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Privacy-Enhancing Auctions Using Rational Cryptography

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  • Department of Computer Science
We consider enhancing with privacy concerns a large class of auctions, which include sealed-bid single-item auctions but also general multi-item multi-winner auctions, our assumption being that bidders primarily care about monetary payoff and secondarily worry about exposing information about their type to other players and learning information about other players’ types, that is, bidders are greedy then paranoid. To treat privacy explicitly within the game theoretic context, we put forward a novel hybrid utility model that considers both monetary and privacy components in players’ payoffs. We show how to use rational cryptography to approximately implement any given ex interim individually strictly rational equilibrium of such an auction without a trusted mediator through a cryptographic protocol that uses only point-to-point authenticated channels between the players. By “ex interim individually strictly rational” we mean that, given its type and before making its move, each player has a strictly positive expected utility. By “approximately implement” we mean that, under cryptographic assumptions, running the protocol is a computational Nash equilibrium with a payoff profile negligibly close to the original equilibrium.Supported by the Center for Algorithmic Game Theory, funded by The Carlsberg Foundation.
Original languageEnglish
Book seriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Pages (from-to)541-558
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 2009
EventInternational Cryptology Conference- CRYPTO 2009 - Santa Barbara, United States
Duration: 16 Aug 200920 Aug 2009
Conference number: 29


ConferenceInternational Cryptology Conference- CRYPTO 2009
CountryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara

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