Department of Economics and Business Economics

Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Power illusion in coalitional bargaining : An experimental analysis. / Maaser, Nicola; Paetzel, Fabian; Traub, Stefan.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 117, 09.2019, p. 433-450.

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaperJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Maaser, N, Paetzel, F & Traub, S 2019, 'Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 117, pp. 433-450. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010

APA

Maaser, N., Paetzel, F., & Traub, S. (2019). Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 117, 433-450. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010

CBE

MLA

Maaser, Nicola, Fabian Paetzel and Stefan Traub. "Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis". Games and Economic Behavior. 2019, 117. 433-450. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010

Vancouver

Author

Maaser, Nicola ; Paetzel, Fabian ; Traub, Stefan. / Power illusion in coalitional bargaining : An experimental analysis. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2019 ; Vol. 117. pp. 433-450.

Bibtex

@article{5d6706890cd14d91aa614c42dc2a7744,
title = "Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis",
abstract = "One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning.",
keywords = "Alternating offers, Coalition formation, Experiments, Legislative bargaining, Weighted voting",
author = "Nicola Maaser and Fabian Paetzel and Stefan Traub",
year = "2019",
month = "9",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010",
language = "English",
volume = "117",
pages = "433--450",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Power illusion in coalitional bargaining

T2 - An experimental analysis

AU - Maaser, Nicola

AU - Paetzel, Fabian

AU - Traub, Stefan

PY - 2019/9

Y1 - 2019/9

N2 - One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning.

AB - One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote distributions and instead only depend on pivotality. We conduct an experimental test of the classical Baron-Ferejohn model with five-player groups. Holding real power constant, we compare treatments with differences in nominal power. We find that initial effects of nominal differences become small or disappear with experience. Our results also point to the complexity of the environment as having a negative impact on the speed at which this transition takes place. Finally, and of particular importance as a methodological observation, giving subjects a pause accelerates learning.

KW - Alternating offers

KW - Coalition formation

KW - Experiments

KW - Legislative bargaining

KW - Weighted voting

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85070494987&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.010

M3 - Journal article

VL - 117

SP - 433

EP - 450

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -