TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems

AU - Kennes, John

AU - Monte, Daniel

AU - Tumennasan, Norovsambuu

PY - 2019/5

Y1 - 2019/5

N2 - In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools' priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce.

AB - In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools' priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069982177&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1257/MIC.20170077

DO - 10.1257/MIC.20170077

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85069982177

VL - 11

SP - 55

EP - 97

JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

SN - 1945-7669

IS - 2

ER -