Department of Economics and Business Economics

Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment

Research output: Working paperResearch


  • wp14_20

    Submitted manuscript, 690 KB, PDF document

  • Jos Jansen
  • Andreas Pollak, University of Cologne, Germany
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where firms may fail to receive information, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor's product-market strategy. Subsequently, we analyze the firms' behavior in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects often use selective disclosure strategies, and this finding appears to be robust to changes in the information structure, the mode of competition, and the degree of product-market conduct that is largely consistent with theoretical predictions.
Original languageEnglish
Place of publicationAarhus
PublisherInstitut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet
Number of pages59
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2014
SeriesEconomics Working Papers

    Research areas

  • Duopoly, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, Information disclosure, Incomplete information, Common value, Product differentiation, Asymmetry, Skewed distribution, Laboratory experiment

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