elections’ due to the complexity of the question posed to them; turning them in effect to a referendum on whether the voter trusts the government to represent his/her best interests, where the standard of evaluation is voter satisfaction with the economic and political performance of the incumbent government (Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; Franklin 2002). Or do voters undertake a utility calculation of the costs and benefits of the issue before them (whether the country should ratify an EU treaty) (Svensson 1994, 2002)? The argument in this paper is that issue-voting is increasingly becoming the prevalent dynamic in EU referendums as voters become increasingly knowledgeable about EU affairs and believe that referendums are important questions worthy of the investment of significant time and effort in understanding the issues. However, in contrast to existing issue-voting arguments, I argue that the calculation of the utility of voting yes/no by voters has two distinct dimensions. Existing models are based upon the idea that voters undertake a utility calculation of the benefits of ratifying an EU treaty (or removing an opt-out), but this does not capture the separate reasoning of voters regarding what happens in the event that the country votes no.

M3 - Paper

Y2 - 23 April 2009 through 25 April 2009

ER -