Department of Economics and Business Economics

The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions. / Bjørnskov, Christian; Voigt, Stefan.

In: International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2018, p. 101-127.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Bjørnskov, C & Voigt, S 2018, 'The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions', International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 101-127. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy012

APA

Bjørnskov, C., & Voigt, S. (2018). The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 16(1), 101-127. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy012

CBE

Bjørnskov C, Voigt S. 2018. The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions. International Journal of Constitutional Law. 16(1):101-127. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy012

MLA

Bjørnskov, Christian and Stefan Voigt. "The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions". International Journal of Constitutional Law. 2018, 16(1). 101-127. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy012

Vancouver

Bjørnskov C, Voigt S. The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions. International Journal of Constitutional Law. 2018;16(1):101-127. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moy012

Author

Bjørnskov, Christian ; Voigt, Stefan. / The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions. In: International Journal of Constitutional Law. 2018 ; Vol. 16, No. 1. pp. 101-127.

Bibtex

@article{ebbfa49916bf40c4958b7d5089810f0c,
title = "The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions",
abstract = "Nine of ten countries currently have emergency provisions written into their constitutions, here simply referred to as emergency constitutions. The nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. We therefore aim at providing answers to two questions: (i) how much additional discretionary power do emergency constitutions allow and which political actors are given the additional power; and (ii) is there a limited number of {"}typical{"} emergency constitutions that combine various aspects in similar or even identical fashion? To answer the first question we construct an Indicator of Emergency Powers (INEP) which takes six central elements of emergency provisions explicitly into account. To answer the second question, we draw on cluster analysis and identify six well-defined clusters. Both the INEP as well as the six clusters allow us to answer important follow-up questions such as what the factors are that determine a country's choice of emergency constitution but also under what conditions governments are likely to declare a state of emergency given the prevalent emergency constitution.",
author = "Christian Bj{\o}rnskov and Stefan Voigt",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1093/icon/moy012",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "101--127",
journal = "International Journal of Constitutional Law",
issn = "1474-2640",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions

AU - Bjørnskov, Christian

AU - Voigt, Stefan

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Nine of ten countries currently have emergency provisions written into their constitutions, here simply referred to as emergency constitutions. The nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. We therefore aim at providing answers to two questions: (i) how much additional discretionary power do emergency constitutions allow and which political actors are given the additional power; and (ii) is there a limited number of "typical" emergency constitutions that combine various aspects in similar or even identical fashion? To answer the first question we construct an Indicator of Emergency Powers (INEP) which takes six central elements of emergency provisions explicitly into account. To answer the second question, we draw on cluster analysis and identify six well-defined clusters. Both the INEP as well as the six clusters allow us to answer important follow-up questions such as what the factors are that determine a country's choice of emergency constitution but also under what conditions governments are likely to declare a state of emergency given the prevalent emergency constitution.

AB - Nine of ten countries currently have emergency provisions written into their constitutions, here simply referred to as emergency constitutions. The nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. We therefore aim at providing answers to two questions: (i) how much additional discretionary power do emergency constitutions allow and which political actors are given the additional power; and (ii) is there a limited number of "typical" emergency constitutions that combine various aspects in similar or even identical fashion? To answer the first question we construct an Indicator of Emergency Powers (INEP) which takes six central elements of emergency provisions explicitly into account. To answer the second question, we draw on cluster analysis and identify six well-defined clusters. Both the INEP as well as the six clusters allow us to answer important follow-up questions such as what the factors are that determine a country's choice of emergency constitution but also under what conditions governments are likely to declare a state of emergency given the prevalent emergency constitution.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85048627274&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/icon/moy012

DO - 10.1093/icon/moy012

M3 - Journal article

VL - 16

SP - 101

EP - 127

JO - International Journal of Constitutional Law

JF - International Journal of Constitutional Law

SN - 1474-2640

IS - 1

ER -