Abstract
One may wonder why countries have used different public policies to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic. We argue that social trust could be the missing link in explaining why these public policies vary in stringency. Based on the logic of game theory, we draw the hypothesis that more social trust in a society means that less stringent policies are needed to abate the COVID-19 pandemic. Empirical results at both country and individual levels confirm this hypothesis. The implications for public policy stemming from these findings suggest the necessity of addressing initiatives like Team Europe’s 2020 package launched by the European External Action Service (EEAS) to combat Covid-19 in non-EU nations. The more social trust in a society, the higher the likelihood of informal cooperation. Thus, less stringent policies are needed to abate the COVID-19 pandemic. In perspective, policymakers are likely to encounter fewer compliance issues and more cooperative behavior in countries with high levels of trust when confronting future crises.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | European Politics and Society |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages (from-to) | 866-885 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| ISSN | 2374-5118 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Keywords
- Trust
- Collective action
- COVID-19
- Public policies
- Sanctions