Abstract
This chapter describes rents in Denmark, a developed welfare state in which the private sector is sharply delimitated and kept efficient by secure property rights and markets including free trade. In the public sector, rents in the form of excess costs that provide benefits are difficult to measure, but in a number of cases as described in this chapter, the rents are revealed. The implicit welfare coalition, defined as voters receiving their income from the public budget, is the majority, placing the median voter within the welfare coalition. Rents are created and protected by the welfare coalition. Non-governmental organizations have been coopted to serve large welfare expenditure programs that benefit the welfare coalition.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking |
| Editors | Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Place of publication | Cheltenham, UK. and Northampton, MA, US |
| Publisher | Edward Elgar Publishing |
| Publication date | 2015 |
| Pages | 328-49 |
| Chapter | 19 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978 1 78254 493 7 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978 1 78254 494 4 |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |