Praising Without Standing

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Philosophers analyzing standing to blame have argued (a) that in view of a blamer’s own fault she can lack standing to blame another for an act even if the act is blameworthy and (b) that standingless, hypocritical blame is pro tanto morally wrongful. The bearing of these conclusions on standing to praise is yet to receive the attention it deserves. I defend two claims. The first is the conditional claim that if (a) and (b) are true, so are (a*) and (b*). The latter are: (a*) a praiser can lack the standing to praise herself for an act even if that act is praiseworthy and (b*) standingless, hypocritical praise is pro tanto morally wrongful. So I am suggesting that facts about standing to blame reflect more general facts about standing to hold responsible. The second is the claim that (a*) and (b*) are true.

Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Ethics
Pages (from-to)229-246
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2022


  • Blame
  • Ethics of blame
  • Holding responsible
  • Hypocrisy
  • Praise
  • Standing
  • Tu quoque


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