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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments. / Eriksson, Tor Viking; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire.

In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2009, p. 530-548.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Eriksson, TV, Teyssier, S & Villeval, M-C 2009, 'Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments', Economic Inquiry, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 530-548.

APA

Eriksson, T. V., Teyssier, S., & Villeval, M-C. (2009). Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments. Economic Inquiry, 47(3), 530-548.

CBE

Eriksson TV, Teyssier S, Villeval M-C. 2009. Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments. Economic Inquiry. 47(3):530-548.

MLA

Eriksson, Tor Viking, Sabrina Teyssier and Marie-Claire Villeval. "Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments". Economic Inquiry. 2009, 47(3). 530-548.

Vancouver

Eriksson TV, Teyssier S, Villeval M-C. Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments. Economic Inquiry. 2009;47(3):530-548.

Author

Eriksson, Tor Viking ; Teyssier, Sabrina ; Villeval, Marie-Claire. / Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments. In: Economic Inquiry. 2009 ; Vol. 47, No. 3. pp. 530-548.

Bibtex

@article{c8080b9075e311de9bdc000ea68e967b,
title = "Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments",
abstract = "The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This article reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of performance in tournaments. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament instead of a piece-rate payment scheme, the average effort is higher and the between-subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed. Mainly based on risk aversion, sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants.",
author = "Eriksson, {Tor Viking} and Sabrina Teyssier and Marie-Claire Villeval",
year = "2009",
language = "English",
volume = "47",
pages = "530--548",
journal = "Economic Inquiry",
issn = "0095-2583",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

AU - Eriksson, Tor Viking

AU - Teyssier, Sabrina

AU - Villeval, Marie-Claire

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This article reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of performance in tournaments. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament instead of a piece-rate payment scheme, the average effort is higher and the between-subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed. Mainly based on risk aversion, sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants.

AB - The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This article reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of performance in tournaments. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament instead of a piece-rate payment scheme, the average effort is higher and the between-subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed. Mainly based on risk aversion, sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 47

SP - 530

EP - 548

JO - Economic Inquiry

JF - Economic Inquiry

SN - 0095-2583

IS - 3

ER -