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Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model

Research output: Working paperResearch


  • 01-3 ap

    Final published version, 160 KB, PDF document

  • Anders Poulsen, Denmark
We analyze preference evolution in a simple bargaining situation. Preferences for reciprocity, who sustain a conflict-free outcome, may be viable if players have enough information about the opponent's preferences. However, depending on the initial starting point preference evolution can in general both enhance and reduce welfare, relative to the situation where all players have materialistic perferences.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2001

    Research areas

  • Game theory, bargaining, negotiation, evolution, evolutionary stability, efficiency, reciprocity, materialism, altruism

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ID: 32302866