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Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

Standard

Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification. / Bay, Johan; Askarov, Aslan.

2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE, 2020. p. 95-106 (Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Vol. 2020-June).

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Bay, J & Askarov, A 2020, Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification. in 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE, Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, vol. 2020-June, pp. 95-106, 33rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2020, Virtual, Online, United States, 22/06/2020. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00015

APA

Bay, J., & Askarov, A. (2020). Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification. In 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) (pp. 95-106). IEEE. Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium Vol. 2020-June https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00015

CBE

Bay J, Askarov A. 2020. Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification. In 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE. pp. 95-106. (Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Vol. 2020-June). https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00015

MLA

Bay, Johan and Aslan Askarov "Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification". 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE. (Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Vol. 2020-June). 2020, 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00015

Vancouver

Bay J, Askarov A. Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification. In 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE. 2020. p. 95-106. (Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Vol. 2020-June). https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00015

Author

Bay, Johan ; Askarov, Aslan. / Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification. 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE, 2020. pp. 95-106 (Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Vol. 2020-June).

Bibtex

@inproceedings{9904cfad0ef64e06b3be9c41bc50b727,
title = "Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification",
abstract = "Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On the other hand, when the code is trusted to not aggressively exploit termination channels, practical concerns, such as permissiveness of the enforcement, make a case for settling for weaker, progress-insensitive security. This binary situation, however, provides no suitable middle point for systems that mix trusted and untrusted code. This paper connects the two extremes by reframing progress-insensitivity as a particular form of declassification. Our novel semantic condition reconciles progress-insensitive security as a declassification bound on the so-called progress knowledge in an otherwise progress or timing sensitive setting. We show how the new condition can be soundly enforced using a mostly standard information-flow monitor. We believe that the connection established in this work will enable other applications of ideas from the literature on declassification to progress-insensitivity. ",
author = "Johan Bay and Aslan Askarov",
year = "2020",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00015",
language = "English",
series = "Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium",
publisher = "IEEE",
pages = "95--106",
booktitle = "2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)",
note = "33rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2020 ; Conference date: 22-06-2020 Through 25-06-2020",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Reconciling progress-insensitive noninterference and declassification

AU - Bay, Johan

AU - Askarov, Aslan

PY - 2020/6

Y1 - 2020/6

N2 - Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On the other hand, when the code is trusted to not aggressively exploit termination channels, practical concerns, such as permissiveness of the enforcement, make a case for settling for weaker, progress-insensitive security. This binary situation, however, provides no suitable middle point for systems that mix trusted and untrusted code. This paper connects the two extremes by reframing progress-insensitivity as a particular form of declassification. Our novel semantic condition reconciles progress-insensitive security as a declassification bound on the so-called progress knowledge in an otherwise progress or timing sensitive setting. We show how the new condition can be soundly enforced using a mostly standard information-flow monitor. We believe that the connection established in this work will enable other applications of ideas from the literature on declassification to progress-insensitivity.

AB - Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On the other hand, when the code is trusted to not aggressively exploit termination channels, practical concerns, such as permissiveness of the enforcement, make a case for settling for weaker, progress-insensitive security. This binary situation, however, provides no suitable middle point for systems that mix trusted and untrusted code. This paper connects the two extremes by reframing progress-insensitivity as a particular form of declassification. Our novel semantic condition reconciles progress-insensitive security as a declassification bound on the so-called progress knowledge in an otherwise progress or timing sensitive setting. We show how the new condition can be soundly enforced using a mostly standard information-flow monitor. We believe that the connection established in this work will enable other applications of ideas from the literature on declassification to progress-insensitivity.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85090467529&partnerID=8YFLogxK

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DO - 10.1109/CSF49147.2020.00015

M3 - Article in proceedings

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EP - 106

BT - 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)

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Y2 - 22 June 2020 through 25 June 2020

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