Department of Economics and Business Economics

Rents in a welfare state

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This chapter describes rents in Denmark, a developed welfare state in which the private sector is sharply delimitated and kept efficient by secure property rights and markets including free trade. In the public sector, rents in the form of excess costs that provide benefits are difficult to measure, but in a number of cases as described in this chapter, the rents are revealed. The implicit welfare coalition, defined as voters receiving their income from the public budget, is the majority, placing the median voter within the welfare coalition. Rents are created and protected by the welfare coalition. Non-governmental organizations have been coopted to serve large welfare expenditure programs that benefit the welfare coalition.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCompanion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking
EditorsRoger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman
Number of pages22
Place of publicationCheltenham, UK. and Northampton, MA, US
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing
Publication year2015
Pages328-49
Chapter19
ISBN (print)978 1 78254 493 7
ISBN (Electronic)978 1 78254 494 4
Publication statusPublished - 2015

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