Department of Economics and Business Economics

The Coordinating Power of Social Norms

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  • Francesco Fallucchi, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)
  • ,
  • Daniele Nosenzo
A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber, 2013). The Krupka-Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka-Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points. We find that the method is robust as long as there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior. In settings where there is a less clear consensus about the social norm, the method is more vulnerable.
Original languageEnglish
Place of publicationAarhus
PublisherInstitut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet
Number of pages33
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2020
SeriesEconomics Working Papers
Number2020-06

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