(Public) Verifiability for Composable Protocols Without Adaptivity or Zero-Knowledge

Carsten Baum, Bernardo David*, Rafael Dowsley

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to book/anthology/report/proceedingArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The Universal Composability (UC) framework (FOCS ’01) is the current standard for proving security of cryptographic protocols under composition. It allows to reason about complex protocol structures in a bottom-up fashion: any building block that is UC-secure can be composed arbitrarily with any other UC-secure construction while retaining their security guarantees. Unfortunately, some protocol properties such as the verifiability of outputs require excessively strong tools to achieve in UC. In particular, “obviously secure” constructions cannot directly be shown to be UC-secure, and verifiability of building blocks does not easily carry over to verifiability of the composed construction. In this work, we study Non-Interactive (Public) Verifiability of UC protocols, i.e. under which conditions a verifier can ascertain that a party obtained a specific output from the protocol. The verifier may have been part of the protocol execution or not, as in the case of public verifiability. We consider a setting used in a number of applications where it is ok to reveal the input of the party whose output gets verified and analyze under which conditions such verifiability can generically be achieved using “cheap” cryptographic primitives. That is, we avoid having to rely on adaptively secure primitives or heavy computational tools such as NIZKs. As Non-Interactive Public Verifiability is crucial when composing protocols with a public ledger, our approach can be beneficial when designing these with provably composable security and efficiency in mind.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProvable and Practical Security - 16th International Conference, ProvSec 2022, Proceedings
EditorsChunpeng Ge, Fuchun Guo
Number of pages24
PublisherSpringer
Publication date2022
Pages249-272
ISBN (Print)9783031209161
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-031-20917-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022
Event16th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security, ProvSec 2022 - Nanjing, China
Duration: 11 Nov 202212 Nov 2022

Conference

Conference16th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security, ProvSec 2022
Country/TerritoryChina
CityNanjing
Period11/11/202212/11/2022
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Number13600
ISSN0302-9743

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