Strategic Storage Operation in Energy and Reserve Markets: An AC-based Bilevel Approach

Peiyao Guo*, Zhao Yuan, Thomas Hamacher, Vedran S. Perić

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This paper proposes an AC-based bilevel Stackelberg game model to study the strategic storage operation in energy and reserve markets. In the upper-level problem, the price-maker storage bids and offers strategically to maximize its profit. The lower-level problem is the market-clearing problem based on alternating current optimal power flow (ACOPF) model. To obtain the global solution of the proposed model, we first linearize the ACOPF model and reformulate the bilevel model into a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). A six-bus illustrative example is used to compare and discuss strategic and centralized non-strategic storage operation behaviors and their impacts on the market-clearing outcomes.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2023 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM 2023)
PublisherIEEE
Publication date2023
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-6654-6441-3, 978-1-6654-6442-0
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023
Externally publishedYes
Event2023 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2023 - Orlando, United States
Duration: 16 Jul 202320 Jul 2023

Conference

Conference2023 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityOrlando
Period16/07/202320/07/2023
SeriesIEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
Volume2023-July
ISSN1944-9925

Keywords

  • ACOPF
  • energy storage
  • price maker
  • reserve market

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