Department of Economics and Business Economics

The coordinating power of social norms

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The coordinating power of social norms. / Fallucchi, Francesco; Nosenzo, Daniele.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 25, No. 1, 02.2022.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Fallucchi, F & Nosenzo, D 2022, 'The coordinating power of social norms', Experimental Economics, vol. 25, no. 1. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09717-8

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Fallucchi, Francesco ; Nosenzo, Daniele. / The coordinating power of social norms. In: Experimental Economics. 2022 ; Vol. 25, No. 1.

Bibtex

@article{d314494d51754bdebc4646d5b5c01f5f,
title = "The coordinating power of social norms",
abstract = "A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber in J Eur Econ Assoc 11(3):495–524, 2013). The Krupka–Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka–Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points in two series of experiments with more than 3000 subjects. We find that the method is robust, especially when there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior.",
keywords = "C72, C91, Coordination, Dictator game, Focal point, Krupka–Weber method, Saliency, Social norms",
author = "Francesco Fallucchi and Daniele Nosenzo",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021, Economic Science Association.",
year = "2022",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1007/s10683-021-09717-8",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
journal = "Experimental Economics",
issn = "1386-4157",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The coordinating power of social norms

AU - Fallucchi, Francesco

AU - Nosenzo, Daniele

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021, Economic Science Association.

PY - 2022/2

Y1 - 2022/2

N2 - A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber in J Eur Econ Assoc 11(3):495–524, 2013). The Krupka–Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka–Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points in two series of experiments with more than 3000 subjects. We find that the method is robust, especially when there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior.

AB - A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber in J Eur Econ Assoc 11(3):495–524, 2013). The Krupka–Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka–Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points in two series of experiments with more than 3000 subjects. We find that the method is robust, especially when there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior.

KW - C72

KW - C91

KW - Coordination

KW - Dictator game

KW - Focal point

KW - Krupka–Weber method

KW - Saliency

KW - Social norms

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85105883839&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-021-09717-8

DO - 10.1007/s10683-021-09717-8

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85105883839

VL - 25

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

SN - 1386-4157

IS - 1

ER -