Political Solutions to Discriminatory Behavior

Thorbjorn Sejr Guul

doi:10.1017/S0003055422000648

Political Solutions to Discriminatory Behavior

Thorbjorn Sejr Guul^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Political Science

Research output: Contribution to journal/Conference contribution in journal/Contribution to newspaper › Journal article › Research › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Discriminatory treatment of minorities by public authorities remains a serious challenge and breaks with the central principles of impartiality. However, little research examines how discrimination can be reduced through political means. This article argues that discrimination occurs when the perceived marginal cost of serving a minority citizen exceeds the funding per user and/or when excess of demand forces the provider to prioritize which citizens to serve. This also suggests that increasing the funding per user and increasing supply to meet demand might reduce differential treatment. These predictions are tested in a high school enrollment system where the funding is linked to the number of students enrolled. Unique, fine-grained administrative data show that minority applicants are 9 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in their preferred high school. More importantly, an administrative reform shows how increasing the supply-side flexibility and pay per user cuts the difference in half.

Original language	English
Journal	American Political Science Review
Volume	117
Issue	2
Pages (from-to)	719-733
Number of pages	15
ISSN	0003-0554
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000648
Publication status	Published - May 2023

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title = "Political Solutions to Discriminatory Behavior",

abstract = "Discriminatory treatment of minorities by public authorities remains a serious challenge and breaks with the central principles of impartiality. However, little research examines how discrimination can be reduced through political means. This article argues that discrimination occurs when the perceived marginal cost of serving a minority citizen exceeds the funding per user and/or when excess of demand forces the provider to prioritize which citizens to serve. This also suggests that increasing the funding per user and increasing supply to meet demand might reduce differential treatment. These predictions are tested in a high school enrollment system where the funding is linked to the number of students enrolled. Unique, fine-grained administrative data show that minority applicants are 9 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in their preferred high school. More importantly, an administrative reform shows how increasing the supply-side flexibility and pay per user cuts the difference in half.",

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N2 - Discriminatory treatment of minorities by public authorities remains a serious challenge and breaks with the central principles of impartiality. However, little research examines how discrimination can be reduced through political means. This article argues that discrimination occurs when the perceived marginal cost of serving a minority citizen exceeds the funding per user and/or when excess of demand forces the provider to prioritize which citizens to serve. This also suggests that increasing the funding per user and increasing supply to meet demand might reduce differential treatment. These predictions are tested in a high school enrollment system where the funding is linked to the number of students enrolled. Unique, fine-grained administrative data show that minority applicants are 9 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in their preferred high school. More importantly, an administrative reform shows how increasing the supply-side flexibility and pay per user cuts the difference in half.

AB - Discriminatory treatment of minorities by public authorities remains a serious challenge and breaks with the central principles of impartiality. However, little research examines how discrimination can be reduced through political means. This article argues that discrimination occurs when the perceived marginal cost of serving a minority citizen exceeds the funding per user and/or when excess of demand forces the provider to prioritize which citizens to serve. This also suggests that increasing the funding per user and increasing supply to meet demand might reduce differential treatment. These predictions are tested in a high school enrollment system where the funding is linked to the number of students enrolled. Unique, fine-grained administrative data show that minority applicants are 9 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in their preferred high school. More importantly, an administrative reform shows how increasing the supply-side flexibility and pay per user cuts the difference in half.

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Political Solutions to Discriminatory Behavior

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