Department of Economics and Business Economics

Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems. / Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu.

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 11, No. 2, 05.2019, p. 55-97.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Kennes, J, Monte, D & Tumennasan, N 2019, 'Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems', American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 55-97. https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20170077

APA

Kennes, J., Monte, D., & Tumennasan, N. (2019). Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(2), 55-97. https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20170077

CBE

Kennes J, Monte D, Tumennasan N. 2019. Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 11(2):55-97. https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20170077

MLA

Kennes, John, Daniel Monte and Norovsambuu Tumennasan. "Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2019, 11(2). 55-97. https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20170077

Vancouver

Kennes J, Monte D, Tumennasan N. Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2019 May;11(2):55-97. https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20170077

Author

Kennes, John ; Monte, Daniel ; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu. / Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2019 ; Vol. 11, No. 2. pp. 55-97.

Bibtex

@article{02af9039468d4f6c999258234c097119,
title = "Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems",
abstract = "In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools' priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce.",
author = "John Kennes and Daniel Monte and Norovsambuu Tumennasan",
year = "2019",
month = may,
doi = "10.1257/MIC.20170077",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "55--97",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics",
issn = "1945-7669",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems

AU - Kennes, John

AU - Monte, Daniel

AU - Tumennasan, Norovsambuu

PY - 2019/5

Y1 - 2019/5

N2 - In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools' priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce.

AB - In dynamic matching problems, priorities often depend on previous allocations and create opportunities for manipulations that are absent in static problems. In the dynamic school choice problem, students can manipulate the period-by-period deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism. With a commonly used restriction on the schools' priorities, manipulation vanishes as the number of agents increases, but without it the mechanism can be manipulated, even in large economies. We also check manipulation in large finite economies through a novel computer algorithm, which can check every possible manipulation by examining all the different matchings that a single player can induce.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069982177&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1257/MIC.20170077

DO - 10.1257/MIC.20170077

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85069982177

VL - 11

SP - 55

EP - 97

JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

SN - 1945-7669

IS - 2

ER -