Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis

Nicola Maaser; Fabian Paetzel; Stefan Traub

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010

Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis

Nicola Maaser^*, Fabian Paetzel, Stefan Traub

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics and Business Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning.

Original language	English
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	117
Pages (from-to)	433-450
Number of pages	18
ISSN	0899-8256
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010
Publication status	Published - Sept 2019

Keywords

Alternating offers
Coalition formation
Experiments
Legislative bargaining
Weighted voting

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title = "Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis",

abstract = "One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning.",

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AU - Paetzel, Fabian

AU - Traub, Stefan

PY - 2019/9

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N2 - One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning.

AB - One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning.

KW - Alternating offers

KW - Coalition formation

KW - Experiments

KW - Legislative bargaining

KW - Weighted voting

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DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85070494987

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 117

SP - 433

EP - 450

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis

Abstract

Keywords

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