Surveillance without ‘Baddies’: Liability and Consent in Non-Antagonistic Surveillance Ethics

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kira Vrist Rønn

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic raises new questions regarding the moral permissibility of surveillance-in this context there is no human aggressor and, thus, the antagonistic relationship between the surveillant and the surveilled, which is commonly assumed to obtain in much of the literature on surveillance ethics, does not exist. This raises the question of the extent to which existing frameworks for ethical surveillance apply to the surveillance activities aiming at controlling virus transmission. In this chapter, we will address the question of whether and in what form liability should play a role in surveillance ethics in the context of pandemics. Can persons who are not responsible for catching Covid-19 and do not intend to harm or wrong others by transmitting the virus, be liable to being surveilled on account of their posing a threat of virus transmission to others? If so, are they innocent or culpable threats?.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Ethics of Surveillance in Times of Emergency
EditorsKevin Macnish, Adam Henschke
Number of pages16
Place of publicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Publication date2023
Pages95-110
Chapter6
ISBN (Print)9780192864918
ISBN (Electronic)9780191955372
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023
SeriesEngaging philosophy

Keywords

  • aggressors
  • culpability
  • ethics of war
  • informed consent
  • innocent threats
  • liability
  • surveillance ethics
  • voluntariness

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